

Introduction

This volume arose from the 2019 Crete/Patras Ancient Emotions III Conference on Memory and Emotions in Antiquity, which took place at the University of Crete. The event and the present volume, including thoroughly revised versions of the papers read at Crete, are meant as a contribution to the burgeoning field of memory-studies in the ancient world,¹ by proposing that emotion is an integral part in the way in which we recall, reconstruct or represent experiences of the past: sometimes, emotions make those experiences live up to memory more vividly; in other cases, they obfuscate them and give them different shapes and shades of meaning in the present.

The topic in which this volume finds its focus is vast. All we can do in the limited space of this Introduction is to outline possible perspectives from which one may look into the interfaces between memory and emotions. Although no two scholars would agree on the definition of the category emotion, it is possible to argue that cognitive approaches, construed here as approaches emphasizing the appraisals that give rise to individual emotions, have served as the basis for modern classicists' treatment of the history of emotions in antiquity.² Indeed, systematic definitions of emotions in ancient philosophy emphasize the cognitions that cause individual emotions. This implies that emotions have a narrative background and, hence, that our emotional behaviour is shaped by our memories.³ My anger for John requires my cognitive ability to recall the words or actions that caused my anger against him. And the memory of his offensive behaviour will predictably intensify my anger for him. At the same time, the fact that John's offensive behaviour is an emotionally charged event will also entail that the memory of it will probably be more long-lasting in comparison with emotionally neutral events. And, correlatively, the emotional nature of the event will affect the nature of my memory, as it will predictably focus on "central" rather than peripheral aspects of the event.⁴

Another point in which memory and emotions intersect is related to the fact that they both play an important role in the norms that characterize human

¹ A prominent pioneer in the field is Karl Galinsky. His excellent introduction to memory in Rome in his 2018 edited volume explains why memory has recently attracted scholarly attention.

² See for example Kaster 2005 and Konstan 2006. On important methodological issues related to the study of ancient emotions, see Cairns 2008. On this topic, see also Connell's contribution to the present volume.

³ On the narrative aspects of emotions, see Goldie 2012.

⁴ For an introduction to emotions' implications for memory, see Kensinger-Schacter 2016.

societies. In ancient Greece for example the notion of *charis* designates an emotion, what we would label as “gratitude” (in English) or ευγνωμοσύνη (in modern Greek). But *charis* was also a pivotal notion in ancient ethics involving as it did the obligation to reciprocate beneficial actions.⁵ One’s failure to respond with *charis* to beneficial actions was sometimes perceived as an unacceptable and condemnable act of voluntary oblivion. This is for example clear in the way that Tecmessa responds to Ajax’s understanding of honour (*time*) in Sophocles’ homonymous play. Tecmessa, Ajax’s enslaved concubine, deals with Ajax’s resolution to protect his honour by killing himself by emphasizing a man’s obligations to his *oikos* and, hence, to those who depend on him and the impact of these obligations upon his honour. One of the things that Ajax must take into account, Tecmessa insists, is that a noble man must never be oblivious of the erotic favours that he enjoyed, succinctly, sex (S. Aj. 520–522). The interconnections between emotions and normatively regulated memories are also reflected in the language of amnesty, typically involving the use of the emotion word *mnesikakein*. As Chaniotis points out (2018: 59), “[A]ware of the precarious state of amnesty agreements because of the strong feeling of anger and hatred, the Greeks imposed a hierarchy of norms: concord and the survival of a community should be valued more than revenge”.⁶

Memories and emotions also play an important role in the ways in which ancient communities defined their identities and enhanced the bonds between their members. Jan Assman’s pioneering work on memory and especially his definition of “cultural memory” (as opposed to “communicative memory”) can fruitfully be applied to the history of classical antiquity, insofar as both the Greeks and the Romans left behind them abundant evidence about the ways in which they dealt with cultural memory through cults, rituals, written texts and images, and generally their institutional communication.⁷ The implications of emotions for cultural memory can be gleaned from their deployment in types of institutional communication, such as funeral orations in classical Athens or forensic speakers’ treatment of the glorious past of the city.

