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Secularity in South Asia, East Asia, Inner Asia and the Himalayan Region: Introduction

The volumes of this series, with their collections of sources, all share the common aim of mapping and explaining the diversity of arrangements between the religious and secular spheres of society in global modernity. In this series, the term 'secularities' denotes the institutionally and symbolically embedded forms and arrangements of binary distinctions made between religion and other social spheres, practices, and interpretations. In our understanding, then, 'secularity' is a specific mode of conceptualising social differentiation, according to which the complexity of social structures is reduced to a binary epistemic structure that is based on the distinction between what is classified as religious and what is classified as secular. As a 'special-purpose taxonomy,' this mode of distinction has spread worldwide since the late nineteenth century. How religious and secular matters are related to each other, where the boundaries are drawn, and how permeable or impermeable these boundaries are, varies considerably between individual nation states, however. We assume that there has been a variety of causes for the diversity of secularities emerging in global modernity. The current distinctions between religious and non-religious areas of life found in non-European societies do not represent a passive reception of 'Western' classification systems that have replaced earlier distinctions. Rather, the specific forms of secularity found in each case are shaped by an ongoing process that transforms existing epistemic structures. To understand the diversity of modern secularities, it is therefore essential to consider the historical conditions under which they evolved, and the conceptual resources upon which they built. Of particular interest here are sources that illustrate how social differentiation was conceptualised in a particular culture, where debates about drawing boundaries become visible, and where competing knowledge systems, epistemologies, value spheres, and life orders collide. Particular attention must be paid to demarcations based on a distinction between transcendence and immanence, or mundane and supramundane matters.

In general, our main criterion for the selection of premodern sources was that they should offer a *longue durée* perspective on the epistemic and social conditions under which the respective societies would subsequently grapple with 'Western' secularity. That is, how they confronted Western ideas about the appropriate institutionalisation of the relationship between the religious and secular spheres in modern nation states. Our main criterion for the selection of more recent texts was that they should shed light on the current, often controversial debates on the position of religion in modern societies. Now – and, in fact, since the late nineteenth century – hardly any society or state can afford not to take up a position with respect to the relationship between religion and secular societal spheres. The nature and intensity of the conflicts over the concrete configu-

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rations of secularity also reflect the diversity of the historical preconditions for its implementation – that is, the diversity of cultural imprints and path dependencies that can be reconstructed from premodern sources.

Alongside the identification of relevant sources, a substantial challenge has been the arrangement of the volumes of this series according to meaningful criteria. There are several justifiable options: the series could be organised according to geographical, chronological, thematic, linguistic, or cultural criteria. Regardless of the chosen approach, there are always alternatives that might have been preferable according to a certain perspective. Thus, the spatial scope of this volume requires an explanation.

Geographically, we cover a region within Asia that roughly comprises parts of South Asia (India, Sri Lanka), East Asia (China, Korea, Vietnam, Japan), Inner Asia (Buryatia, Mongolia, Tibet) and the wider Himalayan region (Bhutan). With this geographically limited selection, the question arises as to whether there is any common denominator connecting these regions. As the collections of sources in this series are primarily focussed on representing discourses that involve conceptual distinctions between 'religious' and 'non-religious' spheres of life – or other, analogous binary classifications – it is logical to identify discursive spaces rather than strictly geographic regions. These discursive spaces are areas of dense communication where concepts circulate, and ideas are exchanged, in a somewhat systematic, organised, and reflexive manner.

Thus, shifting our perspective from geographical to discursive spaces, it becomes apparent that we are dealing with a discursive space whose most striking link is Buddhism. For this reason, India is only briefly mentioned here as the birthplace of Buddhism, and is otherwise covered in more detail in the sixth volume of this series. Our (by no means exclusive) emphasis on Buddhist texts does not imply that Buddhist discourses were always dominant in the selected regions. Buddhism was present in all of them, however, and, at least in some periods, was of considerable importance as a system of cognitive and normative orientation, and of interrelated beliefs and practices. In these regions, at these times, even Buddhism's opponents could not ignore its ideas and values.

The Role of Buddhism

Given that Buddhist discourses occupy a prominent place in this volume, it is structured to roughly follow the chronology of the spread of Buddhism. Originating in northern India around the fourth century BCE, Buddhism spread rapidly to the south of the Indian cultural sphere, including the island of Sri Lanka, and to its northwestern regions in present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan. Travelling along the 'Silk Roads' through the Central Asian kingdoms, it later arrived in China, in around the first century CE. Spreading from China, Buddhism reached the area of present-day Vietnam in the second or third century CE, the Korean Peninsula in the fourth century, and Japan in the sixth century. East Asia constituted a vast discursive space, known as the 'Sinosphere,' where written Chinese was the *lingua franca* of scholars and officials. The exchange between the 'Sinosphere' and the 'Indosphere' was maintained for centuries. Central Asian kingdoms – and especially multilingual oasis cities, such as Dunhuang at the intersection of all three main silk routes (north, central, and south), or the trade centre Turfan, both in modern-day Northwestern China – functioned as hubs of both commerce and cultural exchange. The travel and translation activities of Buddhist monks from Central Asia, China, and Korea also contributed to cultural entanglements between the two dominant cultural spheres. Moreover, there was lively direct contact between China and Sri Lanka. Without the involvement of Sri Lankan Sinhalese nuns in the fifth century, for example, the establishment of an order of nuns in China would surely have failed. As early as the third century BCE, monks from the Indian subcontinent had brought Buddhism to Sri Lanka, where a strong Buddhist tradition developed, and remained alive even after the almost complete disappearance of Buddhism in India. From Sri Lanka, intensive Buddhist missions were carried out to Southeast Asia, particularly to present-day Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia.

Tibet, situated at the interface between the 'Indosphere' and the 'Sinosphere,' is particularly noteworthy. This situation is reflected in the biography of king Srong btsan sgam po (died 645 or 650), founder of the Tibetan Empire. According to Tibetan tradition, he married one woman from Nepal and one woman from China, both of whom were Buddhists. Historically, however, the official recognition and promotion of Buddhism only occurred in the eighth century, which was followed by two centuries of decline, after which Buddhism gained new momentum in Tibet in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The early decision of the Tibetans to orient themselves more closely to the Indian Buddhist tradition than to the Chinese one was likely motivated more by political reasoning than religious considerations. In any case, Tibetans remained in close exchange with both cultural spheres.

From the Tangut Empire (Xi Xia) in Northwest China and Tibet, Buddhism spread further to Mongolia – which was also very much entangled with China – and Buryatia. From Tibet, Buddhism also spread to Bhutan and the neighbouring Himalayan regions. In later centuries, we can even speak of a 'Tibetosphere,' with Lhasa in Tibet as its centre. The language of religious and intellectual communication in this vast discursive sphere – stretching from the Himalayas, eastwards across the Mongolian regions and Manchuria, to Buryatia, and westwards to the lower Volga region – was classical Tibetan.

Although Buddhism could not claim epistemic hegemony everywhere and at all times, Buddhist ideas nonetheless formed an integral part of the dominant epistemes in all the regions mentioned here. Even outspoken critics of Buddhism, such as officials of the Confucian literati, or Shintō nationalists, had to engage with Buddhist ideas about the world, human life, and the afterlife.

However, the special significance of Buddhism with respect to the shaping of specific forms of secularity in Asia is not limited to its geographical spread and its role as a mediator of a transregional discursive space. There are also certain doctrinal and institutional peculiarities of Buddhism that make it significant to the development of Asian secularities. At the level of epistemic structures, Buddhism distinguishes sharply between transcendence and immanence, which is reflected in a pronounced monasticism at the level of social structures. We assume that the corresponding binary epistemic and social structures have considerably facilitated and shaped the culturally specific appropriation of secularity in modernity. As we will try to show, in countries where Buddhism was a major intellectual force before the encounter with the West, it provided epistemic and institutional resources for the shaping of secularity. In China, on the other hand, the intellectual foundations for the formation of modern secularism were laid by Confucianism.

Buddhist India and Sri Lanka

We have already pointed out the special significance of Buddhism as a highly networked discourse community and trans-regionally effective system of cognitive and normative orientation. We have also emphasised the fact that Buddhism developed its very own form of binary distinction between mundane and supramundane activities, norms, goals, and purposes. Because of the fundamental importance of the corresponding ideas, in the first section of this volume, we present a selection of classical Buddhist texts, followed by post-canonical and modern texts from Sri Lanka. Many of the influential ideas regarding the dual rule of two complementary and interdependent regimes, which resemble a prefiguration of secularity, were also taken up in Inner Asia and East Asia, in an adapted form.

The texts selected for this section illustrate four aspects regarding Buddhist ideas connected to the modern perspective of secularity, looking at their application to and within Sri Lanka. Firstly, a series of authoritative texts from the Theravāda tradition reveals the mythological foundations of these ideas. Secondly, another set of texts engages with classical religio-political models, such as the symbiosis of religion and the state in Sri Lankan history. This is followed by a third set of texts that provides a specific Buddhist narrative of decline, which is sometimes connected with notions of secularisation in present-day Sri Lanka. Finally, we present voices propagating a modern Buddhist anti-secularism.

