International Organizations and Global Development

Yearbook for the History of Global Development

International Organizations and Global Development

Volume 3

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International organizations and development

The connection between International Organizations (IOs) and development and its prominence within the global agenda is well-known and self-evident. One simply needs to observe the emphasis that the UN has placed on sustainable development, which occupies a centre-stage position in international debates. The UN has contributed to strengthening the long-standing effort of the international community to shape a global partnership for development by setting ambitious targets – the latest in a series of targets for development set by the UN – for its 2030 agenda.[1] This process has involved a range of actors, including states, international organizations (both intergovernmental and non-governmental), civil society, and the business community, which highlights the crucial role of these actors in shaping global governance on development. This effort, which reflects the concern of the UN as well as the interest of the entire international community, represents the culmination of long-term work on the issue of development that has led to the multifaceted vision of development thinking and practice that now exists. Thus, this volume starts from the assumption that global development and global governance on development in the twenty-first century can be rightly understood through a long-term historical perspective that considers IOs as crucial actors of this process as well as crucial places from which it is meaningful to analyze global issues.[2]

The contribution of IOs to development has long been the subject of increasing interest amongst historians. The global and transnational turns have brought a major impetus to studies on the history of modernization and development and has gradually opened up new room for research on the role of IOs, thereby demonstrating their importance.[3] While the role of states in defining policies and strat-

1 Iris Borowy, "Negotiating international development: The making of the Millennium Development Goals," *Regions & Cohesion*, 5, no. 3 (Winter 2015): 18–43.

2 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Sandrine Kott, Organiser le monde: Un autre histoire de la guerre froide (Paris: Le Seuil, 2021).

3 Mark Frey, Sönke Kunkel and Corinna R. Unger, *International Organizations and Development, 1945–1990* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 16. Verena Kröss, Corinne A. Pernet and Corinna R. Unger, "International organizations and Development," in *The Routledge Handbook on the History of Development*, ed. Corinna R. Unger, Iris Borowy and Corinne A. Pernet (London and New York: Routledge, 2022), 262. Sandrine Kott, "International Organizations: A Field of research for a Global History," *Studies in Contemporary History* 8, no. 3 (2011): 446–450.

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egies for development is unquestionable, IOs, both governmental and non-governmental, have been central players in shaping the global system of development. By setting agendas, supplying funding for and organizing projects, collecting data, and providing authoritative information on a wide range of topics, IOs have framed ideas and practices regarding development on local, national, regional, and global scales.

IOs have set up centres for research, meeting places for experts from which epistemic communities have arisen. They have contributed to drawing up ideas, concepts, and approaches of development as well as strategies to improve it.[4] These achievements are the main outcomes of a lively confrontation between people with different views, which has led to an evolution of development discourse at various levels (political, economic, cultural) during the twentieth century and beyond: from the economic growth-development nexus to the basic needs approach, from the rise of neoliberal paradigms to the establishment of the human development concept.

IOs have also facilitated the amplification of new voices in development, such as the countries of the Global South at the UN – whose numbers have increased significantly since the 1960s – or civil society organizations.[5] Moreover, IOs have also been centres of dissemination on the importance of development at a global level, succeeding in advocating for this concept to governments and public opinion, and thus to public and private stakeholders. Through the various conferences, summits, and campaigns driven by IOs, they have contributed to the spread of the importance of development for shaping global governance and stimulating governments to improve incisive policies through technical and financial aid.[6]

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4 Karen Gram-Skjoldager, Haakon Andreas Ikonomou, and Torsten Kahlert, *Organizing the 20th Century World: International Organizations and the Emergence of International Public Administration, 1920s-1960s* (London: Bloomsbury, 2020); Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, eds., *Internationalism: A 20th Century History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro, *Internationalism, Imperialism, and the Formation of Contemporary World* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018).

5 On UN and development see: Richard Jolly, *UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Olav Stokke, *UN and development: From Aid to Cooperation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

6 Daniel Maul, *Human Rights, Development and Decolonization: The International Labour Organization, 1940–70* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 7–8. See also: Johannes Paulmann (ed.), *Humanitarianism & Media 1900 to the Present* (London-Oxford: Berghahn, 2019); J. Brendebach, M. Herzer, and H.J.S. Tworek, eds., *International organizations and the media in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: exorbitant expectations* (London: Routledge, 2018). On the UN see: G. Scott-Smith, "The UN and public diplomacy: Communicating the post-national message," in *Wartime Origins and the Future United Nations*, ed. D. Plesch and T. G. Weiss (London-New York: Routledge, 2015), 36–55.

IOs have been key players in development action: intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), acting as multilateral channels of development cooperation, have provided technical assistance (as the UN has done) or financed development (like the Bretton Woods institutions did), while non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with their bottom-up contribution and direct contact with the field, have helped to build connections with IGOs, following their guidelines but often highlighting their limitations and dysfunctions and helping to shape their approach.[7] In this multiplicity of roles, IOs have built their legitimacy and achieved authority in the international system.[8]

This third issue of the Yearbook on the History of Global Development is devoted to the role of IOs as relevant actors for global development and contributes to the current debate on this topic. It does this by presenting fresh research that has a direct bearing on present-day challenges, going beyond single analysis providing a forum for a variety of historical perspectives on, and understandings of, development. This issue has three main focuses. Firstly, the role of thinkers and experts working for IOs or who have contributed to the shaping and conveying of the idea of development in a global context. Secondly, UN action in certain areas and regions – Latin America, East Asia, and North Africa – and core issues of development, like trade-aid nexus, population control, promotion of culture and scientific knowledge, food security, and housing. Thirdly, examining the role of some NGOs that could enhance both a wide perspective on philanthropic action, especially in the Global South, and an alternative model of development, dealing with security and post-conflict situations as well as with consistency between political questions – like protection of human rights and respect of the rule of law – and development policies.

New histories of IOs and development

Studies on the role of IOs in the development and modernisation process, especially in the last decade, have underlined how important the contribution of these actors has been to the history of global development and how their perspective has contributed to redrawing the margins of development history in a global perspective. As Joseph Hodge has written, historical scholarship has gone beyond the evident gap between perceptions and achievements, which had marked the more critical essays on the history of development and on the role of International

7 Krösss, Pernet and Unger, "International organizations and Development."
8 Frey, Kunkel and Unger, *International Organizations and Development*, 4.

Institutions.[9] They have, rather, worked on a reframing of the periodization, a deeper examination of the role of the actors involved – highlighting the complexity of characters and the multiplicity of connections between local, national, and global[10] – widening the viewpoint beyond the traditional approach, and encouraged looking at development "as a global phenomenon."[11] As far as periodization is concerned, while the institutionalization of development policies by states and IOs unfolded systematically in the post-World War II period, a well-established literature, based on the idea of *longue durée*, has traced continuity between the post-World War II experience and the legacy left by the first half of the twentieth century, at various levels.

This has led to a rethinking of the prevailing narrative on twentieth century international history, particularly the history of modernisation, which looked at the Cold War and decolonisation as moments of discontinuity with the past, identifying them instead as merely phases in the broader discourse on development during the twentieth century.[12] A reconstruction of the history of colonial empires as laboratories of development as well as an opportunity to collect data, elaborate solutions, and test policies has represented a new push to this strand of research. This has driven a reframing of the very phenomenon of decolonisation from a long-term perspective, more linked to the directions and practices implemented by the imperial powers to pursue their project of modernisation. In this perspective, room has been given to works on the role of technicians and experts, many of whom then transitioned from imperial institutions to the IOs, revealing the continuities in their developmental work.[13]

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9 Joseph Hodge, "Writing the History of Development, part 2: Longer, Deeper, Wider," *Humanity* 7, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 148–150. On the same view see: David C. Engerman and Corinna R. Unger, "Towards a Global History of Modernization," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 3 (2009): 375–385; Glenda Sluga, "The Transnational History of International Institutions," *Journal of Global History* 6, no. 2 (2011): 219–222.

10 Engerman, Unger, "Towards a Global History of Modernization," and the whole special issue on "Modernizations as a global project," which contains several case studies. See also David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark E. Haefele, Michael and E. Latham, eds., *Staging Growth. Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).

11 Engerman, Unger, "Towards a Global History of Modernization," 377.

12 Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela, eds., *The Development Century: A Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 9–10 and its bibliographical references; and Sandrine Kott, "Cold War Internationalism," in *Internationalism: a XXth century History*, ed. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 340–362.

13 See, for example: Joseph Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007); Veronique Dimier, *The invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy: Recycling Empire* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

Analysis of the legacies of the first half of the twentieth century is abundant and significant, and studies on the contribution of governmental IOs in this regard have been central. In the first half of the twentieth century, growing economic, political, and social interdependence led to a more pronounced trend towards the establishment of IOs, when both regional and universal institutions set up forums for study, discussion, and the elaboration of recipes for peace and progress, marking the link between security and economic-social well-being that constituted the starting point of the international system after 1945.[14] This is demonstrated by literature that has gone "back to the League of Nations"[15] to highlight the continuity of concepts, approaches, and strategies deployed to face the challenges of the early post-war period, especially after the Great Depression, on major economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian issues.

The administration of League of Nations (LoN) mandates, for example, provided the first opportunity for a normative definition of dependent territories, but also for an initial formalisation of the levels of development of single territories and the objectives to be indicated to the colonial powers, linked to improving the living conditions of the subject populations.[16] This latter aspect, which had become the common goal of empires seeking ways to tackle anti-colonialism at its roots, represented the common ground of the other actors who operated, from different disciplinary perspectives, inside and outside the LoN in the early post-war period, sometimes competing with each other, often finding elements of common action, but nevertheless elaborating different possible mindsets on the issue of development.[17]

The work of the Economic and Financial Organisation (EFO) of the LoN,[18] for example, proceeded in this direction. Initially limited to data collection and gradually specialising in the development of background documents for the main international economic organisations and conferences, the EFO initiated a close collaboration with the main technical organisations: the League's Health Organization, whose focus on social medicine expressed the mainstream idea of a network of experts confronting diseases and focusing their efforts to define standards, meth-

14 See, among all: Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World economy. The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); and Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

15 Susan Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations," *The American Historical Review* 112, no. 4 (2007): 1091–1117.

16 Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

17 Kröss, Pernet, Unger, "International organizations and Development," 253

18 Clavin, *Securing the world economy.*

ods, and concerted actions to address transnational problems[19]; the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which was interested in the question of labor and workers and examined the living conditions of workers in depth, both in the industrial and agricultural sectors, in European and non-European territories[20]; and the International Institute of Agriculture (IIA), the organization that had been dealing with agriculture since 1905. Notwithstanding the divergences and the competitiveness between the IIA and the LoN, their contributions, along with those of the other agencies – on food, agriculture, and nutrition – contributed to considering food shortage and malnutrition according to a broader, holistic approach that also included social and economic factors, the premise of the Food and Agricultural Organization's (FAO) post-war work.[21]

What emerged in the early post-war period was essentially a package of solutions based on an unquestioned faith in science and technology. It was motivated by a belief that it was possible to transform societies by modernising them through the transfer of technology and know-how, facilitated by a model in which Western practitioners and political elites were to meet. According to this view, development could only be achieved by broad, top-down, economic, and social intervention, supported by international assistance, capable of securing peace through economic and social improvement of conditions for peoples.[22] It dealt with solutions to face the main economic and social challenges, giving multilateral cooperation a more effective, rational prospect as it could guarantee the spreading of liberal capitalism as a tool for stabilizing societies in economic, social, and political terms.

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19 Iris Borowy, *Coming to terms with World Health: The League of Nations Health Organization* (Frankfurt am Main-New York: Peter Lang, 2006).

20 Daniel Maul, "Help Them Move the ILO Way: The International Labor Organization and the Modernization Discourse in the Era of Decolonization and the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 3 (June 2009): 387–404; Daniel Maul, *Human Rights, Development and Decolonization*; Amalia Ribi Forclaz, "A New Target for International Social Reform: The International Labour Organisation and Working and Living Conditions in Agriculture in the Inter-War Years," *Contemporary European History* 20, no. 3 (2011): 307–330. Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux, eds., *Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond* (London: Palgrave, 2013).

21 On IIA see: Luciano Tosi, *Alle origini della Fao. Le relazioni tra l'Istituto internazionale di agricoltura e la Società delle nazioni* (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1989). Luciano Tosi, "The League of Nations, the International Institute of Agriculture and the Food Question," in M. Petricoli and D. Cherubini (éds.), *Pour la paix en Europe. Institutions et société civile dans l'entre-deux-guerres* (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2007), 117–138. On the legacy of the interwar period see also: Juan Pan-Montojo, "International institutions and agriculture: from the IIA to the FAO," in *Agriculture in capitalist Europe: from food shortages to food surpluses*, ed. C. Martiin et al. (Burlington: Ashgate, 2016), 21–42.

22 Frey, Kunkel, Unger, *International Organizations and Development*, 3–7. On this approach see also: David Ekbladh, *Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

The role of NGOs in development during the twentieth century also forms part of a redefinition of the period. They played a profound role in global affairs, mobilizing people at grassroots level, sometimes in unison with, sometimes in opposition to, official political structures.[23] Although NGOs strengthened in the post-World War II period,[24] the origin of their contribution can be found in the idea of humanitarianism and civic engagement that was affirmed in the West between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and was fulfilled within the imperial experience.[25] That is certainly the case with the large US philanthropic foundations, which operated on the basis of considerable financial resources and implemented modernisation projects, often alongside IGOs, the impact of which has been extensively studied.[26] There are also the many religious and charitable organisations, especially in the United Kingdom and the United States,[27] which carried out small-scale projects related to basic needs such as health, sanitation, and education, driven by the idea that the transfer of skills and knowledge could improve the standard of living within the colonies.

From the interwar period – the origin of modern international humanitarianism[28] and the phase of the LoN's push for activism on social issues[29] – organiza-

23 Kevin O'Sullivan, "NGOs and Development: Small is beautiful?", in *The Routledge Handbook on the History of Development*, ed. Corinna R. Unger, Iris Borowy and Corinne A. Pernet (London and New York: Routledge, 2022), 234–249 and its references. John Boli and George M. Thomas, eds., *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). See also: Kevin O'Sullivan, "A "Global Nervous System": the Rise and Rise of European Humanitarian NGOs, 1945–1985," in *International Organizations and Development, 1945–1990*, ed. Mark Frey, Sönke Kunkel and Corinna R. Unger (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 196–219; Heike Wieters, "Of Heartfelt Charity and Billion Dollar Enterprise: From Postwar Relief to Europe to Humanitarian Relief to "Everywhere" – CARE Inc., in search of a New Mission," in ibid., 220–239.

24 Iriye, *Global Community*, chapter 2.

25 Harald Fisher-Tiné, "Global Civil Society and the Forces of Empire: The salvation Army, British Imperialism and the "Pre-History" of NGOs (ca. 1880s-1930s)," in *Competing Visions of Global Order: Global Moments and Movements*, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 29–67.

26 Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century. The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2012); John Krige and Helke Rausch, eds., *American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2012); Ekbladh, *Great American Mission.*

27 Ian Tyrrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

28 Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011). Silvia Salvatici, *A history of humanitarianism, 1755–1989. In the name of others* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019).

tions such as Save the Children, YMCA, Red Cross or CARE became organizations dedicated to relief and rehabilitation after World War II,[30] passing through a professionalising and highly legitimising experience by associating with the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). As the linking and coordinating body for NGOs working in Europe and Asia, UNRRA became an opportunity to exchange expertise, practices, and approaches, at a time when the category of humanitarian worker was acquiring a more precise and structured definition of both its functions and role and the objectives and principles that inspired its action. Thus, UNRRA's work also further highlighted the continuity of approach and of the people working in it, who had moved from LoN agencies or from working as humanitarian workers in NGOs, then passing to the new organisations that emerged in the post-war period.[31]

Both the post-conflict experience and the imperial background of NGOs were transposed into later post-World War II work, when the focus was placed on post-colonial questions which had become global issues (health, education and training, nutrition, child welfare). They received legitimacy through the recognition of consultative status at the UN, increasing the interconnection with governmental IOs – sometimes in connection, often overlapping or clashing with them – that shaped this well-structured practice of the international system: their visibility increased, the process of internationalisation was strengthened, and many of these actors became transnational actors. However, a complex picture of approaches, models, and organisations did not emerge, and still today there is substantial dependence on major donors, states, and IGOs. Nevertheless, NGOs have taken the opportunity to propose and convey alternative bottom-up models and approaches that have contributed to restoring a human dimension of development, thanks also to the input of economists, thinkers, activists, and politicians from the Global South.[32]

In the second half of the twentieth century, the proliferation of new IOs, global interdependence on socio-economic issues,[33] and the substantial continuity with

29 Magaly Rodriguez García, Davide Rodogno and Liat Kozma, eds., *The League of Nations' Work on Social Issues: Visions, Endeavours, and Experiments* (Geneva: UN Publ., 2016).

30 S. Farré, *Colis de guerre. Secours alimentaires et organisations humanitaires (1914–1947)* (Rennes: Press Universitaires de Rennes, 2014); Emily Baughan, *Saving the Children: Humanitarianism, Internationalism, and Empire*, (Oakland: University of California Press, 2022); R.M. McCleary, *Global Compassion: Private Voluntary Organizations and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

31 Silvia Salvatici, "Help the People to Help Themselves': UNRRA Relief Workers and European Displaced Persons," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 25, no. 3 (September 2012): 428–451.

32 O'Sullivan, "NGOs and Development. Small is beautiful?", 234–235, 246.

33 Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga. "New Histories of the United Nations," *Journal of World History* 19, no. 3 (2008): 261–265.

the solutions proposed in the past led historians to "taking off the Cold War Lens."[34] This allowed for a reconsideration of the periodization of the history of development (not everything originates from, or relates to, the Cold War), as well as allowing for an analysis of new perspectives. While the continuity and prevalence of the Western approach has also been established in the actions of the IOs[35] – an expression of the liberal international order based on US interests and priorities, of the Newdealist principles of state intervention and modernisation from above, of the emphasis on planning according to a Western-centred approach – scholarship over the last twenty years has helped to emphasize the plurality of visions, between and within the two blocs[36] and among the receiving countries.[37] In the latter case, the UN, for example, while being considered by traditional literature as a forum of the Cold War competition and a definitive tool to convey the Western model towards the Global South, represented rather an opportunity for the Afro-Asian countries. New studies underline their role as actors who influenced the agenda of IOs, especially since the 1960s, to bring out non-Western principles, models, and practices of development and to challenge the universal validity of modernisation theories.[38] Recent scholarship on IOs and decolonization has likewise tried to overcome the traditional duality of view – IOs as conveyors of

34 Matthew Connelly, "Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence," *The American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000): 739–769.

35 Amy L.S. Staples, *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965* (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 2006); Michele Alacevich, *The Political Economy of the World Bank: The Early Years* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Daniel Maul, *Human Rights, Development and Decolonization*; Eric Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).

36 On the Western bloc see, for example: Matthieu Leimgruber and Matthias Schmelzer, eds., *The OECD and the International Political Economy Since 1948* (London: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2017). On Socialist bloc: Sara Lorenzini, "Comecon and the South in the years of *détente:* a study on East–South economic relations," *European Review of History* 21, no. 2 (2014): 183–199; David C. Engerman, "The Second World's Third World," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12, no. 1 (2011): 183–211.

37 See for example: Macekura and Manela, *The Development Century. A global History*; Sara Lorenzini, *Global Development. A Cold War History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019); David C. Engerman, *The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018); Nelson Lichtenstein and Jill M. Jensen, *The ILO from Geneva to the Pacific Rim: West Meets East* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). On the effects of US foreign aid policy on the Global South in a long-term perspective see also: Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

38 Amrith and Sluga, "New Histories of the United Nations," 253–254.

neocolonialism and the Western-centred approach as opposed to a location for anti-colonial struggle – and has given room to the complexity of this framework: the range of actors, stances, and tasks which operated within the IOs, as well as to the connections or competing visions among different IOs. As Eva-Maria Muschik argued, "the plurality of chronologies and meanings of global decolonization in the twentieth century (…), cannot be separated from the history of international organizations."[39] Thus, IOs were forums for confronting current ideas, shaping new ideas, and legitimatizing them toward Newly Independent Countries, or late colonial territories.[40]

In this perspective, studies on IOs and development have helped to shed light on the complexity of the history of global development: they enable us to see this history as a universe made up of voices, approaches, spaces, and institutions and open up non-universal perspectives, helping to enhance local experiences and projects and regional-national-international interconnections.[41]

One perspective that follows this indication is that of considering recipients as actors.[42] Studies that have taken this direction have attempted to fill a historiographical gap concerning the interactions of Newly Independent Countries with IOs and their role in shaping IO priorities and practices. Scholars have questioned whether and to what extent beneficiaries played an active role in shaping development thinking and practices, how they participated in the debate and influenced its evolution.[43] For example, scholars have examined the new international eco-

39 Eva-Maria Muschik, "Towards a global history of international organizations and decolonization," *Journal of Global History* 17, no. 2 (2022): 173–190, who present the more recent review of literature about this topic with useful bibliographical references. On this topic see also: Nicole Eggers, Jessica L. Pearson and Aurora Almada e Santos (eds.), *The United Nations and Decolonization* (New York: Routledge, 2020); Damiano Matasci, *Internationaliser l'éducation. La France, l'Unesco et la fin des empires coloniaux en Afrique (1945–1961)* (Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2023).

40 Amrith, Sluga, "New Histories of the United Nations," 265–266.

41 Macekura and Manela, *The Development Century. A global History*, 9–10. Frey, Kunkel and Unger, *International Organizations and Development*, 3. More broadly: Corinna R. Unger, *International Development: A Post-war History* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019). See also the special forum on "Modernizations as a global project," in *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 3 (June 2009), which focus on some case studies from Africa, Latin America and Asia.

42 Corinna R. Unger, "International Organizations and Rural Development: The FAO Perspective," *The International History Review* 41, no. 2 (2019): 3–4; A. O'Malley and V. Thakur, "Introduction: Shaping A Global Horizon. New Histories of the Global South and the UN," *Humanity* 13, no. 1 (June 2022): 55–65; Simon Jackson and Alanna O'Malley, eds., *The Institution of International Order: From the League of Nations to the United Nations* (London: Routledge, 2018).

43 Some examples are: Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundation of Bretton Woods*; and Patrick A. Sharma, *Robert McNamara's Other War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).

nomic order (NIEO) and its legacies.[44] This research challenges the existing historiography by investigating how recipient countries contributed to international development, by examining how they presented their visions, principles, claims, and expectations within IOs, and how much these efforts conditioned the work of IOs. It may be an issue that needs to be analyzed in depth, especially with reference to the role of those new donors now identified with the BRICS group, who have been challenging the liberal-democratic world order with their alternative development model and set of principles that continues to have such a wide hold on low-income countries.[45] This perspective could give new room to studies in regionalism and regional organizations, enhancing the role of UN regional commissions[46] as well as the importance of South-South cooperation and the processes of regional integration to understand more about the role of the Global South in the development discourse.

Overall, the focus of studies on IOs and development has broadened considerably in recent decades, looking at it "as a global phenomenon"[47] and going in the direction Hodge indicated to help construct a global history of development and modernisation.[48] This changing perspective means a reappraisal of topics to be investigated, approaches to be followed, and sources to be searched. This volume contributes to this process.

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44 Patrick A. Sharma, "Between North and South: The World Bank and the New International Economic Order," *Humanity* 6, no. 1 (2015): 189–200; see also *Humanity* 6, no. 1 (Spring 2015), devoted to the NIEO project and its aftermath.

45 Lorella Tosone and Angela Villani, "Traditional and "new" donors in Asia: an introduction," *Asia Maior,* Special Issue on "Foreign Aid in Asia: Traditional and "New" Donors in a Changing Development Landscape," no. 1 (2018): 7–18. On the quest for an alternative order see: Philippa Hetherington and Glenda Sluga, "Liberal and Illiberal Internationalisms," Special Issue, *Journal of World History* 31, no. 1 (March 2020).

46 See, for example: Y. Berthelot (ed.), *Unity and Diversity in Development Ideas. Perspectives from the UN Regional Commissions* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). See also: Ikuto Yamaguchi, "The Development and Activities of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), 1947–65," in *The Transformation of the International Order of Asia: Decolonization, the Cold War, and the Colombo Plan*, ed. Shigeru Akita, Gerold Krozewski and Shoichi Watanabe (New York: Routledge, 2015), 91–108; Margarita Fajardo, *The World That Latin America Created: The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America in the Development Era* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2022); Daniel Stinsky, *International Cooperation in Cold War Europe. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1947–64* (London: Bloomsbury, 2022). Giovanni Finizio, "Regional Multilateralism in Africa: A System in Search of Rationalization," in *Annals of the Fondazione Luigi Einaudi* LIV, no. 2 (December 2020): 53–74.

47 Engerman, Unger, "Towards a Global History of Modernization," 377.

48 Hodge, "Writing the History of Development, part 2: Longer, Deeper, Wider," 148–150. On the same view also Sluga, "The transnational history of international institutions," 219–222.

Contributions to this volume

The chapters of this volume engage with many of the themes that have occupied historians in recent years. Put together, they examine the myriad ways that IOs have engaged with both the concept of development, as well as its implementation, in various parts of the world. The case studies range from Morocco to Honduras to China, and the organisations that are covered include American philanthropic foundations of the early twentieth century, as well as Oxfam and Amnesty International in the 1980s and 1990s. The contributions to this volume also present a varied approach to developmental actors. Some of the contributions explore how large IOs such as the UN dealt with questions of development, while others focus on key individuals, such as Mahbub ul-Haq and Enrique Iglesias. Amidst this variety, a number of common threads emerge: IOs are often at the mercy of the attitudes of their member states and representatives; the Cold War has had a profound effect on the actions of IOs; NGOs are often defined by their relationships with nation-states and IGOs; the legacies of colonialism have profoundly shaped both the personnel and attitudes towards development of IOs; and finally that the regional focus of various programs and IOs has significant developmental consequences. Each contribution offers new insight into the historical understanding of the interaction between IOs and development.

In their chapter, Sabine Selchow and Glenda Sluga conceptualize the relationship between IOs and international development. They present post-Second World War development as a "discourse that shapes international organisations." From this perspective, Selchow and Sluga call upon scholars to consider new ways of examining the role of both development and IOs in "international economic thinking." There are four dimensions to how this thinking is imagined: "the social" versus "the economic"; "the technical" versus "the political"; "the public" versus "the private"; and the ongoing negotiation of "the national." Scholarly analysis of both development and IOs often grapples with some, if not all, of these dimensions, and Selchow and Sluga highlight some of the ways in which this is done. For instance, they explain how women have often been able to find a place to think and work in IOs as opposed to national organisations. Similarly, the chapter explains the power of development as a discourse and how it frames the work of IOs. Drawing upon the work of Daniel Speich Chasse, they interrogate how key post-war concepts in development owe their existence to the very concept of development. The chapter then concludes with a series of provocative questions that is sure to produce more innovative research in this field.

Maha Ali then examines the impact of Mahbub ul-Haq both in terms of his intellectual impact on developmental thought and in his work in both Pakistan and

the World Bank. A key developmental thinker, ul-Haq can be connected to at least two major strands of developmental theory and policy: "basic needs" and "sustainable development." This has contemporary relevance as these concepts helped to shape the concept of "human development." Ali examines the institutional context in which ul-Haq operated, explaining how his work with the Pakistani government shaped his thinking while at the World Bank. This chapter also deals with important questions of how individuals operate withing large IOs. Mahbub ul-Haq was not always a popular figure within the World Bank, as he often struggled with the Bank's global role. Ali suggests that ul-Haq's thinking aligned quite well with the NIEO, which was not always looked upon favorably by the Bretton Woods institutions. This perhaps reflected ul-Haq's Global South perspective. Another tension in the field of IOs and development is addressed in this chapter, as Ali examines the role of Islam as a unifying force in international affairs.

Another key individual is given significant attention in Margarita Fajardo's chapter on ECLA/CEPAL in the 1970s. While not focusing exclusively on Enrique Iglesias, Fajardo examines the work of ECLA, which was under Iglesias' leadership throughout the 1970s. This chapter examines the evolution of ECLA throughout the tumultuous years of the 1970s and 1980s, as the previously powerful UN agency dealt with the possibility that it would be marginalized in the face of emerging NGOs. Under Iglesias, ECLA was forced to change its approach to Latin American development as a global neoliberal agenda began to emerge. Fajardo traces how ECLA was partly a victim of its own success, given its centrality to developmental thinking and policy throughout the 1960s. The chapter also poses important questions about how IOs are shaped by the changes that take place in their member countries. ECLA, based in Chile, is a clear example of this process, as the political changes in that country – and in Latin America more broadly – forced Iglesias and his colleagues to reconsider ECLA's role in the development of the region. As with Maha Ali's chapter, the role of key individuals in shaping the relationship between IOs and development is clear.

Lorella Tosone continues the study of the UN and development with her examination of the circumstances that led to the establishment of the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) in 1969. The connection between population growth, especially in the Global South, and development attracted significant attention amongst demographers, economists, and policymakers throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Tosone traces the origins of this interest back to the work of scholars in the interwar period, with Princeton University being particularly prominent in the establishment of demography as a field of research. By the beginning of the 1960s, a range of IOs – including the UN, World Bank, and FAO – became interested in the issue of population control, drawing upon the expertise of demographers and economists. This chapter traces the different attitudes amongst member states,

which was shaped by Cold War considerations and religious beliefs. These differences often slowed down efforts to promote population control, which by the 1970s had become less central to the work of IOs. As with many of the contributions to this volume, Tosone provides insight into the negotiations that were ongoing within IOs and explains their connections to efforts to promote development around the world.

Yarong Chen then offers an insight into another area of the UN with an interest in international development: UNESCO. Chen focuses on the drive to get the "S" in UNESCO, following the campaign by scientists such as Joseph Needham. The emphasis on scientific knowledge was seen as a necessary complement to the other objectives of UNESCO, which combined in the post-war period to drive UN efforts in international development. Chen also pays close attention to the place of China in this story, which was severely disrupted by the events of the Chinese Civil War. Chinese representatives played an active role in driving the establishment of UNESCO, and China was also seen as an important recipient of UNESCO assistance. The victory of the Communists in 1949 threatened to derail these efforts, once again showing how the Cold War impacted upon the work of IOs in the field of development. Despite the departure of UNESCO from the People's Republic of China in the early 1950s, the work done in the late 1940s was influential in the longer-term developmental approach of the organisation.

Ben Clark and Axel Fisher take us to Morocco and its Rural Housing Program from 1968 to 1972. This program, implemented by the World Food Programme (WFP), in conjunction with the UN Development Program and the Moroccan government, was informed by French and Moroccan ideas regarding rural development. The Rural Housing Program reveals the intersections of decolonisation, IOs, and the Cold War, as French, Moroccan, and American officials, working with the WFP, aimed to respond to the challenges experienced by people in the Moroccan countryside. Clark and Fisher provide a thorough explanation of the intellectual context in which the Rural Housing Program was established, followed by an evaluation of its outcomes. Their analysis reveals the ways that countries emerging from colonial rule drew upon the resources of IOs in their developmental policies. This North African case study reveals both the specific challenges faced in that part of the world while also highlighting broader themes that point to the role of IOs in fostering development in newly independent countries.

The final three chapters deal with NGOs that all engage with development in different ways. Maria Cullen examines the work of Oxfam in Honduras in the 1980s to explore the "politicization" of development assistance. As with many other chapters in this collection, the Cold War looms large in the story, with Oxfam forced to navigate the challenges of Central America in the 1980s. Cullen compares the work of Oxfam in Honduras with earlier examples in Tanzania

and Cambodia to highlight the complex relationship between this NGO and its host governments. This chapter suggests that Oxfam in Honduras did not follow the same pattern as the Tanzanian and Cambodian examples, where NGOs facilitated the "depoliticization" of development and human rights. In contrast, Oxfam personnel worked closely with Salvadoran refugees in Honduras to resist some of the pressures from the United States. The result was a series of policies and programs that drew upon the experiences of the refugees, rather than the UN or other governments. Through this examination, Cullen also traces how NGOs interact with both nation-states and IGOs like the UN to carve out their own place in the international development system.

Michelle Carmody also examines the connections between an NGO and IGO, in this case Amnesty International and the World Bank. She traces the attitudes of both organisations towards the evolving phenomenon of human rights throughout the 1980s and 1990s. For Carmody, the World Bank has an "ambivalent" relationship towards human rights, which is a product of its focus on economic rights as well as with its membership structure. Despite this ambivalence, NGOs like Amnesty International ultimately felt compelled to work closely with the World Bank due to their dissatisfaction with the attitude of individual national governments in the field of human rights. This chapter reveals the ways that IGOs and NGOs work together in the development field, sometimes in tandem and sometimes in tension. In analysing these connections, Carmody explains that both Amnesty and the World Bank shared a mutual dependence on one another. Both needed to project an image to the Global South that may not have always fitted with their actions, and both used the other to maintain their relevance in the increasingly competitive field of international development.

In the final chapter, Nick Pozek examines the role of American philanthropic organisations in the Progressive Era, from roughly 1890 to 1920. In doing so, Pozek identifies some of the early connections between IOs and the fledgling field of development. Paying particular attention to the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations and their work in China, Pozek introduces a range of considerations that would shape events in the second half of the twentieth century. Rockefeller and Carnegie (along with the Ford Foundation) were vital to post-war attempts to promote modernisation throughout the Global South. Many of the lessons that they learned in the earlier period informed their later work. Pozek also traces the role of key individuals in the work of these foundations, which connects to the approach provided in the chapters by Maha Ali and Margarita Fajardo.

These chapters offer insights into the wide variety of ways that IOs have both helped to establish the field of international development as well as being shaped by development itself. The post-Second World War focus of almost of the contributions suggests that this is the era in which IOs emerged in the field of development.

Despite this, the majority of the chapters also examine the ways that events and people in the first half of the twentieth century informed events after 1945. Similarly, the legacies of colonialism are clear to see in the work of Ben Clark and Axel Fisher, as well as in Maha Ali, Margarita Fajardo, and Lorella Tosone's chapters. Finally, the Cold War is present throughout the volume, shaping the interactions of IOs and development. While the collection is comprehensive in its geographical, conceptual, and chronological scope, there is still a huge amount of scholarship to be done in exploring the role of IOs in the field of international development.

There is room for a multiplicity of additions to the current historical debate over the connections between IOs and development. These include research into the questions of gender, race, and more broadly the protection of fundamental rights, inequalities, and employment issues. Furthermore, there is scope for more research into sustainability and environmental protection, as well as rural development, also with regard to the emergence of the contradictions that marked the era of the Green Revolution.[49] Knowledge on the transnational dimension of development could also allow scholars to go beyond the states as well as the IGOs. While literature on Western NGOs has grown, a deeper analysis of Global South NGOs – their origins and evolution, their links to the territories and with the IGOs – is still lacking. Moreover, it would be interesting to more deeply analyze the constant search of the UN from the 1970s for partnerships with non-state actors – not only NGOs but also private corporations (a forerunner of the current practice of public-private partnerships on cooperation issues); or to study the interaction between Western NGOs and the Global South during the 1980s and the 1990s on social justice and human rights. Furthermore, as some scholars have underlined,

49 See, for example, the articles on the *Journal of World History* 19, no. 3 (September 2008), devoted to the "New Histories of the United Nations." Other examples are: Stephen Macekura, *Of Limits and Growth: The Rise of Global Sustainable Development in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Iris Borowy, *Defining Sustainable Development for Our Common Future: A History of the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission)* (London: Routledge, 2013); Ann E. Egelston, *Sustainable Development: A History* (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013); Maria Ivanova, *The Untold Story of the World's Leading Environmental Institution: UNEP at Fifty* (Boston: The MIT Press, 2021); Amalia Ribi Forclaz and Corinna R. Unger, "Progress versus precaution: international organizations and the use of pesticides, 1940s to 1970s," *Comparativ* 32, no. 6 (2023): 611–628; Corinna R. Unger, "International Organizations and Rural Development: The FAO Perspective," and more broadly all the further contributions published on the same issue's Themed Section "Confronting a Hungry World: The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization in a Historical Perspective," *The International History Review* 41, no. 2 (2019). On Green Revolution and its critics see, among the most recent works: Marci Baranski, *The Globalization of Wheat. A Critical History of the Green Revolution* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2022).

the role of local studies or projects, both pursued by IGOs and NGOs, are considered as case studies that could enlighten the process of development as they can underline the connections among regional, national, and global levels.[50]

More broadly, room should be given to research that fosters a bottom-up approach or is able to intersect the latter with the top-down dimension, restoring value and dignity to both and identifying the interactions and exchange between the two perspectives.[51] This can also be achieved considering the diversity of sources for the history of IOs. This leads us to a last reflection, which concerns the need for new archival research and the attempt, by several historians, to start and improve a multilevel research method.[52]

This effort is part of a general will to overcome the view that has long prevailed in this strand of studies, where institutional work by officials, diplomats or practitioners working within IOs has prevailed. Moreover, a historical perspective is still lacking in a broad literature on IOs and development, where there is a prevalence of studies by economists, political scientists, and anthropologists.[53] Thus, more recent, multi-archival research could paint a clearer picture and help to clarify many aspects of the contribution to development by allowing for the definition of periods, specific analyses, and concepts.[54]

50 On this perspective see: Manela, Macekura, eds., *The Development Century*; and the contributions to the special forum "Modernization as a global project," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 3 (June 2009).

51 Iris Borowy, "Introduction" to "Development in World History – Development as World History," Special Issue of the *Journal of World History* 32, no. 3 (2021): 398.

52 G. Sluga, *The transnational history of international institutions*, 220.

53 The most cited example is the series of the UN Intellectual History project, launched in 1999 by the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies of the City University of New York (CUNY). Some important exceptions can be considered the essays written under the auspices of History projects led by some international organizations. See, for example, the essays on ILO's history under the Century Project (https://www.ilo.org/century/lang-en/index.htm).

54 Frey, Kunkel and Unger, *International Organizations and Development*, 3. On this perspective see, for example, the reflections concerning the research on FAO's History by Corinne A. Pernet and Amalia Ribi Forclaz, "Revisiting the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO): International Histories of Agriculture, Nutrition, and Development," *The International History Review* 41, no. 2 (2019): 345–350.

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Sabine Selchow, Glenda Sluga

Development, international organizations and international economic thinking: a conceptual contribution

1 Introduction

Our chapter offers a conceptual contribution to the historiographical scholarship on development and international organisations (IOs). We put on the agenda the conception of a reality that has not yet been fully seen, and the historical manifestations of which have not yet been critically explored. This reality is one in which development is not a policy practice or idea that is shaped by international organisations – which act as political agents who do something or serve as spaces and tools for (other) political agents to do something – but in which development is a post-World War II discourse[1] that shapes international organizations. This relationship between development and IOs is a dynamic worth acknowledging and exploring because, first, IOs are not ahistorical; they change and look different at different moments in time. Capturing diachronic changes in IOs generally adds to our understanding of twentieth century international order. Second, in particular, how IOs change and how they look in different historical contexts matters because they are catalysts of a particular kind of knowledge; we call this knowledge "international economic thinking." International economic thinking plays a significant role in the construction of twentieth century international economic order. Consequently, the conception of reality that we introduce here points the scholarly view to a dynamic which is politically significant. At its heart are, on the one side, IOs as historical catalysts of international economic thinking which, in turn, feeds into the construction of twentieth century international economic order, and, on the other side, development as a discourse that shapes IOs.

We noticed this reality by accident when we brought together the two just mentioned concepts that we developed in different contexts and independently from each other. On the one side is our concept of international organisations as catalysts of international economic thinking. We developed this concept as part

1 With "discourse" we mean a web of meanings that brings out social reality. See further Sabine Selchow, *Negotiations of the "New World": The Omnipresence of "Global" as a Political Phenomenon* (transcript Verlag, 2017), https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839428962.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111280356-002

of a broader research program,[2] grounded in a long-term engagement with international histories and histories of international organisations, in general,[3] and motivated by a perceived gap in existing historiographies of economic thought, in particular.[4] On the other side is our concept of development as a post-World War II discourse that forms a mutually constitutive relationship with IOs, i. e. shapes IOs. We developed this concept grounded in our reception and critical extension of Daniel Speich Chasse's historiography of development.[5]

In this chapter, we introduce both of our concepts and conclude by bringing them together as a novel conceptual basis that makes possible a diverse set of original empirical investigations of the historical realities of the international dimension of the construction of twentieth century international economic order. To be clear, our chapter is not about how to think about IOs historically, nor does it interrogate the place of IOs in the development matrix. It provides a novel conceptual basis for empirical analyses. For historians of IOs and development, our concept of IOs as catalysts that trigger the production of international economic thinking, including on development, and shape it might be most valuable. As we suggest in this chapter, IOs serve this function by being spaces in which international economic thinkers produce knowledge, opportunities that attract individuals to the international realm, and power markers that position international economic thinking within political discourses. No matter which aspects of the histories of development are investigated, our concept invites analyses that go beyond treating IOs as independent actors but acknowledge the complex interplay between individuals and institutions in the production of global realities.

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2 ERC-2019-ADG – ERC Advanced Grant No 885285, "Twentieth-Century International Economic Thinking, and the Complex History of Globalization," https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/885285 (last accessed 12 March 2023).

3 E.g. Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Glenda Sluga, *The Invention of International Order: Remaking Europe after Napoleon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021). Also Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, eds., *Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History* (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

4 See Glenda Sluga, "Twentieth-Century International Economic Thinking, and the Complex History of Globalization: A New Research Programme" (Florence: EUI HEC; ECOINT, 2021), https://hdl.handle.net/1814/71573.

5 Daniel Speich Chassé, "Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System," in *International Organizations and Development, 1945–1990*, ed. Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel, and Corinna R. Unger (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014), 23–45, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137437549_2.

2 International organisations as catalysts of international economic thinking

Metaphors matter. They are more than descriptions of an independently existing reality and more than rhetorical devices. Metaphors are "the main mechanism through which we comprehend abstract concepts and perform abstract reasoning."[6] At the same time, metaphors organize and "reorganize our ideas about the world, help re-describe it and orient the search for causal links that explain phenomena."[7] Metaphors do something. The most prominent and probably most cited example that illustrates this point is the case of "argument" that Lakoff and Johnson discuss. In English, "argument" is grasped through the metaphorical field of war; a different social reality would be grasped and produced if "argument" was captured through the metaphorical field of dance.[8]

At the heart of the historiographical scholarship on development and international organisations stands a metaphor – more precisely, stand three metaphors.[9] They capture the abstract idea of "international organisations" and organize what is seen and investigated. The most used of these three metaphors is the metaphor of agent. IOs are imagined as human-like creatures. They have organs (e. g. "UN organs used their authority to define new norms"[10]) and bodies (e. g. "Even so, NGO representation […] was limited to the lesser bodies of the UN such as ECOSOC, instead of the General Assembly or the Security Council."[11]). As agents, IOs are active and "do" something (e. g. "[e]very year governments, international organizations,

6 George Lakoff, "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor," in *Metaphor and Thought*, ed. Andrew Ortony, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 244, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173865.013. See also George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

7 Stefano Fiori, *Machines, Bodies and Invisible Hands: Metaphors of Order and Economic Theory in Adam Smith* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 9.

8 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, "Conceptual Metaphor in Everyday Language," *The Journal of Philosophy* 77, no. 8 (August 1980): 453, https://doi.org/10.2307/2025464.

9 In the following, we refer to and use examples from the historiographical scholarship on development to speak to the assumed audience of this edited collection. It is crucial to note, though, that our concept of IOs as catalysts of international economic thinking did not come out (and would probably not have come out) of an engagement with this literature alone. As explained in the Introduction, it arises from a long-term engagement with the scholarship on international history at large.

10 S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History*, United Nations Intellectual History Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 9.

11 Anne E. Egelston, *Sustainable Development: A History* (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013), 22, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4878-1.

private foundations, and even multi-national corporations offer billions of dollars to spur economic growth,"[12] "the World Health Organization (WHO) [...] held a ceremony"[13]). IOs are commonly imagined as one of two kinds of agents, namely actors, who play a "role" and form an "ensemble,"[14] and players.[15] As active agents they are conscious and intentional; they have an understanding of something and hold and pursue objectives.[16] IOs might be directed by a human individual but ultimately act as sovereign creatures (e. g. "Under the directorship of the British biologist Julian Huxley (1887–1975) [...], UNESCO decided to contribute [...]"[17]).

Agent is the most common metaphorical field through which IOs are made meaningful in the literature. Two other metaphorical fields are space, in which something happens, and tool, that is used by (other) political actors to achieve a goal. The latter includes the metaphor machinery which is not just a symbolic device used by scholars to make sense of IOs but has also been used over time by

12 Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela, "Introduction," in *The Development Century: A Global History*, ed. Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 1. Here and in the following quotes highlights were added.

13 Erez Manela, "Smallpox and the Globalization of Development," in *The Development Century*, ed. Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 83, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108678940.005.

14 E. g. "the role of international organizations and transnational expert networks in defining development ideas, policies, and practice," in Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela, eds., *The Development Century: A Global History*, Global and International History (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 10. "international organizations and INGOs were always part of an ensemble of institutions," Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel, and Corinna R. Unger, "Introduction: International Organizations, Global Development, and the Making of the Contemporary World," in *International Organizations and Development, 1945–1990*, ed. Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel, and Corinna R. Unger, The Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014), 15, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137437549_1. "The end of the Cold War marked a turning point in this regard, giving the United Nations the chance to establish themselves as the development actor in the global arena," Verena Kröss, Corinne A. Pernet and Corinna R. Unger, "International Organizations and Development," in *The Routledge Handbook on the History of Development*, ed. Corinna R. Unger, Iris Borowy and Corinne A. Pernet (London: Routledge, 2022), 252.

15 E. g. "The World Bank, the biggest development player, had already appeared on the global scene" (Frey, Kunkel, and Unger, "Introduction," 15.) There are other occasional metaphors; one of the latest ones are *meddlers*, used by Jamie Martin, *The Meddlers: Sovereignty, Empire, and the Birth of Global Economic Governance* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2022).

16 E. g. "The chapter focuses on these organizations to highlight the particularities and the differences with regard to the organizations' understandings of development" (Kröss, Pernet and Unger, "International Organizations and Development," 250).

17 Corinna R. Unger, *International Development: A Postwar History* (London; New York; Oxford; New Delhi; Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 53.

contemporary commentators and as a self-description in IOs' public communications, as prominently seen in the 1945 UN Charter.[18] The metaphorical field space is, for instance, manifest in the use of the terms platforms (e. g. "Besides academic exchanges, the United Nations system proved a fruitful platform to think about development")[19] and arenas (e. g. "The postwar international organizations [...] served as arenas in which those looking for development models and funding and those looking for opportunities to export their development expertise and to invest their money met"[20]).

Metaphors are never "right" or "wrong." They are "useful" or "not useful." Often, they are so common that they are invisible. This is true for the agent-metaphor in the historiographical scholarship on development and IOs; its invisibility is apparent in the fact that there is no scholarly reflection on its use.[21] There does not seem to be the need among scholars to justify the choice of this metaphor. While it is relatively easy to see the pathways metaphorical fields determine and the limits these imply, it is not always easy to identify and shift into a metaphorical field that provides the "ideal" pathways. This might explain why historians of development and IOs often mix metaphorical fields.[22]

In our long-term engagement with the scholarship on international histories we have come to realize that the imagination of IOs as agents is not unconditionally useful – at least, there is space to test other metaphors. On the one side, and most obviously, the metaphor runs the danger of obscuring political responsibility: who exactly are "the International Monetary Fund" and "the World Bank" who

18 For a discussion of this metaphor in the context of IOs, see Madeleine Herren, "Shifting Identities and Cosmopolitan Machineries: A New World Imagined at the 1919 Peace Conference in Paris," in *Transcultural Turbulences Towards a Multi-Sited Reading of Image Flows* (Berlin: Springer, 2011), 67–82. For a general discussion of the machine-metaphor, see Fiori, *Machines, Bodies and Invisible Hands*; and Nora S. Vaage, "Living Machines: Metaphors We Live By," *NanoEthics* 14, no. 1 (2020): 57–70, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-019-00355-2.

19 Alessandro Iandolo, "De-Stalinizing Growth: Decolonization and the Development of Development Economics in the Soviet Union," in *The Development Century*, ed. Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 217, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108678940.010.); see also Madeleine Herren, *Internationale Organisationen seit 1865: eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung*, Geschichte kompakt (Darmstadt: WBG, Wiss. Buchges, 2009).

20 Krösss, Pernet and Unger, "International Organizations and Development," 254.

21 In general, historians rarely reflect explicitly on the metaphors they use to grasp IOs. This includes our own writings, i.a. Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga, "New Histories of the United Nations," *Journal of World History* 19, no. 3 (2008). For an exception see *Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865.*

22 Often the agent-metaphor is mixed with the space-metaphor; see for instance Krösss, Pernet, and Unger, "International Organizations and Development."

"wield great influence over the domestic economic policies of many states around the world,"[23] and who are/were "the League of Nations" and "the Bank of International Settlement" who "meddle/d" in national economic policies after having been designed by their "architects"[24]? On the other side, the metaphorical field of IOs as human-like agents sidelines (other) important actors. It is this latter observation that motivated us to think about alternative metaphorical fields to capture IOs in the study of international historical realities.

The individuals that the imagination of IOs as agents obscures are those who work within IOs' international institutionalized environments.[25] Among them is a cohort of people that is of particular interest to us. It is those individuals who work within the environments of international economic organizations, such as ECOSOC, the ILO, World Bank, IMF, the ICC, and the UN Regional Economic Commissions but also economic units, divisions, and programs linked to other IOs, such as UNDP. They are staff, consultants, and other associates. Their positions and expertise are legitimized on grounds as diverse as a formal education in economics, local knowledges, or experiences as businesspeople.[26] Indeed, the credibility and legitimation of these individuals is historical; it changes over time and differs across institutional environments. Importantly, they are also women.

Grounded in recent historiographical findings, we take it as a characteristic of international economic institutional environments that "[f]emale experts, including those trained in economics, were able to find work and roles [there] in ways that were not possible for them in national-state contexts."[27] Hence, women form a key aspect in the study of this cohort – not because of their absolute number or some kind of assumed essential distinctness and/or essential importance,

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23 Martin, *The Meddlers*, 1.

24 Martin, 11.

25 To be clear, this is not to say that historiographies that utilise the agent-metaphor do not consider individuals. They do. See for instance Unger who stresses, "[i]ndividual experts, many of them academics—engineers, economists, sociologists, geographers, anthropologists, demographers, historians, urban planners, agronomists—produced the knowledge and wrote the textbooks that became the theoretical basis of development practice" (Unger, *International Development*, 7). However, they do not see the kind of "international" individuals we point to.

26 For initial explorations of distinct individuals, see the "Profiles"-collection, available online at: https://www.ecoint.org/profiles (last accessed 12 March 2023).

27 Sluga, "Twentieth-Century International Economic Thinking, and the Complex History of Globalization: A New Research Programme," 6. See also Glenda Sluga, "Women, Feminisms and Twentieth-Century Internationalisms," in *Internationalisms*, ed. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 61–84, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107477568.005, which also includes a discussion of the limits of women's employment at and engagements with IOs, such as the LoN.

but because of their relative prominent existence as economic experts in international economic environments. Hence, without considering women one misses the pictures of international economic organizations, even if empirical explorations of a moment in time show their absence or insignificance. The effect of our move to write women experts as a constitutive aspect into our concept of this cohort of individuals is that their study is not optional; considering women experts in international historiographies of development and IOs is not motivated by a normative argument but a necessity that is grounded in the nature of historical realities. This is worth stressing because it is also a historical reality, and has been acknowledged in many ways, that it is labor intensive to "find" and study them. This is because women's existence as experts in international economic environments has been differently visible than that of men experts. It is often hidden in historical sources and requires effort and creativity to find.

We consider this cohort of individuals in international economic institutional environments important and distinct enough to move it into the scholarly limelight by making it visible through a label. We call them "international economic thinkers." We symbolically establish them, i. e., conceptualize them as a historical reality, and, with that, we put them forward for empirical explorations because their study adds to the public understanding of the histories of twentieth century international economic order; more precisely, it helps shedding light to a distinctly international dimension of these histories. This is because "international economic thinkers' produce a distinct kind of international knowledge, which we call "international economic thinking," that feeds into the construction of twentieth century international economic order.

We use the term "thinking" instead of "thoughts" to highlight the production of this knowledge as an activity. We want to stress the temporal and spatial context that shape the produced ideas. For us, the term "thinking" (as opposed to "thought") indicates social processes and power. Not least, it naturalises the necessity of using other sources than "just" official publications and accepted contributions to the respective historical canon, such as private correspondence and other multi-modal reflections. "Thinking" is manifest and visible in various, including unusual places. More generally, and speaking to the existing scholarship, our use of "thinking" marks a "shift away from the traditional preoccupation of histories of thought with elite intellectuals, usually (European) men."[28]

28 For further reflections on why we choose the term "thinking" instead of "thoughts" see Sluga, "Twentieth-Century International Economic Thinking, and the Complex History of Globalization: A New Research Programme."

In our conception, international economic thinking is about two things. On the one side, and most obviously, international economic thinking is about the negotiation of concrete issues related to the respective institutional work programs in the contexts in which it is produced, such as agriculture, poverty, aid, environment, as well as concrete policy mechanisms, such as taxation, foreign direct investments, patents etc. In one way or other, these issues are grounded in economic theories. On the other side, less obviously, international economic thinking is for us about the negotiation of four broader themes that run through all of the above and make international economic thinking "international." Historical manifestations of them might be "characteristic" for particular economic theories but they are not grounded in them. The themes organize and shape collective life more broadly. One could say they are central aspects of an "international political culture." These four themes are:

1. Imaginations of "the social" versus 'the economic";
2. Imaginations of "the technical" versus "the political";
3. Imaginations of 'the public" versus "the private";
4. In addition, international economic thinking is always about a negotiation of "the national." This negotiation is prominently and differently captured in ideas and practices of integration, cooperation, transnationalisation and globalization.

The "international" character of international economic thinking comes from these themes. For sure, these themes might play a role in political debates in local and national contexts. However, we see them as manifestations of the "international" character of international economic thinking because it is the nature of the "international realm" (in a world shaped by what sociologist Ulrich Beck calls the "national outlook")[29] that these issues are up for debate.

In addition to these themes, which we see as significant (underlying) aspects in international negotiations of the world, the "international" character of International economic thinking also arises from how international economic thinking, and its thinkers, come into being. This brings us to the metaphorical field through which we choose to grasp IOs.

So far, we have used the metaphorical field environment to capture where international economic thinkers produce international economic thinking. We now move away from this "nature-based" metaphorical field towards a more "human-

29 I.a. Ulrich Beck, *The Cosmopolitan Vision* (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2006). For an in-depth discussion of the notions "national outlook" and "cosmopolitised outlook" see Sabine Selchow, "The Paths Not (yet) Taken: Ulrich Beck, the 'Cosmopolitized World' and Security Studies," *Security Dialogue* 47, no. 5 (October 2016): 369–85, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010616647859.

made" one. We grasp IOs as catalysts. We see IOs as catalysts for international economic thinking. As with all metaphors, the mechanical idea of a catalyst holds symbolic restrictions. Yet, in want of a better metaphor we use it for now to convey the idea that IOs bring out international economic thinking but are not "themselves" human-like "producers and brokers of knowledge," as Frey et al. see them.[30] Rather, as catalysts they trigger something; they trigger the production of international economic thinking and shape it by being

a. spaces, in which international economic thinkers produce knowledge,
b. opportunities that attract individuals to the international realm, i. e. to become international economic thinkers, and
c. power markers that position international economic thinking within political discourses.

Each of these three aspects of the catalysts IOs are historical.

We now turn to our second concept: development as a post-World War II discourse that forms a mutually constitutive relationship with IOs, i. e. shapes (the catalysts) IOs.

3 The mutually constitutive relationship between development and IOs

In his paper "Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System," Daniel Speich Chassé tackles the question: "When, why and in what forms did questions of development become key topics for international organizations?"[31] The answer he develops is not just original but constructive for us. This is because it does not just provide historical substance for our understanding of development as a post-World War II discourse[32] that divides the world into a global North and global South, cements the "national outlook," and favours technical, economic knowledges. More than that, it enables us to see an overlooked reality in which development brings out IOs. To be clear, Speich Chassé himself does not see this reality; yet, it is because of his argumentation, by pushing

30 Frey, Kunkel and Unger, "Introduction," 8.

31 Speich Chassé, "Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System," 23.

32 As noted above, when we say "discourse" we refer to a web of meanings that brings out the social world. For a detailed discussion and references to the key literature see *Selchow, Negotiations of the "New World."*

this argumentation a step further and through the addition of "legitimacy" to his story, that we were able to see it.

Looking at the historiographical scholarship on development, Speich Chassé points to two positions. The first sees development as a post-World War II reality, essentially born through US President Truman's inauguration. The second position that he identifies stresses that development has a longer history that goes beyond the 1940s since it is a manifestation of "modernist notions of progress and betterment."[33] Of course, these two positions are only a device to order the literature. If we look closely, we see that scholars hardly take one position without somewhat acknowledging the other. Yet, they are a productive device that enables Speich Chassé to make an original move. He does not position himself in one camp or other, nor "in-between." In view of these two positions, he opens an original conceptual path and looks at the nexus of these two positions, identifying a crucial empirical question which goes to the heart of realities of development. This is the question, why exactly in the 1940s the long-existing "modernist notions of progress and betterment" turned into an "international social practice."[34] To answer this question, Speich Chassé looks at "economic cooperation"[35] in the interwar period. Referring to the economic expert boards and international conferences organized by the ILO and the League of Nations (LoN), the aims of the LoN's Mandate Commission, as well as the move in French and British colonial policies towards "developmental connections," he identifies in that period "[f]orms of economic cooperation across national borders and instances of a technical internationalism in a geographic North–South setting."[36] As a way of grasping the nature of these forms of economic cooperation, Speich Chassé singles out three of their "aspects"[37]

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33 Speich Chassé, p. 23. For the record and because it is an important literature we want to add to this position accounts that do not set out to position development in the history of modernist thinking but in the history of pre-World War II efforts by (eventual) "developing countries"; an example for this is Thornton's study of how postrevolutionary Mexico "demanded development" in the interwar period. Christy Thornton, "'Mexico Has the Theories': Latin America and the Interwar Origins of Development," in *The Development Century*, ed. Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 263–82, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108678940.013. Christy Thornton, *Revolution in development: Mexico and the governance of the global economy* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2021).

34 Speich Chassé, "Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System," 23.

35 At one point he uses the term "international development" synonymously. This is conceptually misleading. Hence, we stick with "economic cooperation."

36 Speich Chassé, "Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System," 27.

37 Speich Chassé, 27.

(he uses the words "aspects" and "dimensions"[38] synonymously): a "[g]eographical, epistemological, and organizational" one.[39]

The geographical aspect/dimension of interwar economic cooperation refers to the North/South division that shaped economic cooperation in colonialism. "The planetary action space of European colonialism fostered a geographical imagination that encompassed a global North and a global South," describes Speich Chassé.[40] The epistemological aspect/dimension of interwar economic cooperation that Speich Chassé highlights refers to the "order of knowledge"[41] that shaped it. Speich Chassé finds that "the discipline of economics seems to have contributed little to colonial development before World War II. [...] Colonialism was a mode of exploitation and, thus, an intrinsically economic endeavour. But there was no need for an economic theory in order to exploit the colonies economically."[42] Instead, he argues, anthropology, political science, linguistics, psychology, hygiene, and agriculture were preferred scholarly discourses; he refers to Malcolm Hailey's *An African Survey*[43] and S. Herbert Frankel's work to illustrate his point.[44] The latter, Speich Chassé finds, "understood development as a phenomenon of cultural change that could not be reduced to mechanistic models and assumptions."[45] The organizational aspect/dimension of economic cooperation in the interwar period refers to the establishment of the League of Nations as "the core of a new system of specialized bodies grouping around a new notion of technocratic politics"[46] and, connected to this, "the fact that a new figure – the expert – ha[d] entered the international scene and ha[d] quickly gained a prominent position."[47] Speich Chassé goes on citing Maurice Bourquin, who retrospectively observes for the LoN: "Step by step, under the constant pressure of daily needs and in favour of the circumstances, the bizarre edifice of what has become known as the technical organizations

38 Speich Chassé, 27.
39 Speich Chassé, 27.
40 Speich Chassé, 28.
41 Speich Chassé, 28.
42 Speich Chassé, 28.
43 Malcolm Hailey, *An African Survey. A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938).
44 Speich Chassé, "Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System," 29.
45 Speich Chassé, 29.
46 Speich Chassé, 30, with reference to Maurice Bourquin, *Vers Une Nouvelle Société Des Nations* (Neuchatel: Editions de la Baconniere, 1945).
47 Bourquin quoted in: Speich Chassé, "Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System," 30.

arose, a motley but useful collection of institutions."[48] Speich Chassé suggests that the LoN's 1939 'The Development of International Co-Operation in Economic and Social Affairs: Report of the Special Committee',[49] which came to be taken by contemporaries and historians as a blueprint for the UN Economic and Social Council, "registered this process of organizational change."[50]

For the 1940s, and especially the years between 1942–1946, he identifies the following shaping of the three aspects/dimensions of economic cooperation. Regarding the *geographical* aspect/dimension of economic cooperation and referring to Christophe Bonnueil[51] and Joseph Hodge[52], he observes that "massive personal and conceptual continuities run across the institutional break of decolonization."[53] One of these continuities was the dichotomy between the global North and the global South. It remained in place as the defining feature of the world of economic cooperation after World War II. It was this spatial imaginary that ultimately gave birth to 'development' – as something different from 'growth'. While 'growth' was the label for "economic policy measures [...] if the agents and the fields of implementation are located within Europe or North America; [...] they are 'development' interventions, if a different spatial focus is in place", i. e. if related to the Global South.[54] Regarding the epistemological and organisational aspects/dimensions of economic cooperation in the 1940s, Speich Chassé points to the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 and the Combined Production and Resources Boards, set up by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada in 1943, as crucial moments in which "the Kantian imperative of *enlightened reason* opened up a new political language and

48 Bourquin cited in: Speich Chassé, 30.

49 League of Nations, "The Development of International Co-Operation in Economic and Social Affairs: Report of the Special Committee" (Geneva: League of Nations, 1939).

50 Speich Chassé, "Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System," 30. Like others, Speich Chassé, p. 30, points out that the Bruce Report "had suggested to clearly separate all 'political' activities and organs of the League from its 'technical' organizations." This is not wrong but it overlooks the different meanings of the adjective "political" in the Bruce Report; see Sabine Selchow, "From 'Economic and Social Questions' to National Containers and Two Notions of 'Political': Findings of a Systematic Analysis of the Symbolic Construction of 'Economic Problems' in the League of Nation's Bruce Report (1939)" (Florence: EUI HEC; ECOINT, 2022), https://hdl.handle.net/1814/75130.

51 Christophe Bonneuil, "Development as Experiment: Science and State Building in Late Colonial and Postcolonial Africa, 1930–1970," *Osiris* 15 (January 2000): 258–81, https://doi.org/10.1086/649330.

52 Joseph Morgan Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007).

53 Speich Chassé, "Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System," 28.

54 Speich Chassé, 27.

new action frameworks."[55] They paved the path on which an international economic cooperation that was grounded in and guided by scientific knowledge "became plausible"[56] and set a "new action framework of technical internationalism."[57] While this "technical internationalism" focused first on the Global North, that is, the Western European world and its post-war reconstruction, e. g. through the establishment of UNECE and then OEED, it eventually embraced the whole world through the means of international technical assistance, set on track by the 1948 UN resolutions "Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries" and "Technical Assistance for Economic Development." International technical assistance was built on "macroeconomic modelling of national economies as mechanical devices,"[58] and Speich Chassé identifies W. Arthur Lewis' work[59] as the foundation of this, i. e. as providing an economic theory that could and would be applied also beyond the global North. Speich Chassé observes that "the deeper this new notion of development as growth was rooted in macroeconomic technicality, the clearer were its contours and the more useful it became in global politics. It allowed reducing the complexities of the colonial legacy to rather simple mechanisms of economic interaction, and it rephrased the abstract notion of a civilizing mission in the operational terms of economic policy."[60]

In short, Speich Chassé suggests that at that point, international economic cooperation had become a North-South issue, guided by the belief in apolitical measures and by an economic theory that saw the raising of national income through capital investment as a central strategy. More generally, it had become an issue that built on a quantifiable notion of growth.

In sum, Speich Chassé identifies and observes the development of three central aspects/dimensions of interwar international economic cooperation (geographical, epistemological, and organizational) as initially following "separate historical trajectories" but then "somewhat accidentally cross[ing] each other's lines in the 1940s"[61] and bringing out 'development' as a "new international social practice"[62] and "a buzzword in global politics."[63]

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55 Speich Chassé, 31.
56 Speich Chassé, 33.
57 Speich Chassé, 34.
58 Speich Chassé, 36.
59 William Arthur Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1955).
60 Speich Chassé, "Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System," 37.
61 Speich Chassé, 27.
62 Speich Chassé, 23.
63 Speich Chassé, 26.

Reflecting on his paper, Speich Chassé suggests that more work might be needed to test and elaborate on the causalities that shape the process of the emergence of "development" that he traces.[64] That is probably true. Maybe the "somewhat" in his notion "somewhat accidentally" could be substantiated. Yet, possible shortcomings in that respect are irrelevant for us here. For us, Speich Chassé's paper is a valuable intervention. On a general level, it simply adds historical substance to our understanding of development as a discourse that formed in the late 1940s and orders the world into a global North and a global South. It adds to our understanding of development as a discourse of political explosiveness because it reproduces the global South and positions it as an essential part of the post-World War II international economic order. The global South exists because of development, and development exists because of the global South. Development essentially "others" a large part of the globe vis-a-vis the global North as the globe's formerly (imperial) centre.[65] At the same time, with Speich Chassé we see development as an anti-colonial discourse. As Speich Chassé puts it with reference to Frederick Cooper,[66] "[w]hen colonial development was made an international organizational issue and linked to the social scientific resources of modern Western welfare states, it turned into a source of anti-colonial claims."[67] The discourse favours scientific, economic knowledges and, hence, technical solutions to social problems. With that, it de-politicises and turns the social world into an objective and quantifiable reality. Simultaneously, the kind of knowledge in which it had its foundation, i. e. macroeconomic modelling of national economies towards a quantifiable growth of national product, has two effects: first, it cements the national world, and more precisely it cements what sociologist Ulrich Beck[68] calls the "national outlook," even if it integrates the world and its national containers; and, second, it objectifies global inequalities founded in colonial realities. This makes the development discourse a "politically explosive",[69] 'non-political' discourse.

64 Speich Chassé, 26.

65 For extensive discussions of this see the post-development literature, i.a. Wolfgang Sachs, *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*, Third edition, Development Essentials (London: ZED Books Ltd, 2019).

66 Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, African Studies Series 89 (Cambridge, [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

67 Speich Chassé, "Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System," 35.

68 I.a. Ulrich Beck, *The Cosmopolitan Vision* (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2006).

69 Speich Chassé, "Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System," 35.

But Speich Chassé's paper does much more than providing additional substance to our idea of "development." It enables us to see an overlooked reality in which development brings out IOs.

Speich Chassé argues "that the promise of generally improving living conditions deployed a new global political potential after World War II because it was conceptualized as a technical issue and linked to academic expertise."[70] On the one side, he stresses that IOs "such as the United Nations were important actors in this process."[71] This is in line with the many other historians who understand IOs as agents in the construction of the development discourse. For instance, Frey et al. suggest, "[p]erhaps the 'scientization' of global development policy is [...] one of the most important processes that international organizations and INGOs have set in motion over the last six to seven decades."[72] On the other side, however, Speich Chassé goes further. He suggests that the development discourse found existence in the world of IOs because it stood/stands in accordance with IOs' "rationale"; he understands this "rationale" to be about "establishing transparent procedures in order to solve political problems."[73] For us, this is an interesting, empirically grounded move. On initial view, it indicates a relationship between "development" and IOs that is closer than one in which the latter "brings out" the former. On closer view, however, it does much more. It makes apparent a very different relationship between development and IOs, namely, a mutually constituting relationship.

