

1 Defence of Theodoros Gazes against Michael Apostoles

1.1 Introduction

Of the three interventions that animated the second phase of the Aristotelian-Platonic polemic in the 1450s and 1460s, that of Andronikos Kallistos is by far the most extensive. Gazes had simply analysed the five points of the *De differentiis* by Plethon and had tried to show the superiority of the Aristotelian conception of substance.¹ Conversely, Michael Apostoles had concentrated all his efforts on attacking Gazes' thesis, with the sole purpose of discrediting it in the eyes of potential readers, thus losing contact with the themes of the Plethonian text.² The first goal of Andronikos' *Defensio* (composed in the year 1462, before 19 May) is to demonstrate the absurdity of Apostoles' attack and his ignorance of the Aristotelian question. According to Kallistos, precisely because of this profound ἀμαθία — which led him to misunderstand Gazes' objections to Plethon's theses — Apostoles has shown that he is not even capable of constructively participating in such a complex debate. The second goal pursued by Andronikos is to bring the contents back to the centre of the debate and to address in more detail some of the key points that had pitted Plethon and Gazes against each other, with the addition of a personal contribution to the debate.

Kallistos' argument, both when it aims at attacking Apostoles, and when it develops its own argumentations, is structured in the form of an answer to the claims of Apostoles. Some units of content can be distinguished in the work:

- 1.1–1.2 dedication to Bessarion
- 2.1–7.2 tirade against Apostoles
- 8.1–12.6 on individuals and universals
- 13.1–13.11 on the immortality of soul
- 14.1–15.3 in more detail on the individuals
- 16.1–22.2 debate on Aristotelian form
- 23.1–26.2 difference between μάλλον and μείζων
- 27.1–28.2 conclusions

1 The standard edition is by Mohler 1942, 155–158.

2 Mohler 1942, 161–169. A detailed analysis of Apostoles' work is now Steiris 2021.

The sources listed in the *apparatus fontium* show how the arguments fielded by Andronikos come in most cases from the writings of Aristotle, Plato, and their commentators (Simplicius, Philoponos, Proclus). Kallistos' deep knowledge of Aristotelian matter is impressive, but not surprising in view of the number of manuscripts of Aristotelian content found in his library. These are all the manuscripts of Aristotelian content found in his library, copied and/or consulted by him:³

- Erlangensis A 4 (*Physics*; Simplicius on *Physics*; *Parva Naturalia*)
- Laur. Ashb. 1599 (Themistius on *De anima*)
- Ricc. 46 (*Ethica Nicomachea*, *Poetics*)
- Ambr. D 78 inf. (Ammonius on *De interpretatione*)
- Ambr. I 56 sup. (*De partibus animalium*, *Historia animalium*)
- Mutin. α T.8.3 (*Poetics*)
- Mutin. α T.9.1 (*Ethica Nicomachea*)
- Mutin. α U.9.3 (*De virtutibus et vitiis*)
- Mutin. α W.2.1 (Olympiodorus on *Organon*; Porphyry on *Categories*)
- Oxon. Bodl. Holkham Hall gr. 71 (Porphyry's *Introductio*; *Categories*, *De int.*)
- Par. gr. 1852 (*De anima*, *Ethica Nicomachea*)
- Par. gr. 1878 (Alexander of Aphrodisias on *Metaphysics*)
- Par. gr. 1879 (Michael of Ephesos on *Metaphysics*)
- Par. gr. 1890 (Themistius on *Physics*)
- Par. gr. 1908 (Simplicius on *Physics*)
- Par. gr. 2038 (*Rhetorica*, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, *Poetics*)
- Par. gr. 2046 (Alexander of Aphrodisias on *Meteorology*)
- Par. gr. 2066 (Michael of Ephesos on *Parva Naturalia*)
- Par. gr. 2069 (Theophrastus)
- Par. Suppl. gr. 541 (*Mechanics*)
- Vat. Ross. 1025 (*De anima* and Philoponos on *De anima*)
- Vat. gr. 249 (*Physics*, *De caelo*, *De gen. et corr.*, *Meteor.*, *De anima*)
- Vat. gr. 257 (*Metaphysics*)
- Vat. gr. 1314 (*De mundo* and *Categories*)
- Vat. gr. 2189 (Porphyry's *Introductio*; *Categories*, Philoponos on *Categories*; Ammonius on *De interpretatione*)
- Vat. gr. 2201 (*De caelo*, *De generatione et corruptione*, *Meteorology*)
- Vind. Hist. gr. 78 (Themistius on *Parva Naturalia*)
- Marc. gr. Z. 226 (Simplicius on *Physica*)

³ I exclude the manuscripts copied for a fee.

1.2 The manuscript tradition

The text of Andronikos' *Defensio* is transmitted in its entirety by six manuscripts:⁴

S = El Escorial, Real Biblioteca del Monasterio, Φ.III.15

Paper, third quarter of fifteenth century, mm 208 × 144, fols VI+307(+264^a; –102). Composite manuscript. The text of Kallistos is found at fols 163v–202v in the hand of <Hesaias of Cyprus>. Fols 214r–233r are in the hand of <Makarios of Halicz>.⁵ *Cat.*: De Andrés 1965, II, 68–71. *Bibl.*: Martínez Manzano 2015b, 120, 142, 145. Collated from digital images and verified by autopsy.

B = Milano, Veneranda Biblioteca Ambrosiana, B 141 sup.

Paper, Padua or Venice, sixteenth century, mm 332 × 228, fols III+31+I'. Copied by Bartolomeo Zanetti. The text of Kallistos is found at fols 4v–28v. *Cat.*: Martini and Bassi 1906, I, 167. *Bibl.*: Mohler 1942. Collated from digital images and verified by autopsy.

L = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 58.33

Paper, Crete, third quarter of fifteenth century,⁶ mm 268 × 204, fols IV+157+IV'. Copied by five scribes: A (fol. 2r); B (fols 3r–9v); C = Antonios Damilas (fols 10r, 54v–104r, 105v–155v); D = Michael Apostoles (fols 10v–54r); E (fols 104v–105r). The text of Kallistos is found at fols 96v–117v. *Cat.*: Bandini 1768–1770, vol. 3, cols 480–484. *Bibl.*: Stefec 2009, 154; Stefec 2014, 195. See a full description at <<http://cagb-db.bbaw.de/>>. Collated from digital images and verified by autopsy.

O = Oxford, Bodleian Library, Barocci 165

Paper, Crete, third quarter of fifteenth century, mm 276 × 204, fols II+170+II'. Copied by Michael Lygizos. The watermarks which can be identified within the manuscript point to a Cretan provenance: see the drawing *Monts* (e.g. at fols 16, 22, 58, 68, 83) identical to the type 51 Harlfinger [Crete, 1464]. The text of Kallistos is found at fols 149r–170r. At the bottom of fol. 170r, below the text of the *Defensio*,

⁴ As reported by Rudolf S. Stefec (Stefec 2013a, 34), a very short excerpt of the text (up to the words προσήκουσαν ἀξιώματι [= 171,32 Mohler]) is found at fol. 10rv of the manuscript Athen. Ἑλληνικὸ Λογοτεχνικὸ καὶ Ἱστορικὸ Ἀρχεῖο, Kolybas 235 (nineteenth century); this is in all likelihood a copy of Laur. 58.33 (see Lampros 1922, 469–471).

⁵ For this scribe see Orlandi 2021a.

⁶ An unquestionable *terminus post quem* for this witness is set by one of the texts transmitted therein, i.e. the letter of Nikolaos Sekundinos to Andronikos, which dates back to 5 June 1462; a *terminus ante quem* is furnished by the *ex libris* (12 August 1477) found at fol. 156r.

there is an annotation, in the hand of Lygizos: <κ>αὶ Λατίνοι δὲ τὴν παροιμίαν 'προβέρπιον' λέγουσι. τὸ δὲ προβέρπιον δῆλον λόγον δεδοκιμασμένον. ὅπερ ὀρίζονται οὕτως· προβέρπιον ἐστὶ λόγος ἐπιτετηδευμένου τοῖς ἡθεσι καὶ τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ζωῇ κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ζώντων. *Cat.*: Coxe 1958, cols 279–281. *Bibl.*: –. Collated from digital images and verified by autopsy.

M = Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España, cod. 4790

Paper, Messina, 1480, mm 274 × 294, fols VI+203. Copied by Konstantinos Laskaris. The text of Kallistos is found at fols 156v–179r. *Cat.*: De Andrés 1987, 393–395. *Bibl.*: Martínez Manzano 1994, 257, 260, 265, 267; Martínez Manzano 1998, 40, 57, 59–60, 198. Collated from digital images and verified by autopsy.

N = Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España, cod. 4766

Paper, Madrid, c. 1780 ca., mm 315 × 222, fols III+176. Copied by Faustino Muscat Guzmán (c. 1740–1812). The text of Kallistos is found at fols 73r–123r. *Cat.*: De Andrés 1987, 356–357. *Bibl.*: –. Collated from digital images and verified by autopsy.

The autograph in Andronikos' hand, sent to Bessarion by letter, seems not to have been preserved. However, thanks to the ancient inventories of the Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, studied by Lotte Labowsky, we know that it was (along with other writings) in the collection bequeathed by the Cardinal to the Republic of Venice. It is missing in the first inventory (A), from 1468, but is present already in the next one (B), from 1474. The autograph was in Venice until 1545/1546, the year of the last inventory (Ea). This is the correspondence in the five inventories:⁷

Year	Inventory	Item no.	Description
1468	A	—	—
1474	B	935	Diversi quinterniones operum Domini Reverendissimi et (b) Apostoli et (c) Andronici quaedam, (d) regulae sancti Basilii translatae, scriptae in charta pecorina
1524	C	977	Quaedam scripta cum ipsius Cardinalis, tum aliorum, cum graeca, tum latina, in quinternionibus
1543	D	416	Andronici epistolae, in papiro
1545/46	Ea	308	Diversa opera et epistolae, et Calisti, et notae in graeco et latino, sine tabulis, forma parva

⁷ See Labowsky 1979, 239, 290, 305, 343, and 476.

It is appropriate to quote Lotte Labowsky's assessment:

Both *B* (934 and 935) and *C* (974 and 977) mention what seem to have been batches of loose quires containing various writings and letters, some in Greek, some in Latin, by Bessarion, Plethon, Andronicus Callistus, and others. *D* seems to list some of these papers separately (411; 413; 415; 416; 417; 944), while only one of these batches is mentioned in *Ea* (under 'Diversa', 308: 'Diversa opera et epistole, et Calistii, et notae in greco et latino, sine tabulis, forma parva') [...] Much of this material seems to be lost, though some of it may have turned up bound in with other codices.⁸

The entry corresponding to Andronikos' treatise (*B* 935c = *C* 977 = *D* 416 = *Ea* 308) seems to have been lost forever.⁹ It is likely that one of the two main surviving witnesses, the *Scor. Φ.III.15* assigned to the hand of the monk Hesaias of Cyprus, was copied from the original shortly after it was made. The watermarks¹⁰ suggest a date around the mid-1460s and a location in Venice, where Hesaias was residing in those years.

A copy of Andronikos' text arrived in Crete after May 1462, brought by a certain Iohannes ἱερέύς, to be identified with Iohannes Rhosos or with Iohannes Plusiadenos.¹¹ We know that the latter returned to Crete from Italy — where he had stayed, between Venice and Rome, in the years 1461–1462 — by August 1463.¹² The manuscript *Laur. 58.33* (L), in the hand of Antonios Damilas and of an anonymous collaborator, was to be taken from the specimen brought by Iohannes.

Be that as it may, Mohler's edition of the *Defensio* rests on two witnesses, *L* and *B*. Although he explicitly declares that *B* shows in most cases (circa 90) bad

⁸ Labowsky 1979, 118. For some considerations about the manuscript *Σ.III.1*, which seems to have preserved some material, see also page 485 and the *addenda* at page 509.

⁹ Likewise lost is also the copy that was kept within the Grimani collection (*item* no. 185, *inter alia*), which is described as follows: 'Bessarionis, Pletonis, et Andronici quaedam' (= *Vat. lat.* 3960, fol. 7r lin. 2; see Diller, Saffrey and Westerink 2003, 137–138). In the same collection a copy of some letters of Michael Apostoles annotated by Kallistos seems also to have been found (*item* no. 135, *inter alia*: 'Epistolae Michaelis Bizantii cum glosis Andronici' = *Vat. lat.* 3960, fol. 5v lin. 6–7; see Diller, Saffrey and Westerink 2003, 130). Filippomaria Pontani first drew attention on this item (see Pontani 2011, 367 n. 842). I wonder whether this might be a copy of Apostoles' writing on substance, sent as a letter to Bessarion and annotated by Andronikos.

¹⁰ It is a drawing *Monts* (typologically similar to Briquet 11758 and Harlfinger 65 [1468/69]) and *Étoile dans un cercle* (close to Briquet 6077 [1457–1472], with variants located in Venice in the early 1460s).

¹¹ I have already proposed this identification in Villa 2021, 450. For the mention of a 'Iohannes' see also Cattaneo 2020a, 142 n. 14.

¹² See Despotakis 2020, 62–75, 195.

readings in comparison to L, many times he neglects the latter's good ones in favour of B's. An overview of occurrences is listed below:¹³

- 1.2 (171,23) προσκειμένων L : προκειμένων B Mohler
- 2.4 (172,24) ἐπιβόλῳ L : ἐπιβόλῳ B Mohler
- 2.4 (172,40) ἐπιείμενε L : ἐπείμενε B Mohler
- 6.2 (174,11) σε L : om. B Mohler
- 6.2 (174,15) ἐδίωκες L : ἐδίωκας B Mohler
- 9.3 (177,20) σάς L : om. B Mohler
- 10.2 (179,32) σπάνιν L : σπάσιν B Mohler
- 17.4 (192,26) μόνον L : μόνων B Mohler
- 17.5 (192,37) ἡμᾶς L : ἡμεῖς B Mohler
- 19.2 (194,9) αἰωνίως L : αἰώνιον B Mohler
- 23.3 (197,18) γραμματικὴν L : γραμματικῆς B Mohler
- 23.8 (199,19) διαφερομένους L : διαφερομένου B Mohler
- 23.9 (199,32) τοιοῦτος L : τοιοῦτο B Mohler

In some cases Mohler's editorial choices overlook correct readings of both L and B:

- 8.2 (175,7) οὕτως L B : ὅλως Mohler
- 8.3 (175,27) οὕτω L B : οὕτω Mohler
- 8.4 (176,16) συνθέτοις L B : συνθετοῖς Mohler
- 9.4 (178,1) ἰδέας L B : ἰδίας Mohler
- 9.6 (178,21) ἔσπετο L B : ἔπετο Mohler
- 10.3 (179,34) ἐβούλου L B : ἐβάλου Mohler
- 11.2 (181,9) ἐσομένων L B : ἐπομένων Mohler
- 12.5 (183,10) οὖν L B : ὁ Θεόδωρος Mohler
- 13.8 (187,19) δὴ L B : δέ Mohler
- 13.11 (188,10) ποιητικόν L B : ποιητικὴν Mohler
- 18.2 (193,32) αὐτοανθρώπου L B : αὐτανθρώπου Mohler
- 18.2 (193,35) αἰσθητά τε L B : αἰσθητά (τε om.) Mohler
- 20.2 (194,30) αἰτίοις L B : αἰτίαις Mohler
- 23.6 (198,20) αἰεὶ L B : ἀεὶ Mohler
- 23.7 (199,3) περιθρυλλόμενα L B : περιθρυλλόμενα Mohler
- 25.2 (201,4) ἡρηκώς L B : εἰρηκώς Mohler

13 The following list shows separative errors of B against the whole manuscript tradition. Here and below the first reference (e.g. 1.2) indicates the numbers of chapters and paragraphs of the present edition, while the second one (e.g. 171,23) refers to pages and lines of Mohler's edition, which represented my collation basis.

27.2 (201,35) τούς L B : τὰς Mohler

In the present edition codex B is not cited in the apparatus, since it happened to be an apograph of S. B carries all the significant and insignificant¹⁴ errors of S and all its omissions, as the following examples indicate:

- 1.2 (171,31) ἐαυτόν om. S B
- 2.4 (172,38) ἀδικοῖμεν] ἀδικοῦμεν S B
- 5.2 (174,5) δὴ καὶ om. S B
- 9.3 (177,28) τοῖς] τούς S B
- 9.3 (177,33) ἀκριβεστάτην om. S B
- 10.2 (179,22) ὑπερεπαινεῖ] ἐπαινεῖ S B
- 10.2 (179,26) διαπρέψαντα] διατρίψαντα S B
- 11.1 (181,3) καὶ ταῦτα om. S B
- 12.3 (182,20) σαφῶς] σαφές S B
- 12.5 (183,12) μᾶλλον om. S B
- 13.4 (185,3) ἀπαθῆς] καθαρός S B
- 13.4 (185,12) αἰτίου] αἰτία S B
- 13.8 (187,13–14) τὸν ὀρισμὸν – λεγομένης om. S B (*saut du même au même*)
- 13.11 (188,17) ἐπιστημονικῆς] -νικῶς S B
- 17.3 (191,33) φυσικῇ] φύσει S B
- 17.4 (192,27) σωθῆναι om. S B
- 23.2 (196,31) κατ' αὐτήν om. S B
- 23.7 (199,1) πολλά om. SB
- 24.2 (200,16) τινέ] τινί S B
- 25.2 (200,31–32) ἡμῖν – δυνάμεως om. S B (*saut du même au même*)
- 27.1 (201,26) ὠφελῆσαι] ὠφελῆ S B
- 27.2 (202,1) ὅτῳ] οὕτω S B
- 28.2 (203,4) φιλοσοφίας] σοφίας S B
- 28.2 (203,5) κακῶς] καλῶς S B
- 28.3 (203,8) ἀποτείνειν om. S B

Striking evidence of the derivation of B from S is provided by the omission at 23.5 [= 197,36 Mohler]: the words ἀπάσας καὶ τὰς μεθόδους τῶν λόγων οὕτω τοι, which are missing in B, correspond with one line in S (fol. 195r).

¹⁴ I list here some cases of itacisms and minor slips: 8.1 (175,1) ὦ om. S B; 9.1 (176,39) ἦ om. S B; 13.3 (184,26) ἔστι] εἶναι S B; 13.6 (186,9) εἶδη] ἦδη S B; 13.7 (186,24) δεῖ] δὴ S B; 17.3 (191,30) τῶν] ὧν S B; 19.2 (194,14) ἦς] ἦ S B; 23.7 (199,2) ὁ om. S B; 23.9 (199,32) τούς om. S B; 26.2 (201,16) εἰ] οὐ S B.

Moreover, B inherits from its antigraph all the marginal annotations. At 13.2, for instance, in the outer margin of fol. 14v, the scribe of B (Bartolomeo Zanetti) writes ὅρα περὶ ἀθανασίας ἀναγκαῖα, thus reporting the annotation from its source S (fol. 79v); the same occurs at 13.5, where both S (181r) and B (15v) show in the outer margin the note ὅτι τὸ φθειρόμενον.¹⁵

Therefore, Mohler's codex B is replaced by S in the critical apparatus, whereas L preserves its position in it.

L mostly offers the best readings and does not share the errors and omissions of S listed above; on the other hand L shows a few *lacunae* and some unconvincing readings which are not included in S and which S unlikely could have supplied and corrected by itself, if copying from L:

3.2 (173,24) σου om. L

4.2 (173,34) τοῖς S : τοῖς τοῖς L

7.2 (174,31) ἴσως om. L

8.3 (175,32) δέ om. L

9.5 (178,11) καταδαπανᾶσθαι S : δαπανᾶσθαι L

13.8 (187,17) γάρ om. L

15.2 (189,20) καί om. L

16.3 (190,17) τῷ εἶδει om. L

19.1 (194,5) καί om. L

23.3 (197,15) ὧν om. L

23.6 (198,18) καταθραύεις S : καταθρήνεις L

24.2 (200,5) ἐπαλλάξας S : ἀπαλλάξας L

In addition, S shows initials in carmine ink which L completely lacks: in some cases it would have been very difficult for S to guess them right, if copying from L.¹⁶ Finally, L does not give any indication to distinguish Andronikos' own text and recurring quotations from Apostoles' work, as S on the contrary regularly does. For all these reasons, one may argue that L and S are independent of each other.

Codex O is a copy of L, because it repeats all the errors of L (listed above) and introduces new ones of its own:

¹⁵ See also other *notabilia*: (8.3) Εὐδημος, Πορφύριος; (8.4) Ἀρχύτας; (9.2) ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, μετὰ τὰ πολλά; (13.6) ὅρα ὡς ἡ ἐντελέχεια τῶν πλεοναχῶς; (13.8) ὅτι τῶν πλεοναχῆ λεγομένων τοὺς ὀρισμοὺς δι' ὁμοίων ἀποδιδόναι δεῖ; (13.11) Θεόφραστος; (17.3) Θεόφραστος, Ἡράκλειτος, Κρατύλος; (17.4) Σωκράτης; (*passim*) σημείωσαι.

¹⁶ See for instance 6.2, 15.2, 19.1 (here the entire word καί is missing), 22.2, 25.1.

- 1.1 (171,5) σοφώτατε L S B : θειότατε O¹⁷
 2.4 (172,32) λίαν om. O
 8.4 (176,9) αὐτός om. O
 9.1 (176,39) αἱ L S B : καί O
 12.4 (182,34) ἄγοντα L S B : ἔχοντα O¹⁸
 12.4 (182,35) σοι om. O
 12.5 (183,12) αὐτῆς om. O
 13.2 (184,13) εἰδώς om. O
 13.2 (184,14) ψυχῆς om. O
 13.4 (185,11) γάρ om. O
 13.11 (188,21) ἀγχύρας L S B : ἐχγύρας O¹⁹
 13.11 (188,26) οὖν om. O
 15.2 (189,29–30) οὐ τοσοῦτον – ἀλλ' οὐ om. O
 15.3 (190,2) νοῦν om. O
 20.2 (194,28) ὄν L S B : οἶον O
 23.2 (196,35–36) τοῖς δέ – ἐπιδέχονται om. O
 23.6 (198,23) αὐτῶν om. O
 23.7 (198,26) σε L S B : σου O
 26.2 (201,19) αὐθις L S B : ἄμα O

In addition, O reproduces from codex L some of the latter's variant readings. For instance, at fol. 101r of L, the vocative ἀκριτόμυθε (9.7 [= 179,4 Mohler]), first mistakenly written ἀκριτόθυμε by Lygizos, is corrected in the line-spacing by overwriting -μ- and -θ- (see Fig. 1). At fol. 154v, codex O slavishly imitates this (see Fig. 2).²⁰

¹⁷ The change from σοφώτατος to θειότατος is intentional and probably due to the scribe of O, Michael Lygizos, who spent some time in Italy and may have had the possibility to know Cardinal Bessarion.

¹⁸ See the shape of the word ἄγοντα in L (fol. 103v), which can in fact easily be misinterpreted with ἔχοντα.

¹⁹ See the shape of the word ἀγχύρας in L (fol. 107r), which can in fact easily be misinterpreted with ἐχγύρας.

²⁰ See also at 7.2 [= 174,27 Mohler] βέλτιον in textu, βέλτιστον in marg. L O and 10.2 [= 179,20 Mohler] τὸ μέτριον in textu, τὸ μέτρον in marg. L O.




Fig. 1: Laur. 58.33, fol. 101r; © Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana.




Fig. 2: Barocci 165, fol. 154v; © Bodleian Library.

O is likely to be a direct copy of L, since both of them were produced on the island of Crete by Cretan scribes (Lygizos and Damilas, respectively). Further indication that Lygizos had the Laurentianus in his hands is provided by the fact that an annotation by him can be found in the anterior guard-leaves.²¹

Upon consideration of the evidence, codex M is in turn a copy of O, since M carries all the significant errors of L and O and introduces lots of its own:

- 2.4 (172,25) γούνη om. M
- 2.4 (172,27) καί om. M
- 6.2 (174,19) ἐροῦμεν L O S B : ὀρώμεν M
- 8.2 (175,20) οὕτως om. M
- 8.4 (176,21) οὐ L O S B : ἐν M
- 10.3 (180,2–3) τὰ καθέκαστα μᾶλλον – τὰ καθόλου om. M
- 10.4 (180,17) οὖν om. M
- 13.2 (184,5) συναναίρεθείη L O S B : συναίρεθείη M
- 13.6 (185,31) ἐπομένους L O S B : ἐπομένους M
- 13.8 (187,13–14) τὸν ὀρισμὸν – λεγομένην M
- 14.2 (189,10) ὡς om. M
- 15.2 (189,26) εἰ om. M
- 16.3 (190,23) ἀναισθητόν L O S B : αἰσθητόν M
- 17.1 (191,6) φυσικῶν L O S B : φυτῶν M
- 17.3 (191,24) ἐνδέχεται om. M
- 17.4 (192,26) μαθηματικῶν L O S B : μαθημάτων M
- 19.2 (194,9) ὅν om. M
- 20.3 (194,35) περὶ² om. M

²¹ Identification by Stefec 2014, 195. I would like to point out that a very close relationship between the two manuscripts (L and O) had already been reported in respect of another text, i.e. letter no. 3 of the epistolary of Michael Apostoles: see Stefec 2013a, 35.

- 23.4 (197,29) δρεπομένους L O S B : δρεπομένας M
 23.5 (198,9) ὀνομάζοντας om. M
 23.7 (198,35) λέγειν om. M
 24.2 (200,21) ἡμῖν om. M
 25.1 (200,26) μεῖζον om. M
 26.2 (201,17–18) καὶ ἔλαττον – ἔσται om. M
 27.2 (202,17) τοιοῦτον L O S B : τοσοῦτον M
 28.2 (202,39) φέρεσθαι L O S B : φαίνεσθαι M

More specifically, some cases show that M is a *direct* copy of O. First, the omission of the word ὑπό at 2.4 [= 172,25] has been probably caused by its position in O, coinciding with the turning page point between fol. 150 recto and verso. Then, at 12.3 [= 182,21–23] just after the words πρὸς Παρμενίδην ἔν, the copyist of M, namely Konstantinos Laskaris, had begun to write the sentence τὸ ἐξηρημένον ἐν τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος, but he immediately stopped and deleted it, thus realising he was about to pass over one entire text line of O, εἰπόντα τὸ ὄν ἄτοπα πλείω ἐπιφέρει τοῖς μὴ διακρίνουσι (fol. 157r, lin. 14–16). Exactly the same occurred at 22.2 [= 196,2–3], where Laskaris was about to skip the sentence ὑβρίζων δ' εἰς Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν θεῖον οὕτω τοι ἰταμῶς ψευδεῖς by starting to write the first two words of the following one, καὶ ἀσυμβλήτους (fol. 165r, lin. 24–26). The genesis (as well as the recognition and the correction) of these errors can only be explained if we suppose that Laskaris had the codex O before his very eyes.²²

At many places of the text Laskaris corrected mistakes made by Lygizos. Here some examples:

- 3.2 (173,21) ἐπιμελουμόνους O : ἐπιμελουμένους M
 8.1 (175,1) φειλότης O : φιλότης M
 8.3 (175,32) δέ om. O : rest. M
 9.2 (177,11) καταταγμένον O : κατατεταγμένον M
 9.6 (178,23) Ζωάστρου O : Ζωροάστρου M

²² The results of this philological investigation seem to strengthen the connection between the activity of Konstantinos Laskaris in Messina and some manuscripts copied by Lygizos nowadays belonging to the Barocci collection (Oxford). This link has already been pointed out by Martínez Manzano 1994 (see in particular pp. 273, 302). For instance, we can mention the fact that on the last folios of manuscript Barocci 76 (a collective volume made in Crete by Michael Apostoles, Andreas Donos, Aristobulos Apostoles, and the so-called *Anonymus β-π* Gamillscheg; see *supra*, § 2.1.1.2) one comes across the *Desideraten-Liste* in the hand of Laskaris studied by Martínez Manzano. Furthermore, annotations in Laskaris' hand are found in the manuscript Barocci 119, copied again by Lygizos. Therefore, we could suppose that at a certain time some books linked to Lygizos became available to Laskaris.

- 10.4 (180,24) δεῖ O : δὴ M
 12.3 (182,39) διίσχυρόμενος O : διίσχυριζόμενος M
 12.5 (183,12) πεπρεβευκώς O : πεπρεσβευκώς M
 13.2 (184,10) ὕψω O : ἥψω M
 13.11 (188,21) ἐγγύρας O : ἀγγύρας M
 17.2 (191,20) αἰδία τῆς O : αἰδία τις M
 21.2 (195,21) ἄν ἄν O : ἄν M
 23.2 (196,17) αὐτίκα αὐτίκα O : αὐτίκα M
 24.2 (200,2) πατρολόαν O : πατραλοίαν M
 25.2 (200,33) καί om. O : rest. M
 26.2 (201,23) αὐτὸς αὐτός O : αὐτός M
 28.3 (203,11) ἐπηλούθησας O : ἐπηκολούθησας M
 28.4 (203,33) πάντων O : πάντως M²³

As already noticed by Gregorio De Andrés,²⁴ codex N is a late eighteenth-century copy of M, sharing every single feature of its model (and, of course, all its mistakes). It does not give any kind of contribution to the constitution of the text.

The Latin translation of chapters 13.3–13.7 (on the immortality of the soul) prepared in the summer of 1462 by Nikolaos Sekundinos most likely stems from the autograph copy by Kallistos. This Latin version is found in the manuscript Marc. lat. XIII 62 (fols 133r–135v).²⁵ A collaborator of Bessarion, Sekundinos was in Viterbo together with the cardinal as the latter received Kallistos' work per mail in the late spring of 1462. Like Bessarion, Sekundinos appreciated the work and intervened in the controversy by writing a Greek letter²⁶ to Kallistos praising the high quality of the treatise.

In most cases the Latin text shares L's good readings against S:

- 13.4 *passionibus omnino liber* : ἀπαθής L : καθαρὸς S
 13.6 *formam* : εἶδη L : ἥδη S
 13.7 *opus est* : δεῖ L : δὴ S

²³ Although in this place the correct reading would have been παίδων (as we read in L S B), the conjecture of Laskaris (πάντως instead of Lygizos' error πάντων) is a very good one. For the *iunctura* πάντη πάντως there are in fact lots of occurrences; see e.g.: Plat., *Phaedr.* 246a 4, Arist., *Cat.* 4a 35.

²⁴ See De Andrés 1987, 356.

²⁵ For the edition of the Latin version see Monfasani 1985 (with introduction and explanatory notes).

²⁶ See Boissonade 1833, 377–387 and PG 161, cols 691–696; see *supra*, § 1.3.5. I shall give a new edition of the epistle in the near future.

On the other hand, it shares with S at least one good reading, whereas L bears a significant error: 13.8 *anima motus* : ψυχὴ κινήσεως S: ψυχὴ κυρίως L.

The examination of the relationships among the extant witnesses leads us to place them in the following *stemma*:




Fig. 3: *Defensio Theodori Gazae. Stemma codicum.*

1.3 Editorial criteria

As mentioned, we do not possess the autograph of Kallistos' pamphlet, which would have provided many interesting insights regarding the orthographic uses of a talented Byzantine scholar. For the edition of the *Defensio*, as well as for all the other texts included in this Appendix, we avoided any sort of 'normalization' towards classical Greek forms, thus sharing the choice of most modern editors of

medieval and Renaissance Greek texts.²⁷ A normalization modelled on Kallistos' orthographic habits, evidenced by more than one hundred autographs, was also avoided. I cite here only one exemplary case, which is sufficient in itself to show the difference between Kallistos' praxis and the ecdotic choice adopted for the text of the *Defensio*.

In Andronikos' manuscripts, the enclitic τε is always non-accented when following a proparoxytone, oxytone or perispomenon (in the latter two cases, provided that τε does not precede another enclitic [= *synenklisis*]). After paroxytone and properispomenon instead it almost always takes an accent.²⁸ In this respect, on the basis of the codices available for the text of the *Defensio* (the primary sources, L and S, and their apographs O, M, and B), it seemed appropriate to respect in the most scrupulous way the graphic uses found in M, which is by the hand of Konstantinos Laskaris. Given that M is not the work of any other scribe, but of a Greek master, it seemed natural to expect from him more care concerning spelling and accentuation.

To begin with, concerning the enclitic τε one notices a great difference between Laskaris' and Kallistos' use: in codex M, τε mostly does not take any accent when following a paroxytone²⁹ (with a few exceptions)³⁰ and a properispomenon³¹

²⁷ See Reinsch 1983, 95*–103*; Maltese 1993; Rollo 1993–1994, 37–43; Reisch and Kambylis 2001, 34*–52*; Rollo 2014c, 338–342; Gazzini 2021. By other editors, one still finds the tendency to 'normalize' the text by following classical uses: it is the case e.g. with the edition of Bessarion's *De natura et arte* given by Mariev, Marchetto and Luchner 2015.

²⁸ Some examples from the opening of the *In calumniatorem Platonis* (Marc. gr. Z. 198): αὐτίκα τέ; Ἑλλήνων τέ; ταῦτα τέ; σοφίαν τέ; λόγοις τέ; ἐγαννύμην τέ; πλάγην τέ. These uses are certainly not limited to the works of the Byzantine period, but are also found in copies of classical texts: note, for example, that even in the first chapter of the *De corona* by Demosthenes — copied by Andronikos in the Sinod. gr. 267 — the accent can be found on the enclitic τε both after properispomenon (πᾶσι τὲ) and after paroxytone (σωτηρίας τέ). For the understanding of the accentuation of τε in Byzantine Greek see also Noret 1998.

²⁹ φιλοσοφία τε (1.2); Ἀριστοτέλει τε (2.2 and 25.2); εὐθύνειν τε (2.2); ἐκείνῳ τε (2.4); λόγους τε (2.4); ταύταις τε (2.4); πάπποις τε (4.2); ἐκπίπτων τε (4.2); θορυβηθέντας τε (8.3); πρώτας τε (8.4 and 23.2); φύρδην τε (9.4); φθόνῳ τε (9.5); Αἰγυπτίοις τε (9.6); ἄλλοι τε (9.6); ἄλλων τε (10.2); διακεκριμένα τε (12.2); μεγαλαυχίας τε (12.4); φύσει τε (12.5); λείως τε (12.5); πάντη τε (12.6); ὅπως τε (12.6); τοιαύτας τε (13.7); ἀχωρίστους τε (13.7); οὐκέτι τε (13.8); μιγνύντα τε (13.9); ἄλλοις τε (15.3); ἀνωτέραν τε (17.4); ἀφθάρτων τε (17.6); βαθυτέρων τε (17.7); ἤδη τε (22.2); εἶδη τε (23.1); ὑποκειμένων τε (23.2); ἐπιστήμης τε (23.3); ῥημάτων τε (23.5); ἐσπάρης τε (23.7); Ἀριστοτέλῃ τε (27.2); ἄλλων τε (28.1); φρονιμωτάτου τε (28.2); λοιδορουμένων τε (28.4).

³⁰ Ἀριστοτέλῃς τὲ (1.1); μεταδοξάζων τὲ (12.6); τοιαύτας τὲ (13.7); ἀκριβεστέραν τὲ (17.5); εὐπορίαν τὲ (23.5); Ἀριστοτέλει τὲ (28.3); Θεοδώρῳ τὲ (28.4).

³¹ ὧφλες τε (2.4); τοῦτο τε (8.2); σῶφρον τε (10.4); μᾶλλον τε (11.2, 19.2 and 25.2); κοσμοῦσαν τε (13.6); εἶδος τε (16.3); παῦρα τε (23.4); μεῖζον τε (25.2). Once appears μεῖζόν τε (26.2).

(with the exception of the syntagma οἷός τε).³² I have always respected Laskaris' accentuation for all other enclitics, such as the verbs εἰμί³³ and φημί³⁴. Concerning orthography, I hereby list the most relevant features. I have preserved the *facies* of manuscript M in regard to words written sometimes as one word (univerbation) and sometimes as two separate ones. I name here for example some adverbs: τὰ μέγιστα (8.2; 9.7) and ταμέγιστα (9.5); ταμάλιστα (2.3; 8.4); διαβραχέων (15.2; 27.2; 28.3); ἐπὶ πλέον (23.2) and ἐπιπλέον (18.1); διὰ τοῦτο (2.3; 11.2; 17.2; 24.2) and διατοῦτο (24.2) (meaning in both cases 'therefore / so / for this reason'). It may be of some interest to signal that some words appearing in univerbation are marked by the presence of ὑφήν (◡): τοπαράπαν (2.3; 12.6); τωόντι (13.3; 23.3; 23.5; 27.2). According to the Byzantine orthographic usage, Laskaris writes ταυτὸν = τὸ αὐτὸν (as well as ταυτὰ = τὰ αὐτά) without coronis;³⁵ the conjunction μὴδὲ is provided with a double accent. According to Laskaris' use, adverbs ending with the letter *eta* are generally not provided with *iota* subscript.³⁶ In the word εἰκῆ the

32 οἷός τε (1.2.; 10.2; 11.3; 13.11; 19.2); οἷός τ' (28.4); οἷόν τ' (2.2; 10.4); οἷόν τε (12.3; 13.7; 15.3; 17.3; 27.2). In contrast to this, I found in two cases οἷον τε (9.5; 13.7).

33 After perispomenon: αὐτῆς ἐστι (10.4); φυτικῆς ἐστι (13.10); νοητῶν ἐστι (13.10); αὐτοῖς ἐστιν (16.3); ἀρχῆς ἐστιν (16.3); φυσικῶν εἰσὶν (17.3). After properispomenon: ἐκεῖνο ἐστι (11.1); μᾶλλον ἐστὶ (14.1); γνώσις ἐστι (17.1); θεῖον ἐστὶ (17.4). After oxytone: συμβεβηκός ἐστι (9.2); τελικόν ἐστιν (10.4); γεννητόν ἐστιν (16.2); αὐτοὶ ἐστιν (27.2). After paroxytone: ὑποκειμένῳ εἰσι (8.4); Σωφρονίσκος ἐστι (10.4); ἐσομένων ἐστὶν (11.2); φιλοσοφίας ἐστὶ (13.10); δόξης ἐστὶν (14.2); πάντα εἰσὶ (17.1); σκέψις ἐστι (17.3); ἐπιστήμη ἐστι (17.6); λόγος ἐστὶ (20.3); Ἀρχύτας ἐστὶ (23.8); βασκανίας ἐστιν (27.2). After proparoxytone: ἐρώτησιν ἐστὶ (24.4). See also the case of εἰπέρ ἐστιν (17.3): a second accent is applied on -περ.

34 After perispomenon: ψυχῆς φησὶν (13.3); τυφλῷ φησι (15.3); ἀριθμοῦ φησι (23.8); ἡμεῖς φαμέν (24.1). After properispomenon: ἐκεῖνος φησὶ (7.2); ταῦτα φησι (8.3); παρήχθαι φαμέν (10.4); εἶναι φαμέν (10.4; 13.6; 17.3); συναναιρεῖσθαι φαμέν (11.2); πλῆθος φησιν (12.3); ἀπατώντες φαμέν (14.2); πρῶτα φαμέν (14.2); στοιχεῖα φαμέν (17.2); δῆμος φησὶ (21.1); μεῖζον φαμέν (23.2; 23.3); μᾶλλον φαμέν (23.2); Μιχαῆλος φησὶν (23.3); αἰδεῖται φησὶ (23.3). After oxytone: αὐτός φησιν (8.2; 13.4); ἱστορικῶν φησὶ (9.6); χωριστόν φησι (13.4); Θεοὺς φησιν (17.2); λευκὴν φαμέν (23.2); ποῖόν φησιν (23.2); οὐδεὶς φησιν (23.2). After paroxytone: ὄντα φησι (8.3); Ἀρχύτας φησι (8.4); βίβλον φησὶ (9.6); πρῶτῳ φησιν (13.4); κωλύει φησιν (13.8); ἀέρα φαμέν (13.8); ὄντα φησὶν (14.2); Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν (14.2; 23.7); ἐπιστήμην φαμέν (17.2); ὅμα φησι (17.4); εἶδη φησὶν (18.2); οὐσίαν φαμέν (23.2; 23.3); οὐσίας φαμέν (23.2); συγχωρεῖται φησὶ (23.7); μέλει φησὶ (23.7); συμπεραίνων φησὶ (23.8); μάλα φαμέν (24.2). After proparoxytone: ἔοικε φησὶν (13.3); ἄδελον φησὶν (13.8); ἐντελέχειαν φησὶ (13.8); πότερόν φησι (13.10); Θεόφραστος φησι (17.3).

