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DOSTOEVSKIJ AND SCHILLER

by

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PREFACE

Dostoevskij's relationship to Schiller has frequently been discussed, but never examined in a full-scale study. Such a study is justified by the intrinsic interest of the subject, as well as by the fact that the nature and extent of Schiller's influence upon Dostoevskij's fiction are still debatable issues. Critics such as Dmitrij Čiževskij and Kurt Wais, whose investigations belong to the more extensive ones, assume that the influence was, indeed, very profound and bear this out in their respective interpretations.[1] However, both deal mainly with Schiller's impact upon Dostoevskij in terms of one novel, *The Brothers Karamazov*. While this is clearly the work on which Schiller left the strongest imprint, the culmination of his influence was preceded by a long and complex history. In order fully to understand the wide range of Schillerian motifs in Dostoevskij's last novel, it is necessary to know something about the earlier stages of this relationship.

Much work also remains to be done on *The Brothers Karamazov* in relation to Schiller. While Meier-Graefe, Reizov,[2] and the above-mentioned critics have isolated most of the elements which are traceable to the German writer, they have largely neglected to show how these elements — themes, motifs, and philosophical ideas — function within the novelistic structure. Only a thorough analysis of their artistic elaboration can reveal the true significance of Schiller's contribution to the novel. This means that the subject to be discussed intersects with another one, namely, the compositional patterns of Dostoevskij's fiction. Much of the material in chapters three and four pertain, indirectly, to this aspect of his work. Being able to determine the provenience of a motif or a theme means little unless it is shown how the material bor-

[1] "Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie* 6 (1929), 1-42, and "Schillers Wirkungsgeschichte im Ausland," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 29 (1955), 475-508.

[2] B. G. Reizov, "K istorii zamysla 'Brat'ev Karamazovyx'," *Zven'ja* VI (M.-L., 1936), 545-573.

rowed has acquired resonance in the new aesthetic context. Therefore, genetic investigation and structural analysis complement one another in the examination of the proposed subject.

As already implied, considerable disagreement exists among the critics concerning the nature and extent of Dostoevskij's literary indebtedness to Schiller. This is due, first, to differences in critical approach and *Weltanschauung*, second, to the existence of alternative literary sources. To illustrate the former, Berdjaev claims that, after his Siberian exile, Dostoevskij "lost his youthful belief in Schillerism, by which name he designated the cult of the 'great and beautiful' — idealistic humanitarianism. In his experience Schillerism had not survived a single test. . . ."[3] Meier-Graefe contends, to the contrary, that Dostoevskij throughout his life held on to Schiller's "idealism . . ., and, correctly understood, this appears to me as one of his claims to glory."[4] Similarly, Kurt Wais concludes that the traces of Schiller in *The Brothers Karamazov* represent not a "dethronement" of Schiller's ideas, but rather a commentary on some aspects of them that Schiller had failed to develop.[5]

The second cause of critical disagreement hinges upon the extreme difficulty of pinning down a literary source, especially where several possible sources exist. A well-known example pertains to the literary prototypes of some major figures in *The Brothers Karamazov*, which Charles Passage finds in E. T. A. Hoffmann,[6] Čiževskij and others in Schiller. But even where alternative sources are excluded, it may — in the absence of a specific allusion — be virtually impossible to decide between coincidental resemblances, or such as are due to temperamental affinity, and actual borrowings. This fact, together with other difficulties inherent in this kind of investigation, argues caution. Therefore, in instances where "influence" cannot be conclusively proven, the perceived similarities will be discussed and the possibility of influence debated.

The present study is not intended as a complete and exhaustive treatment of the subject. For example, the first period of Dostoevskij's production, up to *The Insulted and the Injured*, is not examined in

[3] Nicholas Berdyaev, *Dostoievsky: An Interpretation*, trans. Donald Attwater (New York, 1934), 31.

[4] Julius Meier-Graefe, *Dostojewski, der Dichter* (Berlin, 1926), 519.