This is our thinking: if the development discourse is/was closely linked to the "rationale" of IOs, as Speich Chassé demonstrates, then it is closely linked to IOs' legitimacy, i. e. the ground on which IOs exist. An IO's rationale is part of the struggle over their legitimacy. Legitimacy is about an IO's "right" to engage in solving social problems. Hence, legitimacy goes to the heart of IOs' very existence. Following scholars such as L. David Brown and Mark C. Suchman, legitimacy is a social construct.[74] It "is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an en-

70 Speich Chassé, 24.

71 Speich Chassé, 24.

72 Frey, Kunkel and Unger, "Introduction."

73 Speich Chassé, "Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the Founding Moment of the UN System," 26.

74 L. David Brown, *Creating Credibility: Legitimacy and Accountability for Transnational Civil Society* (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2008). Mark C. Suchman, "Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches," *The Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (1995): 571, https://doi.org/10.2307/258788. A fundamentally different scholarly take on "legitimacy" (in the global governance literature) is one that engages with normative criteria of legitimacy, such as criteria grounded in liberal democratic premises. For an example see: Robert O. Keohane, "Global Governance and Le-

tity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions."[75] Hence, how, when, and why some individual or collective social actors and knowledges are perceived as legitimate to help solve social problems is historical and arises from within the respective social environment within which they exist. Legitimacy is precarious, and social actors are involved in a constant process of securing it.[76] For instance, the League of Nation's decision to recruit "international staff," as opposed to "national delegates," which Ranshofen-Wertheimer describes and accredits to the League's first Secretary-General Drummond,[77] can be read as such a strategy to gain and secure legitimacy – as can the framing of various issues as "technical problems" that Speich Chassé identifies as part of the "rationale" of IOs post World War II[78] and that is at the heart of and reproduced through the development discourse.

Following this line of thought brings out a novel idea of development as a discourse that produces IOs. This idea becomes even more exciting if we combine it with our concept of IOs as catalysts of international economic thinking.

4 Conclusion

Combining our two concepts, IOs as catalysts of international economic thinking and development as a post-World War II discourse that shapes IOs, brings out a conception of a complex reality. This is a reality in which a politically explosive dis-

gitimacy," *Review of International Political Economy* 18, no. 1 (February 7 2011): 99–109, https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2011.545222.

75 Suchman, "Managing Legitimacy," 574.

76 Focusing on "transnational civil society," Brown works out the various bases of legitimacy for non-state actors and discusses strategies to secure legitimacy in a transnational context. *Brown, Creating Credibility.*

77 Egon F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, "International Administration: Lessons from the Experience of the League of Nations," *American Political Science Review* 37, no. 5 (1943): 872–87, https://doi.org/10.2307/1949103.

78 Of course this is not an explicitly post-World War II strategy but one that has also been at the heart of struggles over the legitimacy of the League of Nations, as seen, for instance, in the earlier mentioned "Bruce Report" (League of Nations, "The Development of International Co-Operation in Economic and Social Affairs: Report of the Special Committee"). However, an example that demonstrates that not everybody understood the technical/political-dichotomy as a strategy but as an attempt to best describe the nature of the various subject matters that were assigned to each category is Potter's committed, not to say, at times passionate critique of the "dubious nature of the classification," Pitman B. Potter, "Note on the Distinction between Political and Technical Questions," *Political Science Quarterly* 50, no. 2 (1935): 264, https://doi.org/10.2307/2143752.

course shapes a distinct aspect of the production of twentieth century international economic order, while, by nature of being a discourse, being itself historical.

What we have provided in this chapter is a conception of a distinct reality. Although empirically grounded, this conception is not a description of a historical empirical reality. As a conception, our picture of the reality we see can serve as the basis for novel empirical explorations. Inevitably, these will then extend and rewrite our conceptual basis.

The value of taking our presented conception as the basis for empirical synchronic and diachronic explorations is that, by highlighting an aspect of the production of international economic thinking as part of the international dimension of the construction of twentieth century international economic order, it focuses the view on a political reality that shapes global life.

There are countless avenues for empirical studies that our conception open. For instance, in a narrow sense, our presented conception enables analyses that capture the nature of IOs over time through synchronic and diachronic studies of what kinds of (IOs as) spaces and opportunities development has brought out. How have these kinds of spaces and opportunities impacted the legitimizing ground on which international economic thinkers were able to produce what kind of international economic thinking? Furthermore, our conception enables analyses of how the development discourse has shaped IOs as power markers over the course of the twentieth century. In a broad sense, our chapter provides the ground to ask empirical questions such as, how does development and its historically distinct impact/s on IOs and international economic thinking stand in relation to other economic discourses that have fed into the construction of twentieth century international economic order?[79]

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79 For a list of other discourses see Sluga, "Twentieth-Century International Economic Thinking, and the Complex History of Globalization: A New Research Programme," 5. Note that Sluga uses the term registers instead of discourses.

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Maha Ali

The legacy of Mahbub ul Haq: Exploring human development and economic rights at the United Nations

1 Introduction

The "economic rights" of Global South states and "human development" of people of the Global South, as ideas, have evolved at various stages and platforms of the United Nations (UN), specifically during its "Development Decades."[1] The post-second-world-war era witnessed a surge in post-colonial economic thinking and the Third World development discourse that had emerged sat in stark contrast to the existing western ideas of economic growth and industrial development. The prevalent western discourse and scholarship on "development" as a discipline has conventionally highlighted the role of International Labor Organization (ILO) as it successfully established the "employment-oriented" policies of development through its World Employment Program of 1969,[2] and by 1976 had adopted the "basic-needs approach."[3] This concept had earlier appeared in a UN publication of 1972 as well.[4] The new idea was also reflected in the changing World Bank policies towards so-called "developing" states under the leadership of Robert McNamara (1968–1981).[5] Hollis Chenery, the World Bank's Vice President under McNamara, went a step further and explored the "poverty-oriented" approach, in his work, when engaging with this idea.[6] According to Chenery, the ILO approach was an outcome of an exchange of ideas between the ILO and the World Bank, based on country studies by economists like Gus Ranis, Dudley Seers, and

1 The "Development Decades" of the UN spanned thirty years between 1960 and 1990.

2 "The World Employment Programme," Report of the Director-General, 53rd Session, International Labour Organization (Geneva, 1969).

3 "Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem," International Labour Organisation (Geneva, 1976).

4 "Report of the Committee for Development Planning's Attack on Mass Poverty and Unemployment," United Nations (New York, 1972).

5 Patrick Allan Sharma, *Robert McNamara's Other War: The World Bank and International Development* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).

6 Hollis Chenery et al., *Redistribution with Growth: Policies to Improve Income Distribution in Developing Countries in the Context of Economic Growth* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111280356-003

Richard Jolly, hence terming it a "joint activity."[7] Rimmler further elaborated upon the concept by stating that the basic-needs approach enables individuals' needs to be measured in terms of substantial categories such as food, healthcare etc. which have universal validity, rather than the "abstract monetary aggregates making up Gross National Product (GNP) estimates."[8] These changing trends can be viewed as indications of the evolving discourse on "development" within the Development Decades of the UN.

In South Asia, as in many other parts of (then) Third World, development as an idea was moving far beyond merely theoretical debates, and directly into domestic economic discourse and within the policy-making arena. Through the late 1940s into the coming decades, as several economists were keenly studying newly independent countries after the withdrawal of colonial powers from Africa and Asia, Mahbub ul Haq, a Pakistani economist, was also, like his contemporaries, gradually departing from traditional theories of development economics to understand the workings of new developing economies in South Asia. In the 1960s, he had begun to realize that his elitist western training on development and economic growth was not going to prove too fruitful to the South Asian model, and among many other hindrances in understanding developing economies, the GNP as a measure of growth was not contributing much to the study and growth of societies which had been plagued by poverty due to centuries of colonial plunder. The GNP, which had been an instrument for measurement of economic growth in industrialized countries, fell short as a tool for evaluation when assessing and furthering the ambition of placing the human at the centre of development discourse, (henceforth called "human development") in the Third World. Since domestic savings were minimal in most newly independent countries, this would result in a high reliance on foreign aid for development projects. It was only with an increased reliance on external capital that a developing country's growth rate could be expected to outpace the scale of growth of its population. This amplified dependence on external capital also came with the additional baggage of increased military budgets and higher defence expenditures for developing countries, essentially derailing the development agenda. Moreover, increased restrictions and tariffs on trade by the developed countries had been harming local industries and agriculture in the developing economies. Third World economists and activists then

7 "Transcript of Oral History Interview with Hollis B. Chenery," interviewed by Robert. E. Asher. Oral History Program, World Bank Group Archives, January 27, 1983.

8 Douglas Rimmer, ""Basic Needs" and the Origins of the Development Ethos," *The Journal of Developing Areas* 15, no. 2 (1981): 215–38.

began to push forward the "infant industry" argument,[9] employing it in context of the developing world, for the protection of domestic industries from international competition and to promote economic rights and development locally.[10] In the 1970s, economists from the Third World also collectively moved to push for the establishment of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), which was meant to safeguard interests of the Third World amidst declining terms of trade and the imbalance of power within the existing international economic order. Mahbub ul Haq's advocacy and narrative at the world stage regarding the NIEO had complemented those of his other Third World contemporaries, to push forward this Latin American proposal that had emerged under the leadership of Raúl Prebisch at the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in order to defend economic rights of the developing states.

Another concern amidst the increasingly urgent developmental agenda of the Third World, as well as the newly emerging environmental concerns of the developed world, was how to ensure that both these agendas were not mutually exclusive, and that development and environmental conservation could go hand-in-hand. This collective movement of essentially re-inventing the idea of development to various ends, which had been initiated by leaders, politicians, academics and intellectuals of the Third World to shift away from economic growth-centric ideas of the west, and to bring about a shift in discourse with regard to the idea of development and economic rights within the "Three Development Decades" of the UN, has been explored at length within the history of development. However, specifically spotlighting the efforts, advocacy and individual trajectories of various Asian actors pushing against the current, at several multilateral institutions, while promoting this Third World agenda of economic rights, and contributing to the larger understanding of "development" as a discipline, has been rendered rather under-explored. Mahbub ul Haq was one such individual whose international advocacy and journey towards bringing about this "human development revolution" amidst resistance from his western colleagues in the World Bank and the UN, as well as his compatriots at home, needs to be highlighted within

9 Initially articulated by Alexander Hamilton in 1791 for trade protectionism in the United States. See J.S. Mill, "Principles of political economy", in *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. III,* ed. J. M. Robson, (University of Toronto Press, 1848), 918–919; Marc J. Melitz, "When and how should infant industries be protected?" *Journal of International Economics*, 66 (2005): 177–196.

10 Bela Balassa and Joel Bergsman, *The structure of protection in developing countries.* (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971); Shahid Javed Burki, "Economic Growth, Poverty Alleviation and Human Dignity," in *Pioneering the Human Development Revolution: An Intellectual Biography of Mahbub Ul Haq*, ed. Khadija Haq, Richard J. Ponzio, and Amartya Sen (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008).

the wider history of development, shedding light on the years prior to his conception of the ground-breaking Human Development Reports (HDR) of the UN.

2 From economic growth to poverty alleviation

In his book, *The Poverty Curtain*, Mahbub ul Haq had highlighted the "seven sins" which had been committed by the "priesthood of development planners." These had constituted of "playing number games," establishing "excessive economic controls," fixating on "development fashions," being persistently preoccupied with "investment illusions," allowing detachment between implementation and planning mechanisms, as well as the heightened "mesmerization" of planners with high growth rates in Gross National Product (GNP).[11] However, he had only developed this line of thought after having committed many of these "seven sins" himself during his decade of planning and economic policy-making stint in Pakistan.

Mahbub ul Haq was born in 1934, in a town called Gurdaspur in British India, into a family who had emigrated to Pakistan following communal violence during the partition of the subcontinent.[12] After securing successive scholarships to finish his doctoral studies at Yale and Harvard Universities, he had returned to lead the Planning Commission in Pakistan at the age of 23, becoming the chief architect of its Second Five Year Plan (1960–65) under the government of military dictator Ayub Khan. Though not much is known about his prior political links to Ayub Khan's government or about his direct appointment into this prestigious position at such a young age, it was rather common in the 1950s and 1960s for economic experts employed by the Planning Commission of Pakistan to have strong prior links with either Ford Foundation or Harvard University due to the heavy funding that the country had been receiving from the United States, and hence the establishment of a separate "Planning Commission" without much bureaucratic interference was also partly to confer these technocrats with a certain amount of autonomy.[13] Even though Haq later proceeded to understand and explore the significance of poverty reduction in the late 1960s, he had initiated his economic planning ca-

11 G. F. Rohrlich, "Review of The Cruel Dilemmas of Development: Twentieth-Century Brazil," *Journal of Economic Issues* 16, no. 1 (1982): 337–39; Mahbub ul Haq, *The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World* (New York: Columbia University Press. 1976).

12 Amartya Sen and Tam Dalyell, "Obituary: Mahbub ul Haq," *The Independent*, August 3, 1998.

13 This body had been established during the groundwork for the First Five Year Plan of the country, which had also been prepared under the supervision of Harvard economists. See Feroz Ahmed, "Pakistan Forum: Building Dependency in Pakistan," MERIP Reports, no. 29, JSTOR (1974): 17–20; Albert Waterston, *Planning in Pakistan* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).

reer as a young professional at the Planning Commission by highlighting growth-centric ideas and their significance in accelerating growth for a developing economy like Pakistan. His policies in the early 1960s had reflected the idea that poverty alleviation was possible only through economic growth, when the necessary "fiscal space" had been created for the government to be able to spare the necessary capital on poverty alleviation programmes aimed at uplifting masses, as well as creating employment and educational opportunities. These poverty alleviation plans were to supposedly pick up pace at the next stages of the more urgent "economic boost" that the country needed to create said "fiscal space." While formulating the Second Five Year Plan, Haq had argued that high growth rates would eventually benefit a developing economy like Pakistan as this would also allow for funds to be invested in the more overlooked parts of the country, i. e. East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).[14]

Partially, Haq's policies in the Second Five Year Plan for Pakistan proved useful, in so much as the figures were concerned, as the Plan generated a growth rate which was unparalleled in Pakistan's two decade history. In both East and West Pakistan, the GDP reportedly shot up at a rate of six percent per annum, while figures for income per head of the population were also unmatched as they grew by 2.9 percent per annum. [15] These figures had seemingly pleased economists both within and outside of Pakistan, and when the Third Five Year Plan (1965–1970) of the country was launched, Shahid Javed Burki recounts that a workshop held at Harvard University went so far as to describe Pakistan as a "model for development for the rest of the developing world."[16] Burki, a colleague of Mahbub ul Haq as Senior Economist at the World Bank and who later became the Regional Vice President of the Bank in 1990s, was then pursuing his postgraduate degree in economics at Harvard University, and recollected that in a seminar conducted by Albert Hirschman and Edward Mason, the students were taught using a textbook which had a number of development case studies referencing several sectors of the Pakistani economy.[17] This textbook by Gustav Papanek also had inputs of various economic consultants of the Planning Commission of Pakistan.[18] This is no surprise, as many of these economists were, to a large extent, American-sponsored due to the foreign aid pouring into Pakistan from the US.[19]

14 Burki, "Economic Growth, Poverty Alleviation and Human Dignity."
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Gustav Fritz Papanek, *Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).
19 Ahmed, "Pakistan Forum: Building Dependency in Pakistan," 17–20.

However, even after having received much international acclaim over the growth rates of its economy, merely a few weeks after announcing the Third Five Year Plan, Ayub Khan's government completely aborted this strategy by going to war with India. Not only was this war short-lived, but it also managed to reveal all of Pakistan's economic shortcomings, along with its military weaknesses, ones that were previously being excessively celebrated by its government on account of their high growth rates. This was an eye-opener to those celebrating its fleeting economic successes had proved how the country was completely reliant on its external funding "to augment the meagre amounts saved by the government, households, and the corporate sector."[20] As a consequence of the war, external funding for the country froze, and the United States, being one of the country's biggest financiers, had also backed out. At this point, Mahbub ul Haq and his team at the Planning Commission needed a fresh, new strategy to deal with the unpredictable but looming economic problems of Pakistan. This was also the major turning point in Haq's intellectual journey as he began shifting away from primarily growth-centric ideas in development and moved towards the goal of poverty alleviation, which he noticed had remained unaltered, even with such high growth rates that the Second Five Year Plan had achieved. Another visible ideological shift at this juncture, within Haq's wider professional curve, was to highlight the need for increasing expenditure on poverty alleviation programs, and a decrease in military budgets in developing countries.

These gradual transitions in Haq's trajectory could be observed through his career progression as it later led him to serve at the World Bank Group under its President, Robert McNamara. During his time at the Bank, he applied his experience from the Planning Commission in Pakistan as case studies of models which may or may not work for newly independent developing countries. However, his ideas or newer perspectives for change were not always met with enthusiasm. According to Haq, when he had initially joined the World Bank, McNamara had been dismissive and critical of his aggressive inquisitorial approach toward growth-centric models, at a point when the World Bank had been highly dedicated toward its production projects.[21] However, after the initial months of facing this resistance from McNamara, he found various opportunities of engaging in discussions on these issues with the World Bank President on an individual basis, which eventually led him to win McNamara's support and trust. One of Haq's initial successes at the Bank was drafting McNamara's first policy speech where he addressed the bot-

20 Haq, Ponzio, and Sen, *Pioneering the Human Development Revolution.*

21 "Transcript of Oral History Interview with Mahbub ul Haq," interviewed by Robert. E. Asher. World Bank Group Archives Oral Histories, December 3, 1982.

tom forty percent of the world and their deteriorating situation, delivered in Nairobi in 1973.[22] This idea marked a significant shift in the World bank's outlook since its inception, as its policies had been largely geared towards reconstruction and industrialization from the beginning. Harry Dexter White, whose ideas were instrumental in the making of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), had drawn up post-war proposals for the Bank which did not feature the idea of development for the poorer countries; rather, it was only in the 1960s when George David Woods took over as President of the Bank that the role of economists was considerably increased internally, hence beginning the process of a gradual shift in the Bank's overall outlook and agenda.[23] In the early 1970s, within Haq's role as an economist and the Chief of World Bank's policy division, he was able to have "direct and frequent access" to McNamara on policy issues, with some "powerful interchanges" according to McNamara's assistants,[24] and Haq had stated that McNamara used to include him in "major policy discussions and decisions" within the Bank.[25] However, considering McNamara's domineering character, Haq mentioned in an interview that he would only dissent from the President's views "one on one, quietly in his office," as McNamara "used to feel really challenged by dissent" within larger Policy Review Committee meetings.[26] Nevertheless, this evidently did not deter him from partaking in discussions and debates with McNamara where he would put forward his perspectives from the Global South and push for the promotion of poverty eradication models at the Bank. McNamara's assistants, Lafourcade and Christoffersen, emphasize that Hollis Chenery, Mahbub-ul-Haq and Monty Yudelman, who were reportedly "giants in their field", proved to become the three main assets for McNamara within his poverty eradication project at the Bank, with academic endorsement coming from Chenery as a development economist at Harvard, Haq's experience working as

22 Ibid.

23 Mirek Tobias Hosman, "Internal Dynamics as Drivers of Change in International Organizations: The Economists' Takeover at the World Bank", *Swiss Journal of Sociology* 49, no. 1, (2023): 41–60; Sharma, *Robert McNamara's Other War: The World Bank and International Development.*

24 "Transcript of Oral History Interview With Sven Burmester, Leif Christoffersen, Caio Koch-Weser, Olivier Lafourcade, Anders Ljungh, And Rainer Steckhan" interviewed by John Heath. World Bank Group Archives Oral Histories, September 1, 2017.

25 "Transcript of Oral History Interview with Mahbub ul Haq," interviewed by Robert. E. Asher. World Bank Group Archives Oral Histories, December 3, 1982.

26 Ibid.

an economic advisor for a developing country and Yudelman's empirical fieldwork conducted in Africa.[27]

According to Chenery, Haq's role was mainly policy and advocacy oriented at the Bank.[28] He demonstrated this not just by being involved in formulating the Bank's policies for the next decade but by also being vocal about these concerns at various international platforms. At the twelfth World Conference of the Society for International Development in Ottawa in 1971, he articulated how Pakistan becoming a major case study of economic growth in the developing world had not essentially translated into poverty reduction or higher employment levels for the population of the country. He used the example to highlight that even though economists expected that these elements would become a by-product of a high growth economy, it was often the opposite case in developing countries, as evidenced. In the early 1970s, a visible shift could be observed in terms of Haq's economic planning thought as he began quoting the example of the Chinese model of poverty eradication. He would highlight that, in China, they had managed to achieve the desired results within two decades without having concentrated on any growth-centric models for their economy. This was also because they had to temporarily adjust their consumption patterns which were "more consistent with their [existing] poverty levels."[29] He was critical of "products of Western liberalism," including those like himself who had "returned to their countries to deliver development" but instead had often ended up "delivering tensions and unrest."[30]

However, these ideas were not easily palatable with some of his western colleagues and were met with resistance at various stages. During his time at the World Bank, in the 1970s, when Haq had travelled to Guyana to deliver lectures, propagating the imminent necessity for NIEO, the United States (US) Ambassador in Guyana had protested against this move, and the US State Department had submitted that Mahbub ul Haq had no place in the World Bank with such views.[31] This incident and many others had led to personal interactions between McNamara and Haq, where the President had conveyed to the latter that his "drawer was

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27 "Transcript Of Oral History Interview With Sven Burmester, Leif Christoffersen, Caio Koch-Weser, Olivier Lafourcade, Anders Ljungh, And Rainer Steckhan" interviewed by John Heath. World Bank Group Archives Oral Histories, September 1, 2017.

28 "Transcript of Oral History Interview with Hollis B. Chenery," interviewed by Robert. E. Asher. Oral History Program, World Bank Group Archives, January 27, 1983.

29 "12th World Congress, Society for International Development," Ottawa, Mahbub Ul Haq Articles and Speeches (1971–1977), Records of Office of External Affairs (WB IBRD/IDA EXT) (Washington DC: World Bank Group Archives (WBGA), 1971).

30 Ibid.

31 "Transcript of Oral History Interview with Mahbub ul Haq," interviewed by Robert. E. Asher. World Bank Group Archives Oral Histories. December 3, 1982.

full of letters, which had come to him calling for [Mahbub-ul-Haq's] resignation." Many of these had, in fact, been submitted by the "senior members of the World Bank's Presidential staff."[32] Moreover, according to William Clark, Director of Information and Public Affairs for the Bank, McNamara used to "get furious with Mahbub for making remarks that were going to be troublesome with Congress".[33] However, even with such friction and resistance, Haq had admitted that McNamara saw him as an ally and had never dictated or influenced his views by asking him to modify his speeches within or outside the Bank.[34]

3 "Development weariness" in the developing world

The subsequent year at the International Development Conference, held in Washington DC in 1972, Haq pointed out that certain seemingly successful case studies of developing states had turned into "development disasters," while quoting the examples of Pakistan and Nigeria during his speech.[35] Through his speeches at international platforms, he was evidently portraying the perspectives of developing countries more openly and publicly than would perhaps be possible at the Bank. He spoke about a concept called the "development weariness" which was becoming increasingly common in developing countries, in addition to "aid weariness."[36] More actors from these countries were voicing the need for a social and economic revolution, reclaiming their economic rights, rather than more foreign aid packages which were not "partnerships" to begin with and ended up worsening the debt crises of the developing countries. Additionally, Haq had also signalled that the developing world was in no position to pay back its foreign debt of sixty billion dollars (as of 1972), and that the world community at large would have to make necessary arrangements to cancel off such debt.[37]

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32 Ibid.

33 "Transcript of oral history interview with William D. Clark – Second interview session", interviewed by Robert E. Asher. World Bank Group Archives Oral Histories. October 5, 1983.

34 Ibid.

35 Mahbub ul Haq, "Crisis in Development Strategies, Published in World Development," Volume I (Oxford, July 7, 1973): 29–31 [Speech originally delivered at the International Development Conference, Mahbub Ul Haq Articles and Speeches (1971–1977)]. WBGA (Washington DC, 1972).

36 Ibid.

37 Mahbub ul Haq, International Development Conference, 1972. Mahbub Ul Haq Articles and Speeches (1971–1977). WBGA.

On various occasions, he pointed out the irony attached to development assistance projects which had failed to do exactly what they intended. He reiterated that the "sorry record of development assistance" that had been received by developing countries in the last two decades had left him and his liberal contemporaries convinced that they were perhaps "much better off without" such assistance.[38] He stated that the illusion of western living standards that was being portrayed to the developing countries was a farce at best as merely focusing on economic growth-centric models could hardly ever allow the populations of the developing countries to reach such standards of living. The western living standards had to a large extent been achieved due to centuries of colonial policies and industrialization at the expense of colonized countries, by violating their economic rights, and these trends could not be replicated within decades without having made poverty eradication their utmost priority.[39]

Continuing in a similar vein of his Third World contemporaries,[40] Haq suggested a massive redefinition of economic and social policies would be required at the national levels, in addition to a liquidation and redistribution of assets of the most privileged factions carrying the largest amount of vested interests in such societies. He even went so far as to suggest a reorganization of political and economic power in a country to achieve such dramatic results. However, he did admit that such changes in a society could only perhaps be achieved through revolutions instead of through any evolutionary mechanisms.[41] At the time of Haq's statement, in the early 1970s, the Pakistan's People's Party had taken over the government, after elections which led to the separation of East Pakistan, making Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto the first populist elected leader of the Western part. Bhutto had later invited Mahbub ul Haq to quit the World Bank, return to his country and to oversee its economic planning once again, just as he had done under Ayub Khan's government. However, as Haq returned to take up this project, Bhutto's Finance Minister, Mubashir Hasan's radical ideas regarding reallocation and liquidation of assets of the most powerful families of Pakistan reportedly did not sit well with Mahbub ul Haq, as he did not entirely believe in the government's blanket nationalization policies, still holding faith in the market. Thus, he chose to travel back to the World

38 Haq, "Crisis in Development Strategies."

39 Ibid.

40 Raúl Prebisch. "The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems".(New York: United Nations, 1950); Raúl Prebisch, "Interpretacao do Processo de Desenvolvimento Economico" in Revista Brasileira de Economia (1951): 7–117; Charles A. Frankenhoff, "The Prebisch Thesis: A Theory of Industrialism for Latin America," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 4, no. 2 (1962): 185-206.

41 Haq, "Crisis in Development Strategies."

Bank where he would join his previous position again under Robert McNamara,[42] after which he would choose to work under yet another military dictator in Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq. During his time at the Bank, however, in a news article in 1977, he issued a scathing critique of Bhutto's government in Pakistan, and of the human rights violations including election rigging, lack of freedom of the press, restrictions on freedom of the judiciary and of the civil society. He opposed the United States supplying tear gas and arms to Pakistan because "if this is how the Americans are going to show their friendship" to Pakistan, then they were certainly much "better off without it."[43]

Similarly, within his role at the World Bank, he continued to push forward the same hypothesis that if higher growth rates are achieved only due to higher military spending or by catering to the demands of the richer and privileged factions of society with higher production of luxury products, this would not necessarily translate into a more stable economy, which could much rather be achieved through relatively lower growth rates that were more evenly spread at the grassroot levels.[44] Here he was pointing towards one of the biggest problems of developing countries like Pakistan, which were increasing military spending to meet the conditions of their financiers as well as to address regional security problems such as Pakistan's ongoing border disputes with India. However, apart from high military spending, the capital was also accumulated by a privileged few of the country, and the masses could not be uplifted out of poverty even with visibly higher growth rates. In a surprising speech that he made in Karachi, which later came to be known as the "22 families speech," Mahbub ul Haq argued that even though Pakistan had managed to maintain a high growth rate, the benefits of such growth rates had only been experienced by the "22 powerful families" of Pakistan, who held a majority of the agricultural land and industrial assets of the country. These growth figures were, naturally, unsuccessful in translating the gains of a handful of families into prosperity for the rest of the country. He then highlighted the corruption due to which the wealthy and privileged wielded the most powerful positions in the country where no amount of industrial or import licenses were to have any effect on the economy as the same families which bore control in the government also had a stranglehold over the banking systems and industries.[45] This was in sharp contradiction with his earlier reasons for disagreement with Bhutto's

42 Burki, "Economic Growth, Poverty Alleviation and Human Dignity."

43 Mahbub ul Haq, "The Abuses of Pakistan's Bhutto," *The Washington Post*, April 24, 1977.

44 "Mahbub ul Haq's Speech at the International Development Conference," Mahbub Ul Haq Articles and Speeches (1971–1977) WBGA (1972).

45 "The twenty-two families: An interview with Dr. Mahbub ul Haq," *The Sun*, Karachi, February 5, 1972.

government in Pakistan and their policies of redistribution of assets and blanket nationalization, however, it must be noted that even Bhutto's government was not entirely successful in its aims of poverty alleviation and an effective redistribution of assets.

Haq challenged the GNP as a measure of a developing country's growth as it failed to register "social satisfaction." Poverty as an evil in the society could not be tackled indirectly, and hence had to be attacked directly in order to address the glaring issue at hand. He also challenged the idea that a mixed economy could possibly be a solution to any of the problems of a developing country, as in a mixed economy the institutions are more often truly capitalistic. Such economic confusion often ended up serving neither the political nor social aims of the economy, and hence it was neither the ultimate goal of growth nor equity that were reached due to this reason.[46] The recurrent theme in Haq's speeches in the 1970s was that a truly socialist system could potentially be a real alternative for developing economies. This would ultimately have to translate into a radical change in the political balance of power in a developing society and major social and economic developments also had to take place. However, he did question whether such changes may even be possible without "violent revolutions" or "violent political explosions" to begin with. [47]

By proposing a socialist economic model for developing countries, it must be noted that he was not the first individual to suggest or propose this model for his own country or region, because in 1945 the Muslim League in India had publicly published a "Memorandum of Economic Development" which was meant to be an economic plan for Pakistan once she gained independence (eventually in 1947). The crux of this plan was poverty alleviation, provision of social services and to "liberate the mind and the body from the drudgery of existence." It highlighted ideas of social justice, equality of opportunity for all, dispensing capitalism as a model due to its failure, and to standardize basic and vital needs such as food, health, education and housing. The Muslim League's plan had also been critical of then British Indian government's annual budget which was largely dedicated to its defence and internal security expenditures.[48] However, the colonial legacy of prioritising defense and security over other matters seemed to be carried forward to the next decades as Ayub Khan later founded the first "Pakistan Muslim League" in 1962, as a successor to the original "Indian Muslim League," in order to gain legitimacy for his dictatorial regime in Pakistan which had lasted for over a decade.

46 "Mahbub ul Haq's speech at International Development Conference, 1972."

47 Haq, "Crisis in Development Strategies."

48 "Memorandum of Economic Development," Muslim League Papers, Freedom Movement Collection, (Islamabad: NAP, 1945).

It could be argued, however, that Mahbub ul Haq, while working under the Pakistan Muslim League dictatorial leadership, was essentially pushing for the original socialist economic development plans for developing countries like Pakistan which had initially been conceived by the Indian Muslim League before the birth of Pakistan.

4 The New International Economic Order (NIEO) and international advocacy for Economic rights

On the international front, Haq was amongst the band of advocates urging the Third World on to organize their "poor power" in order to advocate for their economic rights and arrange for a transfer of resources to meet the disparity of capital between the developed and developing countries.[49] It was essential that this "emerging trade union of poorer nations," as Julius Nyerere had called it,[50] should take the New International Economic Order (NIEO) as an opportunity for "collective bargaining against the richer nations."[51] Within the NIEO scholarship, the intellectual origins of this Third World project have been traced back to Raúl Prebisch,[52] under whose leadership in the 1960s, the various bold economic claims, as well as the strategic formulation and campaign for the NIEO, had been made by Third World advocates.[53] Mahbub ul Haq had insisted that the developing world had to come up with a "new manifesto" which would eventually lead to greater self-reliance for them as well as a steady shift towards socialist policies. This discourse fit in well with the existing narratives and upcoming Third World debates on the New International Economic Order (NIEO) which were to be introduced at various multilateral platforms.

49 "Towards a New Planetary Bargain," The Aspen Institute. Mahbub Ul Haq Articles and Speeches (1971–1977). WBGA (1975).

50 Julius K. Nyerere, *"Unity for a New Order," Speech in Arusha, Tanzania, February 12, 1979.*

51 Haq, "Towards a New Planetary Bargain."

52 John Gledhill, "The Persistent Imaginary of 'the People's Oil': Nationalism, Globalisation and the Possibility of Another Country in Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela," In *Crude Domination: An Anthropology of Oil,* ed. Andrea Behrends, Stephen P. Reyna, and Günther Schlee (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 165-189; Nils *Gilman, "The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction," Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development,* no. 1 (2015): 1–16.

53 Edgar Dosman, *The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch, 1901–1986* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 2008).

Many of such debates had also touched upon within the previous "basic needs" agenda which was being pursued by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Regarding the existing critiques of the basic needs programs at the ILO, Mahbub ul Haq had highlighted that the basic needs program was, in fact, not conflicting with the Third World ambitions for the NIEO, since the idea of basic needs put an emphasis on equality within nations, while the NIEO stressed upon the need for equality among nations. This was essentially building on Raúl Prebisch's premise regarding the need for a joint strategy between the Global North and South. Prebisch had been a prominent advocate for the economic rights of the Third World since the 1940s, and more specifically during his position as the Secretary General of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (UNECLA) and as the founding Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). During his time at the UNCTAD, Prebisch had also called upon the Third World to devise a plan for systemic and structural change in order to further promote development of the NIEO.[54] Contrastingly, Mahbub ul Haq's colleague, Richard Jolly, had highlighted that institutional reform was more urgently required within the North in order to reinforce and promote higher financial transfers to the Global South states.[55] Largely, within the discourse of economic inequality between the Global North and South, Haq had attributed the lopsided nature of North-South economic engagement to the historical exploitation of the South during colonial rule, which had aggravated the disparities and caused a historical imbalance within the larger global economic dynamics. Additionally, he argued that this "economic dependence" and "intellectual slavery" had continued to persist despite decolonization of states.[56] Prebisch, however, had maintained that these inequalities had existed due to the increased and rapid industrialization of the North, causing diminishing terms of trade for the South, and eventually resulting in a wide rift between the North and the South.[57] Within the larger debate, however, Haq's views had aligned with Prebisch, who had originally formulated the "dependency theory," along with Hans Singer, and had argued that the South's "dependent status" had resulted due to the existing "center-periphery" relations,

54 G. F. Rohrlich, "Review of The Cruel Dilemmas of Development: Twentieth-Century Brazil," *Journal of Economic Issues* 16, no. 1 (1982): 337–39.

55 Ibid.

56 Mahbub ul Haq, *The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

57 Motolani Agbebi and Petri Virtanen, "Dependency Theory – A conceptual lens to understand China's presence in Africa," *Forum for Development Studies* (2017): 429–51; Nils Gilman, "The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6 no. 1 (2015): 429–51.

whereby the richer North was placed at the center and the poorer South at the periphery,[58] and this unequal dynamic had continued to exist as "the imperial powers had historically consigned their colonies as primary producers."[59] Additionally, Haq and Prebisch had both belonged to the school of thought which placed faith in the reformation of the existing international economic order so as to allow the developing states room to be able to overcome this dependency.[60] They had both been vocal of this cause due their belief in the shared economic interests between the North and the South, which they were able to perceive from their respective positions at the UNECLA and the World Bank.[61]

With such NIEO debates and discussions among various Global South actors making a powerful brew in the backdrop, Haq advocated for an initial preparatory framework and a negotiating strategy to be introduced before "a new planetary bargain," as he referred to it, was to be negotiated at the UN.[62] He believed that such an arrangement had to be reached where all parties at the multilateral forum got an equal voice and were able to negotiate as "partners." The international community had evidently not arrived at the ideological breakthrough that the continuous development of wealthier nations was aligned with, and was also dependent upon the sustained development of the poorer nations, making the NIEO a sustained movement with a balance of interests, rather than one particular moment of negotiations held between the North and the South. One of the main areas of concern which needed to be highlighted was the over-reliance on national reserve currencies like USD and Sterling. Haq maintained that these currencies must be replaced by Special Drawing Rights (SDR) or special foreign exchange reserve assets which had been created by the IMF in 1969. He presented the statistics for the years 1970–1974, when international currencies like the SDR accounted for 102 billion US dollars of the international reserve creation, out of which less than 4 percent, only 3.7 billion US dollars, was received by developing countries.[63] According to Haq, an international currency like SDR held major potential as it could have its international liquidity "regulated and adjusted by the IMF to facilitate growth

58 Raúl Prebisch, *Towards a Global Strategy of Development* (New York: UN, 1986).

59 Gilman, "The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction," 1–16.

60 Syed Farhan Ali Bokhari, "South-South cooperation: Reasons, problems and strategies" (MA Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1989).

61 Motolani Agbebi and Petri Virtanen, "Dependency Theory – A Conceptual Lens to Understand China's Presence in Africa," *Forum for Development Studies* (2017): 429–51.

62 "Towards a New Planetary Bargain," The Aspen Institute. Mahbub Ul Haq Articles and Speeches (1971–1977). (WBGA, 1975).

63 "New Structures for Economic Independence," Mahbub Ul Haq Articles and Speeches (1971–1977) (WBGA, 1975).

in developing countries."[64] This, of course, would have to come with structural changes within organizations like the IMF as well, as the voting strength was highly skewed in favor of a few powerful countries and would have to be altered to attain a balance in such decision-making. Haq maintained that this had become increasingly difficult to challenge or reform at international levels due to the voting strengths of the developing countries being one-third of the total, whereby their participation in international economic decision-making remained barely superficial when the biggest industrialized nations came together to decide on the world's economic future.[65] Hence, pushing for a dramatic restructuring of the UN was imminent if powers were to be equally spread out for more sustainable economic decision-making at the core.

To protect economic interests of the developing countries, Haq put forward various proposals through which to break the monopoly of the western banking institutions. He referenced Professor Robert Triffin's idea of a "Dinar zone"[66] which the Muslim world might be invested in to create their own version of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), to protect their interests within the western-dominated banks and institutions. This idea had initially gained some traction at the 1977 London conference on the "Muslim World and the Future Economic Order," convened by the Islamic Council of Europe. Mahbub ul Haq had recommended that with the "Dinar zone" being created, the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) surpluses could be reinvested back into the Muslim world, rather than being invested in western banks and institutions. He argued that the OPEC states, being "second-class powers," held major bargaining chips and that political unity was of the utmost importance for the Third World to negotiate their position. However, any interest in such ideas fizzled out as it eventually did not receive much interest from the Muslim

64 Ibid.

65 Mahbub ul Haq, The Christian Science Monitor. Mahbub Ul Haq Articles and Speeches (1971–1977) (WBGA, 1975.)

66 Professor Robert Triffin worked on the idea of "Dinar zone" at Yale University, however no Muslim countries had shown much interest in developing such research further. The concept of the Dinar zone had been proposed after the "Triffin paradox" was introduced by Robert Triffin in the 1960s due to the scarcity of the US dollar, as the Bretton Woods system moved towards its demise. See Robert Triffin, *Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility* (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1960); Robert Triffin, *Our International Monetary System: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow* (Studies in economics 05706167X) (New York: Random House, 1968); Lim Mah Hui and Lim Chin, "Impact on Asia and Challenges Ahead," in *Nowhere to Hide: The Great Financial Crisis and Challenges for Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2010): 83–113.

governments.[67] Alternatively, Haq had also advocated for the idea of a single economic unit for the whole of South Asia, comparable to that of the European Union (EU).[68] He maintained that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) had to be transformed into a "true partnership for progress" as this would have allowed the governments to prioritize economic growth, development, and people's wellbeing within the region.[69] Regardless of whether it were to be a "dinar zone" for the Muslim world or an alternate economic model in South Asia, Haq insisted that a new economic order was impending as the existing Bretton Woods institutions had been formed under the influence of an uneven balance of power due to a US hegemony, a weakened post-war Europe, an isolated socialist bloc, and a colonized Third World. Since political power in many countries had shifted considerably, the Third World had to organize politically to wield their economic power as well.[70]

His Third World activism for economic rights had led him to highlight his oft repeated claim that the old economic order continued to persist as power and capital were still being controlled by a few wealthy nations, even though the 1940s and 1960s had brought a surge of political movements of independence for much of the Third World. Haq emphasized that the NIEO should be viewed as a "natural evolution in the economic, political and social relationships of all nations in the world."[71] Hence, the key idea behind the NIEO movement was to be able to achieve a greater equality of opportunity for the developing countries. In doing so, Haq hoped the Third World would set out a clear set of objectives, so as not to unnecessarily demand a redistribution of any past resources claimed by the colonial powers, but rather a practical set of objectives for the richer nations to commit to one percent of their respective GNP so as to ensure a "redistribution of future growth opportunities."[72] Through this strategy, he was pointing towards the "inter-

67 Edward Mortimer, "A Five Point Vision to Inspire Muslim Nations," Third World Report, The Time, July 12, 1977; Mahbub ul Haq Speeches, Reuters World Bank Service Press Review, December 7, 1977.

68 Khadija Haq, "Mahbub ul Haq: A Visionary Economist," Mahbub ul Haq Economic Society, Government College University, Lahore. February 10, 2011.

69 These ideas had also been pushed forward within the South Asia Human Development Reports published annually by the Human Development Centre established in Islamabad by Mahbub ul Haq.

70 Mahbub ul Haq, "The Third World and the International Economic Order," The Overseas Development Council (Washington D.C., September 1976).

71 Mahbub ul Haq, "North South Dialogue," in *Dialogue for a New Order*, ed. Khadija Haq (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980).

72 Mahbub ul Haq, "The Third World and the International Economic Order," (Washington D.C.: The Overseas Development Council, 1976).

national equivalent of a welfare state" which was concerned more with ends rather than means of redistribution of resources to the poorer nations.[73] He proposed building newer partnerships based on "justice, not charity [or] aid," "not unilateral conditionality, [but] mutual cooperation" where parties would enjoy their overall fair share of global market opportunities.[74]

This "poverty alleviation" discourse that Mahbub ul Haq was promoting at the World Bank and at other international platforms, however, was not convincing to many, even within the Bank. The historians of the World Bank state that a Vice President (VP) of the Bank had reportedly guided Robert McNamara not to "overdo" the poverty rhetoric, and another VP had stated that the staff at the Bank "did not really believe in the poverty thesis."[75] Evidently, the Bank's staff viewed "poverty eradication" as "an obstacle to lending performance" of the Bank, and that the idea was "McNamara's and Mahbub's favourite toy." Even so, with all of the opposition within the institution, the historians of the Bank have called Mahbub ul Haq "the institution's most eloquent anti-poverty advocate."[76]

By 1981, as McNamara left the World Bank, the institution's policies visibly shifted from poverty alleviation towards what was termed "structural adjustment" of the world economy. Through the 1980s, even as Haq left the World Bank following McNamara, he found various other platforms to voice his opinions, such as the North South Roundtable, along with intellectuals like Frances Stewart, Khadija Haq, and Richard Jolly. They discussed newer approaches as substitutes to "structural adjustment." The alternative approaches which they were proposing would allow developing countries to receive more capital flow and that social costs could also be curtailed. Various North South Roundtable sessions even revolved around UN reforms, including the question of reforming Bretton Woods institutions. One of Haq's proposals which stood out the most was the idea of establishing an Economic Security Council at the UN. The idea behind this proposal was to address all security threats facing humans which were of a social and economic nature since human security did not merely revolve around military threats. Human security also consisted of issues including "poverty, unemployment, food and ecological security, drug trafficking, migration etc."[77] Hence, a UN body to deal with

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73 Haq, Ponzio, and Sen, "Pioneering the Human Development Revolution."

74 Mahbub ul Haq, *Reflections on Human Development: How the Focus of Development Economics Shifted from National Income Accounting to People-Centred Policies, Told by One of the Chief Architects of the New Paradigm* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

75 Devesh Kapur et al., *The World Bank: Its First Half Century*. Vol. 1: History (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997).

76 Kapur et al., *The World Bank: Its First Half Century*.

77 Haq, Ponzio, and Sen, *Pioneering the Human Development Revolution*.

and address these issues was just as essential as the Security Council which existed to deal with military and other security matters. While promoting the idea of an Economic Security Council, Haq also hoped to bring the international community's attention towards the peace agenda. Through the motive of mobilizing resources for social development, he was also trying to bring into discussion the existing conflicts in the Third World, so as to address the idea of disarmament while connecting it with the discourse on development.[78] By connecting these two issues, he perceived that the spending priorities of the richer nations could be significantly steered towards development spending in the Third World. Another important actor who was making a similar argument at the UN General Assembly, in the same decade, was Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines, a diplomat with a career spanning four decades at the UN, and who was purposefully steering conversations regarding disarmament towards linking them with economic development of the Third World.[79] Extending this argument further, Mahbub ul Haq highlighted that it had to be the wealthier countries which had to take the initiative in bringing the global arms race to a halt. In order to reach such a goal, the world needed more transparency and access to information with regard to military spending of governments around the world. At the core of this argument was the idea that "human security" in developing countries depended on a higher amount of spending on human development to enhance their social and economic conditions rather than increased military budgets for arms and the futile arms race. According to Haq, the Economic Security Council would also allow for more equitable sharing of power and reclaiming of economic rights but would also allow more efficient running of international institutions with the most effective use of resources for the benefit of the developing countries. A body such as this could also be held responsible for establishing an "early warning system" to alert on alarming fluctuations in global numbers on food security, incomes, employment levels, natural disasters, epidemics etc., allowing for a more sustainable utilization of resources in cases of natural and health emergencies around the globe.[80]

5 Development and the environment

The exceedingly varied discourses shifting between the North and South regarding the most efficient and sustainable utilization of resources for development often

78 Ibid.

79 Speech of Carlos P. Romulo, Foreign Minister of the Philippines, at the UN General Assembly (Manila: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1973).

80 Haq, Ponzio, and Sen, *Pioneering the Human Development Revolution.*

led to disagreements at international platforms. An important instance was the UN Conference on Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972. Scientists and environmental activists in the west had been leading this movement for more sustainable environmental planning, one of the most prominent efforts of which was a publication by MIT Press in the United States.[81] The developing countries, however, had shown strong resistance with regard to the aims of the conference, which they had believed were against the agenda of diverting resources towards the Third World for their development.[82] Considering the poverty and hunger crises in the Global South, such suspicions regarding this environmental movement originating in the west may also have arisen from previous narratives on resource scarcity intertwined with environmental issues such as that of Ehrlich in 1968,[83] and of William and Paul Paddock in 1967,[84] who had promoted the idea of a "triage" for assessing and filtering out the most deserving recipients of aid in order to tackle hunger and poverty for the most efficient use of resources. Within their work, they had categorized developing countries such as "can't be saved", "walking wounded," and "should receive food", where they had listed India and Egypt under the category of "can't be saved."[85] Unsurprisingly, there was a general lack of enthusiasm within the Global South to participate in a conference where the developing world was expected to solve a global issue which they believed they had not created or contributed towards to begin with, instead of the developed countries with their accelerated industrialization policies. Due to such policies, not only had the richer nations amassed disproportionate amounts of wealth but they also had created excessive environmental and resource scarcity problems for the developing countries to deal with. Many such concerns may have been grounded in reality, as the chief organizer of the first UN Conference on Human Environment, Maurice Strong, as a professional, had controversially built his career in the oil industry and had continued to profit off large corporations with environmentally unfriendly policies.[86] Hence, this conference was collectively viewed

81 SCEP, *Study of Critical Environmental Problems: Man's Impacts on the Global Environment* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1970).

82 Pamela Chasek, "Legacies of the Stockholm Conference," Policy Brief no. 40, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, International Institute of Sustainable Development (2022).

83 Paul Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968).

84 William and Paul Paddock, *Famine 1975, America's Decision: Who Will Survive?* (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1967).

85 Ibid.

86 Claudia Rosett, "Maurice Strong: The UN's Man of Mystery," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 11, 2008.

with suspicion and seen as a ploy that was being used by the richer countries to abandon any development projects in the developing countries.

To bring into context the concerns of Third World leaders, the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's infamous statement, "Are not poverty and need the greatest polluters?", at the UN Conference on Environment in Stockholm in 1972 started to make waves amidst the international community.[87] This strong statement had caused controversy as she emphasized themes such as unemployment, food insecurity, and deprivation of basic human necessities, and stressed that only when such basic human needs are met could developing states move beyond and focus on issues such as environment and climate. This, however, was neither her first attempt to get this point across at the UN, nor was it a narrative that had not been previously echoed by her contemporaries in the Third World.[88]

Mahbub ul Haq, however, had been a part of the camp that aimed to adopt a middle path through dialogue, addressing concerns of both sides. He was amalgamating the issue of environment with the idea of development, which created an "environmentally sound people-centred development paradigm."[89] Some decades later this concept would be promoted as "sustainable development" by the UN. He had highlighted these ideas while drafting the "Founex Report on Development and Environment," after many such concerns were discussed by Third World advocates during the meeting in Founex, Switzerland, in 1971.[90] A Swedish diplomat, Lars-Goran Engfeldt, had later admitted that proceeding with the conference in Stockholm without the dialogue and report at Founex would have had a "devastating effect on the conference."[91] Maurice Strong, as well as Paul Streeten, later termed the Founex Report as a "seminal document" which went on to become a "milestone in the history of the environmental movement."[92]

However, one of the reasons why his ideas on environment and development may have been more palatable to his western counterparts was due to his "strong

87 Indira Gandhi's Speech at the UN Conference on the Environment in Stockholm, 1972; Chasek, "Legacies of the Stockholm Conference."

88 See Indira Gandhi's letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant. No. 78-PMO/66. February 2, 1966, in UN Archives, S-0882–0001–36–00001, https://search.archives.un.org/uploads/r/united-nations-archives/7/5/f/75fc52a7684474813ee34506c4bee57d6749fea3df2e0d9cca800a76fb60e180/S-0882-0001-36-00001.pdf.

89 Haq, Ponzio, and Sen, *Pioneering the Human Development Revolution.*

90 Ibid; "The Founex Report on Development and Environment" (Founex, June 4–12, 1971).

91 Michael Manulak, "Developing World Environmental Cooperation: The Founex Seminar and the Stockholm Conference" (2016).

92 Maruice Strong, "Where on Earth are We Going?" (New York: Texere, 2002); Paul Steeten, "Foreword" in Mahbub ul Haq, *Refelections on Human Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

belief in the markets"[93] and, further, because of his ideas such as insisting that pollution can be curbed through the price mechanism rather than mere agreements on paper.[94] Mahbub ul Haq later, in his written work, expressed the collective disappointment and disillusionment of the Global South representatives present at the Conference who had increasingly become aware that their voices were "neither solicited nor heard."[95] Many of these representatives had later gathered at the "Third World Forum," which Samir Amin had founded along with other Third World advocates including Mahbub ul Haq to discuss Global South perspectives, and had included various prominent socialists, intellectuals, and activists from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[96] The group first met in Santiago and later in Karachi to bring into force their constitution in 1975,[97] with the idea to build a platform for Third World intellectuals who had been critical of the conventional idea of development, and to propose "alternative economic, social and environmental agendas."[98] This Forum, amongst many others organized by Third World actors, demonstrated a lack of trust in institutions, platforms, and conferences set up and organized by western states, in bringing about any real and lasting change with regard to environmental policies and the development agenda in the 1970s. The Forum later produced several advisory reports in the next decades, calling out imperial powers for their hypocrisies. However, many of these actors evidently continued to maintain their dialogue and advocacy within multilateral organizations such as the UN, alongside their Third World solidarity platforms. Mahbub ul Haq used these Third World platforms, such as the North South Roundtables and the Society for International Development, to engage with his contemporaries across the Global South, while also creating space for dialogue with the North, and build on ideas which had been brewing in the background across the board, hence paving the way for Third World consciousness regarding an imminent transformation in the international outlook on development as an idea.

93 Des Gasper, "Pioneering the Human Development Revolution: Analysing the Trajectory of Mahbub ul Haq," *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities* 12, no. 3 (2011): 433–56.

94 Mahbub ul Haq. "The New Deal." Interview in *New Internationalist*, 262 (1994): 1–5.

95 Mahbub ul Haq, *The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

96 Patrick Bond, "Truncated 21st Century Trajectories of Progressive International Solidarity," *Journal of World Systems Research* 25, no. 2 (2019). Doi 10.5195/JWSR.2019.94

97 "Communique Of The Third World Forum Conference In Karachi," *The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs*, no. 1 (1975): 114–18.

98 Bond, "Truncated 21st Century Trajectories of Progressive International Solidarity."

6 The human development revolution

Haq's reputation as a mediator, while also being an avid advocate for the Third World, pushed William Draper III, the administrator of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to offer him a role at the organization in 1989. Although it was finally in this role that the Human Development Reports were born at UNDP, this idea had been brewing in the background for him many years earlier. Richard Ponzio specifies that it was perhaps as early as his days as an undergraduate student at Cambridge University where he also met many of his future collaborators whom he worked with at the World Bank, at UNDP, and within the North South Roundtable discussions. During his time at the World Bank, Haq had worked on the idea of basic needs and poverty alleviation with his colleagues Frances Stewart, Shahid Javed Burki, Paul Streeten, and Norman Hicks.[99] This concept later matured into "human development," as in 1980 Mahbub ul Haq had purportedly convinced Robert McNamara to make poverty alleviation and basic needs the central theme of the annual World Development Report for that year.[100] This was the first time that the term "human development" was cited in an international document within the context of placing people at the center of the development process.[101] Earlier, even within scholarly works of 1960s and 1970s, the phrase "human development" had been limited to being used largely within the context of psychological and biological development of a human being.[102]

Even though Mahbub ul Haq had promoted the use of the term "human development" in this newer context, it has been widely argued by scholars that the conceptual origins of the model of "human development" can be traced back to Amartya Sen's idea of the "capabilities approach."[103] Sen stipulated that the goal of

99 Paul Streeten, "First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in the Developing Countries," A World Bank Publication (New York: Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press, 1981).

100 Haq, Ponzio, and Sen, *Pioneering the Human Development Revolution.*

101 "World Development Report," The World Bank (Washington DC, August 1980).

102 Elizabeth Stanton. "The Human Development Index: A History." Working Paper 127, Political Economy Research Institute (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2007); for 1960s and 1970s usage of the term "human development" see: Frank Tardew Falkner, *Human Development* (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1966); Hugh V. Perkins, *Human Development* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. 1975); Tom G.R. Bower, *Human Development* (San Francisco, CA: Freeman, 1979).

103 K. Griffin, "Human Development: Origins, Evolution and Impact," in Id., *Studies in Development Strategy and Systemic Transformation* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 53-65; David Hulme, "Poverty in Development Thought: Symptom or Cause", in *International Development: Ideas, Experience, and Prospects,* ed. Bruce Currie-Alder et al. (Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2014), 81-97; Maria Emma Santos and Georgina Santos, "Composite Indices of Development," in *Interna-*

development had to be to work towards increasing the capabilities of humans so that they would be able to achieve the basic functioning of a healthy, literate, hunger-free, and socially and culturally fulfilling life. Hence, he was essentially aiming at a shift from the perspective of the ends of development, rather than the means of development.[104] Previously, it was a general consensus amongst economists that "underdevelopment" of the Third World, and the international institutional barriers perpetuating this cycle, were the main causes behind the lagging social and economic advancement of developing states.[105] Seers had gone a step further and stressed upon the need to "measure development more directly, paying attention to the evolution of unemployment, poverty, and inequality."[106]

The discussions over this newer idea of "human development" were developed further by experts during the North South Roundtable conferences which had been organized by Khadija Haq in 1986.[107] As Mahbub ul Haq formulated these ideas into the Human Development Reports of the UNDP, the first five years of the Reports focused on various policy issues such as development with participatory practices, development financing, and the empowerment of women. The latter themes of the reports revolved around other human rights issues, political freedoms, and sustainable practices for the environment. The idea of "human development" had been stretched far beyond the concept of basic needs to include the existing political and institutional problems, and incorporated the concerns of all countries regardless of their development or income levels.[108] The comparative progress measured between countries through the qualitative and quantitative factors also highlighted the political priorities along with civil society discourse while framing the development agenda of a particular country. This emphasized the role of participatory practices of the communities involved and

tional Development: Ideas, Experience, and Prospects, ed. Bruce Currie-Alder et al. (Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2014), 133-150. See: Amartya K. Sen, *Equality of What? Tanner Lectures on Human Values* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Amartya K. Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999).

104 Sen, *Equality of What?*; Sen, *Development as Freedom.*

105 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Paris: François Maspero. 1961); Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London and Dar es Salaam: Bogle-L'Ouverture. 1972); Raul Prebisch, "Five Stages in my Thinking on Development," *in Pioneers of Development*, ed. Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984): 175–91.

106 Dudley Seers, "The Meaning of Development," Institute of Development Studies (IDS) (Brighton, UK: University of Sussex, 1969).

107 Khadija Haq and Uner Kirdar, "Human Development: The Neglected Dimension," in *North South Roundtable* (Islamabad, 1986).

108 Frances Stewart, "Human Development as an Alternative Development Paradigm," in Presentation at the Third Human Development Training Course (University of Oxford, 2006).

steered the narrative away from western ideas of growth-centric development which had dominated the discourse for the previous decades. In order to prioritize the key elements of the Human Development Reports of the UNDP, the experts had to first identify whether they were to focus merely on poverty reduction or also on improving the well-being of individuals. Secondly, they were to include elements through which an individual's choice could be widened in terms of a lifestyle they were to prefer for themselves. Lastly, they were to prioritize "equitable human development" through participation and equitable growth rather than pursuing overall human development for everyone.[109]

One of the most important elements of the Human Development Reports was the Human Development Index which Haq had launched in collaboration with Amartya Sen. Sen notes that even though Haq had been initially hesitant about using a "crude index" like the Human Development Index (HDI) within the reports, he was determined to disrupt the existing dominance of the GNP as a chief indicator of growth in an economy. "We need a measure of the same vulgarity as the GNP," Haq had justified to Sen.[110] Rather than being considered as a "sole indicator" or replacement for the GNP, Haq had seemingly aimed for the HDI to become an enhancement of and a complementary tool to the GNP. He had claimed that the conditions of human living could be altered through efficient policies at the national levels if the focus was moved away from solely GNP-centred economic and social policy-making. It was also essential that through these indices accurate data was made available to the governments to aid poverty alleviation schemes and to bring human development on the agenda. For the 1994 Human Development Report, an earlier recurring theme of "human security" in Mahbub ul Haq's speeches had become the main focus. The report defined "human security" as the Rooseveltian freedom from fear and want,[111] while drawing attention towards the "downside risks" for instance, "political conflicts, wars, economic fluctuations, natural disasters, extreme impoverishment, environmental pollution, ill health, illiteracy and other social menaces."[112] As he founded and annually ex-

109 Inge Kaul, "Choices That Shaped the Human Development Reports," in *Readings in Human Development: Concepts, Measures and Policies for a Development Paradigm*, ed. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and A.K. Shiva Kumar (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 85-91.

110 Amartya Sen, "Obituary: Mahbub Ul Haq" (London, 1998).

111 "Franklin D. Roosevelt's Annual message to the Congress," Records of the United States Senate, 77 A-H1, January 6, 1941.

112 UNDP, "New dimensions of Human Security," Human Development Report, United Nations Development Programme (1994); Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, "Mahbub ul Haq's Human Security Vision: An Unfettered Dream?" in *Pioneering the Human Development Revolution*, ed. Haq, Ponzio, and Sen (Oxford University Press, 2008).

panded the human development paradigm along with Sen and other experts, he essentially managed to transform the philosophy, the policy implications, and the scope of the human development agenda globally.

7 Conclusions

The intellectual journey of Mahbub ul Haq on the economic rights agenda as well as the evolution of human development spanned 40 years until his death in 1998. According to Sen, his political commitment in bringing about a revolution in the field of development and his "sympathetic approach to social evaluation"[113] was a testament to his lifelong leadership in the field. The Human Development Reports that he introduced at the UN not only had a transformational effect on development discourse but also allowed the developed countries to reflect and reassess their commitments towards global poverty alleviation. He used these Human Development Reports to convey the same message which he had been carrying forward at multilateral platforms to promote the Third World agenda internationally. Consequently, his ground-breaking contributions not only advanced the field epistemically, but also helped pave the way for effective policy-making in the field. This decades-long professional trajectory highlighted that much of the Global South development agenda which he was advocating at international forums was manifestly aligned with his contemporaries within the field of post-colonial economic thinking. However, aside from engaging with intellectual and theoretical debates, he had also utilized his influential positions within the World Bank and UNDP, specifically to spearhead policy reforms and to conceive a specialized index for developing countries, the HDI, resulting in data collection in fields which had previously been vastly understudied. This index evidently became a useful tool in understanding the economic and development crises of the developing countries, and to arrive at solutions catering to the Global South. However, many of the other institutional reforms which he had also advocated for, such as the proposal for an Economic Security Council at the UN, are examples of efforts initiated by Third World intellectuals and advocates which were eventually rendered invisible in the larger narrative and struggle for economic rights and the development agenda at the UN. Mahbub ul Haq, like many of his Third World contemporaries, while choosing their battles at the UN, used the international platform to further the rights and interests of the developing world one milestone at a time. In the case of Haq, the human development revolution was just one of the essential foundational step-

113 Haq, Ponzio, and Sen, *Pioneering the Human Development Revolution.*

ping stones upon which his successors were to build the larger human development agenda at the UN, in the decades after him.

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Margarita Fajardo

Development beyond the golden era: CEPAL in the global 1970s

1 Introduction

That "institutions don't die by decree but die of irrelevance" was what most concerned Enrique Iglesias as he took charge of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL, for its acronym in Spanish and Portuguese) in the convoluted 1970s.[1] Since its foundation in 1948 and through the 1960s, CEPAL and *cepalinos*, its members, had accumulated numerous successes in the intellectual, policymaking, and political arenas. The project of *cepalinos* began with the conceptualization of the world economy as divided between industrial centers and raw material producing peripheries, and the denunciation of this global inequality in international trade as the main obstacle for development in Latin America. Based on that premise, *cepalinos* formulated a development platform that encompassed import-substitution industrialization and, most importantly, cooperation between center and periphery in trade, aid, and regional integration. In implementing this development platform, *cepalinos* managed to establish a form of hegemony in development ideas and policies in the region, displacing other powerful ideas and institutions emanating from the global North. Furthermore, by the 1960s, *cepalinos* had seen their vocabulary and concepts for the denunciation of global inequality in international trade transferred to the global level at the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and embraced by the world's periphery in the struggle for economic decolonization. Soon after, their ideas and proposals would become stepping stones for the pursuit of new economic orders. The successes *cepalinos* accumulated would soon come to an end.

Iglesias found himself leading CEPAL from 1972 to 1985, a period of global economic distress, political repression in the region, and in-house exhaustion that wavered the institution in contradictory directions. In the global economic realm, the 1970s were marked by the economic insurrection of the oil-producing countries and the steep rise in oil price with dramatic consequences for a world

1 "Enrique Iglesias" in *The Complete Oral History Transcripts from UN Voices* (New York, NY: United Nations Intellectual History Project, 2007), CDROM, 71–72.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111280356-004

dependent on oil for economic growth.[2] The economic insurrection of raw-material producers of the world's periphery was as much a triumph for *cepalinos* devoted to the denunciation and solution to the inequalities in global trade as a challenge for CEPAL, an institution presiding over a region of largely oil-importing countries. Within the region, the authoritarian turn that began in Brazil in 1964 and that reached Chile, where CEPAL is headquartered, in 1973, brought an end to an era of intellectual freedom, and with it, the fierce debate about development models in which *cepalinos* had been triumphant. In its place emerged a neoliberal regime that saw *cepalinos* as the increasingly weaker opponent even if the infamous Chicago Boys had emerged precisely to debunk the *cepalino* project. Finally, within the institution, the retirement of the long-time official and unofficial leader Raúl Prebisch and the loss of core staff, and the resistance of others, created the space for embracing alternative pathways. The story of Iglesias, CEPAL, and *cepalinos*, as they maneuvered their way through clashing and compounding storms, helps us revisit the end of the so-called development era.

In our prevailing understanding, the era of development—of state-led growth projects and new nation-states, of the rise of international organizations, and of right and left-wing internationalisms—unraveled in the 1970s and 1980s, in the throes of the deeply intertwined energy and debt crises. Economic turmoil eroded emerging solidarities and long-held convictions on the power of the state to foster welfare and growth.[3] In the process, non-governmental organizations and non-state actors replaced international organizations in the world arena; austerity policies came to prevail over planning boards and instruments; the global obsession with growth and redistribution transformed into a concern for human rights; and market-driven development initiatives replaced state-led development projects.[4]

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2 See for instance, Christopher R. W. Dietrich, *Oil Revolution: Sovereign Rights and the Economic Culture of Decolonization, 1945 to 1979* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Giuliano Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

3 On the importance of the 1970s, see Fritz Bartel, *The Triumph of Broken Promises: The End of the Cold War and the Rise of Neoliberalism.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2022); on the erosion of solidarities, see Dietrich, *Oil Revolution.*

4 On the 1970s as the end of the "development era," see: Sara Lorenzini, *Global Development: A Cold War History.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019); Stephen J. Macekura, *Of Limits and Growth: The Rise of Global Sustainable Development in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Joanne Meyerowitz, *A War on Global Poverty: The Lost Promise of Redistribution and the Rise of Microcredit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021); Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); Kevin O'Sullivan, *The NGO Moment: The Globalisation of Compassion from Biafra to Live Aid* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

The ideas, institutions, and practices of the development era were then swept away by these transformations and the emergence of the neoliberal era.

But as Iglesias suggested, institutions don't simply disappear; they are repurposed, reimagined, and reinvented. Some international organizations like the World Bank and the IMF emerged stronger from the sweeping tide of the 1970s and 1980s.[5] This article examines the fate of CEPAL, the most important development institution in Latin America, to understand the end of the development era. The article argues that development as a political and international project did not end with the sweeping tide of foreign ideas, organizations, and policies. Rather, by looking at CEPAL, it shows how a new consensus gradually emerged in the region, especially with the regards to the priority of macroeconomic stabilization and fight against inflation that came to dominate economic policymaking in the 1980s. In the context of a Chile literally under siege, Iglesias and CEPAL found themselves on the defensive, struggling to guarantee its survival and relevance without foregoing its legacy. The first section focuses on the rise of CEPAL and *cepalino* ideas and practices and the resulting legacy that Iglesias had to wrestle with. The second section examines the immediate personal and institution struggles emerging from the transition of leadership at CEPAL and the political predicament of the host country. The third and final section examines Iglesias' search for a new agenda for CEPAL, one that would guarantee its relevance and hence survival without destroying its legacy. Through the story of Iglesias and CEPAL for whom the end of the development was not in sight, the article will show the persistence of development among sweeping transformations as well as the role of development-era institutions in bringing about a new economic consensus.

2 CEPAL and *cepalinos* in their golden age

Established in 1948, the UN CEPAL, an unassuming regional commission, transformed into an intellectual and politically influential global institution in the following two decades, whose legacy Iglesias would have to come to terms with. That transformation was the product of a particular combination of dynamic and ambitious individuals, commanding ideas, institutional thrust and position, personal tensions and inter-institutional confrontations as well as historical con-

5 Patrick Sharma, "Bureaucratic Imperatives and Policy Outcomes: The Origins of World Bank Structural Adjustment Lending," *Review of International Political Economy* 20, no. 4 (2013): 667–86; Alexander E. Kentikelenis and Sarah Babb, "The Making of Neoliberal Globalization: Norm Substitution and the Politics of Clandestine Institutional Change," *American Journal of Sociology* 124, no. 6 (May 2019): 1720–1762, https://doi.org/10.1086/702900.

junctures both within the region and the world. In the following section, the article will briefly explain the factors that led to CEPAL's rise to hegemony and the legacies that hegemony bestowed upon those who followed.[6]

The rise of the *cepalino* project was first the product of commanding ideas and a compelling policy platform. The most salient of those ideas was the international decline in the terms of trade between the world's industrial centers and the raw-material producing peripheries, or the center-periphery framework for short. The center-periphery framework established that given the long-term decline in the exports of raw materials in relation to the imports of manufactures and capital goods, the pattern of the division of labor between centers and peripheries created a serious obstacle for the industrialization and development of the periphery and hence for the reduction of global inequality. However, because industrialization depended on the import of capital goods, that strategy for development required more, not less, international trade, imposing what I called a development paradox. To solve that paradox, *cepalinos* formulated a development platform based on national planning and the cooperation between the global center and peripheries in trade, aid, and integration, which resonated highly with the regional leaders and policymakers and would eventually resonate with leaders of postcolonial, raw material producing nation-states.