Far from aspiring to offer an exhaustive discussion of the subject, the present volume consists of chapters that look at the delicate dialectics between memory and emotion selectively, in a range of different authors, genres and periods, drawn from both the Greek and Roman traditions, starting with Homer and reaching up to Herodes Atticus, Philostratus and Augustine. This diversity

⁵ On the meanings of *charis*, see Fisher 2013: 39.

⁶ See also Chaniotis 2013.

⁷ See Galinsky’s discussion (2018: 12–14).

hopes to bring out common themes but also differences in the ways that the mutual implication of memory and emotion was understood in the Graeco-Roman world.

In the volume's first chapter, entitled **"Emotions, Memory, and the Wrath of Achilles: Observations from Cognitive Psychology"**, Elizabeth Minchin explores the distorting effects that strong emotions sometimes have on the way we shape our memories and, consequently, on how we perceive and understand present reality. Drawing on the work of psychologists such as Linda Levine and Robin Edelstein, Minchin argues that whereas emotional memories tend to be accurate, they also turn out to be highly selective. This is to say that emotions, especially those of a distressing nature, enhance the longevity of one's memory of an event, but they often do so at the expense of peripheral details. This is what cognitive psychology calls "memory narrowing".

According to Minchin, Achilles' wrath is a case in point. What Achilles takes away from his heated encounter with Agamemnon in *Iliad* 1 is a vivid memory of what has occurred between him and the king of the Achaeans; this memory fuels his continuing resentment, as he sits on the sidelines and observes his comrades falling in battle; and it leads to his resistance to the embassy from Agamemnon. But what the external audience takes away from those early scenes is confusion: how could the individual who has been introduced as the hero of this tale abandon his comrades — and the Achaean enterprise itself — so readily? Minchin suggests that something has gone awry at this point — something that the poet shows us but does not interpret, leaving it to the audience to try and make sense of it. And so she proceeds to argue that the emotional impact of the quarrel "has clouded Achilles' ability to think beyond what is critical to himself", which is the same thing as saying that Achilles' capacity to think beyond his own emotional response has been damaged. Seen this way, Achilles' extreme behaviour is not inconsistent with his exceptional origins. On the contrary: his blown-out-of-proportion anger is that of a hero with divine parentage, but, crucially, it is also psychologically true in human terms. As Minchin writes: "We audience members should not be confused or disconcerted by the hero's disregard for his Achaean companions ... even though it is clear that, just a short time earlier, he had held those same Achaeans very dear". The answer to this puzzle lies in the intricate dialectics between memory and emotion. "When individuals' high-order goals are threatened", she continues, "they will experience intense emotional responses related to those goals; and their attention will be tightly focused on their preservation. Emotion will then enhance the subjects' memory for what is central and put out of their mind what is

not”. In a number of significant ways, Achilles reacts and behaves as any one of us would do under similar circumstances.

Jonathan Ready, in a chapter entitled **“The Tension between Memory and Emotion in Homer’s Audience”** zooms out of the text and considers how memory and emotion interact with (and often antagonize) each other at the level of audience response. The starting point for his discussion is a paradox: the audience of an epic narrative (or any other narrative with which we are familiar, for that matter) knows its outcome; and yet, in the course of it we find ourselves, every so often, worrying for things that we know will not come true in the end or, the other way around: we hope and get excited about narrative twists and fictional possibilities that — as, again, we know well — will never happen. “For example”, Ready writes, “we know that Odysseus will make it back home ... Teiresias told Odysseus that he would make it back to Ithaca one way or another (*Od.* 11.100–137). Yet when Poseidon conjures a storm that destroys Odysseus’s raft, Odysseus expresses dismay at what he takes to be his imminent death far from home (5.299–312). In light of our attachment to Odysseus, Odysseus’s despair rubs off on us, and we begin to worry about what will happen to him”.