35 See the following occurrences: 5.2; 10.3; 12.3; 13.11; 17.7; 23.2; 23.3; 23.7; 23.8; 24.2; 25.2.

36 See e.g. ἀμηγέπη (1.1); πάντη (1.2; 12.6; 13.7; 13.8; 13.10; 17.3; 24.2; 28.3; 28.4); κομιδῇ (10.2).

iota subscript is sometimes expressed,³⁷ as in *πλεονακῆ*;³⁸ οὐδαμῇ appears once in the text (14.2) provided with *iota*. It seemed to me unnecessary to reproduce Laskaris' use of ὑποδιαστολή, as it occurs in the following cases: ὅ,περ (2.4; 6.2; 11.2; 12.2; 13.4; 14.2; 17.6; 19.2; 23.2); τό,τε (8.3; 12.3; 17.4; 23.8; 28.4) and τά,τε (12.2; 12.3; 12.4; 13.2; 17.3). I did not adopt Laskaris' emphatic punctuation, rather I preferred to follow the syntax.

Finally, we shall point out that Mohler systematically added to the text the indications <Ἀνδρόνικος> and <Μιχαῆλος> to signal the transition from the arguments of one to the other, so reproducing the layout of codex B (copy of S). However, these indications are not found in manuscripts L O M nor in S (with the exception of the first leaves, where the names of both Andronikos and Michael can be read in the margin in red ink). Quotations from Apostoles' work are marked by expanded character spacing.

37 One finds both εἰκῆ (3.2; 27.2) and ἐικῆ (9.7; 12.4).

38 See the emblematic case of chapter 13.8, where this word appears five times, but only once with *iota* subscript.

Conspectus siglorum

S = El Escorial, Real Biblioteca del Monasterio, Φ.III.15.

L = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 58.33.

Mohler = ed. Mohler 1942, 171–203.

Τῷ δεσπότη Βησσαρίωνι Ἀνδρόνικος, εὐτυχῶς χρῶ.

171 1.1 Ἐμοὶ μὲν, ὦ σοφώτατε δέσποτα, | περιέλκειν σε νῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑψηλοτά-
Mohler των θεωριῶν οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπὲρ ἀστρονομοῦντα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἄκρον τῶν ἀγα-
θῶν ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ μεγίστη ἀνατεινόμενον κάκεῖνο περιχορεύοντα καὶ νοητῶς συνα-
πτόμενον τῷ πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἐπέκεινα καὶ εἰς ὑποθέσεις λογικωτέρας κατὰ 5
γειν καὶ τῆς σῆς ἀμηγέτη οὐκ ἀξίας μεγαλονοίας οὐκ ἐδόκει δίκαιον εἶναι. ἐπεὶ δὲ
Μιχαῆλος πρόφασιν μὲν Πλήθωνι καὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ συνηγορῶν, ἥς οὐδὲν αὐτῷ οὐ-
δέποτ' ἐμέλησε, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ Θεοδώρῳ βασκαίνων καὶ λοιδορήσασθαι θέλων
ἀδίκως τάνδρῃ, εὖ παθὼν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τε καὶ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἡδικημένος δ' οὐδ' ὅπως τι-
οῦν, βιβλίον συνέγραψε κατ' αὐτοῦ λοιδοριῶν τε καὶ ἀμαθίας μεστόν — σοὶ φησι 10
χαριζόμενος· παρενθήκη δ' αὐτῷ Ἀριστοτέλης τὲ καὶ Λατῖνοι γεγένηται — ἀνέ-
χεσθαι γε, σιωπᾶν ἔτι καὶ τουτονὶ μὲν τὸν τελχῖνα οὕτω τοι μεγάλα κομπάζοντα
καὶ τὰς ὀφρῦς ἑᾶν ἀνασπῶντα, Θεόδωρον δὲ περιορᾶν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικούμενον
καὶ μὴ τὰ δυνατὰ αὐτῷ τε καὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ συνειπεῖν, κάκεῖνον διελέγξαι ἀμαθῆ τε
καὶ ψευδόμενον καὶ μὴδ' ὅτιοῦν ὑγιὲς εἰρηκότα, οὐ σώζοντος δήπου οὐδὲ τιμῶν- 15
τος ἣν τὰ γινόμενα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προπηλακισθέντων οὐδέσι, καὶ πρό γε πάντων
τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὅπου γ' ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ταύτης καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα δεῖν ἀναιρεῖν Ἀριστοτέλης
παρακελεύεται.

1.2 Σὲ δ' ἔγωγε εὖ οἶδα, δικαιοτάτε δέσποτα, οὐθ' ἀπλῶς οὕτω τῶν Πλάτωνι
προσκειμένων ἀποδεχόμενον, ἦν μὴ καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς λέγωσιν, οὔτε μὴν τοὺς Ἀρι- 20
στοτέλει τιθεμένους ῥαδίως οὕτωςι παραιτούμενον, ἕως ἂν καὶ παρ' ἐκείνοις τὸ
ἀληθὲς πρεσβεύηται. Μιχαῆλον τέ μοι καὶ πάννυ δοκεῖς τοῦναντίον ἢ αὐτὸς ἀξιοῖ
οὐθ' ἡδέως προσήσσεσθαι οὔτε τοῖς αὐτοῦ λόγοις παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον Πλήθωνος χά-
ριν προσθήσεσθαι, ἦν παρὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ πρέπον δόξῃ ληρεῖν, ἐμὲ τε αὖ οὐκ 25
ἀηδῶς ἀποπέμψειν, ἦν συνηγορῶν Θεοδώρῳ δόξω τί ἀντιλέγειν τῷ Πλήθωνι·
ἀνάξια γὰρ ταῦτα πάντη τοῦ δικαιοτάτου σου ἦθους. ἀλλ' ὥς ὅσιον ἀπανταχοῦ
νομίζων τὸ προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τᾶλλα πάντα παρεῖς, οἷς ἂν ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν
ἑαυτὸν συνιστάναι οἷός τε ἦ, ἄμφω μετιὼν τῷ βιβλίῳ ψῆφον οἷσιν φιλοσοφία τε
καὶ τῷ σῷ προσήκουσαν ἀξιώματι.

8–10 λοιδορήσασθαι–ὅπωςτιοῦν] cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 161,23–34 Mohler

3 οὐρανοῦ–ἀστρονομοῦντα] cf. Plat., *Theaet.* 173e 5–6; Procl., in Plat. *Tim.* 3,277,15 Diehl
17–18 ἐπὶ–παρακελεύεται] cf. Arist., *EN* 1096a 14–15 26–27 ὅσιον–ἀλήθειαν] cf. Arist., *EN*
1096a 15

Inscriptio <Ἀνδρονίκου τοῦ Καλλίστου πρὸς τὰς Μιχαήλου Ἀποστόλου κατὰ Θεόδωρον
ἀντιλήψεις> add. Mohler | τῷ δεσπότη Βησσαρίωνι Ἀνδρόνικος, εὐτυχῶς χρῶ om. L
3 ὑπεραστρονομοῦντα Mohler 9 ἀδίκων Mohler 20 προκειμένων Mohler 24 ἦν Mohler
26 ταῦτα πάντη] ταύτη S Mohler 27 τᾶλλα S L 28 ἑαυτὸν om. S | ἦ] ἦν Mohler | βυβλίῳ S

Andronikos to his Lord Bessarion, enjoy your reading.

1.1 It did not seem right to me, wisest sir, to distract you from your highest reflections, you who observe beyond the sky and in full solitude rise to the greatest good, circle it, and connect intellectually with what is beyond all earthly things, and have you lower yourself to more rational arguments not worthy of your height of ingenuity. However, since Michael, spuriously taking the defence of Plethon and of the truth, for which he never cared, envious of Theodoros and intending to insult him gratuitously, although he was treated well by both Theodoros and myself, without ever being wronged, wrote a treatise against him, one full of insults and ignorance — he says he did it to please you: Aristotle and the Latins were but a diversion to him —, to bear, and keep quiet, and leave to stand this Telchine, so proud and haughty, and disinterested in Theodoros so vilified and not speak as much as I could in defence of him and of the truth, thus proving that he is ignorant and a liar and speaks nonsense, this would not have been appropriate for those who have interest in defending and showing respect towards those insulted by him, and above all the truth, when in defence of this Aristotle states that there is no need to take care of one's well-being.

1.2 I know very well, most just sir, that you are not simply satisfied with those who associate themselves with Plato, if they do not tell the truth. Nor do you easily reject those who are with Aristotle, as long as they speak the truth. It seems to me that, quite contrary to what he believes, you will not gladly accept Michael, nor will you approve his arguments against the just out of respect for Plethon, if it seems that he speaks beyond the truth and the convenient, and you will not, on the other hand, unpleasantly reject me, if in taking Theodoros' defence, it seems that I am speaking against Plethon. This, in fact, is completely alien to your very just nature. However, considering that it is holier to prefer the truth in every case, and setting aside all the things for which both of us can recommend one another, by reading both books you will impart judgment worthy of your doctrine and your dignity.

2.1 Ἔδει σε Πλήθωνος ἔν τε ἄλλοις αὐτοῦ κὰν τῷ περὶ οὐσίας Ἀριστοτέλη εὐθύνοντος σιωπᾶν.

172 2.2 Σὲ μᾶλλον | σιωπᾶν ἔδει τοιοῦτον ὄντα καὶ μὴ εὐήθως οὕτωςι σαυτῷ
θαρρήσαντα Πλήθωνι μὲν συνηγορεῖν ὑποστήναι, Θεοδώρῳ δὲ ἀντιλέγειν πειρᾶ-
σθαι. τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀπεριμερίμνως, ὥς αὐτὸς φῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν ἐπιστημόνως 5
καὶ ἑαυτῷ προσηκόντως Ἀριστοτέλει τε συνηγορεῖν ἐλομένῳ καὶ τοῖς ἡτηκόσιν
ἐταίροις χαρίζεσθαι εὖ μάλα θεθάρρηται, ὥς οὔτε δέον ὄν τὸν οἰκεῖον προστάτην
ὑφ' ὅτουοῦν προπηλακίζομενον προέσθαι μαλακισθέντι καὶ ἅμα ἑαυτὸν οὐκ ἀπα-
ξιοῦντι μὴ οὐχ οἶόν τε εἶναι, περὶ τε τοῦ προτεθέντος λόγον ὑπέχειν καὶ Πλήθω-
να ῥᾶστα εὐθύνειν τε καὶ διελέγχειν πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη νεανειούμενον. 10

2.3 Καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐξήλεγξε κάλλιστά τε καὶ διαλεκτικώτατα, ὥσπερ προεῖρηται.
σοὶ δὲ μὴδὲν μὲν εἰδότε, πάντα δὲ οἰομένῳ εἰδέναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ῥᾶστα μὴδενὶ
ξὺν νῷ σαυτὸν εἰς τοιαύτας ἀγωνίας καθιέντι καὶ κενῆς ταμάλιστα δόξης ἐφιεμέ-
νῳ καὶ ταύτην σαυτῷ προσποιῆσαι πάνυ φαύλως πεισθέντι, ἣν ὑπὸ σχήματι τοῦ
συναίρεσθαι Πλήθωνι ἀντειπὼν Θεοδώρῳ καὶ κολούσας αὐτόν, ἄνδρα ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ 15
νῦν περιβόητον ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ φωνῇ, δόξης εἶναι τι μὴδὲν ὦν, τοιοῦτοις ἀνδρά-
σιν ἀπομαχόμενος εὐήθως πάνυ καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ γε σῶ κακῷ, πείσθητί μοι, τετόλμη-
ται, ἐφ' οἷς Πλήθωνι μὲν κινδυνεύοντι βοηθεῖν, Θεοδώρῳ δὲ ἀντιλέγειν προεἰλου
μὲν, φαίνει δὲ μὴδὲν τι προὔργου τοπαράπαν διηनुκῶς. Πλήθωνά τε γὰρ οὐκ
ὦντας οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ᾧ συναγορεύειν ὑπέστης, ὅπου γε καὶ καταβάλλων αὐ- 20
τὸν ὑπ' ἀβελτηρίας ἀλίσκη συχνά, τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴδὲ τὴν διαφορὰν ξυνιείς, καθ' ἣν
αὐτὸς πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη περὶ οὐσίας διαφέρεται, ὥς προϊόντος ἐλεγχθήσῃ τοῦ λό-
γου.

2.4 Πῶς γὰρ ἂν σοὶ καὶ ἐξεγένετο τῶν Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν
αὐτοῖς ἐπομένων δοξῶν ἐπηβόλῳ καὶ ὁπωσοῦν εἶναι, ὅς γε Ἀριστοτέλους μὲν 25
ὑπὸ βλακείας καὶ βραδυτήτος νοῦ οὐδὲ μικρὸν γοῦν συνήκας, τοῖς Πλάτωνος δὲ
οὐδ' ἐνέτυχες οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν; ἐκείνῳ τε οὖν οὐ ξυνήνεγκε τουτί σου τὸ σύγ-
γραμμα, αὐτὸς τε οὐκ ὦνησο οὐδ' ἦρθης ὥσπερ ᾧου, ἀλλὰ καὶ κεῖσαι καταπε-
πτωκῶς πτῶμα γέλωτος ἄξιον, ἀποτυχὼν τῆς ἥς ἐν ἐλπίδι δόξης ἐτύγχανες ὦν·
Θεόδωρόν τε οὐκ ἐκόλουσας πολλὰ καὶ ταῦτα καμῶν, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ Θεοσίτης 30
Ἀχιλλέα κολοῦειν ἐπιχειρῶν. γέλωτα δὲ πλατὺν παρὰ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν ὦφλες

1–2 Ἔδει–σιωπᾶν] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 161,28–29 Mohler 3–5 σαυτῷ–ἀπεριμερίμνως] cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 161,29–30 Mohler

12–13 μὴδενὶ ξὺν νῷ] cf. Aristoph., *Nub.* 580; cf. *infra* 12.4

1 αὐτοῦ Mohler 11 κάλλιστά τε] κάλλιστα τά τε S | προήρηται L 13 ξυνῶν S Mohler
19 προὔργου S L 21 συνιείς L 25 ἐπιβόλῳ Mohler 27 οὐ om. Mohler | ξυνήνεγκες Mohler
28 καὶ om. L

2.1 ‘You should have kept quiet, given that Plethon corrects Aristotle in his other writings and in the one on substance’.

2.2 You should have remained silent, given who you are and that you maliciously had the courage to take Plethon’s defence and tried to contradict Theodoros. In fact, he rightly had great courage, he who decided, not without commitment — as you put it — but rather with so much doctrine and in such a convenient way to himself, to defend Aristotle and please those friends who had asked him, because it is a duty not to abandon one’s own guide when insulted by anyone, thus showing oneself to be cowardly and not to consider oneself unworthy for not being able to support the debated subject and to easily correct and refute Plethon, who behaves in a reckless way towards Aristotle.

2.3 And then, as mentioned, he replied in the best and most reasonable way possible. As for you, who do not know anything, but instead believe you know everything and for this very reason meddled without reflecting on such a great debate, you who yearn for vain fame and have foolishly convinced yourself of being able to earn it without effort by attacking Theodoros on the pretext of helping Plethon and going against him, he who is a man of culture now famous in both languages, you believe you are worth something, putting yourself in competition with such men, and instead are nothing. It was a foolish gamble and moreover to your disadvantage, believe you me, trying to help Plethon in danger and contradicting Theodoros. You have not achieved anything useful at all. In fact, you have not offered any benefit to Plethon, whom you proposed to help, while you have frequently been caught refuting him because of your ignorance, not even understanding from the very beginning the difference for which he distances himself from Aristotle on substance, as will be proved in the continuation of the reasoning.

2.4 How could you ever feel that you were master of the doctrine of Plato and Aristotle and their followers, you who did not even understand the basics of Aristotle because of your stupidity and your slowness of mind, when you have not even read the works of Plato? Therefore, this writing of yours has not given you any advantages, you have not benefited from it, nor have you risen as you thought. Instead, you lie on the ground like a fallen body worthy of ridicule, without having obtained the fame you so hoped to obtain; and you have not won over Theodoros despite having worked so hard, no more than Thersites who tried to win over Achilles. You have already exposed yourself in a humiliating way to

τε ἤδη ἀσχημονῶν, ἐφ' οἷς τὸ τῆς παροιμίας 'ὕς πρὸς Ἀθηνᾶν ἐρίζων' πεφώρασαι. καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὀφλήσεις, ἐπειδὴν σε τραχύ τι λῖαν καὶ ἄμουσον καὶ καταπληκτικὸν ὑπὸ λεοντῆς φθεγγόμενον καὶ τοὺς ἀπλουστέρους λανθάνοντά τε καὶ δεδιτόμενον ἀποδύσαντες, πολὺ τι τοῦ περιβλήματος ἀπολειπόμενον διελέγξωμεν. καὶ τὸ προσωπεῖον συντρίψαντες, ὅπερ ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας σχήματι πίθηκος ὦν ὑποδεδυκέναι τετόλμηκας, ἐπὶ τοῦ σχήματος, οὐπὲρ ἡξίωσαι, τοῦ λοιποῦ μένειν διδάξωμεν καὶ τῶν σοι μὴ προσηκόντων μεταποιεῖσθαι μηκέτι ζητεῖν. ἡ γὰρ ἂν ἀδικοῖμεν Θεόδωρόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καθ' ὧν ἀνέδην οὕτως τὴν πομπεῖαν ἀδίκως ἐποίησας, εἰ σὺ μὲν κύων 'ἀναιδείην ἐπιεμένε', οὐδαμόθεν προσήκον σοι 5 Πλήθωνι βοηθεῖν, κενῆς | δὲ μόνον ἔρωτι δόξης προαχθεὶς ἐτόλμησας οὕτως ἀντειπεῖν ἰταμῶς Θεοδώρῳ, τῷ ψεύδει καὶ ταῦτα συνηγορῶν καὶ ἅμα οὕτως φαύλως ἔχων ἐπιστήμης καὶ φύσεως, ἡμεῖς δέ, οἷς πολλαχόθεν προσήκει τούτοις βοηθεῖν καὶ ἅμα ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἀπαξιούσι, μᾶλλον δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν ἡμῖν πεπλησιακότων μὴ οὐχὶ τὰ ἐς πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην σου πολλῶ κρείττους εἶναι ὀλιγωρήσομεν. οὕτω δὴ τοι φαύλως τοῦ συγγενικοῦ τε καὶ φιλικοῦ καθήκοντος καὶ πάντας 15 οὕτως περιυβρισμένους ὑπὸ σοῦ τοῦ τελχίνος περιοψόμεθα, ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ ταῦτα ἀγωνιζόμενοι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀποτίσομέν σοι τὸ τῇ σῇ κακοθηεῖα προσήκον ὀφείλημα, τοὺς λόγους τε ἀνατρέποντες καὶ τὸ σαθρὸν καὶ ἀμβλυωπὸν τῆς σῆς διανοίας ἐλέγχοντες καὶ τῶν λοιδοριῶν, ἃς ἐκείνοις προστρίψασθαι καὶ μάλα ἐγλίχου, αὐτοὺς μὲν πολλῶ κρείττους δεικνύντες, σὲ δὲ ταύταις τε καὶ πλείοσιν 20 ἄλλαις ἔνοχον. ἦν δὲ κακῶς εἰπὼν πρότερον ἀδίκως, νῦν ἀκούων δικαίως κακῶς χαλεπαίνης, σαυτῷ μεμφόμενος ἐν δίκη ἂν μεμφόμενος εἴης. 'ὁ γὰρ τὰ σπέρματα καταβαλὼν, οὗτος καὶ τῶν φόντων αἴτιος'.

3.1 Ἄλλ' οὐδ' ὅσοι γε ἐξ αὐτοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐς δεῦρο κείνῳ τιθέμενοι Πλάτωνι ἀπηντήκεσαν. 25

3.2 Οὐκ ἐνέτυχες ἴσως τοῖς τῶν παλαιῶν βιβλίοις. πλείστους γὰρ ἂν εὔρες τῶν Ἀριστοτέλει τιθεμένων ἀντειπόντας ταῖς τοῦ Πλάτωνος δόξαις. ὦν εἷς καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Ἀφροδισιεύς, ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὁ τυχόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν γνησιωτάτων Περιπατητικῶν. τοὺς δ' ἐν ἐσπέρᾳ τῶν φιλοσοφίας ἐπιμελουμένους δογμάτων ποῦ θήσεις, εἰπέ μοι, κρείττους ἀριθμοῦ σχεδὸν ὄντας; πάντας γὰρ τούτους Ἀριστοτέλει 30 τιθεμένους, Πλάτωνι δὲ ἀντιλέγοντας καὶ μάλα ἀσμένως εὐρήσεις. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ὡς ὀρᾷς εἰκῇ σοι εἴρηται. τὰ δὲ λοιπά σου ἴδωμεν.

24–25 Ἄλλ' –ἀπηντήκεσαν] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 162,2–3 Mohler

1 τὸ –πεφώρασαι] *Mantissa Proverbiorum* 3,24 von Leutsch; (cf. Mich. Apost., *Paroem.* 17,73 et Theocr., *Id.* 5,23 cum scholiis) 9 ἀναιδείην ἐπιεμένε] Hom., *Il.* 1,149 22–23 ὁ–αἴτιος] cf. Demosth. 18,159

7 οὐκέτι L | ἡ] ἡ S 8 ἀδικοῦμεν S 9 ἐπειμένε Mohler 27 ἀντιπόντας S 32 σου om. L

the laughter of those who read you, for those things for which, as the saying goes, you look like the sow that challenged Athena. And you will expose yourself even more once you have deprived yourself of your crude and clumsy words which are frightening only because of the lion skin you wear (something that terrifies only the simplest), and we will show how you are without a costume. And, having broken the mask that you dared put on to appear as a philosopher despite being a monkey, we will teach you to remain in the guise you are worthy of and no longer try to arrogate things that do not suit you. We would certainly do Theodoros a disservice, as well as the others you have rudely insulted in this way, if we allowed you, a dog ‘dressed in impudence’ and driven exclusively by the desire for empty fame, to dare oppose Theodoros so brazenly, even if doing so made it not at all convenient for you to help Plethon, taking the side of the lies and at the same time being of such low knowledge and nature. We, who are in many ways better off coming to their aid, and who do not think we ourselves and many of those close to us can be better than you in every aspect of knowledge, will not give it a second thought. In this way, we will not cowardly neglect the duty towards relatives and friends and the fact that everyone has been outraged by a Telchine like you, and moreover fighting for the truth, and we will not give you the compensation that instead belongs to your malice, refuting your arguments, contesting the fallacy and tenuousness of your thinking, and demonstrating that the injuries you have so ardently desired to inflict upon them are far superior and that you are exposed to these and many others. And if having previously spoken badly, now you do not have to tolerate hearing bad words spoken against you, you would rightly blame yourself. ‘Whoever throws the seeds is also responsible for the fruits.’

3.1 ‘But not even those, from Aristotle himself up to those who now adhere to him, have opposed Plato’.

3.2 Perhaps you have not read the ancient works. In fact, you would have found many supporters of Aristotle who opposed Plato’s thesis. One of these is Alexander of Aphrodisias, not just any man, but one of the most illustrious Peripatetics. And, tell me, how do you feel about Western philosophers, who are almost impossible to count? You will find in fact that all of these are supporters of Aristotle, and they almost all contradict Plato with pleasure. Well, this, you said inappropriately, as you can see. Let us take a look at the rest.

4.1 Ὡστε καὶ τοιοῦτοι ἐπιστρατεύειν ἀνδροῖν, παρ' οὓς μόλις ἂν ἄξιος εἴη, εἰ περιεῖεν, φοιτᾶν.

4.2 Θεόδωρον μὲν, εἰ περιεῖεν ἐκεῖνοι οἱ παλαιοί, ἓνα ἂν τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμοτίμων ἡγοῦντο, ἄνδρα εὖ μὲν σοφίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἦκοντα, εὖ δὲ καὶ ἥθους, ὡς δὴ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἡγοῦνται, οἷς αὐτὸς φῆς χαριζόμενος συντεθεικέναι τουτί σου τὸ φιλοῦμενον πόνημα, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι λέγεις οὐδὲ τὸ λεγόμενον ὅπου γῆς εἴ συνιείς. σὺ δ' εἰ περιεῖεν, οὐ παρ' ἐκείνους ἐφοίτησας ἄν. ἀπελήλασο γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖθεν διὰ τε φαυλότητα τρόπων καὶ βραδυτήτα νοῦ. παρὰ κωμωδοποιοῖς δ' ἂν ἴσως διέτριβες καὶ οὐδὲ παρ' ἐκείνοις διὰ τιμῆς ὦν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀπύποις τε καὶ πρεσβύταις συναριθμούμενος, ἔλκων τὸν κόρδακα, καὶ τὸν προστυχόντα τύπτων τῇ βακτηρίᾳ ἀφαιρίζων τὰ σκώμματα ἢ καὶ τούτων ἀσχημονέστερα ἅττα ἐπὶ τῆς ὀρχήστρας ἀνέδην δρῶν, ἐκπίπτων τε καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν θεατῶν συριττόμενος. |

174 5.1 Αὐτίκα δὴ σοι τὸ πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο, πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀφραίνοντος εἴη;

5.2 Οὐ περιπίπτει Θεόδωρος ἑαυτῷ. οὐ γὰρ τούτοις ἀλίσκεται, οἷς μέμφεται Πλήθωνι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἤρξεν ὕβρεως· Θεόδωρος δὲ ἀμύνεται τὸν ὑπάρξαντα. ταῦτα δ' οὐ ταυτόν, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν τις δικαίως ἂν νεμεσήσειεν· σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἀδίκως ἤρξας ὕβρεως, αὐτὸς δὲ δικαίως ἀμύνομαι σὲ τὸν ὑπάρξαντα. ὥστ' αὐτὸς μᾶλλον παραφρονεῖς, ὁ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀφραίνοντας καλῶν.

6.1 Ὑβριν δὲ ἢ λοιδορίαν οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμι τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχον καὶ ἀπόδειξιν, ὅσα ἂν τις ἔχοντι λέγειν τινί.

6.2 Ἡ που σύ, ἣν τις σε ἀσεβείας ἐαλωκότα λέξας τύχη, τάληθῇ λέγων — ἐάλως γάρ, ὡς οἶσθα, ἐν Βυζαντίῳ — οὐκ ἀνιαθήσῃ οὐδὲ λοιδορίαν ἡγήσῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλ' ἡσθεὶς τῷ ῥήματι ὁμολογήσεις χάριτας τῷ εἰπόντι; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδ' ὡς οὐ ῥήμασι μόνον ἂν ἐχρήσω ὑβριστικοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ξίφος σπασάμενος ἐδίωκες ἂν ἐκεῖνον φονῶν. καίτοι κἂν τοῦτο, ὅπερ αὐτὸς τίθεσαι, λοιδορία τυγχάνῃ ὄν, ἐχρῆν σε πρῶτα Πλήθωνα τάληθῇ κατ' Ἀριστοτέλους δεῖξαντα εἰρηκέναι, εἴτ' ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἀναίτιον, Θεόδωρον δὲ δεῖξαι συκοφαντοῦντα. νῦν δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον ὡς ὁμολογούμενον λαβὼν περαίνεις οὐδέν. Πλήθωνά τε γὰρ αἰεὶ λοιδορούμενον Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ συκοφαντοῦντα ἐροῦμεν, Θεόδωρόν τε οὐ συκοφαντοῦντα Πλήθωνα οὐδὲ φονῶντα, ὡς αὐτὸς φῆς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως ἐπεξερχόμε-

1–2 Ὡστε–φοιτᾶν] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 162,5–6 Mohler 13–14 Αὐτίκα–εἴη] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 162,9 Mohler 21–22 Ὑβριν–τινί] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 162,15–16 Mohler 32 φονῶντα] cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 162,24 Mohler

9–11 τοῖς–σκώμματα] cf. Aristoph. *Nub.* 540–542

5 συντεθεικέναι L 8 δ' ἂν in textu om., in marg. suppl. S 17 δὴ καὶ om. S 23 σε om. Mohler 24 ἀνιασθήσῃ Mohler 27 ἐδίωκας Mohler 30 γὰρ om. S Mohler

4.1 ‘To the point of waging war on two men of such stature, with whom you would hardly be worthy of being par to if they were alive.’

4.2 If those great ancient authors were alive, they would consider Theodoros to be on their own level, a man of good doctrine and knowledge, and moreover of good morals, as his contemporaries also thought of him, doing something pleasing to whom you say you have composed this your wonderful work, not knowing what you are talking about and, according to the saying, ignoring where you stand. Rather, if they were alive, you would not have attended their school. You would have been kicked out for the coarseness of your ways and your slowness of understanding. You would have spent your time among the playwrights without even being taken into consideration by them, instead inserted between the grandparents and the elderly, dancing the cordax and beating the first person on hand with a stick, overshadowing the comic jokes or doing shameless things even worse than those in the orchestra, chased away and booed by the spectators.

5.1 ‘For example, how can that first thing not be said to be foolish?’

5.2 Theodoros does not contradict himself. In fact, he is not guilty of the things he says of Plethon. That started the insults, and Theodoros simply defends himself from the one who first insulted. And it is not the same as it is now between you and me. Not in the same way. In fact, one of us could be rightly angry with the other: you started to insult unjustly, while I rightly defended myself from you who attacked me first. So, you are rather the fool, you who call others ‘fools’.

6.1 ‘I would not speak of arrogance and slander, but of refutation and demonstration, things that one could easily say to another who remains steadfast in his position.’

6.2 Perhaps, if someone told you that you were accused of impiety, telling the truth among other things — you were accused, in fact, as you well know, in Constantinople — you would not be angry or consider this a slander, but you would like it and would also thank whoever told you? Of course not! Indeed, I know that not only would you use offensive words, but, your sword unsheathed, you would chase him down to kill him. And even if what you are talking about was really slanderous, it would have been necessary that you first of all, once you had proved that Plethon had said the truth against Aristotle, prove that he was therefore innocent and that Theodoros accused him unjustly. Now, in assuming what is not yet proven, you do not achieve any results. We will in fact say that Plethon slanders Aristotle and has denigrated him unfairly, and that Theodoros does not denigrate Plethon — nor is he ‘bloodthirsty’, as you say —

νον, ἕως ἂν Πλήθωνα μὲν τάληθῃ κατ' Ἀριστοτέλους εἰπόντα, Θεόδωρον δὲ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἐκείνῳ περιάψαντα δείξῃς.

7.1 Εἴτ' οὐ ξυνίης ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρηκῶς ἀγαθὸν αὐτόν, μὴ συκοφάντην μὴ δ' ἐξαπατῶντα τὸν Πλήθωνα.

7.2 Οὐ συνήκας, ὦ ἄγαθέ, Θεοδώρου, οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ περιπίπτειν ἔλε- 5
γες. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος φησὶ Πλήθωνα ἔθει Ἀθηναίων. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ πάντα ἄνδρα οὐκ ἀγαθὸν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔλεγον. ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸν σε λέγων καὶ μοχθηρὸν ἔφην καὶ αὖθις ἐρῶ, καὶ ὅμως οὐ περιπίπτω ἑμαυτῷ. ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ σε νομίζω, τοῦτο δὲ λέγω τῷ ἔθει χρώμενος. δεδόσθω δὲ ὅμως, ὡς Μιχαῆλος ἀκούει, οὕτω καὶ Θεόδωρον εἰρηκέναι· ἀλλ' οὐδ' οὕτως ἑαυτῷ περιπίπτει. ἀπλῶς 10
μὲν γὰρ ἴσως Πλήθων ἀγαθός, πῇ δ' οὐκ ἀγαθός, ἔνθα δηλονότι Ἀριστοτέλῃ συκοφαντεῖ. οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἀπλῶς κατηγορούμενα καὶ πῃ κατηγορεῖσθαι ἀνάγκη, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ πῇ καὶ ἀπλῶς. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐς τὰ προοίμια εἰρημένα σοι οὕτως εὐήθως καὶ ἀμαθῶς εἴρηται, ὥστε μοι δοκεῖς παρὰ κρατῆρα καθήμενος συντεθεικέναι αὐ- 15
τά. φέρε δὴ καὶ ἃ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους σοι εἴρηται διακρούσωμεν. |

175 8.1 Οὐδεὶς τῶν παλαιῶν, ὦ φιλότης, οὐθ' ὅσοι γε συνέθεντο ἐπιστήμας, οὐτε οἷς ἄλλοις ἐν τοῖς σφετέροις συγγράμμασι τοιαῦ-
ται ξυνέτυχον ὑποθέσεις, μᾶλλον οὐσίας τὰ καθεκαστα ἡξίωσαν
τῶν εἰδῶν.

8.2 Καὶ ποῦ σὺ ἢ τίσι τῶν παλαιῶν συγγράμμασιν ἐντυχὼν καὶ γνοὺς ἀκριβῶς 20
μηδένα ἐκείνων τὰ καθεκαστα τῶν καθόλου μᾶλλον οὐσίας ἡξιωκότα; διῖσχυρίζη
βοῶν μηδένα ἐκείνων τὰ γε τοιαῦτα ἡξιωκέναι. δεδόσθω δὲ ὅμως μηδένα τῶν
παλαιῶν τοῦτο ἡξιωκέναι, οὐδ' οὕτως ἡμᾶς αἰρεῖς. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄλλα τοῖς πα-
λαιοῖς μὲν οὐχ εὔρηται, διὸ καὶ πολλοῖς ἀτόποις ἐνεδίδοσαν λόγοις, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ
περὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος δόξης. μὴ γὰρ δυνάμενοι κατιδεῖν, ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔν τε καὶ πολλὰ 25
οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἶναι — ἐν μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ, δυνάμει δὲ πολλὰ, καὶ αὖθις ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν
πολλὰ, δυνάμει δὲ ἔν —, ἀναγκάζομενοι δ' ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν τὸ ἔστιν ἀφή-
ρουν, οἱ δὲ τὴν λέξιν μετερρῦθμιζον, ἕτεροι δὲ εἶναι τι μὴ ὄν ἐτίθεσαν, οἱ δὲ τὰς
ἀτόμους εἰσήγαγον. τοῖς δὲ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλῃ τοῦτο τε κάλλιστα εὔρηται, καὶ ἄλ- 30
λα πλεῖστα οὐ πρὸς λογικὴν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἠθικὴν καὶ φυσικὴν καὶ θεολογίαν
τὰ μέγιστα συμβαλλόμενα. ἔστι δ' ἃ καὶ τοῖς περὶ Πλάτωνα. τί οὖν ἄτοπον, εἰ καὶ
τοῦτο ἡγνοεῖτο μὲν τοῖς παλαιότεροις, Ἀριστοτέλῃ δὲ ἄτε οὐ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ μό-
νον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν νοῦ τε ὀξύτητι καὶ σπουδῇ διενηνοχότα πολλῷ καὶ

3–4 Εἴτ' –Πλήθωνα] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 162,26–27 Mohler 16–19 Οὐδεὶς –εἰδῶν] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 163,4–6 Mohler

27–28 οἱ –μετερρῦθμιζον] cf. Arist., *Phys.* 185b 27–28

5 ὦγαθέ S 7 βέλτιστον e βέλτιον corr. L 11 ἴσως om. L | Ἀριστοτέλει S 14 συντεθεικέναι L 16 ὦ om. S 23 οὕτως] ὅλως Mohler 24 δι' ὃ L 29 τε supra lin. scr. L

but that he accuses him rightly, until you prove that Plethon spoke the truth against Aristotle, and that Theodoros attributed things to him that were not true.

7.1 ‘Besides, you do not understand that you have previously defined Plethon as a good man, not a “sycophant” and a “deceiver”.’

7.2 Good man, you did not understand what Theodoros meant; otherwise you would not say that he contradicted himself. He calls Plethon ‘good’ in the manner of the Athenians. In fact, they not only called every man ‘good’, but also ‘excellent’. I myself, who now call you ‘good man’, first called you ‘bad’, and I will say it again, and yet I do not contradict myself. In fact, that is what I think of you, and I am telling you this while sticking to this usage. But let’s also make a case, as Michael intends to do, that Theodoros really said so – well, even in this case he does not contradict himself. Plethon will simply also be ‘good’, but somehow ‘not-good’, when he speaks in a malevolent way against Aristotle. Things predicated in absolute need not be predicated in a certain way, nor need things predicated in a certain way be predicated in an absolute sense. So what was said by you as an introduction was said in such a foolish and ignorant way that it almost seems to me that you wrote these things sitting in front of a bottle of wine. And now we also reject what you said about the points of reasoning.

8.1 ‘None of the ancients, my friend, nor those who built the system of knowledge, nor the others who in their writings made use of these notions, believed that individuals are more substance than form.’

8.2 And what works of the ancients have you ever read, or where have you ever learned with certainty that none of them considered the individuals to be more substantial than the universals? You say loudly that none of them has ever been of this opinion; well, let us also admit that none of the ancients ever said this, even so you will not convince us. In fact, many other things were not discovered by the most ancient authors, and for this reason too they fell into many absurd arguments, such as, for example, on the theory of Being. In fact, failing to see that it is not impossible that the same is One and Multiple – the One is in act, the Multiple in potency and, vice versa, the Multiple is in act, while the One in potency – and forced by their own reasoning, some have eliminated the copula ‘is’, others have reformulated the expression, and yet others have hypothesised that there is something that is not. Still others have finally introduced the theory of atoms. This fact (*scil.* the fact that the One and the Multiple are the same thing) was a beautiful discovery of the Aristotelian school, along with many other things that contribute greatly not only to logic, but also to ethics, physics and theology. But there are also some contributions from Plato’s followers. So why is it any wonder, if even this fact (*scil.* the fact that individuals are more substance than form) was ignored by the most ancient, and if Aristotle, who had more acumen, ingenuity and scientific commitment not only than his

τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων ἀκριβέστατα διηρευνηκότα οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔλαθεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πολλοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ καλλίστοις εὐρῶν αὐτὸς πρῶτος οὕτως ἐκάλεσε; ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰδώς, εἴτ' αὐτὸς φησιν οὕτω πρῶτος καλῶν, εἴτε καὶ ἐτέρων τινῶν παλαιότερων δόξη καὶ διαιρέσει καὶ λέξει χρώμενος.

8.3 Ὅτι δὲ ἀπλούστερον οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τῶν φιλοσοφίας δογμάτων ἤπτοντο 5 καὶ ὡσανεὶ ψελλιζόμενοι, πλείστους ὅσους ἔχοντί μοι παράγειν μάρτυρας δύο ὅμως Εὐδημὸς τε καὶ Πορφύριος ἀποχρήσεται. Εὐδημος μὲν λέγων· Παρμενίδου μὲν οὖν ἀγασθεῖν τίς ἂν ἀναξιοπίστοις ἀκολουθήσαντος λόγοις καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ἀπατηθέντος, ἃ οὐπω τότε διεσαφεῖτο; οὔτε γὰρ τὸ πολλαχῶς ἔλεγεν οὐδεὶς — ἀλλὰ Πλάτων πρῶτος τὸ δισσοῦν εἰσήγαγεν —, οὔτε τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβε- 10 βηκός, φαίνεται τε ὑπὸ τούτων διαψευσθῆναι. ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν ἀντιλογιῶν ἐθεωρήθη, καὶ τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι οὐ γὰρ συνεχωρεῖτο, εἰ μὴ φαίνοντο ἀναγκαῖον. οἱ δὲ πρότεροι ἀναποδείκτως ἀπεφαίνοντο'. ταυτὶ μὲν Εὐδημος. Πορφύριος δέ, ἐκθέμενος τοὺς λόγους σχεδὸν ἀπάντων τῶν ἐν τε τὸ ὄν εἰπόντων καὶ τῶν πολλά, καὶ τοὺς ὕστερον δείξας θορυβηθέντας τε καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιχειρή- 15 σαντας λύειν ἐτέροις ὑπ' ἀγνοίας ἀτοπωτέροις ἐαλωκότας πρὸς τὸ μὴδ' ἐκπεφευγένοι, τὴν ζήτησιν ἐπάγει· 'τὴν τοίνυν τοιαύτην καὶ τηλικαύτην ἀπορίαν μόνος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης σύννοιδεν, ὅπως λύειν χρή. τὰ γὰρ ὄντα, φησι, μὴ ὁμοίως ὄντα εἶναι. διὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτῶν γένος τὸ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ 176 ὑποστῆναι | δύναται, χαρακτηρὰ ἐμφαίνον ἴδιον. τὰ δὲ ὄντα μὲν οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ 20 μετελιηφότα τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον τῷ ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι καὶ ἡρτῆσθαι ἀπ' ἐκείνου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι'. τὰ μὲν οὖν ῥήματα τοῖν ἀνδροῖν ταῦτα, ἐξ ὧν ἔχουσιν οἱ τῶν παλαιῶν ἀπλούστερον περὶ τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας εὗρεσιν καὶ τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους πρὸς τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ πάντας ὑπεροχὴν. 'μόνος γάρ, φησιν, Ἀριστοτέλης σύννοιδεν, ὅπως χρή λύειν τὴν τοιαύτην καὶ τηλικαύτην ἀπορίαν'. 25 ταῦτα φησι Πορφύριος, ὁ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὑποφότης, ᾧ καὶ Πλήθων ἴσως παραχωρήσειεν.