[5] *Wais*, 476. – For a similar judgment on a different basis, see V. Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy* I, trans. George L. Kline (New York, 1953), 413.

[6] See *Dostoevski the Adapter: A Study in Dostoevski's Use of the Tales of Hoffman* (Chapel Hill, 1954), 168ff.

detail, though several of the early stories contain a great deal of relevant material. Furthermore, the relation between Schiller's and Dostoevskij's aesthetics and literary theory — a topic worthy of one or two chapters — is discussed only incidentally. What the book sets out to do is, first, to trace an outline of the changing literary relationship between Dostoevskij and Schiller and, second, to present an intensive analysis of the climax of this relationship as it manifests itself in Schiller's impact on *The Brothers Karamazov*.

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I

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "SCHILLERISM" IN DOSTOEVSKIJ'S EARLIER FICTION

Schiller's importance to Dostoevskij can be viewed in two distinct ways: on the one hand, as the reflection of a general orientation towards German intellectual culture in the Russia of his time, on the other, as the result of a spiritual affinity between two literary men who were also philosophers. Though literary contacts were fairly continuous between Russia and Germany throughout the eighteenth century, after the Petrine period France became the principal source of foreign influence in Russian literature.[1] To mark the point at which the balance of influence tipped in favor of Germany, 14 December 1825, associated ever after with the Decembrist Uprising, may serve as a convenient date. It is true, as O. P. Peterson has pointed out, that in the case of Schiller the influence began already at the turn of the century,[2] the first climax of his Russian popularity being signalized in 1804 by the presentation of a diamond ring from Alexander I and Elizabeth.[3] However, this early wave of Schiller enthusiasm was much narrower in scope than that which came in the wake of the Decembrist revolt, being largely based on his *Sturm und Drang* dramas and his lyrical poetry. As the proponent of a philosophy and an aesthetic, Schiller became important only at the point where a powerful new wave of German influence, that of literary and philosophical romanticism, made its impact upon Russian culture. Yet, in his capacity as poet-thinker Schiller transcended this wave, achieving a popularity in Russia unequaled both by pure philosophers, like Fichte and Schelling, and by other poets.

The combination, in Schiller's work, of philosophical and aesthetic speculation with revolutionary drama and romantic poetry is, no doubt,

[1] Harald Raab, "Deutsch-russische Literaturbeziehungen von der Aufklärung bis zur Romantik," *Neue deutsche Literatur* 5, 1 (1957), 93.
[2] *Schiller in Russland, 1785-1805* (New York, 1934), 234.
[3] *Ibid.*, 98.

the chief reason why he held a unique place in the affections of Russian writers and intellectuals. This is also the reason why there is no unified conception of Schiller in Russian literature. A Soviet critic has noted that, from the very inception of Schiller's Russian influence, there were two schools of interpretation, one "progressive," the other "reactionary." The progressives, first represented by the Decembrists, saw Schiller as a revolutionary humanist, while the reactionaries saw him as an aesthetic idealist.[4] Dostoevskij, according to this critic, belonged to the reactionary camp. After the Decembrist debacle it was Schiller the aesthetic idealist who came to the fore; only in the late 'thirties and early 'forties, with the stabilization of Belinskij's philosophy of revolutionary radicalism, did the "progressive" interpretation of Schiller become a force in literary and critical activity. A counterforce emerged in the early 'sixties, when Dostoevskij and his brother started their own journal, *Vremja*. The publication, by Gerbel', of Schiller's works in Russian translation (1856-1861) provided an occasion for controversy.[5] With the growth of the revolutionary movement, Schiller once more emerged as a potent force in Russian cultural and literary life; Gor'kij, among others, shows traces of Schiller's influence.[6] Of later Soviet writers, Aleksej Tolstoj and Konstantin Fedin reflect the "progressive" Schiller's popularity after the Revolution.[7] It is not surprising that, in Soviet criticism, Schiller the aesthetic idealist should have become submerged by Schiller the revolutionary humanist. One element, however, has supervened upon the revolutionary, namely, nationalism. Accordingly, *William Tell* exceeds anything else that Schiller wrote both in popular appeal and in critical acclaim.[8]