By the 1960s, *cepalinos* were at the peak of their influence in the region. Their efforts in conducting development and planning training courses, in orchestrating regional debates about trade and aid, in steering the conversation towards the terms of trade and the effects of the global economy, and their leadership in regional integration projects paid off. The *cepalino* regional economic studies, the first of their kind, were "like a bible" for the economists and policymakers of the region. They had come to displace the US-sponsored Organization of American States (OAS) and its economic arm in steering the conversation about development and leading regional initiatives. Most importantly, they had come to make the International Monetary Fund staff conclude that they lost the battle of ideas in Latin America and to reconsider and transform their policy options, after the *cepalino* structural approach to inflation had come to dominate policy and academic discussion and become a tool against IMF anti-inflation plans.[7] But what perhaps best attests to their hegemony was the intellectual counteroffensive from all sides of the political spectrum and that their ideas became the fulcrum for conflicting in-

6 This first section draws substantially from my book, Margarita Fajardo, *The World That Latin America Created: The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America in the Development Era* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2022).

7 Margarita Fajardo, "CEPAL: the International Monetary Fund of the Left," *American Historical Review* 128, no. 2 (June 2023): 588-615.

ternationalist projects such as the Cuban Revolution and the Alliance for Progress, the counterrevolutionary development assistance program. All of this positioned *cepalinos* to take their ideas globally through the United Nations Conference and Trade and Development, a stepping stone for the debates around the New International Economic Order.

The institutional position and thrust of CEPAL was also crucial for understanding the rise of *cepalino* ideas. The resources of the UN system and its affiliated agencies provided CEPAL with a global network of data, human resources, and mechanisms for cooperation as well as opportunities for conflict with other international organizations that made possible the formulation of classic *cepalino* ideas including those on trade and inflation. Over time, *cepalinos* also filled a vacuum that opened early on in the global system of institutional governance. Rallying support North and South, CEPAL was the product of a Chilean diplomatic initiative that advocated for addressing the interrelated problems of trade and development in the new economic order emerging after the war. In the absence of an International Trade Organization (ITO) to complement the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International and Monetary Fund (IMF), CEPAL in some ways absorbed the role of global forum for discussing the controversial issue of trade and development, furthering the position of the UN, especially for those countries in the periphery of the world economy.

That CEPAL became a global forum for the problem of trade and development became readily apparent when Prebisch, the head of CEPAL, assumed the leadership of UNCTAD. Perhaps Prebisch's greatest accomplishment in bringing the project of *cepalinos* to the global level and cementing its hegemony in the region was his leadership of the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development from 1964 to 1968. In the hands of Prebisch, UNCTAD gave currency to the 1950s *cepalino*-concept of the "foreign exchange gap," transmuted as "trade gap" in the new international context of the 1960s. The conference also deployed the *cepalino* arsenal for cooperation between center and peripheries including commodity stabilization agreements, tariff reduction at the global centers, and balance-of-payments financing as instruments for development. Under Prebisch and with *cepalino* tools, the world's periphery rallied to formulate a platform that would culminate in demands for a new international economic order a decade later. Furthermore, the position of the institution helped to amplify the reach of *cepalinos* as the ideas traveled through the network and many influential economists came to Santiago, taking their ideas back to other parts of the UN network, including Africa.[8] As a

8 Dudley Seers and Samir Amin were two of those important vectors of dissemination of *cepalino* ideas. Very little has been written, but see: "Samir Amin" in The Complete Oral History Transcripts

result of these and other initiatives, the legacy of CEPAL revolved around the obstacles that the international division of labor and the system of trade imposed on development, a tenet that critics increasingly conceptualized as a form of "export pessimism."

Aside from the center-periphery framework and the concept of foreign exchange gap, *cepalinos*' rise to hegemony left another important legacy. Born out of a conceptual as well as political dispute between Prebisch and his disciples, the structural approach to inflation came, in a few years, to represent a consensus and a signature contribution of the institution. The *cepalino* approach to inflation differentiated between the mechanisms of propagation of inflation – such as the quantity of money and the price-wage spiral – from the structural causes of inflation – such as the position of Latin America in the world's periphery or the land tenure system – in an effort to understand inflation as a result of the process of economic development. Initially, it was a synthesis between two extremes, but over time the "structural approach to inflation" became radicalized, especially as regional governments confronted the International Monetary Fund in their efforts to arrest inflation and balance of payments crises. At the peak of the confrontation between CEPAL and the IMF, the *cepalino* approach to inflation came to posit an unpopular trade-off between inflation and development—a trade-off that for *cepalino* critics implied a "tolerance to inflation" that was no longer tolerable as Brazil and the Southern Cone moved from chronic inflation to unrelenting hyperinflation through the late 1970s and 1980s.

The central position CEPAL had come to occupy left Iglesias with the almost impossible task of maintaining the relevance so far achieved. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, *cepalinos* had made CEPAL the most important economic institution of their day. Yet, CEPAL had also become the target of intense criticism. Critics on the left accused CEPAL of fostering underdevelopment by seeking a compromise with the industrial centers in trade, aid, and capital. In turn, critics on the right accused CEPAL of promoting an almost parochial nationalism by discouraging trade and discouraging monetary stability. Both of these criticisms distorted and eroded CEPAL's legacy of an international cooperation that demanded more and better trade as well as the concern with monetary matters and inflation. Iglesias was aware that CEPAL was losing ground and that the setbacks he would begin to confront would entail identifying a legacy that he would have to both preserve and transcend in order to survive.

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from UN Voices (New York, NY: United Nations Intellectual History Project, 2007), CDROM, 71–72; Margaret Lispcomp, "Changing Meanings of Development: Dudley Seers an intellectual biography" (B.A. Thesis, University of Southampton, 1993).

3 The long decline and the coup

When Iglesias assumed the leadership of CEPAL in 1972, he knew he had large shoes to fill and multiple obstacles to surmount. The sense of decline and crisis had begun even before Iglesias assumed power, and reflected perhaps the criticism that from the left had mounted against CEPAL, especially as *dependentistas* came to the fore demanding more radical solutions to underdevelopment than those offered by cooperation between the center and peripheries for better terms of trade and aid. The criticism was especially salient as one of those efforts of cooperation consumed the energies of Prebisch, its leader. During those years, Prebisch had relocated to Geneva to lead UNCTAD but his presence remained strong, and the time was experienced as a longing for a "return to the glorious years."[9] Thus, the erosion of the *cepalino* project and the need for reconfiguration was felt within the institution many years before the sweeping tide of reform on the throes of the entwined energy and debt crises.

The first of the obstacles Iglesias could come to confront was in-house. Although Prebisch, the long-time leader of the institution, had officially retired in 1963, it was only a decade later that he finally stepped down and truly opened up the way for a successor. Venezuelan José Antonio Mayobre and Mexican Cristóbal Lara had taken over in 1963 and 1967 respectively, but Prebisch remained the power behind the throne, perhaps debilitating his successors and the institution along the way.

The rumors and corridor conversations about succession absorbed the time and energy of the staff and created factions among them. Appointing a successor involved balancing the representation of different nationalities, avoiding antagonizing key governments as well as the personal characteristics of the candidates. The names of Celso Furtado and Victor Urquidi floated as possibilities alongside that of Iglesias. Prebisch discarded Furtado because, given his opposition to the military regime in Brazil, the government would most certainly veto his candidacy. Urquidi was Mexican, like the immediate predecessor, which made him an unviable choice. Plus, it would be hard to persuade him. Despite his leadership role in CEPAL's early projects on regional economic integration in the 1950s, Urquidi had left the institution years earlier to embrace "his lifelong ambition" of an academic career, and had almost been forgotten by the institution.[10]

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9 Monica Barnett to Raúl Prebisch, 9 November 1966, Archivo de Trabajo de Raúl Prebisch. R. 5, F. 121.

10 "Victor Urquidi" in *The Complete Oral History Transcripts from UN Voices* (New York, NY: United Nations Intellectual History Project, 2007), CDROM, 71–72.

The uncertainty of successions deepened the frustration among the staff across all levels. CEPAL was becoming "less the endeavor that you devote your life to" and more "a way to make a living, albeit an agreeable and privileged one."[11] The presence of the Brazilian exiles, who in conversation with old *cepalinos* gave rise to dependency theory, had temporarily reinvigorated the institution in the mid-1960s but also deepened the frustration among some of its staff desiring more radical options.[12] The pace of reform in Chile seemed to promise deep social transformations but was also marked by increased polarization, dividing *cepalinos* themselves. The morale of the staff remained low. Therefore, by the time of the 1972 succession, the question of personality and leadership became paramount. Prebisch, who was still for all intents and purposes in charge of appointing his successor, rallied regional support for his colleague and friend Enrique Iglesias. Prebisch believed Iglesias was a "brilliant man" with "great driving power," and, most importantly, could restore "a sense of mission" among *cepalinos.*[13] Although the mission that Iglesias imbued on CEPAL was perhaps not exactly what Prebisch imagined, Iglesias certainly seemed poised for the job.

Iglesias was both an insider and outsider of CEPAL. Born in Spain in 1931, Iglesias emigrated at a young age to Uruguay, where he received a Catholic education early on that accompanied him throughout his life. While cultivating a passion for acting and theater, he studied economics and management at the undergraduate level in the early 1950s. Like many economists at this early stage in the professionalization of the discipline, Iglesias combined a career in the private sector, in banking in his case, with an academic interest and teaching responsibilities at the university.

While never a member of the institution until his appointment as Executive Secretary, Iglesias' contact with CEPAL began early in his professional trajectory and left a profound mark. The CEPAL manifesto containing the center-periphery framework came out when Iglesias was an undergraduate student. As Iglesias recalls, his course on classical as well neoclassical economics, with which he was fascinated, suddenly stopped to give space to the manifesto. The "concrete, almost palpable vision of the reality of our countries" contained in the manifesto, perhaps in contrast with what he was reading, made an impression on him and on others of

11 Monica Barnett to Raúl Prebisch, 9 November 1966, Archivo de Trabajo de Raúl Prebisch. R. 5, F. 121.

12 Margarita Fajardo, *The World That Latin America Created: The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America in the Development Era* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2022), Ch. 7

13 Raúl Prebisch to Philip de Seynes, 17 January 1972, Archivo de Trabajo de Raúl Prebisch. R. 5, F. 121.

his generation.[14] The effect of the ideas was reinforced by the presence of Prebisch in Montevideo shortly after, in one of CEPAL's biennial plenary meetings. Prebisch, who was a charismatic, energetic, and colloquial orator, "seduced" Iglesias, who in turn had sneaked into the inter-governmental meeting. Invited by *Universidad de Chile*'s *Instituto de Economía*, Iglesias finally met Prebisch and many of the *cepalino* core group in Santiago in 1958. After the visit, Iglesias played a key role in cementing *cepalino* influence in his country. The encounter motivated Iglesias to bring the *cepalino* development courses to Montevideo in 1960. A year later, Iglesias, as head of the *Centro de Investigaciones en Desarrollo Económico*, the state planning institute, carried out a massive project: a national census and national accounts for planning "very influenced by CEPAL."[15] Just before being appointed Executive Secretary of CEPAL, Iglesias worked together with Prebisch in Washington preparing a report for the Inter-American Development Bank, which turned their relationship from admiration to friendship. It was at this point that Prebisch finally decided to let go and hand over what had been *his* institution.

Iglesias had been prepared to uplift the morale of the CEPAL staff but the rapidly unfolding political situation in Chile changed the priorities. When Iglesias arrived at Santiago, Salvador Allende's Chilean Road to Socialism was under way and had taken a large portion of *cepalinos* with it. Former *cepalinos* Pedro Vuskovic and Carlos Matus became Ministers of the Economy and director of the planning office ODEPLAN respectively, taking a lot of the CEPAL staff with them. So, Iglesias found an institution depleted of its greatest talents; the "gurus had left," he said.[16] But within a year, the problem of an understaffed institution with low spirits was the least of Iglesias' worries.

The military coup against Allende's government and the subsequent military regime led by Augusto Pinochet established a reign of terror in the country that threatened the lives and ideas of the supporters of the socialist government, many of which were *cepalinos* and their allies. Furthermore, the military regime was itself hostile to the institution and its ideas.[17] There were rumors of efforts to "clean up" an already depleted CEPAL.[18] Alongside the pressure from inside the country, Iglesias also confronted external pressure.

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14 "Enrique Iglesias."

15 "Enrique Iglesias."

16 "Enrique Iglesias."

17 See: Juan Gabriel Valdez, *Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

18 "Enrique Iglesias."

So, as censorship, torture, and repression became the norm, there were many who insisted that the best option for CEPAL was to leave Chile. Not only was the country not safe anymore; it was no longer the pluralistic polity and stimulating environment that had given rise to or consolidated crucial ideas and political projects, including those of *cepalinos.* In turn, CEPAL, which had with its presence turned Santiago into a cosmopolitan city and raised the presence and prestige of the country in the international arena, could not allow itself to do the same for the new regime. In light of the dire situation and knowing the importance of CEPAL for their purposes, Mexican president Luis Echavarría and Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, both interested in spearheading global Third Worldism, put pressure on Iglesias to relocate CEPAL.[19] But Iglesias recognized how much CEPAL and *cepalinos* owed to Chile and how much CEPAL and he himself had an obligation and responsibility towards its host country, so he decided to stay.

Transforming the mission of the institution, Iglesias turned CEPAL temporarily into a human rights haven. Iglesias knew that CEPAL, as an international organization, was better positioned to withstand repression and censorship than the national universities, research centers, and the press. So, first, he started by moving personnel away from Santiago to the CEPAL offices in Argentina and Mexico. But the special position of the institution, along with his personal faith and conviction, motivated him to broaden the endeavor. He then joined forces with the only other institution that remained standing and with the capacity to resist and assist those in need; he began to work closely with Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez and with the organization *Vicaría de la Solidaridad.* Before the coup, the Cardinal had assumed political leadership by mediating between Allende and the fierce opposition that threatened to depose him to avoid the imminent democratic collapse. Immediately after the coup, Cardinal Silva Henríquez directly intervened to bring to a halt ongoing summary executions and created the *Comité Pro Paz* to give material and legal aid to the victims of the military regime.[20] As an outgrowth of these endeavors, *Vicaría de la Solidaridad* was established in 1975, and for many years it was the only institution that assisted the victims, denounced human rights abuses and crimes, and maintained a space for public debate. In alliance with Silva Henríquez and the *Vicaría*, Iglesias gave CEPAL a new role by assisting foreigners living in Chile who could not return to their own countries.[21] Despite the initial hostility

19 "Interview of Enrique Iglesias" by Aldo Marchesi, Andres Rius and Andrea Vigorito, 19 June 2018. Thanks to Aldo Marchesi for sharing the interview.

20 Mario I. Aguilar, "The Vicaría de La Solidaridad and the Pinochet Regime, 1976–1980: Religion and Politics in 20th Century Chile," *Iberoamericana – Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 31, no. 1 (1 January 2001): 101.

21 "Interview of Enrique Iglesias."

of the military regime, the endeavor, supported by the United Nations, resulted in the assistance and relocation outside Chile of over 7,000 foreigners looking for asylum. For Iglesias, the endeavor was a "once in a lifetime opportunity" to make a difference in what seemed like a hopeless situation. Through this endeavor, he became part of the country's political and social life, turning Chile into his "second motherland."

In turn, for the institution, the human rights' struggle represented not only a path for survival in an adverse environment; it was also a partial political triumph since Iglesias had proven to simultaneously coexist with and resist a belligerent host government. In an extremely repressive environment in which most intellectual life remained under siege, Iglesias had positioned CEPAL as one of the very few institutions to withstand the pressure. For a while, before independent research centers began to consolidate in the late 1970s, CEPAL would be the only available space for the exchange of economic ideas.[22] In some ways, it was also a de facto site of resistance to the economic program of the regime since the Chicago Boys, who came to orient economic decision making, were born to challenge *cepalino* hegemony. Despite the autonomy that Iglesias bestowed CEPAL with, especially relative to academic institutions, Iglesias still had to tread with outmost care. Most importantly, Iglesias believed that given the capacity of the regime to impose an economic program as the only available alternative after the socialist revolution in democracy, this meant that CEPAL had to fight the battle of ideas from the defensive and on the opponent's own terrain. In some ways, the endeavors that Iglesias supported later on were a mechanism to earn back a legitimacy that was lost with years of criticism and disenchantment and furthered censored by coercion and repression. In the process, CEPAL would reinvent itself and became part of the path for a new consensus.

4 Searching for a new paradigm

If the initial years were ones of survival, Iglesias spent the rest of his tenure at CEPAL attempting to save the institution from itself. At the global level, the oil shocks of the 1970s imposed a serious challenge for the *cepalino* legacy. Iglesias received CEPAL in the midst of a global energy crisis that represented both the apex and the nadir of the dearest of *cepalino* tenets and projects. On the one hand, OPEC-led price spikes were in some sense a triumph of commodity-exporting coun-

22 For the independent research centers: Jeffrey Puryear, *Thinking Politics: Intellectuals and Democracy in Chile* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

tries and hence an inversion of the center-periphery relations *cepalinos* had denounced. On the other hand, the rise in prices also put enormous pressures on the finances and stability of developing countries. At the regional level, CEPAL became the focus of intense criticism. Brazil and Chile, long-term and loyal allies of the institution, turned their backs on the institution. Aside from regional and global pressures to come to terms with the *cepalino* legacy, Iglesias confronted a recalcitrant staff unwilling to forego the old "cepalino Talmud." All those challenges moved a diplomatic and conciliatory Iglesias to find new allies among old enemies, pour new ideas into old wineskins, and establish unexpected institutional partnerships, all in an effort to both rescue and transcend the golden era of CEPAL.

The first of those challenges to the *cepalino* legacy came with the global energy crisis. While Iglesias turned CEPAL towards the defense of human rights in Chile, world events forced him to go back to the institution's original mandate. The October 1973 price-hike in oil prices that precipitated a global economic and political crisis carried special weight for CEPAL and *cepalino* ideas. The institution had been founded on the premise that global economic shocks such as the Great Depression and the Second World War had particularly pernicious effects for Latin America, a region highly dependent on international trade. The global energy crisis combined with the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system a few years earlier seemed poised to produce another structural transformation and to wreak-havoc on development plans dependent on foreign earnings and reserves. Was the region better prepared to weather the storm? Had *cepalino* ideas helped make the region more autonomous to global forces?

Iglesias seemed optimistic. Whereas Raúl Prebisch, his predecessor, routinely emphasized the obstacles to development, Iglesias focused on the progress achieved. The five-year period prior to the oil crisis was one of accelerated economic growth for Latin America, driven by but not exclusive to mighty Brazil.[23] Latin America was "much more industrialized" and "much more developed" than at the onset of the *cepalino* project. Indeed, by the time of the first oil shock, the industrialization process peaked, as the share of the manufacturing sector on the national product was the highest. The process diverged significantly across the region, leading to highly diversified economies in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, while in others, such as Chile and Venezuela, one industry took the leading role.[24] Since the "industrialization of Latin America was now a reality," *cepalinos* could at least partially claim a success in achieving a structural transformation of

23 Enrique Inglesias, "Exposición del secretario ejecutivo de la CEPAL ante el 57º Período de sesiones del ECOSOC," *Repositorio Digital CEPAL* (1974), http://hdl.handle.net/11362/32937.

24 Luis Bértola and José Antonio Ocampo. *The Economic Development of Latin America since Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 168.

the world economy through the transformation of Latin America.[25] Given these results in the era of hegemony of *cepalino* ideas, Iglesias insisted a few years later that "Latin America ha[d] undergone significant changes in its productive structure" and therefore had "greater capacity to withstand repercussions of international upheavals," only a few years later.[26]

There were other reasons to be optimistic, especially for those seeking Third Worldism. That commodity-exporters of the world's periphery were able to set the terms of trade of a crucial product such as oil was initially perceived as a triumph of developing countries seeking to upend unequal center-periphery relations and to transform unfair patterns of international trade. "Through an exceptional demonstration of political organization," Iglesias explained, "the developing world is reversing the traditional relation of dependency and is working together to obtain a higher price for its basic products."[27] Furthermore, the OPEC-led spike in the prices of the crucial commodity was a particular triumph for *cepalinos.* The concepts and language of unequal exchange between center and peripheries that *cepalinos* had formulated and disseminated, especially through Prebisch's leading role at UNCTAD, underpinned the discussions that led to the OPEC decision.[28] Therefore the OPEC intervention seemed to represent the much-expected transformation in power relations between center and peripheries that *cepalinos* had advocated for.

Yet, the action of OPEC countries not only shocked developed economies. Since most developing countries were also oilimporters, the effects of the attempt to highlight the dependence of industrialized countries on the commodities produced by the periphery also highlighted the limits of the developing countries' own development model. For most Latin American countries, the crisis was particularly acute. These countries, Iglesias explained, had "an accelerated rate of industrialization and urbanization" and an "automobile-based civilization that has penetrated into their most remote areas," making them equally dependent on oil consumption as their industrialized counterparts.[29] Industrialization continued to deepen dependence rather than further autonomy as *cepalinos* had originally envisioned. Furthermore, Iglesias feared that the resources made available through international organizations to offset the oil price increases would privilege less developed countries, bypassing the middle-income Latin American ones.

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25 Enrique Iglesias, "La CEPAL de Hoy," *Vision*, 26 June 1976.

26 Enrique Iglesias, "Address Delivered by the Executive Secretary of CEPAL," *CEPAL Review* (1977): 248, http://hdl.handle.net/11362/10646.

27 Enrique Iglesias, "The Energy Challenge," *Revista de la CEPAL,* 10, 1980: 13. From *Repositorio Digital CEPAL.*

28 Dietrich, *Oil Revolution.*

29 Iglesias, "Energy Challenge."

Therefore, to confront the crisis, Iglesias leveraged on the *cepalino* tradition of cooperation between center and peripheries to propose the creation of a "Latin American safety net," an additional pool of resources, to guarantee access to foreign capital in times of need. Iglesias toured the Washington-based institutions, the European Economic Community, and the regional governments to gain support for the initiative without much formal success. The safety net did not materialize, but Iglesias was at least able to highlight the dire financial situation of Latin American economies as middle-income, raw-material producing as well as consuming periphery.[30] The OPEC shock therefore further heightened the vulnerability of the world's periphery to global crisis and crushed the hope of autonomy and equality that *cepalinos* had heralded as the goal of development. As such, the OPEC insurrection further eroded the legitimacy of the *cepalino* project.

Meanwhile, Brazil and Chile, who were once crucial country allies in the *cepalino* project, turned their backs on CEPAL, further discrediting the institution. While the establishment of the institution was the product of a Chilean diplomatic initiative in the 1940s, the support of the Brazilian government proved decisive for the continuation of the institution when its survival was under threat in its formative years. Both Brazil and Chile saw *cepalinos* ascend to power and take control of ministers and development institutions. The development trajectories of these two countries inspired *cepalino* approaches to inflation, and *cepalino* ideas inspired several government programs.

However, by the 1970s, the tide turned. Despite the deep-seated tradition of *cepalino* developmentalism in Brazilian academic and policy circles, Minister of the Economy Delfim Netto distanced himself, and the Brazilian "economic miracle" he presided over, from CEPAL. He emphatically declared that "Latin American countries have been for almost twenty years prisoners of an ideological fantasy that condemns the Third World to a loser in international trade." According to the Brazilian Minister, CEPAL had encouraged protectionism and discouraged Latin American countries from expanding exports, fearing a deeper fall in the terms of trade. By "eliminating the disastrous influence of CEPAL," Minister Netto argued, Brazil had managed to compete in international markets and, despite losses in terms of trade, managed to increase income, control inflation, and balance its external payments. Minister Netto's statements resonated widely over Latin America. [31] The Chilean press, of which even the more conservative outlets had been supportive

30 Carlos Sansón to Johannes Witteveen, 1 August 1975, IMF Archive, International Organizations, B. 37, F. 3.

31 "El Subdesarrollo y la culpabilidad de la CEPAL," *El Mercurio*, 18 August 1973; Eudocio Ravines, "Atendado de la CEPAL contra América Latina," *Diario de las Américas* (29 August 1973).

of CEPAL in its golden years, voiced similar criticisms.[32] The recriminations mounted during the final years of the Allende government – in which *cepalinos* occupied key positions – and turned to outright disparagement after the advent of the military regime. "I personally doubt that [CEPAL] will ever regain its former prestige," concluded a knowledgeable observer of Latin America.[33] The global and regional situation was dire.

The severity of the situation did not escape Iglesias. The *cepalino* project, exported to the world through UNCTAD and disseminated through debates at OPEC and the New International Economic Order, was under duress. The closest regional allies, including the host government, were outwardly hostile to CEPAL, and Iglesias struggled to avoid becoming a second Prebisch and simply follow the trajectory established by its predecessor. Iglesias felt somehow "the world had fallen over them."[34] Something had to change. And it did, paving the way for a new but perhaps unwanted consensus.

First, Iglesias put the house in order. The institution began to recalibrate its publications; it moved away from its long-established regional economic survey towards a study of the annual economic conditions that, according to a staff member, became the most cited CEPAL document of all time.[35] Andrés Bianchi, a Yale University-trained Chilean economist who became Iglesias' right hand on the in-house reform of the institution, believed that by privileging long-term, region-wide analysis to the detriment of short-term, national-scope studies, CEPAL was losing touch with regional decisionmakers. Furthermore, the regional scope, mostly grounded on the experience of the Southern cone countries, had given CEPAL an unwarranted pessimism about the prospects of development and had led it to neglect the experience of Andean countries with different growth models. Finally, the institution created a long-awaited periodical to act as a mechanism for the diffusion of ideas. Although *cepalinos* were a diverse group in terms of ideologies and political affiliations, the institution lacked an outlet for its members to express individual viewpoints distinct from those of the official institutional stance. Thus, *Revista de la CEPAL* was created in a particularly timely matter for Prebisch to have one last affiliation to the institution as the journal's director after his retirement. Aside

32 "CEPAL: Una doctrina y un fracaso," *El Mercurio*, 7 April 1973.

33 Jorge del Canto to Johannes Witteveen, 7 October 1973, IMF Archive, International Organization, B. 37, F. 2.

34 "Enrique Iglesias."

35 Andrés Bianchi, "La CEPAL en los años setenta y ochenta," *La CEPAL En Sus 50 Años: Notas de Un Seminario Conmemorativo*, ed. United Nations (Santiago de Chile: Naciones Unidas, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, 2000).

from these administrative adjustments, Iglesias would steer CEPAL towards a what seemed a more substantial transformation.

The OPEC shock first and the influx of recycled dollars of increased profits later put inflation, balance of payments, and other monetary matters once again at the forefront of the debate. For most *cepalino* critics, CEPAL had little to offer in terms of short-term macroeconomic problems and, thus, with the management of the unfolding economic crisis. Iglesias was aware that the criticism was unfounded. Certainly, *cepalinos* were better known for their attention to "structural" or long-term aspects of development, including the system of international trade, planning for import-substitution industrialization, and regional industrial integration. However, the region's high inflation levels, the recurrent balance of payments crisis, and other macroeconomic problems were always at the forefront of *cepalino* considerations about development. In the past, the concern with inflation had motivated lively debates among *cepalinos* about the origins of the phenomenon and the effects over development that drove a wedge between them and led them to propose what came to be known as the "structural" or *cepalino* approach to inflation in the late 1950s. The structural approach to inflation, in turn, positioned *cepalinos* as adversaries to the International Monetary Fund and generated enormous friction with the institution, heightening political polarization in the region. During the emergence and transformation of the *cepalino* approach to inflation in the 1960s, *cepalinos* had become associated with a disregard of monetary matters and a tolerance to inflation. Furthermore, Iglesias also recognized that Prebisch himself had an approach to the matters that many of the critics would sympathize with. In opposition to other *cepalinos*, Prebisch had been originally concerned with internal drivers of inflation. When put in charge of confronting an inflationary crisis in Argentina, Prebisch, unlike other *cepalinos*, had privileged "sound money" and monetary restraint, not just "structural reforms," to curb inflationary pressures.[36]

Drawing on these neglected portions of the cepalino legacy, Iglesias, in an apparent swerve, redirected CEPAL's attention towards monetary matters. However, Iglesias' incursion into finance and money entailed different methods, perspectives, and allies than those of the *cepalino* golden years. First and perhaps most surprisingly, Iglesias recruited some of the most lenient *cepalino* critics to assume the study of monetary and financial matters at CEPAL. Those critics came from the most unexpected places. In the late 1950s the Chilean Catholic University and the University of Chicago established a partnership to train several cohorts of Chilean economists in the United States, some of which would become the infamous Chi-

36 See: Fajardo, *World*, 81.

cago Boys, the experts in charge of the military regime's implementation of a new liberal order. One of the principal objectives of that partnership was to undercut *cepalinos* and their influence in Chile and Latin America.[37] Despite the distance separating the institutions, Iglesias recruited Roberto Zahler and Carlos Massad, two university professors trained through that program who would later become directors of the inflation-targeting Chilean Central Bank. Furthermore, given the resistance of the staff, Iglesias and Bianchi put in place an almost parallel unit within CEPAL. The financial support for that parallel unit came from external, private sources, different from the United Nations, to bypass the internal opposition against the transformation and bureaucratic inertia.[38]

Within a decade, the insurgent unit contributed to "generalize the idea that maintaining macroeconomic equilibrium was not just a mere obsession of the monetarists but a necessary, though insufficient, condition for growth."[39] CEPAL was therefore ushering in a new consensus.

Finally, perhaps the most unforeseen of the changes was the forging of what seemed like an unholy alliance. The relations between the IMF and CEPAL had shifted over the years. The initial personal and even theoretical affinities in the 1940s and early 1950s turned to rivalry and even animosity in the early 1960s.[40] The institutions had found some "common ground" in the late 1960s as the IMF became more "sympathetic" to the problems of the developing world and created new instruments that favored them, "chang[ing] the image of the IMF in Latin America."[41] Iglesias further propelled what the IMF staff called a "rapprochement."

Since he assumed the leadership of the institution, Iglesias built new bridges with CEPAL's long-established adversary. During his years as the director of Uruguay's Central Bank, Iglesias had built friendly and strong relations with the International Monetary Fund staff. The IMF staff described Iglesias as "appreciative of our efforts to… produce sensible policies for the developing world."[42] He sought IMF cooperation for CEPAL's new endeavors on the monetary and financial studies. In turn, the IMF was skeptical about Iglesias' "safety net" proposal to cope with

37 See: Juan Gabriel Valdez, *Pinochet's Economists;* Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century.*

38 Personal interview with Andres Bianchi, 29 July 2013.

39 Bianchi, "La CEPAL," 51.

40 Fajardo, "CEPAL."

41 Raúl Prebisch to Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, 15 February 1973, IMF Archive, International Organization, B. 37, F. 2.

42 Jorge del Canto to Johannes Witteveen, 7 October 1973, IMF Archive, International Organization, B. 37, F. 2.

the effects of the energy crisis, but was nonetheless cooperative, and the staff believed it could play an important role in assisting these countries. If former endeavors of the kind were viewed with suspicion, in the Iglesias era, the IMF staff viewed CEPAL's involvement in monetary matters quite favorably.[43] The goodwill and amicable relations turned to formal cooperation with the IMF-CEPAL partnership to study "alternative strategies to open up the economies of developing countries." The market liberalization project was again led by Massad in collaboration with Zahler to analyze the macroeconomic effects of trade and capital liberalization through a computer simulation designed and implemented by the two institutions. The IMF staff reported CEPAL to be "well pleased with the cooperation from the Fund."[44]

The market liberalization project represented a complete transformation, not only of the relations between these two institutions. Despite precedents of *cepalino* incursion into monetary matters and of advocating more, not less trade, Iglesias' turn was received with resistance among the old guard. For Iglesias, those recalcitrant staff members were defending a doctrine that was increasingly losing credibility and threatened the very existence of the institution. The institution had received numerous embattlements and criticisms throughout the years that had eroded its legitimacy and distorted its legacy. The oil shocks once again demonstrated the lack of autonomy of the periphery and the failure of an industrialization-based development model; the criticism of Chile and Brazil, former allies, blaming *cepalinos* for the region's "underdevelopment," especially for disregarding the potential of export-led growth and the importance of monetary stability, distorted the legacy, turning CEPAL into a symbol of a parochial nationalism and what critics later called "macroeconomic populism."[45] Instead, Iglesias believed that taking CEPAL towards money and finance "afforded [the institution] respect within the economic orthodoxy" and, hence, represented a springboard to reclaiming lost ground. It was only by playing its adversaries on their own terrain that the institution could reassert itself as legitimate interlocutor of the economic policy debate of freeing markets and politics. This area became even more important for the institution as Latin America confronted the Debt Crisis beginning in 1982 and further research is needed to assess the role of CEPAL in that moment. However, in

43 Jan-Marteen Zeegers to Johannes Witteveen, 7 December 1979, IMF Archive, International Organization, B. 37, F. 3.

44 Internal Memorandum to the Members of the Executive Board, 19 March 1980, IMF Archive, International Organization, B. 37, F. 3.

45 Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, eds., *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), http://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio14121114.

the process of reasserting itself in the 1970s, CEPAL perhaps became instrumental in the forging of a new consensus that would only fully consolidate in the last decade of the twentieth century.

5 Conclusions

The turn of CEPAL towards monetary stability and economic liberalization constituted for many a tergiversation of the ethos of the institution. CEPAL, among other organizations, had played a key role in transforming the United Nations into a forum for defending the interests of the global South. As such, CEPAL advocated for less protectionism in the world's economic centers and thus privileging non-reciprocal exchanges over free trade. Distancing itself from the IMF, *cepalinos* also insisted on the non-monetary causes of inflation and balance of payments problems and urged for more liberal access to resources for patching-up income drops during downward trends of the economic cycle. In the process, the denunciation of the pitfalls of the prevailing system of trade and the insistence of the structural origins of inflation, the legacy of the institution was reduced to the defense of protectionism and of privileges of domestic industries and a tolerance to inflation. In the context of accelerating inflation, partial attempts at liberalization in Chile and Brazil, and the rise of research and academic centers competing for influence, the preservation of a distorted legacy represented a threat to the existence of the institution itself inasmuch as for Iglesias, the new in command, irrelevance meant retreat.

Iglesias would not accept retreat, but the situation imposed a dilemma. CEPAL "was far too important for Latin America to disappear," Iglesias believed, but its preservation entailed foregoing what many understood as the *cepalino* legacy. Iglesias did not forego the problems of industrialization, trade, and development. He continued to participate and advocate for the demands for the new international economic order and to insist on the unequal relation between center and peripheries. Yet, Iglesias, who had the firm conviction that Latin America needed to "increase export capacity," "integrate dynamically to world markets," and fight inflation and debt, steered the institution in a new direction. [46] The venture into a new territory involved the recruitment of former adversaries and joining forces with an institution reviled in the region and the world for denying aid

46 Enrique Iglesias, "Latin America on the threshold of the 1980s," *CEPAL Review* 9 (December 1979): 42.

when most needed and enforcing austerity and inflation-control over countries and governments in distress.

Although there were important precedents of *cepalino* concerns with the matter, the move did entail a transformation with important consequences. It is often considered that the turn towards liberalization of trade and capital movements and the enforcement of austerity and other instruments of inflation-control, captured under the umbrella term of neoliberalism, came to developing countries from the outside, and that overwhelming resistance was the response. This article, based on very preliminary primary research, explores how the transformation began from within. By focusing on CEPAL, an epitome of development-era thinking and practice, the article highlights the role of internal transformation in bringing about what eventually became a paradigm shift. The seemingly small changes implemented by Iglesias did create bridges with established, orthodox economic institutions and individuals who are considered responsible for the turn to neoliberalism. As such, CEPAL and other similar institutions and individuals might have had a key role in the transformation, but more research is needed. The article focuses on the complementary, not adversarial, role this institution played in carving a path for a new consensus, one that would eventually combine a monetary stability, reintegration to world markets, and a concern with equity as much as growth.[47] This article showcases the personal, institutional, administrative, and conceptual factors that led to an embrace of policy choices and partnerships that would have been unthinkable years earlier. The specific case of CEPAL shows that the transformation anteceded the Debt Crisis and was born out of optimism in the prospects of growth rather than catastrophism of a seemingly "lost decade." It also shows that the leadership came from a *cepalino* friend, disciple, and ally rather than from individuals, institutions, and ideas forced upon them. Finally, the article shows that rather than a takeover of powerful and adversarial institutions such as the IMF, the embrace of different themes and policy choices was possible because the gap between them had narrowed as those adversarial institutions had grown more sympathetic, not more contrarian, to the interests of the developing world. This exploratory article thus hopes to contribute to rethinking the end of the development era.

47 On the new synthesis, see: Bianchi, "La CEPAL," 44, 52.

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Lorella Tosone

Planning growth and population. The debate on population and development at the UN and the origins of UNFPA

1 Introduction

Since Malthus, the relationship between a growing population and limited natural resources, especially food, has been dealt with by scholars of various disciplines – economists, agriculture and nutrition experts, sociologists, and, finally, demographers – in a debate that still today has not adequately explained the nature of this relationship[1]. Does a growing population favor or hinder economic development? Are the many people who every year add to the world population – which on 15 November 2022 was projected to have reached eight billion people[2] – an unsustainable burden for the planet or, on the contrary, do they mean greater production, greater consumption, and finally greater possibilities for further technological developments?

Today, demographic issues are relegated to the margins of the development discourse and seem to be of little interest to the international community, even when it is engaged in the elaboration of new development goals and targets. From time to time we can read reflections on the low average age of the countries of the Global South and, especially in Europe, on the demographic projections of the African continent – mostly due to the concerns aroused by immigration issues – while European countries are experiencing their "demographic winter."

In the 1960s, however, the world population issue and its links with the expectations of economic growth of Third World countries was widely discussed in debates on modernization. Demographic estimates and censuses carried out between the 1950s and the 1960s confronted the international community with the need to deal with the "population explosion" of the developing countries. At the same time, advances in scientific research on human reproduction hinted at the possibility of

1 Massimo Livi Bacci, *A Concise History of World Population* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2017), 85.

2 United Nations, *Day of Eight Billion*, https://www.un.org/en/dayof8billion.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111280356-005

intervening in a phenomenon which, it was feared, could affect the economic growth of developing countries as well as international security.

This essay, based on the available historiography, archival documentation, and UN official documents, reconstructs the debate on the population-development nexus that developed at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) and at the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), as well as the role played by UN technical bodies that dealt with population issues, such as the ECOSOC Population Commission and the Population Division of the Secretariat.

After a brief introductory paragraph illustrating the intellectual roots of the UN's approach to world population issues, the essay illustrates the factors that pushed the organization and its specialized agencies towards an increasing involvement in population policies in the Third World, the support of some member states and the resistance of a part of the international community to the idea of fighting hunger and sustaining economic growth by reducing the size of families in the Third World.

2 World population as an international question

Having emerged as an autonomous discipline between the two world wars, demography went through a phase of further development after WWII, for reasons related to the needs of post-war reconstruction. Counting, classifying, and being able to predict population trends was of fundamental importance for post-war planning: welfare needs, economic development programs, domestic and foreign investments. Estimates and forecasts on population trends in the different countries were requested by the UN and its agencies, and were necessary for the states themselves: they were needed, for example, by the FAO to define the level of agricultural production required in the medium term, by the International Labor Organization (ILO) to analyze migration trends and the availability of manpower, and by governments to plan economic and social policies. From this point of view, studies on the European population had been conducted by the Princeton University Office of Population Research (OPR) on behalf of the League of Nations when the war was still ongoing.[3]

3 European population studies included Frank Notestein et al., *The Future population of Europe and the Soviet Union. Population Projections, 1940–1970* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1944); Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1945); Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946); and Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years,* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946).

The confidence that in those years was placed in planning as the most appropriate approach to reconstruction in Europe and as a useful tool for redefining the international system after the end of empires[4] favored a greater use of demographic research and data on population trends, while the discipline was consolidating, also through the establishment of new professional associations and scientific journals.[5] The discipline saw its greatest development in the United States (US), thanks above all to the support of private foundations, in particular the Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems and the Milbank Memorial Fund which, starting in the 1920s, financed the first research institutions in the biomedical and demographic fields.[6] US demographers, who worked in research centers, government institutions, and foundations, were for a long time the most influential at the UN, helping to shape the demographic bodies and the political and scientific direction of the organization.

In those years, also the interpretative theory of demographic transition established itself, which would remain the predominant interpretation of demographic changes at least until the end of the 1960s.[7] It stated that every society progressed from a pre-modern regime of high fertility and high mortality to a post-modern regime of low fertility and low mortality and identified the factors of change in economic and social progress. The theory was elaborated between 1943 and 1945 by the OPR demographers Dudley Kirk, Frank Notestein, and Kingsley Davis.[8] It

4 See James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999); Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 87–94.

5 The journal *Population Index*, published since 1935 by the Population Association of America, added *Demography*, by the same association, in 1946, and *Population*, published by the *Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques* (Ined), and, in 1947, *Population Studies*, founded by David Glass, then director of Britain's Population Investigation Committee of the London School of Economics.

6 Frank W. Notestein, "Reminiscences: The Role of Foundations, the Population Association of America, Princeton University and the United Nations in Fostering American Interest in Population Problems," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (1971): 67–85.

7 For a critical reading of the theory and its evolution, see in particular Dennis Hodgson, "Demography as Social Science and Policy Science," *Population and Development Review* 9, no. 1 (1983): 1–34; Simon Szreter, "The Idea of Demographic Transition and the Study of Fertility Change: A Critical Intellectual History," *Population and Development Review* 19, no. 4 (1993): 659–701; Susan Greenhalgh, "The Social Construction of Population Science: An Intellectual, Institutional, and Political History of Twentieth-Century Demography," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38, no. 1 (1996): 26–66.

8 Kingsley Davis, "The World Demographic Transition," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 237 (1945): 1–11; Dudley Kirk, "Population changes and the post-war world," *American Sociological Review* 9, no. 1 (1944): 28–35; Franberelsonk Notestein, "Population.

started from studies on fertility in industrialized countries conducted in the previous fifty years, from research developed in the 1930s at Princeton on the decline in fertility in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, and reworked concepts already proposed in 1929 by Warren Thompson, then one of US major demographers.[9] Kirk, Notestein, and Davis described the transformation of fertility rates in industrialized countries in relation to economic growth, in a process that had unfolded in long-term phases, and thereby derived a general theory from this description which they considered applicable to developing countries. Simultaneously with the industrialization process, they explained, strong population growth had occurred in Europe caused by a constant lowering of mortality rates, especially infant mortality rates, induced in turn by improvements in nutrition, public hygiene, and health services. At the same time, fertility rates had remained unchanged, thus causing the population to increase; in fact, fertility rates responded less quickly than mortality rates to the changes brought about by modernization processes. The former, according to the two scholars, depended on a series of social, cultural, and religious factors which changed very slowly and only as a response to the transformations generated by economic growth.[10]

Between the end of the 1940s and the mid-1950s, however, the applicability of the theory of demographic transition in developing countries began to be questioned: demographers started to maintain that rapid population growth in poorer countries was hindering development, making direct intervention on the part of states necessary to limit fertility rates and accelerate demographic transition, thus allowing the initiation of the process of modernization in a short period.[11] Thus, as Simon Szreter points out, in the space of a few years, the fertility rates which, at first, were considered as dependent on economic and social development began to be seen as an independent variable upon which governments could directly act in order to limit fertility.[12]

The works of the most influential demographers increasingly left aside the mere technical description of demographic variables to make room for different

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The Long View," in *Food for the World*, ed. Theodore W. Schultz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), 36–57.

9 Warren Thompson, "Population," *American Journal of Sociology* 34, no. 6 (1929): 959–975.

10 Notestein, "Population. The Long View," 40–41.

11 Frank Notestein, "The Population of the World in the Year 2000," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 45, no. 251 (1950): 343–344; Kingsley Davis, "The Unpredicted Pattern of Population Change," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 305 (1956): 59; id., "The Amazing Decline of Mortality in Underdeveloped Areas," *The American Economic Review* 46, no. 2 (1956): 305–318.

12 Szreter, "The Idea of Demographic Transition and the Study of Fertility Change."

considerations: expressed in Cold War language, reflections on the economic and political consequences, at the international level, of the uncontrolled increase in population in developing countries became increasingly frequent. While Notestein highlighted the difficulty of guaranteeing sufficient agricultural production for a continuously growing population in the long run,[13] Davis went further and directly linked the conditions of poverty to the constant political instability found in the most densely populated areas, among populations now aware of their disadvantaged conditions and who aspired to improve their living standards as promised at the time of independence.[14] A volume entitled *Population and World Politics*,[15] edited by the sociologist and demographer Philip Hauser, linked the problem of world population growth to the instability of international relations in the Cold War and called for the definition of a US population policy in developing countries, as "the principal population problem of the United States is the overpopulated countries."[16] In his introduction to the book, Hauser noted that population trends had now become an element of the Cold War, due to their links with the widespread aspirations for economic development among peoples of the newly independent countries and attempts of the two superpowers to attract the latter within their own sphere of influence.[17]

Thus, a scenario was outlined in which the influence of the Soviet Union could easily extend to economically weak and politically fragile countries, thereby threatening the position of the US in the world. Starting from the mid-1950s, indeed, this hypothesis seemed to be more than probable in light of the growing attention that Soviet leaders showed towards developing countries and national liberation movements in the post-Stalin era.

These theses also seemed to find confirmation in some economic studies. Simon Kutznets, for example, had linked the increase in population in some developing regions both to the growing differences in income with the industrialized countries and to the increase in internal inequalities: for Kutznets too this situation brought with it the risk of internal unrest.[18] In the same years, the Princeton demographer Ansley Coale and the World Bank economist Edgar Hoover conducted a study on the economic consequences of a possible decrease in birth rates in

13 Frank Notestein, "Economic problems of population change," in *Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference of Agricultural Economists* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 146–147.
14 Davis, "The Unpredicted Pattern of Population Change," 59.
15 Philip M. Hauser, ed., *Population and World Politics* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958).
16 Quincy Wright, "Population and United States Foreign Policy," in *Population and World Politics*, ed. Philip M. Hauser, 270.
17 Philip M. Hauser, "Introduction," in ibid., 14.
18 Simon Kuznets, "Regional economic trends and levels of living," in ibid., 79–117.

non-industrialized countries, using India as a case study. The conclusion they arrived at, considered applicable to the whole developing world, was that a decrease in fertility levels in countries with high demographic growth would make it possible to transfer resources from consumption to investment, leading to a significant increase in per capita income in the medium to long term: "at any stage in the foreseeable future of the low-income countries with high fertility, a reduction in fertility would produce important economic advantages. Since these advantages are cumulative, the ultimate benefits of fertility reduction are greater, the sooner it occurs."[19]

This interpretation of the population trends of developing countries is almost completely superimposable in terms of concepts and approaches to the theory of modernization, which in those years was establishing itself in the US and in international organizations as the prevailing interpretative paradigm of the development processes and as a point of reference for the practical definition of technical and financial cooperation interventions in the field.[20] These theories shared an evolutionary vision of social development, deriving from common roots in sociological functionalism[21]: a strongly Eurocentric approach, for which modernity was only a positive value and was represented by Western models of states and societies, towards which all others had to converge. They also shared an interpretation of social change as a process that advanced in stages, unidirectional (from pre-modern to modern) and universal (the same for all), which did not take into account the peculiarities of the economic, social, and cultural conditions of each country in different historical moments. The arrival point of the path towards modernity, for both, was represented by the structure of the industrialized societies of the capitalist world: an "age of high mass-consumption," for the theory of modernization, a condition of equilibrium with low birth rates and low mortality for the demographic transition theory. In the mid-1950s, the theory of demographic transition had conformed to that of modernization in another respect as well: it was now functional to the idea that the West, in the context of the Cold War,

19 Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover, *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries. A Case Study of India's Prospects* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 335.
20 For an interesting synthesis of modernization theory and US foreign policy see Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and US Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011). See also Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010) and the essays included in "Towards a Global History of Modernization," ed. David C. Engerman and Corinna R. Unger, *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 3 (2009).
21 Szreter, "The Idea of Demographic Transition," 673.

had the power and the duty to condition the social, economic, and political changes of developing countries, through direct interventions in the field of population policies. It offered the Western ruling classes and those of the newly independent countries an apparently simple solution to complex development problems, proposing a strategy that contemplated planning families, together with development planning and presenting itself as a sort of "non-Communist Manifesto" in the demographic field.

It is difficult to overestimate the influence that this interpretation of world population issues had on the UN approach to population problems, at least until the mid-1970s. It is, in fact, on the basis of these conceptualizations that, starting from the end of the 1960s, the UN began to support family planning programs in the Third World.

3 Demography at the UN in the 1950s and "the ghosts of Malthus and Marx"

In 1946, on a proposal from the United Kingdom (UK) and the US, the Population Commission was established as one of the functional commissions of ECOSOC with the mandate to analyze "the size and structure of populations and the changes therein," the interplay of demographic factors and economic and social factors, and "the policies designed to influence the size and structure of populations."[22] Shortly thereafter, a Population Division was created within the Social Affairs Department of the Secretariat, made up mainly of demographers who would support the Commission's work by providing research and statistical data to specialized agencies and governments. It was led between 1947 and 1948 by Notestein,[23] who also contributed to its organization, and soon established itself as the leading center of research in the demographic field internationally, with a special link to the OPR of the University of Princeton from which the subsequent directors, Pascal Whelpton (1950–1952) and John Durand (1953–1965), also came. The creation of the Population Division represented, on the one hand, the continuation and expansion of research work in the demographic field carried out, albeit for a short period, by the League of Nations, and, on the other, the sign of the growing importance acquired over the interwar years by demography. Above all, as the Di-

22 *Report of the Population Commission on its Third Session, 10–25 May 1948*, ECOSOC Official Records [Escor], III Year, seventh session, Supplement no. 7 (New York: United Nations, 1950), cap. I, E/805 e E/805/Corr. I.

23 Ansley J. Coale, *An Autobiography* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2000), 18.

vision itself underlined, "it was the expression of a growing realization that research in the social sciences is too important to the welfare of the entire world to be left in the hands of the few nations which are able to undertake it on a substantial scale."[24] The Population Commission, which met for the first time in February 1947, included representatives of ECOSOC member states and, without voting rights, representatives of some specialized agencies (FAO, UNESCO, and ILO) and of organizations of civil society.

In its first years of activity, the body maintained a technical profile, with respect to its composition, its members being chosen above all from demographers and statisticians, or highly experienced economists and sociologists whose interests had converged in the field of population problems: at the first meeting for example, among others, Alfred Sauvy, a key figure in French and international demography and founder of the *Institut national d'etudes demographiques* (Ined); Philip Hauser, US Representative; David Glass, a leading British demographer and member of the Royal Commission on Population (1944–1949); Conrad Taeuber, demographer and economist at the US Department of Agriculture, as FAO representative; and the ever-present Notestein, as representative of the UN Secretary General all faced off. The Population Commission managed to reach a good level of consensus on issues considered as mere technical issues. But the "nice non-political commission, consisting entirely of scientists" [25] that Henri Laugier, Deputy Secretary General for Social Affairs, had described to the UN Secretary General Trygve Lie was not free from the tensions of the Cold War, which it was forced to deal with when it tried to address the most important issue of its mandate, i. e. the nature of the relationships and reciprocal influences between demography and economic development, an issue which intellectuals and scholars of various disciplines had grappled with since the time of Malthus. Sauvy and Roland Pressat, French members of the Commission, recall that, from the very first meetings, the issue was raised and immediately shelved due to the reactions of the Soviet and Ukrainian representatives, who rejected any attempt to discuss the relationship between demographic and economic trends, in terms they defined as "Malthusian."[26]

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24 ECOSOC, *Accomplishments of the Population Division, Department of Social Affairs, 1946–1950*, 3 April 1951, p. 1, E/CN.9/L.13.

25 *103rd private meeting in the Secretary-General's Office on Thursday 21 August 1947 at 4,30 pm*, p. 2, United Nations Archives, New York [UNA], S-0847–0001–02–00001.

26 Roland Pressat and Alfred Sauvy, "L'activité des Nations-Unies pour les questions de population," *Population* 14, no. 3 (1959): 540. See also Alfred Sauvy, "La commission de la population aux Nations Unies (2e session)," *Population* 2, no. 2–4 (1947): 835–836 ; and id., "La quatrième session de la commission de la population des Nations Unies (Genève, avril 1949)," *Population* 4, no. 2 (1949): 404–405.

The Commission virtually covered the entire "ideological spectrum" of positions that could be expressed on world population problems, although the main fault line was quite clear: "the ghosts of Malthus and Marx have been apparent at each session, and occasionally have exhibited unwilling vigor."[27]

However, Cold War divisions do not by themselves explain the lack of consensus on the interpretation of the impact of population growth in development processes and international relations. Diversity of positions, in fact, ran throughout the two blocs, just as it characterized the attitude of the various developing countries, to the point of making even the definition of the problem difficult. At least until 1960, some members of the Population Commission questioned the very existence of a "demographic explosion," consequently also rejecting the idea that governments could implement policies aimed at curbing it.

The greatest resistance came from a rather unusual coalition, made up of Catholic countries and countries of the Soviet bloc, together with some Latin American representatives. The former opposed any attempt to discuss birth control policies on the basis of religious arguments[28]; the latter maintained that it was not "overpopulation" that prevented development, but rather the opposite and that the only possible solution to the problem lay in the implementation of socialist-type economic and social reforms.[29] The Latin American countries, especially Brazil and Argentina, which had their representatives on the Commission throughout the 1950s, added the idea of being underpopulated countries to these arguments, therefore having the right to decide demographic policies that they felt were best suited to their internal context autonomously and without interference. To the group of critics must be added France, whose representative, Sauvy, was, "as much as any of the delegates from communist countries, an implacable opponent to what he called *le malthusianisme anglo-saxon.*"[30] Indeed, Sauvy believed that

27 Notestein, "Demographic work of the United Nations," 188.

28 On the Holy See positions towards family planning see John T. Noonan, *Contraception: A History of its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965) and Kevin McQuillan, "Common Themes in Catholic and Marxist Thought on Population and Development," *Population and Development Review* 5, no. 4 (1979): 689–698.

29 See, among others, Robert Cook, "Soviet Population Theory from Marx to Kosygin. A Demographic Turning Point," *Population Bulletin* 23, no. 4 (1967): 85–115; Milos Macura, "Population Policies in Socialist Countries of Europe," *Population Studies* 28, no. 3 (1974): 369–379; Helen Desfosses, "Demography, Ideology and Politics in the USSR," *Soviet Studies* 28, no. 2 (1976): 244–256.

30 Cited in Richard Symonds and Michael Carder, *The United Nations and the Population Question, 1945–1970* (London: Sussex University Press, 1973), 74.

the problem of world population was posed by many demographers in a simplistic and emotional way: according to him, demographic research had not yet managed to fully explain the reciprocal influences between population and economic growth and therefore, before supporting family planning to stimulate the development of Third World countries, it was necessary to deepen knowledge on the different aspects of human reproduction and take into account the different economic, demographic, and political conditions of the various countries. Finally, he believed that, out of respect for the national sovereignty of each state, external interventions should be limited to recommendations and advice, and that only the awareness of the individual countries could help solve any problems of overpopulation.[31] This stopped the Commission from initiating an in-depth discussion on the most relevant demographic issue of those years, i. e. the economic and political consequences, at domestic and international level, of the rapid population growth in Third World countries.[32]

World population growth in its relationship with development processes was discussed for the first time at the UN GA only in 1957, in the context of the debate on the *Report on the World Social Situation*, presented by Philippe de Seynes, Deputy Secretary General for Economic and Social Affairs. In his speech to the Assembly de Seynes put it quite clearly:

> the unprecedented increase in population in recent years was undoubtedly one of the most important factors in the social situation, particularly in backward countries, where considerably more goods and services than formerly had to be produced in order to maintain even the existing low living standard. [...] Policymakers were faced with a continual problem of choice among social objectives each of which might be desirable in itself. In the case of the underdeveloped countries, the choice between measures for long-term development and those for the relief of immediate needs was particularly painful.[33]

During the general debate, numerous countries, in describing their own experience, identified demographic growth as the origin of the main problems that their governments were facing in the attempt to guarantee adequate basic social services, in the management of internal migrations and in coping with the growing unemployment in cities: among them Iran, Indonesia, Afghanistan, India, Ethiopia,

31 See, for example, Alfred Sauvy, "Le malthusianisme anglo-saxon," *Population* 2, no. 2 (1947): 221–242 and id., "Le "faux problème" de la population mondiale," *Population* 5, no. 3 (1949): 447–462.

32 Pressat, Sauvy, "L'activité des Nations-Unies pour les questions de population," 540.

33 General Assembly Official Records [GAOR], Twelfth session, III committee, 766th meeting, 27 September 1957, A/C.3/SR.766, par. 9.

and Tunisia.[34] Saudi Arabia and Pakistan explicitly referred to the need to identify "birth control" tools to favor their development policies. Saudi delegates directly linked population growth to food shortages and therefore to the danger of internal and international instability.[35]

In November 1957, five countries (Brazil, Italy, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru) presented a draft resolution urging the UN and its member states, especially the poorer ones, "to follow as closely as possible the existing interrelationships between economic and population changes." [36] The resolution did not aim to recommend states to implement specific demographic policies, but only to draw attention to the need to take demographic factors into account in development planning.

During the debate on the draft resolution, the interpretation of population growth as an obstacle to the development of many Third World countries became even more explicit. The representative of the Philippines, for example, linked the rapid population growth to the large migratory movements that affected some countries, to the reduction of per capita income in others, and to the general lack of resources in developing countries to finance health and education services.[37] Although the alarmist tone could have been dictated at that time by the intention to push Western countries to approve the creation of the Special UN Development Fund, which was then being discussed, it should be noted that since the second half of the 1950s, in the debates on development programs and their financing, it was above all the Third World countries, in particular those of South-East Asia, who pointed to the increase in world population as an obstacle to their chances of economic growth. During the 1957 debate, the only countries that expressed a different position were the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe.[38]

Due to ideological and political divisions, during the 1950s the UN was unable to express a clear position on the relationship between the increase in world population and development nor to formulate population policy recommendations to member states or initiate programs of technical assistance in this field. The activity of the UN was limited to research: the collection and improvement of data, the

34 GAOR, Twelfth session, III committee, 767th meeting, 30 September 1957, A/C.3/SR.767; 769th meeting, 1 October 1957, A/C.3/SR.769; 770th meeting, 2 October 1957, A/C.3/SR.770 and 772nd meeting, 4 October 1957, A/C.3/SR.772.

35 A/C.3/SR.767, cit.

36 UN General Assembly [UNGA], Twelfth session, Report of the second committee, *Economic development of under-developed countries*, 13 December 1957, A/3782; A/Res/1217 (XII), *Demographic questions,* 14 December 1957.

37 GAOR, Twelfth session, II committee, 496th meeting, 27 November 1957, A/C.2/SR.496, par. 12.

38 GAOR, Twelfth session, II committee, 501st meeting, 4 December 1957, A/C.2/SR.501, par. 30.

elaboration of forecasts and statistics, the conduct of studies, and the training of demographers and other experts in population problems in developing countries.[39]

This was a fundamental contribution, since the effort to systematize and deepen knowledge represented an important point of reference for demographers and other population policy experts at an international level.

In the 1950s, the impossibility of the UN expressing a general consensus in support of family planning programs in the Third World was counterbalanced by the activism of some non-governmental organizations and US foundations, such as the Rockefeller and the Ford Foundations.[40] In 1952, on the initiative of John D. Rockefeller III, the Population Council was created, which brought together academics (demographers, statisticians, economists, and biologists) and activists who saw the exponential growth of the population in the Third World as a threat to the security of the United States and for the "quality" of Western civilization itself.[41] With the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation, the Population Council became one of the most important centers of research and education in the biomedical and demographic fields and, above all, the major funder of birth control programs in various developing countries, long before the United Nations and the United States initiated their own policies in this area. The first countries to obtain economic support and advice for the implementation of their antinatalist policies were India and Pakistan, followed by South Korea and Taiwan.

In the same year, the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) was also established from the union of eight national family planning associations and whose first president was Margaret Sanger. The IPPF supported the establishment of national family planning associations in developing countries, financially and

39 ESCOR, Thirteenth session, Supplement no. 11, Population Commission Report of the 6th session, 23 April–4 May 1951, New York, UN, 1951 of the sixth session, 1951, p. 4.

40 US foundations' role in pushing family planning internationally has been widely analyzed in Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception. The Struggle to Control World Population*, Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008. See also John Sharpless, "Population Science, Private Foundations, and Development Aid: The Transformation of Demographic Knowledge in the United States, 1945–1965," in *International Development and the Social Sciences. Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge,* ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 176–200; Paul Weindling, "From disease prevention to population control. The realignment of Rockefeller foundation policies, 1920s-1950s," in *American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century*, ed. John Krige and Helke Rausch (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2012), 125–145; John Caldwell and Pat Caldwell, *Limiting Population Growth and the Ford Foundation Contribution* (London: Frances Pinter, 1986). For an insider's account Oscar Harkavy, *Curbing Population Growth: An Insider's Perspective on the Population Movement* (London and New York, Plenum Press, 1995).

41 Matthew Connelly, "Seeing beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty," *Past & Present* (2006): 193, 218–219.

through consultancies and, subsequently, the implementation of their birth control programs.

These organizations, together with numerous others,[42] gave life in those years to a transnational network made up of scientists, activists, politicians, and government officials who worked at various levels – from raising public awareness to lobbying governments – to advance family planning on the agenda of governments and international organizations.

4 Demographic projections of the late 1950s and the changing international perception of world population growth

Between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s a different perception of the world population problem and of the UN role in coping with it began to emerge and paved the way for a greater involvement of the UN in technical assistance programs in the field of family planning. This change can be traced back to the gradual evolution of the attitude of some industrialized countries, especially the US and the UK, with respect to international population policies, to a greater awareness on the part of the developing countries of the consequences that high population rates could have on their economic growth and to an effective lobbying action of the neo-Malthusian movement and family planning organizations, especially from the US.

However, these changes were above all triggered between 1958 and the early 1960s by the publication by the UN of new demographic forecasts and world population estimates based on the results of censuses held around 1960, which sig-

42 To the activities of the organizations briefly mentioned must be added those of other associations and institutions that had been operating in the same field since the 1930s, also including members who came from eugenicist associations, such as the Population Association of America, the Population Reference Bureau, the Pathfinder Fund and, especially, the Milbank Memorial Fund and the Scripps Foundation. To these were added in the 1960s the influential Population Crisis Committee – founded in 1965 by William Draper – and the Zero Population Growth (now Population Connection) cofounded by Paul Ehrlich in 1968. Frank W. Notestein, "Reminiscences: The Role of Foundations, the Population Association of America, Princeton University and the United Nations in Fostering American Interest in Population Problems," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* XLIX, no. 4 (1971): 67–85; Dennis Hodgson, "The Ideological Origins of the Population Association of America," *Population and Development Review* 17, no. 1 (1991): 1–34.

naled, without any doubt, an unprecedented growth in world population.[43] The 1958 estimates revised upwards those of 1951 and 1954[44] and clearly indicated that the world population would increase from approximately 2.5 billion individuals in 1950 to 3.5 billion in 1970 and 6.2 billion in 2000.[45] Furthermore, they pointed out that most of this growth would occur in developing countries: while in 1950 the industrialized world was home to about a third of the world's population, UN projections suggested that by the end of the century this proportion would reach a fifth, signaling a steady decline in the relative population weight of Europe and North America.[46] In commenting on these data, the Population Division highlighted their relevance which, it argued, transcended any consideration of an economic and social nature, placing itself instead "at the very heart of the problem of our existence."[47] The 1958 estimates of world population trends were confirmed by the first results of the censuses which took place in the early 1960s in 157 countries, in accordance with the world census program launched by the UN, which involved about 70% of the world population. They showed that, in some areas, the growth rate had previously even been underestimated. Since effective birth and death registration systems did not exist in many countries, it was only with the new surveys that many governments were able to appreciate the real growth rate of their populations.

Such data affected the way in which the international community came to consider demographic problems: it showed many leaders of the less developed countries that the demographic transformations affecting their populations were, in fact, unprecedented and that they had to be kept in mind in the multiannual development planning. Furthermore, they prompted the governments of the major Western countries to take note of the fact that it was becoming increasingly difficult to exclusively relegate processes of demographic transformation to the private sphere which would have an impact, in the medium-long term, on the modernization of the newly independent countries and, through this, on international balances. It was necessary to start considering the hypothesis of governing this transformation, as demographers had been suggesting for some time, walking the narrow road between population policy interventions, which the data indicated as neces-

43 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs [DESA], *The Future Growth of World Population* (New York: UN, 1958).

44 *The past and Future Growth of World Population*, UN, Population Division, *Framework for Future Population Estimates, 1950–1980*, in *Proceedings of the World Population Conference* (Rome, 1954, New York, UN), 288–328.

45 *The Future Growth of World Population*, tables 1 A and 1B, 69–71.

46 Ibid., Table 5, 23 and Table 7, 24.

47 Ibid., v.

sary and urgent, and the difficulty of suggesting reproductive choices to Third World citizens, precisely at the moment in which many of them were freeing themselves from colonial control. Despite the caution required by such a complex issue, which touched upon religious sensitivities and state sovereignty at its root, in those years the problem began to emerge as a relevant issue for the international community, which pertained to problems of development, food supply, stability, and international security.

In 1959, the Population Commission underlined the concerns that such data raised, and for the first time, in an official document, explicitly recognized that those growth rates represented an obstacle to the economic growth of less developed countries.[48] In July 1959, the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, in introducing the debate on the World Social Situation Report to ECOSOC, spoke extensively on population growth, emphasizing how important it was to take demographic data into account in assessing progress in the field of social development, since – he argued – in this specific field "overall progress has no meaning save in relation to the welfare of the individual."[49]

In November, the British historian Arnold Toynbee gave the first McDougall Memorial Lecture at the tenth FAO Conference, on the theme "Population and Food Supply."[50] The initiative to honor the memory of Frank L. McDougall (one of the agency's founding fathers, who died in 1958), with a series of lectures by authoritative cultural and political personalities, had come the previous year from the FAO Director General Binay R. Sen, who aimed at stimulating public reflection on the issues of food supply, agriculture, and population growth. In his speech, Toynbee spoke of the need to keep birth rates under control since the planet's resources would not suffice to feed an infinitely multiplying population. In 1961, the second lecture was given by John Rockefeller III, President of the Rockefeller Foundation, who had long been very active in lobbying in favor of the implementation of family planning policies in developing countries.[51]

The speakers and topics chosen for the McDougall lectures at the FAO Assembly signaled an important change in the FAO position regarding demographic issues. Sen, indeed, considered the impressive demographic growth of the poorest

48 Population Commission, *Report of the Tenth Session, 9–20 February 1959*, Escor, 27th Session, Supplement n. 3 E/CN.9/156/Rev.l.

49 UN, Press Service, Press Release SG/837, *Introductory statement by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold on item 3, on the World Social Situation to the Economic and Social Council*, Geneva, 14 July 1959, 4, UNA, S-0928–0001–07–00001.