According to Ready, what we witness in this case is an emerging *tension* between memory and emotion. On the one hand, memory helps us store in our minds the data and details of a traditional epic narrative; on the other hand, the very moment someone (a rhapsode) hits the replay button, our emotional engagement with the narrative’s fictional characters is ignited, and starts over again — so much so that, in the process of identifying with those characters and while we (re)adopt their perspective, we tend to forget, as it were, the story’s final outcome, and to share in the character’s feelings, their hopes, fears and anxieties, as the plot is progressing. For this process of identification, Ready turns to modern theoretical approaches. Although emotional empathy has not gone unnoticed by ancient writers such as Plato and Aristotle, Ready argues that the systematic empirical research that is being currently carried out in media studies, communications and psychology has helped to develop “more rigorous and fine-grained models of identification”. In this context, the author offers a close reading of Agamemnon’s display of martial excellence in *Iliad* 11, illustrating the different levels of — cognitive, motivational and, significantly, emotional — identification we may experience with the king of the Achaeans at various turns and points of the narrative. This case study helps to consolidate how richly engaging the Homeric narrative can be; and how the more we engage with it emotionally, the more susceptible we become to abandon our remembrance of its overarching plot, and to zoom in specific episodes and scenes

(this could be described as our own “narrowing of memory” *qua* readers, to recall Elizabeth Minchin’s use of the term). In Ready’s concluding words: “One of the reasons we worry about the fate of characters even when we have it stored away in our memory that they are going to be fine is because we have experienced emotional identification with them or are experiencing emotional identification with them at that very minute ... The Homeric poet may alert us as to what is to come; we may already know what is to come from prior exposure to the tale. Yet our memory for what is to come fades on account of our affective ties to — more precisely, our emotional identification with — the characters”.

In the third and final chapter of the first section, entitled **“The Emotional Memories of Internal Narrators: Homer, Virgil, Ovid”**, Philip Hardie looks at first-person narrators in Homer’s *Odyssey*, Virgil’s *Aeneid* and Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*. A comparison between Homer and Virgil yields some rather interesting results. As Hardie points out: “first-person narrators in the *Aeneid* are ... more emotional ... than those in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*”; what is more, they tend to “highlight the fact that what they narrate is drawn from their own memories, in a way that develops, but goes beyond, Homeric practice”. Whereas the *Odyssey* is intensely focused on how the past is remembered in the present, it is argued that Homer is sparing in his use of the vocabulary of memory when his characters remember their pasts. It bears emphasizing, for example, that memory-related terms are not highlighted as such when Odysseus weeps at the songs of Demodocus on the Trojan war in Book 8 or when he undertakes himself to narrate his past troubles and sufferings in his introduction, in Book 9, to his *apologoi*. Consider, by contrast, the famous *Infandum, regina, iubes renouare dolorem* in *Aeneid* 2.3. According to Hardie, “emotion and memory, the emotions of memory, receive an emphasis [at this point] never found in Homer”. The line recalls, of course, Odysseus’ response to Arete’s request for his story, at *Od.* 7.241: ἄργαλέον, βασιλεια, διηνεκέως ἀγορεύσαι. Still, in the case of the *Odyssey*, ἄργαλέον brings out not the remembered, and renewed, pain of Odysseus’ sufferings in the past but rather the difficulty, vexatiousness, of narrating the totality of his numerous griefs. In the *Aeneid*, on the other hand, emphasis is placed, among others, also on the *reliving of experience* through narration. The reasons that this mutual implication between memory and emotion becomes more pronounced in Virgil can be many. As Hardie proposes: “It serves the more general heightening of pathos in Virgilian epic, fueled in part by the subjective emotionality of post-Homeric tragedy and rhetoric, and by the symbiosis of emotion and *enargeia*. The increase in the affective quality of memory may also be related to the role of memory in the plot and psychological motivation of the *Aeneid*, painful memories that make it hard for Aeneas and the Trojans to move on to

the future, and which threaten a repetition that results in regression". When it comes to Ovid, we find several narrators experiencing the same difficulty at stirring old memories as that felt by Aeneas at the beginning of *Aeneid* 2. Added to that, as Hardie illustrates, is the exploitation, on Ovid's part, of an emotional memory's potency in collapsing the distance between time past and time present, and the poet's use of the trope of recalled/renewed emotions as sites of intense intertextual engagement with the literary past.