In early Buddhist texts, teaching and governance are treated as cosmic twins. Classical Buddhist perspectives on the social world frequently delineate two distinct spheres of activity, often labelled in modern literature as ‘secular’ and ‘religious.’ Texts, mostly written by Buddhist monks, emphasise the interdependence of these spheres, and their mutual indispensability for societal well-being, asserting that neglecting one could lead to social catastrophe, or even the collapse of civilisation – a trope that we also find in Buddhist discourses in Japan and Mongolia, for example. A unique vulnerability is attributed to Buddhism, however, positioning it as being dependent on external support. This dependence serves as a persuasive tool, portraying Buddhism as fragile, and requiring constant protection and backing from the powerful and wealthy.

The classical religio-political discourse envisions an ideal king who harmonises peaceful Buddhist principles with a strong, protective role against societal challenges, presenting a normative model for worldly authorities. Despite the underlying tension between the moral values of Buddhism and the role of a ruler, which is often characterised – particularly in traditional Indian theories of rulership – by the use of force and violence, some historical kings have nonetheless been described as embodying this dual responsibility, managing to be both just rulers and patrons of religious institutions. The idealised figure of the Dharma king, or righteous king, acknowledges fundamental ethical principles, such as righteousness, justice, and modesty. This concept of just rule culminates in the idea of *cakravartins*, or wheel-turning monarchs, who embody the Dharma so profoundly that they can rule and expand their territory without resorting to warfare, relying on their noble charisma and an exemplary lifestyle. These exceptional rulers are believed to be the result of karmic preparation across numerous lifetimes, akin to the preparation of a bodhisattva for supreme awakening.

The idea of two distinct spheres of activity is already seen in hagiographies of the Buddha, which state that Siddhārtha Gautama, possessing the thirty-two marks of a 'Great Man,' was presented with two paths: either to pursue Buddhahood, or to become an ideal worldly ruler. Both the religious and the political sphere are symbolised by wheels: the "wheel of the doctrine" (*dharmacakra*) and the "wheel of authority" (*ājñācakra*). Both supramundane truth and mundane authority have their own logic, language, organisation, and authority structure. The wheel of the doctrine is set in motion when a Buddha delivers his first sermon, as exemplified by Gautama Buddha's lecture in the "deer park" at Isipatana near Varanasi. The wheel of authority is represented materially by the "wheel-treasure," a 1000-spoked wheel that miraculously appears and disappears when a king embodies the characteristics of a wheel-turning monarch. The wheel-turning monarch enlightens the world with Dharma through 'political means'; the Buddha does so through 'religious instruments.' Thus, the cosmological twins of the wheel-turning monarch and the Buddha symbolise the 'political' and 'religious' facets of an ideal world, governed by truth or righteousness (*dharma*).

Eventually, this twin concept transformed into a political model for an ideal kingdom. The twin pair is represented by the worldly 'state' or society (*loka*), and the institutionalised representation of the Buddha's teachings (Pali *sāsana;* Sanskrit *śāsana*) within society. Both are considered distinct domains that are to be supported and protected by the king. The term *sāsana* is synonymous with Dharma in this context, representing the supramundane truth that is comprehended and revealed by an awakened being – that is, the Buddha. However, *sāsana* is not completely identical with Dharma in *all* contexts. *Sāsana* is the embodiment of the Dharma within time and space, representing the 'three jewels' in society: the Buddha, his teachings (Dharma), and his community (*saṅgha*). Located in time and space, *sāsana* is described as a material entity vulnerable to historical contingencies, and thus requiring protection. A Dharma king plays a crucial role by investing resources in maintaining and expanding the kingdom, and in creating optimal conditions for the monastic community to preserve, practice, and spread the *sāsana*.

On a practical level, this involves significant royal donations to monasteries – including royal monasteries, which receive daily support from the king's budget. Monasteries enjoy various privileges, such as tax exemptions and legal protection. In Sri Lankan historiography, king Parākramabāhu I of Polonnaruva (1153–1186) represents an ideal protector of the *sāsana*. He is celebrated for his political success, and his efforts in establishing religious conformity, often being referred to as a *cakravartin,* or wheel-turning monarch. Notably, the chapter presented in this collection narrating the deeds and achievements of this king (text no. 4) is structured around the distinction between *loka* (mundane) and *sāsana* ('religious') – indicating a Buddhist distinction of two spheres akin to secularity. The text outlines Parākramabāhu's achievements, starting with his military campaigns against both rebels within Sri Lanka and external threats from South India and possibly Burma. Once his sovereignty is secured, he focuses on stabilising the kingdom by establishing a centralised administrative apparatus for the mundane sphere (*loka*). Additionally, he purifies the 'religious' domain (*sāsana*), by expelling monks with heretical views, addressing a historical disharmony among monastic communities that had split into different sects 1,254 years earlier.

Later sources suggest that Parākramabāhu may have also initiated a centralised hierarchy within the *saṅgha* – the monastic community – a system fully developed in later sources. This hierarchical structure parallels the twin concepts of *loka* and *sāsana,* reflecting a similar organisational structure with delegated authority for both worldly and religious domains. The text implies that peace and order were restored through violence (warfare and eradication of heresies), followed by the establishment of centralised authority to prevent future conflicts. Another text from the same period explicitly references the parallelism, stating that the king redesigned the wheel of authority and the wheel of the doctrine in Sri Lanka, to prevent fragmentation of control.

Classical Buddhist discourses not only distinguish between mundane and supramundane spheres represented by the king and the *saṅgha* respectively, but also provide a unique 'secularisation narrative.' This narrative informs Buddhist perspectives on secularisation even today, framing it as a decline in morality, with catastrophic consequences for humanity. Unlike the European historiographical focus on progress, Buddhist concepts of history assert that everything was better in the past, and the future will see further deterioration, until a distant period of improvement – that is, when the future Buddha Maitreya descends from Tuṣita heaven to restore the Dharma.

Text no. 5 and no. 6 discuss the Theriya tradition's prediction of the *sāsana's* disappearance. According to this tradition, particularly found in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, it is foreseen that the *sāsana* will vanish 5,000 years after the death of Buddha Gautama; other Buddhist traditions may use different timeframes. The Theriya concept, introduced to Sri Lanka by commentator Buddhaghosa in the fifth century CE, outlines five stages of decline, each lasting 1,000 years. Notably, one version of the narrative of decline (text no. 5) emphasises that the moral decline and near extinction of humankind are directly linked to political failure, a motif that modern Buddhist authors often draw upon.

Given the religio-political model of mutual support between the *sāsana* and the secular authorities, and the fact that ideas of secularisation are often formulated in line with the ancient Buddhist prediction of the gradual decline of the Dharma and the disappearance of the *sāsana*, it is not surprising that secularism is strongly rejected by most Buddhists nowadays, and that secularisation is viewed rather negatively. Issues of modern Buddhist anti-secularism and nationalism in Sri Lanka are discussed in a famous text (text no. 8), parts of which are reprinted here. The absence of a formal declaration of secularism in post-independence Sri Lanka (Ceylon) provided a loophole for Buddhism in the state: the constitution avoids the term 'secular,' opening the door for the consolidation of Buddhist supremacy. This absence is attributed to political concessions to Buddhist nationalist forces that emerged during the anti-colonial struggle. The Buddhist nationalist D. C. Wijewardena (Vijayawardhana) – in accord with his contemporaries' writings in many other publications in the period – formulated a new master narrative of Buddhist nationalism in 1953 (text no. 8), which brings forth three main arguments:

1. Buddhism and the Sinhalese nation have been intertwined for more than two millennia. Buddhist kings of the past were guided by Buddhist principles, exercising power in order to promote societal welfare.
2. British colonialism and Christian missionaries disrupted this harmony, nearly extinguishing Buddhism, and causing turmoil in post-independence Sri Lanka.
3. Buddhism should be restored to its former glory under modern democracy.

Such Buddhist nationalist texts often blend European and Buddhist philosophical resources, to revise cultural memory. Wijewardena here traces a timeline from a golden past through to colonial decline, and advocates a bright future where righteousness prevails, aligning with classical cosmic oscillation themes. The Sinhalese/Sanskrit title of the text, *Dharmavijaya*, implies a triumph of righteousness, reflecting the demand for the re-marriage of politics and Buddhism. The author integrates traditional Buddhist ideas with modern political and philosophical concepts, emphasising the symbiotic relationship between politics and Buddhism. The narrative contends that a secular state would lead to the annihilation of Buddhism and global moral bankruptcy, advocating instead for religion's taming of politics and society.

The book details a world in moral decline, which it attributes to imperialism, Christianity's corruption, and the rise of materialism and the 'American lifestyle.' It parallels the 'endangered *sāsana*' motif in premodern Buddhist historiography, but expands the crisis to a global scale. The text introduces the term "*dharmocracy*," where the state's ultimate purpose is to serve a higher religious goal. Thus, the reinterpretation of traditional concepts of dual dominance is used to address contemporary political challenges. Either a purely materialistic ideology or a strictly secular society without a religious foundation would be destined to fail. The author of text no. 8 takes a daring conceptual leap by associating the supposed moral decay observed in Christian Europe with the United States, suggesting that the US has substituted religiosity for the deities of consumerism. Buddhism offers itself as the antidote. The principles of Buddhism should guide and govern the individual, as well as the instruments and organs of the state. The harmony of religion and politics should be the ideal of any state, with the happiness of the people being its ultimate goal.