The general vicissitudes of Schiller's reputation in Russia have their counterpart in the individual writer's and critic's attitudes. Again, though the response may vary from admiration to scorn, the interest is usually permanent. An excellent example is provided by the intellectual biography of Vissarion Belinskij. Initially an enthusiastic admirer of Schiller, Belinskij in the middle 'thirties became first an exponent of

[4] Roman M. Samarin, "Schiller im Urteil der russischen Kritik," trans. E. M. Arndt, *Weimarer Beiträge* 2 (1956), 20.

[5] *Ibid.*, 21.

[6] Rudolph Fischer, "Schillers Widerhall in der russischen Literatur," *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig* 103, 5 (1958), 21.

[7] *Ibid.*, 22.

[8] Samarin, 29. –Though Samarin's view is limited by the schematic dichotomy of "reactionary" and "progressive" characteristic of Soviet criticism, it correctly emphasizes the wide range of critical interpretation of Schiller's work.

Schellingianism, later of Hegelianism. When, around 1840, he rejected the Hegelian "harmony," Schiller — who in the meantime had been downgraded for his abstract idealism[9] — returned to prime place in his affections. In a letter to V. P. Botkin of 4 October 1840, he writes: "I curse my base striving to reconcile myself with base reality! Hail the great Schiller, the noble advocate of humanity, the bright star of salvation, the emancipator of society from the bloody prejudices of tradition."[10] The same return to Schiller characterizes the thought of other Russian radicals, such as Bakunin and Gercen. In all these instances Schiller displays a staying power exceeding that of other influential German philosophers and poets.

The same pattern of permanence in change also marks Dostoevskij's relations with Schiller; there is scarcely a time when the German philosopher-poet is totally absent from his thought. When he leaves no mark on the creative work, he appears in the letters, and vice versa. The change in Dostoevskij's critical response has a remarkable similarity to that which occurred in the case of Belinskij. A youthful phase of extravagant enthusiasm for Schiller is followed by one of critical reevaluation, leading, in turn, to a period of renewed Schillerian impact on his creative work.

The phase of enthusiasm began exceptionally early, namely, when Dostoevskij, at the age of ten, saw the great actor Močalov in a performance of *The Robbers* in Moscow. In a letter to N. L. Ozmidov written in August 1880, about half a year before his death, Dostoevskij says that "the powerful impression which I carried away [from the performance] had a very fruitful effect on my spiritual life."[11] The first recorded expression of his enthusiasm for Schiller appears in a letter to his brother Mixail of January 1840, in which he relates an experience of the preceding year. At that time he had become close friends with the Schiller-disciple Šidlovskij, as well as with another young man whom he came to love very dearly, but whose identity has not been established with certainty.[12] Dostoevskij writes:

Last winter I was in a sort of exalted state. The acquaintance with Šidlovskij bestowed upon me so many hours of a better life; this, however,

[9] See letter to N. V. Stankevič of 1939 October 2, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij* XI (Moscow, 1956), 385-386.

[10] *Ibid.*, 556.

[11] F. M. Dostoevskij, *Pis'ma,* ed. A. S. Dolinin, IV (Moscow, 1959), 196.