Next comes a section on religion and inscriptions. In a chapter entitled **"Religious Emotions and Mnemonic Discourses: The Gold Tablets of Memory"**, Mark McClay delves into the multiple meanings assigned to memory in the Orphic-Bacchic gold leaves found in the graves of Dionysiac mystery initiates beginning in the late Classical period. According to McClay, these leaves reflect two distinct mnemonic discourses, each one corresponding to doctrinal and imagistic cognitive religious modes respectively: "on the one hand, the tablets rely on traditional epic diction to describe the transmission of mystic wisdom to the initiate — an ideal of memory that is aligned, at least in theory, with the doctrinal religious mode. This seems to be the default for the language of memory in the gold leaves". On the other hand, "the tablets show influence of imagistic conceptions of memory. The Classical period", as McClay discusses in detail in connection to Gorgias, Plato and Aristotle, "produced new descriptions of memory in pathogenic terms: memory and initiation were both theorized as an imprint (τύπος) or affection (πάθος) left in the soul by intense emotion or sensory experience. Traces of such ideas can be found in the gold leaves alongside more traditional poetic memory language".

The doctrinal mode proposes that frequent repetition of low-intensity religious practices helps to build up a semantic memory for beliefs and an implicit or habitual memory for ritual. The imagistic mode, by contrast, capitalizes on infrequent but emotionally intense practices which are meant to produce episodic or "flashbulb" memories of great explicitness and particularity. By looking closely at the language of μνημοσύνη in the gold tablets, McClay finds traces of both modes: doctrinal religiosity, on the one hand, is maintained by a traditional epic discourse of memory, which makes its presence felt as a means of assuring the retention of wise instruction. The occurrence of πάθος-related terms in some of the tablets, on the other hand, is read by McClay as pointing to a new pathogenic theorization of memory in terms of the affective imprint it leaves on the souls of the initiates.

In the chapter that follows, entitled **"Remembering Emotions"**, Angelos Chaniotis focuses on the rich evidence afforded by inscriptions which commemorate emotions, private and collective, as parts of larger, structured narra-

tives. The reproduction of an emotional episode that occurred in the past is seen by the author to have served specific purposes: it might have been meant to enhance or arouse emotion; to shape attitudes and belief; or to persuade. In Chaniotis' words, "painful memories of lost loves", found in gravestones, "increased the sorrows of a lonely heart". The memory of fear (for instance, the one documented in a honorary decree set up, in 307/6 BCE, for the orator Lycurgus) contributed to the appreciation of an individual's courage; "the memory of joy could both offer consolation and increase grief, depending on the context. The commemoration of the anger of gods" (explored in connection to the stories of divine punishment in the so-called "confession inscriptions" found in sanctuaries of Lydia and Phrygia) "contributed to faith".

Chaniotis raises a crucial methodological point here. "In Classics and Ancient History", he writes, "we do not study what people experienced or remembered but only what they communicate in writing about their memories and experiences. Their recollections may be subjective, selective, fragmented, or simply false; we lack the tools of a modern psychologist or neuro-scientist to approach individual memories — and we should not have any illusions about the limitations of our sources". That said, we seem to be stepping on far safer ground when we focus on how emotions were *commemorated*. "Reminiscences of emotions, both individual and collective, were" without a doubt "used in strategies of communication, persuasion, and emotional arousal in religion, political life, and private interpersonal interactions". In sum, the study of emotions in the past becomes tricky when we try to reconstruct how people *really* felt under, say, circumstances of joy, sadness, fear and anger. What we can do instead is explore how (remembered) emotions found their way in filtered narratives displayed on stone, and ponder on the range of functions they were meant to serve.

The next chapter, entitled "**Exploitation of (Alleged) Memories in Demosthenes and Aeschines**", deals with Greek orators, exploring the mutual implication of memory and emotion in the courtroom. Nick Fisher investigates how forensic speakers call up "memories" among the dikasts — many of which were doubtless vague or false — along with their attending emotions. The kind of memories that Fisher is concerned with, though personal in nature, tend also to be shared or collective — not in the sense that they conjure up recollections of past events such as wars, alliances or treaties, political achievements or struggles, but in a different way: "they mostly concern deeds and speeches which had taken place in public view and hearing, ... so that it can be supposed that some or many of the current dikasts might have been witnesses (or heard about them about at the time). A few are more private events, for example at symposia,

reports of which may have circulated. Naturally they tend to be dramatic events, and they are often summoned up to the jurors' eyes by attempts at vivid description, the rhetorical effect which came to be called *enargeia* in rhetorical theory".