East Asia

China occupies a unique position among the East Asian countries in several respects. Perhaps the most significant factor is that writing was invented there in the second millennium BCE, with a rich body of literature emerging from the middle of the first millennium BCE onward. By contrast, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam did not have their own writing systems until well into the common era. Consequently, the earliest literary records in all these regions are in Chinese script. Chinese literature and the ideas it conveyed thus spread widely throughout East Asia. Particularly in the adjacent countries of Korea and Vietnam, the worldview of the literate elites was strongly influenced by Chinese philosophy and historiography. The lively exchange of cultural artefacts similarly justifies referring to East Asia as the 'Sinosphere.'

Key mediators of Chinese literature were the monks who brought Buddhism from China to Vietnam, Korea and Japan. Many of them were well versed in literature, and brought with them not only Buddhist scriptures, but also other writings. Buddhism had been introduced to China predominantly from India, via Central Asia, in the first century CE, and spread rapidly in the following centuries. Buddhist scriptures were widely translated into Chinese, and these Chinese translations were disseminated throughout East Asia. The influence of Buddhism reached its zenith during the Tang dynasty (618–907). The number of monasteries, monks, nuns, and lay followers was immense, and Buddhist philosophy dominated intellectual life. It was only during the Song dynasty (960–1279) that the dominant influence of Buddhist metaphysics was broken, as many outstanding scholars systematically re-examined the pre-Buddhist Chinese philosophy of antiquity, expanding it into a comprehensive philosophical system known in the West as 'Neo-Confucianism.' This intellectual movement attained the status of a state orthodoxy under subsequent dynasties, dominating the Chinese elites' understanding of the world until the end of the imperial era in 1911.

In line with the objectives of this volume, we have to address whether, in premodern China, a distinction similar to the modern one between religious and non-religious (or 'secular') ways of life can be found. It should be pointed out that, until the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese language lacked a word that could unequivocally be translated as 'religion' or 'religious.' Nevertheless, historical sources indicate the existence of practices and beliefs from ancient times that can, from a modern Western perspective, be labelled as 'religious.' This is particularly true of Buddhist and Daoist monks, nuns, priests, their rituals, teachings, and the social formations centred around monasteries and temples. Even though there was no equivalent general term for the word 'religion,' it is evident that Buddhism and Daoism were distinguished from other social phenomena.[I]

To fully grasp the breadth of practices and beliefs that, from a modern perspective, would be described as 'religious,' one must go back to pre-Buddhist antiquity. During the Zhou dynasty (approx. 1050–221 BCE), belief in the existence of gods and spirits, and the great importance of sacrificial rites, are well documented. While the form of state sacrifices and offerings to the ancestors was precisely regulated, belief in gods and spirits was by no means binding. In the later part of the Zhou era, many – especially among the educated – seem to have doubted the existence of gods who could be influenced by sacrifices. Two texts printed in this volume present opposing opinions on this matter (texts no. 9 and 10): Mozi defended the belief in the existence of gods who intervene positively or punitively in human life. Xunzi, on the other hand, considered this idea to be a superstition of the unenlightened, and argued that nature followed immutable laws unaffected by gods or spirits. Mozi and Xunzi can thus be seen as early representatives of 'religious' and 'secular' interpretations of the world, respectively.

Xunzi's position is of particular interest because his 'secular' naturalism had a lasting impact on the Confucian interpretation of sacrificial rites. For him, such sacrifices were not a service to gods or spirits, but cultural conventions expressing the feelings and attitudes of the participants. According to this interpretation, although the rites were obligatory, there was no need to believe in the existence of supernatural beings responding to the sacrifices. Up until the end of the imperial era, state sacrificial rites, performed by the emperor or his officials, remained an indispensable expression of legitimate rulership. However, individuals were free to understand the sacrifices as pleas for divine assistance or, following Xunzi, as ritual manifestations of social order. Both interpretations are historically traceable. This ambivalence on state sacrificial rites has led to contrasting interpretations of premodern Chinese statehood.

I In the *Weishu* 魏書 (History of the Wei Dynasty), which was compiled in the sixth century, Buddhism and Daoism are treated together in one chapter (chapter 131). The chapter is entitled: *Shi Lao zhi* 釋老志 (Treatise on [the Traditions of] Śākyamuni and Laozi).

While some scholars view China as having been a "religious state," others characterise the Confucian state as "secular."[II]

Starting in the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), and up until the end of the imperial era, the Confucian tradition was the primary subject of study for the literati, from whom state officials were recruited. The Confucian understanding of political and social order thus became the basis for the organisation of the state. Buddhism and Daoism, unlike Confucianism, spoke of transcendent worlds, heavens and hells, demons, gods, and merciful buddhas and bodhisattvas. These were doctrines of salvation, with Daoism promising a long life, or even immortality, and Buddhism offering a blissful heavenly existence after death, and ultimately the attainment of nirvana.

By the fourth century, Buddhism had gained many followers, including literati and officials. These were laypersons who, despite their Confucian education, believed in and promoted the Buddha's teachings. A key controversy at that time revolved around whether monks, in line with their self-image, were outside of society – and thus not bound by the duty to honour secular authorities through prescribed rites (text no. 11). This debate took place between high-ranking officials at the imperial court. Arguments put forth by both sides foreshadow much of subsequent discussions of the following centuries – and even up to the present day – about the relationship between Buddhism (and, today, religion in general) and the state. The ruling regent, representing the Confucian position, emphasised that state laws and ritual regulations applied to all subjects of the emperor, and that, therefore, monks must show the emperor the respect he was due. He highlighted that the Buddha's teachings pertained to other-worldly matters, whereas the teachings of the wise rulers of antiquity pertained to the order of this world. Individuals were permitted to believe in the Buddha's teachings privately, but it was not permissible for state laws to be based on Buddhist rules. This argument reflects the basic structure of secularity, in the clear distinction between 'religious' (*fangwai* 方外, other-worldly) and 'secular' (*fangnei* 方內, inner-worldly) spheres. It is also a 'secularist' position that prioritises state laws over religious ones, and seeks to confine religious beliefs to the private sphere.

The question of whether monks should bow before the emperor remained controversial for centuries, before the Confucian position was finally favoured. Before that, however, Buddhism enjoyed a triumphant ascent, and dominated not only religious but also intellectual life, until the ninth century. The beginning of the Confucian reaction can be seen in a memorial to the throne presented by the official and scholar Han Yu in 819, criticising both the harmful influence of Buddhism on society, and the emperor's tolerance of religious fanaticism (text no. 13). Han Yu's critique of Buddhism became a widely cited model for numerous Confucians in later years. With the

II For examples of the contrasting interpretations, see John Lagerwey, *China: A Religious State* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), and Wang Gungwu. "Secular China" [Giri Deshingkar Memorial Lecture], *China Report* 39, no. 3 (2003): 305–21; see text no. 30 in Vol. 1 of the series.

rise of Neo-Confucianism, starting in the Song dynasty, Buddhism lost its overwhelming influence on the intellectual and political elites.

The fact that, until the beginning of the twentieth century, Confucianism was considered the state orthodoxy, and knowledge of Confucian scriptures was an essential prerequisite for state offices, does not mean that all officials and literati opposed Buddhism and Daoism. Many, including some emperors, personally leaned towards one or the other of these religions. However, in state affairs and political debates, the Confucian tradition formed the only legitimate reference for any argumentation. This separation of private belief, which can be described in modern terms as 'religious,' and 'secular' discourses on political matters and questions of social order, can be interpreted as a form of secularity – even though a terminological distinction between 'religious' and 'secular' was not made at the time.

The consistent influence of Confucianism on the state is also evident in legislation. There are numerous examples of state laws regulating 'religions,' in line with demands raised by Confucians, from as early as the fourth century. An extensive legal framework from the Song period (960–1279) regulated the rights and duties of Buddhist and Daoist clerics in detail.[III] The legal codes of the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties also contain provisions restricting the construction of monasteries and the ordination of Buddhist and Daoist clergy. Particularly in the commentaries on some laws, it is evident that the Confucian authors harboured deep mistrust towards these two religions, as well as other religious communities (text no. 14). One reason for this can be found in the frequent reference to the social unrest and rebellions triggered by religious movements. This experience was already hinted at during the fourth-century controversy over the role of monks, and has remained ingrained in the historical memory of political elites to the present day.

Neo-Confucianism was not a static philosophical system. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, different schools emerged, and their interpretations sometimes deviated significantly from the state orthodoxy. Debates and discussions arose over the correct understanding of the teachings, and the demarcation from Buddhism, whose metaphysics also influenced the thinking of some Confucians. In text no. 15 in this volume, the differentiation between Confucianism, on the one hand, and Buddhism and Daoism, on the other, is justified by the claim that the latter two only deal with transcendent matters (*renwai* 人外, literally: "outside the world of humans"), while the teachings of Confucianism are an indispensable prerequisite for the well-ordered coexistence of humans in society.