50 Arnold Toynbee, *Population ad Food Supply*," McDougall Memorial Lecture 1959 (Rome: FAO, 1959).

51 John D. Rockefeller III, *People, Food and the Well-being of Mankind* (Rome: FAO, 1961), 18.

countries to be one of the main obstacles to solving the problem of malnutrition in the world and, therefore, one of the major obstacles, certainly not the only one, on the road to economic growth. It is therefore not surprising that, unlike his predecessors, from Boyd Orr to Philip Cardon, who had not exposed the agency on this issue, he emphasized the demographic question in many of his interventions, relating it to the availability of food resources and making FAO one of the most active agencies in the UN system debate on world population.[52] It was no longer a question of hoping or believing that technological advances could feed a growing population. According to Sen, it was a question of analyzing the data and acknowledging that, in light of the acceleration of world demographic growth, "which is in the nature of an explosion never before experienced in human history," many countries would not succeed, at least in the medium term, to obtain the increases in production necessary to feed all its citizens adequately, while the disparities in income levels between rich and poor countries would widen further.[53] The McDougall Lectures were part of a larger project that Sen was dedicating himself to in those months, the Freedom from Hunger Campaign (FFHC), which was launched in July 1960. The campaign aimed to sensitize governments and international public opinion on the conditions of malnutrition in which a large part of the world's population lived, in order to arrive at the definition of national and international policies capable of tackling the problem.[54] From this perspective, reflection on the growth of the world population became an inescapable premise of any strategy aimed at identifying the paths that could lead to greater availability of food and better-quality consumption. Naturally, Sen did not believe that the problem of malnutrition would be solved only through the implementation of anti-natalist demographic policies, but he believed that some factual data that the various studies conducted by the FAO had highlighted could not be ignored. In particular, the

52 See Symonds and Carder, *The United Nations and the Population Question*, 129–132.

53 Report of the Director-General of the FAO, *Development through Food. A strategy for surplus utilization* (Rome: Fao, 1961).

54 Historiography on the FFHC is still rather scarce. For case-studies on the reception of the Campaign at the national level see Anna Bocking-Welch, "Imperial Legacies and Internationalist Discourses: British Involvement in the United Nations Freedom from Hunger Campaign, 1960–70," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 40, no. 5 (2012): 879–896 and Matthew J. Bunch, "All Roads Lead to Rome: Canada, the Freedom From Hunger Campaign, and the Rise of NGOs, 1960–1980" (Thesis, University of Waterloo, 2007). On the role of NGOs see Heike Wieters, "On Fishing in Other People's Ponds: The Freedom from Hunger Campaign, International Fundraising, and the Ethics of NGO Publicity," in *Humanitarianism & Media. 1900 to the Present*, ed. Johannes Paulmann (New York-Oxford: Berghahn, 2019). For an account provided by Sen himself see *Towards a Newer World* (Dublin: Tycooly International Publishing, 1982), 123–278.

third *World Food Survey*,[55] launched in 1960 precisely to guide the initiatives of the FFHC, had shown that a significant part of the world population continued to eat inadequately, both from a quantitative and qualitative point of view, estimating the number of undernourished people at between 200–300 million (11–15 % of the total population). To ensure enough food for all, this study concluded, world food production would need to double by 1980 and triple by 2000, especially in developing countries.[56] The various initiatives launched within the FFHC helped to highlight the demographic question as a topic of discussion in various international forums[57]: from the *World Food Congress* in Washington, convened by the FAO in 1963 to discuss the first results of the campaign,[58] to the *Special Assembly on Man's Right to Freedom from Hunger*, which anticipated it by a few months, to the debates within FAO, ECOSOC, and the UN GA, where in 1960 and 1961 the creation of an international body for the redistribution of food surpluses was discussed, a prelude to the establishment of the World Food Programme.[59]

In April 1961, the World Bank also contributed to the debate on the population-development nexus when its president, Eugene Black, devoted much of his annual report to ECOSOC to world population growth.[60] After describing the Bank's work on Third World development activities, he stressed that there were limits to the aid rich countries were willing to transfer through the Bank and refuted the argument that a larger population could represent a stimulus to productivity and development. In fact, this was not the case for most developing countries, which did not have enough resources to devote to productive investments and social services for a population that was growing at an unsustainable pace. Finally, he urged the governments of the developing countries to become aware of the economic and social obstacles that the high rate of demographic growth represented for their development projects and for the aspirations of successive generations.

At the beginning of the 1960s, the problem of world population became a widely discussed issue at the UN and in its specialized agencies, in its connection with development problems, and the main development initiatives proposed by the UN

55 The first *World Food Survey* was conducted by FAO in 1946, the second in 1952.

56 Sen, *Towards a Newer World*, 140–141. See FAO, *Third World Food Survey* (Rome: Fao, 1963).

57 See for example the studies *Population and Food Supply* (New York: UN, 1962); *Aspects of Economic Development. The Background to Freedom from Hunger* (New York: UN, 1962).

58 See, in particular, the statements by Arnold Toynbee, *Man and Hunger. The Perspective of History*, and of Gunnar Myrdal, *Food for Increasing Millions*, UNA, S-0885–0006–27–00001.

59 A/RES/1496 (XV), *Provision of Food Surpluses to Food-Deficient Peoples through the United Nations system*, 27 October 1960; A/RES/1714 (XVI), *World Food Programme*, 19 December 1961.

60 Eugene Black, *Address at the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations*, New York, April 21, 1961, World Bank Group Archives, Washington, D.C., Records of President Eugene R Black, 1961, Speeches 03, Folder 1769197, Ecosoc, 8–9 and 14.

system in this period (from the FFHC to the World Food Program to the Decade of Development) could no longer ignore demographic trends.

It is significant that, while in those same years the Population Commission was still forced to state that the population-development nexus still had to be studied before formulating any assessment of it due to the diversity of views among its member states, other UN bodies, in numerous official documents, took the effects of this relationship for granted.[61]

Finally, it is worth noting that the 1962 Final Declaration of the Cairo Conference of Developing Countries also contained a paragraph urging countries suffering "from the pressure of population on resources available" to speed up the rate of economic development and "in the meantime take appropriate legitimate measures to deal with their population problems."[62]

5 The 1962 debate at the UN General Assembly

In August 1961, the Swedish and Danish delegations proposed the inclusion of a point concerning population growth and its relationship with economic development in the sixteenth GA agenda, with the aim of starting a "realistic and tolerant" reflection of the role that the UN could play in the field of population policies.[63] The two countries, in particular Sweden, had a long experience in the field of population policies which dated back to the 1930s when the latter adopted a pronatalist policy which contemplated, together with eugenic and coercive aspects, the dissemination of knowledge on contraceptive methods and the creation of family planning clinics, with the aim of favoring a greater awareness of birth planning.[64] Moreover, Sweden was at that time the only country which directly financed family planning projects in developing countries, particularly in South-East Asia.[65]

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61 UN DESA, *The United Nations Development Decade. Proposals for Action*, Report of the Secretary-General, New York, UN, 1962, E/3613, 7. For similar appraisals see Secretary General Report, *Demographic conditions and population trends in non-self-governing territories*, 23 July 1959, A/4106.
62 Cfr par. 13, *Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries*, in ECOSOC, Economic Commission for Africa, Standing Committee on Trade, First Session, 12–22 September 1962, E/CN.14/STC/16.
63 GA, XVI Session, *Population growth and economic development*, 18 August 1961, A/4849.
64 Allan Carlson, *The Swedish Experiment in Family Politics: The Myrdals and the Interwar Population Crisis* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1990); Gunnar Broberg and Nils Roll-Hansen, eds., *Eugenics and the Welfare state: sterilization policy in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1996).
65 Annika Berg, "A Suitable Country: The Relationship between Sweden's Interwar Population Policy and Family Planning in Postindependence India," *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte* 33, no. 3 (2010): 297–320.

The explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal explained that these demographic trends would, in the short term, frustrate the development assistance efforts of the international community and pose huge obstacles to the realization of the multi-year development plans of many countries, in terms of scarcity of productive investments and growth in public spending on essential services. Problems deriving from the high fertility rates were also placed in relation to other issues, the relevance of which would only emerge later, in particular the protection of the health of mothers and children and individual human rights. However, the most significant paragraph of the memorandum concerned the proposal to assign a more active role to the UN in the demographic policies of the member states, that of providing countries requesting it with the technical assistance necessary to introduce "measures designed to prevent their population growth to run at a faster pace than consistent with the economic development desired and planned for."[66] The Scandinavian initiative followed a proposal for discussion of the same issue that the governments of Ceylon and Norway had put forward in February 1961 to the WHO Assembly by just a few months, and which had been rejected due to a procedural flaw, raised by the Vatican delegation.[67]

The support that Ghana, Pakistan, and Tunisia gave to the Swedish and Danish proposal was of great significance, as it did not appear a purely Western initiative, with a potentially racist or neocolonial flavor. The first signs of resistance to the idea of discussing such a divisive issue in an international forum were not slow to manifest themselves, already during discussions on the definition of the agenda of the sixteenth session of the GA.[68] Anticipating what would become its constant topics of discussion, the Argentine government circulated a note to the governments of the member countries in which it argued its firm opposition. It maintained that the discussion proposal represented an attempt to propagate contraceptive methods at an international level, which were contrary to the moral and ethical foundations of the Argentine state. Finally, it maintained that the solution to the economic problems of developing countries had to be accomplished by other means.[69]

The Holy See also considered the Scandinavian proposal an attempt to push the UN to promote "a worldwide campaign for artificial birth control," which represented "a completely unsatisfactory approach to a highly complex problem" and a decision that could have brought "irreparable and perhaps unforeseen conse-

66 *Population growth and economic development,* 4.

67 Brief, *Item 84: Population Growth and Economic Development,* attached to Letter, D. Burns to W. Bentley, 7 October 1961, The National Archives, UK [TNA], FO 371/161053.

68 GAOR, XVI session, 19 December 1961, pp. 113–1114, A/PV.1084.

69 *Statement by the Argentine Government,* 16 September 1961, TNA, FO 371/161053.

quences of the utmost gravity."[70] Notwithstanding the resistance, the issue was included in the GA agenda, with a draft resolution inviting member states to ask for UN assistance in addressing their population problems. However, for procedural reasons, the discussion was postponed to the following session of the GA.

The draft resolution, which in the meantime had gained new sponsors among developing countries,[71] was assigned to the Second Commission of the GA which finally began its examination in December 1962. The discussion lasted for four sessions and, as expected, was quite lively; the most criticized part of the draft resolution was its operational paragraph, which urged the UN to provide technical assistance to governments that had requested it "for national projects and programs dealing with the problems of population."[72] The Swedish position was supported by numerous developing countries, especially from Southeast Asia and the Middle East, which more than others were aware of how much demographic trends could condition people's aspirations for better living standards. During the discussions, for example, the representative of Ghana pointed out the gravity of the demographic situation in some developing countries, and the threat posed by exponential population growth in areas where large numbers of people already lived at subsistence levels.[73] According to the Tunisian delegate, "after Keynes no one could deny the importance of population in economic theory or its importance to any development planner." Faced with the evidence of the data – he argued – "to say that nothing could be done about population growth was to take a fatalistic attitude."[74] The Algerian representative defined demographic growth as "one of the most important problems confronting the under-developed countries in their efforts to achieve economic development,"[75] while the Indian representative maintained that he could not understand the point of view of those who argued that the problem would be solved simply "by the interplay of natural forces." His country had in fact seen its population increase by about 200 million between 1921 and 1961. This had forced the government to plan for a higher rate of economic growth and to allocate more resources to meet the needs of the still unproductive parts of

70 Aide memoire, Apostolic Delegation, London, 1011.61, 26 September 1961, TNA, FO 371/161053. See also Letter, D. Malcolm to Archbishop O'Hara, 6 November 1961, ivi.

71 Ceylon, Nepal, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda and United Arab Republic

72 UNGA, XVII session, Agenda item 38, *Population Growth and Economic Development*, Report of the Second Committee, 14 December 1962, A/5354.

73 GAOR, XVII session, Second Committee, 867th meeting, 7 December 1962 (A/C.2/SR.867), 449.

74 Ibid.

75 GAOR, XVII session, Second Committee, 869th meeting, 10 December 1962 (A/C.2/SR.869), 459.

the Indian society.[76] The US representative, Richard Gardner, while abstaining in the final vote, guaranteed that the US government would provide information and assistance "on ways and means of dealing with [population] problems"[77] to governments requesting it, thus demonstrating the first, cautious opening from Washington on assistance to population policies.

In addition to the Catholic countries, harsh criticism also came from the Soviet bloc countries. They argued that placing the emphasis on demographic factors as the direct cause of the economic problems of many developing countries only served to distract attention from the real causes of underdevelopment, primarily colonialism. These causes required different solutions, such as support for the technical and industrial development of developing countries, an increase in agricultural production, greater efficiency of international assistance, the revision of the rules of international trade, and the use of funds freed from disarmament policies for development purposes.[78]

The UK adopted a low-key stance, consistent with the idea that family planning should be an autonomous choice of each state, just as it was a personal choice for individuals.[79] The British government shared concerns about humanitarian and economic problems that the demographic trends of the Third World represented also for Western countries (the possible increase in requests for economic aid, migratory flows, and political instability), but it still did not favor the idea of pushing the UN to use development assistance funds to finance family planning programs if most of the countries concerned did not want to do so. Furthermore, the government was not ready to take a clear-cut position on an issue that it knew was very sensitive and that would attract Third World hostility, especially towards a former colonial power. The British delegation was therefore instructed not to take any initiative in this field and to vote in favor of the resolution only if the majority of developing countries did the same.[80] In the event of a vote in favor of the resolution, the government was in any case oriented towards directing funds for bilateral aid for this purpose towards private foundations and organizations of civil society.[81]

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76 ECOSOC, Population Commission, XII session, Summary record of the 170th meeting, 16 May 1963, E/CN.9/SR.170, pp. 8–10.

77 A/C.2/SR.869, cit., 458.

78 A/C.2/SR.867, cit., 450 (Ukraine). See also A/C.2/SR.869, cit. 457 (Urss).

79 Brief, D.A. Burns, May 15 1961, *The United Nations and Population Control*, TNA, FO 371/161053: Letter, A. Auckland to A.R. Isserlis, 16 June 1961; Tel. 3947, Foreign Office to UK Mission to the UN, ivi.

80 Letter, Miers, FO, to Jones, Health, 25 April 1962; Draft IOC Paper, s.d., TNA, FCO 371/166951

81 Odgers, Department of Technical Cooperation, to Miers, FO, 2 August 1962, TNA, FCO 371/166951.

The most effective resistance was expressed by France. For Representative Maurice Viaud, it was obvious that the major concern of the sponsors of the resolution was their fear of a "brutal sharing of riches between the starving and the more fortunate," i. e. the prospect of having to commit more resources for development cooperation. The French had long opposed the idea that birth control represented an instrument of economic progress and therefore rejected the draft resolution. The French representative recalled the lack of reliable data, especially for developing countries, and denounced the risks that state population planning would cause: a possible resort to coercive systems and the possibility that such planning could lead to an excessive aging of the population.[82] Viaud therefore proposed a series of amendments to the draft resolution asking, in particular, for the suppression of the operational paragraph,[83] and the launch of an international inquiry into the problems caused, in each country, by the interrelationship between demographic and economic trends.[84]

The French attempt to distort the meaning of the resolution failed in the Second Commission, but instead succeeded in the plenary session of the GA, where the resolution was finally approved, by a very narrow margin, with amendments that significantly weakened its scope: the operational paragraph was in fact deleted, and the UN was not recognized any competence to initiate technical assistance projects in the field of family planning, while a passage was inserted in the preamble which called for further studies on the population-development nexus.[85] The resolution thus added little to the UN role in international population policies, but it contributed to initiate a public debate at an international level on an issue that until then had remained confined to research centers and UN bodies.

In the early 1960s, in the wake of the growing attention to demographic issues, the activities of the UN Regional Economic Commissions also expanded.[86] The most

82 A/C.2/SR.868, cit., 451–452. Citation p. 451.

83 GAOR, XVII session, Second Committee, 874th meeting, 12 December 1962 (A/C.2/SR.874) and GAOR, XVII session, 2nd Committee, 875th meeting, 13 December 1962 (A/C.2/SR.875). See also GAOR, XVII session, 2nd Committee, *Population Growth and Economic Development. Report of the Second Committee*, 14 December 1962 A/5354.

84 UN, *Inquiry among Governments on Problems Resulting from the Interaction of Economic Development and Population Change* (UN: New York, 1964), E/3895/rev.1. Between 1968 and 2015, ten other inquiries were conducted.

85 A/RES/1838 (XVII), *Population growth and economic development*, 18 December 1962.

86 ECOSOC, Commission de la Population, XII session, Compte rendu analytique de la 166e séance, 16 mai 1963, (E/CN.9/SR.166), 7–14; ECOSOC, Commission de la Population, XII session, Compte rendu analytique de la 167e séance, 16 mai 1963 (E/CN.9/SR.167), pp. 3–8; ECOSOC, Population Commission, 12th session, Summary record of the 173rd meeting, 17 May 1963 (E/CN.9/SR.173), 3–4; ECOSOC, Population Commission, *Regional Demographic activities*, 21 December 1963 (E/CN.9/172).

active regional commission in this field was the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) which since the 1950s had been pushing the UN to take a more active role in assisting the demographic policies of the member countries.[87] In 1963, the Commission sponsored the first Regional Population Conference, which was held in New Delhi and was devoted to analysis of demographic trends in relation to development planning, with the aim of identifying practical solutions to be recommended to governments.[88] The recommendations of the Conference were endorsed by ECAFE in a resolution that represented a sort of "leap forward" with respect to the positions expressed up to that moment by the majority of UN member countries. Indeed, the resolution explicitly declared that the development programs of the countries of the area had to take into consideration and, "if necessary, *modify* demographic trends" in the light of their impact on economic growth and social development. Furthermore, it called on governments to adopt "positive" population policies and asked the ECAFE Secretary to expand the technical assistance programs in the field of population policies, also including assistance to family planning, and, finally, urged the UN and the Specialized Agencies to launch specific population programs.[89] In August 1964, a new ECOSOC resolution, endorsing ECAFE's position, urged the GA and the Regional Economic Commissions to intensify UN assistance to developing countries with demographic problems.[90]

The ECOSOC resolution represented a new step forward on the road to full involvement of the UN in programs aimed at countering world population growth, and a sign that the issue was now gaining the attention of the international community.

At the same time, with the new Lyndon B. Johnson administration, the position of the US on population policies underwent a radical rethinking which manifested itself in 1965, on the occasion of a new GA debate on "population and development."

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87 Symonds and Carder, *The United Nations and the Population Question*, 135–138.

88 Population Commission, Report of the Twelfth session, 4–15 February 1963, Escor, XXV session, Supplement no. 2 (New York: UN, 1963) (E/CN.9/181/Rev.l), 13; Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, *Annual Report* (19 March 1963–17 March 1964), Escor, 37th Session, Supplement no. 2 (New York: UN, 1964), 113.

89 Ecafe resolution 54 (XX), *Population growth and economic and social development*, 17 March 1964, ivi, 128–129.

90 Ecosoc Resolution 1048 (XXXVII), *Population growth and economic development*, 15 August 1964.

6 Lyndon B. Johnson and "the race between food supply and population increase"

Crucial to the launch of UN activities in the field of population policies was the change in the position of the US, until then reluctant to deal with the issue.[91] The turning point came between 1965 and 1966, in the context of the revision of the development aid program and in the wake of requests from Congress.[92]

The aid program, which had been a source of tension between the executive and Congress for some time, became the object of increasingly heated criticism as well as cuts in funding during the Johnson years,[93] who between 1965 and 1966 was forced to review its organization and goals.[94] This resulted in a series of transformations in US program design and policy priorities, which were identified in the sectors of agriculture, healthcare, and education.[95] This choice explicitly recalled the ambition to internationalize the "Great Society" project, the program of social reforms, and the fight against poverty that Johnson was pursuing at home in those years.[96] These areas of intervention inevitably indicated the need to reflect on the role of demographic trends in the developing countries. In particular, attention to world population problems stemmed from concern for the low growth of agricultural productivity in developing countries, which could not keep pace with the

91 On US policy see Phyllis T. Piotrow, *World Population Crisis. The United States Response* (New York: Praeger, 1973); Ronald Walter Greene, *Malthusian Worlds: U.S. Leadership and the Governing of the Population Crisis* (Bolder: Westview Press, 1999); John Sharpless, "World Population Growth, Family Planning and American Foreign Policy," *Journal of Policy History* 7, no. 1 (1995): 72–102; Matthew Connelly, "LBJ and World Population: Planning the Greater Society One Family at a Time," in *Beyond the Cold War*, ed. Francis J. Gavin and M. Atwood Lawrence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 141–164.

92 US Senate, *Population Crisis*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Committee of Government Operations, 90th Congress, 2 November 1967–1 February 1968, four parts (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1966–1968).

93 Memorandum, Bell to Bundy, *Impact of Cuts in Foreign Aid Appropriations*, 7 January 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1964–68, vol. IX (Washington: US GPO, 1997), doc. 1.

94 Memorandum, Rusk to Johnson, 31 January 1966, ivi, doc. 47.

95 Minutes of Meeting, Meeting with Mr. McGeorge Bundy, October 12 1965, FRUS 164–68, vol. IX, doc. 42; Memorandum, Rusk to Johnson, 31 January 1966, ivi, doc. 47; Summary Notes of 562nd Meeting of the National Security Council, July 19 1966, *The World Food Problem*, 2, Lyndon B. Johnson Library [LBJL], National Security Files [NSF], NSC Meetings, box 2, f. 9.

96 On this, see Kristin L. Ahlberg, *Transplanting the Great Society. Lyndon Johnson and Food for Peace* (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2008); Francis J. Gavin and Mark Atwood Lawrence, eds., *Beyond the Cold War. Lyndon Johnson and the New Global Challenges of the 1960s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

rates of population growth, and which, according also to the FAO,[97] risked causing the deterioration of conditions of undernourishment or even famine in various areas of the Third World.

In just over a year, awareness of the seriousness of the global demographic issue led the State Department to define it as "the most serious single problem facing most of the LDC's," a "danger" for economic growth, food sufficiency, and political stability[98].

Since the end of 1965, the White House began to focus its foreign aid strategy on the problem of world agricultural production and its relationship with demographic trends in the Third World: reports, analyses, and meetings of the National Security Council (NSC) on the "World Food Problem" followed one another, indicating a growing concern, also fueled by the food crisis that occurred in India between 1965 and the beginning of 1967.[99]

The Indian food crisis is of particular interest here for how it was represented with respect to the demographic question. The president and the executive interpreted it as the result of a structural imbalance between population and food resources and thus presented it to Congress and to domestic and international public opinion as just one example of what could happen in other areas.[100]

This interpretation favored the emergence of the world population question as one of the main issues in US relations with developing countries and led the President to an increasingly clear public stance in favor of fertility control policies.[101]

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97 B.R. Sen, *Food and Population,* Statement made to the UN Population Commission, New York, 24 March 1965, in US Senate, *Population Crisis,* 89th Congress, 1st session, part 2 A, Washington, US GPO, 1966, pp. 837–842.

98 Memorandum, Philander P. Claxton to Aid Administrator, *Statement of Policy on Population Matters*, November 2 1966, in US Declassified Documents Online [DDO], CK2349065518. For similar evaluations on the part of the Department of Agriculture and USAID see, for example, Discussion Paper for NSC Meeting on July 19, 1966, *The World food Problem*, July 15 1966, and *Review of the World Food Situation and the US Supply Position*, Statement before the NSC by the Secretary of Agriculture, both in LBJL, NSF, NSC Meetings, box 2, f. 9.

99 See, for example, Memorandum, Bundy to Freeman and Bell, October 6 1965, FRUS 1964–68, vol. IX, doc. 41; Memorandum, Schultze to Johnson, *A New Food Aid Policy,* ivi, doc. 46; Memorandum, Donald Horning to Johnson, *World Food Production,* November 19 1965, National Security Files, Subject Files, box 15, f. 10, LBJ Library. For Johnson Administration's interest in Indian food crisis see Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World. America's Cold War Battle against poverty in Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 205–231.

100 See, for example, "Special Message to the Congress on food for India and Other Steps To Be Taken in an International War on Hunger, February 2, 1967," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967,* I (Washington: US GPO, 1968), 121.

101 Brief references to world population problems appeared in Johnson's speeches starting from 1965. In the 1967 State of the Union address he stated that "Next to the pursuit of peace, the really

Throughout the debate on food aid and its reform, the question of the increase in world population became central, as well as the unexplained link between food shortages and demographic trends. Different analyses, which could take into account, for example, the problem of economic access to food resources or obstacles to international trade in agricultural products of developing countries, found no place in this interpretation, nor other factors that could help explain the condition of malnutrition in millions of people in the world, such as poverty, unemployment or conflicts.

During the 1960s, this view of the relationship between food production and population growth remained the prevailing interpretation of the causes of malnutrition. When Johnson announced his new food aid program to Congress in February 1966, he presented the Food for Peace Act as an initiative that addressed "the inescapable fact that man is losing the race between the size of population and the supply of food," a problem which, he added, needed to be resolved as soon as possible if international peace and security were to be safeguarded.[102]

In the US, efforts to define a new approach to the food aid program proceeded alongside revision of US policy on the world population problem.[103] In this context, the implementation of population policies by aid-receiving countries began to be seen as evidence of their efforts in their own economic development and in reducing their dependence on food imports from abroad. The Food for Peace Act of 1966 put this idea in black and white: in granting aid, the president would have to take into account the recipients' commitment to their own development, "including efforts to meet their problems of food production and population growth."[104]

The internationalization of the new priorities of the US aid program, with its emphasis on agricultural development according to the paradigm of the Green Revolution, implied greater involvement of the other Western countries in international aid spending and required their awareness of the problems of agricultural development. To this end, the Johnson administration proposed the "World food problem" and the food-population nexus as the main topic of discussion in various

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greatest challenge to the human family is the race between food supply and population increase" and that "nations with food deficits must put more of their resources into voluntary family planning programs." Cited in Piotrow, *World Population Crisis*, 132.

102 "Statement by the President on the Food for Freedom Message to the Congress, February 10, 1966," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson,* 1966, I (Washington: US GPO, 1967), 169.

103 Memorandum, Robert Barnett, *Population: Policy and Programs*, s.d., LBJL, NSF, Subject Files [SF], b. 38, f. 6

104 Public Law 89–808, 89th Congress, HR 14929, November 11 1966, title I, Sec. 103.a and Airgram CA-4609, State to All American Diplomatic Posts, *Increased Responsibilities of the Department of State, AID and Missions in Population Matters*, December 20 1966, LBJL, NSF, SF, box 53, f. 1.

international forums, such as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the 1966 GA, and the 1967 FAO Conference.[105] While the last two proposals proved to be impracticable, Washington managed to get the working meeting and the high-level meeting of the DAC, scheduled for April and July 1966 respectively, to be mainly devoted to discussing the world food question.[106] Similarly, at DAC, the world food problem was discussed and interpreted as the result of the inability of the agricultural sector of many developing countries to keep up with the high rates of population growth, which became the subject of studies and theme of debate at DAC in the late 1960s.[107]

The discussion on world population, in its links with food production, also reached NATO's Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, where the American representative circulated a document illustrating the complexity of the problems that Western countries would have to face in the following years and their consequences on international security.[108]

The new course of US population policies took shape in late 1966, when the State Department informed the diplomatic corps abroad that measures to limit the "excessive" growth of the world's population and to increase agricultural production would have the highest priority in US foreign policy towards developing countries and in the work of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other government agencies. Secretary of State Rusk's instructions indicated that, where necessary, US representatives had to approach local governments to better understand "the nature of their population problem, the implications for their plans and prospects for improving economic and social conditions, the dangers of food shortages and the importance of early governmental action" and encourage them to intervene. The Secretary of State went so far as to support the need to indicate reduction targets for each country and recalled that in providing aid, including food aid, the US would take into account the

105 Memorandum, Rusk to Johnson, *Multilateral Food Initiative*, 12 March 1966, LBJL, NSF, SF, box 15, f. 10. See also Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Development Assistance Committee [DAC], *The World Food Problem. Informal Preliminary Paper Submitted by the United States Delegation*, 21 March 1966, OECD Archives, Paris, DAC (66)10, roll 161, 260–66.
106 Memorandum, Francis Bator to Johnson, *Europe and the World Food Problem*, 31 March 1966, National Security Files, Subject Files, box 15, f. 10, LBJ Library.
107 Circular Telegram, State to Certain Posts, *DAC High Level Meeting*, Washington, July 20–21, FRUS 1964–68, vol. IX, doc. 124; D. N. Lane, Economic Relations Dept., to F. E. Bland, OD, 10 May 1966; Bland to Lane, 15 August 1966, TNA, OD 29/45; Ministry of Overseas Development, Record of meeting held on 21 March by Sir A. Cohen with Mr. H. Harding, UK Permanent Delegation to the OECD, 4 April 1966, TNA, ivi.
108 Foreign Office, Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, Note by the United Kingdom Member, *The Population Problem*, March 1966, TNA, OD 29/45.

self-help efforts of the recipients, which also included "activities related to the problem of population growth." Finally, Rusk recommended that the mission leaders make constant reference to the binomial food-population "in Mission planning, programming and field activities and, particularly, in discussions [...] with local authorities, leaders, groups and ordinary people."[109] At the end of 1966, therefore, the idea was no longer to respond positively to requests for economic aid for population policy programs from developing countries but to encourage the latter "to understand their population problems and to take specific action to reduce them." [110] It was essentially a commitment to "educate" Third World governments and public opinion to consider the issue as a top priority.[111]

From the mid-1960s, contemporary advances in science, which made more effective and cheaper methods of contraception available, paved the way for a growing USAID commitment in this field, especially after the ban on providing contraceptives as part of its technical assistance programs was lifted in 1967. After internal resistance was overcome, the Agency dedicated more and more funds to family planning, financing bilateral programs, technical assistance from UN agencies, and also the activity of non-governmental organizations: the funds dedicated to this purpose saw a significant increase in a relatively short space of time, going from 2 million dollars in 1965 to 125 million dollars in 1973,[112] making the US, until the early 1980s, the largest donor for population programs in the Third World.[113]

7 The 1966 General Assembly resolution and the establishment of UNFPA

The change in attitude on the part of the international community towards demographic problems was expressed in 1966 with the unanimous approval of GA res-

109 Airgram CA-4609, *Increased responsibilities of the Department of State,* cit., 9; Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to all Assistant Secretaries of State, Assistant Administrators of AID and other Bureau Heads, *Policy and Programs on Population Matters*, 19 January 1967, FRUS 1964–68, vol. XXXIV (Washington: US GPO, 1999], doc. 281.

110 State information Memorandum, *Progress in East Asian Population Policies Programs*, attached to Memorandum, Benjamin Read to Rostow, June 14 1967, LBJL, NSF, SF, box 53, f. 1.

111 ivi.

112 Usaid, Bureau for Population and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Population, *Population Program Assistance. US Aid to Developing Countries*, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1973, May 1974, 2.

113 Barbara Herz, *Official Development Assistance for Population Activities. A Review*, World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 688, Washington, The World Bank, 1984, 6–7.

olution 2211, which recognized that the composition of each family should be a "free choice" of each couple and authorized the UN to support the population policies of Third World countries with technical assistance for family planning.[114]

The approval of the resolution was preceded by a Declaration circulated by the Secretary General on 10 December 1966 (International Human Rights Day) in which the 12 signatory governments drew attention to the effects of rapid population increases on economic development and international peace, and urged the heads of state of all countries of the world to recognize family planning as a human right as well as a vital interest of families and states.[115] The Declaration was sponsored by John D. Rockefeller III, who with an intense lobbying on governments subsequently managed to get 18 other states to sign it.[116] Introduced at that time, the Declaration put further pressure on the GA to pick up on the demands of family planning advocates.

Even the main UN officials, from de Seynes to Sen and Thant himself, had by then made their position explicit in favor of the involvement of the UN in family planning on various public occasions, recalling, on the one hand, the imbalance between food resources and demographic growth rates and, on the other, the need to promote economic development.

In this new climate, the Secretary General believed that the time was ripe for a further step forward. In July 1967, at ECOSOC, Thant announced the creation of a trust fund within the Secretariat aimed at collecting voluntary contributions from states, NGOs, and private foundations for technical assistance in population policies. The fund was intended to raise additional voluntary contributions without stoking fears that resources earmarked for development projects could be diverted towards family planning.

In particular, the aims of the Fund were "to promote the realistic recognition of population problems and their significance for human well-being and quality of life"; "to encourage the formulation of population policies as an integral part of national economic and social planning"; "to support the implementation of effective means to accomplish the objectives of established population policies"; and "to

114 A/RES/2211, *Population growth and economic development*, 17 December 1966.

115 The text of the Declaration is in *Studies in Family Planning* 16, no. 1 (1967): 1.

116 See, for example, Letter, Rockefeller to Rusk, September 13 1966, Frus 1964–68, vol. XXXIV, doc. 279; Letter, Rockefeller to Rusk, 3 March 1967, ivi, doc. 284; Action Memorandum, Claxton to Rusk, May 25, 1967, ivi, doc. 289; Memorandum, Claxton to Cater, June 23 1967, ivi, doc. 291; Memorandum, Claxton to Cater, August 4 1967, ivi, doc. 292.

promote the spread of family planning in the interests of the health and well-being of the individual, the family and the community."[117]

A few months of reflection followed on the future institutional framework to be given to multilateral activities for population policies, and rivalries emerged between the various agencies with fears of seeing the already scarce resources for technical assistance in other sectors reduced. Finally, on a proposal from the US, it was decided to place the Secretary-General Fund, which in 1969 became the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), under the administration of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to underline its close link with development issues.

From then, UNFPA activities quickly developed, also in collaboration with the various UN Specialized Agencies – especially UNICEF, UNESCO, and FAO[118] – as well as with international and national non-governmental organizations interested in population activities. Voluntary contributions to UNFPA rose quickly: the fund began operations in 1969 with a budget of about 4 million dollars contributed by seven donors and in 1970 it had reached a figure of 15 million dollars. By the end of 1972, the fund had received cumulative contributions of about 80 million dollars and was supporting more than 500 population projects and programs in 76 countries and at a regional level.[119]

Although the UNFPA four-year work plan, drawn up in 1972, provided for the fund's activities in six main categories – collection of basic demographic data, population dynamics, population policy, education, communication, and family planning – it was in the latter field that the largest part of the budget (about 40 %) was allocated. The main recipients of UNFPA's assistance in those first years were Southern Asia countries such as Indonesia, Iran, India, and the Philippines.[120]

117 UNDP Governing Council, fifteenth session, *UNFPA, Report by the Executive Director*, January 9 1973, DP/L.268, 2.

118 On FAO activities see: Paper prepared by the Home Economics Branch, *Planning for Better Family Living*, March 1969 and FAO Nutrition division, *FAO Mandates in the Population field*, both in FAO Archives, Rome, UN/14, 12-ESN-525.

119 UNGA, twenty-seventh session, Ecosoc Report, *United Nations Fund for Population Activities. Note by the Secretary-General*, 28 November 1972, A/8899, 1; *UNFPA, Report by the Executive Director*, 4.

120 Rafael M. Salas, "The United Nations Fund for Population Activities," *International Journal of Health Services* no. 3 (1973): 683–684.

6 Conclusions

At the end of the 1960s, the creation of UNFPA represented the international community's increased awareness not only of the negative impact that population growth could have on the economic and social development of the Third World, but also the affirmation of the idea that demographic trends could be governed through appropriate interventions by states, or to quote de Seynes, "that possibility of influencing historical evolution was beginning to enter into the economic calculations of public authorities and the decisions of planners."[121] Third World fertility "could now be regarded as a political parameter which could henceforth be influenced."[122] And it had to be.

UN involvement in population policies also represented a success for that part of the international community which had been committed for years to supporting the need to limit world population growth through the implementation of anti-natalist demographic policies. From that moment on, the requests addressed to the states to intervene more decisively in the demographic field multiplied and the public positions taken by population experts on the measures to be implemented became at times grotesque, raising legitimate doubts about the real motivations of the Western obsession with Third World fertility. Militant and influential demographers and sociologists, such as Bernard Berelson and Kinglsey Davis, suggested that overpopulated states should go "beyond family planning" and implement more active policies to force individuals to have and "want" fewer children.[123]

To bear witness to how much the issue had also become a concern of public opinion, it is enough to recall the success of the publication by environmentalist Paul Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb*, of which more than three million copies were sold and which depicted the future of a humanity grappling with the dilemma of balancing resources and growing population.[124]

The principle that every couple had the right to decide on the number of children and on the spacing between births was reconfirmed not only by the Declaration on Social Progress and Development[125] but also by the final document of the

121 UNGA, Twenty-Second Session, 2nd Committee, 1109th meeting, *General Statements*, 2 October 1967, speech by Philippe de Seynes, A/C.2/SR.1109, 8.

122 UNGA, Twenty-Third Session, 2nd Committee, 1180th meeting, *UN Development Decade: Report of the SG*, 4 October 1968, speech by Philippe de Seynes, A/C.2/SR.1180, 2–3.

123 See, in particular, Bernard Berelson, "Beyond Family Planning," *Studies in Family Planning* 38, no. 1 (1969): 1–16, and Kingsley Davis, "Population Policy. Will Current Programs Succeed?", *Science* 68, no. 3802 (1967): 730–739.

124 Paul R. Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968).

125 *Declaration on Social Progress and Development*, General Assembly resolution 2542 (XXIV).

Tehran Conference on Human Rights of 1968, in which 49 states, including the Vatican, agreed to insert a paragraph that defined this choice as a "fundamental human right."[126]

It is worth noting that during the 1960s, the debate at the UN on the population-development nexus, as well as the proposed solutions, did not take into account the question of women's rights. Although the freedom of women's reproductive choices was naturally present in the activity of the many women's associations represented at Ecosoc, such as the International Council of Women or the Women's International Democratic Forum, the issue was seen above all as a tool for women's emancipation in the family and in society, while the feminists themselves expressed different positions with respect to family planning as a solution to the demographic and development problems of communities and countries. The only UN body that in this period managed to hold together the reflection on demographic problems, development issues, and the condition of women in the world was the Ecosoc Commission on the Status of Women. Starting in 1965, in the context of the study of a long-term international program for the advancement of women, it began to examine the links between family planning and women's status and between the latter and fertility rates.[127] Only in the following decade, however, also thanks to the contribution of the Commission, was the interpretation of demographic problems articulated to bring about a vision centered on women's rights and on the "lien fondamental entre la condition de la femme, les problèmes démographiques et le développement global."[128]

Despite the fact that by the end of the 1960s a broad consensus seemed to emerge on the approach to be adopted with regard to world population growth, differences of views remained as well as some resistance referring to scientific and religious principles and on human rights arguments, especially with respect to the power of states to interfere in family and fertility decisions.

In the following years, as this resistance strengthened, the support for neo-Malthusian arguments to legitimize intervention in limiting births among the

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126 *Proclamation of Teheran*, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968 (New York: UN, 1968) (A/CONF.32/41), par. 16, 4.

127 Maud Anne Bracke, "Women's Rights, Family Planning, and Population Control: The Emergence of Reproductive Rights in the United Nations (1960s–70s)," *The International History Review* 44, no. 4 (2022): 751–771. On the positions of the US feminist movement and the US neo-Malthusian movement with regard to international population policy see Dennis Hodgson and Susan Cotts Watkins, "Feminists and Neo-Malthusians: Past and Present Alliances," *Population and Development Review* 23, no. 3 (1997): 469–523.

128 Département des affaires économiques et sociales, *Condition de la femme et planification de la famille. Rapport du Rapporteur special nommé par le Conseil économique et social en vertu de la résolution 1326 (XLIV)*, Nations Unies (New York, 1975) (E/CN.6/575/Rev.1).

world's poor became stronger. Furthermore, the tone of some of the public interventions mentioned above and their tenacious insistence on birth control aroused more suspicions the more it persisted in ignoring other factors that influenced fertility, and therefore population growth, on which it was equally possible to intervene (such as, marriage age, women's education, infant mortality rates, and the level of economic development of each country).

All this aroused the suspicions and resistance of Catholic and developing countries. The skepticism of the former was accentuated after the publication of Pope Paul VI's *Humanae Vitae* encyclical in 1968, which clarified that the Church would condemn any practice aimed at artificial birth control.[129] Developing countries, for their part, began to fear that so great a Western interest in their fertility, and the resulting interpretation of their development problems, could preclude a further decrease in aid, or its conditioning on anti-natalist demographic policies. Moreover, some also read racist and neo-colonial intentions in the numerous declarations on the "excessive" population of the Third World.

These forms of resistance were clearly expressed in the following years, especially on the occasion of the 1974 UN World Population Conference: it ended with placing the demographic problems in a broader context, linking them not only to economic resources and social development, but also more firmly in the need to respect human rights and the need to advance the status of women, themes which, together with environmental protection, would become central in the international debates of the following years on the link between population and development.

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129 Encyclical Letter *Humanae Vitae* of the Supreme Pontiff Paul VI, 25 July 1968, available at https://rb.gy/6tvq1d.

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Yarong Chen

An unfinished mission: UNESCO in deploying science and education for global development, 1945–1956

1 Introduction

As the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) launched in 2015, it is unsurprising that SDGs or sustainable development became buzzwords for international organizations, national politicians, civil societies, and activists across the world, but also for scholars. Academia has witnessed an explosion of literature on SDGs or sustainable development, most notably the journal *Sustainable Development.* There have been several critiques on the feasibility of these ambitious goals amidst further evaluation of the implementation and impacts of SDGs.[1] Historians have investigated sustainable development debates since the 1970s, including the Brundtland Commission, the Rio Summit (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UNCED) in June 1992, and the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development.

UNESCO is a firm supporter of the SDGs, although, among the 17 goals, only Goal 4, quality education, is related to the expertise and mandate of UNESCO.[2] However, as one zooms in, one can see that clean water (Goal 6), life on land (Goal 14), and life below water (Goal 15) are directly resonant with other UNESCO programs: the Man and the Biosphere Program and the Intergovernmental Oce-

1 Iris Borowy, *Defining Sustainable Development for Our Common Future* (London: Routledge, 2013), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203383797; Iris Borowy, "Negotiating International Development: The Making of the Millennium Development Goals," *Regions and Cohesions* 5, no. 3 (1 December 2015): 18–43, https://doi.org/10.3167/reco.2015.050303; Iris Borowy, "Sustainable Development in Brundtland and Beyond: How (Not) to Reconcile Material Wealth, Environmental Limits and Just Distribution," in *Environmental History in the Making*, ed. Estelita Vaz, Cristina Joanaz de Melo and Lígia M. Costa Pinto, vol. 6, Environmental History (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 91–108, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41085-2_6; Stephen J. Macekura, *Of Limits and Growth: The Rise of Global Sustainable Development in the Twentieth Century*, Global and International History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela, eds., *The Development Century: A Global History*, Global and International History (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

2 Maren Elfert, "Lifelong Learning in Sustainable Development Goal 4: What Does It Mean for UNESCO's Rights-Based Approach to Adult Learning and Education?", *International Review of Education* 65, no. 4 (2019): 537–56, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-019-09788-z.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111280356-006

anographic Commission. If one looks at UNESCO's early history, one will find that they also decided to tackle the issue of inequality in terms of race and gender (Goal 10).[3] UNESCO was also deeply involved in the international discussion of energy development (Goal 7).[4] The history of UNESCO has been examined by many scholars, including by UNESCO itself when it launched the UNESCO history project in 2005, which focused more on the origins of UNESCO's activities. Later, the action and impacts of UNESCO were also scrutinized in a significant research project hosted at Aalborg University, Denmark, during 2013–2017 that focused more on UNESCO's global impact.[5] The studies on UNESCO's policies and activities in education, science, and culture have been very fertile and productive.[6] Scholars have done extensive studies reviewing the activities of UNESCO in science.[7] UNESCO has long played an essential role in fostering a love for science[8] and fostering networks for nature conservation.[9] In addition, a growing body of literature has investigated UNESCO's role in global education.[10] Scholars have recently examined UN-

3 Sebastián Gil-Riaño, "Relocating Anti-Racist Science: The 1950 UNESCO Statement on Race and Economic Development in the Global South," *The British Journal for the History of Science* 51, no. 2 (June 2018): 281–303, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007087418000286; Claude Lévi-Strauss, "Race and History" (UNESCO,1958,1952), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000002896?posInSet=64&queryId=107da343-5cde-42d1-b49d-214b79e2a23b; Agnes Heller, "On the Future of Relations between the Sexes," *International Social Science Journal* XXI, no. 4 (1969): 535–544, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000021699?posInSet=91&queryId=6d019ace-3c5d-484b-9200-94ee26784795.

4 Enrique V. Iglesias, "The Transition to a New Energy Mix: A United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Energy Sources," *Courier* 34, no. 7 (July 1981): 6–8.

5 Poul Duedahl, ed., *A History of UNESCO: Global Actions and Impacts* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-58120-4.

6 Aigul Kulnazarova and Christian Ydesen, *UNESCO without Borders: Educational Campaigns for International Understanding*, Routledge Research in Education 172 (London: Routledge, 2017).

7 Patrick Petitjean et al., *Sixty Years of Science at UNESCO 1945–2005* (Paris: UNESCO, 2006), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000148187?posInSet=3&queryId=b64ebb8e-f0d0-46ca-ba94-ec5613fbe052.

8 Ivan Lind Christensen, "Fostering a love of truth: Ideas of science in UNESCO in the early years," in *The Right to Science: Then and Now*, ed. H. Porsdam and S. Mann (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 76–90.

9 Anna-Katharina Wöbse, '"The World after All Was One": The International Environmental Network of UNESCO and IUPN, 1945–1950," *Contemporary European History* 20, no. 3 (August 2011): 331–48, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777311000348.

10 Maren Elfert, *UNESCO's Utopia of Lifelong Learning: An Intellectual History*, 1st ed., Routledge Research in Lifelong Learning and Adult Education (London: Routledge, 2017), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315278131; Maren Elfert, "Revisiting the Faure Report and the Delors Report: Why Was UNESCO's Utopian Vision of Lifelong Learning an "Unfailure"?,' in *Power and Possibility in Contemporary Adult Education*, ed. Bernie Grummell and Fergal Finnegan (Leiden: Sense Publishers, 2019); Phillip W. Jones, "UNESCO and the Politics of Global Literacy," *Comparative Education Review* 34,

ESCO's initiatives and programs that have a direct reference to SDGs, while UNESCO has set up a special section on Education for Sustainable Development.[11] Given the functionalist design of UNESCO by the founding fathers, UNESCO has three major areas of action including education, science, and culture.[12] Therefore, it is understandable that scholars tend to look at UNESCO's initiatives and actions in these fields separately.

Scholars have traced the conceptual history of sustainable development to the development framework that underlined the East-West competition during the Cold War.[13] It is noticeable that this development framework is also profoundly rooted in the historical rise of postwar development thinking that derived from both humanitarian and strategic motivations promoted by the creation of organs of the newly established United Nations, including UNESCO. In fulfilling its mandate of intellectual engineering, UNESCO has been well known for its tradition of "scientific humanism," a "humanist outlook combined with an unwavering trust in science, rationality, and progress."[14] This chapter will take a different approach to UNESCO's activities by placing UNESCO in the global history of development, particularly the inception and initial emergence of the global development aid regime between 1945 and 1956 in the wake of World War II. This chapter will explain the formulation of UNESCO's scientific humanism and its implication for the development aid regime in the UN system and international society. China, one of the most populous postcolonial countries, was a major target of various UN development programs, yet has received relatively less attention from the scholarly inquiry into the global history of development. The story of China in the prototype of the UN development aid exhibited the politics of development as China became part of the Communist bloc and was excluded from most UN programs before China regained its seat at the UN in 1971. To generate a nuanced understanding of the historical contribution of UNESCO to global development, this article will combine the history of development and the global history of UNESCO by examining two UN projects in its early history, UNESCO Fundamental Education

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no. 1 (1990): 41–60; Phillip W. Jones, *International Policies for Third World Education: UNESCO, Literacy and Development* (London; New York: Routledge, 1988).

11 Maren Elfert, *Lifelong Learning in Sustainable Development Goal 4: What Does It Mean for UNESCO's Rights-Based Approach to Adult Learning and Education?.*

12 David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for Functional Development of International Organization* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943); Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the nation-state: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 6.

13 Macekura, *Of Limits and Growth*, 25.

14 Maren Elfert, "Humanism and Democracy in Comparative Education," *Comparative Education*, 59, no. 3 (2023), 398-415, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050068.2023.2185432.

(1946–1956) and the Field Science Cooperation Office (1947–1954). These projects were evacuated from China in 1950 and 1952, respectively. By drawing upon the experience of China, this article seeks to demonstrate the blind spots and limits of UNESCO in the entangled complexity and challenges of the development field during the early Cold War period.

2 From UNECO to UNESCO: the inclusion of science in UNESCO

The Cold War development framework, as presented by scholars, included the notion that human progress was a linear and measurable phenomenon. It was marked by a progressive faith that held that applying expertise could transform the world for the better, and a belief in the benefits of nondiscriminatory trade and scientific, governmental management of market forces.[15] Science had a central place in the Cold War development framework. As mentioned above, the disciplines involved in many SDGs, ranging from geology, geography, oceanography, biology, and forestry to economics, are related to the big word in the acronym of UNESCO: S, Science. However, adding "Science" was a last-minute thing due to the lobbying of a group of scientists headed by Joseph Needham.

One of the predecessors of UNESCO, the British-led Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME[16]), was, in fact, more about educational reconstruction in the European countries that the Axis invaded. CAME began to involve more non-European countries such as China in May 1943 and considered expanding it into an international organization that would involve all members of the fledgling United Nations, but it was still primarily concerned with educational aids and reconstruction.[17] The engagement of American delegates George Kefauver and James William Fullbright with CAME enhanced the stature of the organization within the US, and connected CAME to what later became the United Nations. CAME envisaged a post-

15 Sara Lorenzini, *Global Development: A Cold War History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 93; Macekura, *Of Limits and Growth*, 25.

16 The ministers of education of the UK, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia started the meeting in November 1942. Later, Luxembourg, Australia, Canada, China, India, New Zealand, and the Republic joined CAME in 1943. The Soviet Union remained observers, while The United States became an active member in July 1944. See H.H. Krill De Capello, "The Creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization," *International Organization* 24, no. 1 (1970): 1–30.

17 H.H. Krill De Capello, "The Creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization."

war international educational and cultural organization within the new United Nations system. Science was not the top priority of CAME at the time when Needham was involved in wartime scientific cooperation service via the Sino-British Science Cooperation Office (SBSCO) in Chongqing, China.[18] By circulating three memoranda in which Needham devised an International Scientific Cooperation Service (ISCS) for the world, the "S" was incorporated into the new organ for education and culture. This helped to spur on inter-governmental arrangements for scientific collaboration in the post-war international system.[19]

In his first memorandum, Needham suggested that the ISCS, with functions of a clearing house modeled on post-office SBSCO, be set up by the United Nations after the war and that it would be parallel with ILO and other similar bodies.[20] Needham spent a great deal of time lobbying his friends and colleagues worldwide for the importance of "Science" in general and for international scientific cooperation under the purview of international organizations. Needham mobilized a worldwide network of politicians, diplomats, scientists, and scholars, including the founding fathers of UNESCO – Mr. H.G. Wells, Julian Huxley, Sir Alfred Zimmern, Gilbert Murray, and UNRRA, Rockefeller Foundation, and the ILO.[21]

Needham revised and formulated his ideas in a second memorandum in December 1944, by which time the discussion of a post-war international organization had been much discussed in CAME and was much further advanced than he had supposed.[22] Having realized that the American delegate Grayson N. Kefauver proposed a United Nations Educational and Cultural Organization (UNECO), Needham started to argue for the addition of Science to make UNECO work in his communication with the head of British Commonwealth Scientific Office – Dr. Ralf Bagnold in February – in 1945.[23] In a Letter from Needham to Sir Henry Dale, the chairman of the Science Commission of CAME on 1 March 1945, Needham addressed again that Science should be clearly named as such in the title of the organization so

18 Thomas Mougey, "Building UNESCO Science from the "Dark Zone": Joseph Needham, Empire, and the Wartime Reorganization of International Science from China, 1942–6," *History of Science* 59, no. 4 (1 December 2021): 461–91, https://doi.org/10.1177/0073275320987428.

19 University of Cambridge Library, Joseph Needham Papers (JNP), D.2, manuscripts of the first memorandum.

20 JNP, D.2, manuscripts of the first memorandum.

21 JNP, D.3, a letter from Joseph Needham (British Council Cultural Scientific Office in Chunking) to J.G. Crowther on 25 July 1944.

22 JNP, D.6, typescript drafts on "Memorandum addressed to the parliamentary and scientific committee (December 1944). Measures for the organisation of international co-operation in science in the post-war period," London, December 1944.

23 JNP, D.8, a letter from Needham to Dr. Bagnold (British Commonwealth Scientific Office) in February 1945.

that UNECO would be UNESCO.[24] Realizing that the American proposal of UNECO may be brought up preliminarily in the United Nations Conference in San Francisco in April 1945, Needham suggested British delegations have more vigorous support for adding Science in UNECO and literally proposed to transform the abbreviation UNECO into UNESCO.[25]

Needham's idea went even further as he made a clearer reference to the place of science in the UNECO in his third memorandum.[26] He even proposed to set up a Scientific Commission parallel with the Economic and Social Commission under the Economic and Social Council of the UN and to expand the importance of science in many agencies under the umbrella of the UN.[27] Inspired by Needham, in May 1945, 14 Chinese scientific societies in China sent a telegraph to the Chinese delegation at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, earnestly expressing the hope that the Chinese delegation could propose and press for the establishment of a United Nations Cultural Organization with the inclusion of an international science cooperation service within it.[28] Needham also suggested that James Gerald Crowther – the scientific journalist from the British Council Science Committee – convey his request to the chairman of the Science Committee and the Royal Society Sir Henry Dale, that the Royal Society sent a similar telegram to the British delegation in San Francisco.[29] The lobbying continued during the founding conference of UNESCO in London in November 1945, as four Chinese scientific societies pressed the Chinese delegation to follow the lines of Needham's third memorandum, i. e., the scientific commission directly affiliated with the ECOSOC.[30]

Needham's scientific internationalism was reinforced by the broad belief in the necessity of international regulation over nuclear physics after the atomic bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima in August 1945. In the founding conference in London, the issue of atomic energy and the nuclear age received noticeable attention. Quoting statements of the three leaders of the Anglophone world who controlled the atomic bomb, Chinese delegate Dr Hu Shi reminded the audience of the

24 JNP, D.9, a Letter from Needham to Sir Henry Dale on 1 March 1945.

25 Ibid.

26 JNP, D.10, manuscript and typescript draft on "The place of science in a United Nations Educational and Cultural Organisation," March 1945 and D12-D14, "The place of science and international scientific co-operation in post-war world organisation," Chungking, 28 April 1945.

27 JNP, D.8, an organizational chart of the UN with some revisions made by Joseph Needham.

28 JNP, D.16, in a news clipping on 11 May 1945 titled as "Local Institutions Want International Scientific Cooperation Service" and in a cable Crowther received from Joseph Needham on 16 May 1945.

29 Ibid.

30 JNP, D.22, an official statement in Chinese signed by four Chinese societies.

heavy burden and long journey to create the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind as the only means of preventing war.[31] Even the American delegate recognized that the founding conference was potentially the most important one of the United Nations, three months after the first use of atomic weapons.[32] The threat of the atomic energy was so urgent and appalling that Needham became very humble about his contribution as he acknowledged that the most significant credit for the international science cooperation service embodied in UNESCO must go to the atomic bomb.[33] Realizing the danger of the atomic armaments race and that nuclear scientists from the U.S. agreed to entrust the further development of atomic energy to the UN, he emphasized the necessity of international supervision and the dissemination of the latest scientific and technical information to those countries that were less developed.[34] Dr. Hu Shi also remarked at the London conference, which was dedicated to the UN educational and cultural organ, that the inclusion of the critical scientific field to the scope of the organization would promote "the influence of scientific man" and scientific pursuit in international education.[35]

3 Reinventing global humanity: scientific humanist approach of development

The inclusion of science in this post-war organ was welcomed by Needham's friend, the British biologist Julian Huxley, a great popularizer of science who replaced the classicist Alfred Zimmern as the first Director-General of UNESCO.[36] Huxley exerted his influence over UNESCO through his intellectual networks. Born into a family of biologists, and whose grandfather Thomas Huxley was a firm champion of Darwinism, Huxley incorporated evolutionary biology into his

31 UNESCO Preparatory Commission, *Conference for the Establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, held at the Institute of Civil Engineers, London, from the 1st to the 16th November, 1945*, UNESCO Archives (Paris: UNESCO, 1946), 87–88, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000117626?posInSet=2&queryId=61a968c5-48d0-459c-8d2b-b78156a0d9ea.

32 Ibid., 104.

33 JNP, C.108, Science Cooperation and Atomic Energy, by Dr. Joseph Needham, 25 December 1945, Chongqing.

34 Ibid.

35 JNP, D.24, a news clipping on 11 December 1945, titled as "Hu Shih Praises Accomplishments of UNECO".

36 John Toye and Richard Toye, "One World, Two Cultures? Alfred Zimmern, Julian Huxley and the Ideological Origins of UNESCO," *History* 95, no. 3 (319) (July 2010): 308–331.

philosophical work for UNESCO: Scientific Humanism, which would leave a significant mark on UNESCO's approach towards development.[37]

During his visit to Latin America, the biological diversity of this continent reminded Huxley of Darwin's voyage and the theories that Darwin inspired from his voyage in Latin America, i. e. evolution as a fact.[38] In the pamphlet *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Philosophy* (1946), Huxley developed his ideas for UNESCO based on his personal views toward an inevitably evolving world consciousness in the cosmos that could be triggered by international cooperation in science, education, and culture. Scientific Humanism, according to Huxley, was based on the facts of biological adaptation and advancement, brought about through Darwinian selection, and continued into the human sphere by psycho-social pressures, progress with increased human control, and conservation of the environment and natural forces.[39] UNESCO's discourse of development in the immediate postwar era had a particular focus on the evolution of humanity.

As argued by Huxley in his pamphlet for UNESCO:

Evolution in the broad sense denotes all the historical processes of change and development at work in the universe… and it is divisible into three very different sectors – the inorganic or lifeless, the organic or biological, and the social or human.[40]

Huxley argued that since humankind had distinct properties of speech and conceptual thought, just as Natural Selection operated through its distinctive properties of reproduction and variation, humankind possessed the new method of "cumulative tradition, which forms the basis of that social heredity through which human societies change and develop."[41] Thus, the "Cumulative tradition, like all other distinctively human activities, is largely based on conscious processes – on knowledge, on purpose, on conscious feeling, and on conscious choice" and, for Huxley, the destiny of man was to realize the maximum progress in the minimum time.[42]

According to Huxley, UNESCO had to constantly test its policies against evolutionary progress' touchstone. For this purpose, Huxley proposed transcending nationalism, and promoting international contacts, international organizations, and international achievements, and that UNESCO should stimulate to the utmost extent the application of Science, such as nuclear physics and microbiology, to peace-

37 Julian Huxley, *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy* (Paris: UNESCO, 1946).
38 Julian Huxley, *Memorie ii* (London: Penguin Books, 1972), 4.
39 Julian Huxley, *Memorie ii*, 15.
40 Huxley, *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy*, 8.
41 Ibid., 9.
42 Ibid., 12.

ful ends.[43] Like Needham, Huxley also conceived that UNESCO should deal with science in general, including both pure and applied science. Furthermore, Huxley derived some general principles built around the idea that a well-developed human individual was the highest product of evolution to date. In other words, UNESCO should promote the democratic principle of the dignity of men. Meanwhile, since the evolution of humankind operated via cumulative tradition and manifested in the development of societies, the development of human individuals should be socially conditioned.[44] In this way, Huxley laid out the scientific, humanistic approach of development:

Unesco's activities, while concerned primarily with providing richer development and fuller satisfaction for the individual, must always be undertaken in a social context; and many of its specific tasks will be concerned with the social means towards this general end – the improvement of social mechanisms or agencies, such as educational systems, research organizations, art centers, the press, and so forth.[45]

UNESCO worked as an organ through which the evolution of educated, intelligent people could be harnessed for human progress. Huxley believed that man's capacities depended upon the social framework that conditioned their use; thus, the future evolution of humankind should benefit from innovations in social organization.[46] Along this line of logic, UNESCO invested itself in establishing social mechanisms in the forms of institutes and various associations and fostering regional-global networks in almost every modern discipline and field that could be covered by education, science, and culture.[47]

Convinced of the existence and efficacy of a common pool of experience, awareness, and ideas, one that is self-perpetuating and evolving, Huxley was fascinated with constructing a unified pool of intellectuality for the human species as a whole. The task of pooling included the unity-in-variety of the world's art and culture, as well as the promotion of one single pool of scientific knowledge and effort[48]. Huxley also noted that "UNESCO should devote special attention to the leveling up of educational, scientific and cultural facilities in all backward sectors where these are below the average, whether these be geographical regions or

43 Huxley, *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy*, 13–14.

44 Huxley, *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy*, 16.

45 Ibid.

46 James P. Sewell, *UNESCO and World Politics: Engaging in International Relations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), 108.

47 Petitjean et al., *Sixty Years of Science at UNESCO 1945–2005*, 100, 143–145.

48 Huxley, *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy*, 13–14, 17, 19, 38.

under-privileged sections of a population."[49] Because Huxley felt that it would be impossible for humanity to acquire a common outlook if large sections of it were illiterate and preoccupied with the bare material and physiological needs of food, shelter, and health. In other words, "it [UNESCO] must attempt to let in light on the world's dark areas."[50] This also foretold that UNESCO's approach towards development would intensely focus on addressing the inequality of development at every possible level, be it racial, gender, and particularly regional levels that became a landmark for differentiating the developed world and developing/underdeveloped world.

4 Aid for development in underdeveloped areas

When the Second World War ended in 1945, countries that had seen fighting were devastated. As a result, UNESCO had rehabilitation and reconstruction as one of its three major priority projects in the first years after the war. Agreed by the founding fathers and promoted by Needham, UNESCO, as a world organ, was supposed to offer necessary aid in rebuilding the post-war world. It was reported in a Chinese newspaper that the Preparatory Committee of UNESCO had already launched a donation campaign before the first General Conference aiming at providing 10 million pounds worth of publications, research courses, and scholarships for the war-devastated countries.[51] At the first General Conference, the issue was discussed by the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Commission in their first meeting held on 25 November.[52] Many national delegates expressed the urgency of reconstruction and the necessity of listing it as one of UNESCO's tasks. Nevertheless, in carrying out the mission of post-war reconstruction, UNESCO also paid attention to the aid for development in the backward areas.

Ever since establishing science as part of UNESCO, Needham had included scientists, educationists, and intellectuals from the underdeveloped countries such as China. Being a scientist himself, and having reflected upon the "rise and fall of Western European Science," Needham generated a comparative perspective to

49 Huxley, *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy*, 17.

50 Ibid.

51 *Shenbao,* 30 October 1946, 9.

52 UNESCO, "General Conference First Session Held at UNESCO House, Paris from 20 November to 10 December 1946," UNESCO Archives (Paris: UNESCO, 1947), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000114580/PDF/114580engo.pdf.multi.

look at the history of science between China and the West.[53] Before Huxley began to present a philosophical framework for UNESCO, writing from China, Needham had discovered "the Chinese Contribution to Scientific Humanism" – the humanism supplied by the Confucians and the science by the Taoists – in his first academic article on China studies in 1942.[54] He published a series of articles for *Nature* in the years 1943, 1944, and 1946, and became the chief interpreter of Chinese wartime science to the West.[55] He continued to introduce Chinese scientific contributions to the west and helped to promote the opening session of UNESCO at the Sorbonne by giving a lecture with the title "The Chinese Contribution to Science and Technology."[56]

In his letter to Chinese foreign minister T.V. Soong in 1943, Needham drew upon his experience of SBSCO, arguing that the immediate aim of an international scientific cooperation service was to spread the most advanced applied and pure science from the highly industrialized western countries to the less highly industrialized eastern ones.[57] Resuming his position as the head of the Natural Sciences Division, Needham divided the world in terms of the development of science and technology into a zone covering Europe and North America alongside the areas where the need for modern science and technology was desperately felt.[58] His experience in SBSCO in wartime China convinced him that people of underdeveloped areas would be able to contribute to the history of humankind when the elementary needs of civilized life had been secured. And this experience motivated him to devise a global network for the scientific liaison to aid the underdeveloped areas through UNESCO Field Science Cooperation offices (FSCOs).

The purpose of the FSCOs was to address unequal development.[59] It was particularly the scientists and technologists in the far larger regions of the world out-

53 Joseph Needham, "The Rise and Fall of Western European Science," *Manufacturing Chemist* 9, no. 2 (1938).

54 Joseph Needham, "The Chinese Contribution to Scientific Humanism," *Free World* 2, (1942), republished in *Science Outpost* (1943), 259–265.

55 Mougey, *Building UNESCO Science from the "Dark Zone."*

56 Joseph Needham, "The Chinese Contribution to Science and Technology," in *Reflections on Our Age: Lectures delivered at the opening session of UNESCO at the Sorbonne,* ed. David Hardman and Stephan Spender (London: Allan Wingate, 1948).

57 JNP, D.1, a letter from Joseph Needham to T.V. Soong on 29 December 1943.

58 UNESCO Archives, Natural Sciences Division: Field Science Cooperation Offices, Nat. Sci./28/1947 (Paris: UNESCO, 12 June 1947), 3.

59 Patrick Petitjen, "The 'Periphery Principle': UNESCO and the International Commitment of Scientists After World War II," *The Polish Academy of Arts and Science* (2007): 734–741.

side the "bright zone" who needed the helping hand of international science.[60] Needham coined it as the "Periphery Principle," which suggested that UNESCO should help the scientists isolated around the periphery of the "bright zone" that encompassed the war-devastated Europe but referred more to what later would be coined as Global South.[61] As coined by Huxley, "science will not achieve its optimum rate of advance, either in research or in its application, until its light is more evenly shed over the dark surface of the world's ignorance, so as to provide a more equable distribution of scientists, of apparatus, and (equally important in the long run) of popular understanding of science."[62]

The Natural Sciences Division led by Needham embarked on the enterprise of global science liaison. Bearing the memory of SBSCO, Needham envisioned two pillars of the Natural Science Section of UNESCO, via the FSCOs and aid of all kinds, especially grants-in-aid. As a friend of Needham, Huxley knew well what Needham had done in SBSCO, and Huxley was also convinced that the regional centers would play an important part in the future work of the Natural Science Section. The proposal to set up a scientific cooperation office in the Far East, India, and South America to help the areas that needed scientific information and cooperation urgently was approved at the first General Conference.[63] At this conference, Needham presented the model of scientific aid for underdeveloped regions by introducing the work of SBSCO at the International Scientific Exhibition held by UNESCO in Paris. As a result, the Secretariat was instructed to "establish a series of Field Science Cooperation Offices starting with those regions of the world remote from the main centers of science and technology, beginning with East Asia (China), South Asia (India), Middle East and Latin America; each to consist of scientific men engaged in every type of liaison work which will assist the scientists of the region."[64]

Lu Gwei Djen and Joseph Needham classified the scientific liaison work into nine categories. The nine categories featured the establishment and maintenance of the liaison office as a clearing house and information center for the two-way flow of personal exchanges (scientists and technologists of the region); the two-

60 Joseph Needham, "Science and UNESCO. International Scientific Cooperation. Tasks and Functions of the Secretariat's Division of Natural Science," UNESCO Archives (1946), UNESCO/Prep.Com./Nat.Sci.Com./12.