[12] Dolinin suggests that this friend could possibly have been Ivan Ignat'evič Berežeckij, one of Dostoevskij's fellow students from the Military Engineers School. Berežeckij left the school as ensign in 1841 and died after reaching the rank of sub-lieutenant. –*Pis'ma* I (Moscow, 1928), 471.

was not the cause of my state. I had then by my side a friend, a being whom I loved so much! You wrote to me, brother, that I have never read Schiller. You are mistaken, brother! I learnt him by heart, I spoke his language, and I dreamt in his images. I believe that fate never did anything more to the purpose in my life than to allow me to get to know this great poet at such a period of my life; never would I have been able to get to know him better than just then. While I read Schiller *with him,* I tested *on him* the noble and fiery Don Carlos, Marquis Posa, and Mortimer. This friendship brought me so much of both grief and delight! Now I shall forever remain silent about it. The very name Schiller became to me an intimate and sort of magic sound, which evokes in me so many memories and dreams. These memories are bitter, brother; that is why I never talked to you about Schiller, about the impressions he left on me. Just to hear Schiller's name gives me pain.[13]

The atmosphere of passionate friendship in which Dostoevskij acquired a deeper knowledge of Schiller's work no doubt contributed to the intensity and permanence of the poet's impact on his thought. So great was his enthusiasm that it even affected his practical judgment: he believed that the publication of his brother's translation of Schiller's works in three volumes, with a foreword by himself, would once and for all remedy their financial problems.[14]

Through Dostoevskij's acquaintance with Belinskij, his image of Schiller may have become colored by the complex of ideas associated with Utopian Socialism.[15] By this time, 1845, Belinskij had been a confirmed Schillerian for several years. His utopian interpretation of Schiller appears clearly in the following passage from a letter to Bakunin of 1841. Belinskij announces that the time of Goethe and Hegel are past, that

now again have risen before me in the full splendor of radiant greatness the gigantic figures of Fichte and Schiller, these prophets of mankind (humanity), these heralds of the kingdom of God on earth, these priests of eternal love and eternal truth, not merely in a bookish sense and by way of Brahmin contemplation, but in the living and rational deed [*Tat*].[16]

It is highly dubious that the youthful Dostoevskij had interpreted Schiller in such a revolutionary spirit; symptomatic of his vague, almost

[13] Dostoevskij, *Pis'ma* I, 57.

[14] Letter to Mixail Dostoevskij of 30 September 1844, *ibid.* I, 71-72.

[15] Martin E. Malia's statement that Dostoevskij began with a "radical and 'socialist' enthusiasm for Schiller" fails to take into account the earliest period of admiration, in which Schiller was intimately associated with personal friendship, fidelity, and love rather than with devotion to a cause. –See "Schiller and the Early Russian Left," *Harvard Slavic Studies* 4 (1957), 178.

[16] Belinskij, *op. cit.* XII (Moscow, 1956), 38.

indiscriminate response is the simultaneous mention, in the previously cited letter to his brother, of Don Carlos, Marquis Posa, and Mortimer. The only quality which these characters share is idealistic fervor; the tenor of the ideal is different in each case. What Dostoevskij responded to in Schiller at that time seems to have been, above all, the emotional afflatus; he could hardly have been deeply engaged by the ideological content if he was equally attracted by a vacillating princeling crossed in love, a Maltese knight preaching the gospel of a new freedom and peace, and an apostate Protestant prepared to sacrifice all for illicit passion. Yet, this may not be entirely fair; the "preaching" of a Marquis Posa, after all, was not in vain. Moreover, the result of his act of self-sacrifice was to cure Don Carlos of his erotic brooding, make him embrace the cause of freedom and, concurrently, the highest concerns of mankind. Perhaps the ideological content of Dostoevskij's first enthusiasm for Schiller can be said to have been a sort of abstract humanism, embodied in characters who show a need for self-sacrifice, human brotherhood, and idealistic love. Interestingly, this happens to be almost a replica of Belinskij's initial view of Schiller.[17] At that stage, however, influence can safely be ruled out, since Dostoevskij's Schiller-worship far antedates his meeting with Belinskij.