8.4 Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς ὡς ἄτοπον ἐπάγει, τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν παθητὴν τῆς ἀπαθοῦς συμβαίνειν προτέραν εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον οὐσίαν. τοῖς μὲν τὰ καθόλου χωριστὰ καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ ὑφεστηκότα τιθεμένοις δόξειεν ἂν ἄτοπον εἶναι. 30 πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ σύνθετον καὶ φθαρτὸν καὶ αἰτιατὸν τοῦ γε ἀπλοῦ καὶ ἀφθάρτου καὶ αἰτίου πρότερον καὶ μᾶλλον οὐσία ἂν εἴη; τοῖς δ' ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου ἀχώριστα

28–29 τὴν^I–οὐσίαν] cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 163,8–9 Mohler

7–13 Παρμενίδου–ἀπεφαίνοντο] cf. Simpl., in *Phys.* 115,25–116,4 = 120,6–12 Diels
17–22 τὴν^{II}–εἶναι] cf. Simpl., in *Phys.* 94,5–10 Diels

1 διηρευνηκότα Mohler 2 τοῦτ' Mohler 4 παλαιτέρων S Mohler 9 οὐπω] οὕτω Mohler 14 δέ om. L 16 πρὸς τῷ S 20 ἐμφαίνων S 21 ἐν om. Mohler 22 ἔχει L 24 πρὸ in textu om., supra lin. suppl. L 29 πρότερον Mohler 30 δοξεῖεν S

predecessors, but also than those who came later, and who so diligently investigated the nature of things, having discovered it, along with many other beautiful things, defined it first as such? And Theodoros, knowing these things himself, either spoke of them himself, thus being the first to do so, or by resorting to the opinion, distinction, and formulation of others, more ancient authors.

8.3 Regarding the fact that those before him only superficially dealt with the principles of philosophy and did so as if they were stutterers, I would be able to present many witnesses if necessary. However, will rely solely on two, Eudemus and Porphyry. Eudemus asked: Can we be surprised at Parmenides who indulged in incredible words and was deceived by things that were not even demonstrated at the time? In fact, no one spoke of the ‘multiple’ (Plato was the first to introduce the concept of ‘double’), nor of ‘per se’ or ‘by accident’, and they were clearly deceived by these concepts. These were discussed for arguments and objections, and syllogism was not allowed, unless it seemed absolutely necessary. In short, the first philosophers affirmed without demonstrations. So Eudemus. Porphyry, after having expounded almost all the arguments of those who said that being is one and of those who argued that it was multiple, and after showing that later philosophers had only had confused opinions and that, having tried to dissolve the arguments, had been overcome by others more incredibly ignorant until they could not escape (the contradiction), introduced the question: ‘Therefore, only Aristotle knows how to resolve such a contradiction. In fact, entities are not all entities in the same way,’ he says. ‘Therefore the One is not a kind of these, but is such that it can exist in itself, showing a character of its own, while the others on the one hand are entities, and on the other do not participate in the same way as the Being, but in different ways, for the fact of being in it and depending on it in order to be.’ These then are the words of the two philosophers, from which we can recognise the great naivety of the ancients regarding the discovery of the truth and the superiority of Aristotle over all those before him. ‘Only Aristotle,’ he says, in fact, ‘knows how such contradiction is to be resolved.’ This says Porphyry, the great interpreter of Plato, to whom one could perhaps also refer Plethon.

8.4 You take as *aporia* the fact that ‘the passive substance comes before the non-passive one and is more substance than it’. Now, for those who argue that universals are separable and that they exist by virtue of individuals, this would not seem to be an *aporia*. In fact, how could the compound, the perishable, the caused be something prior to the simple, the imperishable and the cause, and have more substance than it? For those of the Peripatetic who, on the other

τιθεμένοις οὐκ ἄτοπον πρώτας τε καὶ μάλιστα καὶ κυριωτάτας οὐσίας τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα λέγειν, δευτέρας δὲ τὰ καθόλου. 'πρώτας' μέν, διότι πρώτοις τοῖς αἰσθη- τοῖς καὶ συνθέτοις — ταῦτα δ' εἰσὶ τὰ ἄτομα — ἔπειτα τοῖς ἀπλοῖς καὶ κοινοῖς ἐπι- βάλλομεν, καὶ διότι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει· 'κυριωτάτας' δέ, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καθ' ὑποκειμένων τῶν καθέκαστα λεγομένων αὐταὶ καθ' αὐτὰς 5 τυγχάνουσιν οὐσαι, μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου λεγόμεναι μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὐσαι· 'μάλιστα' δέ, ὅτι κατὰ τὸ ὑποκεῖσθαι ἡ οὐσία χαρακτηρίζεται. τὰ δὲ καθέκαστα ὑπόκειται οὐ τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι μόνον ἐν ὑποκειμένοις οὖσιν ἐκείνοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθόλου καθ' ὑποκειμένων αὐτῶν λεγομένοις. ἔτι δέ, εἰ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι ταμάλιστα τὴν οὐσίαν χαρακτηρίζει, ὥς δὴ καὶ Ἀρχύτας φησι, 'μόναν ταύταν' λέ- 10 γων ὑποκεῖσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ αὐτὰν καθ' αὐτὰν δύνασθαι νοεῖσθαι' — τοῦτου δὲ τὸ μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου χαρακτηριστικά, ἄμφω δὲ τὰ καθέκαστα ἔχει· οὕτε γὰρ καθ' ὑποκειμένου οὕτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἰσι, τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, ἀλλ' οὖν καθ' ὑποκειμένων τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν λεγομένων — πῶς οὐκ ἂν μάλιστα οὐσίαι τὰ καθέκαστα εἶεν, ἀκριβέστε- 15 ρον ἢ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη τοὺς χαρακτῆρας σώζοντα τῆς οὐσίας; ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰ μὲν καθόλου δυνάμει τὰ καθέκαστα, τὰ δὲ καθέκαστα ἐνεργείᾳ τὰ καθόλου περιέχει. τὸ γὰρ καθόλου, εἰ μὲν ὥς ἀκατάτακτόν τις θεωροῖ, περιεκτικὸν ὄρᾳ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, εἰ δ' ὥς κατατεταγμένον, περιεχόμενον ὄρᾳ ὑπὸ τῶν καθέκαστα, μέρος ὄν αὐτῶν καὶ συμπληρωτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν μετὰ τῆς διαφορᾶς. εἰ οὖν οὕτω 20 ταῦτα ἔχει, τὸ δ' ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ δυνάμει πολλῷ κυριώτερον καὶ τιμιώτερον εἰς οὐ- σίας λόγον, πῶς οὐκ ἂν κυριώτατα καὶ μάλιστα οὐσίαι εἶεν τὰ καθέκαστα;

9.1 Τῇ σφετέρᾳ ἐπαμύνειν βουλόμενος δόξῃ, ὥς οὐχ ὑφεστήκα- σι καθ' αὐτὰς αἰδέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἀτόμοις ἢ ἐπινοίαις ψιλαῖς ἐπι- 25 θεωροῦνται. |

177 9.2 Ἐοικας σὺ οὐ δόγματα μόνον καὶ ὄρους φιλοσοφία προσήκοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ παισὶν ἀρχομένοις δηλα, ἀγνοεῖν. τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν σου καταγελάσειεν, ἐπινοί- ας ψιλαῖς ἐν τοῖς ἀτόμοις τὸ καθόλου λέγοντος θεωρεῖσθαι; εἰ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀτό- μοις θεωρεῖται, οὐκ ἐπινοία ψιλῇ, ἀλλ' ἐπινοία ἂν θεωροῖτο. εἰ δ' ἐπινοία θεωρεῖ- 30 ται ψιλῇ, ὕστερον κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἀτόμοις τὸ εἶναι ἔχον διπλοῦ γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου κατὰ γε τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ. τὸ γὰρ πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν εἰ καὶ τινες τῶν ὑπομνηματιστῶν οὐ Πλάτωνι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει προσποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν τὸ τοῖς πλείστοις

23–25 Τῇ –ἐπιθεωροῦνται] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 163,16–18 Mohler

1–9 οὐκ–λεγομένοις] cf. Simpl., in *Cat.* 80,28–81,5 Kalbfleisch 9–11 ἔτι–νοεῖσθαι] cf. Simpl., in *Cat.* 76,9–12 Kalbfleisch

3 συνθετοῖς Mohler ante 6 οὐσαι¹ scr. εἶναι, postea del. L 18 θεωροῖ e θεωρεῖ corr. L 24 ἢ in textu om. S L, supra lin. suppl. L post 30 ὕστερον add. καὶ S 32 τὸ] τὰ Mohler

hand, maintain that universals are not separable, it is not absurd to call individual substances ‘first’, ‘mainly’ and ‘properly so called’, substances ‘second’ to universals. ‘First’, since we first conceive the sensibles and compounds – and these are the individual substances – and then the simple and common things, and furthermore because in the individual the common substances also have their being. ‘Properly said’, because while the others are called particular subjects, these are substances by virtue of themselves, and are not said of a subject, nor are they in a subject. ‘Mainly’, because the substance is characterised by being a subject, and individuals are subject not only to the accidents that are in the subjects themselves, but also to universals, which are called the subjects themselves. And again, if being in itself characterises substance to the highest degree, as Archytas also says, saying that ‘only this underlies other things and can be conceived as in itself’, the characteristics of this condition are not being in a subject, nor the being said of a subject, while the individuals have both; in fact they are not said of a subject, nor are they in a subject, while the kinds and species, even if they are not in a subject, are nevertheless said of subjects of raw substances – just as individuals could not be mainly substance, which preserve the characteristics of the substance more precisely than the kinds and species. Certainly, on the other hand, universals potentially include individuals, and individuals actually include universals. In fact, if one looked at the universal as uncoordinated, one would see that it contains individuals, while if one conceived it as coordinated, one would see that it is contained by individuals, since it is part of them and completes their substance with its being different. If this is the case, that is, if being in act is something more proper and closer to the concept of substance of being in potency, how could individuals not be substances ‘properly so-called’ and be ‘mainly’ substances?

9.1 ‘Wanting to defend one’s opinion, according to which ideas do not exist in themselves, but are observed in individual substances or pure concepts’.

9.2 You seem to be ignorant not only of the principles and proper philosophy terms, but also of things that are clear even to schoolchildren who are taking their first steps. In fact, who would not laugh at you, you who say that the universal is observed with pure concepts in individual substances? Indeed, if one observes in individuals, one can observe not by means of a pure concept, but of a concept. If the universal is observed by means of a pure concept, it is subsequent, accidental and does not have being in the individual, being in fact the universal double according to the Peripatetic in the many and after the many. If what stands before the many some of the commentators attribute not only to

δοκοῦν θετέα τὰ νῦν ἂν εἶη. ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς μὲν φασὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀτόμοις οὐσιω-
δῶς κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ἔξω τοῦ ἡμετέρου νοῦ θεωρούμενον εἶτε ἐξηρημένον εἶη καὶ
ἀκατάτακτον εἶτε καὶ κατατεταγμένον. μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐν-
νοίαις ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ὑφιστάμενον, ὑστερογενὲς ὄν καὶ τὴν τοῦ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον
καὶ ἀδιαφόρου ἔννοιαν ἐπιδεχόμενον, ἐννοηματικὸν καὶ ὄν καὶ καλούμενον.

9.3 Εἰ μὲν οὖν τοσαύτην ἀμαθίαν νοσεῖς, ὥστε τὰ γε τοιαῦτα ἀγνοεῖν, ἐλεᾷ
σε τῆς κακοδαιμονίας, καὶ σοὶ μεταδοτέα ἂν εἶη αἰσθήσεως. εἰ δ' οὐκ ἀγνοῶν
ἐκὼν εἶναι ἐθελοκακεῖς ἢ καὶ κραιπαλῶν ταῦτα συγγέγραφας, πληγῶν σοὶ δεῖ καὶ
μάλα πολλῶν. τί γὰρ μαθὼν ὑβρίζεις εἰς ἄνδρας, ὧν οὐδὲ τὸ πυκτίον ἄξιος ἂν
εἶης λαβὼν ἔπρεσθαι σφίσι, καθαπερεὶ τις τῶν οἰκετῶν; κακοήθης δ' ὧν αὐτὸς καὶ
ἀχάριστος, Ἀριστοτέλη τοιοῦτον καλεῖς, τὰς σὰς ἐκείνῳ μοχθηρίας προστριβόμε-
νος, ἀνδρί, οὗ τὴν σοφίαν οὐχ ἡ Ἑλλάς μόνον καὶ Ἰταλία, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα ἡ καθ'
ἡμᾶς οἰκουμένη θαυμάζει, καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ καθάπερ τινὰς Πυθικοὺς χρη-
σμους ἀσπάζεται τε καὶ διὰ τιμῆς ἄγει. καίτοι πῶς ἀχάριστος Ἀριστοτέλης Πλά-
τωνι, ὅς γε λοιδορεῖται μὲν αὐτῷ οὐδοπωσοῦν; οὐκ οὖν ἂν εὖροις ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς αὐ-
τοῦ συγγράμμασιν. εὐθύνει δὲ μόνον καὶ ἐλέγχει ἔνθα τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὁρᾷ κινδυ-
νεύουσαν, Πλάτωνι κἀνταῦθα ἐπόμενος, μὴδὲν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας εἰρηκότης πρε-
σβύτερον. καίτοι εἰ καὶ κακοήθης Ἀριστοτέλης τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀντειπῶν, πῶς οὐ
τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον ἂν εἶη Πλάτων, οὐκ ἐλέγξας μόνον τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ
σκώψας εἰς αὐτοὺς ἱκανῶς, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γε Ὀμήρου ἀρξάμενος; Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ οὐ
μόνον οὐ λοιδορεῖται εὐθύνων τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλγοῦντι ἔοικεν ἀν-
τιλέγων αὐτοῖς. καὶ τὴν πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἀντιλογίαν ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς 'προσάντη' κα-
λεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ κακοήθειαν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἂν τις φαίη νοῦν ἔχων. ἐξέτασιν δὲ τῆς ἀλη-
θείας ἀκριβεστάτην λέγων αὐτά, ὁρθότατα ἂν λέγοι παρὰ δικαίοις κριταῖς.

9.4 Πῶς δὲ καὶ φθονερός Ἀριστοτέλης ἡ δόξης κενῆς ἐραστής, ὅς γε μύθοις
μὲν καὶ συμβολικοῖς αἰνίγμασι ποιητῇ μᾶλλον πρέπουσιν οὐκ ἐχρήσατο; οὐδ' αὖ
φύρδην τε καὶ ἀτάκτως διδάσκει τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἀπέραντον πόνον τοῖς βουλομέ-
νοις τοῖς βιβλίοις προσκεῖσθαι παρέχων, τὰ πλείω δὲ μὴδὲ διασαφῶν πότερον
τῆς ἀντιφάσεως μέρος τίθεται, πολλὰ δὲ χαίρειν εἰπὼν τοῖς τοιούτοις, τάξει τε
ἀρίστη καὶ φράσει φιλοσοφία πρεπούση καὶ ποιητικῆς | ιδέας ἀπηλλαγμένη, ἰδία
περὶ ἐκάστης ἐπιστήμης βιβλία κάλλιστά τε καὶ πλεῖστα συντεταχώς, καὶ οὕτως
εὐμενέστατά τε ὁμοῦ καὶ ὠφελιμώτατα τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου γένους προμηθησάμε-
νος, καθαπερεὶ τις πατὴρ κοινὸς τὸ συμφέρον τῶν υἱέων ὁρῶν, προὔθηκε τοῖς

3–5 τὸ–ἐπιδεχόμενον] cf. Simpl., in Cat. 83,8–10 Kalbfleisch 22 προσάντη] cf. Arist., EN 1096a 12 25–26 ὅς–ἐχρήσατο] cf. Simpl., in Cat. 6,30–32 Kalbfleisch

1 τανὺν S 3 ταῖς] τοῖς L 4 ἀφερέσεως S 8 συγγέγραφας] σὺ γέγραφας L 9 ἄξιον L 11 σὰς om. Mohler 15 οὐδ' ὅπως οὖν S 16 συγγράμμασιν L 18 τοῖς] τοῖς S | αὐτοῦ S 19 αὐτοῦ S 24 ἀκριβεστάτην om. S 30 ἰδίας Mohler 31 βιβλία S 33 πατὴρ supra lin. scr. L | τὸ om. S

Plato, but also to Aristotle, we must, however, refer to the opinion of most in the present. They say that what is in the many is observed in the individuals in substance with our minds, outside our own intellects, whether this is abstract, indefinite or determined. After the many (they say that) there is what subsists in our concepts by abstraction, which is subsequently generated and accepts the notion of the common as well as the undifferentiated, intellectual in name and in fact.

9.3 If then you are suffering from such great ignorance, to the point of ignoring such things, I have compassion for your misfortune, and you should be aware of it. If, on the other hand, you are deliberately acting in bad faith or have written these things whilst drunk, not out of ignorance, you need beating, and a lot too. Why are you insolent to men you would not even be worthy of following, like a servant, to carry books? You who are truly so wicked and ungrateful speak of Aristotle this way, attributing your wickedness to him, to a man whose wisdom is admired not only by Greece and Italy, but by the whole world known to us, which welcomes and holds his words in high esteem as if they were oracles of the Pythia. Well, how would Aristotle be ungrateful to Plato, since he does not insult him under any circumstances? You certainly would not find anything in his works. He corrects and refutes only where he sees that the truth is in danger, and even in that case he moves in the footsteps of Plato, according to whom nothing is more precious than the truth. And even if Aristotle had been malevolent towards those before him, how would he be different from Plato, who not only refuted his predecessors, but also ridiculed them for free, starting with Homer himself? Aristotle, on the other hand, not only does not offend when he corrects their opinions, but on the contrary, he almost suffers in opposing them. And the act of opposing Plato in a passage of *Ethics* defines him as ‘hateful’; thus, a sensible person would not say that these words are a manifestation of evil. In defining them instead as ‘a very accurate search for the truth’, he would speak the truth before just judges.

9.4 And how could Aristotle be envious or long for vain fame, he who never made use of stories and rhetorical devices that are more suited to a poet? And, again, he did not convey the science confusedly or without order, causing infinite toil for those who wanted to devote themselves to study or without clarifying mostly which part of the contradiction he put into being, saying that he appreciates things like an excellent disposition of matter and a style that is suited to philosophy and is far from the poetic manner, having privately composed numerous and extraordinary particular works on each discipline, and caring for the good of mankind in such a benevolent and useful way. Like a common father who looks to the good of his children, he proposed these works

βουλομένοις αὐτοῖς συνεῖναι παντοδαπῆς οὔσι παιδείας μεστοῖς, σωτὴρ ἀγαθὸς τῶντι τοῖς πᾶσιν ἀναφανείς.

9.5 Σὺ δέ, ὦ βδελυρέ, τὰς σαυτοῦ μοχθηρίας αἰδοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις προστρίβεσθαι. ὅς γε φθόνῳ τε καὶ ἐπὶ χαιρεκακία καὶ κενῆς ἔρωτι δόξης τοσοῦτον ἐαλώ-
 κεις, ὥστε μήτε σοι τῶν νῦν μηδένα ἐν λόγοις οἶον τε ἀμιλλᾶσθαι νομίζειν, τὴν
 κατὰ διάθεσιν ἄνοιαν καὶ ταῦτα νοσοῦντι κακίστην οὔσαν, ἐπὶ τε τοῖς τῶν πέλας
 ταμέγιστα χαίρειν κακοῖς, τὴν ἐκείνων λύπην σαυτῷ ῥαστώνην νομίζοντα, ἐπὶ τε
 τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς αὐτῶν ἐκτῆκεσθαι τε καὶ καταδαπανᾶσθαι καὶ ἀποπνίγεσθαι ὑπὸ
 τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντός σοι φθόνου καθαπερεὶ τινος πικροτάτου σιγῆς, ὡς καὶ προσαγ-
 γέλλειν δι' αὐτὸν σαυτὸν ἔτοιμον εἶναι οὐδὲ ζῆν βουλόμενον διὰ βασκανίαν, ὡς
 δὴ τοῖς καὶ ὅπως σου διάπειραν εἰληφόσι πεφύρασαι.

9.6 Ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ Θραῖκα Ἀριστοτέλη πρότερον, Πλάτωνα δὲ Ἀθηναῖον ἐκά-
 λεις, ὡς δὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐδέσιν ἄλλοις ἢ Ἀθηναίοις τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας εὑρεσιν ἀπο-
 νεύμαντος. καίτοι καὶ Πυθαγόρας καὶ Τίμαιος, οἷς ἔπεσθαι φῆς, οὐκ Ἀθηναῖοι· ὁ
 μὲν γὰρ Λοκρός, Πυθαγόρας δὲ Σάμιος. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Πλωτῖνος καὶ Πορφύριος· Φοί-
 νικες γάρ. πῶς δ' οὐ συνίης σαυτῷ περιπίπτων νῦν, Πλάτῳ μὲν καὶ Πλήθωνι
 ἔπεσθαι λέγων, τάναντία δὲ ἐκείνοις φρονῶν; οὐ γὰρ Πλάτων Αἰγυπτίοις τε
 ἔσπετο καὶ Πέρσαις, καὶ πᾶσι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἑλλήσι; τί δαί; οὐ καὶ Πλήθων τὴν Πλά-
 τωνος θεολογίαν σεμνύνων, ἦν καὶ τὴν πολυτίμητον αὐτοῦ βίβλον φησὶ περιέ-
 χειν, τὴν ἀπὸ Ζωροάστρου εἶναι φησίν, ἀνδρὸς Πέρσου καὶ οὐδοπωστιοῦν Ἑλλά-
 δος φωνῆς ἐπαῖοντος; ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν σου τοιοῦτο τερέτισμα. κάκεῖνο δέ σου
 πῶς οὐκ ἀγροῖκον, Θραῖκα Ἀριστοτέλη λέγοντος, ὡς δὴ τῆς πατρίδος αὐτοῦ Θρα-
 κικῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ Μακεδονικῆς οὔσης πόλεως, ὡς ἄλλοι τε τῶν ἱστορικῶν φασὶ καὶ
 Πτολεμαῖος ἐν γεωγραφικαῖς ὑφηγήσεσι τῆς Ἀμφαξίτιδος τὰ Στάγειρα παράλιον
 πόλιν ἀπογραφόμενος, τὴν δὲ Ἀμφαξίτιδα τῆς Μακεδονίας γῆν μετὰ τὴν Ἡδωνί-
 δα κειμένην;

9.7 Καί μοι δοκεῖς αὐτός, ὦ κάθαρμα, πρὸς μὲν τὸ πρᾶξαι τι καὶ νοῆσαι καλὸν
 καὶ μάλα τις σκαιὸς καὶ ἀγροῖκος, διαβολὰς δὲ συρράψαι καὶ συκοφαντῆσαι καὶ
 λοιδορήσασθαι καὶ μάλα νεανικὸς καὶ γεννάδας. ὅπου γε οὐδὲ αἰσχύνῃ λέγων
 ἔπεσθαι σε Πλάτῳ καὶ Τιμαίῳ καὶ Πυθαγόρᾳ, μηδὲν ὅλως εἰδώς, οὔθ' ὅτι Πλά-
 των οὔθ' ὅτι Πυθαγόρας ἢ Τίμαιος ἐδογματίσαν, οὔτ' ἄλλός τις τῶν παλαιῶν. ἀλλ'
 ἴσως τοῖς Πλήθωνος ἐντυχὼν καὶ οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα καλῶς συνιείς οἶει σαυτὸν ὑπ'
 ἀφροσύνης σοφώτατον γεγονέναι, ὅς γε, ὑπὸ βραδυτήτος νοῦ, ὅσα μὲν τοῖς ζη-

12–14 Ἀλλὰ–ἀπονεύμαντος] cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 162,31–35 Mohler

24–25 Πτολεμαῖος–πόλιν] cf. Claud. Ptol., *Geogr.* 3,12,8–11

4 ἐπιχαιρεκακία Mohler 5 ἀμιλλᾶσθαι S 8 δαπανᾶσθαι L 9–10 προσαγγέλλειν S L: correxi
 18 ἔσπετο Mohler; cf. *infra* 13.4 | δαί] δέ S Mohler 19 αὐτοῦ Mohler 20 οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν S
 21 τερέτισμα S L: correxi 29 λοιδορήσθαι Mohler

to those who wanted to study them as full as they are of every kind of doctrine, truly revealing himself to be a saviour to everyone.

9.5 You, vile being, are ashamed of attributing your iniquities to others. You who are taken by envy and malevolence and by the desire for vain fame, to the point of believing that none of the scholars of the present can contend with you, you who are by predisposition affected by ignorance, and by a very serious ignorance, to the point of rejoicing greatly in the misfortunes of those who are close to you, considering their suffering a joy, and of pining for their successes and suffocating because of the envy that dwells in you like a very annoying woodworm, to be ready even to denounce you alone, not wanting to live for malice anymore, as you have been discovered to do by those who have somehow made your acquaintance.

9.6 And then, you said before that Aristotle was a Thracian, while Plato was an Athenian, as if God had granted the gift of truth to no one else but the Athenians. Yet even Pythagoras and Timaeus, whom you say you follow, are not Athenians: the latter in fact is from Locri, while Pythagoras is from Samos. And even Plotinus and Porphyry are not: they are in fact Phoenicians. How is it possible then that you do not understand that you contradict yourself now, when on the one hand you say you follow Plato and Plethon despite having opposite opinions to theirs? Did not Plato follow the Egyptians and the Persians and all other peoples more than the Greeks? Well? And does Plethon, who praises Plato's theology, contained, according to him, in his precious work, not say that it is that of Zoroaster, who was a Persian and completely ignorant of the Greek language? And yet such is your rant. And perhaps that other slip up of yours is not coarse either, when you say that Aristotle is a Thracian, as if his homeland were a Thracian city and not a Macedonian one, as the other historians and Ptolemy say, who in *Geography* speaks of Stagira as a seaside town of Amphaxitis, and of Amphaxitis as a region of Macedonia that is located beyond the Edonis?

9.7 It seems to me that you, scoundrel, are very clumsy and coarse when it comes to doing and thinking about something useful, and instead you are rather shrewd and skilful in throwing accusations, in slandering and in offending for free, since you are not ashamed to say you follow Plato, Timaeus and Pythagoras, even without knowing anything about this, nothing about what Plato nor what Pythagoras and Timaeus, or as any other of the ancients, professed. Perhaps you have come across Plethon's writings and not understanding them well, you foolishly believe that you have become very cultured. Because of your slowness of understanding as regards the (salient) issues, you

τουμένοις προσήκε, παρήκας, συνειλοχῶς δὲ ἅττα ἐκ τῶν Πλήθωνος οὐ δεόντως παρενείρεις, ἀλλ' ἀκαίρως αὐτὰ παραβύεις καὶ παρακολλᾷς, τῶν καττυόντων διαφέρων οὐδέν. ἔστι δ' ὅτε ὑπ' ἀναισθησίας καὶ λόγους ἐξεμείς εἰκῇ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν συντείνοντας οὐδαμῶς, ὡς δὴ κάκεῖνο τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι κοινὸν Ἀριστοτέ-
 179 λει καὶ Πλάτωνι, ὥσπερ Θεοδώρου διίσχυριζομένου | κοινόν τι τοῖν ἀνδροῖν τού- 5
 τοιν εἶναι. καὶ μοι ἔπεισι τὸ Ὀμηρικὸν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μάλα ἐν καιρῷ σοι φάναί· Ἐερ-
 σίτ' ἀκριτόμυθε, λιγύς περ ἔων ἀγορητής'. Ἐπίσχες σαυτοῦ τὴν ἀκόλαστον γλῶτ-
 ταν, 'πτύσας — τὸ τῆς παροιμίας — εἰς κόλπον', μὴδὲ κάνθαρος ὦν Ἀριστοτέλει
 λέοντι μάχου. σαυτὸν μὲν γὰρ ταμέγιστα βλάβεις, ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐδένα μῶμον προσ-
 10 τρίψῃ, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ ἥλιον ἀμαυρῶσαι βουλόμενος βάλλων πηλῷ. ἀήττητον γὰρ
 τὸ κλέος τοῦ ἀνδρὸς καὶ οἱ λόγοι, καὶ οἷοι τοὺς αὐτοῖς ἀντιλέγοντας ῥᾶστα ἂν
 διολλύναι. ἔασας οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ἀνθρωπίσκε, ἀντιλέγειν αὐτῷ, καὶ σαυτὸν κατὰ
 τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνούς, πυξίον λαβών, τοσοῦτου γὰρ ἄξιός εἰ, κάθου.

10.1 Οὐκ ἔρρωταί σοι ὁ λόγος καίπερ μέγ' αὐχοῦντι ἐπ' ἐπιστή-
 15 μη τῇ λογικῇ.

10.2 Ἐρρωται καὶ μάλα καλῶς, ὃ ἡλίθιε. καὶ ἔοικας σύ — μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πάν-
 δηλος εἶ — σοφίσασθαι μὲν καὶ παραλογίσασθαι καὶ μάλα πρόθυμος εἶναι· αἶε γὰρ
 ἡ φύσις σου ῥέπει πρὸς τὸ κακοποιόν, ὑπὸ δ' ἀβελτηρίας οὐδὲ τοῦτο οἷός τε εἶναι
 ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐξ ἄλλων τε κομιδῇ ἐάλως καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀντιλογιῶν. οὐδὲ
 γὰρ ἀρχὰς γοῦν ἐπιστήμης λογικῆς ὅλως εἰδῶς φαίνει, ἔπειτα αὐτὸς ὦν τετυφω-
 20 μένος Θεόδωρον ἀλαζόνα καλεῖς, ἀνδρα τὸ μέτρον τε ἐν πᾶσι τηροῦντα καλῶς
 καὶ τὸ εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ δοκεῖν εἵπερ τις ἄλλος τιμώντα, ὡς μηδένα εἶναι τῶν ἐκείνῳ
 ἐς δεῦρο συγγενομένων, ὃς οὐκ ἄγαταί τε καὶ ὑπερεπαινεῖ τὸ σῶφρον τε καὶ φι-
 λόσοφον ἦθος αὐτοῦ. πάντας γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ εὐφημίαν
 ἀνήρηται, τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσιν ἀγχίνουν καὶ ἀκριβὲς τοῦ ἀνδρός, οὐκ ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι
 25 μόνον, τίς οὐχ ὑπερθαυμάζει; ὃν αὐτός, ἀμαθέστατε, ἐξελεγχθῆναι φῆς μὴδ' ὅτι-
 οῦν ἐπαίοντα διαλεκτικῆς, ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ παιδευθέντα καὶ διαπρέψαντα καὶ τῶν
 πρώτων ὑπὸ τῶν ἐταίρων ἀξιοθέντα τιμῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν τῆδε σοφῶν χειροτονη-
 θέντα διδάσκαλον. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τοσαύτης νῦν οὔσης ἀφθονίας ὥδε σοφῶν ἀν-
 30 δρῶν, πῶς δὴ πιστεύσειεν ἂν τις τοσοῦτον χρόνον αὐτοὺς ἀπατάσθαι, ὥστε αὐ-
 τὸν τούτους Ἑλληνα Ἰταλοὺς οὕτω καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ταῖς τιμαῖς τιμὰς
 προστιθέναι καὶ ταῖς δωρεαῖς δωρεάς, εἰ μὴ δι' ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἀρετὴν τε καὶ λό-
 γους; οὐ γὰρ διὰ σπάνιν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὔ. πῶς δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐρρῶσθαι φῆς τὸν

14–15 Οὐκ–λογικῇ] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 164,19–20 Mohler

6–7 Θερεσίτ'–ἀγορητής] Hom., *Il.* 2,246 8 πτύσας–κόλπον] cf. Theocr., *Id.* 6,39 et 20,11; Luc. *Apol.* 6,13 et *Nav.* 15,21; Thphr. 16,14

2 παρενείροις S: παρνεείρεις Mohler 18 ὑπὸ δ' ἀβελτηρίας] ὑπ' ἀβελτηρίας S
 20–21 τετυφόμενος S: τετυφώμενος Mohler 21 τὸ μέτριον in textu, τὸ μέτρον in marg. scr. L
 23 ἐπαινεῖ S 27 διατρίψαντα S 33 σπάσιν Mohler

have left them alone, while, after having collected some scattered things extracted from Plethon, you do not cite them on purpose, but you attack and try to make them stick by force and in an inappropriate way in the discourse, in no way different from those who patch things up. It also so happens that out of sheer stupidity you spew random words that do not pertain to the subject at all, such as the fact that there would be nothing in common between Aristotle and Plato, as if Theodoros affirmed that there is something in common between those two. And it seems to me that the famous Homeric verse is just right for you: ‘O Thersites who talks nonsense, even if you are a loud speaker’. Hold back your intemperate tongue, ‘spitting in your lap’, as the saying goes, and do not, you who are a scarab, fight Aristotle, who is a lion. You will in fact damage yourself greatly, but you will not cause him any dishonour, no more than if, wanting to obscure the sun, you threw mud at it. In fact, the glory of that man is indestructible and so are his words, capable of easily annihilating those who contradict them. So, after having stopped contradicting him, little man who is not much else, and after having ‘known yourself’, as the well-known warning from Delphi says, take the tablet, take notes, and sit down, since you are only worthy of this.

10.1 ‘Your argument does not hold water, you who trusts so much in the knowledge of logic’.

10.2 It does hold water, stupid. And it seems — it is actually very clearly so — that you are very much in the mood to split hairs and lie; your nature in fact always leans toward fraud, but because of your stupidity, you are not able to do it, because you are invariably found out, even due to the present contradictions. You, in fact, do not seem to know the basics of logic, and more so, as arrogant as you are, you call Theodoros a show-off, a man who keeps his measure well in every circumstance and who prefers being to appearing, if anything, someone else, so much so that none of those who have frequented him until now do not admire and praise his being wise and knowledgeable. Truth be told, he arouses in everyone the urge to praise him, but who would not be amazed at the insight into everything and the precision of that man, not only in eloquence? You, fool, you say that he has been refuted since he would have no knowledge of dialectics, even though he was trained in Italy, distinguished himself by his merits, was held in the highest regard by his fellow students and was elevated to master by the learned. But even if it were a case of very great generosity on the part of such learned men, who could ever believe that they have been deceived all this time, to the point of loving him, a Greek, they who are Italians? Why would they praise him and add honours upon honours, gifts upon gifts, if not due to his exceptional value and his writings? Certainly not for lack of learned men — not at all. And how can you say that his argument does not hold water, when it holds it

λόγον, ὅς γε καὶ μάλα εὖ ἔχει; ἀληθὴ τε γὰρ ἔλαβε καὶ συλλογιστικῶς συνεπέραν-
νε.

10.3 Σὺ δ' εἰ μὲν τὸ δεύτερον ἀρνήσασθαι τῶν λημμάτων ἐβούλου, τί σοι
βούλεται τὸ μὴ ἐν τῇδε τῇ ὑποθέσει τὸ ἀξίωμα ἀληθεύειν, ἢ ἴν' ἀφρονέστατος ἀν-
θρώπων ἀναφανῆς; εἰ δὲ τὸ πρότερον ἀρνήσασθαι βούλει, ἐχομένως μὲν τῷ σῶ 5
σκοπῷ λέγεις, πληγῶν δ' ὅμως σοι δεῖ τοιαῦτα ἀρνούμενῳ ἀξιώματα, ἃ γε οὐδεὶς
ὅστις οὐκ ἂν ἀξιώσειε, δῆλα καὶ τυφλοῖς ὄντα· ἀεὶ γὰρ δι' ὃ ὑπάρχει ἔκα-
στον, | ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὰ καθόλου τὰ καθέκαστα, τὰ κα-
θόλου μᾶλλον οὐσίαι. εἰ δὲ διὰ τὰ καθέκαστα τὰ καθόλου, τὰ καθέκαστα μᾶλλον 10
οὐσίαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν διὰ τὰ καθέκαστα τὰ καθόλου. μὴ ὄντων γὰρ τούτων οὐδ' ἂν τὰ
καθόλου εἶεν ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστα τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα. τὰ καθέκαστα ἄρα μᾶλλον οὐσί-
αι. αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγχειν ὑπ' ἀδυνασίας ἐξέκλινας. ἀπατηθεὶς δὲ
καὶ νομίσας ταυτὸν εἶναι τὸ διὸ τῷ ἐξ οὗ, ἔτι πρὸς τὸ ἀξίωμα ἀπαντᾷς δεικνύς,
ἐφ' ὧν ὀρθῶς καὶ ἐφ' ὧν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν ῥηθεῖη.

10.4 Ἰδωμεν δὲ οὕτως. διὰ τὸν Θεὸν φῆς τὰ νοητά, καὶ διὰ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα 15
Τηλέμαχος. καίτοι τὸ μὲν διὰ τὸν Θεὸν τὰ νοητὰ λέγειν ἀληθές, ἢ τελικὸν ἐστὶν
αἴτιον. διὰ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα δὲ ὁ Τηλέμαχος πῶς μὴ ὄντος τελικοῦ αἰτίου τοῦ Ὀδυσ-
σέως; τὸ μὲν γὰρ δι' ὃ τῷ τελικῷ ἀπονέμομεν, τῷ δὲ ὑλικῷ τὸ ἐξ οὗ. τῷ δὲ ποιητι-
κῷ, εἰ μὲν τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ φύσεως τῷ ἀποτελουμένῳ, καὶ αὐτῷ οὐδὲν κωλύει τὸ
ἐξ οὗ ἀπονέμειν· εἰ δ' οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς, τὸ ὑφ' οὗ. ὑπὸ Θεοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὰ πάντα παρῆ- 20
χθαι φαμέν, ἐκ τοῦ Σωφρονίσκου δὲ τὸν Σωκράτη. ὄντος οὖν διὰ Σωφρονίσκον
Σωκράτους, τελικὸν αἴτιον ὁ Σωφρονίσκος ἐστὶ. μὴ ὄντος δὲ τελικοῦ τοῦ Σωφρο-
νίσκου, οὐ δι' ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνου ὁ Σωκράτης. οὕτως μὲν οὖν λαμβάνοντι
τὸ διό, ἔωλός σοι ὁ λόγος δοκεῖ. ψευδῇ τε γὰρ λαμβάνεις καὶ καθ' ἡμῶν οὐδ' ὅτι-
οὖν συμπεραίνεις. ἦν δ' ὡς τὸ οὗ ἄνευ τὸ δι' ὃ λαμβάνης, ὥστερ φαμέν διὰ τὸν 25
ἀέρα τὰ ζῶα ἀναπνεῖν, ὡς ἄνευ αὐτοῦ ἀναπνεῖν μὴ δυνάμενα, καθ' ἡμῶν μὲν οὐδ'
οὕτω περαίνεις οὐδέν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη διὰ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας εἶναι
φαμέν, ὡς μὴ οὐσῶν ἐκείνων μὴδὲ ταῦτα οἷόν τ' εἶναι. τό γε μὴν διὰ Σωφρονί-
σκον λέγειν εἶναι Σωκράτη, ὡς δὴ μὴ ὄντος Σωφρονίσκου μὴδ' ἐκεῖνον εἶναι, οὐτ'
εὐλογον οὗτ' ἀληθές. περιῆν γὰρ Σωκράτης καὶ Σωφρονίσκου τεθνηκότος. ἀλλὰ 30
δὴ κάκεῖνο πῶς οὐ γελοῖον, ἐφ' οἷς τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἀπλοῦ τίθεσαι αἴτιον, ὡς δὴ μὴ καὶ
συνθέτου δυνατὸν εἶναι; καὶ ὡς ἔοικε, σὺ σαυτοῦ τὸν σὸν πατέρα αἴτιον νομίζεις
μόνον, περαιτέρω δὲ οὐδέν. οὐδὲ τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου νοῦν σὺ νομίζεις αἴτιον ἄρα, οὐ-

4 τὸι-ἀληθεύειν] cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 164,26–28 Mohler 7–8 ἀεὶ-ὑπάρχει] cf. Theod. Gazes, *Adv. Plethonem* 154,33 et Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 164,14 Mohler 15–16 διὰ-Τηλέμαχος] cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 164,28–33 Mohler

3 ἐβάλου Mohler 7 οὐκ in textu om., in marg. suppl. L 21 Σωκράτην L | οὖν e corr. L 23 ἐξ om. Mohler

perfectly? In fact, he has spoken the truth and has proven everything syllogistically.