61 Patrick Petitjen, *The 'Periphery Principle': UNESCO and the International Commitment of Scientists After World War II.*

62 Huxley, *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy*, 17.

63 Li Shu-hua, "UNESCO and the 1st General Conference," *Modern Knowledge* [Xiandai Zhishi现代知识] 1, no. 8 (1947): 15–18.

64 JNP, D.234–237, draft and published the booklet "The Field Scientific Liaison Work of UNESCO", which was drafted by Lu Gwei Djen with much editing advice from Joseph Needham.

way communication of scientific literature, scientific apparatus, scientific equipment, scientific information etc. between each region and the rest of the world; and provision of scientific advice to governments of the region.[65]

To carry out this scientific liaison work, the Headquarters Unit at UNESCO House in Paris, UNESCO's scientific secretariat, including experts in various disciplines, the Libraries Division, the Exchange of Persons Department, and the Departments of Education and Culture, were all involved. In addition, the UNESCO office in New York, libraries in France, International Scientific Unions, and various field offices of cultural relations organizations in various countries were also mobilized to act and network with each other in the global FSCO system.[66] Needham believed that UNESCO FSCOs would lay the foundation of a system that would guarantee the effectiveness and speed of contacts between all those posts and outposts where the flag was flying of "Science in the service of Man."[67] By the second General Conference in Mexico in 1947, FSCOs had been built up in Rio de Janeiro and Cairo. In 1948, an FSCO for South Asia was set up in New Delhi while the FSCO in Rio de Janeiro was moved to Montevideo. According to Lu Gwei Djen, the network of scientific liaison offices had become an established part of UNESCO's work for the vast "outlying areas of the world."[68]

In keeping with Needham's earlier work, China was chosen to locate one of the UNESCO FSCOs in the Far East. Needham's experience with SBSCO convinced him of the necessity of an FSCO in Asia.[69] The East Asia Field Scientific Cooperation Office (EAFSCO) of UNESCO was set up in Nanking on 15 November 1947 with Jan Smid, a Czech engineer, as the acting chief official to facilitate the scientific cooperation with UNESCO's member states in the Far East at that moment.[70] Just as Needham did upon his arrival in China, regardless of multiple challenges, Jan Smid spent much time establishing friendly personal contact with leading scientific institutions, universities, and research laboratories, and becoming familiarized with the actual scientific research of these institutions. During the first ten months of his tenure (November 1947–August 1948), Jan Smid had two trips to cities visiting

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 JNP, D.233, a draft preface for a booklet drafted by Lu Gwei-Djen describing the work of the Field Science Cooperation Offices of UNESCO.

68 JNP, D.234–237, draft and published booklet "The Field Scientific Liaison Work of UNESCO", which was drafted by Lu Gwei Djen with much editing advice from Joseph Needham.

69 JNP, D.30, a confidential letter from Joseph Needham to Dr. E. J. H. Corner copied to Dr. Ralph Allee on 11 October 1947.

70 *Shenbao,* February 21 1948, 6; JNP, D.144, Activity Report of the East Asia Field Science Cooperation Office of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

53 Chinese research institutions.[71] After all these either professional or administrative contacts, the EAFSCO was set up and located firstly at No. 671 Zhongshan Road North (中山北路671号), then later moved to No.14 Wuyee Lu (武夷路).[72] Biochemist Lu Gwei Djen worked from the headquarters as Assistant Chief; Smid was the acting head and W.J. Wills, the Australia Biochemist, would arrive in March 1949 as the acting official.[73]

5 Imbue education with science: fundamental education

The scientific humanistic approach was also embodied in the first flagship project from UNESCO, Fundamental Education, which is described as the prototype of UN Developmentalism by international historian Glenda Sluga.[74] Having survived the Second World War, the national delegations attending the UNESCO founding conference in London in November 1945, mainly the politicians, educationists, and intellectuals of the Allies, were convinced that education should be deployed as an instrument for promoting international understanding.[75] Sir Alfred Zimmern presented the idea before the First Plenary Meeting of the Preparatory Commission in London in 1945 that this new organization should embark on a worldwide attack against the dangers to the peace of the world – illiteracy and ignorance.[76]

Another issue raised and discussed at the London Conference was economic and social betterment in under-developed areas. This reflected growing interest in the connections between literacy education policy and broader social development. American writer Pearl S. Buck had just published a book (*Tell the People*) introducing Chinese educational activist James Yen's pioneering work Mass Education Movements (MEM) in China and pointed out that no lasting peace would be possible with three quarters of the population of the world ignorant, illiterate,

71 JNP, D.144. Activity Report of the East Asia Field Science Cooperation Office of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

72 JNP, D.144, correspondence from Jan Smid to Joseph Needham on 4 September 1948.

73 JNP, D.235, FSCO Booklet, Appendix of Personnel and Addresses of the Offices.

74 Glenda Sluga, "UNESCO and the (One) World of Julian Huxley," *Journal of World History* 21, no. 3 (September 2010): 393–418.

75 Wodajo Mulugeta, *An Analysis of UNESCO's Concept and Program of Fundamental Education* (PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 1963), Chapter I.

76 UNESCO, *Fundamental Education: Common Ground of All Peoples, Report of a Special Committee to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation* (UNESCO Preparatory Commission. Education Section, Paris, 1947), 9.

ill-fed, and diseased.[77] MEM, under the leadership of James Yen and his assistant Qu Shiying, constituted a significant part of an interwar network that was dedicated to combating rural poverty in China.[78] With the endorsement of American philanthropic agencies and missionaries, MEM developed a scientifically experimental and democratic approach towards social betterment via comprehensive programs encompassing literacy, livelihood, health, and self-governance that aimed at breaking the vicious circle of rural poverty.[79] Qu Shiying attended the London conference and the first General Conference as a Chinese delegate, bringing MEM into the UN prototype of developmentalism.

The scientific and holistic approach of interwar developmentalism was highly resonant with UNESCO. This new UN organ claimed to possess expertise in science and education and was dedicated to promoting scientific humanism for the evolution of humankind. Moreover, to build up a true world community, the post-war generation of internationalists gathered at UNESCO adopted a scientific worldview, which sought to foster a world of Unity in Diversity that would embrace the global diversity of cultural values, social structures, and economic ideas.[80] American anthropologist Margaret Mead, who was on the editing committee of the report, proposed considering Asian cultures in the policymaking of international organizations, in order to contrast and complement the dominant Western cultures.[81] By comparing and synthesizing the perspectives molded by diverse national cultures, UNESCO aimed to develop an objective view of social phenomena.[82] In an attempt to provide a universal epistemology that enabled diverse peoples to collaborate, not only were Anglo-American experts consulted, but also many experts from underdeveloped countries such as China, Egypt, Sudan, Colombia, and Haiti were in-

77 UNESCO, "A Chinese Pioneer: Dr. Yen Describes Work of Mass Education in China," *Courier* 1, no. 2 (March 1948), 7.

78 David Ekbladh, "To Reconstruct the Medieval: Rural Reconstruction in Interwar China and the Rise of an American Style of Modernization, 1921–1961," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 9, no. 3–4 (2000): 169–96, https://doi.org/10.1163/18765610079364590 3; David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011); David Ekbladh, "'Mr. TVA': Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise and Fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933–1973," *Diplomatic History* 26, no. 3 (July 2002): 335–74, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7709.00315.

79 Charles Wishart Hayford, *To the People: James Yen and Village China*, The U.S. and Pacific Asia–Studies in Social, Economic, and Political Interaction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Ekbladh, *To Reconstruct the Medieval.*

80 Perrin Selcer, *Patterns of Science: Developing Knowledge for a World Community at UNESCO* (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2011).

81 UNESCO, *Fundamental Education: Common Ground of All Peoples*, 132.

82 Perrin Selcer, *Patterns of Science: Developing Knowledge for a World Community at UNESCO*, 57.

volved in investigating the development of fundamental education on a global scale. The reports provided an overall review of the status of educational activities in countries with high literacy rates in Europe and North America as well as the countries with the lowest literacy rates in the vast underdeveloped "Third World."[83] The experience from the different parts of the world offered research data for comparative studies, which provided a foundation for "scientific" understanding of educational development.[84]

After an expert meeting in January 1947 in London that involved the British scholar of comparative education Joseph Albert Lauwerys, a British expert on colonial education, Margaret Read, and two Chinese educationists Qu Shiying and Guo Youshou, UNESCO decided to host a regional study conference in China as an international platform for exchanging ideas and experience of deploying education for societal betterment.[85] John Bowers, the British diplomat and educationist who would take charge of the programme for 20 years, argued that the problem of fundamental education "can only be solved by mass education campaigns, linked wherever possible with schemes of economic and social development, backed by all the techniques and resources of modern educational method and scientific knowledge and the localized 'Projects', from which mass education will spread onwards."[86]

On 3 September 1947, numerous foreign delegations from the Asia-South Pacific region, Chinese politicians, Chinese educational experts, and UNESCO representatives visited Nanjing to inaugurate the UNESCO Regional Study Conference on Fundamental Education in the Far East. The conference sought to usher in a comprehensive educational program to break the vicious circle of poverty, illiteracy, and low productivity in underdeveloped areas. The conference agreed that UNESCO would launch pilot projects in certain member states. Experts would collect, compare, and study the data and experiences, then synthesize these into generalizable insights and models that could be applied and replicated in other regions. A special committee consisting of UNESCO delegates, Chinese experts, and other foreign delegates drafted a "Plan and Outline of Experimental Zones of Fundamental Education" (基本教育实验计划纲要) and an operational plan for a "China Pilot Project" (中国示范设计区).[87]

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83 UNESCO, *Fundamental Education: Common Ground of All Peoples*, 132.

84 Perrin Selcer, *Patterns of Science: Developing Knowledge for a World Community at UNESCO*, 55.

85 UNESCO, UNESCO Archives, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Regional Study Conference on Fundamental Education, UNESCO/Educ./6/1947, March 13 1947, 5.

86 Joseph Bowers, *What is Fundamental Education*, UNESCO Archives, Educ./43. Paris, July 1947, 1.

87 "Plan and Outline of Experimental Zones of Fundamental Education," *Shenbao*, 6 September 1947, 6.

6 Challenges and evacuation

Two major UNESCO projects, FSCO and Fundamental Education in China, demonstrate the profound challenges and dilemmas in implementing this scientific, humanistic approach. In both cases, contact with local authorities, local institutions, and intellectuals was essential to carry out the mission. However, UNESCO was faced with the unstable environment related to the Civil War in China, which included rampant inflation, displaced populations, and difficulties with travel and communication. More significantly, there were rising suspicions and confrontations between the Western and Eastern blocs, mirrored in China by the confrontation between Communist and Nationalist forces. As an internationalist, Needham had a connection with both camps, even top-level politicians, even though he himself was a communist. However, the difficulties of operating FSCO and implementing Fundamental Education became increasingly difficult as the civil war between the communists and nationalists approached its final phase. Furthermore, the Nationalist government blockade of the Chinese coast, which disturbed all contacts with the outside world, delayed any responses or confirmation from outside China; even the correspondence with UNESCO Paris headquarters through Hongkong by courtesy of the WHO office was prolonged and irregular.[88] The Nationalist government's failed currency reform worsened the economic situation, and the constant depreciation of the local currency caused additional expenses of local salary payment in the USD equivalent, making it more challenging to recruit workers and pay for their salaries.[89]

Jan Smid decided to move the office in Nanjing to the United Nations Building in Shanghai, which they shared with the United Nations Information Office. The office handed over the UNRRA Industrial Reconstruction program to the FSCO.[90] Communication within inland China was also slow by mules or on junks since the regular commercial planes were canceled by the Nationalist fighters and travel from the Shanghai office was restricted in the unsafe strategic situation during the last months of the Nationalist regime.[91]

Jan Smid could only manage to do what was possible under such circumstances, such as trying to update the addresses of all their correspondents even though

88 JNP, D.155, Activity Report of the East Asia Science Cooperation Office of UNESCO (Shanghai), Period: March 1949–December 1949.

89 Ibid.

90 JNP, D.155, in a letter from Jan Smid to Joseph Needham, 7 January 1950.

91 JNP, D.155, Activity Report of the East Asia Science Cooperation Office of UNESCO (Shanghai), Period: March 1949–December 1949.

many of them had evacuated from their former residences and some of them had even left mainland China for Taiwan or abroad.[92] The Ministry of Education appropriated in January 1948 the sum of 100 million Chinese yen to the Committee on Research and Experimentation in Fundamental Education.[93] At the suggestion of UNESCO, a congregational missionary, Hugh Wells Hubbard, who had dedicated more than two decades to rural reconstruction in China, became the supervisor of this pilot project.[94] According to a report from UNESCO, there was even a national budget passed by the Executive Yuan with an item of 800 billion Chinese Yen for subsidizing Fundamental Education.[95] The Nationalist regime was confronted with a severe legitimacy crisis. Thus, the priority for the Nationalist government was to earn international recognition. Having spent a great deal of money preparing for the Nanjing conference, including organizing a grand tour trip for the delegates and UNESCO representatives to visit Chinese cities and cocktail parties, exhibitions, concerts, and performances, the Nationalist government reneged on the promise to promote fundamental education and allocated no substantial funds for a pilot project.[96] Later the Nationalist government voted for 200 million Chinese Yen for the pilot project, almost 80,000 USD, but the Minister of Education Zhu Jiahua divided this among the provinces for primary education, trying to please the educational officials and to gain favor for his political advancement.[97] The uneasy cooperation with the crumbling government and this corruption caused Hubbard to suggest UNESCO get as far away as possible from the Nationalists.[98]

UNESCO decided to conduct a small pilot project titled "The Healthy Village" which was supposed to illustrate to the Chinese peasants the rules of hygiene and means of protection against disease.[99] The project focused on epidemic diseases such as smallpox and vaccination; trachoma; cholera, Malaria, typhoid fever and Tuberculosis; child diseases such as tetanus neonatorum; and healthy habits of daily hygiene such as safe drinking water and food safety.[100] Thus, the original

92 UNESCO, 1948c. UNESCO Archives, Fundamental Education China Pilot Project, FE/Rep.1, 7 April 1948, pp. 1–13.

93 UNESCO Archives, Fundamental Education China Pilot Project, FE/Rep.1, 30 August 1948, 3.

94 Hugh W. Hubbard, *Transcription of Hugh W. Hubbard's Tape-Recorded Reminiscences of A Lifetime of Service in China 1908–1952* (Bethesda, MD: Poolside Publications, 1989), 144.

95 UNESCO Archives, Fundamental Education China Pilot Project, FE/Rep.1, 30 August 1948, 3.

96 Hugh W. Hubbard, *Transcription*, 144.

97 Ibid., 146–147.

98 Ibid., 147

99 UNESCO, "Cartoons and Films in China," *Courier* 2, no. 9 (October 1949): 12.

100 UNESCO, *The Healthy Village: an Experiment in Visual Education in West China* (Paris: UNESCO, 1951), 15.

plan to experiment with comprehensive programs of Fundamental Education became a short-lived experiment of the public health campaign.[101]

In January 1949, UNESCO officially authorized the start of the project. In February 1949, they began to recruit and organize personnel for the project, including local public health workers, local artists, educational activists, and a UNESCO expert on film production and animation.[102] In February 1949, six artists were engaged and had already started drawing posters and filmstrips.[103] In March 1949, the artists finished their first filmstrip for vaccinations and posters on trachoma while Dr. Nutting planned the health program around the topic "Healthy Village."[104] The conditions were so limited that they had to test the finished filmstrips using Hubbard's bicycle as the generator in April.[105] In June and July 1949, they finished 13 sets of filmstrip drawings, two more sets of filmstrip drawings, and eight posters.[106] This was based on experiments that proved posters and filmstrips were efficient and useful in the field.[107] In August, the Canadian animation expert Norman McLaren was brought by Hubbard from Hong Kong and joined in the making of visual aids.[108] They produced and experimented with four types of materials in the project, including wall posters and connected pictures; picture books; mobile pictures; filmstrips and film slides; and animated movies about health campaigns such as "Trachoma Campaign in Huang Ke Chen," the "Vaccination Campaign in Huang Ke Chen," and "Dishwashing and the Prevention of Typhoid-dysentery Infection."[109]

Health education was conducted through a tour exhibition and medical examination. The staff found a place in the villages, often in an old temple, unpacked their equipment and set up an impromptu outdoor film theatre, or made an exhibition, and broadcasted the filmstrips or orally explained to the audience with loudspeakers. The health workers sat at three tables and offered consulting and examination for the townsfolk and farmers and children.[110] After watching the educational filmstrips and the visual materials, the villagers came and received ex-

101 The Author, "Experimenting with a global panacea: UNESCO's Fundamental Education programme in China, 1945–1950," *International Review of Education* 68 (2022): 345–368, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-022-09959-5.

102 UNESCO, *The Healthy Village*, 15.

103 Mabel Ellis Hubbard, Ode to '49, Hubbard Papers, Yale University.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.

106 UNESCO, *The Healthy Village*, 11.

107 UNESCO, *The Healthy Village*, 16.

108 The Watchman, October 15 1949, UNESCO Office, Pehpei, Hubbard Papers, Yale University.

109 UNESCO, *The Healthy Village*, 26 and 41–95.

110 UNESCO, "A New Lesson at Shih Tze Hsiang," *Courier* 3, no. 3 (April 1950): 3.

aminations or vaccination. Next to this, posters were put up on walls to show how diseases evolved and were cured.[111]

The presence of a UN organ in China became highly political. Writing from Shanghai after many months of disconnection, Jan Smid reported to Needham and described the hectic time in November and December 1948 in China, when politicians concealed all military problems, and nobody knew how long they had to wait for any decision.[112] Contact with the Nationalist government was non-existent, which undermined Needham's previous work.[113] In the last months of the Civil War, Jan Smid had the wishful thinking that the Shanghai Office would continue its routine work.[114] From March to May 1949, the office still had the normal official status and facilities given to the UN organizations by the Nationalist government; however, from June to December, when the new communist regime took over mainland China, Jan Smid and the UNESCO office was confronted with a trickier situation. Well informed that Needham had his permanent interests in scientific work in China, Jan Smid sought the continuance of UNESCO FSCO in mainland China. However, the dilemma of UNESCO FSCO's operation within the new regime lay in the fact that the Nationalist Government was deeply involved in this UN agency from its inception, which indirectly reinforced the legitimacy of the regime.[115] Just as at the Nanjing conference in 1947, the Nationalist government utilized it as a site to display the educational modernity as well as the political legitimacy and the sole representation of China in international society.[116] Hence, contact with the Beijing authority was refused since the new government was skeptical about all western agencies and individuals and imposed a more restricted regulation upon the travel of foreigners. Therefore, contacts with the new Shanghai authority were noncommittal since Shanghai was also waiting for higher level directions from Beijing.[117] The relationship with Chinese scientists and scholars also became complicated, and contact with them continued but was reserved and limited. The FSCO officers tried not to embarrass their friends because they had difficulties in the social dynamics under the new regime.[118]

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111 UNESCO, "Chinese Artists and UNESCO Experts Find New Roads to "The Healthy Village"," *Courier* 3, no. 8 (September 1950): 5.

112 JNP, D.152, a letter from Jan Smid to Joseph Needham on 8 March 1949.

113 Ibid.

114 JNP, D.155, Activity Report.

115 Gordon Barrett, "Between Sovereignty and Legitimacy: China and UNESCO, 1946–1953," *Modern Asian Studies* 53, no. 5 (September 2019): 1516–42, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X17001159.

116 The Author (2022).

117 JNP, D.155, Activity Report.

118 Ibid.

As for the project on Fundamental Education, although Hugh W. Hubbard also sought possible cooperation between the UNESCO pilot project and the new regime in Beijing, he could not proceed because, as the head of the Public Health Department of the Southwest said, "everything depends on Peking… there are two big hurdles to get over, one is that the United Nations has not recognized our government, and second, you have been working in conjunction with the Mass Education Movement, and the status of that movement is not clear."[119] The pilot project lasted for one year, at the end of which the pilot project staff witnessed the evacuation of the Nationalist army and the triumphant march of the Chinese Red Army to power in December 1949 when Pehpei (Beibei in Pinyin), the small town that hosted the pilot project, was "liberated."[120]

It was not until 1950 that Jan Smid realized that Beijing's skeptical attitude towards the relations with UNESCO would be certainly maintained unless the Communists gained official recognition from the UN.[121] He could not continue his efforts in contacting Beijing due to his family difficulties in Czechoslovakia and he was withdrawn by UNESCO. At the same time, Needham failed to find someone else to carry out the mission of communicating and working with the Communists. However, Needham was expecting some official contact between UNESCO and Beijing to maintain the FSCO in mainland China. Despite the efforts of Needham to find pro-communist officials, the new regime was suspicious towards international organizations such as UNESCO that had both a strong American influence and a connection with the Nationalist government. Due to this hostility towards the activities of FSCO in China, FSCO was limited and finally closed in 1953.[122]

7 Impacts and lessons

Since its inception, UNESCO's outlook fit with the development discourse of the postwar period. Needham and Huxley, as founders of UNESCO, had the vision to include poorer countries in global science when the international community discussed how to forge reconstruction and development by applying science and technology. The FSCO in China acted as a hub of the exchange of scientific information, scientific periodicals, scientific apparatus, and specimens between China and the rest of the world, and international organizations such as the IMF and, of course,

119 Hubbard, *Transcription*, p.152.

120 University of Stirling, University Library, Norman McLaren Archive, GAA-31-PC-1950–001, News Clipping, "I Saw the Chinese Reds Take Over," *Maclean's Magazine*, October 15 1950, 10–11, 73–76.

121 JNP, D.155, Activity Report.

122 Barrett, *Between Sovereignty and Legitimacy*.

UNESCO. As initiated and expected by Needham, EFSCO carried the mission of channeling two-way flows for anything concerning science with China. As summarized by Jan Smid, EAFSCO managed to facilitate the international exchange of scientific periodicals on social science, botany, and geology between institutes in China and those in India, the Middle East, and Europe; the provision of subtropical plants seeds, cotton, wheat, and millet seeds for agriculturalists in Fukien and North China; the communication of scientific information about sugar cane between China and Philippines, and the communication of scientific information about hygro-electric projects and paper making from bamboo in pulp between China and India.[123]

The FSCO was an excellent example of how UNESCO sought to approach development by laying down a global liaison network for scientific cooperation between developed and underdeveloped areas. As recalled by Jürgen Hillig, who was once Coordinator for Natural Sciences Sector, in 1967–88, and Director, Regional Office for Science and Technology, Jakarta, in 1989–94, FSCOs "were very small, consisting of only one or two professionals. Their resources were rather limited. But they were highly effective as information exchange centers and clearinghouses for the regions concerned."[124] This field science office in China proved an efficient framework for fostering cooperation for developing science worldwide, particularly in those underdeveloped areas. Examples are vividly presented by Lu Gwei Djen: "Fukien would like to try out the 'carob bean' and legume trees from Sicily," "Kuangsi Agricultural Experiment Station wants to experiment with the Hawaii horse-bean," while by liaising with the International Association of Microbiologists and its International Centre of Type-Culture Collection at Lausanne, EAFSCO officers were able to know where to obtain sulphur bacteria, yeasts, and algae that Chinese scientists from National Peiping University and other institutes wanted for urgent research.[125] This international scientific cooperation linked those who had access to knowledge and resources and those who had not as "the Sulphur bacteria were winging their way by Pan-American from the west coast of California, the yeasts were coming by KLM from Delft in Holland, and the algae, carefully sub-

123 JNP, D.144, Activity Report of the East Asia Field Science Cooperation Office (EAFSCO) of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) covering the period from its establishment in Nanking on November 15 1947 till August 31 1948; also collected in the Second National Archives in Nanjing, Volume 5 (2), no. 1356, date 194809, Chinese National Commission for UNESCO 2nd General Conference September 26 1948, reference materials in English.

124 Petitjean et al., *Sixty Years of Science at UNESCO 1945–2005*, 73.

125 JNP, D.235, Draft booklet "The Scientific Liaison Work of UNESCO" by Lu Gwei-Djen, with much editing advice from Joseph Needham, The Science Co-operation Office in East Asia section, 31–33.

cultured in Prague were on their way also."[126] Due to the liaison work of the FSCO, scientific periodicals, plant seeds, scientific papers, and scientific information had flown from scientists, research institutes, libraries, and laboratories in India, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and America to China to aid scientific activities there.

Even during the chaos of the Chinese Civil War, Pinus seeds were supplied from Australia and USA for trial in Fukien, wheat and millet seeds from Egypt, Italy, and India were supplied for trial in China, silkworm eggs were exchanged between China and Siam, and Alpine, cotton seeds, and wood samples were supplied from India.[127] The Shanghai office even managed to deal with inquiries from other member states in East Asia—ten scientific institutions from Indochina, eight from Manila, and six from Siam. The Shanghai Office also managed to exchange with other FSCOs in Delhi, Montevideo, and Cairo. The results were that Camphor and rice seeds from Taiwan, corn and mango varieties from the Philippines, and various seeds from Malaya and India were supplied for trial in Indochina, and corn varieties from Latin America, various rice and vegetables seeds from Taiwan, and silkworm eggs from Siam were supplied for the Philippines.[128] The FSCO in China was really playing its part in the global science liaison network that Needham had envisioned.

The historical construction of development discourse targeted the Third World as undeveloped and subjected it to systematic comprehensive intervention.[129] But Needham's interests and inquiry into the history of science and technology in China enabled him to note that some of these peoples of undeveloped areas had produced great men in the past and had produced forms of art and culture which were noble and beautiful.[130] Needham's notion of global mutual indebtedness and interdependence in humankind's scientific and cultural history was inspiring for UNESCO's globalist concern of facilitating international understanding as the real common ground of humankind.[131] In this case, Needham's influence sought to rebalance the Euro-American centrism in the typical development framework.

126 Ibid.

127 JNP, D.155, Activity Report.

128 Ibid.

129 Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995), 6.

130 JNP, D.234–237, draft and published booklet "The Field Scientific Liaison Work of UNESCO," which was drafted by Lu Gwei Djen with much editing advice from Joseph Needham.

131 Poul Duedahl, "Selling Mankind: UNESCO and the Invention of Global History, 1945–1976," *Journal of World History* 22, no. 1 (2011): 101–33.

The FSCO in China not only managed to facilitate two-way exchange between China and the outside world to benefit China but also constantly involved and triggered a global network of science involving scientists and non-human agents such as scientific literature, scientific information, scientific apparatus, specimens, and plant seeds. They flew from diverse places of origin to sites where they were needed for scientific research, firstly among UNESCO member states in Asia and then enlarged to cover member states in Latin American, East Europe, the Middle East, and of course the advanced areas of Western Europe and North America. FSCO was an excellent example of UNESCO's scientific, humanistic approach toward development, particularly addressing the inequality between the developed and the underdeveloped.

If the FSCO system and later the ROST network exemplified the proper scientific approach to global development, Fundamental Education was how UNESCO sought to combine science with education in its project, from the contents to the methodology. Guided by scientific humanism, the design of the Fundamental Education project was experimental in its nature and holistic in its contents, trying to resolve multiple issues that UNESCO experts diagnosed in the development of backward areas. In the pilot project in China, the final records indicated that they examined 9,514 out of 13,518 people, i. e. 70 % of the entire population in the small town, and found 2,665 cases of trachoma.[132] In a local county, UNESCO experts performed 1,965 vaccinations of smallpox during the spring, which the Chinese believed was the good time for smallpox vaccinations.[133] Influenced by the campaign, the Health Centre in the county performed 4,077 vaccinations of smallpox during March and April in 1949.[134]

UNESCO, an organ mandated by its member states, heavily relied upon the sponsorship from its members, such as the U.S., in its early development.[135] However, as the projects in China illustrate, UNESCO's holistic approach often expanded and involved diverse fields that required substantial funds or personnel. American president Truman's inaugural speech in January 1949 kicked off the making of the Cold War development regime that aimed to deliver scientific and technological knowledge for better lives in the world's underdeveloped areas.[136] The U.S. was once interested in cooperating with Fundamental Education, however, American money did not ultimately contribute to the pilot project in China due to the increas-

132 UNESCO, *The Healthy Village*, 39.

133 Ibid., 36–37.

134 Ibid., 39.

135 Chantalle F. Verna, "Haiti, the Rockefeller Foundation, and UNESCO's Pilot Project in Fundamental Education, 1948–1953," *Diplomatic History* 40, no. 2 (2016): 269–95.

136 Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 3.

ing Cold War tensions.[137] FSCO could have well served Truman's goals of promoting scientific and technological aid as it had taken over the U.S. dominated UNRRA program in China. Unlike the USSR, which finally joined UNESCO in 1954 and participated in several major projects, the UN did not recognize the new government of mainland China until two decades later due to the Cold War confrontation and the politicization of Chinese representation in the UN system. The rejection of Beijing in the UN system excluded the possibility of aiding the communist China until 1971.

As Sandrine Kott points out, even during the Cold War international organizations acted as sites of exchange and encouraged hybridizations, and Eastern European countries continued to be seen as a particular testing ground for economic development projects beyond the ideological divide.[138] In fact, despite the interplay of the nationalism and geopolitics, the formulation of UNESCO Fundamental Education involved diverse ideologies such as Confucianism, liberalism, and Christianity.[139] Before the "development decade" of the 1960s, UNESCO Fundamental Education and FSCO served as the prototype of UN developmentalism as it foretold and experimented the close if not causal connection among education, science, and development in Eastern countries like China. However, the intellectual cooperation for development promoted by UNESCO became highly politicized amidst East-West skepticism and confrontation. The Cold War confrontation was in essence structured around an opposition between a liberal conception of "freedom" and a communist conception of equality.[140] UNESCO's empathy towards equality, which was the promise delivered by the Eastern bloc, placed itself in an undesirable position for liberal donors such as the U.S. during the Cold War. The U.S. accused UNESCO Fundamental Education of being infiltrated by communism and reallocated the funds into its bilateral aid programs.[141]

The underdeveloped Third World constituted the main target needing assistance. UNESCO presented itself as the sole organ in the U.N. dealing with science and education. However, the UN also had other organs that dealt with the specific disciplines of science, such as the WHO for health and medicine and the FAO for

137 The Author, *UNESCO-China Cooperation on Fundamental Education, 1945–1950: Between Geopolitics, Idealism of Post-war Global Governance, and Chinese Nationalism,* forthcoming (2023).
138 Sandrine Kott, "Cold War Internationalism," in *Internationalisms: A Twentieth-century History*, ed. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 340–362.
139 The Author, *UNESCO-China Cooperation on Fundamental Education.*
140 Ibid., 347.
141 Charles Dorn and Kristen Ghodsee, "The Cold War Politicization of Literacy: Communism, UNESCO, and the World Bank," *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 2 (April 2012): 373–98.

food and agriculture. Needham had the idea to imbue science in the UN by setting up a scientific council in parallel with ECOSOC, but ECOSOC became the coordinating organ between the UN and UNESCO. Huxley noted that UNESCO needed proper liaison with other UN organs such as the FAO, WHO, and ILO. The formulation of the Fundamental Education pilot project turned out to be a public health campaign that went beyond UNESCO's normal scope of action and overlapped with the functions of other UN agencies, such as the WHO and FAO, both of which were intended to become part of the project. The field of nuclear energy and its application was also removed from the scope of UNESCO in January 1946 when the UN General Assembly set up the Atomic Energy Commission under the UN Security Council.[142] When the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) under the auspices of UNESCO was established in 1954 in Geneva, UNESCO's efforts managed to play a more concrete role in promoting the peaceful utilization of atomic energy across the blocs during the high Cold War.[143]

UNESCO later tied itself closely with the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance to the underdeveloped world, which the second Director-General Jaime Torres Bodet clearly iterated.[144] But as UNESCO coordinated more closely with UN development efforts, it was confronted by intra-agency competitions and the defense of its own expertise.[145] Following the phase-out of the ambitious yet ambiguous Fundamental Education in 1956, UNESCO later launched the Experimental World Literacy Program (EWLP) and promoted the ideas of adult education and lifelong education that emphasized the more emancipatory and human rights aspect of education than the human resource capital in the puzzle of economic growth.[146] But its humanistic approach was challenged by the more economic/utilitarian perspective of other US-dominated international organs, notably the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

142 Patrick Petitjean, "International scientific cooperation finding a footing: The sciences within the United Nations system," in *Sixty Years of Science at UNESCO 1945–2005*, ed. Petitjean et al., 49.
143 Patrick Petitjean, "Cool Heads in the Cold War: Pierre Auger and the Founding of CERN," *Sixty Years of Science at UNESCO 1945–2005*, ed. Petitjean et al., 57–60.
144 UNESCO, "UNESCO Can Aid U.N. Plan for under-Developed Areas, Torres Bodet Says," *Courier* 2, no. 3 (April 1949): 1–2.
145 Karen Mundy, "Educational Multilateralism in a Changing World Order: Unesco and the Limits of the Possible," *International Journal of Educational Development* 19, no. 1 (January 1999): 27–52, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0738-0593(98)00054-6.
146 Maren Elfert, "UNESCO, the Faure Report, the Delors Report, and the Political Utopia of Lifelong Learning," *European Journal of Education*, UNESCO Archives, 50, no. 1 (March 2015): 88–100, https://doi.org/10.1111/ejed.12104; Elfert, *Revisiting the Faure Report and the Delors Report: Why Was UNESCO's Utopian Vision of Lifelong Learning an "Unfailure"?*

(OECD).[147] To fulfill the mission of deploying science and education for development, UNESCO must navigate itself in the tensions regarding liberty versus equality that have been deeply rooted in the intellectual history of humankind since the Enlightenment.

8 Conclusion

This chapter recognized that UNESCO has long been promoting SDG ideas mainly due to its expertise in education and science. This chapter briefly reviews the inclusion of science in UNESCO and the emergence of scientific humanism that shaped the guiding ideas of UNESCO toward development in its early history. The chapter later takes the FSCO and Fundamental Education as an example to demonstrate UNESCO's scientific, humanistic approach towards development, particularly in aid for the world's backward areas. FSCOs consisted of a global actor-network of scientific liaison, with a particular concern on aiding the development of scientific research in backward areas for the evolution and process of humankind. Fundamental Education experimented with comprehensive education programs (in public health, literacy, and livelihood) for development. As the FSCO and Fundamental Education in China illustrate, UNESCO's scientific humanist approach to global development vividly presents the overarching and self-expanding tendency of UNESCO's work. Its involvement in global development often went far beyond its scope of action and financial capability and unavoidably interwove itself with the politics at the international/national and local levels. UNESCO's approach demonstrated its significance for international society as an intellectual spearhead, to explore and experiment with the link between education, science, and development, which is still an unfinished mission today.

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147 Maren Elfert, "UNESCO, The World Bank, and The Struggle Over Education for Development Through the Lens of The Faure Report (1972) and The Delors Report," *L'Education En Débats: Analyse Comparée*, no. 8 (2017): 5–21.

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Ben Clark, Axel Fisher

The WFP 1968–72 rural housing program in Morocco

1 Introduction

Drawing on an ongoing reconstitution of the *Centre d'expérimentation, de recherche et de formation*'s (CERF, "center for experimentation, research, and training") archives,[1] this chapter deals with the 1968–72 Rural Housing Program,[2] jointly prepared by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations' (FAO) World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Moroccan government. Its main objective was to "improve" rural habitat and local equipment using the food-for-work method, in order to support the territorial transformations required by the country's agricultural development project. It was also conceived as a practical measure to curb rural exodus and support agrarian reform. Eventually, the implementation of this WFP-backed operation spanned from 1969 to 1975, covering over 170 worksites throughout the country.[3]

This chapter approaches the Rural Housing Program from the perspective of its continuities and discontinuities with a set of development actions initiated by actors both national and international, from the late colonial to the early post-independence eras. The first part traces the context of the program's origins, exploring three aspects: (1) the gradual emergence of "ruralism," a new technical and ideological approach to rural planning; (2) the rise of policies promoting "self-

1 The CERF's archives are currently dispersed across various Moroccan institutions (mainly the Ministry of Housing and the *École nationale d'architecture* [ENA] in Rabat) and individual archives related to former CERF members (in particular the Fonds Jean Hensens held at the Faculty of Architecture of the Université libre de Bruxelles [ULB], as well as the Alain Masson and Jean Dethier collections held at the Archives du Maroc). In addition, important documents concerning CERF and the Rural Housing Program have also been located at the United Nations Archives, the *Centre national de documentation* (CND), the library of the *Institut national d'aménagement et d'urbanisme* (INAU), the archives of the Aga Khan Foundation, and the archives of the human sciences department of the *Institut agronomique et vétérinaire* Hassan II in Rabat.

2 This program was known in Morocco as PAM 68–72, after the French acronym for the WFP: *Programme alimentaire mondial.* In UN archives, the program was named "Project MOR416."

3 According to WFP, *Morocco 416. Rural housing and Community development in selected areas* (draft report for the WFP, 1975), in United Nations Archives, United Nations Registry Section 1946–1979, S-0175–1472–0008.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111280356-007

help" approaches (such as the *Promotion nationale*, a national program of public works relying on a volunteer workforce, or early UN-supported "Community Development" programs); and (3) the expanding involvement of international organizations (e.g. foreign expertise within the renewed context of Western patronage embedded in *coopération* ["foreign aid"]).

In the second part of the article, we first look at the establishment of the CERF, which was created by the Ministry of Interior in Rabat to implement this rural development project. We then analyze the Rural Housing Program by detailing its initial objectives, the methods advocated by foreign experts, the operation's achievements, and its criticisms.

From this perspective, in line with recent scholarship which questions the country's independence (1956) as a moment of clear rupture,[4] the Rural Housing Program generalizes and intensifies a set of intentions, policies, and practices that had already been initiated and promoted in post-war Morocco by various national and international actors. In this sense, the Rural Housing Program should be regarded as the climax of the development methods promoted in the 1960s, globally known as the "development decade" and locally as the "countryside decade."[5]

2 Post-war rural development

2.1 The emergence of ruralism

In the early days of the Protectorate and throughout the interwar period, rural development was almost exclusively oriented towards the development of colonial-owned lands, mostly located within what colonial administrators often referred to as *Maroc utile* ["useful Morocco"]. Colonial authorities focused on providing infrastructures (roads, railways, irrigation networks, electric power supply) support-

4 The continuities of architectural and planning policies between French-ruled and independent Morocco have recently been put forward by A. Chaouni, D. Williford and M. Tenzon. Aziza Chaouni, "Depoliticizing Group GAMMA: contesting modernism in Morocco," in *Third World Modernism: Architecture, Development and Identity*, ed. Duanfang Lu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011): 57–84, doi:10.4324/9780203840993–9; Daniel Williford, "Concrete futures: Technologies of urban crisis in colonial and postcolonial Morocco" (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2020); Michele Tenzon, "Village design and rural modernization in the Moroccan Gharb, 1946–1968" (PhD diss., Université libre de Bruxelles, 2023).

5 Alain Claisse, "Stratégies d'aménagement et supports sociaux au Maroc," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 22 (1983): 243–257.

ing the progress of colonial agriculture.[6] However, rural housing—in particular "indigenous"[7] rural housing—was long neglected in colonial planning.[8] While colonial institutions allegedly expressed, from 1917 onwards, a concern for the well-being of Moroccan *fellahs* ("peasants"), establishing among others the *Sociétés indigènes de prévoyance* (SIPs, "indigenous contingency societies"),[9] and made a few limited attempts to modernize Moroccan agriculture, their attention to rural housing and development indeed remained marginal.

In this regard, the end of the Second World War marked a significant turning point in France's rural development policy for colonial Morocco, with the emergence of an approach that eventually came to be known as "ruralism" (understood here in the broad sense of territorial planning schemes and projects specifically designed for the countryside). Against a backdrop of growing discontent within the Moroccan population, along with the global emergence of nationalist movements and calls for independence, this was a period of international concerns about "tensions" in colonial territories (reflected in the aptly-named Tensions Project launched by UNESCO in 1947),[10] which resulted in various efforts on behalf of

6 Grigori Lazarev, *Les politiques agraires au Maroc, 1956–2006. Un témoignage engagé* (Paris: Économie critique, 2012): 35.

7 The term "indigenous" emerged in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century colonial doctrines, referring to the native population of colonial holdings—as opposed to European settlers—and marking a shift from a colonial policy based on exploitation and "assimilation" (in which the colonial power either disregarded the faith of native populations or considered it was entrusted with a "civilizing mission" to gradually transform natives into fully-fledged citizens of the colonial nation) to a policy of "association" (in which the colonial power reconsidered its "civilizing mission" and paternalistically promoted its own understanding of native interests). In this sense, the term "indigenous" rose to the status of official category in colonial laws, rights, and duties applicable to the native population. See Véronique Dimier, "Politiques indigènes en France et en Grande-Bretagne dans les années 1930: aux origines coloniales des politiques de développement," *Politique et sociétés* 24, no. 1 (2005): 73–99, doi:10.7202/011496ar.

8 For instance, Mekki Bentahar, "L'aménagement du territoire du Maroc" (PhD diss., Université d'Aix-en-Provence, 1972); Jean Dethier, "Evolution of concepts of housing, urbanism, and country planning in a developing country: Morocco, 1900–1972," in *From Madina to Metropolis: Heritage and Change in the Near Eastern City*, ed. L. Carl Brown (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1973); Ménana Belkhader, "L'habitat rural dans la politique du 'ruralisme' au Maroc" (PhD diss., Université d'Aix-en-Provence, 1980); Mohamed Naciri, "Politique urbaine et 'politiques' de l'habitat au Maroc : incertitudes d'une stratégie," *MOM Éditions* 1, no. 1 (1985): 71–98.

9 SIPs were essentially credit institutions for Moroccan farmers. They could also help *fellahs* in case of natural disasters. After independence, they were renamed *Sociétés de crédit agricole et de prévoyance* (SCAP, agricultural credit and contingency societies).

10 Chloé Maurel, "Le programme d'enquêtes sociales de l'UNESCO pour apaiser les 'états de tension' dans les sociétés urbaines," in *Étranges voisins: Altérité et relations de proximité dans la ville*

the French authorities to "appease" an incipient crisis. The post-war period in colonized countries marks a reconfiguration of the rights that colonized populations were able to reclaim and, as a corollary, of colonial powers' attention to such claims.[11] Despite the promise of US support for post-war Moroccan independence expressed in parallel to the 1943 Allies' Casablanca Conference and the 1944 Proclamation of Independence by Moroccan national movements, the Free French leaders rejected any possible concession of overseas colonies at the 1944 Brazzaville Conference. As a result, like other colonial powers, the Protectorate had no other option than to gradually take initiatives for the development, planning, and housing of "indigenous" populations in cities, but now also in the countryside.[12]

Among the first such measures, the *Secteurs de modernisation du paysanat* (SMP, "peasantry modernization sectors")[13] launched in 1945 exemplified this new interest in the fellah. The SMP policy translated the proposals of two progressive colonial officers, Julien Couleau (1906–96, agronomist) and Jacques Berque (1910–95, scholar and colonial official, co-responsible for overseeing the Protectorate's program of reforms),[14] to promote a rapid and radical economic and social

depuis le XVIII^e siècle, ed. Judith Rainhorn and Didier Terrier (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2010). doi:10.4000/books.pur.127872.

11 Frederic Cooper, "Writing the history of development," *Journal of Modern European History* 8, no. 1 (2010): 9–12, doi:10.17104/1611–8944_2010_1_5; Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 25–32.

12 The period from 1943 to 1947, under residents-general Gabriel Puaux (June 1943–March 1946) and Eirik Labonne (March 1946–May 1947), marked a "progressive" interlude in the Protectorate's late history, preceding a violent repressive policy in the face of political instability and recurring claims for independence. See Daniel Rivet, "Des réformes portées par des réformistes? La parenthèse de 1944–1947 dans le protectorat français au Maroc," *Hespéris-Tamuda* 39, no. 2 (2001): 195–213; Susan Gilson Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge University Press, 2013): 148; Lazarev, *Les politiques agraires au Maroc*, 35–38.

13 For further contextualization of the SMP's policy and coeval French initiatives in Algeria (*Secteurs d'amélioration rurale*, SAR) and Tunisia (*Secteurs de modernisation du paysannat*, SMP [where *Paysannat* was spelled with a double "n"), see André Nouschi, "Modernisation au Maghreb et puissance française (1945–1948)," in *La puissance française en question, 1945–1949*, ed. Robert Frank and René Girault (Paris: Éditions de la Sorbonne, 1989): 255–270, doi: 10.4000/books.psorbonne.50458; Pierre Vigreux, "Le rôle des ingénieurs dans l'agriculture, les forêts et l'équipement rural au Maghreb (1890–1970)," in *L'ingénieur moderne au Maghreb (XIX^e-XX^e siècles)*, ed. Éric Gobe (Tunis: Institut de recherche sur le Maghreb contemporain, 2004), 145–158, doi: 10.4000/books.irmc.1524; Omar Bessaoud, "Les réformes agraires postcoloniales au Maghreb : un processus inachevé," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, no. 4 (2016): 115–137, doi:10.3917/rhmc.634.0115.

14 Rivet, "Des réformes portées par des réformistes?," 200.

development of the rural sector through the combined introduction of agricultural mechanization and social welfare facilities and services, to be provided by a constellation of agricultural cooperatives spread across the country.[15] As the Protectorate's major state-led measure to improve the living conditions of rural Moroccans, it also aimed at containing potential uprisings. Overseen by a new colonial body, the *Centrale d'équipement agricole du paysannat* (CEAP, "Center for the peasantry's public works in agriculture"), the policy's physical implementation envisaged the provision of built facilities and services to concentrate the action of public authorities in specific locations with the aim of creating a ripple effect in their respective surrounding rural areas. In contrast to the first SIP assistance actions, whose goal was to preserve the traditional structures of non-colonial agriculture, the SMP's initiators advocated a "shock strategy" to modernize the countryside, turning a merely subsistence-oriented native agriculture into an industrialized one, and a more effectively "associationist" colonial policy through the direct involvement of local native assemblies of notables in the proposed cooperatives. This experimentation represents the first attempt at "integrated development" of the Moroccan countryside insofar as it did not focus exclusively on the development of agricultural techniques and infrastructures, but on what Couleau and Berque called the "rural ensemble," i.e. rural habitat and small infrastructural work. In doing so, the SMP introduced a new understanding of the notion of *mise en valeur*,[16] for which rural development could no longer be reduced to technical progress, but also considered political, economic, geographic, and social factors, etc., focusing its effort on specific and well-delimited areas.[17] This renewed conception will stand as a reference point for all future experiments in ruralism analyzed hereinbelow.

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15 Jacques Berque and Julien Couleau, "Vers la modernisation du fellah marocain," *Bulletin économique et social du Maroc*, no. 26 (1945): 18–26; Fernand Joly, "La modernisation rurale au Maroc," *Annales de géographie* 55, no. 299 (1946), doi:10.3406/geo.1946.12596; Louis Papy, "Une réalisation française au Maroc : Les secteurs de modernisation rurale," *Cahiers d'Outre-Mer* 9, no. 36 (1956): 325–349; Bessaoud, "Les réformes agraires postcoloniales au Maghreb."

16 The French notion of *mise en valeur*, which broadly translates as "improvement" and reads as "modernization" or "development," was an understatement upon which the French colonial discourse built its allegedly "natural" right to exploit and bring into the global market natural and human resources of their colonial holdings. See Dimier, "Politiques indigènes"; Hélène Vacher, "From *mise en valeur* to cooperation – Pont-et-Chaussées engineers overseas and the rise of planning expertise in the twentieth century," *Planning Perspectives* 34, no. 1 (2019): 91–113, doi:10.1080/02665433.2017.1352476.

17 Will Davis Swearingen, *Moroccan Mirages: Agrarian Dreams and Deceptions, 1912–1986* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Tenzon, "Village design," 198–201.

This renewal of the Protectorate's approach to rural development also translated into rural housing and planning policies. In fact, until 1942, the colony's housing policy was overseen by the *Office chérifien de l'habitat européen* ("Sherifian bureau of European housing"), whose renaming in 1944 to *Office chérifien de l'habitat* already testified of a shift towards Moroccan target beneficiaries. Further renamed *Service de l'urbanisme* ("Town Planning Department") in 1946, it was entrusted to the direction of French architect and planner Michel Écochard until 1953.[18] During this so-called "Écochard period," favorable economic conditions[19]—paired to the eligibility of investments in French territories in North Africa for Marshall Plan funding[20] and to the injection of substantial funds linked to the presence of French and American military bases[21]—made significant state investment in housing and infrastructure possible. Within this context, the *Service de l'urbanisme* engaged in the study of vernacular housing, but also in the development of small rural centers.[22] A number of village development schemes were drawn up and implemented in order to promote the decentralization of food processing industries to the countryside and thereby contribute to containing rural exodus towards the mushrooming coastal conurbation stretching from Rabat to Casablanca.[23] The establishment of these centers formed an initial territorial network from which many future rural development projects would later be based.

18 Michel Écochard (1905–85) was an architect and urban planner who graduated from the École des Beaux-Arts de Paris in 1931. In Morocco, he was designated Director of the Urban Planning Department from 1947 to 1952 by resident-general Eirik Labonne. As the main representative of the *Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne* (CIAMs, international congresses of modern architecture) in Morocco and a co-founding member of ATBAT-Afrique, he was one of the most influential architects in the history of post-war architecture and territorial planning in Morocco. Monique Eleb, "An alternative to functionalist universalism: Écochard, Candilis and ATBAT-Afrique," in *Anxious Modernisms: Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture*, ed. Sarah Williams Goldhagen and Réjean Legault (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 55–73.

19 Samir Amin, *The Maghreb in the Modern World: Algeria, Tunisia. Morocco* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1970): 204.

20 Gérard Bossuat, "Chapitre XIV. La France d'Outre-Mer dans le plan Marshall," *La France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne 1944–1954, Volume I* (Vincennes: Institut de la gestion publique et du développement économique, 1997): 521–562. doi:10.4000/books.igpde.2716.

21 Amin, *The Maghreb in the Modern World*, 167.

22 Katherine Marshall Johnson, *Urbanization in Morocco* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1972), 20–21; Dethier, "Evolution of concepts of housing"; Tenzon, "Village design."

23 Robert Forichon, "L'aménagement des campagnes marocaines," *L'Architecture d'aujourd'hui*, no. 35 (1951): 31–33.

However, it was not until after Moroccan independence that ruralism actually gained prominence[24] as a means to steer agricultural development and the potential agrarian reforms expected from the restitution of colonial-owned lands.[25] In fact, in parallel to the ongoing gradual restitution of colonial-owned lands, the 1960s—the so-called "countryside decade"[26]—witnessed the establishment of a set of public bodies, international agreements, and regulations aimed at "modernizing the countryside," thereby reflecting the keen interest of the newly independent Moroccan state in rural development. To be sure, independence was by no means a clean break. The *Convention franco-marocaine sur la coopération administrative et technique* ("Franco-Moroccan agreement on administrative and technical cooperation," ratified in 1957 and further adapted in 1972, 1984, and 2003) indefinitely postponed the Moroccan state's public administration and economy efforts to cut loose from French expertise and influence. In the 1960s and the early 1970s, "The machinery continued to plod along, using the ideas, policies, programs, and laws of the pre-independence era, […] Moroccans accepted the French administrative system almost in its entirety."[27] Post-independence architecture, rural planning, and development methods remained rooted in the historical legacies of the colonial period. For instance, after independence, the SMPs were transformed into *Centres de travaux* and would stand at the core of independent Morocco's first major rural modernization project: *Opération labour* ("operation plow"). This campaign was conceived of as the first step towards an ambitious agrarian reform and the massive mechanization of the agricultural sector.[28]

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24 As will be the case in many other African countries: with the standard rural schools for Algerian Kabylia within the frame of President Ben Bella's *autogestion* [self-management] policy (Sheila Crane, "Algerian socialism and the architecture of autogestion," *Architectural Histories* 7, no. 1 [2019]: 1–19, doi:10.5334/ah.345); with Fathy's New Gourna village in Egypt (Timothy Mitchel, *Rule of Experts. Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002]); with Ghana's resettlement of submergeable villages (Viviana d'Auria and Bruno De Meulder, "Unsettling landscapes: the Volta river project. new settlements between tradition and transition," *OASE Journal of Architecture*, no. 82 [2010]: 115–127; Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution*, 83–89); with Zambia's village regrouping schemes (Petros Phokaides, "Rural networks and planned communities: Doxiadis Associates' plans for rural settlements in post-independence Zambia," *The Journal of Architecture* 23, no. 3 [2018]: 471–497, doi:10.1080/13602365.2018.1458044); with 1970s Algeria's "1,000 villages" program under President Boumedienne (Djaffar Lesbet, *Les 1 000 villages socialistes en Algérie* [Paris, Algiers: Office des publications universitaires, Syros, 1984]).

25 Paul Pascon, "Types d'habitat et problèmes d'aménagement du territoire au Maroc," *Revue de géographie du Maroc* 15 (1968): 96–98.

26 Claisse, "Stratégies d'aménagement."

27 Johnson, *Urbanization in Morocco*, 40–45.

28 Among the writings analyzing *Opération labour*, see for instance Swearingen's thesis ("Moroccan Mirages") or the reports realized at that time: Jean Le Coz, "L'Opération-labour au Maroc: trac-

A pivotal moment in intensifying the rural modernization process was the establishment of the *communes rurales* ("rural municipalities," a local administrative division) and the related issuing of the first planning regulations dedicated to rural areas: the 1960 "*dahir* ["decree"] on ruralism." Until then, the correlative 1952 *dahir* on urban planning indistinctly applied to both rural and urban areas.[29] As a result, in 1961, the *Bureau central des études rurales* (BCER, "central bureau for rural studies") was created as a new administrative division within the town planning department in parallel to—but autonomous from—the *Bureau central des études* (BCE, "central bureau of studies").[30] While the BCE dealt mostly with urban issues, the BCER was entrusted with preparing rural development plans for small and growing rural agglomerations, usually in agreement and coordination with agricultural *mise en valeur* services on which the WFP's Rural Housing Program would later rely.[31]

The creation of the BCER responded to an emerging awareness of rural areas' specific planning challenges and echoed with similar concerns both in mainland France[32] and within the international architectural and territorial planning

teur et sous-développement," *Méditerranée* 2, no. 3 (1961), doi:10.3406/medit.1961.1007; Herman J. Van Wersch, "Rural development in Morocco: 'Opération labour'," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 17, no. 1 (1968): 33–49; Zakaria Kadiri, "Imprévisible et bricolée: La modernisation rurale et agricole au Maroc," *Hespéris-Tamuda* 55, no. 4 (2020): 173–196.

29 Belkhader, "L'habitat rural," 2–3.

30 BCER, *Ruralisme* (Rabat: Ministère des Travaux Publics, 1962); BCER, *Le Ruralisme au Maroc* (Rabat: Ministère des Travaux Publics, 1965); BCER, *Rôle du BCER dans le développement des agglomérations rurales* (unpublished typescript, Rabat: Ministère des Travaux Publics, 1967).

31 The *Office national d'irrigation* (ONI, national irrigation service, established in 1960) for irrigated land and the *Office national de la modernisation rurale* (ONMR, national service of rural modernization, established in 1962) for dry land. These two institutions were created one year earlier as part of the 1960–64 five-year plan and later merged in 1965 to form the *Office de mise en valeur agricole* (OMVA) and then the various *Offices régionaux de mise en valeur agricole* (ORMVA) for each of the regions. See Mohamed Naciri, "Les expériences de modernisation de l'agriculture au Maroc," *Revue de Géographie du Maroc*, no. 11 (1967): 102–114.

32 The mutual correlations between theorization about rural planning in France (by authors such as Gravier, Leroy, Noilhan, Bardet, etc.) and in Morocco would deserve further exploration. Not only did France witness a revival of the ruralist discourse in the postwar decades (see Stanislas Henrion, "Généalogie du ruralisme, quatre histoires de champs de 1850 à 2012, la construction de la ruralité beauceronne" [PhD diss., Université Paris-Est, Istituto Universitario di architettura di Venezia, 2014]), experts returning from Morocco also refined their acquired skills and techniques in French regional planning (Élie Mauret, *Pour un équilibre des villes et des campagnes* [Paris: Dunod, 1974]).

scene.[33] For instance, preventing the dispersal of the rural population in order to concentrate the state's action on specific settlements appeared then as a distinctively different issue from typical urban ones such as dealing with the saturation of buildable land and with overcrowding, and therefore required appropriate solutions. In their first published report, BCER experts spelled out the challenge of ruralism as falling under three objectives: (a) controlling the development of small rural settlements forecasted to undergo rapid growth (with the BCER being above all tasked with defining the localization of new facilities and infrastructures); (b) reducing rural exodus through the improvement of rural living conditions; and (c) "helping peasants to cross the frontier between the old and new civilizations," i.e. promoting new farming techniques to foster the transition towards a market-oriented and mechanized agriculture.[34] These ambitions—which were quite illusory given the minimal investments granted to the tiny BCER team—foreshadowed the objectives by which the CERF would be assigned with a larger endowment a few years later (see Section 3.1).

2.2 Community development and the *Promotion nationale*

The post-war period also witnessed a radical reconsideration of top-down approaches to development, with the emergence of methods advocating "thinking small." Within this context, Community Development (CD)—a development method that promotes bottom-up participation and local initiative of target groups in aid programs—best reflected this paradigm shift on the international stage.[35]

As a result of the perceived success and acclaim of a new generation of CD experiments in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United Nations promoted the expansion of these development methods to the then Third World, and especially its rural areas.[36] From 1958 to 1965, right after independence, the UN's Expanded

33 See for instance Nelson Mota. "Dwelling in the middle landscape: Rethinking the architecture of rural communities at CIAM 10," *Volume 1. Re-Humanizing Architecture*, ed. Ákos Moravánszky and Judith Hopfengärtner (Berlin, Boston: Birkhäuser, 2017): 311–324, doi:10.1515/9783035608113–020.

34 BCER, *Ruralisme*, 3

35 Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).

36 Chauveau traces the origins of CD to a first shift in the British and the French Empires' colonial policies from the 1920s onwards, with efforts to involve their colonies' local populations in allegedly "participative" governance bodies and processes. Immerwahr explores how this approach resonated with interwar US development theories and experiments inherited from the New Deal and the Tennessee Valley Authority. The experiment conducted in British ruled India in the early 1940s by architect Albert Mayer marked a turning point in the formalization of the CD approach and its



Fig. 1: Post-war rural development and the emergence of the Rural Housing Program © B. Clark.

Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA, merged with the Special Fund and renamed UNDP in 1965) sent multiple CD missions to Morocco to facilitate the adoption of a Community Development policy in the country.[37] Within this context, a trial experiment was jointly developed by Morocco's Town Planning Department and UN experts in Lalla Mimouna, as "a pilot project for the UN proposal of a national framework of community development in Morocco."[38] Eventually, this project remained a virtually isolated experiment.[39]

Subsequently, the Ministry of Interior gradually took over the propagation of CD initiatives in Morocco,[40] adopting a very different conception from the bottom-up and participative approach advocated by the United Nations. H. Van der Kloet, a UNDP expert in Morocco in 1967–68, notes for instance how the Ministry of Interior made opportunistic use of the CD approach, to meet its own political agenda and to gain the support of local populations for governmental projects.[41]

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adoption by US as well as UN international aid bodies. The UN's promotion of the CD approach in Africa was channeled through the UNECA–Economic Commission for Africa established in Addis Ababa in 1958. See Jean-Pierre Chauveau, "Participation paysanne et populisme bureaucratique: essai d'histoire et de sociologie de la culture du développement," in *Les associations paysannes en Afrique: organisation et dynamiques*, ed. Jean-Pierre Jacob and Philippe Lavigne Delville (Paris: Karthala, 1994), 26–60; Immerwarh, *Thinking Small*; Maurice Milhaud. "Le développement communautaire: instrument de développement économique et social en Afrique," *Revue Tiers-Monde* 3, no. 9–10 (1962): 313–320, doi:10.3406/tiers.1962.1081.

37 See the UN experts' successive reports: Jean B. Richardot, *Rapport sur la préparation d'un programme de développement communautaire* (United Nations draft report, 1958); Maurice Méker, *Proposition pour la définition et la mise en œuvre d'une politique de développement communautaire au Maroc* (United Nations draft report, 1964); Fouad R. Faraj, *4 ans de développement communautaire au Maroc* (United Nations end of mission report, 1964); Adrianus Kater, "Community Development in Marokko: Verslag van een poging van de verenigde naties om Community Development in Marokko te introduceren" (PhD diss., University of Amsterdam, 1967). Tenzon's thesis also provides important biographical information on the various experts involved in Morocco during this period. See Tenzon, "Village design," 264–319.

38 Michele Tenzon and Axel Fisher, "Foreign aid for rural development: village design and planning in post-independence Morocco," *Planning Perspectives* 37, no. 5 (2022): 949–971, doi:10.1080/02665433.2022.2116594.

39 Méker, *Proposition pour la définition*; Hendrik Van der Kloet, *Some aspect of Community development in Morocco* (UNDP draft report, 1968, in United Nations Archives, United Nations Registry Section 1946–1979, S-0175–1475; Tenzon and Fisher, "Foreign aid."

40 On the role of the Ministry of Interior in development projects in the 1960s, see Michel Rousset, "Le rôle du ministère de l'Intérieur et sa place au sein de l'administration marocaine," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 7 (1968): 91–106; Johnson, *Urbanization in Morocco*, 10–11, 91–92.

41 Van der Kloet, *Some aspect of community development.* His concerns are also shared by other experts in mission in Morocco in October 1967; see for instance Marc Nerfin, *Mission to Morocco in connection with WFP assistance to regional development* (draft report of a mission for UN/WFP, October 1967), in United Nations Archives, United Nations Registry Section 1946–1979, S-0175–1472–

This became most apparent from 1965 onwards, when the CD method really took off in Morocco. Weakened by the country's political tensions and the 1965 Casablanca riots, King Hassan II launched his first major nationwide CD program to strengthen the sense of national belonging throughout the country: the "days of youth," which became in 1967 the project of *Relance communale* ("municipal revival"). Directed by a community development department within the Ministry of Interior (at a time when controversial General Oufkir became Minister of Interior and the department was acquiring more and more influence within the state), "the aim of this operation was to encourage local people to take part in [public] works to improve the infrastructure of their municipalities,"[42] but above all to reinforce the central administration's control over newly created local authorities (the *communes rurales*). Within this context, CD doctrine assumed in Morocco the role of a particularly effective counterinsurgency tool,[43] with the population's bottom-up participation being used for the dual purpose of "development" and addressing other forms of crisis (slum housing, floods, etc.) that the state proved unable to handle through conventional top-down approaches. As such, rural development combined with a lagging agrarian reform represented an opportunity to prevent the development of revolts in the countryside in the short term. Moreover, from the state's perspective, it also allowed the consolidation of then crucially needed alliances between centers and peripheries.

Prefiguring the WFP's Rural Housing Program, during the 1965–67 period, the *Relance communale* and other CD actions in Morocco mainly targeted the provision of housing, a "classic" provision of CD programs.[44] The Ministry of Interior (and particularly Maâti Jorio, the Ministry's Secretary General [1965–71], who acted as an intermediary between the Moroccan government and international development organizations) favored "immediate and visible action" for the local population.[45] The state's social action had to be made as manifest and as tangible as possible, and habitat provided a particularly good opportunity for this.

In parallel to CD experiments, the underlying principle of "self-help" also gained relevance in post-independence Morocco's public action when the 1961 *Pro-*

0007. Significantly, Arnstein's seminal paper published nearly in the same period spoke out against similar sorts of "manipulative" approaches to citizen participation: Sherry R. Arnstein, "A ladder of citizen participation," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 35, no. 4 (1969): 216–224, doi:10.1080/01944366908977225.

42 Ministry of Interior, *Maroc, pays de développement communautaire* (Rabat: Ministry of Interior, 1969): 8–9.

43 As had been the case in the Philippines. See Immerwahr, *Thinking Small*, 109–131.

44 Immerwahr, *Thinking Small*; Kater, "Community development in Marokko."

45 Nerfin, *Mission to Morocco*, 1.

motion rurale—soon renamed *Promotion nationale*—was launched under the impulse of King Hassan II (crowned the same year).[46] This large national rural development program aimed at mobilizing the country's allegedly "unskilled" and underemployed workforce in the construction of development projects. The underlying idea—then termed the "*pré-mise en valeur*" ["prerequisite to modernization"]—was to lay the groundwork for future development actions by the state.[47] *Promotion nationale* workers carried out a variety of tasks: erosion control through reforestation, small-scale irrigation work, road and path development, construction of schools and community buildings, etc., but also large-scale housing projects.[48]

Significantly, *Promotion nationale* workers were paid half in cash and the rest in food supply (wheat) provided by USAID,[49] foreshadowing the food-for-work method central to WFP-supported rural development projects (see Section 3.2). In both cases, this mechanism was explicitly a privileged means for the Moroccan State to contain rural exodus; according to its instigators, it was indeed a matter of "keeping people where they are"[50] by putting them to work. The *Promotion nationale* policy was directly linked to the ongoing diplomatic rapprochement between the United States and Morocco since independence, and the provision of food rations through USAID (created in 1961, the same year as the *Promotion nationale*)

46 In his memoirs, UN expert J. B. Richardot claims that the *Promotion nationale* was directly inspired by the aforementioned 1958–65 CD mission to Morocco he had initially supervised. See Jean B. Richardot, "Le Maroc: Savoir compter d'abord sur soi," *Une vie à l'ONU. Un français-américain citoyen du monde* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997): 175–195.

47 Blaque Belair, "La Promotion nationale marocaine. Bilan en 1963," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 2 (1963): 161–177; *La Promotion nationale au Maroc* (Rabat: Délégation générale à la Promotion nationale et au Plan, 1964); 99.

48 The largest housing project built as part of the *Promotion nationale* was the Daoudiate district in the north of Marrakech (1962–65). See *La Promotion nationale au Maroc*; Nadya Rouizem, "The modernization of raw earth in Morocco: Past experiments and present," *History of Construction Cultures, volume 2*, ed. João Mascarenhas-Mateus and Ana Paula Pires (London: CRC Press, 2021): 585–589, doi:10.1201/9781003173434–188; Ben Clark, "Comment 'devenir traditionnel'? Premiers projets et espoirs de l'architecte Jean Hensens (1929–2006) au Maroc," *CLARA Architecture/Recherche*, no. 8 (2023): 170-203.

49 "From 1961 to 1966, the PN built some 10,000 peasant houses, 2,400 classrooms and 1,400 teachers' houses" (Ministry of Interior. *Note sur le programme d'habitat rural dans le cadre d'opération de mise en valeur régionale.* Présenté par le gouvernement du Maroc au Programme alimentaire mondial, Morocco: Ministry of Interior, 1968, 15, translated from French by the author).

50 "[…] one should not underestimate the tendency to see work and its remuneration, rather than the outcome of that work, as an immediate means of keeping people where they are" (Ministry of Interior. *Note sur le programme d'habitat rural*, 15, translated from French by the author).

was made possible by the US's grain surplus.[51] The US administration did not hesitate, in the midst of the Cold War, to take over from French aid for fear that former colonized states, plagued by economic and social difficulties, would turn to the countries of the Eastern bloc. Moreover, this American aid was particularly welcome from Morocco's perspective, as bilateral relations with France were even more affected during the 1960s by the Algerian war (1954–62), the laboratory of Algerian socialism established by the Oujda clan in the homonymous Moroccan border town, and the scandal surrounding the disappearance of Moroccan left-wing leader Ben Barka.[52]

2.3 Technical assistance and *coopération*

After US president J.F. Kennedy's March 1961 speech to Congress proclaiming a "Decade of Development," his September address to the UN General Assembly proposed to designate the 1960s as the "UN Decade of Development." Several new international actors (UNDP, UNICEF, IBRD, FAO, USAID, WFP, etc.) entered Morocco and directly or indirectly had a major impact on rural development projects. During the first years of independence, international cooperation and financing agreements were quickly signed, allowing the Moroccan government to intensify its *mise en valeur* projects in rural areas initiated under the Protectorate in the hope of associating them with an ambitious agrarian reform policy that never materialized. One of the key international actors from 1958 onwards was certainly the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which later became the World Bank), from 1958 onwards, when Morocco joined the organization. One significant example of the IBRD's activities in rural development policies in Morocco was its three-month mission conducted in 1964, which recommended (in addition to economic recovery and to a warning against radical land reform) investing in rural development but, unlike UN-supported CD actions, favored infrastructural works and promoted private investment. This mission had an immense impact, since the country's next 1965–67 three-year plan adopted the World Bank's

51 *La Promotion nationale au Maroc.* In addition to USAID, Morocco also received donations at that time from American charity organizations such as Catholic Relief Services and the American Red Cross.

52 El-Mostafa Azzou, "Les relations entre le Maroc et les États-Unis: Regards sur la période 1943–1970," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, no. 1 (2006): 105–116, doi:10.3917/gmcc.221.0105.

recommendations almost in their entirety,[53] marking a liberal shift with respect to the initial orientations of the previous 1960–64 five-year plan. While the latter adopted an "industrialist" approach,[54] the 1965–67 plan restored agricultural development as a top priority[55] and escalated three areas in line with World Bank's recommendations: agriculture modernization, cadre training, and tourism development.[56] These three priorities, with tourism appearing as a newcomer,[57] would define the future framework of the Rural Habitat Program in the next plan (1968–72) and the various objectives of the CERF's studies (see Section 3).