That, on the other hand, Belinskij had something to do with Dostoevskij's changing view of Schiller, seems unquestionable. In the section "Old People" in *Diary of a Writer*, the author says that Belinskij set out to "convert me to his faith."[18] Apparently he was successful. Commenting on the fact that they never met during the last year of Belinskij's life, because the critic no longer liked his work, Dostoevskij confesses that at the time of their friendship he had "passionately embraced his [Belinskij's] teaching."[19] Though this must refer primarily to Belinskij's brand of Utopian Socialism, it is impossible to dissociate that doctrine entirely from his conception of Schiller. At any rate, as time went on Dostoevskij came to associate Schiller more and more with the ideas and attitudes of personalism — the key to Belinskij's new understanding of the German writer — while the equation of Schillerism with abstract humanism still persisted at the back of his mind. Belinskij's new view of Schiller is stated succinctly in a letter to Botkin of 4 October 1840. After hailing the "great Schiller" as the

[17] *Ibid.* XI, 385-386.
[18] F. M. Dostoevskij, *Polnoe sobranie xudožestvennyx proizvedenij* XI, ed. B. Tomaševskij and K. Xalabaev (M.-L., 1926-1930), 8.
[19] *Ibid.* XI, 10.

"noble advocate of humanity," the critic continues: "For me now *human personality* stands higher than history, higher than society, higher than mankind."[20] As I shall show later, this individualistic interpretation of Schiller played an important role in Dostoevskij's literary coming of age.

Curiously, the first larger work in which Schillerian elements appear, *The Insulted and the Injured* (1861), both positively embodies and emphatically rejects these elements. The pattern of attraction and repulsion in regard to Schiller is clearly evident from the fact that, while in its general situation, dramatis personae, and social pathos the novel is reminiscent of Schiller's domestic tragedy *Cabal and Love*, the Schillerian ideal which underlies Dostoevskij's treatment of his material is mercilessly undercut by the only character who seems to possess the breath of life, Prince Valkovskij.[21] This rejection of Schillerism, which began shortly after Dostoevskij's return from Siberia,[22] was directed against Schiller the sentimental romantic and abstract humanist who had been the idol of Dostoevskij's early youth. Speaking of *The Insulted and The Injured,* Meier-Graefe says: "Schiller is the real hero concerned — the Schiller who had possessed the young Dostoevskij."[23] This view acquires considerable credibility when it is recalled that at this period, in which Dostoevskij made a strenuous effort to recollect his childhood, he steeped himself in Schiller a second time.[24] The effects of the new "possession," Meier-Graefe suggests, were "salutary": by carrying his cult to the utmost limit and, consequently, exceeding even Schiller in sentimentality, Dostoevskij reduced his youthful idol to the absurd and rid himself forever of Schiller's "weaknesses."[25] However, this was not, according to Meier-Graefe, his conscious intention; the actual result came about unconsciously. As evidence of Dostoevskij's unconscious intention he mentions the author's rush to complete the

[20] *Belinskij*, XI, 556.

[21] One may note a comment by K. Močul'skij to the effect that Prince Valkovskij is the real hero of the novel. –*Dostoevskij: Žizn' i tvorčestvo* (Paris, 1947), 172.

[22] Leonid Grossman, one of many critics who have commented on this matter, directly attributes it – along with Dostoevskij's turning against all idealists, romantics, and utopians – to his prison experience. – *Put' Dostoevskogo* (Leningrad, 1924), 114.

[23] Meier-Graefe, 127.

[24] *Ibid.*, 128. –Specific evidence in indirect support of this contention is offered by Čiževskij, who says that Dostoevskij reread Schiller when Gerbel' published his edition of Schiller's works (1856-1861). See "Šiller v Rossii," *Novyi žurnal* 45 (1956), 122.

[25] Meier-Graefe, 128.

work, his involuntary self-caricature in the young narrator, and the banality of the characters.[26]

It is, however, the presence of Prince Valkovskij which offers the best evidence of Dostoevskij's unconscious intention. For despite his villainous character, the Prince is portrayed with a great deal of understanding, even sympathy; only through passionate involvement could an author produce a figure of such vehement destructiveness. The fanaticism of Prince Valkovskij's hatred of "Schillerism" is undoubtedly rooted in Dostoevskij's one-time "possession." After reading the anti-Schillerian tirades, one is left with a curiously sad feeling, because one realizes how painful it must have been to destroy something that was once so precious. At the same time, perhaps, the author may have derived a certain measure of masochistic pleasure from the demolition of his idol.