Fisher concentrates on two speeches which were written within two years of each other: Demosthenes' *Against Meidias* (c. 347/6 BCE) and Aeschines' *Against Timarchus* (346/5 BCE). Both of them contain many narratives which carry powerful emotional charge, the first dealing with a case of wrongdoing that consists of multiple acts of *hubris* and *asebeia*, and the second one concerning the process known as *dokimasia rhētorōn*, which involved a charge of ineligibility to be an active politician because of a disgraceful past. These two speeches exploit many different strategies of appealing to the memories of the dikasts: sometimes the speaker calls on them "to remember"; at times he suggests rather that "you all know" or that "some of you know"; and at times he recalls events vividly and suggests implicitly that the audience should remember them. There is an intriguing interplay here between eliciting memories (in a shape that is fitting and convenient to the speaker) and stirring up, through these memories, specific emotions in the audience. In his *Rhetoric* Aristotle explains in detail how incredibly important it is to manipulate the audience's emotions in the courtroom in order to have people at your side. Fisher's chapter illustrates neatly how memory too can be manipulated to that same effect.

In the next chapter, "**Aristotle on Memory and Emotion in Human and Non-human Animals**", Sophia Connell looks to Aristotle's study of animals and explores the philosopher's account of the role of memory in the emotion of love or affection. As she observes, "while all emotions require a degree of memory, its manifestation in loving social relationships is the most cognitively sophisticated. Although, for Aristotle, non-human animals do not have belief (*doxa*) or reason (*logos*), their abilities to remember, feel and respond in a sophisticated manner to their environment and to other animals, show a degree of 'thought'. This thinking is tightly connected to felt bodily experience, particularly when it comes to feelings of affection and love and how memories of past encounters are required to sustain these feelings". The emphasis, placed by Connell, on "felt bodily experience" alerts us, once again, to the fact that emotions are not exclusively experienced "in the mind" but implicate the body as a whole.

This understanding of the emotion of love illuminates Aristotle's account of cognition in non-human animals. It also provides a window into the deep biological roots of human social ties and their connections to memory and recognition. For Aristotle the ability to recognise others as individuals to whom one ought to act in a loving manner forms the basis of all animal communities. In human communities the effect is stronger because of our much more sustained

capacities to remember intergenerationally and through literary devices. Thus we find that memory is not just what is required to reach intellectual perfection for an individual thinker in Aristotle (*A. Po.* II.19) but an integral part of living as humans in communities. “Unlike abstract intellectual achievements”, Connell concludes, “human emotional attachments, strengthened by collective and cultivated memory, are aspects of bodily lived experience”.

Jennifer Devereaux’s chapter (“**Emotive Memory Traces in Roman Literature**”) is also concerned with the idea of “community”, in a more extended sense. By looking closely at a range of Roman literary texts (including Manilius’ astronomical poetry, Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*, Accius’ and Seneca’s tragedies), Devereaux first reconstructs a shared vocabulary of embodied emotion when it comes to feelings of anxiety, fear, horror and anger — revolving around the imagery of canine sounds, the roiling of the sea, and the heat felt by the body. All these elements, she argues, whether separately or in combination, participate in a reconstructive memory retrieval process that is not only dependent on intertextual references, but also upon a series of connections that involve background knowledge acquired over the course of a lifetime of embodied experience. Identifying such memory traces, and in particular their embodied origins, generates — according to the author — a kind of emergence history. “Emergence history”, as Devereaux puts it “is a term meant to capture the effect of the ahistorical on present states of affairs, recognizing that irrecoverable origins operate as a force in history in much the same way that Indoeuropean words do, by expressing a system of connections among historically accessible languages”. What Devereaux is suggesting is that when we think about memory and text, we think about brain and body in this way — with the former operating as an ahistorical system that connects the transhistorical latter to historically accessible emotions. As an origin from which emotion emerges in lived experience, the body, which is transhistorical, takes part in a past that is not a simple past, but a *more-than-a-past*, meaning that there is nothing *past* in it, rather, it is “a futural past, that is, of a future-perfect: a past which will have been”. The body as origin shapes the recollection of all manner of memories by way of the emotions it gives rise to, and in this way generates a futural past that inscribes — even as it is inscribed upon — historical narrative.