In addition, a new type of actor, which we refer to broadly as *coopérants* (i.e. skilled foreign development aid volunteers), played a very important role in the implementation of rural development policies. It was in fact at this time that the figure of the technical assistant in architecture and urban planning linked to bilateral conventions or non-governmental cooperation agencies was structured in the Global South.[58] Foreign semi-public organizations made it possible to recruit foreign assistance, such as SCET-Coopération in France (which became SCET-International in 1969),[59] VITA—Volunteers in Technical Assistance (1963–2005)—, and the Peace Corps program in the United States.[60] In addition, international agencies

53 IBRD, *The economic development of Morocco: report of a mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Government of Morocco* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966); Swearingen, "Moroccan Mirages," 159.

54 Samir Amin, "Le plan quinquennal marocain (1960–1964) : orientation et bilan," in *L'économie du Maghreb (2). Les perspectives d'avenir* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1966): 105–152, doi: 10.3917/minui.amins.1966.02.

55 "Le Plan triennal marocain (1965–1967)," *Maghreb – Machrek* 4, no. 10 (1965): 49–54. doi:10.3917/machr1.010.0049.

56 Amin, *The Maghreb in the Modern World*, 228.

57 In 1966, Morocco and Tunisia were the first countries to receive World Bank loans specifically targeting tourism development. The bank famously pursued this strategy from the early 1980s onwards around the Luxor archaeological site in Egypt. See Donald E. Hawkins and Shaun Mann, "The World Bank's role in tourism development," *Annals of Tourism Research* 43, no. 2 (2007): 348–363, doi:10.1016/j.annals.2006.10.004; Mitchel. *Rule of Experts*, 196–197.

58 John Friedmann, "Crossing borders: do planning ideas travel?," *Crossing Borders*, ed. Patsy Healy and Robert Upton (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010): 337–352, doi:10.4324/9780203857083–23; Marco Chitti, "L'assistance technique Nord-Sud en urbanisme: circulation de modèles ou circulation d'urbanistes ?," *Les Annales de la recherche urbaine*, no. 113 (2018): 66–77, doi:10.3406/aru.2018.3273.

59 On the role of SCET in Morocco, see Michèle Jolé, "Nature et fonction d'un outil de planification, le schéma-directeur de Rabat-Salé" (PhD diss., Institut d'Urbanisme de Paris, Université de Paris Val-de-Marne, 1982).

60 About the Peace Corps' early presence in Morocco, see the testimony of the agency's former director in Morocco (1963–64): Frederic C. Thomas, "The Peace Corps in Morocco," *The Middle East Journal* 19, no. 3 (1965): 273–283.

(e.g. UNDP) sent their own experts to either report on or sometimes directly implement development projects. The landscape of planning expertise in newly independent Morocco was indeed largely shaped by international organizations, public or semi-public, and by the technical departments within the state administration in charge of planning, which were essentially made up of a foreign workforce (still essentially French at the time).[61]

The presence of these international experts within the frame of four major rural development programs implemented with the assistance of the UNDP/FAO underway at the end of the decade[62] testifies to the experience that Morocco had acquired in attracting foreign aid and expertise.[63] As Grigori Lazarev, once a FAO expert agronomist in the 1960s in Morocco, explains, "at that time, the FAO had become an essential partner in the production of concepts" and in the way rural development was conceived in Morocco.[64] Nonetheless, the housing issue was still secondary in these FAO/UNDP-assisted projects preceding the WFP Rural Housing Program (see Section 3.1).[65]

3 The rural housing program

An early *Promotion nationale* report encouraged "a more diversified international aid, thanks to the various surpluses available to many more privileged nations."[66]

61 Jolé, "Nature et fonction," 261–265.

62 The DERRO project (*Développement rural du Rif occidental*, the first FAO program in Morocco), the Sebou Project, the Souss project, and the PRAM (*Projet de revalorisation de l'agriculture en sec au Maroc*) project for the dry land areas.

63 The "Sebou Mission" (1963–68) was a preliminary study envisaging a major rural development project to be funded by the World Bank, based on the construction of irrigation infrastructure in the Sebou basin. Financed by the UNDP, with technical assistance from the FAO, this study is widely considered to be the most important of Morocco's four development projects of the period as it involved enormous funding and expertise (both foreign and Moroccan), resulting in numerous detailed studies. It is also often described as the most ambitious rural development project in the post-independence era (since it was based on the reorganization and revalorization of the local institution of the *jemaa*, as well as on large-scale agrarian land reorganization). Grigori Lazarev, *Ruralité et changement social. Études sociologiques* (Rabat: Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences humaines, 2014); Lazarev, *Les politiques agraires au Maroc*, 67–95; Tenzon and Fisher, "Foreign aid."

64 Lazarev, *Les politiques agraires au Maroc*, 186. See, for example, the importance of Raymond Aubrac's presence in Morocco as FAO advisor from 1958 to 1962.

65 Ministry of Interior. *Note sur le programme d'habitat rural.*

66 *La Promotion nationale*, 133.

Three years later, when USAID considered reducing its donations to Morocco,[67] the Ministry of Interior turned to the WFP—already involved in Morocco as early as 1963[68]—as an alternative source of foreign assistance for housing development.[69]

This request concomitantly occurred with King Hassan II's revival of the Protectorate's dam policy and objective to irrigate a million hectares by the year 2000,[70] and represented an opportunity to extend the government's CD actions (*Relance communale* project, see Section 2.2) to all the country's *communes rurales.* Within this framework, the BCER quickly drafted a rural development program

67 See Nerfin. *Mission to Morocco*, 1. USAID eventually maintained its aid in 1967 (Azzou, "Les relations entre le Maroc et les États-Unis," 114). The period of the Rural Housing Program then exemplified the two approaches of rations-based assistance for social and economic development at the time. The first, by USAID, did not require that the rations be used for a given project. The second, by the WFP, was in support of a specific program agreed upon with the government, based on predefined, time-bound objectives (Dollinger, "Le Programme alimentaire mondial," 280–281; John D. Shaw, *The UN World Food Programme and the Development of Food Aid* [London: Springer, 2001]: 40–41).

68 Since 1963, the WFP was involved in the *Projet de développement économique de la région rurale du Rif occidental* (DERRO, "Economic development project for the rural region of Western Rif"). A food aid project to develop the Western Rif region by combating erosion, improving land use, and modernizing agriculture. At the same period, WFP also became involved in a school meal program. See archives of United Nations, S-0175–1472–0007.

69 The constellation of people involved would require much further development regarding their expertise, provenience, political and ideological leanings, and capacities. Still, we can list some of the key figures who made this request to the WFP in Morocco possible: Addeke Boerma, WFP Director who visited the Moroccan government in April 1967 (see Nerfin, *Mission to Morocco*, 1); Suzanne Vervalcke, a UN expert detached to Morocco by the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who actively participated in the implementation of the request to the WFP in collaboration with A. Masson and M. Jorio (Masson, *Mes années de coopération*); Hendrik Van Der Kloet, Resident Representative of UNDP in Rabat (1967–68) and Community development expert; Patrice Blaque-Belair, the FAO expert detached to Morocco for the *Promotion nationale* at the time; and Arnauld Haudry de Soucy, assigned FAO/UN/WFP coordinator in Morocco in 1968.

70 In 1968, King Hassan II launched the policy of building great dams with a view to irrigating one million hectares by the year 2000, and which announced, following the great floods of the Ziz in 1965, the construction of the Hassan Addakhil dam in Ksar Es Souk (today Errachidia) in the Ziz valley and the El Mansour Eddahbi dam in Ouarzazate at the beginning of the Drâa valley (Ahmed Benhadi, "La politique marocaine des barrages," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 14 [1975]: 275–294). This major operation pursued a concern that was not new to Morocco, a country regularly affected by episodes of drought with dramatic consequences (including the great famine of 1945), nevertheless, the policy of large dams is unprecedented by the investments of the state. This policy was already in place for the previous three-year plan (1965–67), which aimed at intensifying agricultural development and concentrating investments in these areas. However, it was not until the following five-year plan that rural development and the issue of rural development really became a priority for the State (Naciri, "Politiques urbaines").

in 1967 to be presented to the UN/FAO experts in charge of evaluating the proposal.[71] The WFP's Rural Housing Program initially targeted the construction/renovation of 90,000 dwellings (as well as small facilities and infrastructures) in 500 worksites across the country in five years, using assisted self-help construction and CD methods. The final agreement eventually focused the planned actions on agricultural development zones (mainly irrigated).[72]

3.1 The constitution of the CERF

Within this context—the preparation of the 1968–72 five-year plan, the rise of CD methods, massive and regular recourse to international expertise and development agencies (IBRD, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, etc.), and growing interest in "ruralism" (e.g. the BCER)—the preparation of the Rural Habitat Program represented a pivotal moment. What the French engineer and CERF director Alain Masson would call a "new spirit" in spatial planning policies[73] was in part the result of the 1967 transfer of the Town Planning Department[74] from the Ministry of Public Works into a "super-ministry"[75] of Interior (further strengthening its power within

71 Negotiations were conducted from April 1967 to September 1968, between the Moroccan government (led mostly by Maati Jorio and Alain Masson, a French engineer and the CERF director) and the international experts. The UNDP/WFP preparation missions in Morocco included the September-October mission, headed by Victoria Marrama (UN expert), and the December 1967 mission in which Jacques Bugnicourt and Marc Nerfin took part. The missions included experts from UNICEF, FAO, UNDP, and WFP. See the United Nations archive files "United Nations Registry Section (1946–1979)": S-0175–1475; S-0175–1472–0007; S-0175–1472–0008; S-0175–1457–0007.

72 The final agreement between the UN/FAO WFP and the Moroccan government was reached in September 1968. See WFP, *Plan d'opérations entre le gouvernement du Maroc et le Programme alimentaire mondial ONU/FAO relatif à une assistance du PAM pour un Programme de construction et d'amélioration de l'habitat rural dans le cadre d'opérations du développement régional (Maroc 416)* (WFP final report, September 1968), in United Nations Archives, United Nations Registry Section 1946–1979, S-0175–1472–0008.

73 Alain Masson, "Le nouvel esprit des études entreprises en matière d'aménagement d'urbanisme et d'habitat" (paper presented during a conference at the *Institut technique du bâtiment et des travaux publics*, Casablanca, 1971). Moroccan National Archives (Alain Masson Collection, folder no. 32); Henri Coing, Michèle Jolé and Hélène Lamicq, *La politique de recherche urbaine française dans le Tiers-monde* (Paris: Institut d'urbanisme de Paris, 1978).

74 In 1967, the Ministry of Public Works' *Circonscription de l'urbanisme et de l'habitat* was transferred to the Ministry of Interior and became the *Direction de l'urbanisme et de l'habitat* (DUH).

75 K. M. Johnson refers to the Ministry of Interior as a "super-ministry" to emphasize the power that this ministry held under General Oufkir, who controlled the national police system, local governments, and, from 1967 onwards, urban and rural planning (Johnson, *Urbanization in Morocco*, 10).

the government) headed with an iron fist by the infamous General Oufkir.[76] Just a few months before this transfer of jurisdiction, which corresponded to the return of planning issues to a more political ministry (as it had been during the "Écochard period" [see Section 2.1]),[77] a new research center was created: the *Centre d'expérimentation, de recherche et de formation* (CERF).[78] This interdisciplinary research center, mainly composed of foreign experts, was a sort of think tank within the Ministry and the nerve center of research in architecture, ruralism, and urbanism between 1967 and 1973. The CERF was in charge of radically rethinking spatial planning and housing studies, methods, and regulations.[79] In short, the CERF had the very broad mission of "defining standards and models, experimenting with materials, techniques and construction methods, studying the cost of construction, and proposing priorities" in order to "combine the reduction of construction costs with the massive use of the *Promotion nationale* and Community Development."[80]

Unlike other UN-related foreign development aid organizations, the WFP relied on institutions already locally active for the implementation of its supported

76 General Oufkir is well known for his responsibility in Morocco's repressive policies during the 1960s, for being the one who, once he became Minister of Interior, had control over the entire Moroccan government, and especially for having participated in the two failed military putsches (1971 and 1972) against Hassan II. General Oufkir was assassinated in 1972 following the second attempted putsch.

77 Naciri, "Politique urbaine," 89.

78 CERF was created on 8 August 1967 within the Ministry of Interior, as part of a new organization called the *Direction de l'aménagement du territoire* (DAT). A few months later, on 14 November 1967, the DAT became the *Division de l'urbanisme et de l'habitat* (DUH), when responsibility was transferred from the Ministry of Public Works to the Ministry of Interior. See Rousset, "Le rôle du ministère de l'Intérieur," 98–99; Alain Masson, "Urbanisation et habitat du grand nombre. L'approche marocaine," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 11 (1972): 105–143; Dethier, "Evolution of Concepts of Housing"; Alain Masson, "Mes années de coopération au Maroc… Les plus formatrices de ma vie professionnelle" (unpublished manuscript, 1982). The most complete description of the actions for which the CERF was mandated can be found in the following draft report: Ministry of Interior, *Une action: le programme d'habitat rural assisté par le PAM* (Rabat: Ministry of Interior, 1968). In 1972, the CERF received the prestigious Sir Patrick Abercrombie Urban Planning Award from the International Union of Architects.

79 As J. Hensens (a Belgian architect who was one of the linchpins of the CERF) noted, the CERF was at the end of the 1960s "the central body for analysis, reflection, proposals, and programming in the field of housing and development of urban and rural planning" in Morocco (Jean Hensens, "Le CERF" [unpublished manuscript, 1972]. Translated from French by the author).

80 Ministry of Interior, *Projet de développement rural 1968–1972. Demande d'assistance adressée au Programme alimentaire mondial ONU/FAO* (Rabat: Ministry of Interior, 1967), translated from French by the author.

development projects[81] since it did not dispose of sufficient nor appropriate staff of its own, which however "allowed its selective appropriation by undeveloped countries."[82] The establishment of a "development group"[83] within the Moroccan State (i.e. a platform for liaison between state policy and international organizations) like the CERF was therefore necessary in order to facilitate the WFP program as well as other development projects requiring international assistance (e.g. from the World Bank).[84] "It was accepted as a principle [...] at the CERF, that the success of any new initiative in planning policy depended on the ability to attract high-level foreign experts to work in teams with their Moroccan colleagues."[85] Back in 1964, UN expert for community development Maurice Méker had already recommended the creation of a *Centre d'étude, de documentation et de formation à l'action communautaire* ("Study, documentation, and training center in community development"), foreshadowing the creation of the CERF.[86]

Without elaborating in detail on the CERF's complex and evolving composition, it is important to note that it virtually brought together the entire range of technical assistance forms (including UN experts, French *coopérants militaires*, SCET-Coopération employees, young Peace Corps graduates, VITA program engineers, etc.) as well as foreign experts hired directly by the Moroccan state. This is partly because the CERF had inherited a favorable environment in which tech-

81 In the case of the Rural Housing Program, many national institutional actors were involved in the project: the CERF and Ministry of Interior's community development department, and more broadly the DUH (*Direction de l'urbanisme et de l'habitat*), local authorities, as well as development organizations linked to the Ministry of Agriculture (such as the ORMVA). This refers to one of the specificities of the WFP: it does not provide sufficient expertise for the implementation of the project and depends on collaboration with local organizations, infrastructures, and logistics; unlike other development institutions that send their own staff (Corinna R. Unger, "International organizations and rural development: The FAO perspective," *The International History Review* 41, no. 2 [2019]: 451–458; Shaw, *The UN World Food Programme*).

82 Tenzon and Fisher, "Foreign aid," 952.

83 For a description of CERF as a "development group," see Nerfin, *Mission to Morocco*, 6.

84 In the case of the Rural Housing Program, many national institutional actors were involved in the project: the CERF and Ministry of Interior's community development department, and more broadly the DUH (*Direction de l'urbanisme et de l'habitat*), local authorities, as well as development organizations linked to the Ministry of Agriculture (such as the ORMVA). This refers to one of the specificities of the WFP: it does not provide sufficient expertise for the implementation of the project and depends on collaboration with local organizations, infrastructures, and logistics; unlike other development institutions that send their own staff (Corinna R. Unger, "International organizations and rural development: The FAO perspective," 451–458; Shaw, *The UN World Food Programme*).

85 Jolé, "Nature et fonction," 101.

86 Méker, *Proposition pour la définition*, 2.

nical assistance partnerships were already in place in Morocco, and that new bilateral agreements (e.g. with Belgium) would strengthen the options available for Morocco to recruit foreign experts. At the turn of the 1970s, the CERF was without a doubt a privileged "contact zone" for international and national expertise in spatial planning and architecture in Morocco, but also the place of training for the new generation of Moroccan executives. Finally, the CERF experience (and thus the organization of the WFP's operations) ought to be replaced in the context of political tensions and of some Moroccan intellectuals' critique of the presence of cooperation experts.[87]

The CERF crystallized the ambitions and actions promoted by the Ministry of Interior during the 1968–72 five-year plan. According to A. Masson,[88] the CERF's "new spirit" related to three radical departures from past architectural and planning policies:

(a) First, there was a "disengagement of the state from the housing sector,"[89] especially from the so-called "housing for the greater number" policy—i.e. the massive production of affordable housing in (semi-)urban areas—, as had been done during the "Écochard period," with the state now encouraging private initiatives. A. Masson eventually summarized this conceptual shift in 1982 as "the replacing of a constraint-driven urbanism with an incentive- and consultation-driven urbanism,"[90] a statement which reflects an implicit criticism to early-independence planning approaches.
(b) Second, according to the same observation that the state could no longer respond alone to the increasing need for housing in Morocco, the CERF was charged with developing new planning methods to encourage and supervise self-help construction methods. This eventually led the center's architects and engineers to experiment with low-tech building techniques in order to reduce the production costs of affordable housing, and more generally to reconsider certain virtues of vernacular architecture.[91]
(c) Finally, as sociologist Paul Pascon remarked at the time, the CERF's creation reflected "the lively and recent interest of the public authorities in the prob-

87 Oualalou, Fathallah, "Point de vue du tiers monde," *Esprit*, no. 394 (1970): 151–158. The CERF has indeed been described at the time as a "foreigner ghetto" in the heart of the Moroccan state (from a 2022 interview with former Moroccan administration officials at the time of CERF).

88 Masson, "Le nouvel esprit."

89 Ibid.

90 Masson, "Mes années de coopération."

91 Clark, "Comment 'devenir traditionnel'?"

lems of territorial planning and the urbanization of the countryside."[92] For the first time in the history of independent Morocco, strategic priority was given to rural over urban development, made practical by the Rural Housing Program. The expected result entailed a reduction in rural exodus, directly aligned with the objective of diminishing the State's direct engagement in urban construction efforts. As a result, the CERF period appears clearly as the generalization on a national scale of the various elements of the policy of ruralism already initiated in Morocco, leading for example to the publication of the *Précis de ruralisme* (handbook of ruralism) written by two CERF architects, G. Bauer and B. Hamburger[93]; and a few years later to the first SAR (*Schéma d'armature rurale*, i. e. "rural structure plan") set up by Jan Kratochvil, a UNDP expert detached to the CERF.[94] Another aspect, also related to the reconsideration of vernacular architecture, was the importance granted to studies carried out in rural areas: for example, the nationwide rural housing survey conducted by J. Hensens in 1969–70.[95]

3.2 Rural housing program objectives and methods

At the time of the BCER's 1967 application to the UN/FAO, the WFP was still a relatively young organization (founded in 1961, it had been in an experimental phase from 1963 to 1965).[96] The WFP extended the FAO's 1960 Freedom from Hunger Campaign (FFHC) which aimed at promoting development rather than providing mere relief aid through the redistribution of food production surpluses from Western countries to underdeveloped ones. Unlike USAID and other US food surplus redistribution programs, the FAO had a less evident geopolitical objective of gaining recipient countries' allegiance to the so-called "Free World," but clearly integrated the potential role of underdeveloped countries in responding to the structural weakness entailed by overproduction in capitalistic agriculture. The FAO was high-

92 Pascon, "Types d'habitat," 85–101. However, this prioritization of rural studies was short-lived. From the early 1970s, the State drastically reoriented its land-use policy again towards urban issues.

93 Gérard Bauer and Bernard Hamburger, *Précis de Ruralisme* (Rabat: Ministry of Interior, CERF, 1968).

94 Jan Kratochvil, *Rapport final sur les programmes d'habitat rural d'aménagement du territoire* (Rabat: UNDP report, November 1973).

95 See Clark, "Comment 'devenir traditionnel'?"

96 For an overview of the WFP's history, see for instance Shaw, *The UN World Food Programme.*

ly concerned with avoiding unwanted side effects of food distribution on the global market economy.[97]

A peculiarity of the WFP was the adoption of the food-for-work principle, according to which food distributed could support rural development through various means, including vocational training, local CD actions, improvement of farming techniques, road and irrigation infrastructures, reforestation and erosion prevention. As such, this approach not only offset anticipated food production deficits resulting from structural reforms or desired investments like land reform, but also created opportunities for new production avenues.[98]

Until 1967, the WFP pursued a "project-based approach," with localized actions avoiding the risk of overlapping with USAID. With its Rural Housing Program, the WFP operated a shift towards a new "sectoral approach"[99]and the implementation of larger, nationwide projects.[100] The WFP program resonated with the 1968–72 five-year plan priority of agricultural development, but also, indirectly, with that of tourism (following IBRD recommendations [see Section 2.3]). To this end, the approach embedded in the WFP-supported Rural Housing Program focused on two types of actions: firstly, the provision of rural housing to support agricultural development and agrarian reform projects; and secondly, the "renovation" of so-called "traditional" dwellings in pre-Saharan areas tagged for tourism development. Both actions introduced a novel approach within a WFP-supported project: the focus on rural housing and on tourism were unprecedented. Both also contributed to an ongoing battle against rural exodus (which continued to increase rapidly in the years following independence, partly as a result of the demographic boom)[101]: "The planners considered that with increased revenues in those rural areas, a modernization of the rural habitat would at the same time stimulate production, create employment opportunities, and contribute toward stemming the

97 Gerda Blau, "Disposal of agricultural surpluses," in *Food Aid for Development. Three Studies by Gerda Blau, Mordecai Ezekiel, B. R. Sen* (Rome: FAO, 1985), 3–90.

98 Mordecai Ezekiel, "Uses of agricultural surpluses to finance economic development in underdeveloped countries, a pilot study in India," in *Food Aid for Development. Three Studies by Gerda Blau, Mordecai Ezekiel, B.R. Sen* (Rome: FAO, 1985), 91–222.

99 "As far as the WFP is concerned, the project would mean a step beyond the 'project approach' and would represent a first implementation of the 'sectorial approach' since the whole activities of the government in rural housing during the five-year period would be assisted by the WFP […]" (Nerfin, *Mission to Morocco*, 6).

100 Shaw, *The UN World Food Programme*, 70.

101 As J. Abu-Lughod wrote: "Between 1960 and 1971, the Moroccan Muslim population increased from 11.2 million to 15.3 million […] 1.2 million Moroccans moved from rural to urban areas during those eleven years" (Janet Abu-Lughod, "Dependent urbanism and decolonization: the Moroccan case," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 1 [1979]: 53).

drift to the towns."[102] To achieve this task, "29,250,000 days of work using a total of 135,000 men"[103] were initially requested from the WFP, which made it (according to the Moroccan government) "the largest project ever considered by the WFP or any other United Nations agency."[104]



Fig. 2: Location map of construction and renovation actions planned in 1968 to be undertaken for the WFP's Rural Housing Program (Collection of the National School of Architecture ENA of Rabat).

The project was planned for implementation in all of the country's *mise en valeur* area. However, possibly following Méker's 1964 UN report's recommendations,[105] the government identified two priority regions for the program's implementation: the eastern Rif and the pre-Saharan valleys (i.e. Morocco's two least developed re-

102 WFP, *Morocco 416*, 2.

103 Ministry of Interior, *Projet de développement rural 1968–1972. Demande d'assistance adressée au Programme alimentaire mondial ONU/FAO* (Rabat: Ministry of Interior, 1967), 28.

104 Ministry of Interior, *Note sur le programme d'habitat rural*, 1.

105 Méker, *Proposition pour la définition*, 9.

gions).[106] Within this context, the BCER (before it was merged into the CERF) proposed three different types of food-for-work methods to be used within the WFP program:

(a) In Morocco's touristic southern region, the BCER proposed to "renovate" 30,000 dwellings in the various pre-Saharan valleys using the CD method, enabling the inhabitants to renovate dwellings and small facilities within *ksours* ("fortified villages") by employing "traditional" construction techniques.[107] The operation's main objective was to maintain local inhabitants in what was considered by the Ministry as an important heritage, especially in the context of the growing tourism economy in the region, and avoid the *ksours*' abandonment. From this perspective, the WFP program represents the first major state intervention in territorial planning in this part of the Moroccan territory.[108]

(b) The second type of operation consisted of two parts. The first was to continue and intensify the BCER's rural actions, i.e. prepare master plans for rural areas and build new facilities and infrastructures in existing rural centers. In addition, the BCER encouraged the production of 45,000 self-built houses, with no other public intervention than technical support, in accordance with self-help methods. In this case, the local owner bought his land with a loan, built his own house under public service supervision, and reimbursed the municipality for the amount borrowed from the state, thereby providing a new source of revenue to rural municipalities.[109] The principle of credit is very important, because it was intended to create a long-term dynamic and encourage small ownership. As G. Bauer and J. Dethier wrote while preparing

106 The Basse Moulouya watershed in the eastern Rif was the area where most newly built houses were planned. On the other hand, the pre-Saharan valleys were the focus of all renovation works.

107 Jean Hensens, *Opération PAM 1968–1972. Rénovation de l'habitat traditionnel. Rapport de mission dans les provinces de Ouarzazate et Ksar Es Souk* (Rabat: Ministry of Interior, 1968); Gérard Bauer, Jean Dethier, Bernard Hamburger, and Jean Hensens, *Rénovation de l'habitat de la vallée du Draa. Dans le cadre du programme national de développement rural 1968–1972* (Rabat: Ministry of Interior, CERF, 1967).

108 It should be noted that the great Atlantic plains and their irrigation perimeters still constituted until 1966 "the exclusive spatial framework for state intervention" (Benhadi, "La politique marocaine des barrages," 276). While rural development experiments did take place in the Ziz Valley in the early 1960s, it was not until the 1966 establishment of the ORMVAs (*Offices régionaux de mise en valeur agricole*), and the creation that same year of two new regional offices (the office of Ouarzazate for the Drâa Valley and the office of Tafilelt for the Ziz Valley), that the State really started to invest development policies in the pre-Saharan valleys of Drâa and Ziz.

109 Balkhader, *L'habitat rural*, 28–30.

the operation, it was a matter of avoiding the "gift formula"[110] at all costs. This pursued a vision of CD (animating, not giving) as a means of promoting "pride of accomplishment" and "pride of ownership," to quote the WFP's final report in 1976.[111]

(c) BCER's final type of operation proposed expanding on a larger scale the experimental construction of housing from raw earth already carried out in Ouarzazate in 1967 by future members of the CERF.[112] The operation planned to build 15,000 houses from standard plans in areas of allegedly "weak or absent" building traditions.[113] This was expected to enable experimenting with new ways of building for the greatest number of people at a lower cost to the state.[114] This third option came under heavy criticism when UN/FAO experts evaluated the BCER project, because it represented too high an investment in relation to the number of dwellings potentially created. As such, it was in contradiction with the government's intention to withdraw from the construction sector. In the end, it was proposed to build these 15,000 dwellings in the same way as the rest of the "self-help construction" operations (for a total of 60,000 new dwellings).[115]

This entire program obviously had a cost, which was promised to be largely covered by the Moroccan government. An early document for the preparation of the program noted that it constituted a total public investment of 225 million dirhams for the state (about USD 45 million at the time).[116] The WFP's assistance in

110 "If the beneficiaries feel that they are receiving a gift, passive mentalities can only be reinforced, animation does not take place and, without even mentioning the consequences of such an attitude at the stage of maintenance of the patrimony thus created, it will be remembered that a new dwelling has meaning only if it is presented as an element of the overall process of modernization; it must at least correspond to a change in the family mode of production" (Ministry of Interior, *Note sur le programme d'habitat rural*, 8. Translated from French by the author).
111 "Le gouvernement n'a pas seulement cherché à stimuler la 'fierté de l'accomplissement' des bénéficiaires, mais aussi leur 'fierté de la propriété' [...]." (WFP, *Morocco 416*).
112 Rouizem, "The modernization of raw earth in Morocco"; Clark, "Comment 'devenir traditionnel'?"
113 Ministry of Interior, *Note sur le programme d'habitat rural.*
114 Dethier, "Evolution of concepts of housing."
115 See for instance, the "*Note en réponse à une lettre de J. Henderson, adressée le 10 janvier 1968 à M. Boerma, directeur exécutif du PAM*" in the United Nations Archives, folder "S-0175–1472–0007-Technical Assistance mission in Morocco. WFP."
116 More precisely, it amounted to 75 million dirhams for the rural municipalities' credits (dedicated to land purchase and the construction of infrastructure and equipment), to which 150 million dirhams were added for self-construction credits. Ministry of Interior, *Projet de développement rural 1968–1972*; Ministry of Interior, *Note sur le programme d'habitat rural.*

food aid (for 30 million workdays) was estimated in Project MOR416's final agreement document at USD 13 million to be paid by the WFP (of which 11 million would be given in the form of food rations).[117] In addition, the government requested an estimated USD 454,000 in UNDP assistance to support the WFP program and help with staff training.[118]

The entire food-for-work system was therefore based on state-funded credits and food rations provided by the WFP, but also on the capacity of the communes and local authorities. It was therefore very similar to the one already well tested in Morocco, namely the *Promotion nationale.* However, unlike the rations of the *Promotion nationale*, which mainly consisted of wheat, the WFP rations were more diversified.[119]

One of the roles of the CERF was then to design ways of distributing food rations to make it possible to use so-called "unskilled labor" on the worksites.[120] In some cases, qualified workers were also hired and paid by the program (such as *maalems*—"skilled craftspeople"—in *ksour* renovation operations), but the largest work force was composed of "unskilled men." Indeed, in most cases, the beneficiary families were asked to mobilize two men from their family, for a period of five months, to build their own house.[121]

To disseminate and ensure the acceptance of this development mechanism among the inhabitants, the WFP program benefitted from the support of "animators" employed by the Department of Community Development from the Ministry of Interior and supervised by a UN expert. The former's role was "the psychological preparation of the inhabitants," as a necessary precondition for development

117 WFP, *Plan d'opérations entre le gouvernement du Maroc et le Programme alimentaire mondial ONU/FAO relatif à une assistance du PAM pour un Programme de construction et d'amélioration de l'habitat rural dans le cadre d'opérations du développement régional (Maroc 416)* (WFP final report, September 1968), 4, in United Nations Archives, United Nations Registry Section 1946–1979, S-0175–1472–0008.

118 See United Nations Archives, "S-0175–1472–0007–Technical Assistance mission in Morocco. WFP."

119 "The commune gives the beneficiary 300 food rations from the WFP. These rations are distributed gradually as the house is built. Each contributor agrees, by signing a contract with the commune to provide 100 days of work, in addition to the time he or she devotes to the construction of the house. In return for these 100 days of work, the recipient receives 100 additional WFP rations, or a credit note of 200 dirhams that will be deducted from the total amount he owes the commune" (Belkhader, *L'habitat rural*, 28–30. Translated from French by the author).

120 Ministry of Interior, *Projet de développement rural.*

121 Ibid.



Fig. 3: Photograph from 1969 showing the arrival of food rations in Morocco. On the cardboard that the person is carrying, we can read: "The Rural Housing Program. Ministry of Interior. Assistance PAM" (Collection of the National School of Architecture [ENA] of Rabat).

actions.[122] In this sense, the program relied on the experience already acquired in Morocco in terms of agricultural extension.

3.3 Criticism and results

In view of the first UN-Habitat conference and the related documentary film festival held in Vancouver in 1976, the Ministry of Urban Planning, Housing, Tourism, and the Environment (MUHTE) produced two short propaganda films.[123] These two films actually presented—without naming it—the main lines of the development policy initiated by the CERF during the 1968–72 five-year plan. One of them deals with the rural realm and is of great interest because it presents the recently completed (1975) WFP Rural Housing Program, and shows the extent to which the rural development policy was based on the program set up with the WFP. The film showcases all the mantras underlying the WFP's action: "improvement" of construction techniques and composition of traditional habitat; use of food rations to encourage assisted self-construction; ambition to curb rural exodus; (a) quest to foster the population's joint collective effort to make the desired agricultural development more efficient, etc.

While the propaganda film obviously lacks objectivity in analyzing the project's outcomes and its reception by the affected inhabitants, more rigorous criticism and analysis can be found in national and international reports produced during and after the operation. The most accurate accounts of the project are found first in the assessment carried out to prepare the following five-year plan

122 Ministry of Interior, *Projet de développement rural 1968–1972. Demande d'assistance adressée au Programme alimentaire mondial ONU/FAO* (Morocco: Ministry of Interior, 1967), 26. A famous example of this application is reflected in the means used to convince the peasants of the benefits of sugar beet cultivation by the ONI in the early 1960s; as Naciri writes, the population's support was made possible by "using both the services of storytellers in the souks and the most modern audiovisual techniques." These outreach activities provided inspiration for the WFP's Rural Housing Program and were used to incite and explain to the inhabitants the "assisted self-construction" mechanism (use of state credit, proper monitoring of standards and recommendations of experts in terms of construction and planning, etc.). This filiation derives in part from the fact that one of the main artisans of the audiovisual techniques of the ONI, French photographer Paul Moity, was also briefly part of the CERF. We have for instance found in the archives various slides of "pedagogical drawings," intended to be displayed for the inhabitants to explain to them very simply the benefits of the operation, and the modalities of the new access to the property encouraged by the State.

123 All digital archives related to the UN-Habitat conferences are available on the following website: https://habitat.scarp.ubc.ca/. Felicity D. Scott, "Foreigners in filmmaking," in *Architecture in Development*, ed. Aggregate (London; New York: Routledge, 2022), 179–194.

(1973–77) and in the final report of the WFP, and then in various drafts written for UNESCO[124] and the Aga Khan Foundation.[125] In such sources, the WFP's actions are all presented as a success, even though the figures advertised at the project's beginning were never achieved and the initial intention of containing rural exodus proved to be completely illusory.[126]

At its outset in 1969, the operation launched the construction of 11,250 houses and the renovation of another 1,000.[127] By 1972, approximately 30 % of the planned dwellings had been built (~20,000) and 10 % of the renovation operation had been completed (~3,000).[128] The program was redesigned in April 1972 and objectives were more realistically revised downwards. The 1971 national census revealed the precarious housing conditions in urban areas, implying that the urban question could no longer be downplayed as it had been in the previous five-year plan. The Rural Housing Program, which was initially directed exclusively towards rural areas, progressively addressed peri-urban issues by, on the one hand, participating in Casablanca's and Rabat's slum clearance projects, and, on the other hand, setting up housing construction operations in the urban areas of Agadir, Settat, and Kenitra.[129]

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124 UNESCO was not directly involved in the Rural Habitat Program. However, it did initiate the Southern Kasbah Inventory Project in 1974 (and later, with the UNDP, the co-creation of the CERKAS, *Centre de conservation et de réhabilitation du patrimoine architectural atlasique et subatlasique*). In this context, some UNESCO reports provide a detailed account of the "Renovation" component of the Rural Habitat Program. Vérité, *Inventaire, protection et mise en valeur.*

125 The Aga Khan Foundation was not involved in the Rural Habitat Program. However, the renovation work carried out by architect J. Hensens in the Drâa Valley as part of the Rural Habitat Program was selected for the Aga Khan Award for Architecture. This led to several technical reports in 1986 and 1989, as well as photographic surveys by Chrisitan Lignon, on the achievements of the Rural Habitat Program in the Drâa valley. Raoul Snelder, *Technnical review summary. Rehabilitation of ksour. Drâa Valley* (Aga Khan Foundation, 1986); Jamel Akbar, *Rehabilitation of Drâa Valley Ksour, Morocco. Technical review summary* (Aga Khan Foundation, 1989).

126 "Although the program has been only one third completed, in only three full years, it must be considered a success. This is at least the opinion of WFP, which has not seen such a program succeed in any country that has received its support. This was the first time in Morocco that self-building was used on such a large scale" (Ministry of Urban Planning, Housing, Tourism, and the Environment, *Plan quinquennal 1973–1977. Équipements urbains et ruraux* [Morocco, 1973]. Translated from French by the author).

127 Ministry of Interior, *Une action: le programme d'habitat rural développé par le PAM* (Rabat: Ministry of Interior, 1968).

128 Ministry of Urban Planning, Housing, Tourism, and the Environment, *Plan quinquennal 1973–1977.*

129 WFP, *Morocco 416.*

Fig. 4: Photograph around 1969 of the village of Sidi Moussa built in the Haouz region as part of the WFP's Rural Housing Program (Collection of the National School of Architecture ENA of Rabat).

Table 1: Information collected from the Snelder report (1986) with the addition of information from the final WFP report. These documents are now part of the archives of the Aga Khan Trust for Culture, Geneva (in the "Rehabilitation of Ksour Draa Valley" record).

Quantitative objectives and results of the WFP, 1968–75	Initial 10–1968	Revised 01–1970	Revised 04–1972	Realized 06–1975
WFP (USD 1000)	13,115	15,735	10,194	5,377
Total cost	100 %	120 %	78 %	41 %
WFP (USD 1000)	10,245	///	///	4,039
Total food cost	100 %			39 %
Government (USD 1000)	103,000	///	///	54,500
	100 %			54 %

Table 1: *(Continued)*

Quantitative objectives and results of the WFP, 1968–75	Initial 10–1968	Revised 01–1970	Revised 04–1972	Realized 06–1975
New rural houses	60,000	///	28,700	21,326
	100 %		48 %	36 %
Houses renovated	30,000	///	4,530	4,374
	100 %		15 %	15 %
Slum Clearance	0	///	1,500	///

When the program concluded after its six-year duration, the final WFP report indicated that 152 worksites had been opened for the "construction operation" and 20 *ksours* had been renovated as part of the "renovation operation" (17 in the Drâa Valley and three in the Ziz Valley). When the program was definitively stopped in 1975, a total of 21,326 new dwellings had been built, i.e. 35.5 % of the initial objective and 74 % of the 1972 revised objective; 4,374 dwellings had been renovated in the *ksours*, i.e. about 14.6 % of the initial plan's target and 96.5 % of the 1972 forecast. Therefore, in the light of the revised objectives, the operation may well be termed a success in purely quantitative terms, despite the fact that it failed to meet any of the 1968 objectives.[130]

Putting aside the bookkeeping aspect, other critical comments have been expressed. These concerned, first of all, the logistical and forecasting problems (costs and delays): as a general rule, the 1968 program underestimated the costs and duration of the operation (whether it was the failure to take into account the gradual increase in the cost of materials, the cost of supplying food products, or the cost and time expected for the construction of each house by the interested parties themselves)[131]. Secondly, numerous delays were noted, beginning with the delay in the delivery of food from the WFP by one and a half years, which delayed the launch of the project originally planned in 1968.[132] As a corollary, a field survey notes that, at the end of the program, many complaints were registered by some of

130 Ibid.

131 According to Vérité, for instance, the cost per renovated house turned out to be four times higher than expected (Jacques Vérité, "Inventaire, protection et mise en valeur des architectures traditionnelles. Un exemple: le sud marocain" [Master thesis, Institut d'urbanisme de Paris, Université Paris VIII, 1977]). For his part, Naciri has shown that the cost per dwelling also increased rapidly because of the 1972 decision to extend the WFP program to peri-urban areas (Naciri, "Politique urbaine," 79).

132 Ministry of Urban Planning, Housing, Tourism, and the Environment, *Plan quinquennal 1973–1977.*

the skilled workers because they had not been paid for their last year of work.[133] Another finding is that logistical problems were related to the diversity of food rations and the storage and transportation problems that these generated.[134]

The aforementioned challenges were exacerbated by staffing shortages within the relevant institutions.[135] Furthermore, the program involved numerous national public entities, which arguably added complexity to its implementation. For instance, the heads of the rural municipalities, who were to play an important role in some of the program's actions (*inter alia* in providing land for building), did not always cooperate. In a broad sense, the hoped-for subsidiarity did not always take place, and communication between the CERF, the regional delegations, and the rural communes was not trouble-free.[136]

Beyond the logistical problems, several authors (including CERF architects J. Dethier and J. Hensens, who directed some of the renovation actions themselves) have noted that some of the facilities built by the WFP were never used by the inhabitants (such as "collective stables" in the pre-Saharan valleys) and that this was due in part to a lack of consultation with the population.[137] In addition, some have pointed out that the primary beneficiaries of the program were not the ones originally targeted. Instead of benefiting the most vulnerable families as originally intended, the project seemingly favored those who already possessed some financial resources. In fact, the self-builder inhabitant had to buy some of the construction materials himself and his participation in the program required a "significant financial effort."[138]

4 Conclusion

Much like the history of the WFP's role and influence in the post-war period,[139] the Rural Housing Program remains a largely unexplored topic. Apart from a few stud-

133 Akbar, *Rehabilitation of Drâa Valley Ksour.*

134 WFP, *Morocco 416.*

135 Johnson, *Urbanization in Morocco*, 94–95. See also the testimony of two young Belgian architects who took part in the WFP Rural Housing Program in the Moulouya *mise en valeur* region (Daniel Bran and Monique Dumont, "Une expérience de ruralisme au Maroc ou les limites de l'assistance technique," *Synthèse*, no. 281 [1969]: 77–83)

136 Ministry of Urban Planning, Housing, Tourism, and the Environment, *Plan quinquennal 1973–1977.*

137 Dethier, "Evolution of concepts of housing."

138 Belkhader, *L'habitat rural*, 28–30.

139 Unger, "International organizations."

ies,[140] the project has almost exclusively been documented by its firsthand witnesses.[141] Our article thus attempts to fill this gap, contributing to the growing interest in the interrelations between the fields of architecture, rural planning, and development history.[142]

We consider this huge program to be a remarkable example of the complex role that the WFP has played in the development of assisted self-help construction methods in rural areas in the Global South, indirectly driving states both to create institutional structures capable of concretely handling this "assistance" and to keep engaging with opportunities to attract different forms of foreign expertise. The study of the CERF and Rural Housing Program also contributes to a broader understanding of the continuities and discontinuities of rural development policies promoted during the late-colonial and post-independence periods. We indeed argue that the Rural Housing Program builds on, continues, and accentuates three pre-existing situations:

- It continues and amplifies the significant presence and role of international organizations and foreign experts related to the various forms of technical assistance in independent Morocco. The production of large studies, the massive presence of foreign experts, and the creation of research centers all continued to be important assets for the Moroccan state to justify its requests for aid and were part of a form of recognized and legitimized rationality linked to development policies valued at the global scale.
- It reflects the move, since the late-colonial period, to encourage "self-help" policies, and the way in which the Ministry of Interior has gradually taken over UN-supported CD methods, applying them in an unorthodox way, confirming that beneficiary countries and actors were nothing but merely passive recipients of foreign aid.
- It corresponds to the development of planning policies known as "ruralism" directly linked to agrarian policies, which were intended to be both adapted to local situations and at the same time derived from a conception of the countryside as a space to be "enhanced." The stated objective remained that of re-

140 For instance, Vérité, *Inventaire, protection et mise en valeur*; Belkhader, *L'habitat rural*; Naciri, "Politique urbaine."

141 For instance Jean Hensens, "Les limites permises à la conception et à la construction de l'espace local au Maroc," in *Habitat, État, société au Maghreb*, ed. Pierre Robert Baduel (Paris: CNRS ed., 1986): 103–113; Dethier, "Evolution of concepts of housing"; Masson, "Urbanisation et habitat du grand nombre"; Bentahar, "L'aménagement du territoire."

142 Duanfang Lu, ed., *Third World Modernism: Architecture, Development and Identity* (London; New York: Routledge, 2010); Aggregate, *Architecture in Development. Systems and the Emergence of the Global South* (London; New York: Routledge, 2022).

> ducing rural exodus, and the method for doing so was still that of a form of acupuncture, where pilot projects or model villages were developed in the hope of being propagated and gradually improving the quality of life in small rural centers and the surrounding areas.

Hence, paradoxically, while the CERF introduced a "new spirit" that marked a reevaluation of housing and planning policies inherited from the colonial and Écochard periods, the WFP Rural Housing Program—despite being a central undertaking of the CERF—should also be regarded as an expansion and intensification of preexisting actions and development policies that had begun to take shape since the post-war period.

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List of illustrations

(3 black/white images)

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Maria Cullen

The politicization of development: Oxfam and the idea of a rights-based humanitarian action in the Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras during the 1980s

1 Introduction

Because of the concept's broadness and malleability, the idea of development captured the imaginations of a diverse range of actors across the globe, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. Indeed, recent research has drawn attention to the lack of a fixed or stable meaning that has been attached to development in the minds of those that pursued political and economic projects in its name.[1] In the post-war period, the dominant interpretation was articulated by Western states and international organizations. These actors advanced a vision of a linear and universally applicable process of economic improvement that could be implemented in the Global South.[2] At the same time as this project reflected the need to challenge socialist modernization theory during the Cold War, it demonstrated the durability of assumptions that former colonies were in need of external guidance to evolve along a fixed path towards modernity. Conversely, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) positioned themselves as the voices of an "alternative" development to the states' top-down approach.[3] The extent to which this corresponded to a true independence from the interests of powerful states in the networks of "global

1 Corinna R. Unger, Iris Borowy, and Corinne Antezana-Pernet, eds., *The Routledge Handbook on the History of Development* (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2022); Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela, *The Development Century: A Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

2 Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth; a Non-communist Manifesto* (2d ed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); also see Corinna R. Unger, *International Development: A Postwar History* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 7–8 and 21.

3 See Kevin O'Sullivan, "NGOs and development: Small is beautiful?" in *The Routledge Handbook on the History of Development*, ed. Corinna Unger, Iris Borowy, and Corinne Antezana-Pernet, eds., 234–249.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111280356-008

governance" has been debated.[4] Kevin O'Sullivan concluded that despite their genuine criticism of establishment thinking in the 1970s, the NGO model of development was ultimately "what states made of it."[5] On the other hand, Paul Adler highlighted how some social justice advocacy NGOs became important critics of structural economic inequalities in the Global South.[6] This paper adds another layer of complexity to what still amounts to an incomplete picture. By adopting a case-study approach and examining the advocacy practiced by Oxfam on behalf of Salvadoran refugees in Honduras in the 1980s, it demonstrates how the "social justice development" identified by Adler was employed by a humanitarian NGO in an emergency relief setting, with concrete effects for the provision of aid on the ground.[7]

In the last decade of the Cold War, Oxfam – a British NGO founded in 1942 – became a vehicle for solidarity and human rights activism in Latin America.[8] In Honduras, Oxfam acted alongside other NGOs within the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) to strongly oppose an attempt by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Honduran government to relocate refugees away from the Salvadoran border in 1984. The reasons for Oxfam's radicalization on this issue, which contrasted with the more conservative positions it took on human rights within Cambodia and Ethiopia around the same time, were rooted in the distinct socio-political environment it encountered in Central America. The experience of the global Cold War in this region was complex – combined with entrenched societal inequalities, longstanding tensions with a superpower neighbor, the United States (US), served to escalate ideological confrontations in local politics.[9] Following a period of détente from the late 1960s, the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and the successful invasion of Cambodia by Soviet-backed Vietnam in 1979 re-energized displays of open hostility between the US and Soviet Union in the theatres of hot conflict in the Third World where they competed for dominance.[10] This so-called "Second Cold War," which preceded Soviet

4 See Mark R. Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007) for a critical appraisal of the role played by humanitarian NGOs in global governance.

5 O'Sullivan, "NGOs and development."

6 Paul Adler, "Creating "The NGO International": The Rise of Advocacy for Alternative Development, 1974–1994," in *The Development Century*, ed. Stephen J. Macekura and Erez Manela, 305–325.

7 Ibid.

8 Maggie Black, *A Cause for Our Times: Oxfam, the first 50 years* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

9 Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010).

10 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); see Jan Eckel, *The Ambivalence of Good:*

retrenchment and movements towards peace talks in the Third World by the end of the 1980s, resulted in protracted bloody conflict in Central America.[11] The Nicaraguan revolution both gave confidence to other leftist movements and increased the defensiveness of regional oligarchies, leading to an acceleration of violent repression and the launching of armed revolts. In El Salvador, the military assaulted rural communities following a hollow attempt at land reform in 1980, leading thousands to flee to Honduras, a state whose regime was not a signatory of the Refugee Convention and which was actively hostile to the leftist refugees that settled in camps along its border.[12] Adding to the sense of a hostile environment, UNHCR was seen by many NGOs to be too close to the US Embassy in Honduras, and was accused of being weak in the performance of its protection duties in its administering of aid to the camps, which faced constant violent incursions from the Honduran Army.[13] The idea of a universal, neutral humanitarianism was thus profoundly challenged by the unavoidable encounter with "the political" in the Salvadoran refugee crisis.[14]

In such a polarized context, development effectively became either a tool to contest state power or a counter-insurgency measure. However, even when implemented by states as counter-insurgency, development could be subverted to em-

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Human rights in International Politics since the 1940s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 207–210 for overview of the evolution of US foreign policy in terms of human rights in the 1980s; see also Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (Basic Books: New York, 2005) on Soviet foreign policy and attempts to covertly influence the Third World; see also Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko, "Introduction: The end of the Cold War in the Third World", in *The End of the Cold War and the Third World: New Perspectives on Regional Conflict*, ed. Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 1–21.

11 Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (London: Verso, 1983); see also Svetlana Savranskaya, "Gorbachev and the Third World", in *The End of the Cold War and the Third World*, ed. Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko, 21–46; Brands, *Latin America's Cold War*; and Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

12 Jeff Schuhrke, "Agrarian Reform and the AFL-CIO's Cold War in El Salvador," *Diplomatic History* 44, no. 4 (2020): 527–553; see Molly Todd, *Beyond displacement campesinos, refugees, and collective action in the Salvadoran civil war* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), 88–90 for a description of the Honduran government's attitude towards Salvadoran refugees, and its influence over UNHCR.

13 Several Oxfam and Catholic Relief Servives (CRS) reports make this argument. PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

14 Miriam Ticktin uses the term "the political" in her analysis of how medicalisation depoliticises suffering in international humanitarian aid. See Ticktin, "The Gendered Human of Humanitarianism: Medicalising and Politicising Sexual Violence," *Gender & History* 23 no. 2 (2011): 250–265, see 252–253, 258, and 264.

power rather than disempower.[15] In the refugee camps in Honduras, the languages of development and human rights even became tools for transnational political advocacy in the hands of Salvadoran activists. Influenced by the refugees it encountered, Oxfam became a participant in a European solidarity network, which represented an important challenge to US dominance in its sphere of influence.[16] In Oxfam's international program, however, the logic of development was far from a consistently progressive influence. In 1960s Tanzania, Oxfam's utopian vision of grassroots development led it to mistakenly believe its goals were inseparable from the government's.[17] A similar pattern of naivety and instrumentalization can be observed in Oxfam's involvement in post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia, where the authorities' restrictive conditions of access were accepted in the hope that Oxfam could establish a long-term development program in the country. In reality, as in Tanzania, its interventions served mainly to depoliticize the penetration of state power into new spaces by an autocratic regime.[18] In Ethiopia too, the

15 Sarah Foss, "Community Development in Cold War Guatemala – Not a Revolution but an Evolution," in Thomas Field, Stella Krepp, and Vanni Pettinà, eds., *Latin America and the Global Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2020), 123–148.

16 On the European and North American solidarity networks fostered by Nicaraguans and Salvadorans, see Eline Van Ommen, "The Nicaraguan Revolution's Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine: Sandinistas and Western Europe, 1979–1990," *The Americas* 78 no. 4 (2021): 639–666; Kim Christiaens, "Between diplomacy and solidarity: Western European support networks for Sandinista Nicaragua," *European Review of History* 21, no. 4 (2014): 617–634; and Hector Perla Jr, "Si Nicaragua Venció, El Salvador Vencerá: Central American Agency in the Creation of the U.S.: Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement," *Latin American Research Review* 43 no. 2 (2008): 136–158; see also Kevin O'Sullivan, "Civil War in El Salvador and the origins of rights-based humanitarianism," *Journal of Global History* 16 no. 2 (2021): 246–265; and Molly Todd, *Beyond displacement campesinos, refugees, and collective action in the Salvadoran civil war* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010).

17 Michael Jennings, "'Almost an Oxfam in Itself': Oxfam, Ujamaa and Development in Tanzania," *African Affairs* 101, no. 405 (2002): 509–530; Jennings, *Surrogates of the State: NGOs, Development, and Ujamaa in Tanzania* (Bloomfield, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 2007).

18 This argument is made by the author in a chapter from a forthcoming PhD thesis. It draws on the theory of development as an anti-politics machine from James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development", Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), along with primary documentation from the Oxfam archive. For existing literature on Oxfam and other western NGOs in Cambodia during the 1980s, see Maggie Black, *A Cause for Our Times: Oxfam, the first 50 years* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 214–235; William Shawcross, *The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience* (London: Andrew Deutsch, 1984); Esmeralda Luciolli, *Le Mur de bambou: le Cambodge après Pol Pot* (Paris: Éditions Régine Deforges, Médecins Sans Frontières, 1988); Fiona Terry, *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2002), 114–

NGO's supposedly non-political values of development helped to provide a cover for counter-insurgency measures.[19]

What was different in Honduras? Unlike in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America represented a space in which Oxfam's pattern was to side with oppressed rural communities, and to platform their grievances against authoritarian states in the international sphere. Non-state actors, including progressive elements of the Catholic church and educationalists like Paolo Freire, had a profound effect on Oxfam staff when they articulated emancipatory ideologies like liberation theology and conscientization.[20] To understand why Oxfam was susceptible to internalizing these radical discourses, it is necessary to delve into the biographical backgrounds of key figures within the organization. Bill Yates, for example, who was Country Director in Brazil during the 1970s and an ongoing influence on Latin American programs in the 1980s, was attracted to a revolutionary interpretation of development as a vehicle for social activism.[21] Yates' worldview was forged within a broader process of introspection that took place within the European humanitarian sector from the late 1960s, within which contemporaries rejected older paternalistic practices of charity in favor of commitments to structural critiques of inequality.[22] At the same time, however, a constant yet "changing interplay between charity and justice" continued to characterize the logic and functionality of international aid.[23] This was certainly true for Oxfam, yet this does not

155; and Linda Mason and Roger Brown, *Rice, Rivalry and Politics: Managing Cambodian Relief* (London; Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1983).

19 This is also an argument made by the author in a forthcoming PhD thesis. On repressive developmentalism, see Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, "A Robust Operation: Resettling, Security, and Development in Late Colonial Angola (1960s–1970s)," *Itinerario* 44, no. 1 (2020): 55–79. On the role of humanitarian aid in depoliticising the government repression that had caused famine, see Alex De Waal, *Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia (Africa Watch Report)* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), and Tony Vaux, *The Selfish Altruist: Relief Work in Famine and War* (London: Earthscan, 2001), 43–68.

20 On liberation theology, see Lilian Calles Barger, *The World Come of Age: An Intellectual History of Liberation Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), and Christopher Rowland (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology* (second edition) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); on conscientisation, see Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (new rev. ed. London; New York: Penguin Books, 1996), first published in Portuguese in 1968 as *Pedagogia do Oprimido*; on the influence of liberation theology and conscientisation on Oxfam, see Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 177–202.

21 Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 186–188; oral history interview with Bill Yates, conducted on 21 July 2020.

22 Peter Van Dam, "No Justice Without Charity: Humanitarianism After Empire," *International History Review* 44, no. 3 (2022): 653–674, see 653–654.

23 Ibid., 653.

mean that a "politicization of humanitarianism" did not occur with tangible effects in some places.[24] Indeed, it was through a unique constellation of circumstances in Latin America and Britain, within which the old religious networks of charity proved central, that a solidarity-based approach was embedded in the organization's regional program.

What did this mean in operational terms? Can a refugee camp become the setting for a meaningful contestation of global power dynamics? If so, what does this tell us about the relationship between humanitarian NGOs, development and rights discourse during the Cold War? These questions form the backdrop for the analysis that follows. The first section contextualizes Oxfam's vision of progressive development in Latin America within the organization's global program, demonstrating that it was an exception to overall trends. The second section asks why this was the case and explores the influence of intellectual formation and field experiences on action in the 1980s. The third section analyzes how Oxfam reacted when forced to confront politics in the Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras. The fourth section examines the significance of the case-study's findings for broader histories of development and human rights, arguing that development conditioned the integration of rights discourse within humanitarian action before the UN's Responsibility to Protect ideology emerged in the 1990s.[25]

2 Oxfam's global development program

Oxfam's approach to development in the Global South was shaped by the distinct relationship between civil society and the state that crystallized in Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In 1601, the Elizabethan Statute of Uses set out a list of activities which could be defined as charitable, broadly falling under the headings of the relief of poverty, the advancement of education and religion, and other purposes beneficial to the community.[26] The long-standing official role for charity in British society that this produced meant that non-state organizations were later regarded as natural providers of social services.[27] A perceived

24 Ibid., 657.

25 David Chandler, "The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda," *Human Rights Quarterly* 23, no. 3 (2001): 678–700.

26 See Hilton, *A Historical Guide to NGOs in Britain: Charities, Civil Society and the Voluntary Sector since 1945* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 2012), 1–2.

27 Hilton, "Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film: Humanitarianism, Imperialism, and the Changing Role of Charity in Postwar Britain," *The Journal of Modern History* 87, no. 2 (2015): 357–394, see 381–382; Hilton, *A Historical Guide*, 1–2.

"golden age" of this philanthropic sensibility is often located in the Victorian era, yet partnerships between NGOs and government were common even following the growth of the welfare state in the early twentieth century.[28] On this basis, charities were entitled to tax exemptions, yet their ability to engage in political speech was also heavily curtailed, especially after the power of the Charity Commissioners (who policed the "non-political" definition of charity) was widened in the 1960s.[29] Some NGOs had a complicated relationship to government funding as a result, and Oxfam pursued a "no money from governments" policy aside from income-tax recovery into the 1960s.[30] Nevertheless, when the state introduced a more formal system of financial contributions to NGOs, Oxfam embraced the benefits of a reliable funding stream, and became one of the first organizations to benefit from guaranteed block grants to international aid charities in 1976.[31]

In the inter-war period, this British model of state-NGO partnership was carried through to the government's imperial obligations.[32] NGOs like Oxfam were encouraged to fill gaps in the state's overseas obligations, and Oxfam became deeply embedded in colonial governance once it expanded its field of operations from post-1945 European reconstruction to charitable intervention in the Third World.[33] Its first Field Director in Southern Africa, for example, was T.F. Betts, an ex-colonial official in Nigeria, and brother of Minister for Overseas Development Barbara Castle, who heavily drew on colonial surveys in compiling an Oxfam report on development in the region in 1962.[34] Thus, when NGOs took on an elevated status in UN development aid projects in the 1960s, colonial knowledge remained influential and Oxfam was optimistic about establishing partnerships with newly independent states. Oxfam's faith in its alliances with post-colonial regimes led it to believe – most prominently in Tanzania – that its vision of community development was inseparable from that of the local authorities.[35]

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28 Matthew Hilton and James McKay, *The Ages of Voluntarism: How We Got to the Big Society* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1–26; Hilton, *A Historical Guide*, 303–308.

29 Ibid.; Hilton, "Politics Is Ordinary: Non-governmental Organizations and Political Participation in Contemporary Britain," *20th Century British History* 22, no. 2 (2011): 230–268, see 256; Hilton, *Ages of Voluntarism*, 381–382, and *A Historical Guide*, 1–2.

30 Heike Wieters, "Reinventing the firm: from post-war relief to international humanitarian agency," *European Review of History* 23, no. 1–2 (2016), 116–135, see 127.

31 Hilton, *A Historical Guide*, 303–308.

32 Hilton, "Charity and the End of Empire: British Non-Governmental Organizations, Africa, and International Development in the 1960s," *The American Historical Review* 123 no. 2 (2018): 493–517, see 498–500.

33 Ibid., 495–496.

34 Ibid., 506–507.

35 Jennings, "Almost an Oxfam in Itself'; Jennings, *Surrogates of the State*.

Crucially, the "ambiguity" of the role of NGOs in international development allowed Oxfam to position itself as a counterpoint to statist top-down developmentalism even while it participated in state development programs itself.[36] As Matthew Hilton has shown, the distinction between NGO-led "community development" and state-led infrastructural modernization was never as clear-cut in practice.[37] Indeed, colonial authorities used the term "community development" to describe interventions that focused more on the immediate living conditions of the rural poor than macroeconomics since the inter-war period,[38] and NGOs like Oxfam sometimes supported large-scale developmentalist projects.[39] Furthermore, in several settings, Oxfam's commitment to offering a supposedly alternative, grassroots approach led it to be instrumentalized by governments. In 1960s Tanzania, Oxfam became a "surrogate of the state."[40] The organization believed in voluntary participation, yet the *Ujamaa* socialism program practiced by Julius Nyerere's government with its support more often resembled a top-down, forced villagization strategy. Oxfam failed to challenge the policy, yet in the 1970s its staff remained attached to grassroots development as a core component of the organization's identity.[41] More broadly, utopianism continued to animate calls for new and improved development approaches, as reflected in Ernst Schumacher's *Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as If People Mattered* in 1972.[42] This criticized the prevailing obsession with mechanization and scientific inputs in agriculture, yet did not challenge assumptions that the most important problem faced by the Global South was a lack of productivity that should be addressed with external intervention.[43] For Oxfam's part, it was strongly influenced by Schumacher's argument that "intermediate" or "appropriate technologies" should drive development programs, and supported local knowledge and community ownership of projects accordingly.[44]

From the late 1970s, the idea of development as a depoliticized humanitarian endeavor also allowed Oxfam to see a specific moral role for itself in transcending

36 Hilton, *Charity and the End of Empire*, 494, 512–513.

37 Ibid., 496–501.

38 Unger, *International Development*, 103–109.

39 Hilton, "Charity and the End of Empire," 504–508.

40 Jennings, "Almost an Oxfam in Itself," 509–530.

41 Jennings, "Almost an Oxfam in Itself," 509–530; Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 177–202.

42 Ernst F. Schumacher, *Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as If People Mattered* (London: Vintage, 1993, first published in 1973 by Blond & Briggs); see Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 180–182, and Unger, *International Development*, 109–115.

43 Ibid.

44 Schumacher, *Small Is Beautiful*; Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 180–182.

the dynamics of the Cold War in the Global South.[45] However, Oxfam's interventions remained far more politically consequential and implicated in governmental power than it claimed. In Hanoi in 1978, Director Brian Walker remarked that the state's development plans matched "almost everything we are trying to bring about elsewhere in the world," echoing the sentiments expressed by his predecessors in Tanzania.[46] A year later, Oxfam's naïve faith in state partnerships was carried through to its assumption that it could have an influence on the post-Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia.[47] Because of the "sovereignty deficit" that existed in Cambodia, Oxfam's intervention had particularly consequential effects in shoring up the fragile governmental bureaucracy of a precarious regime, which was diplomatically isolated and not entitled to UN development aid.[48] In the first year of its engagement in Cambodia, officials complained about the extent of governmental control over the storage and distribution of aid, along with the restricted ability of Oxfam staff to travel outside Phnom Penh and monitor projects.[49] This was far from the grassroots development Oxfam usually associated itself with, yet the NGO remained in the country throughout the 1980s, even as it became aware of mass human rights violations being committed by the regime with the alleged help of international aid.[50] Just as James Ferguson observed in Lesotho in the same decade, development aid performed the functions of an "anti-politics machine," consistently failing to develop Cambodia yet succeeding in depoliticizing the penetration of state power into new spaces.[51]

In sub-Saharan Africa, the logic of development also often resulted in conservatism and an unwillingness to challenge human rights abuses during the 1980s. In South Africa, a combination of British interests in the country and Walker's attach-

45 Hilton, "Charity and the End of Empire," 500; Brian Walker, "NGOs break the Cold War impasse in Cambodia," in *Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and Their Craft*, ed. Larry Minear and Hazel Smith (Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 2007).

46 Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 215–216.

47 "Report on the Kampuchea Emergency Programme by Tigger Stack, August 1983… Commissioned by the Asia Field Committee (&) the Director General, April 1983," DON/1/6 ("Tigger Stack's papers on Kampuchea'), Oxfam Archive.

48 See Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine*; Fiona Terry, *Condemned to Repeat?*; Mason and Brown, *Rice, Rivalry and Politics*; and William Shawcross, *The Quality of Mercy.*

49 Report on the Kampuchea Emergency Programme by Tigger Stack, August 1983. Commissioned by the Asia Field Committee (&) the Director General, April 1983, DON/1/6, Oxfam Archive.

50 September 1986 Amnesty International "File on Torture" report on Kampuchea, PRG/2/3/2/8, Oxfam Archive; "Notes from the Meeting of the Indo China Working Group of 24 July 1986," PRG/2/3/2/8, Oxfam Archive; "NGO Meeting on Kampuchea. September 25 1986 at the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam," "Cambodge 1980: Marche Pour la Survie (comptes) et courriers, 80–92 fiche pays," MSF Archive; Luciolli, *Le Mur de bambou.*

51 James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine.*

ment to a non-political development strategy meant that Oxfam only moved slowly towards an anti-apartheid policy after 1982, supporting sanctions for the first time in 1987 and later being chastised by the Charity Commissioners as a result.[52] When famine unfolded in Ethiopia in 1984, Oxfam's commitment to development discouraged the NGO from criticizing the government's forced resettlement of famine victims from the north to the south of the country – this was initially viewed by some officials as a logically sound initiative that was needed to reform the country's agriculture.[53] In truth, resettlement was a classic case of what has been called "repressive developmentalism" in Ethiopia's civil war that utilized socio-economic development concerns in the service of securitarian objectives.[54] This was a cruel experiment in social engineering, in which human lives were a secondary concern,[55] yet the question of whether to publicly expose the abuse of aid in resettlements came down to how much value NGOs placed on retaining a field presence in Ethiopia. In Oxfam's case, the long-term development goals that it possessed in the country produced a blindness to human rights abuses. The question remains – why was Latin America the exception to dominant trends in Oxfam's international development program? The answer to this question lies in the importance of intellectual formations for producing a distinct, contextually understood ideology of development in Latin America.

3 Social movement theory and the radical habitus

In the 1960s, so-called "new" social movements emerged in the West which saw mass coalitions of young people taking to the streets and engaging in political campaigns that were not directly connected to the participants' economic class interests or established political parties.[56] Oxfam later became a vehicle of this "new social movement" activism in Britain because it was shaped by the radicalism of the generation that came of age in the 1960s, who had benefited from a long period

52 Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 244–246 and 249–252.

53 Fourth report from Wegel Tena, 8 February 1985 and Evaluation and Monitoring: Ethiopia, PRG/5/3/1/5, Oxfam Archive; oral history interview with Tony Vaux, conducted on 28 May 2020; Vaux, *The Selfish Altruist*, 43–51.