As mentioned above, the phrase "abstract humanism" comes closest to summing up what Schiller and Schillerism signify in the novel. With the principal characters this "humanism" is not a mere attitude, but a veritable cult. In the absence of a ritual, the members of the cult abandon themselves to the transports of eternal brotherhood and mutual self-sacrifice. All the younger characters adopt this stance: Nataša, Aleša, Katja, and Vanja, the narrator; even Prince Valkovskij, the evil prime mover of the action, confesses that at one time he "wanted to be a benefactor of humanity, to found a philanthropic society."[27] The young people, inspired by an "ardent love for all humanity" (III, 199), have an informal counterpart of such a society. Katja typifies their rhetoric by her talk of "duty, of our mission, of how we all ought to serve humanity" (III, 197). They are easy targets, and the Prince revels in puncturing their pretty dreams — his son's, for example. With his talk of "universal love" and his enthusiasm for the "sublime and the beautiful," Aleša, he notes, is yet capable of committing "crimes against love" by neglecting a woman who, he says, "must be dearer to you than the whole world!" (III, 204).

Since *The Insulted and the Injured* is a love story — several in one, in fact — it is largely through the treatment of love that Schillerism is defined and exposed. One quality characterizes all the passionate involvements: an unusual readiness to merge eros in agape, to give up one's beloved for another's benefit. The young people assume extrav-

[26] *Ibid.*, 129.

[27] F. M. Dostoevskij, *Sobranie sočinenij* III (Moscow, 1948-1959), 272. Henceforth references to this work will be made in the text.

agant stances of self-denial and of mutual devotion. Most extreme is the attitude of Vanja; though he loves Nataša, he is — in the Prince's words — prepared, "like some Schiller, to lay down . . . [his] life for them," and he calls his behavior a "sickening show of generous feelings" (III, 266). The strictures of the Prince apply all too justly to the manner in which the love "rectangle" manage their affairs. Thus, at a point where everyone knows that he will marry Katja, not Nataša, Aleša goes into raptures over Katja's suggestion that he and Nataša stay together another few days. "He was at once completely comforted; his face was radiant with joy, he embraced Nataša, kissed Katja's hand, and embraced me" (III, 324-325). Katja, being the least experienced, is the most theoretical and consequently the most ludicrous of the foursome. When the rivals meet — in a scene which echoes *Cabal and Love* — she is quite prepared to discuss their situation, including the question which of them "should make Aleša happy and which ought to give him up" (III, 323). Then, holding Nataša "in her embrace" and kissing her hands, " 'If you only knew how I love you!' she said, weeping. 'Let us be sisters, let us always write to one another . . . and I will always love you . . . I'll love you so, love you so' " (III, 323). This ideal love is associated with Schiller not only by Prince Valkovskij, but also by Masloboev, who mentions that Mr. Smith's daughter had an "ideal lover, one of the Schiller fraternity, a poet, and at the same time a merchant, a young dreamer . . ." (III, 236).[28]

The epithets used by the Prince to deride the attitudes of the young people betray the nature and the possible source of the underlying ideal of perfection. He says he is "sick of all these naivetés, all these pastorals of Aleša, all this Schillerism, all the loftiness of this damned affair with this Nataša . . ." (III, 268-269). These epithets bring to mind Schiller's treatment of the idyl in his essay "On Naive and Reflective Poetry" (1795). Central to the concept of the idyl in its "reflective" [*sentimentale*] variety is the absence of conflict "in the individual as well as in society, a free accord of inclination with the law. . . ." In brief, Schiller writes, this concept is "nothing but the ideal of beauty