The heterogeneity of Neo-Confucian thought was not limited to China, but is also reflected in Vietnam and Korea, where this tradition was further developed and diversified. The two texts selected from these countries – from 1773 for Vietnam, and

III See Werner Eichhorn. *Beitrag zur rechtlichen Stellung des Buddhismus und Taoismus im Sung-Staat* (Leiden: Brill, 1968).

1833 for Korea – show an engagement with Western ideas that had become known through the Jesuit mission in China from the sixteenth century, and through Protestant missions in Korea in the nineteenth century (texts no. 21 and 22).

In all the examples mentioned so far, where various distinctions are made between the other-worldly orientation of Buddhism and Daoism, and the focus on the mundane world in the teachings of the ancient sages, no terminological differentiation is made between 'religious' and 'secular.' Nevertheless, modern terminology can capture the distinctions between these terms. An explicit reference to this modern terminology appears for the first time at the end of the nineteenth century, in a text addressing a Western audience (text no. 16). The positions presented therein essentially correspond to those mentioned so far. However, it emphasises that, in the Western definition, 'religion' implies the worship of God or gods, which is not found in Confucianism. Therefore, the latter should be considered not as a religion, but as a secular doctrine.

The engagement with the Western concept of religion in the nineteenth century was also driven by the presence of Christian missionaries, who enjoyed the protection of European powers. European colonial ambitions and military superiority exacerbated the political crisis that China had been experiencing since the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864), which was triggered by a Christianity-influenced religious movement. Towards the end of the century, open calls for reform became inevitable and impossible to ignore. Some Confucian scholars voiced the idea of reforming Confucianism and making it the state religion, following the example of Christianity in Europe (text no. 17). However, most revolutionary intellectuals viewed Confucianism as a conservative doctrine hindering a radical reform of state and social structures. After the revolution that led to the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1911, politically active intellectuals turned to Western ideas of democracy, progress, and science. Similarly to the views of 'progressive' circles in Europe, religion was seen as being incompatible with scientific knowledge, and, therefore, an obstacle to modernisation (see text no. 18). The contrasting of religion with science resembles the distinction between religious and secular knowledge, pointing to a significant opposition inherent in the concept of secularity.

All political ideologies of the twentieth century invoked the theme of 'science.' The Chinese Communists, claiming to represent a 'scientific worldview,' also adopted the Marxist-Leninist criticism of religion. However, religion was not seen as the cause of societal ills – but rather as their concomitant. In a text from 1927, Mao Zedong points out that traditional power structures were supported by superstition (he avoided the word 'religion') and that, with the liberation of peasants from oppression, superstition would be abandoned (text no. 19). To this day, the Communist Party of China adheres to the thesis that religion will disappear upon the full realisation of socialism and communism. However, it is acknowledged that this will be a lengthy process. Therefore, at present, it is necessary to integrate religious believers into socialist society, while subjecting religious activities to state control, through laws and educational measures (see text no. 20).

The Chinese sources selected for this volume predominantly reflect a Confucian perspective on the social phenomena now classified as 'religious.' By contrast to the teachings of Buddhism and Daoism, Confucianism placed its emphasis on the social and political order. Within this context, the relationship between the state and 'religion' was a central theme. From the Confucian viewpoint, this relationship was hierarchical, with religious communities, like all other societal formations, being subordinate to the state and its laws.

Considering this through the theoretical lens of secularity, we see that certain distinctions emerged that structurally resemble those between 'religious' and 'secular' – such as the juxtapositions of 'religious' (*shen* 神) and 'cultural' (*wen* 文) practices, or inner-worldly (*fangnei* 方內) and outer-worldly (*fangwai* 方外) teachings. Distinctions of this nature can be traced back to antiquity, but the fact that they were not terminologically fixed, and were expressed in various formulations, suggests that they did not become the subject of systematic reflection and discussion. From the Confucian standpoint, 'religious' beliefs and practices pertained to things beyond this world, and were therefore deemed useless for government and societal order (see texts no. 15 and 16). Buddhist texts, again using different terminology, made a similar distinction, unsurprisingly presenting the 'religious' truth as superior to the 'worldly' one (text no. 12).

Against the backdrop of these established distinctions, it was relatively straightforward to apply the term 'religion,' introduced in the late nineteenth century, to Chinese society. In this process, the evaluative framework shaped by Confucianism was largely retained. What changed was that religion was no longer seen as antithetical to the Way of the wise rulers of antiquity, but instead was opposed to a secular knowledge that was now labelled as 'science.'

The discourse on the interplay between spiritual and worldly power, between "temple nobility" and "military nobility" – to use Max Weber's[IV] words – is exceptionally well documented in the case of Japan, with its abundance of textual sources. Most of them were written by Buddhist monks, who, as an educated elite, claimed a high degree of epistemic authority in medieval Japan. As early as the tenth century, a model was successfully propagated by Buddhists, distinguishing the Buddha Dharma (*buppō* 佛法) and the ruler's law (*ōbō* 王法) as two distinct yet interdependent or complementary normative systems or "nomospheres" (see texts no. 23–31; 35, 37, 38).[V] Both nomospheres were believed to be mutually dependent, repeatedly likened metaphorically to the two wings of a bird or the two wheels of a cart. The Buddha Dharma – with its superior potential for domesticating the masses and civilising the people,

IV Max Weber, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology.* 2 vols. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 1160.

V Cf. Kuroda Toshio, "The Imperial Law and the Buddhist Law," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 23, 3–4 (1996): 271–85; Christoph Kleine, "Religion and the Secular in Premodern Japan from the Viewpoint of Systems Theory." *Journal of Religion in Japan* 2, no. 1 (2013): 1–34.

through moral instruction (including the threat of divine punishment and torment of hell) and ritual subjugation of demonic forces – was considered indispensable to social peace, prosperity, and stable political order. It was thus thought to complement the institutions of the state, which resorted to corporal punishment and physical force. Buddhism's supporters argued that it should be allowed to develop according to its specific intrinsic laws, and be largely free from state intervention, in order that it might be allowed to achieve its full potential in its ritual and moral efficacy. Moreover, especially in the Kamakura period (1185–1333), worldly authorities were often called upon to combat deviant currents within Buddhism, as the preservation of orthodoxy was also considered a prerequisite for the Buddha Dharma's support of the ruler's law (see texts no. 23 and 25). This model of the "interdependence of the Buddha's law and the ruler's law" (*ōbō buppō sō'i* 王法佛法相依) was a religious and political paradigm that retained its validity – albeit often being rejected by non-Buddhist intellectuals – until well into the nineteenth century. The actual relationship between Buddhist and state institutions underwent significant modifications over the centuries, however, shifting from a model of dual domination by two roughly equal power blocks in the Middle Ages, to a Chinese-style model of the subordination of Buddhist institutions under an absolutist state in early modern times. Accordingly, the interpretation of this paradigm underwent certain modifications too, partly due to the specific doctrinal preferences of the authors, and partly due to changes in power configurations, as the selection of texts presented here demonstrates.

For example, the monk Nichiren (1222–1282) advocated a form of 'mystical union' between the two nomospheres (text no. 27). It was envisioned that this unity would find visible expression in a national "ordination platform of the original gate" (*honmon no kaidan* 本門の戒壇), though Nichiren and his followers were unable to persuade the rulers to establish such a national place of worship in their own time. After the Second World War, the influential lay organisation Sōka Gakkai revived this programme, founding the Kōmeitō political party, with a view to establishing such an ordination platform[VI] – now a delicate issue in light of the strict separation between religion and state prescribed by the post-war constitution.

Nichiren's desire for a de-differentiated relationship between the nomosphere of the Buddha and the nomosphere of the ruler remained a rare exception, however. In premodern Japan, the idea of a division of labour and complementary differentiation was generally maintained, a concept not dissimilar to modern forms of secularity.

Regarding the paradigm of the interdependence of a mundane and a supramundane sphere as a potential conceptual resource for establishing a modern, specifically

VI Levi McLaughlin. "Did Aum Change Everything? What Sōka Gakkai Before, During, and After the Aum Shinrikyō Affair Tells Us About the Persistent 'Otherness' of New Religions in Japan." *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 39, no. 1 (2012): 51–75; 58.

Japanese form of secularity, there is a noteworthy emerging trend of the 'privatisation' of the Buddha Dharma from the fifteenth century onwards, particularly in the context of the highly influential True Pure Land School (Jōdo shinshū).[VII] Before this point, the Buddha Dharma and the ruler's law had both been perceived as having a primarily public function of providing social peace, economic prosperity, and political stability. Moving away from this interpretation, Rennyo (1415–1499), the 'second founder' of the Jōdo shinshū sect and leader of the powerful Honganji Temple, emphasised that, while the sphere of the ruler should regulate the public life and social actions of the faithful, believers should be inwardly (that is, privately) entirely focused on the Buddha Dharma (text no. 31). In other words, we observe here a division of the individual into a publicly acting subject and a privately engaging believer, a rather 'modern' image of the person. Another reinterpretation occurred in the nineteenth century, when there was a renegotiation of the relationship between the newly established Meiji government and the Buddhist institutions, which were facing various pressures.[VIII] Instead of emphasising the supramundane dimension of the Buddha Dharma, most relevant for the individual believer, representatives of Jōdo shinshū, such as Fukuda Gidō (1806–1883) (text no. 37) and Hakoya Tokuryō (1803–1892) (text no. 38), now emphasised the Buddha Dharma's mundane aspect, as a normative system forming the basis for all morality, including the ethical principles of Confucianism. This argument, too, undoubtedly put forward without any Western influence, has something modern about it. It is reminiscent of the famous dictum of the German constitutional and administrative lawyer and legal philosopher Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde (1930–2019), according to which the liberal, secularised state rests on preconditions that it cannot itself guarantee.[IX] Accordingly, political debates in Western European countries repeatedly refer to the Christian foundations of the modern European view of the world and humanity.