54 Jeronimo, "A Robust Operation."

55 Fourth report from Wegel Tena, 8 February 1985, PRG/5/3/1/5, Oxfam Archive; De Waal, *Evil Days*, 211–230.

56 See Hilton, *A Historical Guide*, 6–7, and Paul Byrne, *Social Movements in Britain* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1997), 13.

of economic growth and increased access to education.[57] This section examines how this impacted the evolution of the organization's development program In Latin America, where interventions were increasingly animated by a vision of solidarity with the poor and an orientation towards collective rights from the 1970s. To get to the heart of why this was the case, it utilizes Pierre Bourdieu's concept of the "habitus" to analyze the intellectual formation of Oxfam's Bill Yates.[58] As is widely recognized among social movement theorists, this captures the importance of social structure and primary socialization in shaping an individual's values at the same time as it acknowledges the agency of individuals in continually seeking out social worlds and forms of action that appeal to them. In this way, it establishes a distinct habitus that can be examined over a person's lifetime.[59] Of particular interest for the analysis is Erik Neveu's identification of a "militant habitus" among '68 activists in France, described as "a lasting input of social energies to involvement in collective action and struggles, shaping a set of skills, interpretative schemes, and ways of behaving that support this orientation."[60] Several forces, including religious socialization, class, and place, shaped Bill Yates' worldview along with the policies of the organization he worked for.[61]

Neveu's research is insightful on the role of religion in primary socialization as it demonstrates the persistence of a militant habitus among the rural, Catholic '68 activists he analyzes.[62] In contrast to previous constructions of '68 activists as "frantic social climbers" who rejected their youthful radicalism for personal gain, Neveu emphasizes that most sought out careers that reflected their anti-hierarchical, caring, and communitarian impulses.[63] Yates' background had much in com-

57 Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 177–203; Chris Rootes, "The New Politics and the New Social Movements," *European Journal of Political Research* 22, no. 2 (1992): 171–91; Byrne, *Social Movements in Britain.*

58 Pierre Bourdieu, *La Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement* (Paris: Les Editions de minuit, 1979), and Bourdieu, *Questions de sociologie* (Paris: Les Editions de minuit, 1981).

59 See Nick Crossley, "From Reproduction to Transformation: Social Movement Fields and the Radical Habitus," *Theory, culture & society* 20, no. 6 (2003): 43–68, and Erik Neveu, "Life stories of former French activists of "68": Using Biographies to Investigate the Outcomes of Social Movements," in Erik Neveu and Olivier Filieule, eds., *Activists Forever? Long-Term Impacts of Political Activism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 84–108, and Rootes, "The new politics and the new social movements."

60 Neveu, "Life stories," 91.

61 Neveu, "Life stories"; Fred Rose, "Toward a Class-Cultural Theory of Social Movements: Reinterpreting New Social Movements," *Sociological Forum* 12, no. 3 (1997): 461–495; Kiran Patel and Sonja Levsen, "The Spatial Contours of Transnational Activism: Conceptual Implications and the Road Forward," *European Review of History* 29, no. 3 (2022): 548–561.

62 Neveu, "Life stories," 91–92.

63 Ibid., 103–104.

mon with this Christian left milieu, for whom the psychological effects of communal devotion and encountering a transnational missionary network from an early age instilled values of collective action and solidarity with the poor.[64] Yates jokingly refers to himself now as an "Atheist Quaker" but acknowledges that his Catholic socialization was formative, especially as he spent part of his childhood in Brazil. When he returned there in 1972 with Oxfam as Country Director, he was deeply inspired by the liberation theology movement that had spread among progressive sections of the church following the Vatican II conference in Medellín in 1968.[65] The central claims of liberation theology were that Catholic scripture readings should be guided by "a preferential option for the poor," and that priests had a spiritual duty to directly engage with communities in dismantling systems of social injustice.[66] In practice, liberationist priests often set up what were called "Christian Base Communities" in which *campesinos* ("peasants") were invited to reflect on the injustice of the economic system that had caused them to live in poverty, and which they were told they had a "right" to contest.[67] As the Catholic church was already Oxfam's main contact in the region, Yates developed relationships with influential liberation theologians like Dom Hélder Câmara, who ensured that the impulse to solidarity was more important in structuring Yates' primary worldview than the anti-communism that simultaneously molded the outlooks of other humanitarian organizations.[68]

Social class and the geographies of intellectual formation were also central. It is widely acknowledged that new social movements were overwhelmingly middle-class, but the concept of "class-culture" allows us to move beyond economic explanations and locate the reasons for this in the group psychology and social attitudes structured by class.[69] Yates fits neatly into the category of middle-class activists who sought self-definition through their occupations, as would most Oxfam members at the time.[70] Claiming he experienced something akin to a "mid-life crisis" in

64 Ibid.

65 Oral history interview with Bill Yates, conducted on 21 July 2020.

66 Calles Barger, *The World Come of Age*, and Rowland, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology*.

67 See Todd, *Beyond Displacement*, 41–45, for a description of Christian Base Communities in northern El Salvador in the 1970s.

68 Oral history interview with Bill Yates, conducted on 21 July 2020; on the influence of anti-communism on the formation of French NGO Médecins Sans Frontières, see Eleanor Davey, *Idealism beyond borders: The French revolutionary Left and the rise of humanitarianism, 1954–1988* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

69 Rose, "Toward a Class-Cultural Theory of Social Movements."

70 Ibid.

his twenties, Yates was compelled to join Oxfam when he realized that he was not doing anything worthwhile despite making a lot of money in his post-university marketing job.[71] Willing to self-limit his earning potential to channel his idealism into his profession, Yates approached his work in Oxfam with a high level of personal investment and commitment. Added to this was the distinctiveness of Britain as a national setting for social change. There is a trope of British exceptionalism with regards to European experiences of 1968, which rests on the "decidedly modest" nature of student radicalism in the UK.[72] Rather, the institutional constraints of British political culture – its first-past-the-post electoral system, and relatively open civil society – led to the integration of social movement activism into established political and civil society forums. Britain lacked an autonomous or overly militant student protest movement, yet its educated middle-class activists were able to combine the "new" social movements with "old" economic issues in a more durable manner, without the sharp fracturing between traditional leftist and post-materialist activism that occurred elsewhere.[73] Yates' experiences were consistent with this pattern: his political activism occurred primarily within Oxfam, which by the 1970s was already regarded as an establishment NGO. Initially unreceptive to activist infiltration in the late 1960s, Oxfam was successfully infused with a new sense of (tempered) radicalism by Yates and his colleagues in the 1970s.[74] The intellectual atmosphere within Oxfam in this period, he recalls, was one of "permanent revolution," indicating the capacity for established British civil society organizations to be remade into sites of activism.[75] Furthermore, as Yates did not participate in a radical protest movement as a student, he felt no need to reckon with a revolutionary past as an adult later on, resulting in his deepening engagement rather than questioning of leftist ideologies throughout the 1970s.

In addition to national context, there is a growing body of literature on transnational social movements that shows the importance of comparing "spaces of imagined belonging" with the actual spaces of social interaction within which activists form their worldviews.[76] Crucially, Brazil was the most formative spatial environment for Yates. Based in the northern capital of Recife as Country Director,

71 Oral history interview with Bill Yates, conducted on 21 July 2020; Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 186.

72 See Rootes, "The New Politics," 177.

73 Ibid., 180–187.

74 See Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 155–162, on the internal tensions of the 1960s over domestic advocacy. See also 177–202 on the radical evolutions that occurred in the 1970s.

75 Oral history interview with Bill Yates, conducted on 21 July 2020.

76 Patel and Levsen, "The Spatial Contours of Transnational Activism."

Yates encountered a cradle of radical thinking in which the slums contained the physical evidence of poverty, and the church became invested with spiritual dissent. Dubbed "conscientization capital" by Maggie Black, Recife was also the hometown of Paolo Freire, the educationalist who wrote *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* in 1968, arguing that poor youth should be given the tools to recognize their own oppression and dismantle the systems that disempowered them.[77] Dom Hélder Câmara was the archbishop of Olinda and Recife, and his famous lament, "When I fed the poor, they called me a saint. When I asked 'Why are they poor?' they called me a communist," became a touchstone for Yates.[78] Finally, Recife bore the hallmarks of entrenched repression, having been the scene for a failed leftist military revolt in 1935 that was mythologized by the right-wing authorities as a uniquely evil episode justifying extreme measures.[79] Over five years, Yates witnessed several priests and development partners being arrested, and his awareness of Oxfam's vulnerability to CIA infiltration led him to burn his office files, remarking "you didn't have to be paranoid, but it helped."[80] This prolonged exposure to surveillance and fear again meant that Yates deepened rather than questioned his commitment to using charity as a form of radical solidarity with poor communities in Latin America.

In Oxford, Yates pushed for the application of conscientization in Oxfam's development thinking, insisting that the NGO should prioritize the fostering of autonomy and critical consciousness over measurable outcomes in program evaluations.[81] He admits that the concept was difficult to explain to board members due to "the fact that it was about sitting under a tree with a bunch of villagers who had a common problem… and just talking about it and listening to their views…. encouraging them to create solutions, however small-scale it might be."[82] Resistance came from those with a more corporate outlook, who prioritized quantitative indicators. By contrast, Yates argued that even if a community wanted to spend Oxfam money to build a football pitch, this would still be a positive outcome because it represented the beginning of a process of empowerment which would

77 Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 185–187.

78 Oral history interview with Bill Yates, conducted on 21 July 2020.

79 Vincent Bevins, *The Jakarta Method: Washington's Anticommunist Crusade & the Mass Murder Program that Shaped Our World* (New York: Public Affairs, 2020), 101–105.

80 Oral history interview with Bill Yates, conducted on 21 July 2020; see also Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 187, on Yates' experience of repression in Brazil.

81 Oral history interview with Bill Yates, conducted on 21 July 2020; see also Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 196–197 and 188–189.

82 Oral history interview with Bill Yates, conducted on 21 July 2020.

have knock-on effects in the sustainable improvement of livelihoods.[83] This was a radical expression of what social development should look like as it decentered the external expertise of Western humanitarian practitioners and placed the unquantifiable achievement of critical consciousness above traditional indicators of a project's success like crop productivity and nutritional health. Development Secretary Adrian Moyes later reintroduced some practical economic considerations in what he called an "integrated development" approach,[84] yet the sense of radical renewal that accompanied Yates' "politicization of humanitarianism"[85] had a strong influence on the organization, which was evident in the 1980s.

When this approach was put into practice, the experiences it produced strongly influenced how Oxfam engaged with Salvadoran suffering. Officials had long realized that the kind of development work it practiced was a target for repression in Latin America, especially when in the 1970s this began to encompass legal aid to communities whose land rights were threatened.[86] When violence intensified in Central America, it felt directly impacted and expanded its role to include advocacy on human rights.[87] In 1982, Field Director Rolando Lopez responded to concerns in Oxford that a funding proposal from a human rights NGO in Guatemala was beyond Oxfam's remit by pointing out that the murders being documented by the organization were often of people Oxfam had closely worked with on development programs before the outbreak of hostilities.[88] While Oxfam was able to maintain a level of social distance that allowed it to pursue non-political development programs in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, this was impossible in Central America – the deep ties it had cultivated with local communities in pursuit of conscientization-informed development produced an instinctive solidarity with civilians against governmental violence.

Oxfam's relationship with the program began when it channeled funds through local solidarity-oriented organizations like Catholic Relief Services (CRS)

83 Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 188.

84 Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 189–191.

85 Van Dam, "No Justice Without Charity," 657.

86 Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 191–192.

87 11 December 1980 letter from Brian Walker, Director General of Oxfam to Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, lobbying UK government to support a UN Resolution condemning human rights violations committed by Salvadoran government, OD 28/451 El Salvador, UK National Archives.

88 Annual Report for Central America and Mexico by Field Director Rolando Lopez, 27 October 1982 minutes of Latin America Field Committee, PRG/1/5/6, Oxfam Archive.

and Caritas Santa Rosa in 1980.[89] In this way, Oxfam's established practice of working through local intermediaries, which had previously relied on colonial missionaries and more conservatively-minded church organizations, now produced a deference to organizations which had become closely linked to liberation theology. For everyday information on the program, Oxfam relied upon reports from CRS, an organization it had long-standing ties with.[90] One detailed report from CRS representative Mary Contier sent to Oxfam emotively described how a refugee had slipped Contier a note pleading for help in the face of harassment from the Honduran military.[91] Thus, even though Oxfam had no permanent operational presence, the communication links it possessed promptly provided it with eyewitness accounts that revealed the violence committed by Honduran soldiers and the fear under which Salvadorans were living. When Oxfam staff made field visits – however brief – to El Salvador and Honduras, they resulted in emotionally affecting experiences that were strongly shaped by Salvadoran agency. Bill Yates recalled a visit to an Oxfam-supported church refuge in San Salvador in the early 1980s, when a priest once drove him early one morning to see "on an incipient rubbish heap, [amid] old car tires and the odd chucked away household appliance," "half a dozen bodies… the death squad's work of the previous night."[92] Direct encounters like this ensured that Salvadoran suffering was experienced as a personal trauma for some Oxfam members.

While other European NGOs that had a presence in the camps in Honduras practiced a medicalized approach to saving bodies,[93] Oxfam's more holistic understanding of the role of aid was reflected in its support for El Centro de Investigacion y Accion Social (CIAS), a grassroots healthcare organization that operated

89 June 1981 Report on "Salvadorean Refugees in Honduras" from Rolando Lopez (Field Director for Central America), attached to 5 and 11 June letters from Rolando Lopez to Bridget Wooding and Christine Whitehead, PRG/3/3/3/8, and PRG/1/5/6, Oxfam Archive.

90 See Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 183–186, on the beginnings of Oxfam's relationship with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in the mid-1960s; correspondence between Oxfam and CRS representatives attests to the close ties in 1980s Honduras, PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

91 Report on "Trip to Mesa Grande, La Virtud, and Colomoncagua," "April 19, 1982 through April 24, 1982," signed "Prepared by: Mary Contier, May 6, 1982," PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

92 Oral history interview with Bill Yates, conducted on 21 July 2020.

93 This was true for Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). See "Honduras 80–88: refugies salvadoriens" and "Honduras 87/89 Salvador Refugies," MSF Archive; on medicalisation, see Miriam Ticktin, *Casualties of care: immigration and the politics of humanitarianism in France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011) and "The Gendered Human of Humanitarianism: Medicalising and Politicising Sexual Violence," *Gender & History* 23, no. 2 (2011): 250–265.

within insurgent zones in El Salvador.[94] Even though they had become refugees in Honduras, Oxfam applied the same values of autonomous community development to the Salvadorans it encountered there, viewing them primarily as partners in development rather than as patients. In 1983, this led Oxfam to support supplementary nutrition centers as important spaces of independent community care, even after Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and UNHCR called for their closure because they were no longer medically necessary.[95] Along with political formation and professional ideology then, practice was key in reinforcing ideological reproduction and crystallizing the distinct political role Oxfam viewed for itself in Honduras.[96] Because Yates channeled his discontent with his bourgeois lifestyle into a vision of humanitarianism as a vehicle for social change, he deepened his commitment to this vision over time and influenced the development of a specific "action repertoire" that corresponded to it within Oxfam.[97]

4 Social development shapes action in Honduras

"Politics" confronted Oxfam in Honduras when it was lobbied by refugees to participate in an international campaign against UNHCR's planned relocation of camps away from the Salvadoran border. The camps were adjacent to areas in El Salvador that were held by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgents and the refugees experienced constant harassment from the Honduran Army, who often colluded with the Salvadoran forces in arresting, torturing, and executing refugees who were suspected to be members of the FMLN or to be aiding the FMLN in any way.[98] UNHCR representatives failed to offer ade-

94 11 February 1982 Agenda, 27 October 1982 Agenda and Minutes of Latin America Field Committee, PRG/1/5/6, Oxfam Archive.

95 Oral history interview with Pauline Alvarez, conducted on 27 June 2019; "Field trip to Honduras, 19–28 May 1982," "PURPOSE OF TRIP: Visit Mesa Grande, Colomoncagua refugee camps, Accompany Mr. James Howard, Oxford, as translator," PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive; 19.1.84 letter from CJ to BFW on "Refugees- Honduras," PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive; Report "Honduras: Campa de refugies de "Mesa Grande"", "Mission fev 82- Aout 82 [MJ Clarenie] MSF Aquitaine," Honduras 80–88: refugies salvadoriens, MSF Archive.

96 Joseph Ibrahim, *Bourdieu and Social Movements: Ideological Struggles in the British Anti-Capitalist Movement* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 64–85.

97 Ibrahim, *Bourdieu and Social Movements.*

98 See Molly Todd, *Beyond Displacement*, 112–138, on military repression and the refugees' campaigns against relocation of camps in Honduras; see also O'Sullivan, "Civil War in El Salvador," for a discussion of how Anglophone international humanitarian NGOs, including Oxfam, responded to these incidents.

quate protection to refuges from the military and claimed that relocation away from the border alone would solve the refugees' security issues.[99] However, refugee committees vehemently disputed this, claiming that they feared the Honduran soldiers just as much as the Salvadoran forces, and would feel less safe if they were moved further into a country where the authorities were so hostile to their presence.[100] There was also a political element to their preference for remaining at the border – the refugee community cultivated a strong sense of Salvadoran national identity in exile and did not wish to lose their physical proximity to their homeland.[101] The location of the refugee camps made it relatively feasible for people and goods to pass back and forth across the border, which fueled allegations of aid diversion and constituted an important reason why relocation was pursued so forcefully by UNHCR and the Honduran government.[102] Finally, the US Embassy in Honduras was a powerful advocate for relocation, and its training of Salvadoran troops in a military base at Puerto Castilla in Honduras led refugees to argue that the policy was a cover for military maneuvers in the border region.[103] Refugee committees passionately argued that they would not allow themselves to be moved to facilitate the invasion of their country by foreign troops.[104] As such, the attempted enforcement of the wholesale relocation of camps to the interior of Honduras became a lightning rod for political animosities and divisions over the broader dynamics of the global Cold War.

Oxfam joined with several local and international solidarity-minded organizations in directly participating in the anti-relocation campaign. Following the failure to prevent the first, violently enforced relocation from the La Virtud to Mesa Grande camps by the Honduran military between 1981 and 1982, the threat of a second relocation was pivotal in encouraging Oxfam to embrace the language of human rights and denounce UNHCR's policy as politically motivated. When UNHCR announced in early 1982 that refugees from Colomoncagua and excess population from the newly opened yet already overcrowded Mesa Grande would be relocated to a new permanent site in Olancho, many Salvadorans claimed they

99 UNHCR, Oxfam and CRS reports, PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

100 2.12.81 telex "Following for Chefeke Dessalegn…," PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

101 Todd, *Beyond Displacement*, 138–190.

102 See Todd, *Beyond Displacement*, 3–4, for description of Honduran propaganda that portrayed camps as "hotbeds of guerrilla activity," and 82–112 for an overview of the porous nature of the Honduran-Salvadoran border.

103 "Update on Refugee Situation in Honduras," June 1983, "The Salvadorean Refugees in Colomoncagua and Mesa Grande, Honduras (The Relocation Question)," "Prepared on January 18, 1984 for the ICVA Consultation on Central America"; 14 January 1984 letter from "All of the Refugee Community, Colomoncagua," PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

104 Todd, *Beyond Displacement*, 157–158.

would rather return to war-torn El Salvador than be moved.[105] Aware of the strategic value of appealing to international humanitarians, the refugee committees produced public announcements that used the language of human rights and the Salvadorans' Christian faith to express their resistance.[106] Oxfam was plugged into both the professional humanitarian and Christian charity networks, and was highly receptive to the refugees' lobbying.

In internal communications, Oxfam's stance was consciously understood as an operationalization of the values of social development. Staff members complained about UNHCR's overly "technical" approach in failing to take on board the Salvadoran community's wishes.[107] UNHCR officials claimed that experts would be brought in to help refugees deal with any psychological distress that resulted from the move, yet Oxfam's stated view was that the refugees' trauma from fleeing El Salvador constituted the primary reason why they should not be uprooted again against their will.[108] Oxfam also contradicted UNHCR's narrative that the border was uniquely unsafe by arguing that the Honduran military's brutality, rather than proximity to the border, was the primary cause of insecurity.[109] When UNHCR attempted to pressure NGOs to promote relocation, Oxfam responded that it was not its place to advise the Salvadorans on something of which only

105 Details of second phase of relocation contained in following reports. Report on "Trip to Mesa Grande, La Virtud, and Colomoncagua," "April 19, 1982 through April 24, 1982," signed "Prepared by: Mary Contier [CRS], May 6, 1982"; "Report on UNHCR Mission to Central America (11 to 22 February 1982)"; "Briefing Paper on the Relocation of Salvadoran and Guatemalan Refugees in Honduras… Peter Shiras. CRS Teguc.," all PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

106 Public letters from the refugee community appealing for solidarity against relocation make several references to the refugees' Christian faith. 14 January 1984 public letter from "All of the Refugee Community, Colomoncagua" on relocation, and letter from "San Marcos Ocotepeque, Honduras 27 de enero, 1982" signed by "Refugiados de Mesa Grande" (in Spanish), PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

107 11 March 1982 letter from PS (Peter Sollis) to RMW (Richard Moseley-Williams), about conversation with UNHCR rep Ingenar Cederburg (Projects Officer) in Costa Rica, PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

108 3 August 1983 report of meeting, sent from Bridget Wooding to Richard Moseley-Williams (Oxfam) and Martin Barber (British Refugee Council), "Debriefing of O Haselman and C Bertrand following their Mission to Honduras/ Mexico in June 1983," PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

109 A military incursion to Guatemalan refugee camp El Tesoro in June 1983 was politicised in different ways by UNHCR and Oxfam. UNHCR representatives claimed in "Mission Report: Honduras (June 1983)" written by "O Haselman C Bertrand 30 June 1983" that it showed the incompatibility of the border with refugee security, while Oxfam claimed in the report "Update on Refugee Situation in Honduras, June 1983" that it demonstrated refugee security had less to do with proximity to the border, and more to do with the Honduran army, which UNHCR had proved itself powerless to protect refugees from. Both reports in PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

they would experience the consequences, reflecting the belief that external actors should not dictate the community's development, or in this case its emergency relief needs.[110]

Oxfam had shied away from direct confrontation with UNHCR in 1981, yet in 1983 it was aware of the refugees' higher level of organization and resolved to support their resistance.[111] The existence of ICVA as a forum through which to collectively advocate for the refugees also made the decision to embrace solidarity an easier one. Oxfam rarely made lone stands on human rights issues, preferring to work with other NGOs to present a coordinated front, a tendency which stemmed from Oxfam's center-left background, and the institutional environment in which political activism developed in Britain.[112] Thus, Oxfam worked with CRS, the British Refugee Council, and others to make representations on behalf of the refugees to UNHCR.[113] The need to publicize the refugees' campaign was emphasized, and refugee objections to relocation were repeated by staff at meetings with UNHCR in Geneva. The idea of establishing an "alarm system" of influential people to go to the camp at any sign of imminent relocation was discussed.[114] In Britain, Oxfam participated in a Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) appeal on Central America in 1982, and over the following years it continued to produce press releases, write letters to parliament, and facilitate visits by Salvadoran activists to Britain (and visits by British public figures to the camps in Honduras) to raise awareness about the suffering of Salvadoran refugees.[115] However, advocacy on Central America in Britain was complicated – the DEC appeal in 1982 was hampered by the difficult task of needing to present facts in a "non-political" manner, and there was little public engagement with the region's crises compared with the attention given to Cambodia and Ethiopia in the same decade. Rather than this being a hindrance to Oxfam, however, it may have allowed for the maintenance

110 From MP to File, "Field trip to Honduras, 19–28 May 1982," "PURPOSE OF TRIP: Visit Mesa Grande, Colomoncagua refugee camps, Accompany Mr. James Howard, Oxford, as translator," PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive; [Julia] Cameron, "The Salvadorean Refugees in Colomoncagua and Mesa Grande, Honduras (The Relocation Question)," "Prepared on January 18, 1984 for the ICVA Consultation on Central America," PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

111 Telex from M. Pickard to BFW 26 August 1983, PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

112 Rootes, "The New Politics."

113 See "83–10–05" telex from Harris, Oxfam Overseas Director to Paul Hartline, High Commissioner for Refugees, 10 November 1983 letter from Martin Barber (Director, British Refugee Council) to other agencies, including Oxfam, on planned ICVA Working Group meetings with UNHCR, and "Briefing Paper on the Relocation of Salvadoran and Guatemalan Refugees in Honduras' (undated) by 'Peter Shiras. CRS Teguc." All PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

114 14 October 1983 letter from Chris Jackson to Bridget Wooding, PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

115 O'Sullivan, *Civil War in El Salvador*, see 252, 258–263.

of a more radical stance in its on-the-ground campaigning and professional lobbying of UNHCR.[116]

In January 1984, a comprehensive report was compiled by the ICVA campaign that summarized the arguments against the policy, and clearly demonstrated how social development concerns had led to a denunciation of US foreign policy interference.[117] The report began by scrutinizing conditions in Olancho and Yoro, provinces which had been proposed by UNHCR as relocation areas. The sites being scoped out for purchase were highly problematic, it concluded, due to a history of tensions between locals and Salvadoran immigrants, and the fact that Honduran *campesinos* claimed the land as part of an increasingly contentious land rights struggle. The report also challenged UNHCR's central claim that the move would allow refugees to regain dignity and independence by achieving agricultural self-sufficiency. ICVA relayed the refugees' response that they would not have the capacity to increase their productivity just because they had access to more land.[118] It was from this line of argument that the report exposed American interference in UNHCR policy. When the refugees' concerns were pointed out, the American Embassy in Honduras said it would provide machinery to help them work the land. Yet when NGOs replied that Salvadorans would be unable to obtain permits to operate these vehicles in Honduras, the Americans simply said they would pay Hondurans to do it instead.[119] Agricultural independence was manifestly not a goal of relocation for Salvadorans.

Finally, the report recorded that UNHCR staff members had admitted under pressure from late October 1983 that the policy was being pushed by outside influences. This was seen to confirm rumors that UNHCR was clearing the border of refugees to facilitate an invasion by Salvadoran troops (training at US Army base Puerto Castilla in Honduras) to retake guerrilla-held areas across the border.[120] Several facts were described by the report's author Julia Cameron to corroborate this allegation. The most obvious giveaway was the extensive camp infrastructure built by the refugees, which could easily accommodate a military base

116 Ibid.

117 [Julia] Cameron, "The Salvadorean Refugees in Colomoncagua and Mesa Grande, Honduras (The Relocation Question)," "Prepared on January 18, 1984 for the ICVA Consultation on Central America," PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

118 Ibid.; see also Todd, *Beyond Displacement*, 129–136.

119 [Julia] Cameron, "The Salvadorean Refugees in Colomoncagua and Mesa Grande, Honduras (The Relocation Question)," "Prepared on January 18, 1984 for the ICVA Consultation on Central America," PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

120 Ibid.

for 10–11,000 soldiers.[121] Tellingly, after relocation was announced, a road from Colomoncagua to San Antonio was also completed and an airplane landing strip was proposed to be repaired with UNHCR money. This was an absurd use of donors' funds, unless UNHCR was being consciously used as a political tool. As such, the ICVA report questioned UNHCR's neutrality in Honduras. Why was it so keen on enforcing a policy that was being pushed by a third-party government and had been initially opposed by the host state? [122] In pointing out the many holes in UNHCR's defense of relocation, ICVA agencies drew attention to the fact that UNHCR was a politically compromised hostage of US foreign policy in Honduras. For this, they were, in turn, denounced as guerrilla stooges by the Honduran Army.[123]

The values of social development as understood in the context of Latin America had driven Oxfam to support the political activism of the Salvadoran refugees, demonstrating that development thinking could produce interventions that were not instrumentalized by states during the Cold War. This ultimately led Oxfam to embrace a form of human rights that reflected the refugee community's goals. Often associated with advocacy on the behalf of political prisoners during the Cold War, human rights did not always uniformly disaggregate societies into individuals.[124] Social cohesion and collective rights activism became important means of survival for the Salvadoran refugee community in Honduras.[125] The refugee committees represented powerful advocates for their community, and they consciously utilized humanitarian NGOs as both sources of information about human rights and allies in an international solidarity network.[126] Oxfam's position as an NGO within which social movement activism was channeled and operationalized as part of a radical vision of social development meant that it was receptive to the refugees' vision of human rights as a way to advocate for the collective welfare of their community against external aggressors. The campaign against relocation also showed that US and UNHCR policies were conceived of as threats to the

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.

123 25/1/84 telex from CJ to MRH/ RMW describes Pauline Martin's receipt of word at ICVA conference that Colonel Turcios (Coordinator of National Refugee Commission in Honduras) had condemned the anti-relocation campaign as a front for guerrilla interference, PRG/3/3/3/8, Oxfam Archive.

124 Jessica Stites-Mor, *Human Rights and Transnational Solidarity in Cold War Latin America* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013), 9–12.

125 Todd, *Beyond Displacement*.

126 Ibid., 114–117.

rights of Salvadoran refugees, which challenged the US government's attempted co-optation of human rights as a language of anticommunism in the 1980s.[127]

5 Development and human rights in humanitarian history

The experience of engaging with the political activism of Salvadoran refugees in Honduras had important consequences for Oxfam. The second phase of relocation was never implemented, representing a victory for the refugees.[128] Oxfam remained involved in the relief program in Honduras until it ended in 1989, and as camps began to close it supported refugee-run repatriation efforts instead of the UNHCR-led program, which refugee committees rejected as unsafe.[129] As Molly Todd has explored, the community repatriations can be seen as important political acts that helped to eventually bring the Salvadoran civil war to an end because they allowed formerly exiled communities to reassert sovereignty over villages in defiance of state control.[130] For its part, Oxfam supported refugee-led repatriation because it embodied the vision of autonomous community development that had become so central to its mission in Latin America.[131] In Britain, Oxfam was also driven to be more outspoken in domestic campaigning, participating in a "Central America Week" in 1988 alongside Christian Aid and War on Want to raise awareness about human rights abuses and US interference in the region.[132] Oxfam was later investigated by the Charity Commissioners for this campaign (among others), and in 1990 was found to be guilty of political campaigning – in violation of charity law. While more of a symbolic reprimand than a severe blow, this nevertheless clearly demonstrated that Oxfam had felt compelled to push the boundaries of acceptable conduct in its engagements in Central America.[133]

127 On human rights in Western foreign policy, see Jan Eckel, *The Ambivalence of Good: Human rights in international politics since the 1940s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 190–243; see also Sarah Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

128 Todd, *Beyond Displacement*, 112–138.

129 Oral history interview with Pauline Alvarez, conducted on 27 June 2019.

130 Todd, *Beyond Displacement*, 190–221.

131 Oral history interview with Pauline Alvarez, conducted on 27 June 2019.

132 Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 272–273.

133 Ibid., 278–284.

In further evaluating the significance of development in shaping Oxfam's humanitarian advocacy in Honduras, it is necessary to reconsider this episode alongside Oxfam's other development programs. Was Oxfam's interpretation of solidarity in Latin America really so different from the naivety of earlier forms of grassroots development that proclaimed to embody a bottom-up approach yet often resulted in the entrenchment of state power or the replication of paternalistic colonial dynamics? More research is needed on Oxfam's development program in Nicaragua under Sandinista rule, which may prove to share some of the characteristics of its involvement in Tanzania and Cambodia.[134] However, this article argues that the values of social development as understood in Honduras were distinctive because they led to the operationalization of a collective human rights activism that was strongly influenced by non-state actors. In particular, the confrontations that occurred over relocation demonstrated that rights discourse was a powerful tool in contesting the governance of refugee camps by large international organizations and the states that funded them.

The anti-relocation campaign in Honduras constituted one of the key moments at which political formations and professional ideologies crystallized into a clear engagement with rights in humanitarian action, laying the groundwork for the deepening of this relationship in the following decade. Arguments that 1989 should be regarded as a big bang moment for the history of human rights thus adopt a narrowly consequentialist logic that limit the importance of rights to their influence on states in the form of military "humanitarian" interventions, failing to recognize the key role played by non-governmental actors in the 1980s.[135] In successfully resisting the relocation of camps, Salvadoran refugees and sympathetic NGOs exerted an influence on superpower politics by preventing the US and Honduras from clearing the border area for military maneuvers. As such, the refugees may have prevented a re-invasion of El Salvador and changed the outcome of the civil war in their country. Following calls to look "beyond the eagle's shadow" in evaluating the impact of interventionism in Latin America, this should be seen

134 Eline Van Ommen's forthcoming monograph *Revolutionary Diplomacy and the Global Cold War* (University of California Press) should add to our understanding of European political and humanitarian solidarity with the Sandinista regime in the 1980s. However, more research is needed on the development programmes of Oxfam and other European NGOs in the country at the time.

135 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman, "Human Rights and History," *Past & Present* 232, no. 1 (2016): 279–310. See also critical replies to Hoffmann's argument from Lynn Hunt, "The Long and the Short of the History of Human Rights," *Past & Present* 233, no. 1 (2016): 323–331, and Samuel Moyn, "The End of Human Rights History," *Past & Present* 233, no. 1 (2016): 307–322; see also Michael Barnett, *The Empire of Humanity a History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca [N.Y.]: Cornell University Press, 2011).

as a powerful indication of the agency and influence held by ordinary people when confronted with the immense yet not absolute power of the United States over the course of the Cold War.[136]

Stepping back to adopt a *longue-durée* perspective on the history of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) also allows us to appreciate the importance of the anti-relocation campaign as part of a pattern of norm contestation that can be traced back to the post-war negotiations that led to the codification of IHL. While the language of human rights was ultimately isolated from IHL due to the inability of negotiators to pin down exactly whose human rights IHL should prioritize in conflicts, it was strongly present in negotiations.[137] The norms of IHL ultimately focused on the rights of states over those of civilians, and accordingly the Honduran state's right to protect its security interests by moving refugees away from an international border was deemed by UNHCR to trump the refugees' desires to remain there in the 1980s. However, the powerful defiance of Salvadorans frustrated this view. By rejecting the relevance of IHL in this case, and instead asserting that its implementation constituted a human rights violation, the refugees and NGOs like Oxfam punched holes in the state sovereignty of Honduras, disrupting the idea of IHL as a settled, universally applicable legal regime. In effect, they resurrected the arguments that had occurred over the negotiating table decades earlier by rejecting a statist hierarchy of rights in war. [138] By openly engaging with the political nature of relocation, they also exposed the fact that IHL was being used as a cover for the agenda of the US government and its allies in the region.

Building on this, it is important to recognize the implications of the Salvadoran refugee program for how we understand the role of Latin American agency in shaping global norms. Oxfam's staff were directly influenced by the Salvadoran refugee committees and chose to amplify their strategic use of rights language in the campaign against relocation. Reading the Central American case in this way allows us to move beyond historical narratives that reproduce humanitarian constructions of refugees as passive victims, while also challenging Eurocentric analyzes that disproportionately locate the formative acts of international norm proliferation in northern actors. In parallel to the advocacy of Salvadoran expatriates in American solidarity networks, the refugees in Honduras skillfully used their

136 Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Julio Moreno eds., *Beyond the Eagle's Shadow: New Histories of Latin America's Cold War* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013).

137 Boyd Van Dijk, "Human Rights in War: On the Entangled Foundations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions," *The American Journal of International Law* 112, no. 4 (2018): 553–582.

138 Ibid., 575–577.

personal connections to international workers and a conscious performance of their suffering to expand the reach of their activism and penetrate the political spaces where they knew it would have an impact.[139] This was evident in Oxfam's campaigning in Britain and at the United Nations headquarters in Geneva, yet it was also evident in Oxfam-Canada's campaigning in Canada, and the efforts of NGOs like Trócaire in Ireland – together, these organizations (and others) engaged in a coordinated international campaign to bring the *campesinos*' narrative to Western audiences.[140] In promoting their message abroad, the Salvadoran refugees were thus important political actors in Salvadoran history, yet it is also important to think globally, and to explore the dynamics of Latin American history during the Cold War, not just for their internal relevance but for their role in shaping the development of human rights discourse as an international norm.[141] Stella Krepp and Christy Thornton have already illustrated the role played by Latin American diplomats and the Mexican government in shaping the discourse and institutions of global development discourse, while Kevin O'Sullivan has demonstrated the influence Salvadoran refugees had on British, Irish, and North American NGOs in engaging with solidarity.[142] This case study has taken this further by showing exactly how it came to be that Oxfam was open to being influenced by Salvadoran refugees in this way. The malleability of development as a concept combined with the intellectual formation of figures like Bill Yates to condition Oxfam's internalization of the logics of liberation theology and conscientization in the 1970s. Because these radical ideologies of empowerment and solidarity largely came up through the traditional charity networks of the Catholic church, the practice of charity became politicized, and when violent conflict broke out in Central America this interpretation of development ideology translated into a distinctive form of collective human rights activism.

Reflecting on Oxfam's interpretation of human rights in Honduras permits critical distance from normative debates about the influence of human rights on

139 See Hector Perla Jr., "Si Nicaragua Venció, El Salvador Vencerá: Central American Agency in the Creation of the U.S.: Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement," *Latin American Research Review*, 43 no. 2 (2008): 136–158, and Kim Christiaens, "Between Diplomacy and Solidarity: Western European Support Networks for Sandinista Nicaragua," *European Review of History* 21, no. 4 (2014): 617–634.

140 See O'Sullivan, *Civil War in El Salvador.*

141 Todd, *Beyond Displacement*; Patrick William Kelly, *Sovereign emergencies: Latin America and the Making of Global Human Rights Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

142 Stella Krepp, "Fighting an Illiberal World Order: The Latin American Road to UNCTAD, 1948–1964," *Humanity* 13, no. 1 (2022): 86–103; Christy Thornton, *Revolution in Development: Mexico and the governance of the global economy* (Oakland: University of California Press: 2021); O'Sullivan, "Civil War in El Salvador."

humanitarianism in the 1990s. Writing in 2001, David Chandler had a wholly pessimistic perspective on the influence of human rights, viewing it as a negative force that had diluted the purity of humanitarian neutrality, the purpose of which was to allow relief organizations to save bodies without meddling in sovereign states.[143] According to Chandler, human rights served only to depoliticize conflict in the Global South by advancing paternalistic ideologies of unique suffering and victimhood in need of Western military intervention and ever deepening humanitarian governance. However, the case of the Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras reveals that Oxfam articulated an alternative form of rights activism in the 1980s that, in contrast to Chandler's construction, served to politicize rather than depoliticize, platformed southern voices, and directly challenged US interventionism as opposed to encouraging it. This demonstrates that the path to interventionism and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was not linear or inevitable. Indeed, the fact that human rights were used to argue for and against US interventionism in the 1980s should not be seen to discount its relevance, as argued by Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman, but to underline how important it was as a flexible transnational language of political advocacy in this decade, allowing a diverse range of actors to translate their struggles to a global audience through a rights framework.[144]

Oxfam's vision of collective human rights activism was strongly informed by its distinctive interpretation of the values of development in late Cold War Central America. However, we should be cautious about reading this as a straightforwardly heroic story of NGOs standing up to states. From the perspective of the Honduran government, Oxfam was part of a network of influential Western organizations that sought to push the state to act against its interests. Far from being a puppet of the US government, the Honduran authorities had independent goals which sometimes clashed with its role as a regional anti-communist policeman.[145] Indeed, Honduran officials regarded UNHCR as a "superagency" which possessed more power over the terms of refugee relief in their country than it did in other parts of the world.[146] They also resented how the influx of refugees and international NGOs had intensified the "extraterritoriality" of the Salvadoran border re-

143 David Chandler, "The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda," *Human Rights Quarterly* 23, no. 3 (2001): 678–700.

144 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman, "Human Rights and History."

145 For a discussion of the need to see beyond US hegemony and recognize the independent interests of right-wing governments in Central America during the Cold War, see Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Julio E. Moreno, "Introduction," in Garrard-Burnett et al. (eds.), *Beyond the Eagle's Shadow: New Histories of Latin America's Cold War* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013), 1–21.

146 Todd, *Beyond Displacement*, 121–122, 88.

gion, which had long been contested and had been the subject of open conflict with the Salvadoran state in 1969.[147] At the encouragement of the US government, Honduran officials collaborated with the Salvadoran Army in repression of Salvadoran refugees; nevertheless, the presence of the Salvadoran Army, along with the FMLN and the refugees, in the border region was perceived as a threat to Honduran sovereignty.[148] Oxfam firmly believed in the moral rightness of its mobilization of human rights discourse in defense of the refugees' interests at the border. However, it was also a Western organization that leveraged its influence over UNHCR to influence how the Salvadoran refugee crisis was managed in a manner which directly conflicted with the political outlook of a sovereign state in the Global South.

Finally, there were also those within the international humanitarian sector who denounced the adoption of an advocacy function by Oxfam and other NGOs on behalf of Salvadoran refugees. MSF was in the minority of NGOs active in the country to reject the validity of the campaign against relocation, viewing the policy instead as a standard application of IHL. MSF also spoke out about what it claimed was the authoritarian control exerted by the refugee committees over other refugees within the Salvadoran camps.[149] Oxfam preferred not to engage with the uncomfortable truths about the conduct of the committees highlighted by MSF, including their policing of moral and political conduct, and their use of violent intimidation (including murder) to discourage refugees from participating in the UNHCR repatriation program.[150] For the individual refugees who sought to contest the power held by the committees over their lives in the camps, Oxfam's seemingly unconditional support for the committees' campaigns would have been an obstacle to the realization of their rights.

In the post-Cold War era, it was MSF's opposing vision of human rights that won out in the sector; its receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999 was viewed by David Chandler as a vindication of its erosion of traditional humanitarian principles in favor of rights-based interventionism.[151] It is thus of utmost importance to recover the vitality of alternative forms of rights-based engagement, and to explore the contingencies of moments of contestation, like that which occurred in the Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras. Although Oxfam may have been a voice of

147 Ibid., 89, 121–122.

148 Ibid., 89.

149 Laurence Binet, "Salvadoran Refugee Camps in Honduras 1988," *Médecins Sans Frontières: Speaking Out Case Studies* (Paris, 2013); Bertrand de la Grange, "Pour ne pas cautionner l'emprise de la guérilla sur les camps l'organisation Médecins sans Frontières renonce à assister les refugies salvadoriens au Honduras," *Le Monde*, 16 November 1988.

150 Todd, *Beyond Displacement*, 106–111, 194–198.

151 Chandler, "The Road to Military Humanitarianism."

"alternative" development and human rights in this setting, it was among the many organizations swept up in the dominant currents of rights discourse in the 1990s. Oxfam's advocacy on behalf of the Salvadorans ended up having unintended consequences in helping to mainstream the invocation of human rights in humanitarian aid, later reproducing entrenched power dynamics in international relations.[152] The lobbying of Mexican diplomats in the inter-war period for the creation of multilateral lending institutions and a rules-based international economic system resulted in the formation of the decidedly US-dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in 1944. [153] Similarly, the utilization by Salvadoran refugees and sympathetic Western NGOs of human rights as a tool with which to contest US interventionism in Central America sowed the seeds for the embeddedness of human rights discourse in military humanitarianism, which has fostered a renewed culture of northern intervention in the Global South in the post-Cold War era.

6 Conclusion

This article has shown how a commitment to the values of social development translated into a radical solidarity with oppressed rural communities for Oxfam in Cold War Latin America. In conflict situations in Central America in the 1980s, this led Oxfam to participate in the international solidarity networks cultivated by refugees and to utilize human rights as a political language of resistance to the violence committed by right-wing forces. The case of the Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras illustrates how this manifested in practice in Oxfam's support for a coordinated ICVA campaign that collaborated with refugee committees in opposing the UNHCR policy of relocating camps away from the Salvadoran border.

This kind of understanding of the practical relevance of development and human rights to humanitarian action was an exception to the dominant trends of Oxfam's international development programs. The reason why this radical form of solidarity became internalized in Latin America can be partly attributed to the importance of the intellectual formations of individual actors, along with the role played by traditional religious charity networks in diffusing revolutionary ideologies among Western humanitarian organizations. This constellation of factors permitted Oxfam's development program in Central America to be trans-

152 This analysis is strongly informed by Christy Thornton's view on the role played by the Mexican state in global governance. See Thornton, *Revolution in Development.*
153 Ibid.

formed into a vehicle for social movement activism that had the capacity to represent an alternative form of rights-based humanitarian action in the 1980s. Predating the formal integration of human rights as connected to military interventionism in the 1990s, this challenges us to deepen our understanding of the many political projects with which development and human rights discourse have been invested over time.

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Michelle Carmody

Human rights and development: The World Bank, Amnesty International, and the history of a difficult relationship

1 Introduction

In 2004 World Bank president James Wolfensohn gave the opening speech at a Conference on Human Rights and Development, co-organized by UN Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson. In his address Wolfensohn, a graduate of law whose mentor in his student days was Julius Stone, an international lawyer who conducted a high-profile mission for Amnesty International to Indonesia in the late 1960s, apologized for being such a novice in the area of human rights.[1] He promised, however, that he wanted to engage more and as preparation for the event he had read, for the first time, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenants on Economic and Social and on Civil and Political Rights, and the Declaration of the Right to Development. He was surprised and encouraged, he said, to see that while he'd never thought about what the Bank did in terms of rights, there was already "a tremendous coalescence between human rights and what we do every day in our institution."[2]

It is possible that Wolfensohn, despite his background, had indeed never thought about or come across human rights before. But his comments also reflected the ambivalent relationship between the World Bank and human rights. Since the 1970s the Bank has claimed a natural connection between its work and human rights, while also working to perpetuate divisions and maintain a superficial understanding and interpellation of human rights. During the later part of the twentieth century human rights became increasingly spatialized, divided along North-South lines with civil and political rights emphasized by the former and economic

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1 James D. Wolfensohn, Oral History Interview, https://oralhistory.worldbank.org/transcripts/transcript-oral-history-interview-james-d-wolfensohn-held-june-5-and-14-september-25; Amnesty International, Annual Report 1970.

2 James D. Wolfensohn, "Some Reflections on Human Rights and Development," in *Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement*, ed. Philip Alston and Mary Robinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 19.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111280356-009

and social rights by the latter.[3] These divisions were politically mobilized: the US mobilized human rights as a tool for fighting the Cold War, highlighting the importance of certain civil and political rights such as political imprisonment or torture to illustrate western claims to moral superiority, while ignoring others like self-determination when it came to securing certain strategic relationships.[4] Third World developmental states increasingly pushed back against the global machinery for civil and political rights, labeling it an example of "western" neo-colonialism in order to gain space for the pursuit of their own national development agendas.[5] But the World Bank, despite its frequent association with the global North encapsulated in the shorthand phrase "the Washington Consensus," did not readily embrace the civil and political rights commonly understood as "western" rights. Instead, the Bank formulated its own relationship to, and mobilization of, human rights. While the Bank had a firmly capitalist worldmaking vision it had a different approach than the US to fighting the Cold War struggle over these visions, aiming – much like Western development itself – for the hearts and minds of Third World governments.[6]

As historians of development have noted, the question of how to incorporate human rights into development – human rights conditionality – remained largely unresolved throughout the end of the twentieth century.[7] The World Bank's many years of engagement with human rights did nothing to close this gap between "rhetoric and reality" (instead inspiring an abundant body of scholarly literature on how to help the Bank really address human rights).[8] But, still, key human rights figures like Robinson and Philip Alston, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, see the Bank as "a crucial actor in the whole debate over both the eradication of poverty and the promotion of human

3 Roland Burke, "The Internationalism of Human Rights," in *Internationalisms: A Twentieth Century History*, ed. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 287–314; Joseph Slaughter, "Hijacking Human Rights: Neoliberalism, the New Historiography, and the End of the Third World," *Human Rights Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (2018): 735–775.

4 Bradley Simpson, "Denying the "First Right": The United States, Indonesia, and the Ranking of Human Rights by the Carter Administration, 1976–1980," *The International History Review* 31, no. 4 (2009): 798–826; Slaughter, "Hijacking Human Rights."

5 Roland Burke, *Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 129–141.

6 Sara Lorenzini, *Global Development: A Cold War History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 144–145.

7 Ibid., 158–159.

8 For an analysis of the performative dimension of these critiques, see Dimitri Van Den Meerssche, "A Legal Black Hole in the Cosmos of Virtue—The Politics of Human Rights Critique Against the World Bank," *Human Rights Law Review* 21, no. 1 (1 March 2021): 80–107.

rights."[9] Amnesty International, perhaps the highest profile human rights non-governmental organization, also strives to "mainstream" human rights within the policies and programs of multilateral financial institutions like the Bank in order to achieve their goals on a global scale.[10] Wolfensohn, it seems, was the last to get the memo. Yet his performed ignorance points to the reason behind the curiously difficult relationship between human rights and development. The World Bank has been a key actor engaging with and mobilizing human rights since the 1970s, the period of the concept's explosion into contemporary political consciousness and parlance. Often characterized as a breakthrough, I use the word explosion to point to the destabilizing effects of this phenomenon, in which the constituent elements of the concept were pulled in different directions, for different ends.[11] The Bank was a key figure in this process, actively promoting the division and mobilizing the spatialization of human rights.

By spatialization of human rights I mean the mutually exclusive characterization of civil and political rights as features of Western political economies, and economic and social rights as key to the development path of Third World states. The Bank did so as a way of creating a script that would allow the pursuit of its specific development vision in a world where engaging with human rights was an almost unavoidable fact. In doing so the Bank contributed to a situation described by Roland Burke as one in which the internal normative content of human rights was eroded, where the "endless energy poured into proceduralist and bureaucratic forms, institutions, 'plans of action', and mechanisms delivered growth in verbiage without appreciable meaning in the enjoyment of human rights."[12] I look at this process both from the side of the Bank, and from the perspective of one of its interlocutors, Amnesty International. Over time, when faced with the growth in empty verbiage on human rights, Amnesty abandoned its faith in national governments as potential agents of change, turning towards international organizations like the Bank as vehicles for human rights protections. Reluctant to engage in a

9 Philip Alston, "Rethinking the World Bank's Approach to Human Rights," address to Nordic Trust Fund for Human Rights and Development Annual Workshop, The World Bank, Washington DC, 15 October 2014.

10 See for example "Final report: International Conference on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders in Latin American and the Caribbean," Bogota, 22–25 May 1996. Amnesty International, International Secretariat Archive, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam (hereafter AI IS), Folder 608.

11 Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, eds., *The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).

12 Roland Burke, "Decolonization, Development and Identity: The Evolution of the Anticolonial Human Rights Critique, 1948–78," in *The Routledge History of Human Rights*, ed. Jean Quataert and Lora Wildenthal (London: Routledge, 2019), 236.

struggle over the normative content of human rights, which implied taking a side in the North-South debate, groups like Amnesty adopted a "most we can hope for" approach, coming to see the Bank as a human right agent almost by default rather than the result of any clear and consistent pattern of action.[13]

Amnesty International's turn towards the Bank was part of a broader effort to identify new techniques with which to address the political economy of human rights violations. This puzzling maneuver speaks to a central topic in the recent historiography of human rights, the relationship between human rights and neoliberalism.[14] Within these works, the coinciding temporality of and occasional intellectual connections between human rights and the Bank's basic needs paradigm is pointed to as an example of the former's inexorable shift away from a concern with structural or redistributional matters.[15] The relationship between development and neoliberalism is more well established, and recent histories have built on these bodies of literature to explore western development's own shift from an approach aimed at building strong Third World states to one focused on helping the poorest in those states escape absolute deprivation.[16] These works underscore the close connections between histories of development and of political economy.[17] Without wanting to reduce the World Bank or the western development enterprise to neoliberalism, this chapter draws on these themes to examine the relationship between human rights and the Bank, one of the key institutional drivers of a development vision that focuses on the individual over the structural.

Histories of development note that the absorption of human rights frameworks into development was "a massive shift."[18] But accounts of the history of rights and development, especially when focused on the Bank, remain sparse and often remain focused on the realm of ideas without accounting for the broad-

13 Wendy Brown, ""The Most We Can Hope For. . . ": Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 103, no. 2 (2004): 451–463.

14 Samuel Moyn, *Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018); Jessica Whyte, *The Morals of the Market: Human Rights and the Rise of Neoliberalism* (London; New York: Verso, 2019).

15 Moyn, *Not Enough*, 119–145.

16 For an overview of early development historiography see Joseph Morgan Hodge, "Writing the History of Development (Part 1: The First Wave)," *Humanity* 6, no. 3 (Winter 2015): 429–463, 479; Joanne Meyerowitz, *A War on Global Poverty: The Lost Promise of Redistribution and the Rise of Microcredit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021).

17 Artemy M. Kalinovsky, "Sorting Out the Recent Historiography of Development Assistance: Consolidation and New Directions in the Field," *Journal of Contemporary History* 56, no. 1 (2021): 238.

18 Lorenzini, *Global Development.*

er context that shapes these ideas.[19] Claudia Kedar's recent work on the Bank has done much to move beyond simplistic readings of the institution and shows both how it attempted to navigate contradictory pressures and how it was a site of differing views itself.[20] This chapter sets out to follow in Kedar's footsteps by highlighting the multiple actors on all sides of the Cold War and how they interacted with each other in pursuit of their objectives. The tensions that emerged between North and South as a result of development being wielded as a Cold War tool, tensions that shifted the focus of many of these actors away from the East-West conflict, provided the explosive conditions that the Bank attempted to navigate through its engagements with human rights.[21]

2 Economic and social rights, civil and political rights, and the North-South divide in the 1970s

As an organization the World Bank straddled the North-South divide, often uncomfortably. The main symbols of power aligned it with the West: headquartered in Washington D.C., with its president always, albeit unofficially, chosen by the U.S. government. Behind the boardroom doors, however, non-western nations made their voices heard when necessary, and president Robert McNamara (1968–81) himself was keen to ensure the Bank was not perceived by them as merely synonymous with western interests.[22] In the face of increasingly strident Third World articulations of their own development vision, one which saw the current global economic structure as one that benefited the North at the South's expense, the

19 Peter Uvin, "From the Right to Development to the Rights-Based Approach: How "Human Rights" Entered Development," *Development in Practice* 17, no. 4/5 (2007): 597–606; Dimitri van den Meerssche, "Performing the Rule of Law in International Organizations: Ibrahim Shihata and the World Bank's Turn to Governance Reform," *Leiden Journal of International Law* 32 (2019): 47–69.

20 Claudia Kedar, "Human Rights and Multilateral Lending: The World Bank, Argentina, and the United States, 1976–1978," *The International History Review* 41, no. 6 (2019): 1256–1275; Claudia Kedar, "Economic Neutrality during the Cold War: The World Bank, the United States, and Pinochet's Chile, 1973–1977," *Cold War History* 18, no. 2 (2018): 149–167.

21 Lorenzini, *Global Development*, 3–5; Michael Franczak, "Human Rights and Basic Needs: Jimmy Carter's North-South Dialogue, 1977–81," *Cold War History* 18, no. 4 (2018): 449.

22 Kedar, "Human Rights and Multilateral Lending"; Patrick Sharma, "Between North and South: The World Bank and the New International Economic Order," *Humanity* 6, no. 1 (2015): 189–200; Patrick Sharma, *Robert McNamara's Other War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 101–102.

Bank needed to foster closer relations with the latter if it were to stand a chance of remaining in business.[23]

At the same time, the business of development – which McNamara rearticulated as a mission against poverty in the Third World – cost money, money which was to come from the donor nations. The US, the Bank's key donor, had its own complex relationship with the Third World. On the one hand, it sought to manage the developing world's economic demands. It saw the Bank as an agent of these demands, generating suspicion if not outright hostility.[24] At the same time, it needed to maintain relationships with key Third World allies. Human rights became a key part of President Jimmy Carter's attempts to pursue these dual goals.[25] And while Carter's policy emphasized basic economic and social needs alongside civil and political rights, topics like torture and repression captured the attention and energy of Congress (and that of the many human rights groups lobbying it for action), resulting in associated restrictions on development assistance.[26]

This policy was a regular topic at the Bank's President's Council Meetings, with McNamara and his close circle keeping a keen eye on what they saw as an incoherent policy approach. They noted with alarm the spread of these particular human rights concerns into western European policy, in addition to the increasing constraints imposed on the US Executive Director.[27] While these western representatives were outnumbered on the Bank's board, there was a practice of not presenting projects for funding in the first place if it meant that representatives would be forced to raise their country's human rights concerns.[28] Increased media attention made the atmosphere even more charged. McNamara and his circle were furious about the distribution of a report that noted that around one third of projected Bank funds for 1979 were to be directed toward 15 of what the Bank itself classified as "the most repressive regimes."[29] This information had made its

23 Sharma, *McNamara's Other War*, 96–97.

24 Ibid., 102–105; Lorenzini, *Global Development*, 156–157.

25 Brad Simpson, "Denying the "First Right": The United States, Indonesia, and the Ranking of Human Rights by the Carter Administration, 1976–1980," *The International History Review* 31, no. 4 (2009): 798–826; Franczak, "Human Rights and Basic Needs."

26 Franczak, "Human Rights and Basic Needs," 449; William Michael Schmidli, *The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and US Cold War Foreign Policy Towards Argentina* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013); James N. Green, *We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).

27 President's Council Meeting, 20 June 1977. Folder ID 1770828, Records of President Robert S. McNamara, World Bank Group Archives, Washington D.C. (hereafter McNamara records).

28 Ibid.

29 Clyde Farnsworth, "Linking Aid Plans to Human Rights," *New York Times*, 19 June 1977.

way into *The New York Times* via a report by the Centre for International Policy, an NGO focused on global aid flows. The *New York Times* article also reported on the Bank's practice of strategically delaying certain project approvals to minimize unwanted attention, especially during House and Senate debates on relevant foreign policy.[30] This brought animosity between the Bank and the US Congress to a peak.

This animosity shaped the Bank's response to the human rights issue. McNamara noted the hypocrisy in the US' own human rights policy – he singled out the difference in treatment that Argentina received compared to South Korea or Indonesia – and pushed back against the idea that the Bank should have a clear policy on the topic when those pushing them clearly didn't.[31] Their preferred tactic, delaying voting on particularly problematic projects, had significant limitations given that, as the members of the Council put it, "roughly 95% of borrowing nations had more or less repressive regimes." Conscious of the restrictions Congress had put upon the IMF when releasing additional funds for that institution, McNamara and others knew that they would need a better response to the human rights question.[32] One member of the President's Council worried that the issue would mean the end of the Bank completely. McNamara disagreed that it was so drastic, but acknowledged the serious implications given the prevalence of authoritarian regimes amongst borrowing nations.[33] It was not just that their potential borrower base was being cut off: by the 1970s the Bank represented a shrinking proportion of overall development assistance flows, giving regimes themselves plenty of other options if Bank conditions were to become too onerous.[34]

As a response, McNamara aligned the Bank's work with economic and social rights. While doing so, he emphasized a division and a hierarchy between these and civil and political rights. In February 1978 McNamara authorized the production of a confidential internal study of how the Bank might navigate the human rights issue, although meanwhile he went ahead with public statements that foreshadowed his preferred outcome.[35] He had previously suggested that lending to underprivileged countries and the creation of economic opportunities for their citizens, as well as addressing matters like life expectancy and illiteracy, should

30 Ibid.

31 Memo: Meeting between Solomon and Bergstein, 31 January 1978. Folder ID 1771459, McNamara records.

32 President's Council Meeting, 13 February 1978, and President's Council Meeting, 18 February 1978. Folder ID 1770829, McNamara records.

33 President's Council Meeting, 20 June 1977.

34 Sharma, *McNamara's Other War*, 96–101.

35 President's Council Meeting, 15 February 1978. Folder ID 1770829, McNamara records.

also be understood as human rights work.[36] Indeed, Carter's own policy had left that door open with its prohibition of assistance except in cases that directly benefitted the "poor and needy."[37] The Bank had already leaned on this provision to rebuff criticism of its lending to the Pinochet regime in Chile.[38] There was internal opposition to framing the Bank's work as rights, with Paul Streeten, senior economic advisor responsible for developing the "basic needs" program, arguing that the concept of rights muddied the fact that basic subsistence needs came first.[39] But as Bank President, McNamara needed to navigate the broader diplomatic world of North-South relations, and human rights were an increasingly central part of that. A profile piece in *The New York Times*, published in April 1978, saw McNamara begin to counterpose economic and social to civil and political rights. It aired his argument that "among the most fundamental of human rights are the rights to minimum acceptable levels of nutrition, health and education" and noted his concern that while the Bank was helping those in absolute poverty, "what we are not capable of is action directly related to civil rights. Such action is prohibited by our charter."[40] This division of human rights was not new: the invocation of two branches of rights had already been made during the drafting of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in the late 1940s.[41] McNamara mobilized and exacerbated it by asserting a hierarchy of rights within development.

This hierarchization of rights was also gaining momentum across many of the more authoritarian states in the developing world. The spatialization of rights – the association of (certain) human rights with a particular part of the world and the meanings associated with it – was a tool in this process. The debate at the UN over the possible creation of a High Commissioner for Human Rights was a key site for this spatialization, with several authoritarian states drawing on decolonial language to characterize the proposal as western imperialism.[42] The association of civil and political rights, especially around torture and repression, with the West, allowed them to be subordinated to the economic and social rights that their own proposed development path would bring. Mexico, a key driver of the Third World demands for a reconfigured global political economy, even warned that

36 President's Council Meeting, 20 June 1977. Folder ID 1770828, McNamara records.

37 Schmidli, *Fate of Freedom Elsewhere*, 67.

38 Kedar, "Economic Neutrality during the Cold War," 156.

39 Moyn, *Not Enough*, 134.

40 "McNamara on the Largest Issue: The Economy," *New York Times*, 2 April 1978. For the Bank's approach to its Articles of Agreement, see Guy Fiti Sinclair, *To Reform the World: International Organizations and the Making of Modern States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 226.

41 Whyte, *Morals of the Market*, 78–79.

42 Burke, *Decolonization*, 129–141.

without this fairer international economic distribution that the developing world was proposing, civil and political unrest – code for violent repression of student and other movements – would continue.[43] Human rights had become a divided battlefield, mapped onto the North-South struggle over development. The Bank chose to fuel this fire, joining in the division, hierarchization, and spatialization of rights to deactivate the pressure it was receiving from US Congress and to advance its "basic needs" program, which was itself an alternative to the Third World's more strident demands for redistribution and restructure.[44] This was how they rode out the North-South divide.

3 Amnesty International and the turn to the World Bank as potential partner

The US Congress was not the only body pushing for more attention to certain civil and political rights in the Bank's dealings. In June 1978 Amnesty's International Executive Committee, its delegated governance body, affirmed the desirability of the organization's Washington office making direct approaches to the World Bank and circulating Amnesty reports to it's loan officer for their use in assessing different countries and requests for loans.[45] This had already been informally occurring, for example when Amnesty members accompanied US Congressional representatives in a January 1976 visit to McNamara urging him to reject loans to Pinochet's Chile.[46] Amnesty was also fast becoming a target of spatialized rights critiques, with Ethiopian diplomats calling it a "mouthpiece of international imperialism" to delegitimize the organization's concerns.[47] A key concern of Amnesty throughout the 1970s had been to reconfigure its image so as not to appear as a "white, European" organization.[48] Those comments struck at the heart of this anxiety. The way that this spatialization of human rights was mapped onto the North-South contest over development shaped Amnesty's approach to the question of the relationship between human rights and development assistance.

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43 Christy Thornton, *Revolution in Development: Mexico and the Governance of the Global Economy* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2021), 167–170.

44 Sharma, *McNamara's Other War*, 97–102; *World Development Report* (1980), 72.

45 "Washington officer reportback" (1978). AI IS 419.

46 Kedar, "Economic Neutrality during the Cold War," 160.

47 Burke, "Decolonization, Development and Identity," 223 at 4.

48 Michelle Carmody, "Making Human Rights International? Amnesty International, Organizational Development, and the Third World, 1970–1985," *Human Rights Quarterly* 43, no. 3 (2021): 586–606.

While Amnesty had been formed in London in 1961 to campaign for the release of political prisoners, it was their 1973 Campaign against Torture (CAT) that saw them experience a breakthrough in terms of visibility and impact. This visibility grew almost exponentially, at least within Western Europe and its settler colonies, culminating in the organization's's receipt of the 1977 Nobel Peace Prize. But this high profile, and the associated perception of impact and effectiveness, brought with it an anxiety: the fear of losing that authority.[49] This fear was compounded by the increasing spatialization of human rights. The sorts of human rights violations that were capturing the attention of Amnesty's new members, things like torture, disappearance, and repression, were occurring in the Third World, and they saw association with the West as negative for potential effectiveness.

The CAT campaign attracted many new members, some from the civil rights movement in the US and from the various "Third World movements" across Western Europe, as well as people new to activism but influenced by the increasing visibility of the Third World, particularly repressive dictatorships, in their home societies, transforming Amnesty into a large and politically diverse organization.[50] In addition to its campaigning, Amnesty held many internal forums and congresses that provided a space for these members to shape their ideas; these could in turn shape the organization's methods at the annual International Council Meetings. At one of the CAT summits, some of these new members proposed calling to halt aid to governments known to engage in torture.[51] This call sparked a long-running internal debate over the broader political economy of rights violations.[52] Within that debate Amnesty conceptualized its approach to development assistance, and to international and multilateral organisations like the World Bank.

The relationship between the Bank and the broader social and economic context of violations took center stage in, for example, a 1978 internal seminar on "Human Rights and Economic Pressures." The Amnesty members and staff at

49 Michelle Carmody, "Making Human Rights Effective? Amnesty International, "Aid and Trade," and the Shaping of Professional Human Rights Activism, 1961–1983," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 11, no. 3 (2020): 280–297.

50 Ibid.; Kim Christiaens, "Why Brazil? The Belgian Mobilization Against Repression in Brazil and Its Significance for Third World Solidarity Activism in the 1970s and Beyond," *Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis* 43, no. 4 (2013): 108–147; Jan Eckel, *The Ambivalence of Good: Human Rights in International Politics since the 1940s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 160–165.

51 Amnesty International, *Conference for the Abolition of Torture: Final Report*, Paris 9–10 December 1973.

52 For an overview of this debate, see Carmody, "Making Human Rights Effective?"

this meeting referred closely to the 1977 study by the Center for International Policy whose reporting in the press had so incensed McNamara and his colleagues. In this study the Center used the Bank's own data to show that multilateral aid aimed at "buttressing some of the world's most repressive governments" with "the timing of the aid to these countries generally coinciding with the highest levels of internal repression."[53] But while the seminar participants recognized that Amnesty needed to address these economic flows lest they "indirectly absolve those who are responsible," when it came to devising a plan of action they also recognized the undesirability of using aid as a political weapon given the North-South dynamics involved.[54] The role of the US in pushing the Bank to embrace human rights conditions made them especially wary, bringing the potential for politicizing the human rights question and identifying it with decision makers in western centers of power.[55] The US' embrace of human rights left the term "in great danger of politicization, or "Westernization" or even "Americanization"."[56] This spatialization of human rights, and by extension Amnesty's work, was precisely what they wanted to avoid, as they felt that being associated with the "West" impacted their ability to claim impartiality vis-à-vis the major Cold War blocs, which even newer members saw as key to their effectiveness.[57] There were also other concerns, such as the population impacts of cutting off aid and development assistance.[58] Although they agreed with the critiques made of the Bank and its development assistance, the concern over being drawn into a spatialized struggle over human rights and development prevailed.

This pragmatism shaped Amnesty's attitude towards organizations and bodies like the Bank that were engaged in military, economic or cultural relations with human rights violating states. In order to remain impartial, they took a non-confrontational approach that emphasized accepting these organizations and bodies on their own terms and seeing them as potential partners rather than targets for pressure themselves. In stark contrast to proposals made throughout the debate that these organizations and bodies providing economic and other resources should be seen as "co-responsible" for the violations that occurred in recipient states, they became known as "target sectors," a term used to refer to other organ-

53 "Seminar on Human Rights and Economic Pressures," 1978. Amnesty International Nederland archive, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, Folder 92.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 "AI and Governments," 1977. AI IS 117.

57 Carmody, "Making Human Rights International?," 593; Carmody, "Making Human Rights Effective?"

58 "Amnesty International and International Trade/Aid," 1977. AI IS 177.

izations or sectors whose own interests overlapped with Amnesty's and could therefore be brought in to collaborate on specific projects or campaigns.[59] In terms of the content of these collaborations, calls for specific outcomes like sanctions or aid or trade cessation remained on the cutting room floor. Even modest proposals, like the idea of asking organizations like the World Bank to raise concerns with officials while negotiating a loan or supervising a project, were characterized as unrealistic and more likely to be met "with a guffaw or perhaps more polite rebuttal" than enthusiastic adoption.[60]

Instead, throughout the 1980s Amnesty developed a "modest but practical program' for working with the Bank in which its researchers would establish contact with their Bank counterparts with a view to exchanging information bilaterally but would not call for any specific actions.[61] Amnesty sent reports and received a generally positive response but no big campaigns were launched nor did the Bank explicitly shift on civil and political rights.[62] Amnesty's fear of being seen as political and being drawn into a spatialized mobilization of human rights, lest it impact their effectiveness, created the conditions for a tacit, and at times explicit, acceptance of the Bank as a partner in the human rights struggle, not a target of it. This, in turn, gave the Bank legitimacy as a human rights actor, one that could set the agenda for integrating rights into development.