10.3 If your intention was to deny the second term of syllogism, what is the use of saying that the axiom is not true in its premise, if not to show yourself as the most foolish of men? If, on the other hand, you want to deny the first, you speak appropriately for your purpose, but you should receive a beating for the mere fact of denying these axioms, which no one can deny, as clear as they are even to the blind: ‘in fact always that because of which each thing exists, that thing exists to a greater degree’. If, therefore, the individuals exist because of the universals, the universals are more substance. If, on the other hand, universals exist because of the individuals, the individuals are more substance. But it is the universals that exist because of the individuals (in fact, if these did not exist, the universals could not have their being in the individual); the individuals are therefore more substance. You have avoided, because of your inability, refuting these arguments: deceived yourself and convinced yourself that $\delta\iota' \tilde{\omicron}$ (= ‘that because of which a thing exists’) and $\acute{\epsilon}\xi \tilde{\omicron}$ (= ‘that out of which a thing originates’) are the same, and you have then opposed the axiom, explaining what would be correctly expressed and what not.

10.4 Let us put it this way. You say that the intelligible exists because of God, and Telemachus because of Odysseus. And so, to say that the intelligible exists because of God is true, since God is the final cause. So how can Telemachus exist because of Odysseus, since Odysseus is not the final cause? In fact, we associate $\delta\iota' \tilde{\omicron}$ to the final cause, and $\acute{\epsilon}\xi \tilde{\omicron}$ to the material cause. If it is of the same nature as the effect produced, nothing prevents us from associating $\acute{\epsilon}\xi \tilde{\omicron}$ to the efficient cause; if, however, it is not of the same nature, we associate $\upsilon\phi' \tilde{\omicron}$ to it. We say that everything is created by God, and Socrates by Sophroniscus; therefore, since Socrates exists because of Sophroniscus, Sophroniscus is the final cause. But since Sophroniscus cannot be the final cause, Socrates does not ‘exist because of’ Sophroniscus, but instead ‘originates from’ him. When $\delta\iota' \tilde{\omicron}$ is interpreted in this way, your argument appears very weak. In fact, you speak falsities and cannot come up with anything against us. And even if you interpret $\delta\iota' \tilde{\omicron}$ as ‘that without which (a thing exists)’ — let us say, for example, that animals breathe because of the air, since they could not breathe without it — even so, you do not have anything against us. In fact, we say that kinds and species exist because of the raw substances, since if these are not there, these cannot be. Hence, to say that Socrates exists because of Sophroniscus, since, if Sophroniscus did not exist, the other would not exist either, is neither logically correct nor true: in fact, Socrates was alive even after Sophroniscus died. So how can it not also be ridiculous that such a view also considers the simple to be the cause of the simple, while it cannot be the cause of the compound? Apparently,

δέ γε τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν, ἥς τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐλίκων φθάνειν Πλήθων διίσχυρίζεται.

10.5 Ταυτὶ μὲν οὖν σοῦ τοιαῦτα. ὁ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτό σου λόγος τί σοι πρὸς τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν βούλεται; οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, κἂν εἰ τὸ μὲν σύνθετον ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἶδους, τὸ δὲ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης μᾶλλον αἴτιον τοῦ συνθέτου. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ ταῦτα 5 εἶναι τὸ τὰ εἶδη τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα μᾶλλον εἶναι οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τὸ εἶδος μᾶλλον οὐσίαν εἶναι τῆς ὕλης. ὁ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα Ἀριστοτέλει ἐπόμενοι, τὸ μὲν εἶδος θεῖον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐφετὸν λέγοντι, τὴν δὲ ὕλην αἰσχροὺς καὶ ὅσα τῆς ὑφέσεως, εἰ καὶ μὴ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. εἰ δὲ οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγνοεῖς, τί τοῦ Κοροΐβου διενήνοχας, εἰπέ μοι. 10

11.1 Τουτὶ μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον κατόρθωμα. ὁ δ' ὥσπερ τι μεγάλα τοῖς προκειμένοις συμβαλλόμενον συμπεράνας ἐπιφέρει ἕτερον λόγον αὐτός τε ἀπα- 181 τώμενος καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπατήσας θέλων. φησὶ γάρ· | ὁ τι ἕτερον ἐνεργεῖα μὴ ὄν αὐτό τε εἰδοποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐντελεχεῖα παράγει, ἐκεῖνο ἐστὶ πρῶτον ὄν καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχον. τὰ δὲ εἶδη τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα παρά- 15 γει εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ταῦτα τὴν κατὰ μέρος.

11.2 Εἰ μὲν ἐξηρημένα τὰ εἶδη τῆς ὕλης ἡμεῖς ἐτιθέμεθα, λόγον ἂν ἴσως εἶχεν, ὅπερ αὐτὸς φῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔνυλα ταῦτα τιθέμεθα, οἷον βεβαπτισμένα ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐκέτι συγχωροῦμεν, ὅπερ αὐτὸς οἶσι συνάγεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὰ εἶδη τὰ καθέκαστα παράγει εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλ' ἀρχὴ καταβληθεῖσα πρῶ- 20 τον ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, ἥτις δεκτικὴ αὐτῆς τε τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτὴν ἐσομένων ἐστίν. ἐκεῖνη μὲν ἐποίησε τοδὶ οὐ ποιητικὴ πέφυκε, κάκεινο ἄλλο, καὶ τοῦτο ἕτερον, μέχρις ἂν τοῦ τέλους τύχῃσι. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ φυσικὸν εἶδος, οὐπερ ἀρχὴ τὸ καταβληθὲν πρῶτον ὑπῆρχε. καθόσον μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἶδους ἐφειμένη ἡ φύσις πάν- 25 τα ποιεῖ, ὑφ' οὗ κινεῖται, οὐχ ὡς εἶδους μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς τέλους, καὶ τούτου τυχοῦσα ἴσεται καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονεῖ περαιτέρω, ὑπὸ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ καθέκαστα παράγεσθαι ἂν ῥηθεῖεν, καθόσον δὲ τὰ εἶδη, δυνάμει ὄντα ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, ἐνεργεῖα τοιαῦτα γίνεται διὰ τὰ καθέκαστα — ὁ γὰρ δυνάμει ἄνθρωπος διὰ Καλλίαν ἐνε- 30 γεῖα τοιοῦτος γέγονε —, τὰ εἶδη διὰ τὰ καθέκαστα εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖα παράγεσθαι ἂν ῥηθεῖεν. καὶ μᾶλλον τε οὐσίαι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ καθέκαστα τῶν καθόλου ἂν εἶεν, 30 ὡς μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ὑπάρχειν μὴ ὄντων γε τῶν καθέκαστα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα τὸ ἐνεργεῖα ὑπάρχειν ἔχοντα καὶ ἐνεργεῖα ὑπὸ τούτων πε- ριεχόμενα, κἂν ἐκεῖνα δυνάμει ταῦτα γε περιέχῃ. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ καθέκαστα τοῖς κα-

13–16 ὁ –μέρος] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 165,7–9 Mohler

8–9 τὸ –συμβεβηκός] cf. Arist., *Phys.* 192a 16–25 20–23 ἀλλ' –εἶδος] cf. Simpl., in *Phys.* 311,1–7 Diels

7 τὸ¹ om. L 13 γάρ add. Μιχαήλος Mohler | ὁ τι] ἔτι Mohler 16 καὶ ταῦτα om. S 21 ἐπομένων Mohler 27 ῥηθεῖν in textu, -en supra lin. scr. L: ῥηθείη Mohler 31 αὐτοῖς Mohler

you consider your father only a cause, and nothing more. And you do not even consider the mind of the sun a cause, nor the soul of the cosmos, whose influences Plethon claims reach up to orbit.

10.5 So these things are such for you. After that, what is your argument aiming at in relation to the contents of the argument itself? In fact, in no case is it against us, even if you add that the compound is made up of matter and form, and that form, more than matter, is the cause of the compound. In fact, even if this is the case, it does not happen that forms are necessarily more substance than individuals, but that form is more substance than matter. That is something we who follow Aristotle also believe, as he affirms that form is divine and perfect and that is what one tends towards, while matter is vile and constitutes what is low, if not even for itself, but by accident. In short, if you ignore such important things, tell me, why did you ever compete with Coroebus?

11.1 So this here is his great achievement. And he, as someone who has produced something that is very useful to the topic, puts forward another argument, deceiving himself and with the intention of deceiving others. In fact, Michael says that ‘what gives shape to something else that is not in act and induces it to be in act, is the first being and of most substance. Forms induce universals to act, and moreover to a particular act’.

11.2 If we understood forms as being completely separate from matter, things would perhaps actually be as you say. But, since we conceive of them as something inherent in matter, as if they were immersed in matter, we can no longer accept what you believe is a certain conclusion. In fact, not only do the forms induce individuals to act themselves, but there is, first of all, a principle established in the matter, which is capable of receiving this same principle and what will be after it. This principle has created that of which it is the cause, and this has created more, and this more, until the end is reached. And this is the natural form, the principle of which is what was first established in it. Therefore, since nature, tending to form, creates everything, and is moved by it, not only as a form, but also as an end, and after having achieved it, stops and does not proceed any further, it could be said that individuals are induced to act by the forms. But inasmuch as the forms, which are potentially in matter, become such in actuality because of the individuals — in fact, a man in potency becomes such in actuality due to Callias — it could be said that the forms are induced to the act by the individuals. And it is precisely for this reason that the individuals would be more substance than the universals, so that the latter could not exist if the individual universals did not exist, which have their being in them and which, through them, have the possibility of being in act and are contained by them in act, even if those in potency contain these. And if we say that the individuals

θόλου συναναιρεῖσθαι φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκείνων συμπληρωτικῶν ὄντων τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν.

11.3 Τουτὶ μὲν οὖν σου τὸ γρίφον, ὡς ὀρᾷς, διαλέλνται. σὺ δ' ὥσπερ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἀπάσης τοὺς λόγους πεποικῶς μάλα σοβαρῶς τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων εἰρημένους ἀξυμβλήτους καλεῖς, ὡς δὴ τῷ οὕτω φάναι καὶ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐπόμενον, ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ τυφλῷ δηλον ἐσόμενον, τίς ὁ τοῖς ἀσυμβλήτοις παρὰ πάντα τὸν λόγον χρώμενος. μόλις δὲ νῦν ἀνανήψας, πρότερον κραιπαλῶν, διδοὺς τὴν προτέραν τῶν προτάσεων, ἀρνούμενος δὲ τὴν ἑτέραν, τὰ ζητούμενα φῆς λαμβάνειν ὡς ὁμολογούμενα, ὥσπερ εἰ ἐτίθει ταύτην ἀξιωματικῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀποδεδειχῶς ἐτύγχανεν ὦν. σὺ δ', εἰ μὲν οἷός τε εἰ λόγῳ αἰρεῖν τὰ καθόλου τά γε ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, μὴ οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἶναι τῶν πρώτων μὴ οὐσῶν οὐσιῶν — τοῦναντίον γὰρ Θεόδωρός τε καὶ πρό γε αὐτοῦ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀποδεδείχοντο —, τί οὐχ αἰρεῖς; εἰ δ' οὐχ οἷός τε εἶ, τί ληρεῖς ὥσπερ ἀπ' ὄνου καταπεσών; πῶς δὲ καὶ ἀσυμβλήτους φῆς τὰς προτάσεις, ἐν οἷς τὸ μέσον, ᾧ τὰ ἄκρα συνάπτεται, ὑπόκειται μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ, κατηγορεῖται δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου;

12.1 Ἐπεὶ, πρὸς Θεοῦ, πόθεν ἔμαθες λέγειν τὰ εἶδη τὸ εἶναι ἔχειν διὰ τὰ καθέκαστα, ἀναγκαῖον ὃν τὰ καθέκαστα ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὰ εἶδη, λόγοι τοῦ Θεοῦ ὄντα. |

182 12.2 Εἴρηται πρότερον, ὡς οὐ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐκείνων ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς. σὺ δ', ἐξ ὧν τε εἶπες, ἐξ ὧν τε νῦν λέγεις, τὴν τε διαφορὰν πάνυ τοι ἐλέγχῃ μὴ συνιείς, καθ' ἣν Πλήθων πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη περὶ οὐσίας διαφέρεται, ὅπερ αὐτὸς ἀρχόμενος διῶσχυρίζομην, τά τε εἶδη τὰ χωριστὰ μὴδ' ὅπως οὖν συνιέναι πεφώρασαι, ὅπως οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα τίθενται, ἐν τῷ τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ νῷ ταῦτα λέγων ὑπάρχειν καὶ λόγους αὐτοῦ ταῦτα δημιουργικοὺς εἶναι οὐκ ἀνουςίους. ἦν τε οὖν τὸ πρῶτον νοῦν καλῆς, ἀμαρτάνεις τῶν περὶ Πλάτωνα Περιπατητικὴν τὸ τοιοῦτο καινοτομίαν καλούντων καὶ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὸν νοῦν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ ὃν αὐτὸ τιθεμένων· ἦν τε τὸν προσεχῆ τοῦδε τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργὸν νοῦν καλῆς, καὶ οὕτω πλημμελεῖς οὔτε διακρίνων ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὰ εἶδη οὔτε πρὸ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα τιθέμενος — δέον διακεκριμένα τε καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα τίθεσθαι, ὡς διὰ πολλῶν ἐφόδων ὁ Πρόκλος δείκνυσι —, κἂν μὴ τὸ ἐν δὲ μόνον τῷ πρώτῳ τίς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὃν ἀναθῇ, τὸν δὲ δημιουργὸν συνάψῃ τοῖς εἵδεσιν, ὃ δὴ καὶ Πλήθων ἀξιοῦν δοκεῖ.

16–18 Ἐπεὶ–ὄντα] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 165,21–23 Mohler

25–26 Περιπατητικὴν–καινοτομίαν] cf. Procl., *Theol. Plat.* 2,31,21–22 Saffrey – Westerink

27–28 τὸν–νοῦν] cf. Georg. Gemist. Plethon, *Epist. ad Bessarionem* 458,24 Mohler

3 γρύφον S L: correxi 5 τῷ] τὸ S | φᾶναι S L: correxi 25–26 Περιπατητικῶν L

disappear with the universals, we can say it not because those (the universals) have their being in them (the individuals), but because they are complements of their substance.

11.3 So this enigma of yours, as you see, is quickly solved. Yet, as if you had made your arguments with all the science in the world, you define, with great arrogance, the arguments of others as ‘incomprehensible’, as if saying so followed being so and it would be clear even to a blind man who uses incomprehensible arguments against all logic. After you have just recovered from the hangover, you who were previously obviously drunk in affirming the first of the statements and in denying the second, you say to take the issues for granted, as if he (= Theodoros) had posed that statement only axiomatically and had not proven it. Rather, if you are able to prove by a convincing argument that the universals that are in the many are not impossible, not being first principles — although in fact Theodoros and Aristotle before him proved the opposite — why not do so? If you are not capable of that, why are you squawking as if you fell off a donkey? And how can you say that those sentences are incomprehensible, when in them the middle term, to which the extremes of the syllogism are linked, is subordinate to the first and the last is a predicate?

12.1 ‘Then,¹ by God, where did you learn to say that forms have their being because of individuals, when it is necessary for individuals to exist because of forms, which are God’s words.’

12.2 It has already been said that our argument is not about those forms, but about the forms in the many. From the things you have said and those you now say, you, on the other hand, show well that you do not understand the difference whereby Plato departs from Aristotle in the matter of substance, which I also stated at the beginning, and it turns out that you do not understand separable forms at all, as the Platonists understand them, because you say that they reside in the intellect of Almighty God and that they are his demiurgic words not devoid of substance. And if you then call the first principle ‘intellect’, you depart from the Platonists, who call this statement a ‘peripatetic novelty’ and place it beyond not only intellect, but Being itself; and if you call the Demiurge close to this heaven of ours ‘intellect’, even so you are mistaken, neither separating forms from him nor placing them before him (they must necessarily be considered

1 In the text edited by Mohler one reads here, instead of ἐπεὶ, the imperative εἰπέ. It is a correction made by Mohler. I checked the most important witnesses to the text of Michael Apostoles’ *Obiectiones* (cf. 165,21 Mohler), all of them transmitting the reading ἐπεὶ. This is also the case with two autographs by Apostoles, i.e. Pal. gr. 275 (fol. 179v) and Cantabr. Trinity College, O.1.23 (fol. 92r). The Cambridge copy — which was not included in Mohler’s edition — should be studied more in details. For it is Apostoles’ working copy, thus bearing evidence to corrections and additions made by the author himself.

12.3 Καὶ οὕτω διχῇ πλημμελεῖς, τῇ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον νοῦν καλῶν, ὑπὲρ τὸν νοῦν τιθεμένων ἐκείνων, τῇ δὲ τὰ εἶδη μὴ διακρίνων ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ. Πλάτων γε μὴν ἔοικεν ὑπὲρ τὸ ὂν τὸ ἐξηρημένον ἔν τιθεσθαι ἀξιῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐν Φιλήβῳ μὲν εἰπὼν μεμῖχθαι τὸ ὂν ἐξ ἀπειρίας καὶ πέρατος, τούτοις ἀμφοῖν τὸν θεὸν ὑποστά- 5
την φησίν, οὕτως ἐκεῖ τὸ πρῶτον καλῶν. ἐν δὲ γε τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Παρμενίδου ὑποθέσεων σαφῶς ὑπὲρ τὸ ὂν τὸ ἐξηρημένον ἔν ἀποδείκνυσιν, ὡς δὲ κἂν τῷ Σοφιστῇ ἀπηντηκῶς ὁ Ἐλεάτης ξένος πρὸς Παρμενίδην, ἐν εἰπόντα τὸ ὂν, ἄτοπα πλείω ἐπιφέρει τοῖς μὴ διακρίνουσι τὸ ἐξηρημένον ἐν τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος. τό τε γὰρ πληθος, φησιν, ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὐκ ἔσται τὰ τε πράγματα ὀνομάζειν οὐχ οἶόν τε καὶ 10
τό τε ὄνομα τῷ πράγματι καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα τῷ ὀνόματι ταυτὸν ἔσται. καὶ ταύτῃ τό τε πρᾶγμα πράγματος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὀνόματος πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ ὀνόματος ὄνομα, ἀλλ' οὐ πράγματος ἔσται.

12.4 Ὡν αὐτὸς ἐπαῖων οὐδέν, τὰ τε παρατυχόντα μηδενὶ ξὺν νῷ φθέγγῃ, μᾶλλον δ' ἐμεῖς ὅ τι κεν ἐπ' ἀκαιρίμαν γλῶσσαν ἔπος ἔλθῃ προφέρων εἰκὴ καὶ νόθ' ἄττα δόγματα τολμᾶς ὑπ' ἀμαθίας Πλάτωνι προσποιεῖν, Πλατωνικὸς μὲν καὶ 15
λίαν γλιχόμενος εἶναι, οὕτω γε μὴν τοῖς Πλάτωνος προστυχῆς γεγωνός, δέον ἢ μετὰ τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης ἀληθείας καὶ ἐπιστάσεως περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀποφαίνεσθαι, οὕτω τοι θείων ὄντων καὶ ὑψηλῶν καὶ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἔξιν ὑπερβαλλόντων, καὶ ἐν οἷς μέγιστος κίνδυνος ἀποπεπλανῆσθαι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, ἢ τῷ δευτέρῳ 20
χρησάμενον, ὃ φασί, πλῶ σιωπὴν ἄγοντα τὰ σαυτοῦ τε πράττειν καὶ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντά σοι μὴ προσποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ λέγοντα περὶ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα, ἀσχημονεῖν καὶ γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνειν παρὰ πᾶσιν, ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρόν τι προσήρηται'. ἀποσεμνύνεις μὲν γάρ σου τὸν λόγον, παρὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους λέγων ἄνθρωπον εἶναι καὶ παρὰ πάντας ἵππους ἵππον, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην εὐδαιμονίαν ἐν τῇ τῶν 25
εἰδῶν θεωρίᾳ Πλάτωνα διίσχυριζόμενος τίθεσθαι, ἐν | τῇ τάγαθου θεωρίᾳ, μᾶλλον ἐν Πολιτείαις αὐτὴν ἀξιούντος ἐκείνου, πρὸς ἣν δὴ δόξαν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ἠθικοῖς ἀπαντᾷ. ἣν δὲ τις σε ἔρηται τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκείνον καὶ τὸν ἵππον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκείνην τίς ἐστίν, ἐλεγχθήσῃ παρὰ πόδα μηδὲν εἰδώς. ἀποκρινόμενος μὲν μὴδ' ὅτι οὖν, ἰλιγγίων δ' ὑπ' ἀπορίας, πολλὰ χασμῶμενος καὶ ὁ νῦν μεγα- 30
λαυχίας τε καὶ φρονήματος ἀπρεποῦς ἔμπλεως ὢν, τῶν κανθηλίων τότε εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι διοίσεις οὐδέν.

3–4 ἐν[–πέρατος] cf. Procl., *Theol. Plat.* 3,30,19–21 Saffrey – Westerink 5–6 ἐν–ἀποδείκνυσιν] cf. Procl., *Theol. Plat.* 2,36,7–37,3 Saffrey – Westerink 6–12 κἂν–ἔσται] cf. Procl., *Theol. Plat.* 3,67,24–68,2 et 69,10–24 Saffrey – Westerink 13 μηδενὶ–νῷ] Aristoph., *Nub.* 580; cf. *supra* 2.3 14 ὁ–ἔλθῃ] Dion. Hal., *Comp.* 1,37 19–20 τῷ–πλῶ] cf. Plat., *Phaed.* 99d; *Phil.* 19c; Arist., *Pol.* 1284b 19 22 ὅσοις–προσήρηται] Plat., *Phil.* 58a

4 μεμῖχθαι S L: correxi | τοῖτοις L 6 σαφὲς S 17 τῆς om. S Mohler 18 τοι e τῶν corr. L 20 χρῆσάμενος L 26 πολιτείας Mohler

separate and prior to him, as Proclus repeatedly shows), even in the case where one would make not only the One but also Being coincide with the first principle, and join the Demiurge to forms. Moreover, Plethon also seems to maintain this.

12.3 And so you are wrong in two ways, on the one hand in calling ‘intellect’ the first principle, when it is a matter of things that are beyond the intellect, and on the other hand in not separating the forms from the intellect. Yet Plato seems to believe that the One-transcendent is placed beyond the One-that-is, when in the *Philebus*, asserting that Being is composed of unlimited and limited, he states that divinity is superintendent of both, thus calling it on that occasion the ‘first principle’. In the first argument of the *Parmenides* he clearly reveals that the One-transcendent is beyond the One-that-is, just as in the *Sophist* the stranger from Elea, presenting himself before Parmenides, who calls Being ‘One’, accuses those who do not discern the One-transcendent from the One-that-is of more absurdity. For, he says, there will be no multiplicity in entities, and it is not possible to give names to things, and the name is the same as the thing and the thing as the name, so the thing will be a thing of the thing, but not of the name, and the name of the name, but not of the thing.

12.4 Not understanding any of this, you speak without any knowledge of the arguments that are needed, but rather, you vomit ‘whatever words you can get on to your tongue’ by pulling them out at random, and have the audacity to attribute false beliefs to Plato. Driven by your ignorance, you are all too eager to be Platonic at all costs while never applying yourself to Plato’s concepts. It is necessary either to speak about these matters with the utmost truth and care, for they are matters so divine, sublime and beyond the understanding of most, and in which there is a great risk of distracting from the truth, or to use the ‘second way’, as they say, keeping silent, doing what is your own business and not attributing to yourself things that do not suit you, rather than, in speaking of things you do not know, behaving in an unseemly manner and provoking laughter from all those who have even a shred of sense. For you exalt your work by saying that man is beyond all men and the horse beyond all horses, and by claiming that Plato placed human happiness in the theory of Ideas, when he had argued in the *Republic* that happiness is mostly placed in the theory of the highest good, a doctrine against which Aristotle argued in his *Ethics*. But if one were to ask you what that man and horse and happiness are, it would immediately come out that you know nothing. Without in any way giving an answer, confused by the difficulty, remaining speechless, and now truncated with vainglory and shameful pride, know that then you will be no different in anything from donkeys.

12.5 Ἐπειτα τοσαύτην ἀμαθίαν αὐτὸς νοσῶν καὶ οὕτω τοι πόρρω τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποπλανώμενος, Θεοδώρῳ φῆς μὴ πάνυ τοι τῆς ἀληθείας μεμεληκέναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἔπεται τῇ Πλήθωνος δόξῃ, ἀλλὰ τῇ Ἀριστοτέλους, ἀνδρὸς πολλῶ ἀμείνονος ἢ κατὰ Πλήθωνα. αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπου τὸ ψεῦδος τῆς ἀληθείας κενῆς ἔνεκεν δόξης, ὡς αὐτὸς φῆς, πεφώρταται προτετιμηκώς. τούναντίον μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν αὐτῆς μᾶλλον ἐκ νέου παρὰ πάντα τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον πεπρεσβευκῶς φαίνεται. οὐκ οὖν αὐτῷ οὔτε περὶ τῶν μεγίστων, ἐν οἷς πολλὸς κίνδυνος ἀποπεπλανῆσθαι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, οὔτε περὶ τῶν φαυλοτάτων παρὰ τὸ ἀληθές οὔτε δεδόξασται τι ὡς γοῦν ἐφικτὸν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει οὔτε συγγέγραπται. ἀλλὰ φύσει τε ἀρίστη καὶ πρὸς τῇ φύσει σπουδῇ καὶ πρό γε τούτων τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ φόβῳ, δι' ὃν ἡ ἔλλαμψις τε καὶ ἡ τοῦ πόθου πληρώσις παραγίνεσθον, πάνθ' ἄπερ ἐγκεχειρήκεν, ἥ φησι Πλάτων, 'δίκην ἐλαίου ἀσποφῆτι ρέοντος', λείως τε καὶ ἀπταιστως καὶ ἀνυσίμως κατορθῶν ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ φωνῇ φαίνεται.

12.6 Σὺ δ', ἔμπληκτε, νοῦ τε παχύτητι καὶ τρόπων μοχθηρίᾳ καὶ κενῆς ἔρωτι δόξης τὸ μὲν ἀληθές οὐδέποτε ἐζήτησας οὔτε παρὰ σαυτοῦ εὐρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἐτέρου μαθεῖν. τερατείαις δὲ χαίρων καὶ καινοτομίαις αἰεὶ φασματολογεῖς, καὶ πλάτων καὶ τινὰ ὅσαι ὥραι διηγῇ τοὺς ἀπλουστέρους ἐκπλήττων, μυριάκις δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας μεταδοξάζων τὲ καὶ μεταβαλλόμενος νῦν μὲν τοῖς Πλάτωνος τίθεσαι, νῦν δὲ τοῖς Ἀριστοτέλους, τὰ πλείω δὲ τοῖς Ἀριστίππου καὶ Πύρωνος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές πάντη τε καὶ πάντως ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀφαιρούμενος, τέλος δὲ νομίζων τὴν κατὰ μέρος σωματικὴν ἡδονήν, δι' ἣν κἂν φονεύσεις κἂν τὸν πατέρα τὸν σαυτοῦ, εἰ περιῇν, τύψειας, βοσκηματώδη τινὰ καὶ Σαρδαναπαλικὸν βίον ζῶν, καθάπερ ἀργυρώνητον ἀνδράποδον δέσποιναν θεραπεύων τὴν Φιλήβου θεόν. καὶ οὐπω λέγω, ὅτι οἷς τε λόγοις ἐκεῖνοι πειθόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐτίθεντο, ὅπως τε ἐτίθεντο, τοπαράπαν οὐκ οἶσθα. ἀλόγως δὲ πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν σοι φέρῃ, καθάπερ τῶν πλοίων τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα. οὕτωςι πάνυ τοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λόγον ποιούμενος μέμφῃ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς ἀμελοῦσιν αὐτοῦ.

13.1 Εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ ἀδύνατον φάσκων τί τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι μὴ οὐσῶν τῶν καθέκαστα οὐσιῶν, ἅρ' οὐ διαμένουσιν, ὡς ἔφαμεν, τὰ καθόλου; οὐκ εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ ὅλως τὰ νοητά;

13.2 Ἀποφθάρηθι, κάθαρμα. αὐτόν σε γὰρ μᾶλλον αἰσχύνεσθαι ἔδει, ἀνδράσι μαχόμενον, πίθηκον ὄντα, οἷς οὐδέν τι αἰσχύνῃς ἄξιον οὐτ' | εἴρηται οὔτε διαπέ-

28–30 Εἴτ'–νοητά] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 165,33–35 Mohler

10–11 ἔλλαμψις–πληρώσις] Greg. Naz., in *sancta lumina* (orat. 39), 164,16–17 Moerschini

12 δίκην–ρέοντος] Plat., *Theaet.* 144b

4 οὖν] ὁ Θεόδωρος Mohler 6 αὐτῷ L | μᾶλλον om. S | αὐτοῦ S | πεπρεσβευκῶς L 16 καινοτομίαις S 17 ὅσαι ὥραι L: ὅσας ὥρας Mohler 19 Ἀριστίππου L 24 τε¹ om. Mohler 31 ἀποφθάρηθι Mohler 32–412,1 διαπεπράκται S

12.5 And then, sick of such great ignorance and so far removed from the truth, you say that Theodoros is not interested in truth at all, since he does not follow the doctrine of Plethon, but that of Aristotle, a much better man than Plethon could ever be. Therefore, he is not learned to prefer falsehood to truth for the sake of a vain fame, as you say. On the contrary, from his youth and throughout his life, it is evident that he did not observe anything else with greater interest than it. Neither around matters of great importance, in which there is a great risk of deviating from the truth, nor around minimal matters has he ever argued verbally or written anything contrary to the truth, as far as is possible to human nature, but thanks to his excellent nature and beyond, thanks to study and even before that thanks to the fear of God, through which comes enlightenment and the satisfaction of desire, all that he has undertaken, as Plato says, 'like oil flowing without a sound', he shows that he accomplishes it smoothly, without error and effectively, in both languages.

12.6 As for you, foolish man, because of your dullness, wickedness, and desire for vain fame, you have never sought to find either the truth by yourself or to learn it from others. Enjoying vacuity and absurdity, you are always talking about admirable things, and inventing strange things you continually tell them by impressing the simple-minded, changing your opinion a thousand times a day, and changing sides, now adhering to the doctrines of Plato, now those of Aristotle, mostly those of Aristippus and Pyrrho, keeping the truth away from the facts in the most absolute manner, holding as your ultimate end the particular bodily pleasure, moved by which you would be able to kill and even beat your father, if he were still alive, living a life as an animal and in the manner of Sardanapale, like a bought slave serving the divine mistress of Philebus. And I do not say that you do not know at all what arguments had persuaded them to expound these opinions and how they expounded them, but you are carried along by what you think, like a ship without ballast. By reasoning in this way about the truth, you accuse others of disregarding it.

13.1 'Are you not ashamed then to say that it is impossible for anything else to exist once individual substances do not exist? Do not universals then continue to exist? Do not souls and intelligibles continue to exist?'

13.2 Go to hell, you scoundrel. You should rather be ashamed to stand up against men of such kind, you ape, men who have said or done nothing to be

πρακται. μὴ οὐσῶν γάρ, φησι Θεόδωρος, τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατόν τι τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι, τῶν ἢ καθ' ὑποκειμένων αὐτῶν λεγομένων ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ὄντων. τὰ τε γὰρ συμβεβηκότα πῶς ἂν εἶεν μὴ τούτων οὐσῶν; τίνος γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἶεν συμβεβηκότα; τὰ τε γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη τὰ γε 5 ἀχώριστα συναναιρεθεῖν ἂν τοῖς καθέκαστα ἀνηρημένοις. τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τὴν γε ἀνθρωπίνην καὶ τὰς χωριστὰς οὐσίας μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένων τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν λεγομένας μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς οὔσας, οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι μὴ οὐσῶν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον Ἀριστοτέλη, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς αὐτῷ ἐπομέ- νους συκοφαντεῖς ὡς τὸ εἶδος τῇ ὕλῃ συμφθίρεσθαι φάσκοντας, εἰ μὲν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἂν ἤψω λόγων Ἀριστοτελικῶν, οὐκ ἂν οὕτως ἡσχημόνεις συκοφαντῶν. 10 ἐκ πολλῶν γάρ τις τῶν Ἀριστοτέλει εἰρημένων δύναιτο ἂν τὴν γε ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ἀποδείξει. ἐπεὶ δὲ μηδὲν εἰδὼς αὐτός τε ὑπενεῖς, καὶ τοὺς ἀπλουστέρους ἀναπέθεις ταυτά σοι φρονεῖν, ἡμῖν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποδεδειχόσιν ἀθανασίαν, ἐπομένοις Ἀριστοτέλει, οὐ σοῦ γε ἔνεκα — οὐ γὰρ συνοίσεις ἀσυνε- τώτατος ὢν —, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὴ ἐντυγχανόντων τοῖς τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους βιβλίοις, ὡς 15 ἂν μὴ παρακρουσάμενος λάθῃς αὐτοῦς, οὕτω σου καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα ἀπαν- τητέα ἂν εἴη.

13.3 Ἐν τοίνυν τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς πρώτῳ· ‘ὁ δὲ νοὺς ἔοικε, φησὶν, ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὔσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι. ἡ γὰρ ἂν ἐφθείρετο ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρα ἁμαυ- 20 ρώσεως’. συμφανὲς οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀθάνατόν τε αὐτὸν τίθεσθαι τὴν ψυ- χὴν καὶ μάλα ἐρρωμένως ἀποδεικνύναι· ἀκμάζει γὰρ τφόντι, ἀλλ’ οὐ συναμαυ- ροῦται τῷ σώματι τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τῷ σώματι οὐσῶν συνακμαζουσῶν τε καὶ συναμαυρουμένων αὐτῷ. ἔτι ἐν τῷ περὶ γενέσεως ζῶων δευτέρῳ· ἔοικε δὲ ‘ὁ νοὺς, φησί, θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ εἶναι θεῖος· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐπικοινωνεῖ 25 τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ σωματικῇ ἐνέργειᾳ’. εἰ τοίνυν ἔξωθεν ἐπείσρχεται καὶ ἔστι θεῖος, οὐτ’ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης ἀπὸ τοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ παράγοιτ’ ἂν, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τινος κρείττονος αἰτίας καὶ τελεωτέρας, τοῦ Θεοῦ δηλαδή, διὸ καὶ θεῖος· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ Θεοῦ θεῖον οὕτε συνεκτείνοντο ἂν τῇ ὕλῃ ἐπείσερχόμενον ἔξωθεν, εἰ δὲ καὶ οὐδε- 30 μίᾳ σωματικῇ ἐνέργειᾳ ἐπικοινωνεῖ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτοῦ, χωριστὴν δὴπου τὴν ἐν- ἐργειαν ἔχει. εἰ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν χωριστὴν ἔξει — ἐν γὰρ τῷ πρώ- τῳ τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς φησὶν· ‘εἰ ἔστι τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἴδιον,

1–3 μὴ–ὄντων] Theod. Gazes, *Adv. Plethonem* 154,34–36 Mohler

1–3 μὴ–ὄντων] cf. Arist., *Cat.* 2b 5–6 4–5 τά¹–ἀνηρημένοις] cf. Simpl., in *Cat.* 83,30–85,33 Kalbfleisch 18–20 ὁ–ἁμαυρώσεως] Arist., *de An.* 408b 18–20; cf. Phlp., in *de An.* 11,20–22 Hayduck 21–23 ἀκμάζει–αὐτῷ] cf. Phlp., in *de An.* 14,38–15,4 Hayduck 24–25 ὁ–ἐνέργειᾳ] Arist., *GA* 746b 27–39 31–414,1 εἰ–χωρίζεσθαι] Arist., *de An.* 403a 10–11; idem *infra* 13.4

6–7 οὐσίῳ L 13 ταυτά] ταυτά σοι Mohler 23 τῷ] τῶν S Mohler 24 ἐπείσιναι S 25 ἔστι] εἶναι S 28 ἐπείσερχόμενος S L: corr. Mohler

ashamed of. Theodoros says: ‘For since the first substances do not exist, it is impossible for any other of the things to exist or to be predicated on the same subsistent substances or to be in the same subsistent substances’. For how could accidents exist in the absence of these substances? Of what, in fact, would they be accidents? The inseparable kinds and species would disappear in the absence of the individual. But since they are neither predicated on the first subsistent substances nor subsistent in them, there is nothing to prevent the human soul and the separable substances from existing even if the first substances do not exist. You slander not only Aristotle but also those who follow him as saying that form comes to disappear with substance. If you had even essayed Aristotelian works in any way, you would not be so shameless in your slanders. Indeed, it could be proven on the basis of many things said by Aristotle that the human soul is immortal. But since, although you know nothing, you behave like a swine and persuade simpletons to think as you do, we, who have proven the immortality of the soul on the basis of what Aristotle says, should not answer your arguments for you — for you are obtuse to the utmost degree, it would be of no use — but for those who do not read Aristotle’s books, so that you cannot deceive them underhandedly, like this.

13.3 Then, in the first of the books *On the soul* he says: ‘The intellect seems to generate itself as a substance that is, and not to destroy itself; for it would otherwise be destroyed by the weakening of old age’. So it is very clear from what has been said that he considers the soul immortal, and that he also proves this very strongly; for it grows, but does not weaken with the body, whereas all other things that are subject to a body grow and weaken along with it. Again, in the second book *On the Generation of Animals*, he says: ‘The intellect seems to come from without and to be divine: for it has nothing in common with its activity that of the body’. If, therefore, it comes from without and is divine, it cannot be brought from power to act by matter, but from a more powerful and perfect cause, namely God, and is therefore divine. Not only could God’s divinity not be equalled by matter, since it comes from without, but if no activity of the body is common with its activity, then they have a distinct activity. In fact, in the first of the books *On the soul*, he says: ‘If there is any function or sensation of the

ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι' —, εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, διαμένει ἂν δήπου καὶ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου τοῦδε ἀπαλλαγὴν.