Emotions like anger and fear are physical, mental, and social experiences, the culturally-specific definitions of which are loosely held together by experiential bonds that explain the nature of what, operating in the background, anchors experience, aids memory, and creates emotional as well as readerly communities. “By paying attention to the memory traces tied to body and environment in ancient texts”, Devereaux concludes “we are able to better ap-

preciate the emotional component of certain textual practices. In turn, we can more clearly recognize that such practices participate in the creation and re-creation of emotional experiences that are available to cognition precisely because they are recognizable in diverse ways, by diverse observers, under diverse conditions. The mnemonic bond that exists between texts and authors thus lives ever-present within our bodies and the world they inhabit”.

The volume’s final section moves to imperial times and late antiquity. In a chapter entitled **“Herodes Atticus, Material Memories, and the Expression and Reception of Grief”**, Estelle Strazdins takes a close look at Herodes’ monumentalizing project throughout Greece by focusing on two major examples: the portrait herms of his deceased favorite foster-sons found in the magnate’s private lands and the Arch of Eternal Concord that marked a boundary on his Marathon estate. Strazdins argues that these material commemorative efforts “appear less bent on remembering the dead in their own right and more interested in trying to capture” Herodes’ “personal experience of emotion in relation to the dead as vividly as possible”. This is a crucial point and one that is hardwired in human psychology: often, a powerful expression of a fond memory regarding a relative or a friend that has passed away, though seemingly directed towards the deceased, essentially serves to pronounce how we feel in the present.

In the case of the portrait herms of the deceased foster-sons, Strazdins places particular emphasis on the fact that some of them were inscribed with curses against those who might damage or move them away, and she goes on to explore, in this connection, the complex emotional script embodied by these monuments. Obviously the herms were meant to crystallize Herodes’ feelings of love, loss, and nostalgia for the dead boys; at the same time, however, the presence of curses adds an extra layer of eerie and supernatural feeling to these memorials allowing them ultimately to function as “potential conduits for the boys’ shades”. Caught in a liminal space between eternal frigidity and imminent animation (one that draws on the deep-seated Greek cultural anxiety of the potential of statues to come alive), the herms have a haunting effect on the landscape. With regard to the Arch of Eternal Concord in Marathon, Strazdins takes the reader by the hand and offers a succinct tour of the monument. In its original form the Arch was meant to celebrate a bicultural — Greek/Roman — union; but after Regilla’s death, it turned into a makeshift funerary memorial. This creates an intriguing “architectural palimpsest” — one that is inhabited by all sorts of contrasting feelings and emotions embedded in its stones and inscriptions. How we engage with it as visitors today depends heavily on the details on which we (choose to) focus and on how carefully we interact with its different emotional layers and its different shades of meaning. This process of

emotional re-signification (scripted into the monument's dynamic transformation from a memorial of joyful celebration to one of painful loss and death) extends beyond the Arch itself, and applies to the wider geography of the place. Herodes' estate spread over much of the deme of Marathon and thus stood in a landscape permeated by pre-existing and powerful memorial connotations, all of them pointing to the famous battle fought against the Persians. As Strazdins argues, in order to fully appreciate Herodes' commemorative mode, we need to focus on how he seeks to redefine a culturally significant and emotionally loaded space (Marathon) by pronouncing it an important spot for his own private feelings of loss and grief. It is almost as if, by means of saturating the space with his personal grief, Herodes "redefines or at least recalibrates existing memorial landscapes in his own image".