Approaches to the distinction between the religious and the non-religious can be found in Japan in greater variety than just as a paradigm of the interdependence of two spheres, however. The Japanese encounter with Christian missionaries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries created the necessity of finding general terms for comparing the seemingly similar traditions of Buddhism and Christianity. If the development of secularity as a binary 'special-purpose taxonomy' depends on the differentiation of religion as a distinct realm of social action, then the development history of a comparative concept analogous to the European concept of religion, which became in-

VII Kleine, Christoph. "Preparing the Field for Secularity in Medieval Japan." Accessed March 20, 2023. https://politicaltheology.com/preparing-the-field-for-secularity-in-medieval-japan/.

VIII See Christoph Kleine, "Rethinking the Interdependence of Buddhism and the State in Late Edo and Meiji Japan." *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 49, no. 1 (2022): 89–113.

IX Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, "Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation," in *Recht, Staat, Freiheit: Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie, Staatstheorie und Verfassungsgeschichte*, ed. Ernst W. Böckenförde, 92–114 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2006), 112.

creasingly generalised due to European expansion, is of great relevance to our attempt to identify culturally specific paths to secularity. In the seventeenth century, general terms (e.g. *shūshi* 宗旨 and *shūmon* 宗門) were established for characterising both Buddhism and Christianity, for the purpose of comparison and translation. Until the late nineteenth century, and in some cases even until the modern day, these terms were used as equivalents to the term religion.

Initially, Christianity and Buddhism were considered the primary representatives of *shūshi* or *shūmon*, and thus of religion. However, with Japan's horizons widening after a nearly 250-year-long period of isolation, these terms were also applied to other traditions, such as Islam, Judaism, and Hinduism. By the beginning of the Meiji era, it was widely accepted that there existed a particular domain of human action that was to be treated in a special manner in law and politics; a domain referred to in the West as religion, and in Japan as *shūshi, shūmon,* etc. By the 1880s, these older terms had largely been replaced by the term *shūkyō* 宗教.[X] Furthermore, Japan quickly threw itself – with some intensity – into the rapidly globalising discourse on religion, and made a significant contribution to its development. Texts by the reform-minded intellectual Shimaji Mokurai (1838–1911) (text no. 36) and an early work by the famous scholar and cultural mediator Suzuki Daisetsu Teitarō (1870–1966) (text no. 39) are illustrative of this.

After its opening, and under some pressure exerted by Western nations – though with remarkably little resistance – Japan soon established its own form of secularity. As we have seen, this principle was not entirely unfamiliar to the Japanese in any case. However, the concrete implementation of secularity was rather tricky in one respect: the question of which mythological and ritual traditions should be considered religion/*shūkyō*, implying that individual participation therein was to be considered a matter of free choice, became a subject of political debate. The architects of the new regime of modern Japan argued that the tennō-centric state Shintō and its shrines – in contrast to "sect Shintō" (*kyōha shintō* 教派神道) – did not belong to the realm of religion. This resulted in a specifically Japanese variant of secularity, in which (the idea of) a sacred ruler descending from the gods and the ritual system revolving around him were legally categorised as "non-religious" (*hi-shūkyō* 非宗教), but at the same time demanded cultic veneration and absolute normative hegemony. Tennō-centric Shintō, the ritual veneration of the emperor, and the recognition of a moral

X Christoph Kleine, "When Christianity Became a Shūshi 宗旨: Cultural Encounters and Comparisons Between Europe and Japan and the Origins of a Global History of Religion," Special Issue of the *Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society (JRAT)* 10, no. 2 (2023); for detailed studies on the development of a generalised concept of religion in modern Japan, see also Jason Ānanda Josephson, *The Invention of Religion in Japan* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012) and Hans Martin Krämer, *Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2015).

order centred on the emperor were deemed a civic duty, and a public matter that did not contradict the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion (text no. 40).

By contrast, Buddhism's being classified alongside Christianity under the globalised category of 'religion' – defined as a matter of personal conviction and private concern – was largely undisputed and uncontroversial. It was mainly Buddhists who dealt with questions concerning 'religion' (*shūkyō*) and its relationship to other social spheres, now classified as 'secular.' Moreover, Buddhist authors supported the theory of a non-religious Shintō. They asserted that imperial power, and the complex of legitimising myths and symbolic performative rituals that revolved around it – now known as Shintō – although undoubtedly sacred, nevertheless had a 'secular' character. The reason for this distinction was that Shintō was only concerned with mundane affairs, especially with legitimate political power and social order, whereas Buddhism was primarily in charge of supramundane affairs – though the Buddhist authors maintained that Buddhism was ultimately also the decisive factor in maintaining social peace and political stability.

One could consider the pre-1945 distinction between the religious and the secular, which excluded Shintō from the religious realm, as the first attempt at a specifically Japanese version of secularity. It responded to the normative requirements of Western secularism, particularly the granting of religious freedom, but also drew from indigenous conceptual resources, and took into account political interests – in particular, the restitution of the emperor as a descendant of "Shintō gods," legitimised by "Shintō myths." However, with the Allied occupation, the issuing of the "Shintō directive" (see texts no. 42 and 43), and the imposition of a constitution dictated by the Americans after the Great Pacific War, this specifically Japanese form of secularity was replaced by one constructed according to American standards (text no. 40). According to the post-war constitution, Shintō is legally defined as one religion among many, and may not be funded or otherwise supported by state authorities. Government officials are prohibited from participating in Shintō festivals in their official capacity. This post-war configuration of secularity has repeatedly led to conflicts, both at the local level and nationally, especially in the context of the annual commemorative event for the war dead at the Yasukuni Shrine. This form of secularity is considered by many conservatives to be inappropriate to Japanese culture. The long-ruling conservative LDP party has thus sought a revision of the constitution time and again, envisioning the culturalisation of Shintō, redefining its festivals as social events and traditional customs (texts no. 40 and 41). With such culturalisation, an attempt is made to bring state and Shintō closer together again. Indeed, we find similar endeavours towards analogous (re-)entanglements in many parts of the world, although with very different motives.

However, as elsewhere in the world, the issue of drawing boundaries between the religious and secular is not limited to the determination of the relationship between religious and state institutions. A classic grey area between the religious and the non-religious, or between spiritual and material activities, is the healing of the sick. As can be seen from the texts presented here, in the context of healing practices, such delineations are at most only implicitly present in the stated distinctions between causes of illness, healing methods, and ultimate goals (healing or salvation?).[XI] This issue also presented an interesting challenge in the confrontation between Christian Europeans and the Japanese. How could seemingly effective healing methods be adopted, without embracing the undesired associated religious interpretive frameworks? While Jesuits such as Luís Fróis (1532–1597) claimed that religion is the "true" medicine, superior to natural science, and that the Jesuit missionaries were "preachers and professors of the divine and supernatural science and of the salvation of men," Japanese physicians were curious about the Jesuits' medical knowledge, and less interested in their belief system (text no. 32).

In Japan, from the banning of Christianity in the early seventeenth century (text no. 34), the adoption of Christian ideas was definitively no longer an option. Christianity was regarded as the prototypical "evil tradition," "evil Dharma," or "evil sect" (*ja-shūshi* 邪宗旨, *ja-hō* 邪法*, ja-shūmon* 邪宗門, etc.) until the 1870s. People accused of being Christians were crucified in Ōsaka as late as the 1820s. It was only in 1873 that some 3000 Christians were released from imprisonment, under massive diplomatic pressure. Thus, what Balagangadhara (vol. 1, text no. 14) states for Europe also applies to Japan: in addition to the distinction between religious and secular, the social field was also structured by the distinction between "good religion" and "bad religion."

Lastly, even in the present, the demarcation between the religious and the secular continues to be a subject of public controversy in the fields of education, bioethics, and similarly normative issues. This applies to the West: Habermas, in his vision of a post-secular society (vol. 1 of this series, text no. 69),[XII] calls on secular individuals to be open to arguments based on religious considerations but communicated in secular semantics. But it also applies to modern Japan, which is generally considered highly secular. Two texts from the Buddhist Jōdo Shinshū tradition, reprinted here, confirm the situation-dependent and flexible character of secularity, through the incoherence of distinctions between religion and social spheres such as politics, law, public education and science, within the same doctrinal framework of interpretation. Against the background of historical experiences from the time of ultra-nationalism, the authors of one text (text no. 44) firmly reject attempts at a patriotic 'revision' of the *Fundamental Law of Education* and increasing state interference in the area of moral education and char-

XI See C. Pierce Salguero, "Healing And/or Salvation? The Relationship Between Religion and Medicine in Medieval Chinese Buddhism," *Working Paper Series of the HCAS "Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities"* 4, Leipzig, 2018; Christoph Kleine, Katrin Killinger, and Katja Triplett, "Distinctions and Differentiations Between Medicine and Religion," *Asian Medicine* 14, no. 2 (2019): 233–62.