185 13.4 Ἔτι ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς πολλαχοῦ τὸν νοῦν φησὶ χωριστόν, 'χωρίζεσθαι γάρ, φησιν, αὐτόν, καθάπερ τὸ αἶδιον τοῦ φθαροῦ' καὶ 'χωρίζεσθαι δὲ μόνον |
τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἶδιον', καὶ 'οὐδὲ μεμίχθαι εὐλο- 5
γον τῷ σώματι αὐτόν', καὶ 'τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός',
'καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστός καὶ ἀμιγῆς καὶ ἀπαθὴς τῇ οὐσίᾳ'. εἰ οὖν χωριστόν φη-
σι τὸν νοῦν, ἢ τῇ οὐσίᾳ μόνον ἢ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ καὶ ἀμφοῖν χωριστόν δοξάζει; ἀλλὰ
τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μόνῃ χωριστόν ὑπολαμβάνειν αὐτόν ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ εὐλογον. ἐν γὰρ
τῷ πρώτῳ φησιν· 'εἰ μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἴδιον αὐτῆς — ἔργον ἢ πάθος δηλαδὴ — οὐκ ἂν 10
εἶη χωριστή'. καὶ γὰρ ἀνερέργητον μένειν καὶ μάτην εἶναι συνέβαινεν ἂν μετὰ
τὴν τοῦ σώματος τοῦδε ἀπαλλαγὴν. οὐδὲν δὲ οὔτε τὸν θεὸν οὔτε τὴν φύσιν μά-
την ποιεῖν ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτός φησιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχοντα χωρι-
στήν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀχώριστον ἔχειν ὑποληπτέα ἂν εἶη δοξάζειν αὐτόν. ἔσπετο γὰρ
ἂν τὸ αἰτιατόν τοῦ αἰτίου κρεῖττον εἶναι, αἰτίου μὲν τῆς οὐσίας οὔσης, αἰτιατοῦ 15
δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας, διὰ μέσης γε μὴν τῆς δυνάμεως. ἄτοπον δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τῷ
τυχόντι περιάπτειν, μὴ ὅτι γε Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ ταῦτα ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ λέγοντι· 'εἰ
ἔστι τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζε-
σθαι'. λείπεται δὴ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν χωριστὴν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτὸν λέγειν. εἰ δὲ
τοῦτο, διαμένειν δήπου καὶ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου τοῦδε ἀπαλλαγὴν. 20

13.5 Ἔτι Ἀριστοτέλης ἀμερῇ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποδείκνυσιν, οὐ τὴν λογικὴν μό-
νον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν. εἰ γὰρ ἄλλῳ μὲν, φησι, μορίῳ ἢ αἰσθησί τοῦ λευ-
κοῦ, ἄλλῳ δὲ τοῦ μέλανος ἀντιλαμβάνεται, παραπλήσιον ἂν ἦν, ὥς εἰ τοῦ μὲν
ἐγώ, τοῦ δὲ σὺ αἰσθοιο. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κρίσις οὐκ ἂν ἦν. ἐν γὰρ δεῖ τὸ κρίνον εἶναι.
ἀμερῆς ἄρα ἢ αἰσθητικὴ; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κἂν ἢ λογικὴ πολλῶν κρεῖττον οὔσα. τούτου 25
ὑποτεθέντος, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν τὸ φθειρόμενον ἢ καθ' αὐτὸ φθείρεται, ὥς τὸ μέλαν
ὑπὸ τοῦ λευκοῦ, ἐναντίου γε ὄντος, καὶ τὸ σύνθετον εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη, ἢ κα-
τὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥς ἡ ἁρμονία τῇ λύρᾳ συμφθαρεῖσα, ἐν ἐκείνῃ τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσα

3–4 χωρίζεσθαι–φθαροῦ] Arist., *de An.* 413b 26–27; cf. Phlp., *in de An.* 11,3 et 25 Hayduck
4–5 χωρίζεσθαι–αἶδιον] Arist., *de An.* 430a 22–23; cf. Phlp., *in de An.* 11,5–6 Hayduck
5–6 οὐδὲ–αὐτόν] Arist., *de An.* 429a 24; cf. Phlp., *in de An.* 11,13–14 Hayduck 6 τὸ–
χωριστός] Arist., *de An.* 429b 5; cf. Phlp., *in de An.* 11,18 Hayduck 7 καὶ!–οὐσίᾳ] Arist., *de An.*
430a 17–18; cf. Phlp., *in de An.* 11,19 Hayduck 10–11 εἰ–χωριστή] Arist., *de An.* 403a 11–12
17–19 εἰ–χωρίζεσθαι] Arist., *de An.* 403a 10–11; idem *supra* 13.3 22–23 εἰ–ἀντιλαμβάνεται]
cf. Phlp., *in de An.* 13,5–6 Hayduck 23–24 ὥς–αἰσθοιο] Phlp., *in de An.* 13,11–12 Hayduck
24 ἐν–εἶναι] cf. Phlp., *in de An.* 13,14 Hayduck 25–416,5 τούτου–ψυχῇ] cf. Phlp., *in de An.*
16,18–25 Hayduck

5 μεμίχθαι S L: corr. Mohler 7 ἀπαθὴς] καθαρὸς S 8 καὶ om. S 11 ἀνέργητον Mohler 12 τὴν¹
om. Mohler 14 ἂν in textu om., in marg. suppl. L 15 αἰτίου¹] αἰτία S 27 ὑπὸ] ἀπὸ L | τὸ supra
lin. scr. S 28 ἢ om. L

soul that is proper to it alone, it can be admitted to be separate.’ If this is the case, it can then continue to exist even after departing from this life.

13.4 Again, in several places in the books *On the soul* he says that the intellect is separable. For he says that ‘it is separate like the eternal from the perishable’, that ‘only what exists can be separate, and this alone is immortal and imperishable’, that ‘it is not reasonable to think that it is mixed with the body’, that ‘the faculty of perceiving does not exist without the body, but the intellect is separate’, and that ‘this intellect is separate, unmixed, immune from substance’. If, therefore, it is separate, do you think it is separate only by substance, by activity, or by both? It is unreasonable, however, to suppose that Aristotle believes it to be separate by substance alone. For in the first book, he says: ‘If there is nothing — clearly action or passion — peculiar to it (= the soul), it could not be separated. For it would happen that it (= the intellect) would remain inactive and useless after separation from this body.’ But he says in several places that neither God nor nature does anything by chance. Nor is it conceivable that he should think that it has separable activity and inseparable substance. For it would follow that the thing caused is stronger than the cause, whereas the substance is the cause, the activity the thing caused, by means, however, of the potency. It would be absurd to attribute these theses to anyone, and all the more so to Aristotle, who says in the first book: ‘If there is an act or passion of the soul peculiar to it, it would be admissible for it to be separate.’ It remains that according to him both substance and activity are separate; if so, the intellect continues to exist even after separation from this body.

13.5 Again, Aristotle proves that the soul is composed of several parts, not only the rational, but also the sensory. He says: ‘If sensation was perceived as one part white and on part black, it would be more or less as if I felt one thing and you another.’ If that were the case, there would be no possibility of distinction. Necessarily only one must be the part that distinguishes. Perhaps the psychic one is without parts? If so, the rational one would be much better. That being so, since everything perishes either of itself, like the black because of the white that is its opposite and the compound in the parts of which it is composed, or by accident, like the harmony that dissolves together with the lyre (in that it has its being and is in no way separate from it), the soul by accident could not

καὶ οὐδ' ὅτι οὖν χωριστόν, ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μὲν οὐκ ἂν φθαρείη — δέδεικται γὰρ ἤδη χωριστὴν ἔχουσα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν — ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ καθ' αὐτό. οὐτε γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη διαλυθεῖη ἂν — οὐ γὰρ σύνθετος, ἀμερὴς γε οὐσα, ὡς δέδεικται — οὐθ' ὑπὸ ἐναντίου· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐναντίον οὐσία γε οὔση. οὐδαμῶς ἄρα φθείρεται ἡ ψυχὴ.

5

13.6 Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ ἀθάνατον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῖν ἐπομένους Ἀριστοτέλει ἰκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται, ἀπαντητέα ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιχειρημὰ σου. τῷ οὖν ἐντελέχειαν λέγειν Ἀριστοτέλη τὴν ψυχὴν ἔπεσθαι οἶει καὶ τὸ θνητὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι, νομίζων ἅπασαν ἐντελέχειαν ἀχώριστον δεῖν εἶναι τοῦ οὗ ἐστὶν ἐντελέχεια, ἀπλῶς 186 αὐτὴν λαμβάνων λεγομένην πλεοναχῶς. ἄλλως μὲν γὰρ τὴν φυτικὴν | καὶ ἄλλως 10 τὴν αἰσθητικὴν καὶ ἄλλως τὴν λογικὴν ἐντελέχειαν εἶναι φαμέν. τὴν μὲν γὰρ φυτικὴν ὡς μορφωτικὴν καὶ διαπλαστικὴν τοῦ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ὄργανου καὶ λογικῆς, καὶ ὡς χρωμένην αὐτῷ ἀπλουστερόν γε μὴν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν τε καὶ λογικὴν, καθ' ἣν δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔμψυχα λέγεται ζῆν. τὴν δὲ αἰσθητικὴν ὡς αἰσθησιν τῷ ὀργάνῳ παρεχομένην, καὶ ὡς αὐτῷ χρωμένην ποικιλώτερον δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν φυτι- 15 κήν, καὶ ὡς κατὰ τόπον κινουσαν, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ τελειότερον ἄγουσαν, καθ' ἣν δὴ καὶ ζῶν τὸ ἔμψυχον λέγεται. ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀμφοτέρας ταύτας οὕτως ἐντελεχειάς τοῦ φυσικοῦ καὶ ὀργανικοῦ σώματος καὶ εἶδη διοριζόμεθα ὡς, εἰ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς εἶδος τὸ φυσικὸν ἢ καὶ τὸ τεχνητὸν ἐν τῇ προστυχούσῃ ὕλῃ ἐγγίνεσθαι εἵπομεν οἶον τὸ λίθου καὶ ἀνδριάντος, ἐκείνου ταύτας ὅλας γινομένας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τού- 20 των. τὴν δὲ λογικὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ τελειότατον ἄγουσαν καὶ λογικῶς καὶ χρωμένην καὶ πείθουσαν τὸ ὄργανον ζῆν, κοσμοῦσαν τε τὰ πάθη καὶ λόγῳ παιδεύουσαν αὐτὰ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ ἑαυτῆς ποιουμένην ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτην γινομένην ἐκείνου.

13.7 Τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων τὴν μὲν φυτικὴν καὶ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ἀχωρίστους εἶναι ἀνάγκη, τοιαύτας τὲ ἐντελεχειάς αὐτὰς ὑπάρχειν, μὴ οἷας χωρὶς τοῦ 25 οὗ εἰσὶν ἐντελέχειαι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ σώματι συναπόλλυσθαι τῶν ἐνεργειῶν αὐτῶν ἀχωρίστων οὐσῶν. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ γεννήσῃ ἡ γεννητικὴ χωρισθεῖσα, ἢ ἡ θρεπτικὴ θρέψῃ, ἢ αὐξήσῃ ἡ αὐξητικὴ; τί δ' ἂν ἡ αἰσθητικὴ κινήσῃ κεχωρισμένη; ἢ πῶς ἂν αἰσθοίτο χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος; ὧν δ' αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἀχώριστοι, καὶ αὐτὰς πάντῃ ἀχωρίστους ἀνάγκη εἶναι. τὴν δὲ λογικὴν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν αὐτῆς, ὧν μὲν δη- 30 λονότι τοῦ σώματος χάριν αὐτῇ μόνον δεῖ καὶ αἷς οὐχ οἶον τε χρῆσθαι χωρὶς σώματος, ταύτας ἀχωρίστους τε ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ τῷ σώματι συναπόλλυσθαι, ὧν δὲ δεῖ ταύτῃ οὐ τοῦ σώματος μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτῆς χάριν καὶ αἷς οἶον τε χρῆσθαι καὶ χωρὶς σώματος, μᾶλλον δὲ πολλῷ κρεῖττον ἢ μετὰ σώματος — αὗται δ' εἰσὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι —, ταύτας χωριστάς τε εἶναι καὶ μὴ τῷ σώματι συναπόλ- 35

27–28 τί–αὐξητική] cf. Phlp., *in de An.* 204,16–17 Hayduck

3 συνετέθει S 4–5 αὐτὴ ... οὐσία S Mohler 10 λεγομένης L 16 τελειώτερον S 18 εἶδη e corr. L: ἤδη S 19 καὶ in textu om., supra lin. suppl. L 27 γεννήσοι Mohler 28 θρέψοι Mohler αὐξήσοι Mohler 29 τοῦ om. L 29–30 ἀνάγκη ἀχωρίστους S 31 μόνων S 33 δεῖ] δὴ S

therefore perish. It has already been proven, in fact, that it has both substance and activity separate. Nor could the soul perish of itself. It could neither dissolve into the parts of which it is composed — it is not a compound, since it is without parts, as has been proven — nor on account of any of its opposites, for there is no opposite for it which is substance. In no case, therefore, does the soul perish.

13.6 Once we have sufficiently proven, we who follow Aristotle, that the soul is immortal, we should answer your argument. So, you believe that the fact that Aristotle says that the soul is act follows from the fact that it is mortal, because you think that necessarily everything that is act is inseparable from that that is act, and you conceive this in a simple way whereas in fact it is said with many meanings. For we say that the act is now vegetative, now psychic, now rational. A ‘vegetative’ act is so because it shapes and moulds the organ of sensation and reason, and because it uses it, but in a simpler way than the sensory and the rational; because of this, living beings are said to ‘live’. A ‘sensitive’ act is so because it gives the organ the faculty of perception, because it uses it in a more varied manner than the vegetative act, and because it moves through space and leads towards what is more perfect; because of this, we say that the living being is an ‘animal’. We call both of them thus, simply, acts of the physical and organic body and forms, for even if we were to say that the simple natural or even artificial form is inherent in any matter, such as the form of a stone or a statue, these would be entirely acts of the body and not the body act of those. And the ‘rational’ act, finally, is so since it leads towards the most perfect, rationally uses the organ and persuades it to live. It orders the passions, educates them to obey the commands of reason and makes the organ part of itself, but does not become a part of that.

13.7 This being so, the vegetative and the sensory are necessarily inseparable, and these acts are such, not that they exist as such without that of which they are acts, but that they die with the body, precisely because their activities are non-separable. For if the act were divided, what could generate the generative activity, or what could nourish the nourishing one, or what could make the augmentative one grow? And, as they are separate, what would move the psychic one? Or simply how would it perceive without the body? Acts whose activities are not separable are also required to be non-separable. On the other hand, it is necessary for the rational act to be separable because, among its activities, those of which it clearly needs only for the body and of which it is unable to make use without the body are necessarily inseparable and perish with the body, whereas those of which it needs not only for the body but also for itself, and of which it is possible to make use even without the body, indeed much better than with the body (i.e. thinking and willing), these are necessarily

λυσθαι, καὶ αὐτὴν ἀνάγκη χωριστὴν εἶναι. τοιαύτην γὰρ αὐτὴν ἐντελέχειαν ὑπάρχειν, οἷαν καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ οὗ ἐστὶν ἐντελέχεια εἶναι, καὶ τῷ ὀργάνῳ, ὥπερ ἐχρήτο, μὴ συναπόλλυσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ τίς ἐνέργεια ταύτης χωριστὴ σώματος, καὶ αὐτὴν χωριστὴν ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν μετὰ τὸν τοῦ σώματος χωρισμόν.

13.8 Ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀποδοὺς τὸν ὅρισμόν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιφέρει· 5
 'ἐνίων δὲ ἡ ἐντελέχεια τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν', περὶ τῆς φυτικῆς καὶ αἰσθητικῆς τοῦτο λέγων. 'οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐνία γε οὐδὲν κωλύει' χωριστὰ δηλαδὴ εἶναι, περὶ τῆς λογικῆς τοῦτο λέγων. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πράττει τί χρωμένη τῷ σώματι καὶ θεωρεῖ μὴ δεομένη αὐτοῦ, 'οὐδὲν κωλύει', φησι, μέρη τινὰ χωριστὰ τοῦ σώματος εἶναι 'διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελεχείας', κἂν εἰ ἅπανα ἡ ψυχὴ ἐντελέ- 10
 χεια εἴρηται. ἐκώλυε γὰρ ἄν, εἰ καὶ καθ' ὅλην ἑαυτὴν καὶ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἐνέργειαν 187 ἑαυτῆς σώματος ἦν ἐντελέχεια. ἐπεὶ δὲ | καθ' ὅλην μὲν, οὐ κατὰ πᾶσαν δὲ ἐνέργειαν ἑαυτῆς — οὐ γὰρ δήπου κατὰ τὸν νοῦν· εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ 'χαλεπὸν καὶ πλάσαι ποῖον μόριον ἢ πῶς ὁ νοῦς συνέξει' — οὐδὲν κωλύει, φησιν, ἐντελέ- 15
 χειαν μὲν εἶναι, ἔνια δὲ τῶν μερῶν χωριστά. 'ἔτι τε ἄδηλον, φησιν, εἰ οὕτως ἐν- 16
 τελέχεια τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ὁ πλωτὴρ πλοίου', διὰ τούτων ἐναργέστε- 17
 ρον δεικνύς, ὅπως ἐντελέχειαν φησὶ τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς γὰρ πῇ μὲν χρωμέ- 18
 νην, πῇ δὲ μὴδ' ὅλως. τοιοῦτο γὰρ τὸ τοῦ πλωτῆρος παράδειγμα. εἰ οὖν ἡ αἰσθη- 19
 τικὴ ἡ πάντη χρωμένη ἀχώριστος δήπου τῷ χρῆσθαι, ἡ πῇ μὲν χρωμένη, πῇ δὲ 20
 μὴδ' ὅλως, οἷα τυγχάνει οὕσα ἡ λογικὴ, τὸ μὴ χρώμενον αὐτῆς χωριστὸν ἔσται 21
 πάντη, οὐκέτι τε χωρισθεῖσα ἐντελέχεια σώματος ἔσται, οὐδέ γε ψυχὴ κινήσεως, 22
 ὡς οὐδὲ ὁ πλωτὴρ τῆς νεῶς διαφθαρείσης ἔτι πλωτὴρ, ἀλλ' ὅλη νοῦς, τῶν οἰκεί- 23
 ων καὶ συγγενῶν ἀντιλαμβανομένη τρανώτερον. ἄτοπον δὲ οὐδὲν διὰ τῆς ἐντε- 24
 λεχείας πλεοναχῇ λεγομένης τὸν ὅρισμόν ἀποδοῦναι τῆς ψυχῆς πλεοναχῇ λεγο- 25
 μένης κάκεινης. τῶν γὰρ πλεοναχῇ λεγομένων τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς δι' ὁμοίων ἀποδι- 26
 δόναί προσήκει. τοῦ γὰρ ὑγιεινοῦ τῶν πλεοναχῇ λεγομένων ὄντος — ὑγιεινὸν 27
 γὰρ σιτίον καὶ σφυγμὸν καὶ ἀέρα φαμέν — διὰ τοῦ συμμετρου πλεοναχῇ λεγομέ- 28
 νου τὸν ὅρισμόν ἀποδίδομεν, ὑγιεινὸν γὰρ λέγοντες τὸ συμμετρως ἔχον πρὸς ὑγι- 29
 εῖαν. διὸ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, μέλλων ἀποδιδόναί τὸν ὅρισμόν, 'εἰ δὴ τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ 30
 πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ, φησιν, εἰπεῖν' ὡς τοῦ ὅρου ὀλοσχερῶς καὶ τὸν ὑπογραφικὸν 31
 ἀποδοθησομένου τρόπον.

13.9 Ὡς μὲν οὖν Ἀριστοτέλης ἀθάνατον οἶδε τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὡς αὐ-
 τὸς παρὰ τὸ πλεοναχῶς ἠπάτησαι, δῆλον. τοῦ δὲ δοκεῖν τισι μήτ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυ-

6–10 ἐνίων–ἐντελεχείας] cf. Arist., *de An.* 413a 5–7; Phlp., *in de An.* 204,18–19 Hayduck
 13–14 χαλεπὸν–συνέξει] cf. Arist., *de An.* 411b 18 14–15 οὐδὲν–χωριστά] cf. Arist., *de An.*
 413a 6–7 15–16 ἔτι–πλοίου] cf. Arist., *de An.* 413a 8–9 26–29 τοῦ–ὑγείαν] cf. Phlp., *in de*
An. 206,1–18 Hayduck 29–30 εἰ–εἰπεῖν] cf. Arist., *de An.* 412b 4 30–31 ὡς–τρόπον] cf.
 Phlp., *in de An.* 205,30–206,1 Hayduck

21 κινήσεως] κυρίως L Mohler 24–25 τὸν–λεγομένης¹ om. S 28 γὰρ om. L 29 δὴ] δέ Mohler

separable and do not perish with the body. For it is necessary for the act to be such as to be even without that of which it is an act, and not to perish with the organ of which it has made use. Since an activity of this act is separate from the body, it is then necessary that it too be separate and continue to exist after separation from the body.

13.8 Aristotle, having expounded these arguments, introduces the definition of the soul: 'The act of some parts belongs to the parts themselves', he says, speaking of the vegetative and sensory. 'But there is nothing to prevent others not being so', i.e., separable, he says, speaking of the rational. For since the soul does something by making use of the body, but contemplates without needing it, 'nothing forbids', says Aristotle, that some parts be separated from the body 'by the fact that they are not acts of anybody', even if the whole soul is said to be an act. For there would be some impediment if the act were of the body in its whole self and in all its activity. But since it is so in the whole of itself, but not in all its activity, for it is not so as far as the intellect is concerned, as is said in the first book *On the soul*: 'It is difficult even to imagine what part or how the intellect will hold it together'. There is nothing to prevent, says Aristotle, that it is act, but that some of the parts are separate. 'It is still not clear', he says, 'whether the soul is the act of the body as well as the helmsman of the ship', showing with these words more clearly how he understands the rational soul to be an act, since it sometimes uses it, sometimes not at all. Such is indeed the example of the helmsman: then, if the sensory part which makes use of it altogether is indivisible precisely on account of the fact that it makes use of it, the part of it which does not make use of it sometimes not at all, that is to say, the rational part, will remain altogether separate. The act, once separated from the body, will no longer be an act, nor will the soul be a soul, once separated from the movement — just as the helmsman of the ship, once it is destroyed, is no longer the helmsman — but all intellect, taking more clearly what is proper and akin to it. It is not at all absurd that, given a multiple meaning of act, one should also give a multiple definition of soul. For it is right to give things that have multiple meanings definitions through similar things. For since health is proper to things said in more than one way — we call food healthy, the heartbeat healthy, air healthy — we give the definition through that which conforms to it said in more than one sense, calling in fact generally 'healthy' that which is in conformity with health. This is why even Aristotle, wanting to give a definition, says: 'If it is necessary to say something that is common to every soul', as if to give a definition in a general and descriptive way.

13.9 That it seems to some that Aristotle, both in his books *On the soul* and in his writings on ethics, treats the argument of the immortality of the soul not

χῆς μήτ' ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς ἰσχυρίζομενον ἄπτεσθαι Ἀριστοτέλη τοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀθανασίας λόγου, ἀλλ' ἐνδοιάζοντι ἐοικότα, ὃ δὴ καὶ Πλήθων ἐν ὀνειδίει προφέρων αὐτῷ φαίνεται — καίτοι τὸ θνητὴν αὐτὸν αὐτὴν δοξάζειν οὐκ εἴρηκε πολλὰ καὶ ταῦτα κατ' αὐτοῦ νεανιευσάμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ συκοφαντίαν αὐτὸ καλεῖ —, αἴτιον 5 τὸ τὰς ἐπιστήμας κατὰ γένη διελόμενον τοὺς προσήκοντας ἐκάστη λόγους ἀποδιδόναι πειρᾶσθαι, διακεκριμένην τὴν διδασκαλίαν ποιούμενον σφῶν, ἀλλὰ μὴ μιγνύντα τε καὶ συγχέοντα, τὸ τοὺς ἐκάστης ὅρους ὑπερπηδᾶν πρὸς ἀπαιδεύτου ἡγούμενον.

13.10 Ὡς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ περὶ ζώων μορίων πρώτῳ δῆλον ποιῶν 'πότερον, φησί, περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς τῆς φυσικῆς ἐστὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν ἢ περὶ τίνος; 10 εἰ γὰρ περὶ πάσης, οὐδεμία λείπεται παρὰ τὴν φυσικὴν ἐπιστήμην φιλοσοφία'. εἴη γὰρ ἂν πάντων ἡ φυσικὴ γνῶσις, εἴπερ ὁ μὲν νοῦς τῶν νοητῶν ἐστὶ νοῦς, ὡς καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἴσθησις, τῆς δ' αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης περὶ νοῦ καὶ τῶν 188 νοητῶν θεωρῆσαι, ἐπειδὴ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα θεωρία ἡ αὐτὴ | πάντων. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἢ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν σκέψις τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας ἐστί, καὶ ἡ περὶ τοῦ νοῦ ἐκεί- 15 νης ἂν εἴη. ταῦτ' ἄρα οὐτ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς οὐτ' ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς ἐναργέστερον περὶ τούτου διαλεχθῆναι ἠθέλησε, τῇ πρώτῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ τὴν τοιαύτην πραγματείαν παρεῖς. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' οὕτως οὐδένα λόγον περὶ τούτου πεποιημένος οὐδὲ πάντα καταλελοιπῶς φαίνεται· ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ἐν τε τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς ἐν τε τοῖς περὶ 20 ζώων ἐδίδαξεν, ἐρρωμενέστατα ἂν τις ἔχοι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποδεικνύειν ἀθάνατον, ὡς δὴ καὶ ἡμῖν ἤδη καλῶς ἀποδέδεικται, ἐξ αὐτῶν λαβοῦσι τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν ῥημάτων τὰ λήμματα.

13.11 Τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ τοῖς περὶ φύσεως ποιεῖ. ἐν γὰρ τῷ δευτέρῳ τὴν φύσιν ποιητικὸν ἐπιστήσας αἴτιον φυσικῷ πρέποντα ποιῶν, ἐν τῷ τελευταίῳ καὶ τὴν 25 ἐξηρημένην αἰτίαν ζητεῖ — ἢ δέ ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον κινεῖν — οὐ μὴν ὡς ἄσχετον καὶ ἀπόλυτον, ἀλλ' ὡς σχέσιν ἔχουσιν πρὸς τὸ κινητόν, ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως ἀναδραμῶν εἰς αὐτήν. τοῦτο γὰρ φυσικοῦ, οὐ τὰ ἔνυλα μόνον καὶ κινητά, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐξηρημένα σκέπτεσθαι καὶ ἀκίνητα, οὕτω γε μὴν ὡς σχέσιν ἔχοντα πρὸς τὰ κινητά. 'ἄνευ γὰρ κινήσεως, ἣ φησι Θεόφραστος, περὶ οὐδενὸς λεκτέον ἂν εἴη τῷ φυσικῷ'. ἐν δέ γε τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πάντα ὑπερاناβὰς καὶ δι' ἄλλης ἐφόδου τὴν 30 μίαν τῶν πάντων ἀρχὴν καὶ μάλα ἐπιστημονικῆς ἀνευρῶν καὶ προσηκούσης τῇ πρώτῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἐν εἶναι αὐτὴν διατείνεται. καὶ ταυτὸν ἐκεῖ νοῦν τε καὶ νοητὸν καὶ νόησιν εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν καὶ δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν. ἐξάψας δ' αὐτῆς πάντα κα-

10–11 πότερον–φιλοσοφία] Arist., PA 641a 33–36 10–16 πότερον–εἴη] cf. Phlp., in de An. 10,16–21 12–16 εἴη–εἴη] cf. Arist., PA 641b 1–4 29–30 ἄνευ–φυσικῷ] cf. Thphr. Fragmenta 18 Wimmer (= Simpl., in Phys. 20,19–21 Diels) 32–422,2 καί–κοίρανος] cf. Simpl., in Phys. 148,19–22 Diels

2 ἐνδιόζοντι S L post corr.: ἐνδοιάζοντι corr. Mohler; cf. infra 11.11 7 τοὺς e τῆς corr. L 10 φυτικῆς L 15 περὶ om. S Mohler 23 καὶ S 24 ποιητικὴν Mohler 31 ἐπιστημονικῶς S

assertively, but almost as if it were in doubt, which even Plethon seems to blame him for (although he did not say that Aristotle thinks it is mortal, although he has hurled many insolences at him), is because he tries, having distinguished knowledge by kinds, to make arguments appropriate to each of them, keeping their teachings distinct, without mixing them up and confusing them, believing it proper of an uneducated person to override the definitions of each.

13.10 Why does Aristotle himself, clarifying this in the first book *On the Parts of Animals*, say: 'Is the argument related to the physical soul in general or to one in particular? If in general, there remains no science other than physics'. Physics would in fact be knowledge of all things, since intellect is intellect of the intelligible, and sensation is sensation of the sensible, and it would be the task of the same science to investigate the intellect and the sensible, since an investigation of things in relation to each other would be the same for all. Then, since the study of the intelligibles belongs to the first philosophy, the study of the intellect should also be its prerogative. Therefore, neither in the books on the soul nor in those on ethics does he wish to discuss them more clearly, having reserved this treatment for the first philosophy. Nevertheless, it does not appear that he does not discuss them at all, nor that he leaves them out altogether, but from the things he teaches in the books on the soul or in the writings on animals, one could firmly prove the immortality of the soul, as, moreover, we too have already well proved, drawing from those writings the content of Aristotle's words.

13.11 He also writes this in the books of the *Physics*. In the second, he deals with nature as an efficient cause, writing that this is the prerogative of physics, and in the last, he then investigates the transcendent one — which is the Prime Mover — not insofar as it is infinite and imperishable, but insofar as it is in relation to being in motion, thus moving from motion to this. For this is the object of physics: not only material or moving things, but also the contemplation of transcendent and immovable things, insofar as they are in relation to moving objects. 'Without motion, in fact,' as Theophrastus says, 'physics can explain nothing'. In the books of the *Metaphysics*, once all this has been overcome and the unique cause of all things has been found through a different approach, one that is truly scientific and suited to first philosophy, it is argued that this cause is one. And there the intellect, the thinkable and the thought, the substance, the potency and the act are one. And attaching everything to it as to the surest

θαπερεί τινος ἀσφαλεστάτης ἀγκύρας καὶ σεβασθεὶς αὐτὴν ἐνθέως ἀναβοᾷ· ‘οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη, εἷς κοίρανος’. οὕτως Ἀριστοτέλης οἰκείως ἐκάστης ἐπιστήμης τοὺς λόγους ἀποδιδούς καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ φυσικῶς θεωρεῖ καὶ τὰ θεολογικὰ θεολογικῶς. καὶ τοῖς ἐγκαλοῦσιν αὐτῷ ὡς ἐνδοιαστῶς ἀπτομένῳ, τοῦ γε περὶ ἀθανασίας ψυχῆς λόγου, οὐκ ἐνδίδωσιν, οἷός τε ὢν δεῖξαι σφίσι μηδὲν περαίνου- 5
σι κατ’ αὐτοῦ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων τοσαῦτα ἀρκεῖ. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ σου ἴδωμεν.

14.1 Λέγεις σὺ Ἀριστοτέλει συνηγορῶν τὰ ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερα πρῶτα καὶ κυρίως ὄντα εἶναι. τὸ δ’ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει. ἀλλὰ τὰ τῷ νῶ γνωριμώτερα, ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, ἧ φησι καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀρι- 10
στοτέλης ἐν φυσικῇ, ἀντιφάσκειν μὴ αἰσχυρόμενος.

14.2 Θεόδωρος ‘τὰ ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερα καὶ πρῶτα κυρίως’, ἀλλ’ οὐ ‘πρῶτα καὶ κυρίως ὄντα’ φησίν, οὐδ’ οὕτω ταῖς χωρισταῖς καὶ θείαις οὐσίαις ταῦτα παραθεω-
ρῶν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς καθόλου, τοῖς γε ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς. ἥς δὴ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης δόξης
ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐν κατηγορίαις μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ φυσικῇ, οὐκ ἀντιφάσκων ἑαυτῷ,
ὡς αὐτὸς ἐμπληκτε οἶει, ἀλλὰ καὶ μάλα σύμφωνος ὢν. νομίσας δ’, ὧ κακόδοιμον, 15
ὡς εἰ λάβοις Θεόδωρον κυρίως ὄντα τὰ καθέκαστα εἰρηκότα, ἐπάξειν ἄτοπὸν τι
κατ’ αὐτοῦ τὴν λέξιν μετέθηκας, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔλαθες κακουργῶν. δεδοσθω δὲ ὁμως
189 καὶ κυρίως ὄντα τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα | εἰρηκέναι, οὐδ’ οὕτως ἡμᾶς αἰρήσεις. ἀποδέδει-
κται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς πρότερον τὰ καθέκαστα πρῶτας καὶ κυριωτάτας
καὶ μάλιστα οὐσίας ὄντα. σὺ δ’ εἰ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀντειπεῖν ἐβούλου αὐτῷ, τί οὐ καὶ 20
πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀπήντας, ὧ τὰ καθέκαστα δείκνυσι πρῶτα; ἀλλὰ παρεῖς τὸ ἀντι-
λέγειν, ἄτοπὸν τι οὐδαμῇ προσῆκον ἐπάγεις καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθαι φά-
σκεας, αὐτὸς ὢν ἀναιδέστατος πάντων. ἐπεὶ οὖν σὺ πρὸς τοῦτο οὐδ’ ἀντιβλέψαι
ἐτόλμησας, ἡμεῖς αὐτὸ καθάπερ ἀήττητον ἐάσαντες πρὸς τὸ ἄτοπὸν σου ἀπαν-
τῶντες φαμέν, ὡς ἄλλως μὲν τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα πρῶτα, ἄλλως δὲ τὰς χωριστὰς καὶ 25
θείας οὐσίας πρῶτας φαμέν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ καθέκαστα, καὶ δι’ ἃς ἔφαμεν πρότερον
αἰτίας καὶ ἔτι ὡς δι’ αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῶν χωριστῶν ἐκείνων καὶ θείων οὐσιῶν
ἀναγόμενοι γινώσκιν, πρῶτα φαμέν· τὰς δὲ χωριστὰς οὐσίας, ὡς καὶ φύσει καὶ ἀξι-
ώματι καὶ τῷ αἰτίῳ τῶν τῆδε πολλῶν πρεσβυτέρας οὖσας καὶ ὡς διακυβερνώσας
τουτὶ τὸ πᾶν. πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου δύναμις ἐκεῖθεν κυβερνᾶται, ὡς ὁ 30
ἡμέτερος προστάτης Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν.

7–10 Λέγεις–αἰσχυρόμενος] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 166,15–18 Mohler 11–12 τὰ–ὄντα] Theod. Gazes, *Adv. Plethonem* 154,36–155,1 Mohler

1–2 οὐκ–κοίρανος] Arist., *Metaphys.* 1076a 4 (= Hom., *Il.* 2,204) 7 Ἀριστοτέλει συνηγορῶν] cf. Arist., *Phys.* 184a 16–23 18–20 ἀποδέδεικται–ὄντα] cf. *supra* 8.4

1 ἀγκύρας e corr. L 8 τῷ om. L 12 καὶ θείαις in textu om., in marg suppl. S 19 αὐτοῖς S L Mohler: correxi 26 γὰρ in textu om., supra lin. suppl. L | ἔφημεν L (cf. *infra* 23.2)

anchor and idolising it as if by divine invasion, he cries out: 'It is not good for many to command, let one alone be the commander'. Thus Aristotle, as he appropriately presents timely arguments for each science, observes physical phenomena physically and theological ones theologically. And in the face of those who accuse him of having treated confusingly, for example, the subject of the immortality of the soul, he does not bend, but rather is able to prove to them that they can prove nothing against him. So far as this argument is concerned, that is enough; let us now see the rest of your arguments.

14.1 'You say in agreement with Aristotle that the things most knowable to us are first and most proper entities, but this is not so. Things knowable by the intellect, on the other hand, are such, as Aristotle also says in the *Physics* without being ashamed to contradict himself.'

14.2 Theodoros says that the things that are most knowable to us are 'properly prime', but not that they are 'prime entities' and 'in a most proper way', without looking at them in this way as separate and divine substances, but as universals, the things that are in the many. Aristotle is not only of this opinion in the *Categories*, but also in the *Physics*, without contradicting himself, as you, fool, think, but rather confirming himself. O miserable one, thinking that, if you had caught Theodoros saying that individuals are 'entities in a more proper way', you could have brought something absurd into play against him. You have modified the quotation, but you have not failed to make a mistake. Let's even admit that he said that individuals are 'entities in a more proper way': even then you would not put us on the spot. In fact, it has been proven by him and ourselves before that individuals are prime substances in their own right and to the highest degree. You, if you also wanted to oppose him in this case, why did you not also reply to this argument, by which it is proven that individuals are 'prime'? But, leaving aside the fact that you wanted to counter-argue, you do not bring anything absurd into play when you say that Aristotle 'is not ashamed', you who are the most shameless of all. So, since you did not have the courage even to oppose this issue, we, leaving it aside as something unobjectionable, in response to your absurdity say on the one hand that we call individuals 'first', and on the other that we call separate and divine substances 'first'. We call individuals 'first' both for the reasons we have stated above and, again, because through them we are led to the knowledge of the separate and divine substances — the separate substances, because both by nature and definition they are far more important than the cause that generated the things of this world, and because they govern this universe. For every movement of this earth is governed from there, as our guide Aristotle says.

15.1 Ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τόδε ἀπαντητέον. ὦν, φῆς, πρώτως τὰ συμβεβηκότα κατηγορεῖται, ταῦτα πρότερα εἶναι καὶ κυριώτερα καὶ μᾶλλον ὄντα.

15.2 Ὡν, φησι Θεόδωρος, πρώτως τὰ συμβεβηκότα κατηγορεῖται, ταῦτα πρότερα εἶναι καὶ κυριώτερα καὶ μάλιστα ὄντα, τοῖς καθόλου καὶ ἀχωρίστοις αὐ- 5
τὰ παραβάλλον, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν πάντων ἀρχῇ. διὸ καὶ ἐπιφέρει· 'ὁ γὰρ τίς ἄνθρωπος περιπατεῖ, οὐχ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκός'. σὺ δ' οὕτω μω-
ρὸς εἶ, ὥστε συκοφαντεῖν ἐθέλων ἐπὶ φανεροῖς οὕτω συκοφαντεῖς, ἐφ' οἷς οὐδέ-
να ἂν λήσης, ἀλλὰ κἂν ὑπὸ παίδων ἀλοΐης συκοφαντῶν καὶ καθάπερ τις μαινόμε- 10
νος καὶ λυτῶν, δάκνειν μὲν καὶ μάλα ἐπιθυμῶν, μὴ δυνάμενος δέ, εἴτα συνηγο-
ρεῖς Πλήθωνι, ὃς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον συνηκας αὐτοῦ, καθότι Ἀριστοτέλους ἐπιλαμβά-
νεται, ἢ εἰ ἐτύγχανες ὦν λίθος καὶ οὗτος ὑπερμεγέθης. εἰ γὰρ ᾤετο Πλήθων Ἀρι-
στοτέλη, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὑπ' ἀναισθησίας οἶει, τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τῶν χωριστῶν οὐσι-
ῶν κυριωτέρας λέγειν οὐσίας, ῥᾶστα ἂν αὐτὸν καὶ διαβραχέων ἐξήλεγξεν, ἀλλ' οὐ
τοσοῦτον ἐπόνησεν ἂν, ὥστε καὶ ἀποκαμεῖν. ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο αὐτὸν ᾤετο λέγειν, 15
ἀλλ' ὅπερ καὶ ἀληθὲς ἦν, τὸ τὰ καθόλου τά γε ἀχώριστα δευτέρας εἶναι οὐσίας,
πρὸς ὃ δὴ καὶ ἀπαντᾷ Πυθαγορεῖσις ἐπόμενος τοῖς καθόλου τοῖς γε ἀχώριστοις τὸ
πρώτως ὑπάρχειν ἀπονέμουσι, τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἐν τοῖς μεριστοῖς καταλείπουσιν.