4 Shifting understandings of civil and political rights, and of the state, in development

On June 4, 1991 Bank president Barber Conable (1986–1991) addressed a gathering of the Organization for African Unity. "I can recall the voices of the Founding Fathers of African Independence," he said:

> Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Leopold Senghor, Mobido Keita, Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere (to name but a few), all demanded "Uhuru" – freedom – of speech, of thought, of association; freedom from arbitrary arrest and oppression; freedom to participate in the de-

59 "Human Rights and Economic Pressures," 1978.

60 "AI and the World Bank," 1982. AI IS Microfilm 256.

61 "AI and the World Bank: Components of a Program," 1985. AI IS Microfilm 377. See also Decision 23, 1983 ICM.

62 "AI and the World Bank: Progress Report," 1986. AI IS Microfilm 511; "Secretary General's Report to the IEC," March 1986. AI IS Microfilm 1150.

> velopment of their nations. Mr Chairman, your Excellencies: Africa today is once again hearing those voices, the voices of freedom. I urge you, as Africa's leaders, not to ignore them.[63]

This reference to freedoms contrasted starkly with the approach of Conable's predecessor McNamara to civil and political rights. During the 1980s, the search for a response to the failures of that decade's development framework brought about this shift. But the Bank's interpretation of civil and political rights differed sharply from those that Amnesty International or the US Congress had been advocating in the 1970s. Instead, they were culturally-inflected notions that continued the division and spatialization of human rights. Multiplying interpretations within the field of human rights further eroded their normative content, producing a human rights-based development characterized by a massive gap between "rhetoric and reality."

The Bank's move to embrace the language, if not the spirit, of 1970s rights claims owed itself to changes in key elements of the North-South conflict. In the 1980s President Ronald Reagan reframed human rights in US foreign policy around democracy promotion, Third World proposals for an New International Economic Order fractured, and by the decade's end the Cold War context that lent salience to these proposals and necessitated their countering had come to an end. In their place were notions of the "right to development," the examples of the newly industrializing countries of East Asia, and the triumphalism of an ascendant liberal internationalism.[64]

These changes converged with the Bank's search for a response to development failures. Reagan's democracy promotion dovetailed with the Bank's new focus on the regulatory environment within states as key targets of development action.[65] As researchers and policymakers reflected on the mixed fortunes of the structural adjustment programs that had been a feature of loan and investment conditionality in Africa and Latin America, they came to focus on context, proposing a stable/weak framework, where stable democracies as well as stable authoritarian regimes like South Korea were argued to provide the best political environment for weathering the short-term effects of structural adjustment.[66] In this context Ibrahim Shihata, who as General Counsel was responsible for interpreting

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63 "Africa's Development and Destiny: Address of Barber J. Conable to OAU," 4 June 1991, 7.

64 Julia Dehm, "Highlighting Inequalities in the Histories of Human Rights: Contestations over Justice, Needs and Rights in the 1970s," *Leiden Journal of International Law* 31, no. 4 (December 2018): 871–895; Mark T. Berger, "After the Third World? History, Destiny and the Fate of Third Worldism," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (1 February 2004): 27.

65 Fiti Sinclair, *To Reform the World*, 252.

66 World Development Report, 1988, 50.

the Bank's Charter, argued that the Bank should be concerned with political rights that provided the stability to successfully complete specific projects, but not with a broader human rights "scorecard" (which reflected a framework that understood political systems along the old democratic/authoritarian divide).[67] As such, the Bank's embrace of market fundamentalist structural adjustment conditionality was intimately connected to the evolution in its engagement with the concept of human rights.

During the early 1990s the Bank's regional research departments took up this search for stability. The Africa team called for an emphasis on political rights such as freedom of association and bottom-up forms of representation, arguing that this approach to politics, emphasizing civil society, was more culturally appropriate for the African context (and, therefore, for "stability") than other, previous forms of government.[68] Latin Americanists within the Bank's orbit were calling for similar things, although with more emphasis on a technocratic ability to "get things done" via "the involvement of a societal coalition for development," a kind of no-nonsense form of political rights for the Latin American context.[69] Taken together, these discussions invented a "developing world version" of civil and political rights.

Yet even this "local" form of civil and political rights found very few concrete expressions. It took until 1998 before the Bank's internal Working Group on Human Rights and Development reported back for the first time, and even then details were sparse: under the heading "participation" it listed a range of initiatives in the areas of partnership, but no substantive programs or policies regarding the freedoms Conable had urged African leaders not to ignore.[70] Shihata also continued to emphasize the primacy of economic and social rights. "How fair is it to deprive the people plagued by a despotic government of bank assistance rather than targeting such assistance to help improve their standard of living and their education?" he asked in 1997, noting that "freedom from poverty is for many peo-

67 Ibrahim Shihata, "The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and the Record of Achievements," *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 17, no. 1 (1988–1989): 47; Ibrahim Shihata, oral history interview, https://oralhistory.worldbank.org/transcripts/transcript-oral-history-interview-ibrahim-f-i-shihata-held-may-23-and-24-2000.

68 Pierre Landell-Mills, "Governance, Cultural Change, and Empowerment," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30, no. 4 (1992): 543–567. Landell-Mills was a senior member of the Bank's Africa team and the coordinator of the pivotal Long Term Perspectives Study on Sub-Saharan Africa.

69 Edgardo Boeninger, "Governance and Development: Issues and Constraints," in *Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics* (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1991), 267, 268.

70 World Bank, *Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank* (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1998), 26.

ple the basic freedom without which no other human right could be enjoyed."[71] Indeed, he said elsewhere, the Bank's work on economic, social, and cultural human rights "may even pave the way for greater awareness and protection of political rights in the borrowing countries."[72] The Bank's own version of civil and political rights, culturally and socially-inflected notions of civic participation which never managed to transition from rhetoric to reality, was part of a continued effort to divide and hierarchize rights.

This echoed the increasingly strident Third World cultural relativism that was being articulated elsewhere, whereby the division and spatialization of human rights was couched in notions of culture and tradition, in addition to anti-neo-colonialism. States like Indonesia had long appealed to cultural specificity and a traditional emphasis on collective rather than individual rights, accompanied with scathing attacks on western bodies like Amnesty for attempting to force their western views onto the Third World.[73] These arguments were re-mobilized in the debate over integrating human rights into development assistance. In 1991 the European Community's resolution on "Human Rights, Democracy and Development," the result of many years of attempts at amalgamating the concepts, saw foreign ministers from the Association of South East Asian Nations counter that the promotion of human rights in poor countries was the concern of their own governments and could not be done using western notions that elevated civil and political rights higher than economic and social ones.[74] Indonesia's Charge d'Affairs at the UN claimed that at best human rights conditionality represented an imposition of the donor's values onto the recipient while at worst "linking questions of human rights to economic and development cooperation" was merely "a pretext to wage a political campaign" against certain states.[75] This language further proliferated in the lead up to the 1993 Second World Conference on Human Rights, held by the United Nations in Vienna. Indonesia's address to the 1992 meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, of which it was now president, evidenced this emboldened

71 Ibrahim Shihata, "Democracy and Development," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 46, no. 3 (1997): 642, 643.

72 "Legal Opinion on 'The Prohibition of Political Activities in the Bank's Work," 11 July 1995. Reprinted in Shihata, *World Bank Legal Papers* (Martinus Nijhoff, 2000), 233.

73 Brad Simpson, ""Human Rights Are Like Coca-Cola" Contested Human Rights Discourses in Suharto's Indonesia, 1968–1980," in *The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s*, ed. Samuel Moyn and Jan Eckel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 199.

74 Ramon Isberto, "ASEAN Takes Offensive on Human Rights," Inter-press Service, 21 October 1992.

75 Demetrios James Marantis, "Human Rights, Democracy, and Development: The European Community Model," *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 7 (1994): 3 at no. 7; Nsongurua J Udombana, "Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in Africa," *Michigan Journal of International Law* 24, no. 4 (2003): 1224 at no. 182.

new agenda: it called on its fellow members to go to Vienna and argue for the primacy of economic and social rights over and above the political and civil ones emphasized by the West.[76] This call seemed to be heeded when Asian nations gathered in Bangkok prior to the Conference issued a statement in which they discouraged "any attempt to use human rights as a conditionality for extending development assistance" and affirmed "that poverty is one of the main obstacles hindering the full enjoyment of human rights."[77]

Amnesty watched these developments with increasing concern. Secretary General Ian Martin noted how Third World countries were increasingly banding together behind these arguments. To meet this challenge, he warned, Amnesty needed to pay more attention "to how we conceptualize and address the relation between "civil and political" and "economic and social" rights."[78] This had long been a pressure point for Amnesty International, and they acknowledged that their responses so far had been inadequate.[79] In 1992 Martin produced a draft statement designed to both clarify Amnesty's position, but also appeal to governments of both the North and South, referencing the Right to Development as a way of "show[ing] that Amnesty International takes development seriously while reminding countries seeking to use it as a diversion from human rights criticism that the Declaration itself regards civil and political rights violations as an obstacle to development."[80] Amnesty was indeed taking development seriously at this time, bolstered by the fruitful experience of working with the European Community on their 1991 development policy. That experience prompted the Flemish Belgian section to successfully introduce a motion at Amnesty's International Council Meeting calling for a re-engagement with donors as target sectors and sanctioning the provision of advice on including programs for human rights protection and realization in loan conditionality.[81] This went beyond Amnesty's previous prohibitions on doing anything more than simply providing information, demonstrating a renewed faith in the possibility of development assistance to achieve their goals as well as a willingness to confront, rather than avoid, the spatialization of human rights.

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76 "The Jakarta Message," in *Final Documents of the 10th Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Jakarta 1–6 September 1992.*

77 'Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, Bangkok 29 March – 2 April 1993'. UN Doc. A/CONF.157/ASRM/8

78 Secretary General's Report to June 1992 International Executive Committee, AI IS Microfilm 1154.

79 "AI's Relations with other NGOs," June 1981. AI IS Microfilm 251.

80 "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Development Aid." AI IS 1154.

81 Decision 23, Boston ICM. AI IS 557.

This willingness was linked to Amnesty's turn away from states as agents of human rights protections. The 1993 Vienna Conference cemented this shift. Although it included "Development, Democracy and Human Rights" as a key agenda item, Amnesty noted wryly the near-inability of governments to even agree on this agenda.[82] The North-South split was on full display: Amnesty lamented yet again how governments in the developing world, particularly those in Asia and Africa, claimed the need for economic and social development before any consideration could be given to civil and political guarantees, while western governments were increasingly invoking political conditionality in their aid policies but applying it unevenly and denying the existence of a right to development on the part of developing countries.[83] Speaking at a press conference a few days after the Conference, Amnesty's new Secretary General Pierre Sané, whose previous experience had been in the field of international development, could barely contain his anger. He had just arrived in Cairo to speak at the twenty-ninth session of the Organisation for African Unity, two years after Conable had appeared before the same audience. In Vienna, he said, a "deeply historic opportunity to resolve humanity's most pressing problems [had] been wasted." The lack of concrete outcomes from the Conference showed that "political self-interest is more important to [the countries in attendance] than the lives of human beings."[84] This was the straw that broke the camel's back. After the Vienna conference Amnesty announced that, going forward, it would focus on exposing state hypocrisy on human rights in both the North and the South and on building a strong network of fellow NGOs to work for concrete rights advancement, rather than looking to states themselves as agents of change.[85]

As such, Amnesty responded to the normative muddling of human rights by embracing an understanding of change that was in line with recent thinking in the Bank and in the development sphere more broadly, bypassing the state in favor of what the Bank's Latin Americanists had called societal coalitions for change. Raising awareness of human rights through publicity and educational initiatives became a key organizational focus.[86] And, facilitated by the new internal policy on collaboration with development assistance providers, Amnesty participated in the myriad of social initiatives launched by the Bank, calling for human rights to be considered in project selection, design, implementation, and

82 Strategy Circular, December 1992. AI IS Microfilm 1154.

83 "Key Issues at the Un World Conference on Human Rights," 1993. AI IS Microfilm 1155.

84 "Pierre Sane Address to Press Conference," 29 June 1993. In AI IS 567.

85 Strategy Circular, December 1992. AI IS Microfilm 1154; "Our World Our Rights," *Asia-Pacific News Bulletin* no. 71, January 1993.

86 Amnesty International, *Annual Report*, 1995.

monitoring.[87] Amnesty was never one of the main NGOs that the Bank collaborated with, a reflection of its continued focus on civil and political rights over poverty alleviation and community development. But given the broader context of NGO activity during the 1990s, which featured a strong movement critical of the Bank and even calling for its abolition, Amnesty's orientation towards the Bank and to development assistance policies more broadly indicates that they were more than just "powerless companions" of the economic restructuring that was the central feature of conditional aid.[88] Amnesty did maintain more of a distance from the Bank than many others in the rapidly professionalizing and bureaucratizing human rights field of the 1990s, and their continued aversion to punitive conditionality was an anachronism given this field's increasing support for interventionism.[89] But their cooperation with the development behemoth was part of a broader shift towards seeing the actions of the Bank and other international financial institutions as generally offering the potential to advance the cause of human rights.[90]

By the end of the 1990s, the Bank happily took up this role, with human rights and democracy no longer taboo phrases within the organization. In 1999 Wolfensohn, despite his later comments "revealing" his ignorance of human rights, declared that in his personal view they were central to development, identifying corruption as the single most adverse factor in development. At the same time, however, he redefined corruption as an economic issue, reasserted the limitations placed on him by the Bank's Charter prohibiting work on political issues, and reiterated the importance of participation to the achievement of freedom.[91] Every assertion of the importance of human rights was followed by a framing of them as both essential for economic development and a result of economic development.[92] In 2003 Peruvian Roberto Dañino became the new General Counsel of the World

87 "Statement on the occasion of the World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings, Hong Kong," September 1997, AI IS 629.

88 Whyte, *Morals of the Market*, 198–233.

89 See for example, Mary Robinson's foreword to the Bank's *Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank*, vii. Robinson had become the first UN Commissioner for Human Rights the year before. For the supporters of interventionism, see Anne Orford, "Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold War," *Harvard International Law Journal* 38, no. 2 (1997): 443–486.

90 Whyte, *Morals of the Market*, 241.

91 James Wolfensohn, Speech to World Bank Legal Group Vice-Presidency, Meeting on Human Rights, 22 February 1999. World Bank archives, Records of the Office of External Relations, series: documentation of institutional meetings, press conferences and other events, ref 00000811I.

92 This was formulated into policy in Wolfensohn's flagship Comprehensive Development Framework.

Bank, and one of his first actions in the role was to create a Working Group on Human Rights, yet another in the Bank's ongoing series of internal human rights bodies. As for his own view on the topic, Dañino said that he saw no stark distinction between economic and political rights, and pointed to the Proclamation of Tehran's statement that "all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated."[93] But given that the 1968 First World Conference on Human Rights in Tehran was a key site for the rehearsal of the argument of the primacy of economic and social rights on the part of authoritarian statist regimes, a moment when the spatialization and geo-politicization of human rights took off, this statement was more of the same from the Bank: a gesture to both sides with a dog whistle to those who opposed civil and political guarantees.[94] "Human rights" remained subordinate to "development," the gap between rhetoric and reality a product of the historical relationship between the two rather than evidence of an unfinished process.

Amnesty had experienced its own reverberations of the Tehran Conference a decade earlier in Vienna. Sané's disillusion echoed that of Jamaican diplomat Egerton Richardson, who left the 1968 event remarking that "we came face to face with the nature of the beast – [and] we saw what it means to be promoting human rights by working mainly through governments."[95] Amnesty's recognition of the hypocrisy of both Northern and Southern governments was part of a longer history. But this particular turn away from the state coincided with shifts in the Bank that allowed it to position itself as pursuing both civil and political, as well as economic and social, rights beyond the North-South divide.

5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has not been to show that the World Bank is hypocritical in its engagements with rights. Rather, it is to show that its invocations of rights both drew on and deepened a broader historical process whereby human rights were spatialized and geo-politicized. The World Bank sought to navigate the North-South divide because it made good business sense: with an increase in potential sources of development assistance, it was imperative that they cultivated an image of being independent of the West and its demands, lest the Third World bor-

93 Roberto Dañino, "The Legal Aspects of the World Bank's Work on Human Rights: Some Preliminary Thoughts," in Philip Alston and Mary Robinson, eds., *Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 509–524.

94 Burke, *Decolonization*, 92–111.

95 Ibid., 104.

rowing nations turn elsewhere. This independence was also a core part of the organization's professional identity. That the Bank's commitments to human rights are repeatedly found wanting is a product of its historical engagements with rights, not evidence of a lack of engagements with rights. A history of human rights and development at the discursive level might find encouragement in the increasing proclamations of indivisibility during the 1990s, including the Final Statement of the 1993 Vienna Conference. But an examination that looks at these invocations of rights in their context, that searches for concrete implementation and that traces the intertextual references, shows that civil and political rights and economic and social rights remained estranged through deliberate actions on the part of states, and on the part of multilateral actors like the World Bank, which continued to court authoritarian developmental states through veiled and not-so-veiled references to hierarchies of rights in development.

Despite the involvement of the Bank in maintaining this spatialized division of human rights, key human rights actors have seen their faith in the Bank as a potential agent of human rights change grow rather than diminish, at the same time as their faith in governments to do the same has dwindled. Throughout this chapter I have told this story through the lens of one organization, Amnesty International. Some, like Robinson and Alston, have been even more enthusiastic than Amnesty, others less. The fact that Amnesty members first addressed the question of human rights and development assistance within the framework of an enquiry into the political economy of human rights, with some even suggesting that international capital, as represented by the Bank, held responsibility for violations, shows that the affinities between human rights and neoliberalism are historically produced, rather than ontological. For Amnesty, their own organizational commitment to a notion of impartiality intersected with the increasing spatialization of human rights to push them further down the path that led away from states as sites of reform and towards an international civil society consisting of NGOs and international organizations, financial ones included. This fatalism has important implications for western development, especially in its hegemonic guise as represented by the World Bank. Instead of the end of the Cold War providing the conditions for a rearticulation of the North-South conflict over development, the conflict itself endured, carrying over with it its spatialized mobilizations of human rights. Human rights actors like Amnesty International, faced with this deadlock, turned to a minimalist notion of human rights and development that at least talked the talk, even if it had difficulty walking the walk.

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Nick Pozek

The titans and tensions of progressive era philanthropy in global development

1 Introduction

This article considers the international dimensions of philanthropic organizations and explores the connections between state and private actors in development from 1890 to 1920. First, (1) it explains the context of the Progressive Era and the dovetailing forces of globalization and industrialization in reshaping the geopolitical landscape. This article will then (2) examine the implementation of the foundation model as the dominant structure for development philanthropy, and (3) consider development philanthropy in the popular imagination. Next, it will consider two case studies: (4) the Rockefeller Foundation and the Chinese Medical Board and (5) the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In their seminal years, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace closely adhere to their founders' values, intentions, agendas, and often idiosyncrasies. To that end, these case studies explore the processes and influences that shaped the ideation of these organizations. Lastly, the article will (6) consider the public response to these philanthropic efforts. This article asks: why did these industrialists choose global philanthropy, and how did their interests shape their programs of giving towards development?

Several themes weave through this article: (1) the World's Fair as a manifestation of popular views from the U.S on globalization; (2) the role of cultural activities as both a testing ground for philanthropic ideas and processes; and (3) the perceptions of international recipients by philanthropists that were formed through the limited opportunities for direct contact and person-to-person exchange.

Today, as in the Progressive Era, private philanthropy remains a powerful force in funding development and driving capital flows from the United States abroad. Many of the wealthiest individuals and corporations in the country continue to make significant charitable contributions to a wide range of causes, from environmental conservation to healthcare to education. However, contemporary philanthropy for development has also encountered criticism for many of the same reasons as its Progressive Era predecessor. Critics argue that philanthropic efforts often prioritize the interests of donors over the needs of the communities they

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seek to serve, perpetuate power imbalances between donors and recipients, and fail to address structural issues that contribute to poverty and inequality.[1]

In *Dead Aid*, Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo concluded that aid was not the solution to Africa's development challenges but rather part of the problem. Moyo argued that foreign aid to Africa has failed to deliver sustainable economic development and created a vicious cycle of dependency, corruption, and poverty. Moyo claimed that aid distorted African economies, undermined democracy and good governance, and perpetuated the cycle of poverty by creating a culture of dependency. Furthermore, Moyo argues that aid has crowded out private investment, stifled entrepreneurship, and was a disincentive for African countries to become self-reliant.[2]

While Moyo's stance was a scathing critique, she echoes the concerns that both John D. Rockefeller Jr. and Andrew Carnegie expressed about their own phi-

1 Joanne Barkan, "Plutocrats at Work: How Big Philanthropy Undermines Democracy," *Social Research* 80, no. 2 (1 January 2013): 635–52; Justin W. van Fleet, "A Half Billion Dollars Adding up to Small Change: The Promises and Pitfalls of Corporate Philanthropy to Support Global Education" (Doctoral dissertation, Maryland, United States, University of Maryland, College Park, n.d.), accessed 18 May 2022; Michael Barnett, "Neoliberalism, Philanthropy, and Humanitarianism," in *The Routledge International Handbook of Critical Philanthropy and Humanitarianism*, ed. Katharyne Mitchell and Polly Pallister-Wilkins, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2023), 9–25, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003162711-3; Emma Saunders-Hastings, *Private Virtues, Public Vices: Philanthropy and Democratic Equality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2022), https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226816135.001.0001; Theodore M. Lechterman, *The Tyranny of Generosity: Why Philanthropy Corrupts Our Politics and How We Can Fix It*, 1st ed. (New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197611418.001.0001; Raj Kumar, *The Business of Changing the World: How Billionaires, Tech Disrupters, and Social Entrepreneurs Are Transforming the Global Aid Industry*, Reprint edition (S.l.: Beacon Press, 2020); Edgar Villanueva, *Decolonizing Wealth: Indigenous Wisdom to Heal Divides and Restore Balance*, 1st edition (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2018); Rob Reich, *Just Giving: Why Philanthropy Is Failing Democracy and How It Can Do Better* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2018); Lovia Gyarkye, "Have the Rich Become 'Super Citizens'?," *The New Republic*, 12 May 2017, https://newrepublic.com/article/142667/rich-become-super-citizens; David Callahan, *The Givers: Wealth, Power, and Philanthropy in a New Gilded Age*, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2017); David Horton Smith, Sharon Eng, and Kelly Albertson, "The Darker Side of Philanthropy: How Self-Interest and Incompetence Can Overcome a Love of Mankind and Serve the Public Interest," in *The Routledge Companion to Philanthropy*, ed. Tobias Jung, Susan Phillips, and Jenny Harrow, Routledge Companions in Business, Management and Accounting (London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016); Kenneth J. Saltman, "Venture Philanthropy and the Neoliberal Assault on Public Education," in *Neoliberalism, Education, and Terrorism*, by Jeffrey R. Di Leo et al., 1st ed. (Routledge, 2015), 67–93, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315633299-3.

2 Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa*, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010).

lanthropic undertakings. The industrialists feared their contributions would undermine self-reliance. They did not extend the same duty of care to workers in their employment through whose labor the philanthropists amassed their fortunes.

2 The Progressive Era

The United States Progressive Era spanned from 1890 through about 1920, was marked by a widening economic inequality gap, and was characterized as the "Gilded Age" by writer Mark Twain[3]; a wealthy class emerged from the industrialization of America, building off of the labor of workers who endured dangerous working conditions and suppressed wages. Technological mining, drilling, and manufacturing advances allowed businesses to scale at dramatic and unprecedented speeds. Advances in banking and communication reduced friction in transnational and international business transactions. By 1861, not only had the telegraph wire crisscrossed the US, but the transatlantic cable enabled telegraph messages to be sent between the United States and Europe. This confluence of factors allowed corporations to not only thrive with fewer logistical barriers to expansion but also amplified the velocity with which shares of businesses were sold. It also increased the complexity of the debt instruments and financial transactions used to access and direct capital flows. Increasingly sophisticated accounting structures and business models foster sprawling horizontally and vertically integrated enterprises whose complexity outpaced the regulatory environments in which they operated.[4]

As economic inequality grew, awareness of economic disparities became widely recognized, and other societal issues became central in the public mind. The systemic causes of poverty came into focus, and with it demand for societal change and government intervention.[5] Newly-formed advocacy organizations such as the American Woman Suffrage Association, the National Woman's Suffrage Association (NWSA), and the Women's Christian Temperance Union campaigned domestically, nationally, and globally for women's suffrage.[6]

3 Mark Twain, Charles Dudley Warner, and Louis J. Budd, *The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today*, Penguin Classics (New York: Penguin Books, 2001).

4 John Whiteclay Chambers, *The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1900–1917*, The St. Martin's Series in Twentieth Century United States History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980).

5 Frederick R. Lynch, "Social Theory and the Progressive Era," *Theory and Society* 4, no. 2 (1977): 159–210.

6 Carrie Chapman Catt and Nettie Rogers Shuler, *Woman Suffrage & Politics: The Inner Story of the Suffrage Movement* (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc, 2020).

Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci, whose brief life (1891–1937) brought him to observe the world at the end of the Progressive Era, suggested the idea of "Cultural Hegemony" – the notion that the beliefs, values, and ideas of the ruling class are often those that prevail.[7] This concept is evidenced in the modes of philanthropic contribution to the global development of the Progressive Era.[8] A philanthropist's reasons for charitable giving can be situated on a continuum between performative and pragmatic reasons and generally adhere to the logics of the era with few expectations for "visionary" philanthropists.

Performative philanthropy is a form of virtue signaling that aided the wealthy in enhancing their social status and endearing themselves to their peers. Performative philanthropy could counteract some of the negative publicity surrounding the means by which many Progressive Era industrialists acquired their wealth. This strategy was effective, if far from perfect, in the long run, with libraries, museums, universities, and other institutions continuing long after the details of their funders' business practices and professional reputations faded.

Pragmatic philanthropy toward global development adheres to the logics of industrialization and seeks to replicate the interchangeable and scalable mining and manufacturing processes. It also reproduces the interoperability, commodification, and fungibility of the increasingly global market and insinuates these rules on the flow and management of program design and human capital. The obvious appeal of this approach for philanthropists is in both the familiarity of methods and the potential for optimizing the "functions" of expenditure towards greater results.

It is impossible to discern to what extent any philanthropist is situated on the performative-pragmatic spectrum, and often philanthropists' attitudes shift on a case-by-case basis. However, it is possible to examine how philanthropists' opinions about the world were shaped through their collegial networks and various types of international contact. Globalization and the telegraph enabled the rapid spread of information about global poverty.

There was tension in the U.S. between the "robber baron" industrialists who engaged in exploitative business practices domestically while also funding philanthropic efforts, many of which were international in scope. The increasing demand for more professionalized nonprofit organizations and a greater effect on the implementation of global development efforts pivoted the sector towards organizational designs that were more businesslike and increasingly hired paid staff rather than recruiting volunteers. The Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 considered the

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7 Walter L. Adamson, *Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

8 Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, "Foundations and Ruling Class Elites," *Daedalus* 116, no. 1 (1987): 1–40, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20025085.

growing presence of charitable organizations by delineating tax benefits and the profit limits of charitable organizations. Under Wilson-Gorman, income to broadly defined charitable and member-benefitting organizations would not be subject to corporate tax. However, they could not distribute net profits among private individual shareholders like their corporate counterparts to receive this benefit. Instead, any profits earned by their organization would be re-invested in the organization to support its staff and mission. Although Wilson-Gorman was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court via *Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.*, it laid the groundwork for the tax-exempt status of charitable organizations.[9]

The Progressive Era in the U.S. drew to a close with the 1913 ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, allowing Congress to levy an income tax without apportioning it among the states based on population. Taxes on income jilted the seemingly endless accumulation of wealth by industrial tycoons.[10] Another shock came in the summer of 1914 when, following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. By 1915, the respective allies of each nation, including Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, were embroiled in the expanding conflict that would become World War I.

Industrialization and globalization provided an unprecedented opportunity to expand and accelerate development, but it also showcased the limits of the United States' problematic understanding of the world. At the beginning of the Progressive Era, Alexander Gram Bell debuted the successor to the telegraph, the telephone, at the Centennial International Exhibition in 1876 in Philadelphia. This Exhibition was a fitting platform to showcase this invention as it was the first World's Fair to be hosted in the United States. A subsequent iteration of the Fair (which had become a regular and almost annual occurrence), the 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition, featured a simulated Philippine village spanning 47 acres. For seven months, more than 1,100 Filipino adults and children resided on the fairgrounds as a living display of "semi-civilized" life.[11] The Louisiana Purchase Exposition had been the most ambitious of the World's fairs, eclipsing previous fairs in scale and cost. Each World's Fair exhibition chose a significant anniversary tied to its location. Beyond its financial cost to fair organizers, the display came at a human cost – with countless deaths from participants both en route to and

9 Paul Arnsberger et al., "A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective," *Statistics of Income Bulletin*, 2008.

10 John D. Buenker, *The Income Tax and the Progressive Era*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 1985), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429490408.

11 Michael Hawkins, *Semi-Civilized: The Moro Village at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition*, NIU Southeast Asian Series (Ithaca, New York: Northern Illinois University Press, 2020).

while on display at the fair. The 1904 fair in St. Louis marked the centennial of the purchase of Louisiana by the U.S. from the French First Republic in 1804 for $15 million. The Louisiana Purchase faced opposition within the U.S., but the territory was admitted into the United States and received statehood in 1812. Including the Philippines within this exposition forced visitors to draw comparisons between the U.S. purchase of the Orleans Territory and the recent "purchase" of the Philippines.[12] While offering a glimpse into the commonalities and differences of at least 10 Filipino ethnicities presented, it also offered a vision of an eventual inclusion and assimilation as had happened with the former French territory over the last century. Placing the children that were included in the exhibition within St. Louis schools for the duration of the fair suggested both the ease of adaptation and the benefits of inclusion within the U.S. Nevertheless, this would not deter the establishment and election of the first Philippine Assembly in 1907, the first step towards the Philippines' eventual independence.

The gruesome reality of World War I offered a stark contrast to the utopian visions of technology the World's Fairs presented. Industrialization's mass manufacturing enabled the efficient production of increasingly deadly and destructive weapons. Moreover, the interconnected world allowed, or even necessitated, the enormous scale of the conflicts and a commensurate death toll. International contact also facilitated the global spread of the 1819 Influenza Pandemic.

This confluence of factors, resulting from the social, societal, industrial, political, and economic transformation of the Progressive Era, was the era's logical and inevitable conclusion.

3 The Foundation as a Model

The charitable "foundation" emerged from the Progressive Era as the predominant model for development philanthropy in the U.S. The private charitable sector in the U.S. assumes societal functions and public benefits that elsewhere fall within the remit of government.[13] Foundations had few public reporting requirements making them particularly suited to shield international program work which was al-

12 The United States acquired the Philippines as a result of the Spanish-American War. After defeating the Spanish fleet in the Battle of Manila Bay, the United States gained control over the Philippines, coercing a sale of the islands by Spain. This acquisition led to a period of colonial rule, which faced resistance from Filipino nationalists until the Philippines gained independence in 1946.

13 Joel L. Fleishman, *The Foundation: A Great American Secret: How Private Wealth Is Changing the World* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009).

ready closely scrutinized. Foundations were quickly professionalized and replicated the conventions of corporate governance that were well-known to Progressive Era industrialists. A foundation would be created through a charter and financed in some part through a trust – a financial instrument whose popularity peaked in the Progressive Era. The trust assets would be invested in a variety of instruments and corporations, and the interest earned would be distributed at the trustees' discretion. Part of the accumulated interest would go toward achieving the foundation's mission, and another portion would be re-invested into the trust. This business model continues today, and foundations are now obligated to spend a nominal portion of the interests accrued on the corpus of their endowments. They can direct this spending toward programs they organize, grants they offer, and the administration thereof.

Although a foundation may be founded by an individual – such as Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – the extent to which their namesake was involved in the foundation's operations varied. Carnegie, for example, sought to give a wide berth to the board of his foundation so that they might consider all avenues in the furtherance of peace.[14] Foundations must maintain a Board of Directors that oversee the foundation's governance. During the lives of their founders, foundations had to negotiate the intermingling of their founders' personal agendas and business interests with the foundation's mission.

In the cases of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, their founders handpicked the first board of directors from their colleagues and confidants. This move kept the early years of these foundations closely aligned with the vision and interests of the founders and reduced the likelihood that the board would steer the foundation in a direction different from what the founder had intended.

Progressive Era philanthropy steered towards the professionalization of charitable development organizations, often driving them to replicate the bureaucratization and industrialization concurrent in the business world.[15] A popular fixation on identifying and remedying "root causes" contributed to the proliferation of foundations. Rather than administering services directly, such as serving food to the hungry or providing shelter to the unhoused, foundations could provide fund-

14 David S. Patterson, "Andrew Carnegie's Quest for World Peace," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 114, no. 5 (1970): 371–83.

15 Donald Fisher, "The Role of Philanthropic Foundations in the Reproduction and Production of Hegemony: Rockefeller Foundations and the Social Sciences," *Sociology* 17, no. 2 (May 1983): 206–33, https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038583017002004.

ing to support various organizations that addressed the constituent components of an issue and constructed a "social safety net."

This turn in philanthropy can largely be attributed to the prominent progressive era industrialists Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and Cornelius Vanderbilt, who grafted their logics of scientific, managerial, and industrial processes to form a professionalized field of philanthropy.[16] This mode of thinking became the basis for "philanthrocapitalism" – the application of business logics and economic frameworks (i. e. "capitalism") to the administration of philanthropy.[17]

Ironically, the Progressive Era industrialist whose name is almost synonymous with factory efficiency – Henry J. Ford – was an adamant detractor of philanthrocapitalism. He explained this sentiment in his autobiography: "I have no patience with professional charity, or with any sort of commercialized humanitarianism. The moment human helpfulness is systematized, organized, commercialized, and professionalized, the heart of it is extinguished, and it becomes a cold and clammy thing."[18]

An act of the U.S. Congress created the Commission on Industrial Relations in 1912 to scrutinize the scope and effectiveness of US labor laws against rapidly industrializing business practices and working conditions. Andrew Carnegie and Henry Ford, among other industrialists, were called as witnesses to provide testimony towards what would become a comprehensive report on the labor conditions of the Progressive Era. The seventh volume of this report includes testimony on two vectors of Industrial relations: "The smuggling of Asiatics" and "the Colorado coal miners' strike." Protesting suppressed wages and dire working conditions, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) organized strikes against Colorado Fuel and Iron (CF&I) that commenced in the summer of 1913. Evicted from company housing, more than 1,200 CF&I coal miners and their families erected and resided in a tent colony on the outskirts of the mine in Ludlow, Colorado. On 20 April 1914, private guards hired by CF&I and the Colorado National Guard opened fire on the improvised town killing approximately 21 people, including miners' wives and children.

Dubbed the "Ludlow Massacre," the Commission chair and Missouri attorney Frank P. Walsh's questioning of CF&I President Jesse F. Welborn drew out the connections between the close circle of Rockefeller confidants and Foundation trustees that guided both philanthropic and professions, and who had, in varying de-

16 Edward H. Berman, *The Ideology of Philanthropy: The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983).
17 Matthew R. Bishop and Michael Green, *Philanthrocapitalism: How Giving Can Save the World* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009).
18 Henry Ford, *My Life and Work*, ed. Samuel Crowther (S.I.: Duke Classics, 2021).

grees, some stake in creating the conditions under which the massacre occurred. Welborn's testimony guardedly offered the image of a small network of actors between both office spaces and private residences controlling the tendrils of Rockefeller enterprises.[19]

4 Myths and Origins

To some extent, philanthropy is an exercise in mythology and myth-making. It situates philanthropists within broader histories and traditions of giving. In Greek mythology, the titan Prometheus stole fire from the Olympian gods and brought it to humanity aboard a fennel stalk. As punishment for his transgression, Zeus bound the titan to a boulder, where a vulture would gnaw out Prometheus' liver each day for the organ to regenerate each night in a perpetual cycle. But, crucially, Prometheus' gift also condemned humanity to a life of toil and labor.[20] However, Prometheus can be viewed as humanity's patron. His paternalism brought fire and the gifts of technology, sciences, and the arts. However, the consequences of his generosity, such as the indefinite internment into labor, were beset upon his gift's beneficiaries, who were neither complicit in the means with which it was acquired nor enfranchised in the decision to receive it.

Leading industrialists of the Progressive Era were often referred to as the "Titans" of Industry and Capital[21] – a name reminiscent of the Greek myth of Prometheus and his gift of fire to humanity. Prometheus belonged to a group of gods, the Titans, who had ruled the earth before the Olympians overthrew and supplanted them. Banished to the underworld, the Titans existed in a type of antithetical deification in uneasy tension with the Olympians and humanity. As they sought to negotiate their roles with successors, they retained an influence over humanity but did not seek to dismantle their waning supremacy. The parallels between the Titans of myth and the "Titans of Industry" offer a lens to view Progressive Era philanthropy's outsized nature and heroic ambitions.

19 Frank P. Walsh and Basil Maxwell Manly, eds., *Industrial Relations: Final Report and Testimony*, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. Senate. Doc. 415 (Washington: United States Government Print Office, 1916).
20 Roger D. Woodard, "Hesiod and Greek Myth," in *The Cambridge Companion to Greek Mythology*, ed. Roger D. Woodard (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
21 "The Struggle of the Titans," *Austin Daily Statesman (1891–1902)*, 26 August 1901.

5 The Rockefeller Foundation and Asia

John D. Rockefeller founded Standard Oil Company in 1870 until he retired as its primary shareholder, making him the wealthiest American of his time. Rockefeller was earnestly committed to philanthropy from an early age, and his donations were primarily directed toward denominational causes. Religion held significant weight in Rockefeller's life, and it would be through the missionary system that his philanthropic work would be realized.

Around 1891, Rockefeller expanded the role of his financial advisor, Frederick Taylor Gates, to guide Rockefeller's philanthropic contributions. Beyond his formidable business acumen and the confidence he commanded as an advisor, Gates was also an American Baptist clergyman and an educator. Ironically, it was Gates who questioned the effectiveness of contributing to organizations that offered foreign aid under the pretense of religious charitable missions. He asserted that these efforts neither produced effective health benefits nor converts.

Instead, Gates championed development through investments in medical science, modern models of medical education, and professionalized medical services – first in the U.S. and, in a bold move for the time, in China. Scientists and the larger science community sought greater participation in advising both industry and government in the Progressive Era, and their contributions had made swift advances in developing systematic and experimental approaches to solving both technical and societal problems.[22] The effectiveness of scientific approaches in the oil industry likely primed Rockefeller to accept these methods in his philanthropic work.

China was not new to Rockefeller; he had contributed to Baptist missionary work in China. Standard Oil had started marketing kerosene as lamp fuel to China as early as the 1890s, and the nation quickly became Standard Oil's largest market in Asia.[23] Christian missionaries in China provided substantial testimony on the urgent need for modern medical practices, including disease treatment and personal and public hygiene. On 19 January 1914, the Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation convened executive officers from significant missionary boards, medical missionaries, and notable Chinese residents in the United States at a New York City conference to discuss medical education and public health. As a result of the conference, the Trustees appointed a Commission to study the needs of

22 Patrick J. McGrath, *Scientists, Business, and the State, 1890–1960*, The Luther Hartwell Hodges Series on Business, Society, and the State (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
23 Mary Brown Bullock, *The Oil Prince's Legacy: Rockefeller Philanthropy in China* (Washington, D.C.: Stanford, Calif: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford University Press, 2011).

China concerning medical education and public health. The Commission comprised of University of Chicago president Harry Pratt Judson, attorney and retired judge Roger S. Greene, and physician Francis W. Peabody. The Commission spent four months studying existing medical schools, hospitals, and dispensaries in Peking for four months. They conferred with advisers, Government officials, and missionaries to determine the best methods of improving the work already done in medical education and public health.

The Commission delivered its findings and recommendations in a comprehensive report to the Trustees. In their findings, they observed key deficiencies in the mission-run Chinese hospitals, but also a Chinese government that was receptive to support in bolstering Chinese healthcare through replicated U.S. medical practices. [24]

Based on these findings, Gates led the Rockefeller Foundation to create the China Medical Board, a nonprofit organization to promote health education and research in Chinese medical universities. Dr. Wallace Buttrick, a Baptist minister and Executive Officer of the General Education Board, was appointed Director of the China Medical Board, and Roger S. Greene was appointed Resident Director in China. John D. Rockefeller also held a seat on the Chinese Medical Board, a role which he would later share with his only son John D. Rockefeller Jr., who would increasingly come to take on an active role as a philanthropic advisor for the Senior Rockefeller.[25]

The CMB dispatched a second commission to China in the summer of 1915, including, along with Dr. Buttrick, Dr. William H. Welch, Professor of Pathology at Johns Hopkins University (who would later become Dean of the Johns Hopkins Medical School), and Dr. Simon Flexner, Director of the Laboratories of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research.[26]

Steered by the council Welch and Flexner, the CMB sought to use Rockefeller funds to provide practical support and build capacity in China along four strands of activity:

1. the promotion of medical education by the building up of schools with adequate personnel and equipment in Peking and Shanghai, and by substantial aid to the Hunan-Yale Medical School in Changsha;
2. grants in aid to hospitals of various missionary organizations;

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24 "Medicine in China" (China Medical Commission, Rockefeller Foundation, 1914).

25 E. Richard Brown, "Rockefeller Medicine in China: Professionalism and Imperialism," in *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad*, ed. Robert F. Arnove, 1st ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).

26 "The Rockefeller Foundation: China Medical Board Departure of Visiting Party," *Peking Gazette (1915–1917)*, 12 October 1915.

3. the granting of fellowships to missionary physicians and to Chinese physicians in order to give them the advantages of special study;
4. aid in the translation of medical books including nursing text-books.[27]

Under Rockefeller Junior, the China Medical Board took control of Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) in 1915. The CMB sought to modernize and professionalize PUMC, making it the "John Hopkins of China."[28] This was an extension of the CMB's focus on capacity-building and leadership development "so that the ultimate task shall fall on the Chinese themselves."[29]

PUMC was founded in 1906 and received inconsistent financial support and staffing through various internationally-focused Christian missionary organizations. The Rockefeller Foundation approached the oversight of PUMC with a focus on medicine and expressly disclaimed any "intent to dictate doctrinal ideas to physicians and nurses," as had been a part of missions' work.[30]

Within a few short years, the CMB made significant headway and, in a 1919 report to the U.S. Bureau of the Interior, described the effects of the foundation:

> No medical school in China is adequately equipped and adequate, though some include on their staff most excellent men who aim for high standards and follow sound policies. The whole aspect of this problem has been modified within the last few years by the entrance into the field of the China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, who have stimulated real progress by giving aid under proper conditions to a number of hospitals throughout the country, by affording opportunities for further training and research to a number of missionary physicians when on furlough and to a number of Chinese graduates in modern medicine, by assisting, in the development of more adequate premedical courses at Changsha, Shanghai, and Foochow in connection with existing institution by strengthening greatly the medical school of Shangtung Christian University where the medium of instruction is Mandarin, and by the reorganization of the Union Medical College at Peking, where the medium of instruction is English. In connection with this last institution a premedical faculty has also been provided, and for the hospital and medical schools very extensive buildings are now in course of construction at a cost of several million dollars gold.[31]

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27 "Annual Report 1916" (The Rockefeller Foundation, 1916), Rockefeller Foundation Library.

28 Frank Ninkovich, "The Rockefeller Foundation, China, and Cultural Change," *The Journal of American History* 70, no. 4 (March 1984): 799, https://doi.org/10.2307/1899749.

29 "Annual Report 1915" (The Rockefeller Foundation, 1915), Rockefeller Foundation Library.

30 Special to The Fee Press, "Rockefeller Foundation Is Held Menace," *Detroit Free Press (1858–1922)*, 26 August 1915, https://www.proquest.com/docview/565913709/abstract/AADC32D3D0A74203PQ/1.

31 Charles K. Edmunds, "Modern Education in China," Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Interior Bureau of Education, 1919).

The foundation used the credibility it garnered in supporting China's medical education to later expand into other development programs in China, including rural development, scientific research, elementary education, and other broader "modernization" efforts. The foundation's investment in China was robust and proved to be a model for development that the foundation would replicate at varying scales in subsequent programs internationally.[32]

Junior also developed an aesthetic appreciation for the art of Asia, imploring his father to support his purchase of Chinese porcelain – acquisitions that he argued had educational merits beyond their aesthetic value. Living with the material culture of Asia would set the groundwork for a growing interest in the region. The Junior Rockefeller expanded the global reach of the Rockefeller family and supported several significant projects in Asia, including Lingnan University in China, St. Luke's International Hospital in Tokyo, and the library of the Imperial University in Tokyo. In the U.S., he further championed broader internationalist causes, including the League of Nations and the Council on Foreign Relations.

John D. Rockefeller the third would continue to hold the seat on the Chinese Medical Board as his father and grandfather had, but he would do so with an interest in Asia more broadly. When the Second World War erupted, JDR3 served as a naval officer in the Military Government, where he would help draft the instructions sent to General Douglas MacArthur upon assuming command of the occupation of Japan. Following the War, John Foster Dulles asked Rockefeller to join his embassy as a consultant on cultural affairs as Dulles negotiated a peace settlement with Japan.

Shortly thereafter, the third Rockefeller would revitalize the moribund Japan Society, where he served as president from 1952 to 1969 and became chairman of the Board until he died in 1978. He concurrently founded the Asia Society in 1956. Both organizations were devoted to fostering cultural, business, and educational exchanges between the East and the West.

He had designed Asia Society with a vision, as he put it, "to contribute to broader and deeper understanding between the peoples of the United States and Asia." From the beginning, the arts would become central to this mission. Presenting performances by dancers, musicians, and actors, as well as visual art exhibitions, Asia Society became a portal connecting the two continents through culture. Following his parents' passion for the material culture of Asia, he would donate more than 300 objects spanning centuries and from across Asia to create

32 David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*, paperback print, America in the World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2011), 1.

the core of the Asia Society Museum's collection. Further, in 1963, he established The Asian Cultural Program of the JDR 3rd Fund to promote cultural exchange in the arts between the United States and Asia. The program not only funded the projects of cultural organizations but also directly supported the work of artists and scholars.[33]

6 Internationalism and the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace

Andrew Carnegie was a contemporary of Rockefeller Senior. Unlike Rockefeller, Carnegie was an immigrant, born in Dunfermline, Scotland, and emigrated to the US at the age of 12 with his parents in 1848. In Scotland, Carnegie's parents fell into financial precarity when the introduction of the weaving machine decimated the demand for his father's skilled work in handweaving.[34] In the U.S., Carnegie quickly developed and exercised business savvy. He accumulated his wealth through his investments in the Carnegie Steel Company. In 1901 Carnegie sold Carnegie Steel Company which would merge with the Federal Steel Company and National Steel Company into U.S. Steel, a corporation (and to some, "The Corporation"[35]) formed and owned by J. P. Morgan.[36]

In the mid-1800s, Chinese immigrants were a vital source of labor for the construction of the United States' First Transcontinental Railroad, which linked the Eastern and Western U.S. railway networks. During this time, Chinese immigrants developed a reputation as both industrious and inexpensive alternatives to American or European labor. As the U.S. economy sputtered in the late 1800s, U.S. workers demanded legislation that would limit immigration from China, and discrimination against Chinese immigrants became widespread.[37]

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33 Peter Johnson and Adriana Proser, *A Passion for Asia: The Rockefeller Legacy*. 1st ed (Exhibition A Passion for Asia: The Rockefeller Family Collects, New York: Hudson Hills Press, 2006).

34 Joseph Frazier Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 2nd ed. (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989).

35 Len Boselovic, "Steel Standing: U.S. Steel Celebrates 100 Years," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, 25 February 2001, sec. Business, https://perma.cc/3SHR-VUUE.

36 David Nasaw, *Andrew Carnegie* (London: Penguin Books, 2007).

37 Gordon H. Chang et al., eds., *The Chinese and the Iron Road: Building the Transcontinental Railroad*, Asian America (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2019); Gordon H. Chang, *Ghosts of Gold Mountain: The Epic Story of the Chinese Who Built the Transcontinental Railroad*, First Mariner Books edition 2020 (Boston and New York: Mariner Books, 2020).

The Naturalization Act of 1870 designated Asians as "permanent aliens" and prohibited them from voting and serving on juries or enjoying the most basic of citizens' rights.[38] The Page Act of 1875 prohibited the entry of laborers trafficked from or recruited for "lewd and immoral purposes" from "China, Japan or any Oriental country" into the U.S. However, selective enforcement and racist interpretations of the Page Act of 1875 became a barrier for Chinese women seeking to enter the U.S.[39] These would foreshadow the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which broadly prohibited all immigration of both "skilled and unskilled" Chinese laborers.[40]

Andrew Carnegie was repulsed by the anti-Chinese sentiment that was brewing in America. Reflecting on this treatment of the Chinese immigrants, he wrote: "...it is preposterous to believe there is anything in the agitation against them beyond the usual prejudice of the ignorant races next to them in the social scale."[41]

He penned this as he traveled by boat in 1878 to China, accompanying his business partner John Vandevort, whom he affectionately nicknamed "Vandy." He would enthusiastically visit China, Japan, and India on this trip. In each country, Carnegie made observations about that country's culture, religion, and economy, which he wove into his travelogues. These travelogues were Carnegie's earliest publications, preceding *Gospel of Wealth* by almost a decade. And the musings that were interspersed with the travel narrative expanded into ideas on business and policy that were the topics of his later books. But within the travelogues, specifically in recounting his travel through Asia, he describes his voracious consumption of local culture. Although he expressed a distaste for Japanese traditional music, for example, he sought to gain as much exposure to it as he could fit into his trip. He would later describe the experience of cultural immersion in Asia as "refreshing" and advise his friends to undertake a similar journey.

However, before positioning himself in world affairs, he would look to the arts as a sandbox for his peacebuilding agenda. Carnegie served on the Oratorio Society of New York and the New York Symphony Society boards.

Furthermore, he funded the construction of a music hall that would serve as a venue for both groups. Opening in 1881, the opulent facility would become known as Carnegie Music Hall. However, Carnegie hinted at a more extensive social mission for the venue as the cornerstone was laid: "It is built to stand for ages, and

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38 Deenesh Sohoni, "Unsuitable Suitors: Anti-Miscegenation Laws, Naturalization Laws, and the Construction of Asian Identities," *Law & Society Review* 41, no. 3 (2007): 587–618.

39 George Anthony Peffer, "Forbidden Families: Emigration Experiences of Chinese Women under the Page Law, 1875–1882," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 6, no. 1 (1986): 28–46.

40 Andrew Gyory, *Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion Act* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).

41 Andrew Carnegie, *Round the World* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1884), 20.

during these ages, it is probable that this hall will intertwine itself with the history of our country. All good causes may find here a platform." Not only would he support performances by international artists and music advocating peaceful relations. But when he convened delegates from around the world for the 1907 National Arbitration and Peace Congress, Carnegie selected the hall as the event's primary venue. The stage was, quite literally, a platform for global debate and discussion.[42]

Only a few years after Carnegie Music Hall opened to the public, Carnegie established what would come to be known as the Carnegie International, an exhibition of international contemporary art presented at the Carnegie Institute, a facility he established in Pittsburgh, the hub of his steel industry. He envisioned the Institute as a "Palace of Culture," combining a library, galleries exhibiting art, and a music hall into an opulent complex. Carnegie's interest in libraries was personal and reminiscent of Carnegie's boyhood experience pouring through the volumes in the private library of Colonel James Anderson, an opportunity for the self-edification that Carnegie attributed to his success.[43]

Carnegie Institute was not the first library that Carnegie founded and funded, but instead it was an early iteration of the "Carnegie Library model" that he was developing. Carnegie first erected a library near his birthplace in Dunfermline, Scotland in 1881. Perhaps emphasizing the means of his ascent from humble beginnings, Carnegie built a second library (and his first in the United States) in Braddock, Pennsylvania, a key site of one of the Carnegie Steel Company's mills. The Carnegie Library of Braddock was commissioned in 1887 and opened to the public in 1889. An 1893 addition doubled the size of the building and included the third Carnegie Music Hall similar to that which would inhabit Carnegie Institute.[44]

Carnegie saw focusing on the Institutes' contemporary art or the "old masters of tomorrow" as a shrewd investment. Art loaned for the exhibition could be purchased inexpensively and then appreciated in both financial value and historical relevance. The practice of buying recent works from contemporary artists would become central to the Institute's strategy for filling its galleries and building the museum's collection. Carnegie took tremendous pride in the Institution, and the

42 Richard Schickel and Michael Walsh, *Carnegie Hall: The First One Hundred Years* (New York: Abrams, 1987).

43 Andrew Carnegie, *Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie* (London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1920), 72.

44 Charles Dunlevey, "Pennsylvania SP Carnegie Free Library of Braddock," National Register of Historic Places nomination (Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1973), NAID: 71994732.

International exhibition drew global attention to it.[45] Carnegie also established his first foundation to fund and govern the Institute, and this became a charitable business model upon which he would repeat and tweak. Carnegie's cultural engagement offered him an opportunity to experiment with the systems that would become necessary for his mission of global peacebuilding, through building opportunities, and he familiarized himself with the many types of structures – social (community and stakeholder engagement), capital (philanthropic trusts), and physical (buildings and facilities) – that would be necessary to operate at the scale he envisioned.

The scale of his ambitions for regional and international development could be seen in the Carnegie Libraries. By 1897, Carnegie had operationalized the founding of libraries and hired James Bertram to liaise with municipalities seeking funding for libraries, and then administer the disbursement of grants to those Carnegie approved. The process quickly became formalized as Carnegie and Bertram began identifying and collecting data from each applicant on criteria that would inform Carnegie's determination. The ability of a municipality to sustain its library beyond Carnegie's gift was of the utmost importance, and to make the determination Bertram provided applicants with a *Schedule of Questions* to collect population data, information about other proximate libraries, and documentation of available community funds.[46]

In total, Carnegie funded the construction of 2,509 libraries worldwide, almost all of which bore his name. One thousand seven hundred and ninety-five were in the United States, including 1,687 public and 108 academic libraries.

Library grants were limited to English-speaking countries, and those built outside of the United States were in Europe, South Africa, Barbados, Australia, and New Zealand.[47] This limitation was both logistical and philosophical, as Carnegie's peacebuilding and development interests were, after all, centered around his conceptualization of the Anglosphere. He saw similarities in the English-speaking countries that he felt gave them an intrinsic coherence.[48]

Following the founding of the Carnegie Corporation of New York in 1911, Carnegie transferred the process for providing grants to libraries to the Corporation's remit. While Carnegie could make personal gifts with few geographical con-

45 Robert J. Gangewere, *Palace of Culture: Andrew Carnegie's Museums and Library in Pittsburgh* (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011).

46 George S. Bobinski, "Carnegie Libraries: Their History and Impact on American Public Library Development," *ALA Bulletin* 62, no. 11 (1968): 1361–67, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25698025.

47 Florence Anderson, "Library Program, 1911–1961" (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1963).

48 Berman, *The Ideology of Philanthropy*.

straints, the Corporation's charter constrained it to spend its income only in the United States, Canada, and the British Colonies. Carnegie established the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust to continue his philanthropic interests in the British Isles in 1913.

The Corporation would encounter a hurdle in administering the program in 1917, as the United States entered the First World War. A shortage of materials and manpower halted the construction of new buildings, such as libraries, in the U.S., and the Corporation discontinued the provision of grants for library construction, first temporarily, then permanently.[49]

The Corporation observed the shortcomings of the library grants almost immediately. While Carnegie and the Corporation generously provided funds for the construction of libraries, ongoing maintenance costs were often left to local communities. This created financial burdens for many towns and cities which, despite Carnegie and Bertram's vetting, struggled to sustain the libraries over time. Many failed to even retain a sole librarian.[50] Internationally, the libraries had been the subject of controversy. The Carnegie name was associated as much with the harsh working conditions and labor conditions as it was the benefactor's generosity.[51]

His philanthropic endeavors would coalesce into a philosophy that he articulated in *Wealth*, his manifesto on both the obligations of the wealthy to give and admonishing posthumous philanthropy, stating "…the man who dies leaving behind many millions of available wealth, which was his to administer during life, will pass away "unwept, unhonored, and unsung," no matter to what uses he leaves the dross which he cannot take with him. Of such as these the public verdict will then be: "The man who dies thus rich dies disgraced."[52]

Carnegie first attempted to interject his ideas on world affairs in 1887 as an advocate for an Anglo-American arbitration treaty. This made sense as a first step as it was a popular and swelling movement, and he knew England and the U.S. well. He was also keen to abolish the monarchy in Britain and avoid imperialism by the U.S.[53] When mounting fear of Japan's influence and naval strength led the U.S. to annex the Island of Hawaii in 1898, Carnegie advocated for a decreased

49 Anderson, "Library Program, 1911–1961."

50 Ibid.

51 Shona Gourlay, "The Carnegie Libraries in Alberta," *Alberta History* 67, no. 1 (1 January 2019): 9–16.

52 Andrew Carnegie, "Wealth," *The North American Review* 148, no. 391 (June 1889): 653–64.

53 Duncan Bell, "Race, Utopia, Perpetual Peace: Andrew Carnegie's Dreamworld," in *American Foreign Policy* (Manchester University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9781526116505.003.0003.

naval presence in the region. He recognized the strategic importance of the annexation for U.S. defense and emphasized that the popular vote in Hawaii towards joining the U.S. was a mitigating circumstance towards his otherwise anti-imperialist stance. However, he saw these conditions as exceptional and implored, "Let us hope that our far outlying possessions may end with Hawaii."[54]

That same year, the Spanish-American War began. In the Battle of Manila Bay, The United State Navy wrestled Spanish naval forces out of the network of colonized Philippines islands over which Spain had almost already lost its grip in an 1896 revolution.

The U.S. returned revolutionary statesman Emilio Aguinaldo to the Philippines from his self-exile in Hong Kong. Seeking a conclusive end to Spanish rule, Aguinaldo promptly issued the Philippine Declaration of Independence. The U.S. did not acknowledge this declaration, and under the Treaty of Paris that concluded the Spanish-American War, Spain sold the Philippines to the United States for $20 million in 1899.

Of this colonial arrangement, Mark Twain, a member of the Anti-Imperialist League (of which Carnegie was also a member), offered a scathing critique in a parody of Julia Ward Howe's *Battle Hymn of the Republic*, a song which had become popular in the preceding decades: "Mine eyes have seen the orgy of the launching of the Sword;
He is searching out the hoardings where the stranger's wealth is stored;
He hath loosed his fateful lightnings, and with woe and death has scored;
His lust is marching on."[55]

Like Twain, Andrew Carnegie adamantly and publicly protested the annexation of the Philippines. "Nations do not hold possession of places captured by war," Carnegie declared in response to the editorial in the New York Times. He explained: "We may safely trust Aguinaldo and his people to establish a government and bring the Philippines into the list of nations more or less wisely governed, fully equal to Haiti, who we have the good sense to let alone and allow to develop in her own way, and much better than Turkey."[56]

Whether as a publicity stunt to draw attention to his anti-imperialist cause or a genuine offer founded in his business-minded approach to all matters, Carnegie

54 Andrew Carnegie, "Distant Possessions: The Parting of the Ways," *The North American Review* 167, no. 501 (1898): 239–48.

55 Arthur Lincoln Scott, *On the Poetry of Mark Twain: With Selections from His Verse* (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1966), 128.

56 Andrew Carnegie, "Carnegie on the Philippines.," *New York Times*, 24 October 1898.

offered to donate $20 million of his personal wealth to the people of the Philippines so they could purchase their independence from the U.S.[57]

Although his stances on Hawaii and the Philippines were consistent with his anti-imperial agenda, these bold viewpoints collided with Carnegie's business interests. Carnegie Steel was a key supplier of the steel used in the Navy's military vessels. A decreased naval presence would entail a decreased demand for Carnegie's steel.[58] As he earned greater confidence both in his command of geopolitics and the philosophical underpinnings of his philanthropy, Carnegie retired from industry upon selling Carnegie Steel in 1901 and shifted his focus exclusively to his philanthropy and mission of world peace.

The massive industrialization, manufacturing, and technological breakthroughs that enabled Carnegie's wealth also brought with it the progressive development of deadlier weapons deployed in international conflict. The necessity for methods of de-escalating conflict and venues for resolving conflict without violence was obvious. The Permanent Court of Arbitration was created under the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes during the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899. Following Andrew Dickson White's invitation and Elihu Root's encouragement, Carnegie contributed in 1903 to construct a "Temple of Peace" which would house this court, opening a decade later in 1913.

On 25 November 1910, the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday, Andrew Carnegie announced the establishment of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to an audience of distinguished Americans convened at the Carnegie Institute in Washington. The corpus for the Endowment was a set of mortgage bonds. Carnegie charged trustees to use the fund to "hasten the abolition of international war, the foulest blot upon our civilization," and he gave his trustees "the widest discretion as to the measures and policy they shall from time to time adopt" in carrying out the purpose of the fund.[59]

Carnegie appointed longtime adviser Elihu Root as the CEIP's first president while still in office as senator of New York and serving on the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He had previously held the office of Secretary of State from 1905 to 1909 -–providing instruction to the American commissioners to the Second Hague Conference in 1907 – and Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904. Root was an active member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague and maintained a profile as a leading figure in international law. Conservative on most fronts, Root was out-of-step with many Progressive ideas and was an out-

57 "Offered to Pay All the Philippine Indemnity," *New York Times*, 16 May 1902, https://www.proquest.com/docview/96201398/abstract/166682090E084F21PQ/1.

58 Patterson, "Andrew Carnegie's Quest for World Peace."

59 Ibid.

spoken advocate against women's suffrage.[60] Despite this, Root was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1912, within his first year at CEIP. Root would remain president of CEIP through 1925, to be replaced by Nicholas Murray Butler, who would also receive a Nobel Peace Prize (shared with Jane Addams) in 1931.[61]

Root led the foundation on a path that favored analysis from a critical distance rather than direct intervention, a tack of scholarly objectivity that would continue into Murray's tenure. Similar to Carnegie's tentative steps into geopolitics and foreign affairs, the CEIP's early efforts were modest.[62] But they also quickly diverged from Carnegie's focus on the Anglosphere and sought to foster capacity-building in and intellectual exchange with South America.

In 1916, the CEIP gave around 9,000 books, pamphlets, and maps, selected as "typical of the political and intellectual life of the United States," to the Museo Social Argentino in Buenos Aires. And by 1919, CEIP had begun plans for sending similar libraries to other South American capitals as well as to several European capitals. By 1919, CEIP had undertaken a massive effort to translate into Spanish numerous volumes of U.S. literature, including works by prominent authors such as Edgar Allen Poe and Washington Irving, and ship them to South American institutions, including Universidad Mayor de San Marcos, Perú (2,864 books), Biblioteca Nacional, Chile (2,864 books), Bibliotheca Nacional, Brazil (2,264 books), Bibliotheca do Estado de São Paulo, Brazil (825 books), Biblioteca Nacional, Uruguay (1,887 books), Facultad de Derecho, Uruguay (302 books), Instituto Paraguayo, Paraguay (1,887 books), and Facultad de Derecho, Paraguay (302 books).[63]

Similarly, plans were made for the exchange of university professors between South American and North American universities as well as students. During the summer of 1919, CEIP convened a conference of the Spanish-speaking teachers in New Mexico to encourage the study of Spanish throughout the State with the hope that "a more general knowledge of the language of Mexico might aid in averting misunderstanding and contribute to a better and more intelligent understanding of that country by the people of the United States." [64]

By 1921, CEIP had established an ongoing international faculty exchange program with broad participation. The scope of these efforts for international ex-

60 Elihu Root, *Address Delivered by the Hon. Elihu Root, before the New York State Constitutional Convention, on August 15th, 1894* (New York: New York State Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage, 1894).

61 Martin David Dubin, "Elihu Root and the Advocacy of a League of Nations, 1914–1917," *The Western Political Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (1966): 439–55, https://doi.org/10.2307/444707.

62 Patterson, "Andrew Carnegie's Quest for World Peace."

63 "Year Book for 1920" (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1920).

64 "Year Book for 1921" (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921).

change quickly expanded and facilitated "missions" visiting the United States to study U.S. educational conditions. Among these were an educational commission from China headed by the Honorable HsiToo Yuan, Vice Minister of Education, a Japanese commercial and educational mission led by Baron Goto, and the mission of French and English physicians who came to study U.S. medical education.[65]

7 Public Outcry

Both Carnegie and Rockefeller were subject to contemporaneous criticism. Andrew Carnegie was acutely aware of what could appear to be hypocrisy, and in a letter posted in 1900 to fellow peace advocate William T. Stead, Carnegie stated, "There is nothing that robs a righteous cause of its strength more than a millionaire's money."[66] Regardless, the blowback to the robber barons' philanthropy came from academia, clergy, government, and the public.

Rev. William Jewett Tucker, who was then a professor at Andover Seminary who would become the ninth President of Dartmouth College, saw fault in the arguments for philanthropy that Carnegie had presented in *The Gospel of Wealth.* "Within proper limits, the public is advantaged by the gifts of the rich," Tucker wrote, "but if the method becomes the accepted method, to be expected and relied upon, the decline of public self-respect has begun."[67]

Methodist Bishop Hugh Price Hughes, a vocal critic of Carnegie's philanthropy, more pointedly described Carnegie as "an anti-Christian phenomenon, a social monstrosity, and a grave political peril."[68]

In seeking the charter for the Rockefeller Foundation, the Senior Rockefeller met resistance from President Theodore Roosevelt. "No amount of charity in spending such fortunes can compensate in any way for the misconduct in acquiring them," Roosevelt declared in his speech at the opening of the Jamestown Exposition in Virginia in the summer of 1907.[69]

Pushback also came from the denominational communities, whose work Rockefeller had generously supported. A contribution to the American Board of Com-

65 Ibid.

66 C. Roland Marchand, *The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1889–1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 13.

67 William Jewett Tucker, "The Gospel of Wealth," *Andover Review,* June 1891.

68 James Cardinal Gibbons, "Wealth and Its Obligations," *The North American Review* 152, no. 413 (1891): 385–94.

69 Theodore Roosevelt, *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Joseph Bucklin Bishop, vol. 8 (Madison & Adams Press, 2017).

missioners for Foreign Missions, the missionary arm of the Congregational Church, stoked heated debate within the Church. In a public response, minister Washington Gladden implored the Church to decline gifts from "persons whose gains have been made by methods morally reprehensible or socially injurious."[70] Criticism even appeared in Chinese-language newspapers published in the U.S., specifically espousing a growing belief that by engaging with Carnegie, Rockefeller, and J.P. Morgan, China was importing U.S. plutocracy rather than democracy.[71]

The Commission on Industrial Relations called Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller to testify before Congress on 5 February 1915. But Carnegie and Rockefeller were interrogated not only about the working conditions of their respective companies and the efforts of those companies to suppress strikers but also on the activities, interests, and legality of their foundations.[72]

8 Conclusion

The philanthropic efforts of Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller toward international development have been the subject of intense debate and criticism. While their contributions have led to the establishment of numerous institutions and initiatives, the means by which they amassed their wealth and the methods they employed to distribute it have been criticized for being exploitative and self-serving. While their selection of causes was built upon the emerging social theories of the Progressive Era, they were subject to the critique of an increasingly socially-minded public.

The means by which their wealth was accumulated did not go unnoticed, and public backlash continued to limit their capacity to launder their reputations through even the most generous of contributions. It can be argued that, at these stages, foundations were too close to the idiosyncratic ideas of their founders and too insulated under the management of their networks of colleagues and confidants. Regardless, these institutions persist and continue to evolve – whether because of or despite their origins. The continuance of these organizational models and regulatory faltering binds the development sector to a problematic legacy.

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70 Washington Gladden, "Tainted Money," *Outlook (1893–1924)* (New York, United States: American Periodicals Series III, 30 November 1895).

71 Bullock, *The Oil Prince's Legacy*.

72 "No Danger Lurks in Their Gifts, Say Carnegie and Rockefeller," *Boston Daily Globe (1872–1922)*, 6 February 1915.

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