XII Jürgen Habermas, *Glauben und Wissen: Dankesrede für die Verleihung des Friedenspreises des Deutschen Buchhandels 2001* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001); "Notes on Post-Secular Society," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (2008): 17–29.

acter formation. They see parallels here with the aforementioned attempts to amend the constitution, and emphasise the importance of an individual education that does not view children primarily as future patriotic citizens. However, the authors leave open the extent to which education is a religious responsibility. By contrast, the Shinshū leadership has taken a clear stance regarding a planned revision of the organ transplant law, and the law on brain death and organ transplants. Decisions related to death, they contend, must also consider religious viewpoints regarding life and death (text no. 44).

Inner Asia and the Himalayas

In eighth-century Tibet, we find the first textual evidence that Buddhism, which had been introduced to the country a century earlier, was assigned to a separate discursive sphere. A philosophical text preserved in the Tibetan Buddhist canon, allegedly written by the Tibetan ruler Khri srong lde'u btsan (r. 755–797), expounds on the doctrinal system of Mani, the founder of Manichaeism.[XIII] Here, Khri srong lde'u btsan uses a single umbrella term to describe both Buddhist doctrine and Mani's non-Buddhist philosophical doctrinal system, and in this way distinguishes both from other areas of knowledge. However, these other areas of knowledge are not specified in more detail, and so cannot be addressed as domains of a 'secularity,' as defined at the outset of this introduction – namely as a modality of distinction between religion and other areas of society.

In later centuries, a distinction between the binary spheres of religion and politics emerged as a fundamental principle of societal organisation in the Tibetan cultural zone. This differentiation is comparable to the distinction previously outlined for Japan, and also shares common features with the distinction in Sri Lanka. Based on the fundamental Buddhist division between "mundane" (Skt. *laukika*) and "supramundane" (Skt. *lokottara*), this binary distinction is fleshed out in the doctrine of the two orders of 'worldly' and 'religious' rule, whose mutual relationship is also expressed in the concept of the "Joint Twofold System of Governance" (Tib. *chos srid zung 'brel*). Over the centuries, the model has been repeatedly modified and reconfigured, and thus requires careful contextualisation in its specific historical circumstances. The earliest Tibetan texts describing and exhorting a good Buddhist government date back to the time of the Mongol Empire, and its rule in Tibet in the thirteenth century. During this period, the Tibetan sphere of influence began to extend far beyond the Tibetan-speaking regions, such as the Kingdom of Xi Xia in the northwestern territories of present-day Gangsu and Shanxi provinces in China, to non-Tibetan-speaking

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XIII *bKa' yang dag pa'i tshad ma las mdo btus pa* ("Summary of the proofs for the true revelation"), Tibetan Tripitaka 144, Nr. 5839, fol. 99v2–4 (fols. 64r4–103v6).

regions, such as the Mongolian territories. Buddhist influence manifested itself particularly in its close relationship with the rulers, in the areas in which Tibetan Buddhism gained a foothold. Spiritual advice to rulers and princes has a long tradition in the history of Buddhism. Tibetan texts of advice are classified under the category of *gdams pa* or *bshad pa*, "instruction, explanation," or under the category of *zhu lan*, "question-answer," or simply as *yig*, "letters." On the one hand, they serve as explanations of the subtleties of Buddhist teaching; on the other hand, they exhort the realisation of a just and good (Buddhist) government. In the Mongol era, the addressees were usually princes and rulers. The letters from Tibetan Buddhist high dignitaries to Mongol rulers and princes give detailed advice on appropriate social behaviour, based on the doctrine of the two orders, in a manner similar to the European 'mirrors for princes.' Thus, they provide us with an insight into the 'secular' sphere of the societies of the time. However, the secular and religious spheres are not seen here as a dichotomous pair that can be equated with 'Buddhist' and 'non-Buddhist'; rather, the Tibetan term *tshul gynis* in these texts refers to a Buddhist ethics that is related to both the worldly sphere, and to the sphere of (Tib.) *chos* – the Dharma of the Buddha.

In the Tibeto-Mongolian cultural zone, starting in the thirteenth century, the rule of Qubilai Qaɣan (1215–1294)[XIV] – the founder of the Mongolian Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), under which Buddhism was afforded the highest status of all the competing worldviews in the area – was regarded as a concrete realisation of ideal Buddhist rule. The concept of a Buddhist government, in which 'religion' and worldly power are separated but equally valued, was thus theorised in Tibet and Mongolia, in a political-cultural situation of encounter and interaction. The dynamics of encounter and interaction ultimately resulted in the formation of a shared cultural space, in which these culturally and linguistically heterogeneous Inner Asian societies were tied together by two factors. These factors comprised a common religion – Tibetan Buddhism – and a common language of communication, the written or classical form of Tibetan. The seventeenth-century establishment of the central government in Lhasa, with the Dalai Lama at its head, led to the city taking on the role of the centre of this shared communicative space. From then on, we can speak of a 'Tibetosphere,' which encompassed a huge geographical area stretching from the Himalayas, across Tibet and Mongolia, to China, and on to Buryatia and Manchuria – and, in the west, to the lower Volga regions. Irrespective of the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences between the peoples of this communicative space, their societies were deeply influenced by the distinctions and interrelations between religion and politics, as well as the societal differentiations between these two spheres that played an equally important role in the shaping of governance. For the Mongols, this had been the case since at least the sixteenth century. Judging by the relevant Mongolian literature on Buddhist governance, we may even suggest that this relationship was ascribed a very special place in social discourse. Uniquely within the Tibeto-Mongolian cul-

XIV More commonly known in the Anglosphere as Kublai Khan.

tural zone, the Mongol regions produced their own literary rendering of the relationship between (Mo.) *šasin* – the Buddhist Dharma – and (Mo.) *törö* – politics: the sixteenth-century *White History* (Mo. *Čaγan Teüke*), part of which in fact dates back to the thirteenth century. The *White History* imagines an ideal Buddhist society, in which the worldly and religious spheres are two separate yet interrelated domains, in a "Joint Twofold System of Governance." The work pays special attention to a description of the social rules pertaining to the worldly realm. Relevant passages are presented here in translation (see text no. 50).

The influence of the Joint Twofold System of Governance has remained prominent, both in Tibet itself and in the wider Himalayan region, especially since the seventeenth century. Under the rule of the Fifth Dalai Lama Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho (1617–1682), political power in Tibet was centralised for the first time since the Great Tibetan Empire (seventh to ninth centuries CE). In 1645, the Fifth Dalai Lama composed a letter to the Khalkha Mongolian leader, the Tüšiyetü Khan Gombodorji (r. 1636–1655), in which he gave the Mongolian noble practical advice on taking equal account of the two spheres, the 'religious' and the 'secular,' in his political actions (see text no. 45). The genealogy of this letter can be traced back to the aforementioned letters of Tibetan religious dignitaries to Mongolian leaders in the thirteenth century, and even further to earlier Indian models.[XV] However, the concept of the Joint Twofold System of Governance is by no means only relevant historically: the Tibetan government-in-exile, the Central Tibetan Administration, still refers to this model, for example in connection to the fourteenth Dalai Lama, who, until recently, was addressed as "Ruler over religion and the secular government of Tibet" (Tib. *bod ljongs chos srid gnyis kyi mnga' bdag*). It was only in 2011 that the Dalai Lama abdicated his political leadership role, which has since been held by the democratically elected Sikyong in the Central Tibetan Administration. Likewise, in Mongolia, Buddhist concepts of good government have been regaining a role in public discourse since 1990. This trend is also evident in the neighbouring Himalayan regions. The Joint Twofold System of Governance was institutionalised in Bhutan in 1625/26, and forms the conceptual basis of the country's first standardised code of laws, the "Bhutanese Legal Code from 1729". This important text is reproduced here in excerpts (text no. 49). The conceptualisations and taxonomic orders contained within it continue to be drawn upon today, to institutionalise, legitimise, and adjust the Joint Twofold System of Governance, within the legal framework of the 2008 Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan, and the Bhutanese Gross National Happiness (GNH) Policy. The relationship between religious and secular spheres in contemporary Bhutanese society is grounded in the emic taxonomic orders described here, and continues to determine the specifically Bhutanese manifestation of a secular society today.

XV Adam C. Krug, "Pakpa's Verses on Governance in *Advice to Prince Jibik Temür: A Jewel Rosary*," *Cahiers d´Extreme-Asie* 24 (2015).