In the next chapter, entitled "**Memory and Emotion in Philostratus' *Heroicus***", Janet Downie addresses the issue of "cultural memory" in imperial literature by focusing on what she recognizes as "two quite different modes" in Philostratus' text: "a rationalizing, materialist cast of mind, and an approach to the world that is open to affect and emotionally inflected". The *Heroicus*, she argues, is constructed as "a drama of belief (πίστις)", and "affective states and emotional response (πάθος) are crucial to several turning points" in the plot. The Phoenician's intellectualizing approach to Homeric tradition comes face to face — and in the end, merges — with the Vinedresser's affective engagement with a Homeric past that is, literally, living to the present: the Greek farmer maintains a close and intimate relationship — one that is almost verging on the erotic — with (the revenant hero) Protesilaus. Instead of dismissing the fantastical elements of the story as humorous and paradoxical sophistries, Downie proposes that we take them seriously: the feeling of heroic numinosity which pervades the text breeds an affective, first-hand sense of engagement with the past, one that, in par with studies and pursuits of a more intellectual nature, is incredibly important for the maintenance of cultural memory. In the author's words, "maintaining cultural memory requires cultivating emotional attachments and responses across generations. In the *Heroicus*, Philostratus explores this idea through the conceit of the revenant hero who, embodying the possibility of a personal and emotional connection to the past, brings into focus the relationship between communicative memory and the cultural archive". This archive — which the Phoenician is interested in constituting, by collecting and gathering as complete a repertoire of Homeric stories as possible — eludes mastery: memory is unquantifiable in its abundance and any catalogue of incidents and events belonging to the past remains infinitely expansive. What the Vinedresser has to offer instead is his close interaction and personal communication with Protesilaus, and the insights he draws

from there. But Protesilaus is neither a Muse nor a divinely inspired bard; he is an engaged participant in the stories he tells, and so the immediate access gained by the Greek farmer to the past is, in its turn, inevitably biased and selective. “Throughout the *Heroicus*”, as Downie observes, “memory is portrayed as being subject to prioritization and exclusion. Individuals make choices about memory — often in the context of personal relationships that entail the transactions of communicative memory”. This is precisely where emotion becomes indispensable: far from being conceived as a purely intellectual activity, maintaining cultural memory requires emotional attachments and responses across generations; the stories which we choose to tell and store in our archive are products of a selection inflected by how we engage with that past affectively.

In the volume’s final chapter, entitled “**Nostalgia and Reading in Augustine’s Confessions**”, Marc Mastrangelo looks at how the Christian Father’s nostalgic reflection on past reading experiences generates a range of emotions linked with those memories; these emotions provoke an evaluation of his past but they are also tightly linked with how he sees himself at the present. Memory, for Augustine, is an emotionally charged process; remembering something means that one recalls how one *felt* at the time; how he was *affected* by the incident or experience that form the memory’s content (*ibi mihi et ipse occurro meque recolo, quid, quando et ubi egerim quoque modo, cum agerem, affectus fuerim, Conf. 10.8.14*). In this context, Augustine presents us with a consistent series of *mixed* emotional scripts. On the one hand, there is the pleasure and joy which he *remembers* himself feeling when reading, for instance, Virgil’s incredibly passionate love story of Dido and Aeneas or Terence’s *Eunuch*; on the other hand, there is an unfailing sense of (present) sadness and regret at having been so blind in the past as to take delight in these sensuous stories. Even in the case of tragedy, Augustine recalls his enthusiasm with the genre with scepticism and a critical attitude: true, pity was there, and he felt it deeply, but it was sensuously accompanied by the excitement caused by the tragic spectacle. To the memory of this flawed emotional experience, the author then contrasts a Christian sense of *misericordia* — a feeling that is purely centered on sharing in someone else’s pain (*dolor*) without being tinged by any sort of *delectatio*. According to Mastrangelo, Augustine’s reflection on these seminal literary experiences of the past is not meant to devalue them. On the contrary: in true nostalgic fashion, Augustine wishes to “confirm and preserve the value of his past reading list”, by way of showing how every single item in it had a necessary function at each stage of his life. In Mastrangelo’s words, Augustine’s “youthful and raw tragic pity for characters in epic and drama has transformed into a Christian compassion for the sinner. His nostalgic evaluation of his pagan philosophical storehouse,

which includes Cicero, Platonic, and Neoplatonic texts and reflects a deep rift between his past and present, has confirmed his acceptance of Christian theology". Overall, "the interior conflict he experienced right up to his conversion in the garden points to the impact of pagan philosophical texts as a source of his complicated emotional memories, which have become clarified through a proper engagement with the Gospels and Paul".

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