15.3 Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ τῶν Πυθαγορείων θέσις οὐκ ἄλογος — ἀλλ' οἷόν τε λό-
γοις ἐνδόξοις, ἄλλοις τε καὶ οἷς Πλήθων χρηται, κατασκευάσαι αὐτήν —, ἄλλος 20
ἂν εἶη λόγος. ἀλλ' ὅτι γε ἡ πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη Πλήθωνος διαφορὰ τοιαύτη τίς ἐστι,
καὶ τυφλῷ φασὶ δηλόν. σὺ δ' οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων εἰδώς, καθάπερ τις | σπερμολό-
γος παρακρούσματα ἅττα καὶ ταῦτα φαῦλα συνειλοχῶς φλυαρεῖς, μηδὲν μὲν πε-
ραίνων, γέλωτα δὲ μόνον ὀφλισκάνων παρὰ τοῖς ἔχουσι νοῦν. καί μοι δοκεῖ Πλή-
θων, εἰ περιῆν καὶ σε συνηγοροῦντα εἶδεν αὐτῷ, παρήνευσεν ἂν σοι σιγᾶν, ἐκείνα 25
τὰ ἱαμβεῖα καὶ μάλ' ἐν δίκῃ εἰπών· 'μέν, ὦ ταλαίπωρ', ἀτρέμας σοῖς ἐν δεμνίοις.
ὀρᾷς γὰρ οὐδέν, ὦν δοκεῖς σάφ' εἰδέναι'.

16.1 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον. ἴδωμεν δέ σου καὶ ἃ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν
φλυαρεῖς, ὥς ἂν σου καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν τὸ ἀμαθὲς ἐλεγχθῇ. ἐροῦμεν δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα,
οὐ τὰ εἶδη ἀναιροῦντες, ἀλλὰ σὲ μηδέν, ἐξ ὧν λέγεις, δεικνύντες περαίνοντα. οὐ 30
γὰρ ἀρκεῖ τὸ τάληθῃ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι δεῖ, καὶ τοῦτο μετ' ἐπιστή-

1–3 Ἀλλὰ–ὄντα] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 166,22–23 Mohler 4–5 Ὡν–ὄντα] Theod. Gazes, *Adv. Plethonem* 155,7–8 Mohler 6–7 ὁ–συμβεβηκός] Theod. Gazes, *Adv. Plethonem* 155,9–10 Mohler

15–18 ἀλλ'–καταλείπουσιν] cf. Simpl., in *Cat.* 91,22–26 Kalbfleisch 26–27 μὲν–εἰδέναι] Eur., *Or.* 258–259

6 καὶ om. L 12 ὑπερμέθης L 19 πυγορείων L 25 αὐτῷ S L: correxi 26 ἀτρέμα Mohler

15.1 ‘What remains then is to answer this: “That of which”, you say, “accidents are primarily predicated, these are first substances, properly so called and in a greater degree”’.

15.2 ‘That of which’, says Theodoros, ‘primarily the accidents are predicated, these are first substances, properly so called and in the highest degree’, contrasting these with universals and indivisibles, but not with the first cause of all things. Therefore he adds: ‘A certain man walks, not a man, as by accident’. But you are so stupid that, wanting to slander at all costs, you do it so openly that it cannot go unnoticed by anyone, and you would be discovered even by children to be slandering and raving like a madman, intending almost to bite, but without succeeding; then you pronounce in favour of Plethon, you who have not even understood of him in what way he contrasts himself with Aristotle, nor whether you are a pebble and he a rock. For if Plethon had thought, as you think because of your foolishness, that Aristotle defined individual substances as more proper than separable ones, he would have refuted him more easily and more briefly, and he would not have exerted himself so much that he would have been easily overthrown. But he did not think that Aristotle said so, but — which was also true — that universals, indivisible, were second substances; and against this assumption he replied by following the Pythagoreans, who attribute to universals, indivisible, being primary substances, while they attach the least importance to divisible things.

15.3 Even if the Pythagoreans’ thesis were not unreasonable — indeed it is possible to support it too, but with appropriate arguments, different from those used by Plethon — the argument would be different. But that there is such a difference between Plethon and Aristotle is clear even to a blind man. You, without knowing anything about these things, like a magpie going about collecting delirious and nonsensical things, speak nonsense without concluding anything good, but only arousing laughter in those who have an ounce of sense. And it seems to me that Plethon, if he were still alive and saw you supporting him in this way, would invite you to be silent, addressing these jumbles to you with good reason: ‘O unhappy one, stay quietly in your bed. For you see nothing of what you think you see clearly.’

16.1 So far, this is our judgement on these matters. Let us also see the nonsense you say about forms, in which way your ignorance is also exposed by them. We will speak in relation to these things not to refute the forms, but to prove that you do not come to any conclusion about the things you say. For it is not enough to say the truth; you must also prove it, and this with the support of

μης. ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ παντὸς καὶ τοῦ τυχόντος, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην ἐπαγγελλομένου. πρῶτον οὖν σου τὸ πρῶτον διακωδωνίσωμεν.

16.2 Ἄπαν γεννητόν ἐστιν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτῷ ὁμοίας τῷ εἶδει. τῶν δὲ γεννητῶν τὰ πολλὰ ἀπὸ σήψεως γεννᾶται τῆς γῆς οὐχ ὁμοίας οὔσης αὐτοῖς. ἐκεῖνα ἄρα γεννᾶται ἐκ τῶν εἰδῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς 5 ὁμοίων τῷ εἶδει.

16.3 Τουτὶ μὲν οὖν σου πρῶτον καὶ λίαν ἀπαίδευτον. εἰπὼν γὰρ ἅπαν γεννητὸν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτῷ ὁμοίας εἶναι τῷ εἶδει, ἐπάγεις τῶν δὲ γεννητῶν τὰ πολλὰ ἀπὸ σήψεως γεννώμενα οὐκ ἀφ' ὁμοίας αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν ἀρχῆς, ἀντίφασιν οὕτω φανεράν συγχωρῶν. ἀντιφάσκει γὰρ τὸ ὁμοίας τῷ οὐχ ὁμοίας· ἅπαν δὲ ἀνάγκη ἢ 10 φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι. ψευδὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν γεννητῶν ἀπὸ σήψεως γίνεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ πολλά, ἀλλ' ὀλίγα ἄττα, ὅπου γε ἔνιοι καὶ περὶ τῶν ὀλίγων τούτων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ τὰ εἶδη λέγειν τὰ γε χωριστὰ ὅμοια τῷ εἶδει τοῖς γεννητοῖς εἶναι καὶ λίαν ἀναίσθητον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ συνωνύμως τὸ εἶδος ἐκεῖνο τῶν γε εἰδῶν τῶν χωριστῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κατηγορεῖται — καθὼ ὅμοια τὰ νοητὰ 15 τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς φῆς —, εἶδος τε ἔσται εἰδῶν τοῦ γε πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ ἅμα ὁ τρίτος εἰσαχθήσεται ἄνθρωπος, καὶ πρόσσεστι τούτοις τὸ καὶ εἶδος εἰδῶν εἰρηκέναι δέον γένος εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ εἶδους, ἀλλὰ γένους τὸ εἶδος εἶδος, ἅμα δὲ καὶ συνώνυμα λέγειν τὰ γεννητὰ τοῖς χωριστοῖς Πλήθων οὐ συγχωρεῖ, ὁμώνυμά τε λέγων τίθεσθαι τοὺς ἀξιούντας τὰ εἶδη καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη βιαζόμενον 20 καλῶν. εἰ δ' ὁμωνύμως, πρῶτον μὲν πῶς τὸ ὁμωνύμως κατηγορούμενον εἶδος; οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ὁ κύων τοῦ τε χερσαίου τοῦ τε ἀστρώου εἶδος, ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμος φωνή. τὸ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη τοῖς γεννητοῖς ὅμοια λέγειν, παραδείγματα ὄντα οὐσιν εἰκόσιν, οὐ πάνυ τοι ἐσκεμμένως εἴρηται, δέον μᾶλλον ὁμοίαν φάναι τὴν εἰκόνα τῷ παραδείγματι. ὅλως δὲ κἂν εἰ δοθεῖν πάντα αὐτῷ ἀτοπώτατα ὄντα, καὶ 25 οὕτως ἀσυλλόγιστα συμπεραίνει. οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἅπαν γεννητὸν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐστὶν ὁμοίας αὐτῷ τῷ εἶδει, τὰ δὲ | εἶδη ὅμοια τῷ εἶδει τοῖς γεννητοῖς, συλλογισμός τις 191 ἔσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι.

17.1 Ἔτι πᾶσα γνῶσις ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν ἀφθάρτων, ἀναγκαίων ὄντων τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν. τὰ δὲ φυσικὰ πάντα ἐστὶ φθαρτὰ καὶ μεταβλητά, συμβεβηκότα ὄντα τῷ ἄλλως ἔχειν δύνασθαι. ἢ 30 γνῶσις ἄρα οὐκ ἔσται περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀφθάρτων πέρι. ἅπερ εἰσὶν αἱ ιδέαι.

3–6 Ἄπαν–εἶδει] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 167,4–7 Mohler 29–33 Ἔτι–ιδέαι] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 167,7–10 Mohler

21–23 εἰ–φωνή] cf. Simpl., in *Cat.* 26,21–26 Kalbfleisch

2 διακωδωνίσωμεν L 7 πρῶτον om. S Mohler 8 ἀπ' ἀρχῆς bis scr., postea primum del. L | τῷ εἶδει om. L 9 αὐτοῖς e corr. L 10 ἢ om. S Mohler 11 ἀποφάναι S 17 πρόσσεστι S: προσέτι Mohler 27 τῷ¹ om. S Mohler

knowledge. To do the first thing, in fact, is possible for anyone, the second only for those who stand for knowledge. So we will now examine your first assumption.

16.2 ‘All generated things come from a principle equal to them in form. But many generated things are generated from the corruption of the earth, which is not equal to them. Those things are then generated from forms that are equal to them in form.’

16.3 So this first assumption of yours here is far too crudely constructed. After saying, in fact, that all generated things come from a principle equal to them in form, you add that many of the generated things are generated by corruption, a principle not equal to them, thus establishing an obvious contradiction. The fact that they are equal contradicts the fact that they are not equal; everything is necessarily either affirmed or denied. It is false that many of the things generated come from corruption; for they are not many, but few, and some disagree even about these few. But, of course, to say that forms, separated, are equal to generated things as far as form is concerned is far too stupid. For if you say that form is synonymically that which is proper to forms, separate, and to the sensible (which is why you say that the intelligibles are similar to the sensible), it will then be the form of forms, proper both to that which comes before the many and to that which is in the many, and you will thus arrive at the paradox of the ‘third man’. Add to this the fact of saying that you must call the form of forms ‘kind’: for form is not form of form, but of kind. Even in saying that generated things are synonymous with respect to separable things, Plethon disagrees, saying that the proponents of the Ideas considered them to be homonymous, and pointing out that Aristotle himself strongly opposed them. But in the case of homonymy, one must first ask: how can the form be predicated homonymically? The dog, in fact, is not a form common to the animal and the constellation, but a word with the same name. To say, then, that forms are similar to generated things, when those (= forms) are models of those other things, which are images, is utterly far-fetched, whereas it is rather necessary to say that it is the image that is similar to the model. Even if one were to give him everything for good, absurd as it may be, even then he would arrive at syllogistically incorrect conclusions. For ‘every begotten thing comes from a principle equal to it as far as form is concerned, then forms are equal, as far as form is concerned, to begotten things’ will not be a syllogism due to the fact that this is given by necessity.

17.1 ‘Again, all knowledge is knowledge of incorruptible things, which are compelled not to be otherwise. All natural things are corruptible and changeable, since they are constrained from being able to be otherwise. There will

17.2 Περί τῶν ἀφθάρτων καὶ ἡμεῖς τὴν ἐπιστήμην φαμέν τὴν γὰρ ἐπιστήμην οἶμαί σε γνῶσιν ἐνταῦθα καλεῖν· ἐξ ἀναγκαίων γὰρ καὶ αἰδίων καὶ οὐκ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν ἢ ἀπόδειξις, ἥ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κτῶμεθα. οὐ μὴν διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰς ἰδέας ἀνάγκη τίθεσθαι, ἅμα μὲν ὁμωνύμως τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα κατηγορουμένων, ὥστε καὶ κτησαμένοις τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκείνων οὕτω τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπιστήμην συμβήσεται κτήσασθαι, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ τὰ καθόλου, τὰ γε ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς συνωνύμως κατ' αὐτῶν κατηγορούμενα, ἱκανὰ πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ὑπάρχειν, ἀφθαρτα ὄντα καὶ ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, τῷ τε διαμένειν αἰεὶ — ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἡ τὸ πᾶν, ἄνθρωπος ἔσται καὶ ἵππος καὶ βοῦς —, τῷ τε τὰς ὁλότητας ἀφθάρτους ἔχειν, κἂν ἔχη τὰ μέρη φθαρτά. ἄτοπον δὲ οὐδὲν τίθεσθαι τι τοιοῦτον· τὰ γὰρ ἀπλᾶ σώματα, ἃ στοιχεῖα φαμέν, τὰς ὁλότητας ἀφθάρτους ἔχοντα τὰ μέρη γε μὴν ἔχει φθαρτά. εἰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε φθαρήσεσθαι αἰδία τις φαίη τὰ καθόλου, εὐλόγᾳ τε φήσει καὶ Πλάτῳ συνωδᾶ. ὃς ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τοὺς θεοὺς φησιν ἀθανάτους μὲν οὐκ εἶναι οὐδ' ἀλύτους τὸ πάμπαν, οὗ τι γε μὴν λυθήσεσθαι γε οὐδὲ τεύξεσθαι θανάτου μοίρας.

17.3 Εἰ δὴ τὰ καθόλου τοσαυταχῇ λέγειν ἐνδέχεται αἰδία, ἢ δὲ ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τοιούτων, ἥ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κτῶμεθα, οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὰ χωριστὰ εἶδη τίθεναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν μὴ ὄντων τῶν χωριστῶν ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἀναιρεῖται· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ὧν εἰσιν ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἷτια γνωριστικά, τούτων ἐπιστήμην εἶναι χρή· τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἷτια γνωριστικά, καὶ τούτων δήπου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι ἀνάγκη. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων εἰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων εἶναι φαμέν, τῇ δὲ περὶ φύσεως πραγματεῖα περὶ τοῦ κινήτου ὄντος ἢ τοιοῦτον ἢ σκέψις ἔστι — τοῦτο δ' αἰεὶ ἢ τοιοῦτον ὡσαύτως ἔχει — καὶ τὴν περὶ φύσεως θεωρίαν ἐπιστήμην ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ὅτι δὲ τὸ κινήτῳ ὄντι ἢ τοιοῦτο τῇ φυσικῇ ὑποκείμενον, διήλον ἐξ ὧν τε τὴν φύσιν ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ὀρίζομεθα, ἐξ ὧν τε Θεόφραστος φησι περὶ οὐδενὸς ἄνευ κινήσεως λεκτέον εἶναι τῷ φυσικῷ. εἰ δὲ τις τὴν περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμην φιλονεικῶν ἀναιρεῖ διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς μεταβολήν, τὴν Ἡρακλείτου θέσιν ἢ καὶ τὴν Κρατύλου συμβήσεται λέγειν αὐτῷ, τοῦ μὲν δις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ μὴ οἶόν τε ἐμβῆναι εἰπόντος, Κρατύλου δὲ μὴδὲ ἅπαξ. εἰ | γὰρ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀριθμῷ μεταβάλλειν οὐκ ἐπιστησόμεθα, διὰ τὸ εἶδει μὴ μεταβάλλειν ἐπιστησόμεθα. τὸ δὲ καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ πάντα φθαρτὰ λέγειν ἡλίθιον πάντη. τὰ τε γὰρ οὐράνια σώματα αἰδία πάντως καὶ ἀφθαρτα. τὰ τε ἀπλᾶ σώματα, ἃ στοιχεῖα φαμέν, κἂν τὰ μέρη φθαρτὰ ἔχη, ἀφθάρτους γε μὴν τὰς ὁλότητας

14–15 ἀθανάτους–μοίρας] cf. Plat., *Tim.* 41b 2–4 20–21 τῶν–ἀνάγκη] cf. Arist., *Phys.* 184a 10–14 26–30 εἰ–ἅπαξ] Arist., *Metaph.* 1010a 10–15 29–30 Κρατύλου–ἅπαξ] cf. Plat., *Crat.* 402a–c

2 σε] γε Mohler 6 τὰ om. L 13 τοὺς bis scr., postea primum radendo del. L ante 19 ἀρχαὶ add. αἰ, postea punctis del. L 21 τῶν] ὧν S 24 φύσεως] θέσεως S Mohler 25 φυσικῇ] φύσει S 29 μὴδὲ] μὴ S 31 ἡλίθιον S post 32 σώματα¹ scr. lin. 33 ἃ στοιχεῖα, postea del. L

therefore be no knowledge of natural and corruptible things, but only of incorruptible things. And these are the Ideas.'

17.2 Of incorruptible things we also say that there is 'scientific knowledge' (for I think you mean scientific knowledge there by the simple term 'knowledge'); a demonstration that moves from necessary premises that are always valid and cannot be otherwise is what we acquire scientific knowledge with. It is not for this reason that it is necessary to suppose the existence of Ideas, either because they predicate themselves homonymically of individuals, so that those who have acquired a knowledge of them can never attain a knowledge of physical phenomena, or because universals, i.e. those that are in the many and predicate themselves of those synonymically, are already sufficient for scientific knowledge, since they are incorruptible and, moreover, cannot be otherwise, both because of the fact that they always continue to exist (in fact, as long as the whole exists, man, horse, ox will exist), and because of the fact that they have the incorruptible totality, even if they have corruptible parts. There is nothing absurd in supposing something like this: for the simple bodies, which we call elements, although they have their incorruptible totality, have corruptible parts. Even if, due to the fact that they can never be destroyed, one were to say that universals are eternal, one would be saying reasonable things and agree with Plato. In the *Timaeus* he states, in fact, that the gods are neither immortal nor completely indestructible, but they will in no way be destroyed, nor will the fate of death befall them.

17.3 While it is certainly possible to say in this way that the individual is eternal, and the demonstration of these things is that by which we acquire scientific knowledge, it is not necessary, if there really is knowledge, to also bring separate forms into play. Even in the absence of the separate forms, knowledge is not excluded. On the contrary, if there are things of which there are cognitive principles and causes, there must be knowledge of them. There are cognitive principles and causes of physical phenomena, and of these it is undoubtedly necessary for there to be scientific knowledge. Without these, if we say that there is knowledge of things that are always in the same way, and the study of nature includes the observation of the mobile entity as such — and this is always, as such, in the same way — then the observation of nature is necessarily scientific knowledge. That the mobile entity as such is the object of physics is clear both from the things for which we define nature as the 'cause of motion' and from what Theophrastus says: of nothing that is not in motion can the student of nature speak. If one, wishing to pick a quarrel, were to exclude knowledge of nature on account of change in natural things, one would happen to support the thesis of Heraclitus or that of Cratylus; the former says that it is not possible to bathe in the same river twice, while the latter says not even once.

ἔχει. καίτοι πολὺ κάλλιον ἦν διὰ ταῦτα μέγιστα μέρη τοῦ κόσμου ὄντα καὶ τᾶλλα μικρὰ ὄντα φθορᾶς ἀπολύειν ἢ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καταγινώσκειν φθοράν. τὸ δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότα λέγειν τὰ φυσικὰ πάντα οὐχ ὑγιαίνοντος ἦν. τίτι γὰρ καὶ συμβήσεται; τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς τῶν πρὸς τι. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ καὶ δοθείη τὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἶναι, τὰ διανοητὰ — ταῦτα δ' εἰσὶ τὰ μαθηματικά — ἐπιστητὰ δὴπου θήσουσι; καίτοι οὔτε ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τὸν αὐτοαριθμὸν θεωρεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἀριθμὸν, οὔθ' ἡ γεωμετρία τὸ αὐτομέγεθος, ἀλλὰ τὸ μαθηματικόν. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐπιστῆμαι δὲ πάντως αὗται, εἰ μὴ σύ γ', ὦ λῶστε, ἄλλως ἀξιούς.

17.4 Εἰ δέ τις διὰ τὸ τὴν τῶν νοητῶν ἐπιστήμην βελτίω εἶναι πολλῶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ταύτην μόνην ἐπιστήμην καλεῖ, τὰς δ' ἄλλας οὐκ ἀποδέχεται — τὸ μὲν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκείνην βελτίω εἶναι καὶ ἀκριβεστέραν καὶ ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα, ἀνωτέραν τε πασῶν τῶν ἄλλων οὔσαν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ μάλιστα ἐπιστήμην καὶ θεῖαν· τό τε γὰρ ὑποκείμενον, περὶ ὃ πραγματεύεται, νοητὸν καὶ θεῖον ἐστίν, ταῖς τε ἀρχαῖς ἀπλουστέραις πολλῶ χρήται, τό τε εἶδος τῆς γνώσεως ἀκριβέστερον ἔχει τῶν ἄλλων, κἂν ἡ μὲν τῷ 'ὄτι' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν τῷ 'διότι' χρῶνται —, καίτοι περὶ τούτου ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις. ἀλλ' ἔστω νῦν ἐκείνης τὸ ὅτι τοῦ διότι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκριβέστερον· οὐ μὴν διὰ τοῦτο ἀπαξιώσομεν μὴ οὐ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, ἃς ἔφην, 'ἐπιστήμας' καλεῖν, εἰ μὴ σύ γε ταύτας ὑπὸ πλούτου σοφίας ἐκ τοῦ σοῦ βιβλίου διέγραψας. ὁ δ' ἐν Πολιτείαις Σωκράτης ὄμμα, φησι, ψυχῆς ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀποτυφλούμενον καὶ κατορυπτόμενον, διὰ τούτων μόνων, τῶν μαθηματικῶν δηλαδή, ζωπυροῦται καὶ ἀνεγείρεται, μυρίων ὃν κρεῖττον σωθῆναι σωματικῶν ὀφθαλμῶν.

17.5 Ἄλλ' ἴσως σὺ τῷ βελτίω τὴν σοφίαν εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν τὰς ἄλλας οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἐπιστήμας ἀξιῶν. οὐ γὰρ οἶσθα σὺ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἄλλην ἄλλης κατὰ πλείους τρόπους ἀκριβεστέραν τὴν οὔσαν καὶ προτέραν, ἐπιστήμας γε μὴν ἀπάσας. ἢ τε γὰρ τῷ διότι χρωμένη τῆς τῷ ὅτι ἀκριβεστέρα ἐστίν, ἢ τε νοητὸν ἔχουσα τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῆς αἰσθητὸν ἐχούσης, ἢ τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀπλουστέραις χρωμένη τῆς μετὰ προσθήκης τινός. ὣν αὐτὸς οὐδὲν εἰδὼς ἐξελαύνεις μὲν φυσικὴν, καταφρονεῖς δὲ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ὥσπερ δὲ αὐτὸς οὐρανὸν ὑπερاناβὰς καὶ τοῦ Διὸς γενόμενος ὁπαδὸς τὸν μυστικὸν Ἰακχὸν τοῖς περὶ ἐκείνον συγχορεύων θεοῖς, ἡμᾶς τε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐφημέρους καλεῖς καὶ περιφρονεῖς οὐ τὸν ἥλιον μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἄναστρον σφαῖραν αὐτήν. |

20–23 ὄμμα–ὀφθαλμῶν] cf. Plat., *Resp.* 527d 5–e 2

1 τᾶλλα S L, corr. Mohler 16 μαθητικῶν S 17 ἀπορήσειεν S 22 μόνον L 23 σωθῆναι om. S 31 ὁπαδὸς S 32 ἡμεῖς Mohler 33 σφαῖραν] σφαῖραν S

If we do not gain knowledge through the change of number, we will gain knowledge through the lack of change of form. To say then that all natural things are corruptible is beyond stupid. For celestial bodies are absolutely eternal and incorruptible. And the simple bodies, which we call 'elements', although they have corruptible parts, nevertheless have an incorruptible totality. It would certainly have been much better to free from corruption, through these very great entities of the cosmos, even the small ones, than to acknowledge, through them, the corruption of the larger ones. Then, to assert that all natural things are accidents is not proper for a sane person. Of what are they in fact accidents? The accident is something relative. And even if one were to admit that there is no knowledge of natural things, would one consider the things produced by thought — and specifically mathematics — to be objects of science? Certainly, neither does arithmetic study numbers in an abstract sense, but numbers in a mathematical sense, nor geometry magnitude in an abstract sense, but in a mathematical sense; and the same is true of other things. These are all absolutely sciences, my dear, however much you may think otherwise!

17.4 If, since the knowledge of the intelligibles is far better than that of the other sciences, one calls only that one 'science' and admits no others (we also hold that that science is better and more exact, since it is superior to all the other sciences; is more important and divine, for the object it treats is intelligible and divine; and it makes use of much simpler principles, and has a more precise form of knowledge than the others, and if the one mostly uses the 'that which', most of the mathematical ones use the 'because of which'), of course one might have doubts about this. But let the 'that which' of the one be more exact than the 'because of which' of the others: it is certainly not for this reason we reject the idea of not calling the others I mentioned 'sciences' as well, however much you have eradicated them from your book for excess of wisdom. Socrates says in the *Republic*: 'The eye of the soul, blinded and oppressed by other occupations, is piqued and awakened only by these (sciences), namely the mathematical ones; it is better that this be saved than an infinite number of eyes of the body.'

17.5 But perhaps you, in saying that philosophy is preferable to the other sciences, do not want to consider the others as sciences. For you do not know that, although one of the sciences is in many respects more exact and may come before another, they are still all sciences. And indeed the one that uses 'because of which' is more exact than the one that uses 'that which', which has an intelligible object, whereas the other has a perceptible one, and makes use of simpler principles than the one that has anything composed. You, knowing nothing of these things, reject physics and do not care for the mathematical sciences. Like one who, having ascended to the heavens, and become a companion of Zeus, dances around him with the other gods the song of Isaac of the mysteries, you

193 17.6 Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ καὶ τὰς μαθηματικὰς διαγράψομεν, οὐδ' οὕτως ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτὸ τὰ εἶδη τιθέναι. οὐ γάρ, εἰ τῶν μὲν ἀφθάρτων μόνων ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ εἶδη ἄφθαρτα, συλλογισμός τις ἔσται· ἐν γὰρ τῷ δευτέρῳ σχήματι κατηγορικός οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός, εἰ μὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀντιστρέφουσιν — ὅπερ ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἔστιν —. οὐ γάρ, 'εἴ τι ιδέα, ἄφθαρτον' καὶ 'εἴ τι ἄφθαρτον, ιδέα'. πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ ἄλλας 5 οὐσίας οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα — τὸν γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλη σοῦ χάριν ἐῷ — νοητὰς καὶ νοεράς παρὰ τὰς ιδέας τίθενται, καὶ πρὸ τῶν εἰδῶν τὸ αὐτοὸν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ γε ἐκείνου τὸ αὐτοέν. τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον κατὰ Πρόκλον οὐκ ὄν, ἀλλ' ἐν μόνον. ὥστε καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν μὴ ὄντων, αὐτῶν γε μὴν ἐπιστήμη ἔσται ἀφθάρτων τε ὄντων καὶ αἰδιῶν. οὐκ ἄρα ἐξ ὧν ὑπέθου, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁ βούλει συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι. 10

17.7 Ἵσως οὖν νεμεσήσουσιν ἡμῖν πλείστοι τοιαῦτα πρὸς σέ λέγουσιν, ἄνθρωπον ἀμαθῆ τε καὶ βέβηλον. ταυτὸν γάρ ἐστιν, ὥς εἰ καὶ πρὸς ἀγεωμετρήτους ἀποδείξουσιν ἂν ἐχρώμεθα γεωμετρικαῖς. συγγνώσονται δὲ ὅμως, ἅτε οὐ σοῦ γε χάριν τοῦ ἀμαθοῦς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων τῷ βιβλίῳ, ὥς δὴ τι λόγου ἄξιον 15 ἔχουσιν ἂν ιδεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ, βαθυτέρων τε ἀπτομένοις ζητημάτων καὶ τὴν σὴν ἔξιν ὑπερβαλλόντων καὶ τὸν λόγον ἔσθ' ὅτε μηκύνουσι. τούτοις μὲν οὖν σου τοῖν δυοῖν λόγοις ὁ μὲν πρῶτος ἀναίσθητόν σε ἀπέδειξεν, ὁ δὲ ἕτερος οὐδὲν συμπεραίνει. ἴδωμεν δέ σου καὶ τοὺς λοιπούς.

18.1 Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ἐπιπλέον ἅπαν οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει διὰ τὸ τῶν οὐκ ἀντιστρεφόμενων τὸ ἕτερον πλείω περιέχειν καθολικώτερον 20 ὄν. τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη τῶν ἐπιπλέον ὄντα καὶ καθολικώτερα περιέχει τὰ καθέκαστα ἐλάττω ὄντα καὶ μερικώτερα. τὰ ἄρα εἶδη πρῶτα καὶ κυριώτερα τῶν καθέκαστα.

18.2 Οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐκ τῶν τεθέντων τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι συμβαίνει τὸ τὰ εἶδη πρῶτα καὶ κυριώτερα τῶν καθέκαστα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν μόνον. 25 ὁ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς συγχωροῦμεν, ἣν περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς καθόλου λέγῃς, εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν χωριστῶν εἰδῶν, οὐ μόνον οὐδέν, ὥς εἴρηται, συμπεραίνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ θάτερον τῶν λημμάτων ψευδές. οὔτε γὰρ οὕτω καθόλου τὰ εἶδη φασὶν οἱ κομίσαντες, ὥς τῶν καθέκαστα περιεκτικά, ἀλλ' ἢ πλείστα μερικά τῇ μεθέξει ἐκείνων τοιαῦτα λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ καθέκαστα ἄνθρωποι τῇ τοῦ αὐτοανθρώπου μεθέξει 30 ἄνθρωποι. καὶ ἅμα, εἰ καὶ δώσει τίς τοῦτο, χαλεπὸν καὶ πλάσαι, πῶς περιέξει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμει, ἄτοπον· ἀτελέστερα γὰρ τῶν καθέκαστα ἔσται ἐνεργεῖα ὄντων, δυνάμει γε ἐκεῖνα ὄντα. εἰ δ' ἐνεργεία, γελοῖον· αἰσθητὰ τε γὰρ ἔσται καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ ἄπειρον ἕκαστον, ἐξ ἀπείρων τῶν κατὰ μέρος συγκείμενον. οὕτω σύ, Κρόνε, τὰ Πλάτωνος οἶσθα, Πλάτωνι συνηγορῶν. | 35

19–23 Καὶ–καθέκαστα] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 167, 11–14 Mohler

2 τῶν del. L | μόνον L 3 τῷ om. S Mohler 7 τοῦ om. L 12 ἀγεωμετρήτους in ἀγεωμετρίτους mut. S 14 βιβλίῳ] βυβλίῳ S | τι] τοι S Mohler 18 δέ] οὖν S 30 αὐτανθρώπου Mohler 33 τε om. Mohler 34 ἕκαστα Mohler

call us mortal men and look with contempt not only upon the sun, but also upon the very terrestrial sphere devoid of stars.

17.6 But even if we exclude the mathematical sciences, we can still postulate the existence of Ideas. For ‘if there is science only of incorruptible things, Ideas are incorruptible’ will not be a syllogism, as in the second figure there is no categorical syllogism, except in convertible propositions, which is not the case there. For it is not valid to say ‘if the idea is something, it is incorruptible’, and ‘if there is something incorruptible, it is the idea’. The Platonists — I leave out Aristotle for you — postulate the existence of many other intelligible and non-material substances besides Ideas, and before Ideas the Being-in-itself and before that the One-in-itself. The first principle for Proclus is not Being, in fact, but only the One. So even if there are no Ideas, there will be knowledge of those and of incorruptible and imperishable things. It is certainly not on the basis of what you presuppose that what you want ends up necessarily coinciding with the reality of things.

17.7 Most will perhaps resent us speaking to you, an ignorant and novice man, in this way. In fact, it is as if we were using geometric demonstrations against someone who is totally ignorant of geometry. However, they will come to understand, since you will not, you who are ignorant. For the benefit of those who will come across this book, should they ever feel they see anything worthy of mention in it, we deal with rather profound topics that exceed your capabilities and sometimes lengthen the discourse. So, of these two arguments of yours, the first has proven that you are obtuse, the second leads nowhere. Let us then look at your remaining arguments.

18.1 ‘And certainly not everything that is “mostly” finds reciprocal correspondence due to the fact that one of the things that are related contains more things as being more universal. The kinds and species, which are among the “mostly” and more universal entities, include the individuals, which are lesser and more particular. The Ideas then are to be considered in a primary and more proper way.’

18.2 Nor does it necessarily coincide with the reality of things that Ideas are to be considered primary and more proper than individuals, but only that they are not correlative. We also admit this, if you speak of universals in the many. If, on the other hand, you speak of the separate forms, not only — as has been said — is nothing concluded, but one of the premises is false. Even those who have dealt with it do not so generally understand the Ideas as comprising the individual, but these, insofar as they are numerous, are said to be particular because they participate in them. For individual men are men because they participate in man himself. And even if one were to admit this, it would be difficult to imagine how they (the Ideas) could comprehend them. It is absurd for

194 19.1 Καὶ μὲν δὴ τὰ εἶδη τῶν κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι ὀρίζονται αἰώνια παραδείγματα. τὸ δ' ὄν αἰωνίως ὑφέστηκε. πᾶν δὲ τὸ ὑφεστηκὸς παράδειγμα καὶ αἰώνιον καὶ ἐξῆς [...] καὶ τὸ αἰεὶ δὲ ὄν τοῦ παρὰ μέρος ὄντος μᾶλλον ὑπάρχον. τὸ οὖν εἶδος αἰεὶ ὄν τυγχάνει καὶ ἐξῆς.

19.2 Ἐν τούτοις ἄμφοις τοῖς λόγοις τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ διαρρήδην αἰτεῖς. λαβὼν γὰρ τὸ αἰωνίως ὑφεστηκὸς καὶ τὸ αἰεὶ ὄν μᾶλλον εἶναι οὐσίας τῶν καθεκάστα καὶ φθειρομένων, καὶ προσλαβὼν τὸ τὰ εἶδη αἰωνία τε καὶ αἰεὶ ὄντα εἶναι, ὅπερ οὐ δίδεται, οὐ συμπεραίνεις καὶ μᾶλλον οὐσίας εἶναι αὐτά. ἡμεῖς δὲ σοι φαμέν, ὡς ἐὰν μὲν δείξης τὰ εἶδη εἶναι, ἡμεῖς σοι παραχρήμα δώσομεν μᾶλλον τε οὐσίας καὶ κυριωτέρας εἶναι — ἀνάγκη γάρ — ἕως δ' ἂν μήτ' αὐτὸς οἴος τε ἦς δείξει, μήθ' ἡμεῖς διδῶμεν. τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖς λαμβάνων τὸ ζητούμενον ὡς ὁμολογούμενον.

20.1 Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἅπαν τέτρασιν αἰτίοις γίνεσθαι πέφυκε, ποιητικῶ αἰτίῳ πρώτῳ, εἰδικῶ ἐπομένῳ, ὑλικῶ ἀκολουθῶς, τελικῶ ἐφεξῆς. τὰ δὲ οὖν καθεκάστα τῶν γιγνομένων.

20.2 Πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτό σοι οὐ κατὰ Πλάτωνα εἴρηται, τέσσαρα τὰ αἷτια τιθεμένων· Ἀριστοτέλους γὰρ τοῦτο, οἱ δὲ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ ἕτερα δύο προστιθέασιν παραδειγματικόν τε καὶ ὀργανικόν. ἔπειτα τὸ ποιητικὸν οὐχ ἀπλῶς πρῶτον. τῇ γὰρ ἐπινοίᾳ πρῶτον τὸ τελικόν. ὁ γὰρ οἰκοδόμος προεπινοήσας, οἶαν δεῖ τὴν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομῆσαι, οἰκοδομεῖ. ψευδὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης πρῶτον λέγειν κατὰ πάντα τοῦ προτέρου τὰ σημαινόμενα· τῷ γὰρ ἀξιωματι μόνον πρῶτον, ἀγαθόν τε ὄν καὶ θεῖον καὶ ἐφετόν, τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ ἢ τῇ τάξει ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ προτέρου σημαινόμενοις, πῶς πρῶτον; ἀπλῶς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα. τὸ μὲν ἅπαν τὸ γινόμενον τέτρασιν αἰτίοις γίνεσθαι, ἀληθές, καίτοι περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ σήψεως ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου καὶ τύχης γιγνομένων ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις.

20.3 Ἀλλ' ἔστω τοῦτο νῦν ἀληθές, οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ. τὸ δὲ τὰ καθεκάστα τῶν γιγνομένων εἶναι, εἰ μὲν περὶ τῶν γεννητῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν τοῦτο λέγεις, ἀληθές, εἰ

1–4 Καὶ–τυγχάνει] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 167,15–21 Mohler 13–15 Ἀλλὰ–γιγνομένων] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 167,22–24 Mohler

17–18 οἱ–ὀργανικόν] cf. Simpl., *in Phys.* 3,13–19 et 316,21–25 Diels 18–23 τῇ–ἐπιχείρημα] cf. Simpl., *in Cat.* 421,11–29 Kalbfleisch

3 καὶ ἐξῆς] πρῶτον καὶ μᾶλλον ὄν τῶν εἰκόνων. τῶν τοίνυν καθεκάστα μᾶλλον οὐσίαι τὰ εἶδη in textu scr. Mohler coll. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 167,17–18 Mohler | καὶ^{III} om. spat. rel. L 4–5 καὶ ἐξῆς] τὰ δὲ καθεκάστα φθίρεται παρὰ μέρος, καὶ αὐτῶν ἢ παρὰ μέρος ἐνέργεια. δῆλον ἄρα τὸ λῆγον in textu scr. Mohler coll. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 167,20–21 Mohler 6 τούτοις L Mohler 7 αἰώνιον Mohler 9 οὐ om. L 11 ἀνάγκη Mohler | ἦς] ἦ S post 15 γιγνομένων in textu add. Mohler εἶναι λέγεται — γίγνεται δὲ ἐξ ὧν ἔφαμεν — ὕστερα ὄντα πρώτων ὄντων, καὶ ἔτι τοῦ εἶδους πρώτου γε ὄντος τῆς ὕλης, καθ' ὅποτερον οὖν ἂν εἴποις σημαινόμενον τοῦ προτέρου. δῆλον ἄρα τὸ λῆγον coll. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 167,24–26 Mohler 23 πῶς] τὸ S Mohler 24 αἰτίαις Mohler | περὶ om. S 24–25 ἀπ' αὐτομάτου L 25 ταυτομάτου S

them to comprehend the Ideas in potency: for they will be more incomplete than the individuals who are in act, whereas they are precisely in potency. And it is ridiculous, on the other hand, that they understand the Ideas in act: for they will then be sensitive, corporeal, and each one an infinite, being composed of infinite particular substances. You old fool, so you know Plato's writings and agree with him?

19.1 'And Ideas are by definition perennial models of natural things; their Being endures eternally. Every existing model is also eternal etc. [...] and an eternal Being exists more than a particular entity. Therefore form is something that always exists etc.'

19.2 In both of these arguments, you evidently take the basic assumption for granted. For if you postulate that an eternal and ever-existing entity has more substance than individuals who are perishable, and if you add to this the fact that Ideas are eternal and ever-existent, which is not proven, you do not derive from this that they are more substance. We tell you that, should you prove that the Ideas exist, we would grant you instantly that they have more substance and are principally substance (it would indeed be necessary in that case), but until you are able to prove it, we will not grant it. You take the basic assumption for granted, taking as proof what is not yet so.