The historical traces of a specifically Tibeto-Mongolian understanding of secularity are not limited to the dyadic relationship between religion and politics, but can also be detected in other areas of society. Often, in our sources, the secular is not positively defined, but tends to appear as a residual category; in other words, it comprises everything that is not categorised as religious. In the Tibetan cultural area, however, we can work towards a positive understanding of the secular, by including the binary pair of epistemic terms *mi chos* and *lha chos* in the discussion. These two important terms can be translated as "human rules" and "rules of the gods" respectively. *Mi chos* is probably an indigenous Tibetan term for everyday rules of conduct. According to Ulrike Roesler,[XVI] this classification, in its Buddhist guise, goes back to the late eighth century. The "human rules" primarily comprise social and legal norms; since the triumph of Buddhism in Tibet in the late eighth century – with its being declared the official state religion – these rules have been in a dynamic relationship with *lha chos*, which was then newly defined as Buddhist Dharma. But *mi chos* can also stand on its own, as Janet Gyatso has shown for the domain of medicine – one of the most important Tibetan orders of 'mundane' knowledge. In medicine, *mi chos* is "not a handmaiden to lha chos,"[XVII] but rather "entails sophisticated reflection on how medical learning unfolds and the full spectrum of preparation necessary to thrive professionally and to serve patients effectively."[XVIII] The Tibetan sources meticulously analysed by Janet Gyatso reveal the shift in medicine from normative Buddhist guidelines to empirically based science, and help us to positively define the secular in this important sub-area of society in Tibet. Further sub-areas of the secular can be explored in the *Biography of Do ring Pandita* (1806), a high lay official in the central government in late eighteenth-century Lhasa. His biography allows us a glimpse into what constituted the secular in eighteenth-century Tibet, by describing the sources of secular authority, which were grounded as much in legal titles and contracts as in the role of pious donor of the Dharma (see text no. 46).

Large areas of the so-called Tibetosphere have historically been closely intertwined with the Sinosphere. It is therefore not surprising that Tibetan and Mongolian scholars negotiated the relationship between the 'secular' and 'religious' spheres in not only Buddhist, but also sometimes Confucian patterns of thought. This is exemplified in the œuvre of the Inner-Mongolian author Injannasi (1837–1892), especially in

XVI Ulrike Roesler, "Die Lehre, der Weg und die namenlose Religion: Mögliche Äquivalente eines Religionsbegriffs in der tibetischen Kultur," in *Religion in Asien? Studien zur Anwendbarkeit des Religionsbegriffs*, ed. Peter Schalk, Max Deeg, Oliver Freiberger, Christoph Kleine, and Astrid van Nahl, 129–50 (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet 2013).

XVII Janet Gyatso, *Being Human in a Buddhist World: An Intellectual History of Medicine in Early Modern Tibet* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 349.

XVIII Gyatso, *Being Human*, 350.

his historical novel *Blue Chronicle* (*Köke sudur*).[XIX] However, this Chinese and Confucian influence did not apply to the Buryat-Mongolian regions, which had, since the eighteenth century, formed part of the Russian Empire. Naturally, then, these regions were much more heavily affected by Russian influence. In their chronicles, Buryat historiographers of the nineteenth century identify the secular sphere, which is strictly separated from the Buddhist monastic institutions – not only in the "laws of the emperor," but also in the language schools of the Tsarist empire, which gave their graduates access to the newly founded secular state universities (see text no. 52).

The deeply Buddhist-influenced secularity in Inner Asia and the Himalayas is understood variously, and there are different versions of secularism in the region, following entanglement with the Western model of secularism. Studying precursors of secularity in this region, we do not find a homogeneous, teleologically oriented history that ultimately merges into the Western model of secularism. The history of secularity in this region cannot be told without the ruptures and fissures that shaped it, and thus without the counter-histories and counter-designs to a secular modernity that likewise informed it. This is best illustrated by the example of the Buryat-Mongolian and Mongolian intelligentsia at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, which was strongly divided over how best to view secularity in a Buddhist context. Due to the increasingly strong influence of Russian and Western European ideas, the boundaries between the two spheres of 'religion' and 'non-religion' were renegotiated in Inner Asia in the late nineteenth century. One faction of the religious and lay elites joined the project of a socialist modernity, and tried to unite socialist ideas of a secular society with Buddhist concepts. The Tibetan monk and intellectual Gendun Chopel (1903–1951) even went so far as to claim that scientific reasoning based on empirical facts is inherent in Buddhism. While he engages with the contemporary discourse surrounding the compatibility of Buddhism with science, he anchors his argument in the centuries-long textual tradition of Buddhist scholars in Tibet and Mongolia, in which such questions have been debated repeatedly (text no. 47).

Another faction of the religious elites, however, was sceptical of – or even hostile to – such modernisation projects, and tried to cling to the model of the Joint Twofold System of Governance. Such a critical and ultimately dismissive attitude toward new social models that renegotiated the secular sphere was demonstrated by the Mongolian monk scholar Zava Damdin (1867–1937), who witnessed the transformation of traditional Buddhist Mongolian society into a socialist society in the first decades of the twentieth century. One of his texts that takes a deeply pessimistic view of a European-style secular modernity is also included in the sourcebook (text no. 51).

It is important to note that, in Buddhist Inner Asia and the Himalayan regions, the religious and the secular are conceived as two separate sovereign spheres that are none-

XIX John Gombojab Hangin, *Köke Sudur (The Blue Chronicle): A Study of the First Mongolian Historical Novel by Injannasi*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1973.

theless complementary to each other. For the historical Inner Asian and Himalayan Buddhist societies, it can be stated that the worldly spheres of knowledge only attain their social acceptance through their reference to the religious sphere. This can be seen, for example, in the formulation of the ideal worldly rule, which must be configured in Buddhist terms (see text 49, and the two texts 47 and 48). The mutual interrelatedness between the two distinct spheres is also evident in today's understanding of the secular, for example when the English term "secular" is rendered in modern standard Tibetan as "impartial in relation to religion" (*chos lugs ris med*). The trajectories highlighted in the texts presented here thus allow for a deeper understanding of the different forms of secularity in today's Inner Asian and Himalayan societies shaped by Buddhist thought.

Theoretical Evaluation

As elaborated in more detail at the start of this introduction, the *Multiple Secularities* research approach is based on the assumption that the multiplicity of secularities in global modernity can, in part, be explained by the varying combinations of indigenous conceptual resources, and the particularities of the specific circumstances under which encounters between Western and non-Western epistemes occurred. We assume that existing epistemic and social structures have decisively shaped the appropriation and transformation of Western concepts of order within the framework of diverse, often complex, power configurations. This resulted in culturally specific arrangements of the relationship between religious and non-religious cultural elements, social formations, and nexuses of social activities.[XX]

From the extensive textual material presented here, we can draw the following conclusions: At the level of epistemic structures, systems of thought with a strong distinction between transcendence and immanence[XXI] tend to conceptualise societal differentiation in a binary scheme. There are things that belong to this world, while other things transcend the world. In Buddhism, we find a very strong and influential transcendence-immanence dichotomy.

Furthermore, such binary epistemic structures, according to our thesis, promote the development of binary models of an institutionalised division of labour at the level

XX See Christoph Kleine, and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, "Comparative Secularities: Tracing Social and Epistemic Structures Beyond the Modern West," *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 33, no. 1 (2021): 43–72.

XXI Some refer to these systems of thought as "axial religions." See, for example, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "The Axial Age: The Emergence of Transcendental Visions and the Rise of Clerics," *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie/Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie* 23, no. 2 (1982): 294–314; *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986; Robert N. Bellah, and Hans Joas, eds. *The Axial Age and Its Consequences*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012.

of social structures. A class of full-time professionals dedicate themselves to making transcendence accessible and manageable. This requires specific competences; we might refer here to Weber's idea of "charisma"[XXII] or Bourdieu's "symbolic efficacy" (*l'efficacité symbolique*),[XXIII] which can only be acquired and cultivated through a specific, rationalised way of life. The establishment of monasteries as "heterotopias"[XXIV] conducive to the cultivation of charismatic qualities is an obvious consequence of the requirements of a division of labour between transcendence-oriented and immanence-oriented nexuses of activity. Even more than for Christianity, monasticism is truly constitutive for Buddhism.

It can be assumed that the corresponding epistemic and social structures reinforce each other. Once a class of experts in transcendent affairs has emerged, it is very likely that, for the sake of self-assertion, they will strongly emphasise the difference between transcendence-related and immanence-related activities, and thus constantly reinforce the corresponding epistemic structure. Not surprisingly, it is usually those occupied with the transcendent dimension of human life who propagate the binary organising principle of two complementary, interdependent, and yet autonomous nomospheres. This is precisely what Buddhist authors in various regions of Asia did with great vigour – at least whenever and wherever the Buddhist order was in a position to formulate such claims vis-à-vis the worldly power with a realistic prospect of enforceability.

Needless to say, the form of dual domination advocated by Buddhists, wherein two equal powers coexisted, was highly controversial. Specifically, Confucian literati officials in East Asia generally preferred a hierarchical model of domination, in line with the renowned statement attributed to Confucius that, just as there are not two suns in the sky, there should not be two rulers of the people. The political power represented by the emperor was to dominate all areas of society, including those sociocultural formations that we refer to today as 'religions.' These were granted limited autonomy, as long as they did not jeopardise or challenge political power. In this respect, the configuration that prevailed in China in particular, as well as in Korea and, from the seventeenth century onwards, in Japan, is surprisingly similar to modern forms of secularity. Most modern states similarly grant religious freedom only within the confines of the law, and on condition that social peace is not jeopardised. With regard to the question of whether we are dealing here with a form of secular rule *avant la lettre,* however, a conceptual problem arises: can the mythically legitimised and ritually symbolised political power in East Asia really be characterised as secular?

XXII Max Weber, *Grundriss der Sozialökonomie. III. Abteilung: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1922), 227.

XXIII Pierre Bourdieu, "Genèse et structure du champ religieux." *Revue française de sociologie* 12, no. 3 (1971): 317.

XXIV See Michel Foucault, "Des espaces autres: conférence au Cercle d'études architecturales, 14 Mars 1967," *Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité* 5 (1984): 46–49.

Of course, this question is, in itself, somewhat anachronistic. It would not have made much sense to people in premodern East Asia. When trying to work out the religious or secular character of court rituals, for example, one is inherently bound to the perspective of the modern observer, using meta-linguistic concepts such as 'religious' or 'secular,' on the basis of a predefined set of criteria.

Indeed, one recurring theme in discussions about the concept of secularity is the question of the positively determinable characteristics of the secular. Often, the secular is defined simply in negative terms as that which is not religious. The content of the secular then depends on how the religious is constituted and delineated. Particularly in contexts where the existence of an approximate equivalent of the concept of religion is at least controversial, then, such a negative definition of the secular becomes inadequate. There are undoubtedly good reasons for speaking of the secular only in relation to religion – we, too, assume that the concept of the secular only makes sense with reference to religion. However, if we follow Talal Asad and others in supposing – and there are good reasons for doing so – that the secular is "a variety of concepts, practices, and sensibilities,"[XXV] and that it is "a concept that brings together certain behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life,"[XXVI] then it seems appropriate to inquire about these concepts, behaviours, knowledges, practices, and sensibilities.

With regard to premodern societies, it would then be necessary to clarify whether corresponding characteristics can be found. Some texts in this volume suggest that, even in premodern societies, there were people who followed epistemic norms – such as empiricism, immanentism, and logical consistency, instead of revelation or precedent – which we would today consider typical of the secular; or, to use Charles Taylor's words, they acted and argued within some sort of "immanent frame."[XXVII]

In any case, the texts in this compilation cast doubt on the thesis that Western Europe, dominated by Latin Christianity, is the exclusive and only conceivable place of origin of secularity. The prevailing diffusionist narrative – shared by many Eurocentric and postcolonial scholars, albeit from very different normative positions – considers modern secularism to be a programme for enforcing or enabling a form of secularity that is based on conceptual distinctions and institutional differentiations that are the historically contingent outcome of a specific European experience.[XXVIII]

The peculiarity of European development, it is repeatedly claimed, is primarily due to the fact that Christianity propagated a strict distinction between transcendence and immanence, as well as a dichotomy between a worldly and a spiritual sphere

XXV Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 16.

XXVI Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 25.

XXVII Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 539–93.

XXVIII There are a legion of publications advocating this position, so we will not provide references here. We have reprinted some examples in Volume 1 of this series.

based on this. The distinction between transcendence and immanence was institutionalised by the differentiation of emperor and pope. The famous saying of Jesus in the Bible, “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s” (Mark 12.17), perfectly illustrates this concept. In the fifth century CE, Pope Gelasius differentiated between worldly and ecclesiastical power with his doctrine of the two swords. This motif was taken up during the Investiture Controversy, and again in the sixteenth century, when Martin Luther formulated his doctrine of the two kingdoms. In the wake of the confessional wars that followed the Reformation in Europe, a stricter separation between state and church finally prevailed, aimed at preventing further religious conflict. In modern times, secularity has been considered the standard configuration of modern nation-states, and has spread worldwide. In rather brief and simplified terms, this is the standard narrative of the path and process of secularisation in Europe. Against this backdrop, it is then argued that the emergence of secularity is inextricably linked to the historically singular conditions of Western European societies.

In the light of the sources presented in this volume, it must be asked how unique the European experience actually was. This question presupposes comparative research, as envisioned in the Multiple Secularities approach. Buddhism proved to be a particularly illuminating unit of comparison. As we have seen, despite its entirely different origin, Buddhism exhibits significant structural analogies with pre-Reformation Christianity. Here, too, we find a sharp distinction between transcendence and immanence – with a strong but non-theistic concept of transcendence. As in Christianity, the Buddhist distinction between transcendence and immanence finds its institutional expression in a strong monasticism. Celibate coenobites form the heart of Buddhism; their monasteries have their own rules and legal procedures, specific norms, ways of life, habitus, time regimes, etc. They are conceived as places providing optimal conditions for overcoming the world – that is, the eternal cycle of birth and death driven by the laws of karmic retribution. Similarly to Christian monasteries, in various places and times, Buddhist monasteries eventually became rich and powerful institutions, some of which resisted state orders, claimed legal immunity, acted as feudal lords, and formed a sort of state within the state. This tendency was particularly strong in Japan and Tibet, but was also significant in those regions dominated by Theravāda Buddhism.

Also noteworthy in this context are the early Indian hagiographies rendering the life of Buddha Siddhārtha Gautama, which present two potential paths for the newborn prince – that of a spiritual leader or that of a great king. This contrast establishes an initial dichotomy between a worldly and a spiritual existence, between paths towards mundane or supramundane achievements. In many Buddhist texts, a clear distinction is made between activities associated with mundane (*laukika*) matters, and those linked to supramundane (*lokottara*) concerns;[XXIX] authority over the latter is

XXIX See David Seyfort Ruegg, “A Note on the Relationship Between Buddhist and Hindu Divinities in Buddhist Literature and Iconology: The Laukika/Lokottara Contrast and the Notion of an Indian ‘Reliclaimed by the Dharma as taught by the Buddha, or by *śāsana/sāsana*, his teaching, (which today means "religion"). While it may be an anachronism to directly equate *laukika* with 'secular' and *lokottara* with 'religious,' or *śāsana* with 'religion,' this distinction within Buddhist discourses, in all likelihood, has significantly contributed to the formation of a culturally adapted form of secularity in modern societies influenced by Buddhism. At the level of power structures, the separation between mundane and supramundane means and ends found expression in the aforementioned juxtaposition of professional groups in many of those societies. Consequently, the regulation of the relationship between monasteries on the one hand, and secular authorities, donors, and patrons on the other, remained a persistent issue for many centuries.

Conventions and Formalities

A few words on formalities are in order here. Where English translations have been made for the first time in this volume, page breaks in the original are indicated in square brackets, e.g. [p. 1/2]. Existing translations reproduced here only contain these references if the original was consulted. Square brackets within translations indicate additions by the translator, while round brackets are part of the original text, or serve to emphasise key terms in the transliteration. Note, that due to the specificities of the syntax of the original languages, an exact matching of page breaks is oftentimes impossible.

The International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration (IAST) was used for the transliteration of terms, names, and titles in Pāli and Sanskrit. For the romanisation of Chinese, we chose Pinyin (ISO 7098:1991) without tone characters. Japanese was transcribed using the modified Hepburn system, Korean using the McCune-Reischauer system. The transliteration of Bhutanese and Tibetan terms follows the extended Wylie system. However, in the translated texts, Bhutanese and Tibetan personal names and places were transcribed using the THL Simplified Phonetic Transcription of Standard Tibetan by David Germano and Nicolas Tournadre. Classical Mongolian was transcribed according to the Vladimirtsov-Mostaert system (V-M).

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gious' Substratum?" In *Le parole e i marmi: Studi in onore di Raniero Gnoli nel suo 70. compleanno.* Edited by Raniero Gnoli, Raffaele Torella and Claudio Cicuzza, 735–42. Serie orientale Roma / Istituto italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente 92 (Roma: Istituto italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente, 2001); Christoph Kleine, "Religion and the Secular in Premodern Japan from the Viewpoint of Systems Theory," *Journal of Religion in Japan* 2, no. 1 (2013): 1–34; Max Deeg, "Innerhalb und jenseits der Welt: Kritische Überlegungen zum buddhistischen Begriffspaar laukika/lokottara im Verhältnis zu säkular/religiös." In *Grenzen der Religion: Säkularität in der Asiatischen Religionsgeschichte,* ed. Max Deeg, Oliver Freiberger, Christoph Kleine, and Karénina Kollmar-Paulenz, 173–95. *Critical Studies in Religion / Religionswissenschaft* (CSRRW) 17 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2023).

And finally, it should be noted that, in contrast to the first two volumes of the series, the English short titles listed in the table of contents and section headings do not always correspond to the bibliographical information. This is due to the fact that many of the texts printed here in translation come from collections of original-language sources where they are not listed with their own title. Furthermore, it should be noted that, in many cases, attributing an author is problematic, if not impossible. Some texts are traditionally attributed to an author, even though the attribution is clearly incorrect. These are therefore pseudepigrapha, but not anonymously authored texts. In such cases, we have listed the source collection instead of an author (e.g., “Dīgha Nikāya” instead of “Siddhattha Gotama,” or “Ming Code” instead of the name of the emperor ultimately responsible); in some cases, the responsible institution is listed (e.g., “Supreme Commander of Allied Powers”). In certain cases, where an older English translation already existed, the responsible contributor decided, for content-related reasons, to assign a different short title.