20.1 'But every generated thing is generated by four causes: first the efficient, then the formal, then the material, and finally the final. Individuals are therefore among generated things...'

20.2 First of all, when you call into question the four causes, you are not speaking according to Plato: this is in fact a concept belonging to Aristotle, whereas the Platonists add two others, the paradigmatic and the instrumental. The efficient one is not, then, the first in an absolute sense. In fact, conceptually the first is the final one. The architect, after first thinking about what kind of house he has to build, builds it. It is also false to say that form comes before matter according to all the meanings of *πρότερος*; for it is first only in importance, in that it is perfect and divine and desirable. In terms of time, or order of succession, or the other meanings of *πρότερος*, how can it come first? It is easy to go against this assumption. The fact that 'every begotten thing is generated by four causes' is true, although one might have doubts about things that are generated by decomposition, or even accidentally or by chance.

20.3 But now, this maybe being true, I do not dispute it. The fact that individuals are among begotten things, if you mean by that things that are begotten and perish, is true, but if you speak of eternal things — I mean

δὲ περὶ τῶν αἰδίων — λέγω δὴ περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων σωμάτων —, ψευδές. ἀγένητα
 195 γὰρ ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἄφθαρτα ἐν τοῖς περὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀποδέδεικται. τό γε | μὴν ἐκ πρώ-
 των ὄντων τῶν καθόλου γίνεσθαι τὰ καθέκαστα ὕστερα ὄντα, εἰ μὲν περὶ τῶν
 χωριστῶν λέγεις εἰδῶν — περὶ γὰρ αὐτῶν καὶ φαίνεται τὸν λόγον ποιούμενος — οὐ-
 πω ἔδειξας εἶναι ταῦτα. ὥστε πῶς ἔσται πρῶτα; εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐνύλων λέγεις 5
 εἰδῶν, ἢ ψευδῇ λαμβάνεις ἢ ἀσυλλόγιστος ὁ λόγος ἐστί. ψευδῇ μὲν, εἰ τὰ καθό-
 λου φύσει πρῶτα ὄντα ἀπλῶς πρῶτα λαμβάνεις, τῶν καθέκαστα καὶ — ὡς πρὸς
 ἡμᾶς — πρώτων ὄντων καὶ ὡς ἐν αὐτοῖς τῶν καθόλου τὸ εἶναι ἐχόντων· ἀσυλλό-
 γιστος δέ, εἰ τὰ καθόλου τῇ φύσει πρῶτα λαβὼν, ἔπειτα τὸ ἀπλῶς πρῶτα ἀντὶ
 τοῦ τῇ φύσει πρῶτα μεταλαμβάνεις, παρὰ τὸ πῇ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀπατῶμενος. ὥστε 10
 πῶς δῆλον, φῆς, τὸ λῆγον, ὃ πάντα σὺ τολμῶν, οὕτω περιφανῶς παραλογι-
 ζόμενος;

21.1 Ἔτι γε μὴν δυοῖν τούτοις ὄντοις, νοῦ καὶ αἰσθήσεως, τὸν
 νοῦν ἅπας ὁ τῶν φιλοσόφων δῆμος φασὶ πρῶτον εἶναι καὶ κυριώ-
 τερον καὶ μᾶλλον ὄν, καθότι ὁ μὲν αἰεὶ ὦν τήν τε τῶν νοητῶν πάν- 15
 των [...].

21.2 Ἐκεῖνο μοι πρῶτον φράσον, ὃ λῶστε, πῶς ὁ νοῦς τῶν νοητῶν πάντων
 καὶ αἰσθητῶν κατάληψιν ἔχει, πῶς δ' ἡ αἴσθησις μόνων τῶν αἰσθητῶν θνητῇ οὐ-
 σα θνητῶν. εἰ γὰρ θνητοῦ τὸ τῶν θνητῶν ἔχειν κατάληψιν, καὶ ὁ νοῦς θνητὸς ἂν
 εἴη, ἢ κατάληψιν ἔχει τῶν αἰσθητῶν θνητῶν γε ὄντων. ἔπειτα οὐχ ἀπλῶς τὰ 20
 αἰσθητὰ θνητά, ἀλλὰ τὰ γεννητὰ μόνον καὶ φθαρτά. τὰ γὰρ οὐράνια αἰσθητὰ ὄν-
 τα, αἰδία ὅμως ἐστί. πῶς δὲ καὶ τὰ συγγενῇ τῷ νῷ μᾶλλον οὐσίαι; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὑφέ-
 στηκεν, ἀληθές, εἰ δ' οὐχ ὑφέστηκε, πῶς; τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις ὑπάρχοντα πῶς ἂν
 μᾶλλον οὐσίαι εἴεν τῶν ἐν οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ ὄντων; εἰ οὖν περὶ τῶν ὑφε-
 στηκόντων λέγεις εἰδῶν, τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ πάλιν αἰτεῖς. οὐπω γὰρ ἔδειξας εἶναι ταῦτα. 25
 ὥστε μὴ ματαιολόγει.

22.1 Πάνυ τοι ὀρθῶς φάσκει καὶ τῇ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀξίως καὶ
 ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμη. εὖ γε, ὃ Πλήθων, ὡς ἄμαχός σοι ὁ λόγος καὶ
 τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους σοφίας πολλῷ τῷ μέσῳ προέχων.

22.2 Εἰ μὲν ἄμαχος ἢ οὐκ ἄμαχος, αὐτό φασὶ δείξει. ἐκεῖνο δέ μοι λέγε, τίσι 30
 τῶν παλαιῶν Πλάτων Ἀριστοτέλους σοφώτερος ἔδοξεν, ὅπου τῶν μὲν θεμένων

11 δῆλον-λῆγον] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 167,21 et 167,26 Mohler 13-16 Ἔτι-πάντων] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 167,27-33 Mohler 27-29 Πάνυ-προέχων] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 168,4-6 Mohler

4 καὶ om. S Mohler 10 τῇ om. Mohler post 15-16 πάντων in textu add. Mohler καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κατάληψιν ἔχει, ἢ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν μόνων θνητῇ οὐσα θνητῶν ὄντων. ὅσῳ τοῖνυν τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ κυριώτερον, καὶ πάλιν τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ νοεῖν, τοσοῦτῳ καὶ τὰ εἴδη συγγενῇ αὐτῷ ὄντα πρῶτα καὶ κυριώτερα τῶν καθέκαστα αἰσθητῶν καὶ μεταβλητῶν ὑπαρχόντων coll. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 167,29-33 Mohler 18 μόνον L 21 καὶ om. S 24 καὶ om. L Mohler 24-25 ὑφεστώτων S Mohler

heavenly bodies — it is false. For it has been proven in the books *On Heaven* that those are begotten and incorruptible. And then that the individuals, which are successive entities, are generated from the first entities, the universals. If by these you mean the separate forms — indeed, it seems that your discourse is about them — you have not at all proved that this is indeed the case. So how are the first entities? If, on the other hand, you speak of the material forms, either you make a false claim or the argument is not logically rigorous. It is false if you intend universals, which are prime entities by nature, to be ‘prime in an absolute sense’, since individuals, according to us, are prime entities and have in them the being of universals; it is illogical, if, understanding universals to be prime by nature, you then arbitrarily exchange ‘prime in an absolute sense’ for ‘prime by nature’, confusing $\pi\eta$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\acute{\omega}\varsigma$. So how can you ever say ‘it is clear what follows’, you who are capable of anything, when you so blatantly put forward deceptive arguments?

21.1 ‘Again, of these two things, the intellect and sensation, the whole host of philosophers says that the intellect comes first, is principal and exists most, inasmuch as this, which always exists, has perception of all intelligible things...’

21.2 My dear, explain this to me first, how the intellect has perception of all intelligible and sensible things, while sensation, which is mortal, has perception only of mortal things. For if it is proper for a mortal being to have perception of mortal things, the intellect should also be mortal, since it has perception of sensible things, which are mortal. It follows that not all sensible things are mortal, but only those that are generated and corruptible. For the celestial bodies, although they are sensible things, are nevertheless imperishable. Besides, how can things congenial to the intellect be more substantial? If they exist, that is true, but if they do not exist, how then is it possible? For how could things that exist in other have more substance than the things in which they exist and which are in themselves? So if you speak of ideas as existing, you are again taking the basic assumption for granted. You have not yet proven, in fact, that this is the case. Therefore, do not rant any further.

22.1 ‘Speak very correctly and conveniently to the doctrine of Plato himself. Well said, Plethon, for your speech is unsurpassed and far surpasses the doctrine of Aristotle!’

22.2 Whether it is unsurpassable or not will be clear by itself. Tell me this, rather: To whom among the ancients did Plato seem wiser than Aristotle, since

τῷ Πλάτῳ οἱ πλείους καὶ βελτίους τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους μετ' ἀκριβείας ὑπεμνημάτι-
σαν, τῶν δ' Ἀριστοτέλει θεμένων ἔνιοι Πλάτῳ καὶ ἀντεῖπον. οὕτω δ' ἀχάλινον
ἴσχει τὸ κάθαρμα στόμα καὶ γλῶσσαν ἀκόλαστον, καὶ οὕτω τούτοις ἐαλώκει τοῖς
196 πάθεσιν, ὥστε λόγοις μὲν, οὐ δ' οἰσισινοῦν πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν χρῆται τοῦ ζητουμέ-
νου. κἂν χρῆσθαι δέ, παραλογίζεται | μᾶλλον, ἢ συλλογίζεται. αὐτός τε ὑπ' ἀμα- 5
θίας ἀπατῶμενος ῥᾶστα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους φενακίζειν καὶ λίαν ἐπιθυμῶν, ὑβρίζει
δ' εἰς Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν θεῖον οὕτω τοι ἰταμῶς, ψευδεῖς καὶ ἀσυμβλήτους
τοὺς σοφωτάτους ἐκείνου λόγους καλῶν καὶ Πλήθωνα σοφώτερον αὐτοῦ λέγειν
τολμῶν, δέδοικεν οὐδ' ὅπωςιοῦν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς λοιδορίαις χαίρει. καὶ μέγα ἐπὶ τῷ
προπηλακίζειν φρονεῖ, οὐ συνιεῖς Εὐριπίδου, τότε μὲν αἰσχίστην λέγοντος νόσον 10
τὴν 'ἀκόλαστον γλῶτταν', τότε δ' 'ἀχαλίνων στομάτων ἀνόμου τ' ἀφροσύνης τὸ
τέλος δυστυχίαν'. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἤδη τε ἔδωκας δίκην τῆς ἀκολάστου
σου γλώττης ἀπειληφῶς ἀξίας τὰς ἀμοιβάς, καὶ ἔτι δώσεις, ἐπειδάν σου καὶ τὰ
λοιπὰ τερετίσματα διελέγξωμεν. νῦν δέ σου τὸν καλὸν λόγον ἴδωμεν.

23.1 Ποῖον γὰρ ἄλλο τουτουῖ τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἀληθέστερον ἢ σο- 15
φώτερον, τοῦ γὰρ μέρους τὸ ὅλον μεῖζον, καὶ οὕτω τὰ εἶδη τε καὶ
τὰ γένη τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα μεῖζων οὐσία ἢ μᾶλλον;

23.2 Καὶ πῶς ἀληθὲς ἢ σοφὸν τὸ μεῖζον τῷ μᾶλλον λέγειν ταυτόν; τὸ μὲν γὰρ
μεῖζον μεγέθους περὶ οὐσίαν, μεμεγεθυμένης οὐσίας δηλαδὴ ἢ ὡς μεμεγεθυμέ-
νης. τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ποιῶν περὶ οὐσίαν, πεποιωμένης οὐσίας δηλαδὴ ἢ ὡς πεποιω- 20
μένης. αὐτίκα τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου μεῖζον φαμέν, οὐσίαν μεμεγεθυμένην
ἐτέρᾳ τοιαύτῃ παραμετροῦντες. καὶ τὸ γένος δὲ τοῦ εἶδους μεῖζον φαμέν — ἐπὶ
πλέον γὰρ τῷ γένει τις ἢ τῷ εἶδει ἀφορίζει — οὐσίαν ὡς μεμεγεθυμένην ἐτέρᾳ
τοιαύτῃ ἀντιπαρτιθέντες. τὴν τε γὰρ ὕλην ἐκτείνεσθαι τῷ ποσῷ, τὰ τε καθόλου
τῷ πολλὰ περιέχειν, οἷον ὅλ' ἅττα καὶ ἐκτεταμένα δοκεῖν. τὸ γὰρ καθόλου ὅλον τί 25
ἐστὶ. πολλὰ γὰρ περιέχει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου. τὴν δὲ χιόνα τοῦ γάλακτος μᾶλλον
λευκὴν φαμέν, πεποιωμένην οὐσίαν ἐτέρᾳ τοιαύτῃ παραβάλλοντες. καὶ τὸ εἶδος
δὲ τοῦ γένους μᾶλλον οὐσίαν φαμέν, ὡς πεποιωμένην οὐσίαν ἐτέρᾳ τοιαύτῃ πα-
ραθεωροῦντες. πεποιώται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους μᾶλλον τῇ διαφορᾷ ποιότητι
οὔσῃ. οὐσιώδει γε μὴν καὶ τοιοῦτον ἐνεργεῖα ἐστίν, οἷον δυνάμει τὸ γένος. διὸ 30
καὶ ὡς πεποιωμένην τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς πεποιωμένην.
οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἡ διαφορὰ ποιότητος ὡς συμβεβηκός, περὶ οὐσίαν γὰρ αὕτη τὸ ποιὸν
ἀφορίζει οὐσιώδους οὔσα, καθ' ὑποκειμένων τε καὶ συνωνύμως κατηγορουμένην

7–8 ψευδεῖς–καλῶν] cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 168,8–9 Mohler 8–9 Πλήθωνα–τολμῶν] cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 168,9–10 Mohler 15–17 Ποῖον–μᾶλλον] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 168,10–13 Mohler

11 ἀκόλαστον γλῶτταν] Eur., *Or.* 10 11–12 ἀχαλίνων–δυστυχίαν] Eur., *Bacch.* 386–387

4 οἷς τισινοῦν S L 14 τερετίσματα S L: correxi 17 μεῖζον Mohler

many and the worthiest of the Platonists commented scrupulously on Aristotle's writings, while some of the Aristotelians even contradicted Plato? That rogue thus keeps his unrestrained mouth and intemperate tongue at bay, and is so overcome by these evils that he uses words, yes, but not those that serve as demonstration of what we are seeking. And when he does use them, he cheats rather than using stringent arguments. And you, who, deceived by your ignorance, even have the courage to mock others and so foolishly outrage the divine Aristotle, calling his very wise writings 'false and incomprehensible' and daring to say that Plethon is wiser than him, and do not feel any fear, but rather take pleasure in your own vileness. And you take pride in your mud-slinging, not bearing in mind Euripides, when he speaks of the 'intemperate tongue' as the worst disease and when he says that 'the end of unrestrained mouths and boundless foolishness is misfortune'. But for this you have already paid the price for your intemperate tongue, and you will pay again, once we have refuted the rest of your nonsense as well. Let us now see your beautiful argument.

23.1 'For what other thing is truer and wiser than this axiom here, namely, that the whole is greater than the part, and so the species and kinds are greater substance than the individuals?'

23.2 And in what way is it true or wise to say that 'greater' (τὸ μείζον) is the same as 'more' (τὸ μᾶλλον)? In fact, 'greater' refers to the size of the substance, i.e. what size the substance is and how it has acquired this size. 'More' refers to the quality of the substance, i.e. what quality it has and how it has this quality. Immediately we say that two cubits is 'greater' than one cubit, thus measuring in magnitude one substance relative to another. And we say that the kind is 'greater' than the species (in fact, it is distinguished more by kind than by species), thus comparing in what way one substance is greater than another. For it seems that matter extends in quantity and universals extend to contain the many, as all things extend. The universal is in fact something whole and includes the many as its parts. We then say that snow is whiter than milk, comparing the quality of one substance with another. And we say that the species has 'more' substance than the kind, comparing how the substance has this quality with another. For the species is 'more' endowed with this quality than the kind because of a difference in quality. In relation to substance, the species is such in act as the kind is in potency. Therefore, we also say of such a substance in what way it has a certain quality and not simply that it has a certain quality, for thus there is no difference between quality and accident. This, which

τῶν κατ' αὐτὴν ἀτόμων. ταῦτ' ἄρα λευκὸν μὲν λευκοῦ μᾶλλον φαμέν, καὶ αὐτὸ
 ἑαυτοῦ ἦττον καὶ μᾶλλον λευκόν, ἄνθρωπον δὲ ἀνθρώπου μᾶλλον οὐ λέγομεν
 οὐδ' αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ ἦττον ἄνθρωπον. ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν ποιὸν
 περὶ οὐσίαν συμβεβηκὸς ὄν, καθ' ὃ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἦττον ἐπιδέχονται ἄν. τοῖς
 δὲ ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἀνθρώποις τί ἂν εἴη, καθ' ὃ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἦττον ἂν ἐπιδέχον- 5
 το; τὸ δὲ εἶδος τοῦ γένους μᾶλλον οὐσίαν φαμέν διὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ποιότητά τινα
 οὔσαν, οὐσιώδη γε μὴν. καθ' ἣν — ὡς εἴρηται — τὸ εἶδος τοιοῦτον ἐνεργεῖα ὑπάρ-
 χει, οἷον τὸ γένος δυνάμει ἐστί. διὸ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ μὲν | ποιὸν φησιν ἐπιδέχε-
 σθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον τοῦ θ' ὅπερ ἐστί, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν τοῦ θ' ὅπερ ἐστίν, οὐκ
 ἐπιδέχεσθαι. οὐσίαν γε μὴν μᾶλλον οὐσίας εἶναι τίθεται· τὰς δὲ νοητὰς καὶ θείας 10
 οὐσίας, δι' ἃς ἔφαμεν πρότερον αἰτίας, πρώτας τε καὶ κυριωτάτας καὶ μάλιστα
 οὐσίας φαμέν. τὸ δίπηχυ δὲ τοῦ πηχυαίου μᾶλλον οὐδεὶς φησιν, οὐδὲ τοδὶ τὸ
 λευκὸν τουδὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ μεῖζον, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι συμβέβηκε τῷ λευ-
 κῷ καὶ ποσῷ εἶναι.

23.3 Τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἴδωμεν τί Μιχαῆλος φησίν. οὐκ αἰδεῖται, φη- 15
 σί, τὸ καθόλου τοῦ κατὰ μέρος μεῖζον τιθέμενος, τὰ καθέκαστα
 μᾶλλον οὐσίας τῶν καθόλου λέγων, αὐτὸς ἀπάντων ἀναιδέστατος ὢν καὶ
 βιαζόμενος οὕτως ἀνέδην τὸ μεῖζον τῷ μᾶλλον ταυτὸν λέγειν. δέον λόγῳ αἰρεῖν,
 ἀλλὰ μὴ βιάζεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐφ' οὕτω φανεροῖς, ἐφ' οἷς κἂν παῖδες αὐτὸν ῥᾶστα
 ἐξαπατῶντα φωράσαιεν. ἔπειτα ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀρκεσθεῖς ταῖς κατὰ Θεοδώρου λει- 20
 δορίαις, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ πάντες τῆς πρὸς ἐκείνον αὐτοῦ βασκανίας ἀπολαύσαιεν δεινὸν
 ἠγούμενος, λοιδορεῖται καὶ Λατίνοις καὶ μάλα ἰταμῶς, ψελλίζοντας αὐτοῦς
 ὀνομάζων καὶ διεντερευμάτων ξυγκολλητάς, αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ τῶντιν ψελλιζό-
 μενος καὶ σπερμολογῶν ἔνθεν κάκεῖθεν καὶ ξυγκολλῶν κάκεῖνα κακῶς. ἐπιστή-
 μης τε γὰρ ἀποδέδεικται παρὰ πάντα τὸν λόγον μὴδ' ὅπως οὖν ἐπαίῳ, περὶ τε 25
 γραμματικὴν κἂν παῖδες ἐλέγξαιεν τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, οὕτως ἐπὶ φανεροῖς ἁμαρτά-
 νει.

23.4 Ὅλη δὲ ἡ τοῦ λόγου μεταχείρισις κακόζηλός τε καὶ λίαν εὐήθης καὶ με-
 τέχουσα δεινότητος οὐδ' ὅπως οἰοῦν. καὶ ἐν οἷς μὲν οὐ δεῖ, πέρα τοῦ δέοντος ἀδο-
 λεσχεῖ καὶ τὰς ἀκοὰς ἀποκναίει ἀπολόγους Ἀλκίνου διεξερχόμενος· ἐν δὲ τοῖς 30
 καιρίοις ἀμήχανος, ἄφωνος. καὶ δοκεῖ μὲν μέγα τι κυεῖν, ἀποκυεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ἢ
 μικρόν, ἢ τε ἀγγελία ὑποχάσκουσά τις καὶ κρημνοποιὸς καὶ τὸ ἀηδὲς καὶ ψυχρόν

15–17 οὐκ–καθόλου] cf. Theod. Gazes, *Adv. Plethonem* 155,20–25 Mohler et Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 168,15–16 Mohler 22–23 ψελλίζοντας–ξυγκολλητάς] cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 168,24–25 Mohler

1 κατ' αὐτὴν om. S | μᾶλλον in textu om., in marg. suppl. S 2 λευκόν in textu om., in marg. suppl. S 2–3 δὲ–ἄνθρωπον in textu om., in marg. suppl. S 3 ἐκείνης S 4 ἐπιδέχοιτο S Mohler 5–6 ἐπιδέχοντο ex ἐπιδέχοιτο corr. S 11 ἔφημεν L 23 καὶ in textu om., supra lin. suppl. L ξυγκολλητάς S L, -λ- supra lin. suppl. L | ὢν om. L 24 ξυγκολλῶν S 26 γραμματικῆς Mohler 28 δέ] τε S Mohler | μεταχείρισις L 29 πέρα] παρὰ S Mohler

is substantial, defines the quality of the substance, and is predicated synonymically on the indivisible subjects in it. Thus we say that one white man is whiter than another, and that this white man is darker or whiter than he is, but we do not say that one man is more man than another, or that this man is less or more man than himself. For in those, whiteness is a quality which for substance is an accident, for which more and less might be admitted. But for men, what is there in men, for which more and less could be admitted? We then say that the species has more substance than the kind because of a difference that is, yes, of quality, but also of substance. Because of this difference, as we have said, the species is such in act as the kind is in potency. Therefore, Aristotle also says that quality admits the more and the less of what is, while substance does not. On the other hand, it is held that one substance is ‘more’ substance; and we say that intelligible and divine substances, through which we spoke before of causes, are ‘first’ and ‘proper’ substances ‘principally’. No one says that two cubits are more cubit than one cubit, nor that this white is greater (than another white), unless by accident it happens that the white is a quantity.

23.3 That being so, let us see what Michael says about this. ‘He is not ashamed’, he says, ‘to affirm that the universal is greater than the particular’, saying ‘that individuals are more substance than universals’, he who is the most shameless of all and who shamelessly persists in saying that ‘greater’ (τὸ μείζον) is the same as ‘more’ (τὸ μᾶλλον); one has to convince with words and not by stubbornly persisting in an assertion, and one has to do so clearly enough that even children could easily catch him at fault. Then, as if he were not already paid off by the insults against Theodoros, and even thought it bad that they could not all profit from his envy of him, he slanders the Latins even more shamelessly, calling them ‘beginners’ and ‘weavers of thoughts’, he who is indeed a beginner and collects thoughts here and there, and who puts them together badly. Throughout the entire discourse, it has been proven that he has no grasp of doctrine at all. With regard to grammar, then, even children could correct his mistakes, so blatantly wrong is he!

23.4 The whole treatment of the argument, then, is distasteful, excessively naive and not at all extraordinary. And where that is not the case, he talks beyond the due and wears out his ears giving Alcinoan speeches; at opportune moments, however, he is resourceless, aphonic. He seems to conceive of something great and then gives birth to nothing that is not insignificant, a message that is open-mouthed, thunderous, obnoxious, all too silly and incap-

κατακόρως ἔχουσα καὶ οὐχ οἷα ῥαστώνην τοῖς μετιούσιν οὐδεμίαν ποιεῖν. Λατί-
 νους δὲ ἐν μὲν τῇ σφετέρᾳ αὐτῶν φωνῇ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἔμμετρον εἶδος τοῦ λόγου
 Πλάτων, εἰ παρῆν, ἐνθέους ἂν εἶπε καὶ κατεχομένους ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν Μουσῶν κά-
 κεῖθεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκείνων μελιρρύτων κρηνῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπομένους τὰ μέλη
 φέρειν ἡμῖν, ὡς καὶ ἀμιλλᾶσθαι ἂν Μάρωνι τῷ θείῳ ποιητῇ. ἐν δὲ τῷ καταλογά- 5
 δην πανδείνους ἂν τις ἴδοι καὶ πιθανοὺς καὶ πολύνους καὶ οἴους θυμὸν τε ἐγείρει
 καὶ ὀργὴν πραῦναι καὶ οἶκτον ἐπισπάσασθαι καὶ λόγους δημοτελεῖς συνθεῖναι καὶ
 μετὰ παρρησίας εἰπεῖν, πολὺ τὸ τερπνὸν καὶ ἐπαγωγὸν ἔχοντας, καὶ οὐ μόνον
 παῦρα τε καὶ μάλα λιγέως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διοσημεῖοις ἔσθ' ὅτε λέγοντας εἰκότα, ὡς
 μὴδ' ἂν παραχωρήσαιεν τῷ σοφωτάτῳ Κικέρωνι. 10

23.5 Τὰς δ' ἐπιστήμας ἀπάσας καὶ τὰς μεθόδους τῶν λόγων οὕτω τοι λῖαν
 ἠκρίβωσαν, ὡς μὴδὲ τοῖς περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη, εἰ περιεῖεν ἐκείνοι νῦν,
 παραχωρήσαι ἂν ὅπως οὖν. ἐν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὃ μὴ εὖρηταί τε αὐτοῖς ἀκριβῶς καὶ μέ-
 198 χρι τῶν λεπτοτάτων διηρεύνηται. καὶ εἰ παρῆς ἐνταῦθα καὶ συμπλακῆναι | ἐβού-
 λου τοῖς κρονικοῖς σου τουτοῖσι λόγοις θαρρήσας καὶ τρυγὸς τῶντι ἀπόζουσι, 15
 παῖδες σε νεήλυδες εὐθὺς ἐκ πρώτης εἰσβολῆς κἀνθαρὸν, οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ὄντα ἐξ-
 ἤλεγξαν ἂν. ἡ μὲν οὖν σφετέρᾳ αὐτῶν φωνῇ οὕτω τοι δι' ἀκριβείας σφίσι κατῶρ-
 θῶται. ἤσκηνται δὲ καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν καλῶς — ὅσοις αὐτῶν πρὸς τῇ σφετέρᾳ καὶ
 τήνδε μεμέληκε κτήσασθαι —, ὡς δὴ καὶ τοὺς ὥσπερ σὺ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐπισταμέ-
 νους φωνὴν μακρῷ παρευδοκμεῖν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ τοῖς τῶν παλαιῶν μετ' ἐπιμελεί- 20
 ας συνοῦσι συγγράμμασι — τῶν περὶ Δημοσθένη καὶ Ἰσοκράτη φημί — καὶ τῶν
 ἐκείνων ῥημάτων τε καὶ νοημάτων ἐμφορουμένοις δαψιλῶς — συμβαίνει μήτε
 ὀνομάζοντας πλημμελεῖν τοῖς ἐκείνων χρωμένους ὀνόμασι, κἀν ταῖς συνουσίαις
 εὐστόχως πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἀπαντᾶν τοῖς ἐκείνων καθάπερ κανόσι χρωμένους
 νοήμασιν, εὐπορίαν τὲ τοῦ λέγειν οὐκ ὀλίγην αὐτοὺς κεκτηῖσθαι, τοὺς τῶν παλαι- 25
 ῶν ἐκμανθάνειν λόγους καὶ ἐκμελετᾶν ὅτι μάλιστα ποιούμενους διὰ σπουδῆς.

23.6 Αὐτῷ δέ σοι οὐδένων ἄλλων σχεδὸν ἢ τοῖς Λιβανίου συγγράμμασιν ἐν-
 τετυχηκότη κατ' αὐτὸν ἀνάγκη καὶ ὀνομάζειν καὶ τοῖς νοήμασι χρῆσθαι, πρὸς δὲ
 τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν ὄνον τὸ τῆς παροιμίας πρὸς λύραν διατελεῖν. καὶ οὕτω λέγω, ὅτι
 οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνου εὐδοκμεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκπίπτεις πολλάκις καὶ καταθραύεις, ὃν 30
 εἰσῆεις, ὥσπερ οἱ μαλακοὶ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν τοὺς ἥρωας, οὓς ὑποδύονται. ἦν δέ
 ποτε καὶ δεῖρη βραχέ' ἄττα ἐξ ὑπογύου εἰπεῖν, διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀναληγσίας αἰεὶ διατε-
 λεῖν ἀμελέτητον ἄφωνος εὐθὺς γίνγη, ῥημάτων οὐδ' ὀλίγων οὐδ' ὅπως οἰοῦν εὐ-
 πορῶν. τίσι δὲ καὶ ἐντυχῶν τῶν Λατίνων, ὧ βδελυρέ, καὶ γνοὺς ἀπείρους τῶν
 Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων, κατηγορεῖς αὐτῶν ὡς ἀπ' ἀμάξης βοῶν, ὅτι οὐκ 35

29 ὄνον—λύραν] cf. e.g. Cratin., Frgm. 229

5 Μάρωνι e μάρρωνι corr. L 6 πανδείνους e corr. L: πανδήμους Mohler 8 ἐπαγωγὸν καὶ
 τερπνὸν S 16 ἐκβολῆς S Mohler 17–18 κατόρθωται S 23 συνουσίας S Mohler 26 διὰ] μετὰ S
 Mohler 30 καταθρήνεις L 32 αἰὲ Mohler

able of bringing any relief to his readers. As to the Latins, in their own language, a form of speech in verse, Plato, had it been possible, would have said that they are divinely inspired and possessed by the Muses, and that from there, plucking from those fountains and valleys from which the lyrical song flows like honey, they take it away from us, as if one could ever compete with the divine poet Maro. One could observe that they are very skilful, persuasive, and eloquent in prose and able to lift the soul, appease wrath, move to compassion, compose public speeches and speak in complete freedom, that they master grace and the ability to seduce with words, and that they speak not only in a concise and very harmonious manner, but sometimes even in the manner of divine signals, to the point that one cannot help but surrender to the superiority of the very wise Cicero.

23.5 They have studied all forms of knowledge and methods of research in such detail that neither the Platonists nor the Aristotelians, if they were still alive now, could compete. For there is not a single thing that has not been precisely discovered by them and investigated down to the smallest detail. And if it were you here, and you dared to meddle with these stale speeches of yours that reek of scum, even newcomers would realise directly from the incipit of your work that you are a nobody and not a man. Well, their own language is so successful because of its precision; and they also practise ours well (many of them are also interested in learning it, to the detriment of their own), to the point that they far outnumber those who, like you, devote themselves to the Greek language. For they, who study with interest the works of the ancients — by which I mean those of Demosthenes and Isocrates — and are completely imbued with their rhetoric and concepts, do not happen to misquote them when they use their words, and in class they answer questions with shrewdness, using their thoughts as canons. They develop a not-inconsiderable command of language, learn the works of the ancients by heart and practise imitating them as diligently as they can.

23.6 To you, who have read almost no other works but those of Libanius, it necessarily falls to speak and think in his manner, and to be, with respect to the works of the ancient writers, ‘like an ass to a lyre’, as the proverb says. And I certainly do not mean to say that you are not esteemed for your knowledge of the works of that one, but that you often have lapses and spoil everything, for, once you have entered the scene, you are like those soft actors who impersonate heroes. If it ever became necessary to say a few lines suddenly, due to your always living in indolence you would immediately find yourself unprepared and aphotic, unable even to say a few small words. Having read which of the Latins, o fool, and having known them to be inexperienced in the works of Aristotle, do you accuse them, as if shouting from a chariot, of not knowing his writings? And

ἴσασι τὰ συγγράμματα; εἰ δὲ Πυθαγόρας ἦσθα ἢ Πλάτων ἢ Ἀριστοτέλης αὐτός — ἀλλὰ μὴ ἴτριπτον κίναδος, γαστρί δουλεῦον, ἀμαθέστατον ἀνθρώπιον —, τί ἂν ἐποίεις;

23.7 Ἐκεῖνο δέ σε καὶ μάλα οὐδ' ὅπωςιοῦν ἐλληνικῆς μετασχόντα παιδείας ἐλέγχει, ἐφ' οἷς Θεόδωρον φῆς παρὰ Λατίνων εἰληφότα λέγειν τὸ μεῖζον διαφέ- 5
ρειν τοῦ μᾶλλον, ὥς δὴ μὴ τοιαύτην καὶ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν οὕσαν τὴν χρῆσιν, καί — ὥς ἔοικεν — ὅσα αὐτὸς οὐκ οἶσθα τῆς ῥωμαϊκῆς εἶναι νομίζεις φωνῆς. πλεῖστα οὖν, πίστευσόν μοι, καὶ κάλλιστα διαγράψεις· σχεδὸν γὰρ οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν οἶσθα. εἴτα ἐρωτᾷ· τίνα τῶν γραμματικῶν ἢ φιλοσόφων πεφώρακας τὸ μεῖζον 10
καὶ μᾶλλον λέγοντα διαφέρειν; ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀντερωτήσομεν αὐτόν, τίνα πεφώρακεν αὐτὸς τὸ μεῖζον καὶ μᾶλλον ταυτὸν λέγοντα; εἰ δέ τις ἢ καταχρώμενος ἀντὶ θατέρου θάτερον ἔλαβεν, ἢ καὶ τῶν λογοποιῶν τίς οὕτως ἐχρήσατο, οἷς οὐ τοσοῦτον πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, ὅσον πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ κάλλος λέγειν μεμέληκεν, ἀλλ' οὐ λογοποιὸν ἡμεῖς εὐθύνομεν νῦν. ἀλλ' ἂν περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους Πλήθων ἀξιοῖ, ταῦ- 15
τα καὶ ἡμῖν ἀξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτοῦ συγχωρεῖτω. φησί γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλη εὐθύνων οὐ ῥήτορα εὐθύνειν, ἀλλ' ἄνδρα τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστήμην ἐπαγγελλόμενον. καὶ Θεόδωρος οὖν Πλήθωνα εὐθύνων οὐ ῥήτορα εὐθύνει, ἀλλ' ἄνδρα τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστήμην ἐπαγγελλόμενον καὶ πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη τετολημκότα νεανιεύσασθαι. 199
ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, φησὶν, ἀδιαφόρως τὸ μεῖζον καὶ μᾶλλον | ἐκ-
λαμβάνει καὶ παρέθηκεν ἄν, φησι, πολλὰ τῷ λόγῳ μαρτύρια, εἰ μὴ 20
καὶ τυφλῷ δῆλα ἦν. αὐτὸς ὧν ὁ τυφλὸς ὁ μὴδὲ τὰ ἐν ποσὶ καθορῶν. καίτοι εἰ εἶχεν, κἂν εἶπεν, κἂν ἐβόησεν, κἂν ἐκκεκώφωται ἡμῶν τὰ ὧτα περιθρυλλούμενα. σὺ δ' ὧ μέλει, φησί, τουτουῖ, μέτιθι τὰ αὐτοῦ καί, εἰ μὴ λέγοιμι τὰ-
ληθῆ, οἷον ἂν με βούλοιο κάλει. σοὶ δ' οὐ μέλει, Μιχαῆλε, πρὸς τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν. πόθεν οὖν σοφὸς ἡμῖν ἀναπέφηνας — Πλάτωνα γὰρ οὐδ' εἶδες — ἢ καθά- 25
περ οἱ γίγαντες ἐσπάρης τε καὶ ἔφυς αὐθημερὸν ὠπλισμένους;

23.8 Ἡμεῖς οὖν, οἷς μέλει, τὰ αὐτοῦ μετελθόντες εὖρομεν ἐν μὲν Κατηγορί-
αις τὸ μὲν ποσὸν μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν ἐπιδέχεσθαι
λέγοντα. ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν περὶ ἀρχῶν ἀντιλέγων Ἀναξαγόρα, μήτε τὴν μεγί-
στην μήτε τὴν ἐλαχίστην τιθεμένῳ, δείξας ἀδύνατον, συμπεραίνων φησί· ὁ ἄλλος 30
τοῖνυν ὅτι ἀδύνατον σάρκα ἢ ὅστοῦν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὀπηλικονοῦν εἶναι τὸ μέγεθος ἢ

9–10 τίνα–διαφέρειν] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 168,25–28 Mohler 19–20 ἀλλὰ–
ἐκλαμβάνει] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 168,28–30 Mohler 20–21 παρέθηκεν–ἦν] Mich. Apost.,
Obiect. 168,31–33 Mohler 23–24 σὺ–κάλει] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 168,33–34 Mohler

2 ἴτριπτον κίναδος] cf. Soph., *Aj.* 103 22 ἐκκεκώφωται ἡμῶν τὰ ὧτα] cf. Plat., *Lys.* 204c 7–d 1
28 τὸ ἴ–ἐπιδέχεσθαι¹⁷] cf. Arist., *Cat.* 4a 9, 6b 19 et 10b 26 30–446,1 δῆλον–ἐλαττον] Arist.,
Phys. 187b 20–21; cf. Simpl., in *Cat.* 178,18–19, 278,32 et 290,12–14 Kalbfleisch

2 μὴ ἐπίτριπτον Mohler 17 εὐθύνει e corr. L 20 πολλὰ om. S, post τῷ λόγῳ trsp. Mohler 21 ὁ ἴ
om. S 22 περιθρυλλόμενα Mohler 25 ἡμῖν om. S Mohler

if you had really known Pythagoras or Plato or Aristotle — but you do not, you consummate scoundrel, slave of the belly, ignorant homunculus — what would you have done?

23.7 This proves that you really have no Greek education, when you claim that Theodoros took it from the Latins that *μεῖζον* ('greater') is different from *μᾶλλον* ('more'), as if there were no such usage among the Greeks as well, and — apparently — you believe it is proper of the Latin language what you yourself do not know. Well, you will have to revise many fine things, believe me: in fact, you know almost nothing. Then you ask: 'Who among grammarians or philosophers have you caught saying that there is a difference between *μεῖζον* and *μᾶλλον*?' We then ask you in turn: 'You, rather, who did you surprise by saying that *μεῖζον* and *μᾶλλον* are the same thing?' If someone has done so, he has either taken one for the other by using them wrongly, or perhaps he is one of the logographers, who do not care to speak so much for truth as for pleasure and beauty. But we are not now criticising a logographer. What Plethon claims of Aristotle, let us also claim of him. For in criticising Aristotle, he says he is criticising not a rhetorician, but a man who professes knowledge of things. And so Theodoros in criticising Plethon criticises not a rhetorician, but a man who professes knowledge of things and who dares to behave recklessly towards Aristotle. But even Aristotle — he says — considers *μεῖζον* and *μᾶλλον* indistinctly, and — he goes on to say — could also bear witness to this argument, if only it were not clear even to a blind man. Blind is he who does not even recognise what is in his way. If he really had the evidence, he would speak, he would shout, he would deafen our deafened ears. 'You who care about this thing here,' he says, 'go and investigate his works, and if I do not speak the truth, call me what you will. You do not care, Michael, about their words. Whence is it that you have appeared to us wise? Indeed, you have not understood Plato! Were you sown like the Giants and were you born on that very day already armed?'

23.8 So we, who have an interest, having gone to investigate his writings, have found that he says in the *Categories* that quantity does not admit of more and less, but quality does. And in the first book on Natural Causes, contrasting himself with Anaxagoras, according to whom there is neither the greatest nor the smallest cause, after proving that it is impossible, he closes his thought by saying: 'It is clear then that it is impossible for flesh or bone or anything else to be of unspecified size either in the direction of the greatest (*μεῖζον*) or the

ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον'. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν ἀπέφασκε τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον τοῦ ποσοῦ, ἀποδιδούς τῷ ποιῶ. ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον ἀφορίζει περὶ τὸ μέγεθος. ταύτης δὲ τῆς δόξης καὶ Ἀρχύτας ἐστὶ λέγων κατὰ λέξιν οὕτως· 'καὶ τᾷ ποιότητι δὲ παρέπεται τό τε ἐναντιότητα καὶ στέρησιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥσσον'. καὶ αὖθις· 'καὶ τᾷ ποσότητι δὲ παρέπεται τὸ μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥσσον'. ὥς δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐν Εὐθύφρονι Σωκράτης τοὺς μὲν περὶ ἀριθμοῦ φησι διαφερομένους τὴν λογιστικὴν ἴσχειν κριτήριον, τοὺς δ' αὖ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὴν μετρητικὴν, τοὺς δὲ περὶ βαρέος τε καὶ κούφου τὴν στατικήν· τοὺς δὲ περὶ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐφ' ὧν δηλαδὴ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον φαμέν, οὐκ ἴσχειν φησὶ κριτήριόν τι διαφερομένους, ἐφ' ὃ ἐλθόντας ἂν τῆς διαφορᾶς ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. 'οὐ γὰρ ἂν, φησι, περὶ τούτων ἀλλήλοις ἐστασί- 10 αζον'. εἰ τοίνυν τὸ μείζον τῷ μᾶλλον ταυτόν, ἢ τοῦ μείζονος ἢ μετρητικὴ κριτήριον οὔσα, καὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἦν ἂν δήπου; ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον οὐκ οὔσα, οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ μείζονος ἦν ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἦν ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἦν; ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ, φησὶν ὁ Σωκράτης, τοῦ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. 15

23.9 Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν εὖρομεν οὐκ Ἀριστοτέλη μόνον ἡμῖν συμφωνοῦντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀρχύταν, καὶ πρὸς γε Πλάτωνα, τίνα σε βούλει καλῶμεν; ἀμαθῆ, σοφιστὴν δηλαδὴ καὶ γόητα καὶ ἀπατεῶνα; τουτὶ μὲν οὖν ἐν δίκη σὺ σαυτῷ περιέθηκας, τοιοῦτος δ' ὧν κάθαρμα ἄφρονας τοὺς ἄλλους καλεῖς καὶ τὰ μετ' ἀκριβείας πλεί- 20 στης αὐτοῖς εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς παλαιοῖς συνωδὰ ἀρτιγενῆ τε καὶ νεογνά, αὐτὸς ὧν ὁ τὰ ἀρτιγενῆ κάκεῖνα ἀνεμιαῖα καὶ ἐξαμβλώματα ὁσημέραι ἀπογεννῶν.

24.1 Ἴδωμεν δέ σου καὶ τὴν καλὴν βάσανον· ἡμεῖς φαμεν, θαυμασιώ- 25 τατε ἄνθρωπε, παῖδες Ἑλλήνων καυχώμενοι κάκεινων τοῖς ἴχνεσι, καὶ οὐχ ἐτέρων ἐπόμενοι, τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ μείζον εἶναι συγκρίσεως.

200 24.2 Ἑλλήνων μὲν σε παῖδα ἴσμεν καὶ ἀγαθοῦ πατρός, κάκιστον μέντοι καὶ πατραλοῖαν υἱόν. οὐ γὰρ σε τοῖς ἴχνεσιν ἐκείνων ὀρώμεν ἐπόμενον, ἀλλ' ἰδίαν τινὰ βαδίζοντα, καὶ ταύτην ἐωλοκρασίας ἀπόζουσαν. εἶτα λαβὼν τὸ μείζον καὶ μᾶλλον εἶναι συγκρίσεως, καὶ προσλαβὼν τὴν σύγκρισιν περὶ τε οὐσί- 30 αν καὶ μέγεθος εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιουτότροπα, καὶ λίαν ἀγροίκως ἀπαλλά-

20 ἀρτιγενῆ τε καὶ νεογνά] cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 168,37–169,4 Mohler 22–24 ἡμεῖς–συγκρίσεως] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 169,5–7 Mohler 28–29 τὸ–συγκρίσεως] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 169,7 Mohler 29–30 τὴν–τοιουτότροπα] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 169,7–8 Mohler

5–6 καὶ^{III}–ἥσσον] cf. Simpl., in *Cat.* 93,5–6 Kalbfleisch 6–15 ὥς–ἔστιν] cf. Plat., *Euth.* 7b 6–e 5 11–12 οὐ–εἰ] cf. Plat., *Euth.* 7d 3–4

3 τᾷ] τὰ L 5 τᾷ] τὰ L 7 διαφερομένου Mohler 16 Ἀριστοτέλει S 18 ἀπαταιῶνα L 19 τοιοῦτο Mohler | καθάρμα Mohler | τοὺς om. S | καλεῖν S 20 τε om. Mohler 27 πατρολόαν S L: corr. Mohler (cf. *infra* 28.2) 30–448,1 ἐπάλλαξας S

smallest (ἐλαττον).’ In the first case, therefore, he denies the more (μᾶλλον) and the less (ἥττον) of quantity, assigning it to quality, and then in the second he refers the greater (μείζον) and the smaller (ἐλαττον) to size. This opinion is also held by Archytas, who says verbatim: ‘And for quality, it follows from admitting the opposition and negation, the more and the less’, and again: ‘And for quantity it follows from not admitting the more and the less’. As the Socrates of *Euthyphro* also says that those who speculate on number adopt the science of calculation as their yardstick. In turn, those who reason about ‘greater’ and ‘smaller’ adopt the practice of measurement as their yardstick, while those who observe the differences between ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ the measurement of weight; those, however, who reflect on ‘good’ and ‘right’ and the like, among which we clearly mean ‘more’ and ‘less’, do not adopt’, he says, ‘any yardstick of judgement by converging on which they could definitively settle the question’. ‘For’, he says, ‘concerning these things they did not quarrel with one another.’ If, then, μείζον were the same as μᾶλλον, the practice of measurement being the yardstick of judgement for μείζον, would it also be so for μᾶλλον? Or, not being so for μᾶλλον, would it also not be so for μείζον, or would it be for both or not at the same time? But, says Socrates, if it is of the one, it is not of the other.

23.9 So, since we have discovered that not only Aristotle, but also Archytas and perhaps even Plato agree with us, what shall we call you? Ignorant sophist for sure, and also charlatan and mystifier? So you have rightly secured this appellation for yourself; and such are you, you scoundrel, who call others ‘brainless’ and things said by them with the utmost care and in agreement with the ancients ‘newly-created things’ and ‘novelties’, when it is you rather who continually gives birth to new things, moreover empty, and abortions.

24.1 Let us now also see your beautiful proof: ‘O admirable man, we sons of Greeks (we are deeply proud of them, and follow in their footsteps and not those of others), we say that μᾶλλον and μείζον are proper to the comparison’.

24.2 We know that you are the son of Greeks and of an excellent father, yet you are a terrible and patricidal son. For we do not see you following in their footsteps, but treading your own track, and it reeks of scum. After having considered that ‘μᾶλλον and μείζον are proper to the comparison’, and having added that ‘the comparison refers both to substance and greatness and to similar things’, and having disposed of the matter so superficially, he (= Michael)

ξας τὸν λόγον, μάλα σεμνῶς συμπεραίνει· ἐκατέρω ἄρα τῷ ὀνόματε οὐδὲν διαφέρετον ἐπὶ πάντων λέγεσθαι τῶν τοιούτων. τὸ δ' ἐστὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὸ ποῖ καὶ πόθεν ἐρωτήσεως λέγων, μηθὲν διαφέρειν τούτῳ τῷ ἐπιρρήματε συνεπείραινε. καίτοι τὸ μὲν ποῖ τὴν εἰς τόπον, τὸ δὲ πόθεν τὴν ἐκ τόπου σημαίνει κίνησιν, ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ τούτῳ τῷ κινήσει καὶ μάλα φαμέν. τὰ δ' ἄντικείμενα ταυτὸν εἶναι, πῶς ἂν τις φαίη; οὐ γὰρ διότι ἄμφω ὑφ' ἓν τι τὴν ἐρώτησιν ἐστί, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ πάντῃ ταυτὸν ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον μὲν ἄμφω πυσματικά, ταυτὸν· ἐφ' ὅσον δὲ διαφόρων κινήσεων πύσματα, οὐ ταυτὸν. οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ μείζον· καθόσον μὲν ὑπὸ τὴν σύγκρισιν ἄμφω, ταυτὸν· καθόσον δὲ τὸ μὲν μεγέθους — ὡς δέδεικται —, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦ, διάφορα. εἰ δέ, διότι τινὲς κατὰ 5 τι ταυτὸν ὑπάρχει, διατοῦτο καὶ πάντῃ ταυτὸν οἶε, ὥρα σοι λοιπὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν — ἐναντίῳ ὄντε — ταυτὸν πάντῃ λέγειν, ἐπειδὴ τῷ γένει ταυτὸν ἄμφω γὰρ χρώματε. καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὸν ἀλεκτρυόνα οὐδὲν διαφέρειν ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι ἄμφω ζῶα ἐστόν. καίτοι μοι καὶ ἄλλοτε τοῦτο συνεχώρησας. καὶ τὰ ὑπ' Ἀριστοφάνους ἐν Νεφέλαις εἰρημένα ὑπερφυῶς ἐπήνεις. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀντὶ φιλοσόφου τάχιστα ὁ καλὸς ἡμῖν Μιχαῆλος ὠραῖος ἀλεκτρυὼν ἀναπέφανται, καὶ τίς οὐκ ἂν βακτηρίαν λαβὼν ἀμφοτέραις εὖ μάλα κατὰ κεφαλῆς ἐφικέσθαι σου πειράσεται ἀνέδην οὕτως αἰήτους κάκεινους διωλυγίους συμπλέκοντος;

25.1 Εἰ δὴ τὸ ποσὸν ἐν μεγέθει κἀν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ μείζον, ἥττον τε καὶ μείον, τὸ ποσὸν συγκρίνει καὶ τὸ ποιόν, τί 20 κωλύει τὸ μείζον ἐπὶ μεγέθους λεγόμενον μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ οὐσίας λέγεσθαι;

25.2 Εἰ μὲν διὰ τὰ προσεχῆ λήμματα μηδὲν κωλύειν φῆς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ μείζον ταυτὸν εἶναι, σαυτὸν φενακίζεις, οὐχ ἡμᾶς. οὐδὲν γὰρ περαίνεις· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο συμβαίνει. εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα, τὸ ἐκατέρω τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι δυνάμεως, ἡμῖν ἤδη εἴρηται μὴ εἶναι τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως, καὶ διηυκρίνηται ἱκανῶς, οἷας ἐκατέρω δυνάμεως ἐστόν, Ἀριστοτέλει τε καὶ τῇ πατρίῳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπομένους φωνῇ, ἀποδεδείχθω δὲ ὁμως καὶ τῇδε. ἔστω γὰρ ἐφ' ᾧ ποδιαῖον μὲν, ἥττον γε μὴν λευκόν, α, ἐφ' ᾧ δ' ἔλαττον μὲν ποδιαίου, μᾶλλον δὲ λευκόν, β. εἰ δὴ τὸ μείζον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ α τοῦ β μείζον ὄν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη. ὑπέκειτο δὲ τὸ β μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ β τοῦ α μᾶλλον ὄν, καὶ μείζον ἔσται. ὑπέκειτο δὲ τὸ α μείζον ἢ τὸ μὲν α τοῦ β, μείζον τε καὶ οὐ μείζον, τὸ δὲ β τοῦ α μᾶλλον τε καὶ οὐ 30 μᾶλλον, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μείον ταυτὸν | τῷ ἥττον. ὑπέκειτο δὲ τὸ μὲν α τοῦ β ἥττον, τὸ

1–2 ἐκατέρω–τοιούτων] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 169,8–9 Mohler 19–22 Εἰ–λέγεσθαι] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 169,9–11 Mohler

14–15 τὰ–εἰρημένα] cf. Aristoph., *Nub.* 1427–1429

3 μηδὲν S 10 τινὲ] τινὲ in ras. scr. S 11 ὅρα S Mohler 20 τε om. S 26 ἡμῖν–δυνάμεως^{II} om. S 29 ποδαίου in textu, ποδιαίου in marg. scr. L

solemnly concludes: ‘Both terms are not different to say all such things. This is as if one, saying that $\pi\omicron\iota$ and $\pi\acute{o}\theta\epsilon\nu$ are proper for comparison, we are to conclude that these two adverbs do not differ in anything. Instead, the $\pi\omicron\iota$ indicates movement towards a place, the $\pi\acute{o}\theta\epsilon\nu$ from a place, and we would rather say that these two movements are contrary to each other. So how could anyone ever say that two contraries are the same thing? Not for the reason that both are in some sense relative to the question, so they will therefore be absolutely the same thing, but inasmuch as both are interrogative, they are the same thing. Inasmuch as they are, however, interrogative particles of different movements, they are not. And so it is with $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu$ and $\mu\epsilon\iota\zeta\omicron\nu$: insofar as they both fall under the comparative, they are the same thing, but insofar as the former is proper to greatness, as we have seen, and the latter is proper to quality, they are different. But if you think that because two things are the same thing in relation to something, for that reason they are also in an absolute sense the same thing, it is the case then that you say that white and black (which are opposites) are also in an absolute sense the same thing, since they are by kind the same thing: for they are both colours. Then we shall say that you are not at all different from a rooster, since you are both animals. Yet you have already admitted this a few other times, and are in total agreement with what Aristophanes said in the *Clouds*. If it were so, instead of being a philosopher our dear Michael would have the appearance of a beautiful rooster, and who, grasping a stick with both hands, would not be tempted to throw it right at your head, you who so freely put together such immense nonsense?

25.1 ‘If, then, quantity is both in magnitude and substance, and “more” and “greater”, “less” and “less great”, compare quantity and quality, what prevents “greater” which is said of magnitude from also being said of substance?’

25.2 If by these last arguments you mean that there is nothing to prevent $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu$ and $\mu\epsilon\iota\zeta\omicron\nu$ being the same thing, you deceive yourself, certainly not us. You do not succeed at all: for it so happens that things are not necessarily so. If, on the other hand (you intend to deceive us) through what follows, namely, that ‘each of the two is of the same value’, we have already said that they are not of the same value, and it has been sufficiently explained of what value each is, by Aristotle and those who use the native language of the Greeks, but it is also proven in this way. Let alpha indeed be the size of a foot, but be less white, and let beta on the other hand be smaller than a foot, but whiter. If ‘greater’ were more than alpha, which is greater than beta, it would also be ‘more’. And provided that beta is ‘more’ than beta, which is more than alpha, it would also be greater. And given that alpha is greater than alpha, which is more than beta, it will be greater and not greater, and beta will be more than alpha and not more, since smaller is the same as less. And given alpha less than beta, beta will be

δὲ β τοῦ α μείον, καὶ οὕτω δὴ συναληθεύσει ἅμα ἡ ἀντίφασις ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. ἀδύνατον δὲ τοῦτο. ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ λέγειν ταυτὸν τὸ μείζον τῷ μᾶλλον. εἴτ', ὃ καθάρμα, ὥσπερ ἀναγκαῖον τί συμπεράνας αὐτὸς καὶ ἤδη ἥρηκώς καὶ καταβαλὼν, ἀλλ' οὐ τρίς ἡττηθεὶς μέμφῃ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς ἀξιούσιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα δεικνύουσιν, ἀμαθεῖς καὶ κακοήθεις αὐτοὺς ὀνομάζων, αὐτὸς ὢν ἀπάντων, ὢν ἴσμεν, 5 ἀμαθέστατός τε καὶ μοχθηρότατος·

26.1 Εἰ γάρ τις εἰπὼν μέγεθος μεγέθους καὶ ποσὸν ποσοῦ, καὶ οὐσίαν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἄλλης οὐσίας, ἔπειτα τὸ μείζον προσθεῖς, ὑφελὼν τὸ μᾶλλον, εἴποι ἂν μείζω οὐσίαν εἶναι ἄλλης οὐσίας καὶ μέγεθος [...]. 10

26.2 Ἡμῖν μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν, ὃ λῶστε, δοκεῖ. σοὶ δὲ οὐ (φησι Μιχαῆλος, ὁ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω βουλόμενος μὲν ποιῆσαι, μὴ δυνάμενος δέ). οὐκοῦν Ἀρχύτου λέγοντος 'τὴν ποιότητα τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ἐπιδέχεσθαι' — Ἀριστοτέλει γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἔσποιο σοφὸς ὢν; — ἦν τις τὸ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον ἀντὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον μεταλάβῃ, δώσεις σὺ τοῦτο; εἰ γὰρ δώσεις λευκόν, ἢ λευκὸν λευκοῦ μείζον, 15 ἔσται καὶ ἔλαττον. τὸ γὰρ α μείζον ὄν τοῦ β καὶ ἔλαττον αὐθις ἔσται, ἐπειδὴ τὸ β τοῦ α μᾶλλον ὑπέκειτο. καὶ οὕτω μείζον τε τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ μείζον. καὶ ἡ ἀντίφασις ἅμα ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐθις συναληθεύσει. αὐθις δὲ τὸ ποσὸν λέγοντος μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, οὐδὲν τὸ μείζον δήπου καὶ ἔλαττον ἐπιδέξεται; οὐκοῦν μέγεθος οὐκ ἔσται μείζον μεγέθους; οὐδ' ὁ 'Ρόδου κολοσσὸς ἄρα σοῦ γε 20 πυγμαίου ὄντος, εἰ περιῇν, μείζων ἂν ἦν; οὕτως αὐτὸς ἐπιστήμης εὖ ἤκεις, βάραθρε, καὶ σοὶ τυγχάνει ὄν πάνυ τῆς ἀληθείας μεμεληκός.

27.1 Σοὶ δὲ γραμματικῆς ἐπιμελουμένῳ, καὶ πολλὰ περὶ αὐτῆς ἀπέραντα μὲν, μηδὲν δὲ δυνάμενα ὠφελῆσαι τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα σχολάζοντας πεπονηκότι. 25

27.2 Ποὺ χύτραις λημᾶς, ὅς γε τὰ Θεοδώρῳ περὶ γραμματικῆς συγγραφέντα ἀπέραντα καλεῖς, διαβραχέων ὡς οἷόν τε καὶ εἰσαγωγῇ πρέποντα συντεθέντα; ὢν οὐ τὴν εὕρεσιν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν ὑπερφυῶς ἐπαινεῖ πᾶς τις, ἦν μὴ ἢ βάσκανος κατὰ σέ. οὔτε γὰρ παρεῖται τι, ὢν ἔδει ῥηθῆναι, ὡς προσῆκεν εἰσαγωγῇ, οὐτ' αὖ εἴρηται τι πάρεργον ἢ περιττόν. τῇ δ' αὖ μεθόδῳ καὶ διαθέσει οὐδ' αὐτὸς ὁ Μῶμος ἔχει τί μέψασθαι. ἢ τε ἐρμηνεία καὶ μάλα τῇ ὕλῃ πρέπουσα. σὺ δ' 30

7–10 Εἰ–μέγεθος] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 169,14–16 Mohler 11 Ἡμῖν–οὐ] cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 169,17 Mohler 23–25 Σοὶ–πεπονηκότι] Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 169,18–19 Mohler

13 τὴν–ἐπιδέχεσθαι] cf. *supra* 26 χύτραις λημᾶς] cf. Mich. Apost., *Paroem.* 18,42

3 εἰρηκώς Mohler post 10 μέγεθος in textu add. Mohler μεγέθους καὶ ποσοῦ ποσόν, ὁ τοιοῦτος δοκεῖ σοὶ ἂν ἀμαρτάνειν coll. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 169,16–17 Mohler 14–15 καὶ ἥττον in textu om., *supra* lin. suppl. L 15 εἰ] οὐ S 19 οὐδὲ S 24 δυναμένα L | ὠφελῇ S post 25 πεπονηκότι add. in textu ἔδοξε Mohler coll. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 169,19 Mohler 26 λημᾶς S L: corr. Mohler 27 συντιθέντα L 28 πᾶς om. Mohler

smaller than alpha, and so the contradiction will be equally true in the same proposition. But this is impossible. It is therefore impossible to say that ‘greater’ is the same as ‘more’. Well then, o infamous one, as if you had syllogistically concluded something necessary and had already won and refuted it, and not as if you had already been defeated three times, you criticise others for expressing opinions and not proving them, calling them ignorant and malicious, you who are the most ignorant and malicious of all those we know.

26.1 ‘If one, having said that a greatness is more than a greatness, a quantity more than a quantity, and a substance more than another substance, once the “greater” (μεῖζον) has been put in and the “more” (μᾶλλον) taken out, were to say that a substance is greater than another substance, a greatness greater than a quantity, and a quantity greater than a quantity, he would seem to you to be mistaken’.

26.2 My dear, it seems to us that he is wrong. To you it does not (so says Michael, who wants to make a fairly weak argument stronger, without succeeding). So, although Archytas says that ‘quality admits of more and less’ — in fact, being wise, could he not follow Aristotle? — if one were to put greater and smaller instead of more and less, would you allow it? If you give ‘white’, so one white will be ‘greater’ than another white, it will also be smaller. In fact, alpha being larger than beta will conversely also be smaller, since beta is assumed to be ‘more’ than alpha. And so at the same time, it will be larger and not larger. And this contradiction will, on the one hand, be true, but by saying on the other hand that quantity does not admit ‘more’ and ‘less’, nothing will end up admitting ‘greater’ and ‘smaller’. So will a quantity not be greater than a greatness? And would not the Colossus of Rhodes, if it existed, be greater than you, who are a pygmy? To such a high level of doctrine have you come, o villain, and this touches you, for you are so interested in truth!

27.1 ‘To you who take such interest in grammar and have also put much and endless effort into it, without it being of any benefit to those who study it...’

27.2 But where are your eyes, you who call ‘interminable’ the things written by Theodoros on grammar, composed as briefly as possible and perfect for an introduction? Of these, everyone can only greatly praise not only the inventio, but also the dispositio, unless he is envious in your manner. For nothing is left out that needs to be discussed, as befits an introduction. Nor, conversely, is anything negligible or superfluously treated. Not even Momus himself has anything to reproach in terms of method and disposition, and the interpretation

οὕτω πόρρω βασκανίας ἐλαύνεις καὶ φθόνου, ὥστε καὶ τὰ πᾶσιν ἐπαινούμενα συ-
κοφαντεῖς. πῶς δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὠφελεῖ, ὅπου γε τοὺς σπουδάζοντας περὶ ταῦτα —
πλεῖστοι δ' εἰσὶ — ταμέγιστα ὠφέλησέ τε καὶ ὠφελεῖ, εἰ μήπου σέ γε; ἀνήκεστα
202 γὰρ νοσοῦντα οὐδ' ἂν οὐδ' αὐτὸς Ἀπόλλων | ἰάσαιτο. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐφ' ὅτῳ προδή-
λοις πλημμελήμασιν ἐάλως, ὧν δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐστὶν ἃ ἐπισημηνάμενοι παρεγράψα- 5
μεν ἔξω ἐν τοῖς σοῖς, οὐκ ἀξιώσαντες τοῖς ἡμετέροις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγκαταμίξαι. τὰ
δ' ἄλλα παρήκαμεν τοῖς βουλομένοις ζητεῖν καὶ καταγελᾶν σου. οὐ γὰρ ἡμῖν σχο-
λὴ πάντα σου τὰ ἁμαρτήματα κατὰ ἀκρίβειαν ζητεῖν ἄπειρα σχεδὸν ὄντα. ἦν γάρ
τις τοῦτο ἔλῃται, οὐδὲν ὅτι μὴ διαγράφειν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ· ἐν γὰρ οὐδὲν σχεδὸν
ὀρθῶς σοι εἴρηται. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ἔστιν ἐν σοὶ τῶν καλῶν οὐδέν, οὐτ' ἐν λόγοις 10
οὐτ' ἐν ἔργοις· φθόνος δὲ μόνον καὶ ἔρις καὶ ἀμαθία καὶ συκοφαντία καὶ ψεύδη
καὶ ἀπλῶς πάνθ' οἷς εἰκός σέ τε καὶ τοὺς οἴους σὺ χαίρεις, ὧν ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ μικρὸν
καὶ δριμύ τὸ ψυχάριον εἴρηται. οὕτω δ' ἥττων ὁ βδελυρὸς τῆς πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη
τε καὶ Θεόδωρον βασκανίας ἐστίν, ὥστ' ἀπόδειξιν μὲν τοῦ ζητουμένου χάριν —
ὥς πολλάκις ἔφθην εἰπών — οὐδ' ἠντιναοῦν λέγει, καθάπερ δὲ Μελιταῖον κυνίδι- 15
ον ὑλακτῶν οὐ παύεται, δῆξαι μὲν καὶ διασπαράξαι βουλόμενος, οὐ δυνάμενος
δέ, δοξομανεῖς καὶ ἀνοήτους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα αὐτοὺς ὀνομάζων, αὐτὸς ὧν ὁ τῶόν-
τι δοξομανῆς καὶ ἀναίσθητος καὶ μηδὲν μηδέποτε μήτε δράσας μήτε εἰρηκῶς ὑγι-
ές, λογισμῷ μὲν οὐδ' ὅπωςιοῦν, ἀπονοίᾳ δὲ παρὰ πάντα τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον ἀγόμε-
νος. τοιοῦτον δ' ὄντα τὸν ταλαίπωρον καὶ τοσαύτην ἀμαθίαν νοσοῦντα καὶ δέον 20
ξυνωθέντα που σιγῇ καθῆσθαι, μηδεμίαν ἐπιστήμην λόγων ἑαυτῷ συνειδότα, ἀλ-
λὰ μὴ ἀνταποδυσάμενον εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα καθεῖναι, οὕτω παναισιχῇ καὶ ῥυπῶντα
τοῖς θεαταῖς φανήσεσθαι μέλλοντα, ἐν λόγοις Θεοδώρῳ παραβαλλόμενον. ὅδ' ἀν-
τεπιδείξει τὸ τῶν λόγων εἶδος αὐτοῦ πάνυ τοι ῥυσὸν ὃν οὐκ ἔδεισεν, οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τι
ἄλλο, τὰς μυθολογικὰς γοῦν γραίας οὐκ εὐλαβηθεῖς, ἵνα μὴ λάχωσιν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐξ- 25
ούλης οὕτως εἰκῇ μύθους καὶ φλυαρίας συνείροντι, καὶ τὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν ὑφαρπά-
ζοντι καὶ ἰδιουμένῳ ἐπιτηδεύματα.

28.1 Ταυτὶ μὲν οὖν σοι παρ' ἐμοῦ τὰ πῆχειρα περὶ τούτων ἀποτετίσθω, ἐπεὶ
τὸν ἐμὸν Ἡρακλέα, ᾧ περ ἀντιλέγειν ὑπέστης, ἀνθοπλισθῆναι κατὰ σοῦ νῦν οὐ
θέμις, κατ' ἄλλων τε αὐτὸν δικαιότερον ὃν χρῆσθαι τῷ ῥοπάλῳ τῶν λόγων καὶ 30
ἅμα ἐμὲ κεκτημένον σύμμαχον σέ τε ἀμυνόμενον λόγῳ αἰρεῖν ἱκανόν, κἄν τις σου
κρείττων ἄλλος ὑπὲρ σοῦ προέλῃται διαμάχεσθαι.

15–16 Μελιταῖον κυνίδιον] cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 169,31 Mohler 17 δοξομανεῖς–ὀνομάζων]
cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 169,22–24 Mohler

12–13 μικρὸν–ψυχάριον] Plat., *Theaet.* 195a

2 τοὺς] τὰς Mohler 3 ὠφελῇσει Mohler 4 ὅτῳ] οὕτω S 5 πλημμελήμασιν S 6 ἐγκαταμίξαι S
11 ἐν ἔργοις] ἐνέργοις S 15 μελιτταῖον S 17–18 ὁ τῶόντι om. Mohler 19 αὐτοῦ Mohler
21 ξυνωσθέντα Mohler 24 αὐτοῦ Mohler 30 τε om. S

fits the subject matter very well. You are so seething with animosity and envy that you even mock the things praised by all. Besides, how is it unhelpful, when those who use it to study (and they are many) find it has greatly benefitted them and continues to benefit them — apart from you, evidently? Not even Apollo could heal one afflicted with an incurable disease. You could not have escaped anyone with such egregious errors. And of these, in truth, we ourselves, although we have denounced some, have kept others out of your writing, not deeming it appropriate to mix them with our own. We have set aside the others for those interested in looking them up and laughing at you. We lacked the necessary stimulus to look for all your mistakes carefully, as they were almost infinite. If one were to take the trouble to do so, one would have no choice but to delete everything: in fact, there is hardly a single thing you said correctly. Nor, moreover, is there anything good in you, either in word or deed: only envy and quarrelsomeness and ignorance and slander and lies, and simply everything for which it is likely to please you and those like you, of whom it is said in the *Theaetetus* that they are ‘small and violent souls’. The infamous one is so subjugated by envy towards Aristotle and Theodoros, that, as I have said on several occasions before, he gives no demonstration of the object of investigation. He does not stop barking like a Maltese lapdog, intending to bite and tear to pieces and yet failing to do so, calling others ‘mad for fame’ and ‘fools’ and so on, when it is he who is actually stupid and mad for fame. He and never does or says anything sane, living his whole life not at all in reflection, but in indolence. It is fitting that such a wretch, and one afflicted with such gross ignorance, should stand aside in silence, aware that he possesses no doctrine, and not that, prepared to fight, he should throw himself into a contest, destined to appear so ugly and filthy before the spectators, pitted in dispute against Theodoros. He has not been afraid to show that the appearance of his words is very wrinkled, and has not even guarded himself, if nothing else, against the old, chattering women, lest they sue him for the return of the fables and jibes that he so casually weaves, taking away their occupations.

28.1 Let this then be the reward from me for your actions, since my Heracles, whom you have thought to oppose, should not now take up arms against you, and it is more just for him to use the club of his words against others, since he already has me as a sufficient ally to defeat you, who even try to defend yourself with talk, even if another stronger than you comes forward to fight in your defence.

28.2 Ἰδωμεν δέ σου καὶ τὸν ἐπίλογον, ἐπεὶ κὰν ἐκείνῳ συχνά σοι ἡμάρτηται. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σε ἐκεῖνο καὶ μάλιστα φενακίζειν δοκεῖ, οἴομενον βοηθησάσθαι Πλήθωνι καὶ ἀφοσιώσασθαι καθάπερ πατρί, οὐ βεβοηθηκότα, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταβαλόντα τὸ σὸν μέρος. καὶ εἰ περιῇν Πλήθων, ἀπελήλακεν ἄν σε μακρὰν καθάπερ τινὰ πα- 5
τραλοίαν, ἱκανάς σοι πρότερον ἐπιτρίψας πληγὰς, ἐπεὶ τῷ Πλάτῳ λέγων τίθε-
σθαι τούναντίον νῦν ὅμως ἢ τοῖς ἐκείνῳ τιθεμένοις προσῆκε ποιεῖς, Θεοδώρῳ
μεμφόμενος τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντι, αὐτὸς οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν λέγων, ὥς ὄντος ἀρετῆς μὲν τούτου, κακίας δ' ἐκείνου. Πλάτῳ δέ γε
φρονιμωτάτου τε ἀνδρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα τοῦτο νομίζει, καὶ τὴν οὐρανίαν κίνησιν τῷ
203 κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀεὶ φέρεσθαι περὶ νοῦν | καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὔσαν ἀποδείκνυ- 10
σιν. Καλλικλεῖ τε κατηγοροῦντι Σωκράτους, ὥσπερ σὺ Θεοδώρου, ὥς δὴ τὰ αὐτὰ
περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντος, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐκείνῳ Σωκράτης μέμφεται μέμψιν, ὥς
μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντι. οὕτω σὺ τῆς Πλατωνικῆς πόρρῳ φιλοσοφί-
ας ἐλαύνεις καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου κακῶς ἐπαῖεις δογμάτων.

28.3 Ἡμῖν μὲν οὖν ἀποχρώντως πρὸς γε τὴν σὴν ἔξιν εἴρηται περὶ τοῦ ζητου- 15
μένου διαβραχέων Ἀριστοτέλει τὲ καὶ Θεοδώρῳ συνηγορηκόσι καὶ ἀφοσιωσαμέ-
νοις τοῖς ἀνδράσι δικαίοις οὔσι. μακρότερον δὲ ἀποτείνειν περὶ τούτου λόγον οὐκ
ῥῆθιμεν δεῖν, ἀκριβέστερον τὸ ζητούμενον ἐπεξεργάσασθαι νῦν παραιτησάμε-
νοι, ταῖς ὀλοσχερεστέραις ἀρκεσθέντες ἐφόδοις, τῆς σῆς ἔξω στοχαζόμενοι.
ἀπελείφθης γὰρ ἄν πάντῃ καὶ οὐκ ἐπηκολούθησας, εἰ βαθύτερον τῶν ζητημάτων 20
ἠψάμεθα, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν εἴρηται τινὰ τὴν σὴν ὑπερβάλλοντα ἔξιν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν
περὶ τε ἄλλα ἀσχόλοις οὔσι καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ῥωμαῖστὶ τοῖς ἐταίροις ἀναγινώ-
σκουσιν οὐ ῥάδιον ἢν ἀκριβέστερον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπεξεργάζεσθαι.

28.4 Ἀρκεῖ δὲ ὅμως καὶ ταῦτα τὸ ἀληθές σε διδάξαι καὶ πείσαι γνόντα σαυτὸν 25
ὑφεῖναι τί τοῦ τύφου. καὶ σοι συμβουλευόμεν — οὐ γὰρ σοι φθονοῦμεν, ὥσπερ
αὐτὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις — εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἀφικέσθαι τὴν ἀγαθὴν, πολλὰ τῇ οἰήσει χαίρειν
εἰπόντα, ἣν ἔχεις περὶ σαυτοῦ, πάντα εἰδέναι νομίζων μηδὲν εἰδώς, καὶ παρὰ
τοὺς τῆδε φοιτῆσαι σοφοὺς χρόνον συχνόν. οὐ γὰρ ἐν βραχεὶ χρόνῳ θηράται τὸ
ἀληθές· ἐν βυθῷ γάρ — κατὰ Δημόκριτον — κεῖται. τό τε γὰρ ἀληθές εἴση, ὅπῃ-
ποτ' ἂν ἔχη, ἀπαλλαγεῖς τῆς νῦν ἀμαθίας, ἣ σε συνεχόμενον καθάπερ καταβολῇ 30
πυρετοῦ ἢ λέπρα διὰ παντὸς ἡκούσῃ τοῦ σώματος ὀρῶ, καὶ Πλήθωνι οἷός τ' ἔση
ἀμύνειν ἢ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει, ἣν βούλῃ. καὶ οὖς νῦν καλεῖς 'ψελλιζομένους', πεί-
σθητί μοι, τότε σοφωτάτους ἐρεῖς. ἦν μὲν οὖν πείθωμεν τὰ λῶστα σοι συμβου-

7 τὰ¹—λέγοντι] cf. Mich. Apost., *Obiect.* 169,28–30 Mohler

10 περὶ—οὔσαν] Plat., *Tim.* 34a 11–13 Καλλικλεῖ—λέγοντι] cf. Plat., *Gorg.* 491b-c 29 ἐν—
κεῖται] cf. Diog. Laer. 9,72,10 (= Democr. 117 DK)

5 ἐπεὶ τῷ] ἔπειτα L 8 γε om. S Mohler 9 τε supra lin. scr. S 11 Θεόδωρον S 13–14 σοφίας S
14 καλῶς S 16–17 ἀφοσιωμένοις Mohler 17 ἀποτείνειν om. S 20 ἀπελήφθης S Mohler
ζημάτων L 21 ὑπερβαλλόντα (sic) L 27 εἰπόντι Mohler 28 βραχὺ S 32 βούλει Mohler

28.2 Let us then look at your epilogue, for in that too you have made great mistakes. First of all, you seem to have deluded yourself greatly by thinking that you were coming to Plethon's aid and thus fulfilling an obligation as to a father, not really helping him, but merely serving your part. Even Plethon, if he were alive, would keep you at bay like a parricide, but not before he had beaten you sufficiently, since, by saying that you support Plato (this, however, is the opposite of what befits those who support him), you blame Theodoros because he says the same thing about the same things, whereas you never do so, since goodness is proper to the one, wickedness to the other. Plato believes that this behaviour is proper to the truly sensible man, and shows that even celestial motion, which is the closest thing to intellect and thought, is led to be always in the same positions. And to Callicles, who accuses Socrates — as you do Theodoros — of saying the same about the same things, Socrates addresses the opposite accusation, namely, of not saying the same about the same things. Thus you move away from Platonic philosophy and misinterpret its principles.

28.3 So, we have already said enough far beyond your ability on the subject at hand, defending Aristotle and Theodoros in brief and thus doing our duty to these just men. We felt that it was not appropriate to extend the discourse on this subject any further, and we avoided investigating the matter in more detail now, contenting ourselves with more general reflections and taking into consideration your abilities. Indeed, if we had approached the topics in more detail, you would have remained completely in the dark and would not have been able to follow, since it has just been said that some things are beyond your capabilities. But for us who are also occupied with other things and read Latin works to our companions, it was not easy to investigate these things in more detail.

28.4 It is also enough, however, to give you lessons in truth and persuade you to put aside a little vainglory by 'knowing thyself'. And we advise you — we do not in fact envy you as you do others — to come to beautiful Italy, which cares nothing for the conceit you have of yourself, you who think you know everything without knowing anything, and to assiduously attend the lessons of some of the learned men here. One does not acquire true knowledge in a short time, for, as Democritus says, 'it lies deep within'. And the truth will come out, if there ever is any, once your present ignorance, with which I see you live as well as with an attack of fever or leprosy that pervades the whole body, is removed from you, and you will be able to defend Plethon and even Aristotle, should you wish to do so. And those whom you now call beginners, believe me, you will then call

λεύοντες — ἃ δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συνεβουλευσαμεν —, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι. ἦν δὲ μὴ πείθω-
 μεν, ἀλλ' ἔτι συνοικεῖν ἐθέλης τῇ ἀμαθίᾳ καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἶναι, καλός, ἔτη
 γεγονώς ἤδη πλείω τριάκοντα, καὶ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων ἀντιλαβέσθαι βούλη
 καὶ λοιδορήσασθαι τὰς σὰς ἡμῖν μοχθηρίας προστριβόμενος, ὥσπερ εἴωθας, τῶν
 μὲν λοιδοριῶν, ἃς ἐρεῖς, οὐ πάνυ τοι λόγον ποιησόμεθα, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ πορνιδίων 5
 προϊσταμένων λοιδορουμένων τε καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἡμῖν προστριβομένων ὀνειδίη.
 πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἀντιλήψεις, ἦν τι λόγου φανῶσιν ἡμῖν ἄξιον ἔχειν καὶ μὴ πάντῃ παί-
 δων ἀθύρμασιν ὥσιν ὅμοιοι, ἀποκρινόμεθα ἀκριβέστερον τὸ περὶ τούτου ἐπεξ-
 εργαζόμενοι, Θεοδώρῳ τὲ τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀμύνοντες. τὰ νῦν δὲ καὶ
 ταῦτα ἀπόχη.

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learned. Should we convince you in advising you the best (which is what we would also advise ourselves), that would be good for you. If we do not convince you, and you still wish to live with your ignorance and only seem, but not be, an honest man, having already passed the age of thirty, and wish to counter what we have now said and still slander us by hurling your wickedness at us, as you have been accustomed to do, we will not care at all about the slanders you utter, any more than we care for those harlots who whore themselves and offend and hurl at us the insults proper to their trade. To the objections, if we feel it is appropriate to spend a word on them and they are not really like children's games, we will answer by dealing with the matter in more detail, defending the learned Theodoros and ourselves. This is enough for now.