[28] The definition of Schillerism through love is a natural consequence of the widespread allegiance to Schiller's concept of love among Russian intellectuals of the 1830's and '40's; Belinskij, for example, traces idealistic love to Schiller (Malia, 188). This fact raises the question whether Dostoevskij may not have had nearer targets of satire in mind. Malia notes the Schillerian cult of love and friendship in the Stankevič circle (ibid., 187-188), and Močul'skij claims that the group around Aleša is reminiscent of the Petraševskij circle (*op. cit.*, 174). But such topical satire notwithstanding, the book's anti-Schillerian animus loses none of its force.

applied to real life. Accordingly, its character consists in the fact that *all opposition between reality and the ideal* . . . is completely abolished. . . ."[29] This principle is manifest in *The Insulted and the Injured* through the characters' attempt to live out their poetic dreams and ideal aspirations in their everyday existence. Thus, while *Cabal and Love* provided the general situation of Dostoevskij's novel, its intellectual horizon bears a striking resemblance to Schillerian aesthetic thought, with which Dostoevskij was familiar from his early youth.[30]

The Schillerians, refusing to distinguish between dream and reality, are completely incapable of coping with their problems. Masloboev, a reliable witness, comments on the inferiority of Ixmenev and Mr. Smith's daughter in their dealings with the Prince. These "exalted souls" confine themselves to a "noble and lofty contempt instead of applying the law to the case. . . . Brüderschaft [Miss Smith's "ideal lover"], too, encouraged her. . . . They read Schiller" (III, 238). Here Schillerism is specifically connected with inability to cope with actuality. The Prince puts it more simply: these lofty souls are plain fools; since, however, they constitute the majority of men, he has decided that the only thing one can do is "to encourage them; it pays" (III, 277).

It appears that the Prince has anticipated Raskol'nikov's distinction between ordinary and superior men, with the difference that, because the inferior ones — the Schillerian dreamers — are in the majority, the Prince believes the superior individual had better externally accept their values. The Schillerians, being too tender-minded to bear seeing reality stripped of the veil of pleasant illusions, paradoxically wield such a great power over the tough-minded that the latter must conform; if they are not emotionally swayed to do so, they conform out of "enlightened self-interest." For, as Valkovskij confides to Vanja, "if it were possible for everyone of us to describe all his cherished secrets, . . . what he is even at times afraid to confess to himself, there would rise such a stench on the earth that we would all be suffocated. That is why . . . our social conventions and proprieties are so good. They have a profound purpose, I won't say a moral one, but simply for self-preservation and comfort . . ." (III, 272).

[29] Friedrich Schiller, *Sämtliche Werke* V, ed. Jost Perfahl, with an Introduction by Benno von Wiese (München, 1968), 488. Henceforth references to this work will be made in the text.

[30] See Dostoevskij, *Pis'ma* I, 72. –According to Čiževskij, Dostoevskij read Schiller's philosophical works for the first time in the edition of Gerbel'. He adds, however, that the author must have been familiar with the contents of some at second hand ("Šiller v Rossii," 122). As a matter of fact, Dostoevskij shows ac-

As we have seen, the complex of ideas inherent in the Prince's concept of Schillerism is varied indeed: from abstract humanism, with brotherly love and self-sacrifice as corollaries, it has come to connote a high-strung idealism and romanticism;[31] beyond this, it also comprehends social proprieties and conventions that serve to protect this idealism so as to avoid confronting human nature in the raw. Fundamentally, according to Prince Valkovskij, Schillerism is false, a mask, even with those who are its convinced adherents.

And this is the most telling and cynical point made by the Prince: one cannot really distinguish between the genuine and the fake Schillerian. The anecdote he relates about "an outstanding beauty" with whom he was intimate at one time, helps to illustrate his point. Despite her "majestic and unapproachable" manner and her "formidable" virtue, "no profligate was more lewd than that woman.... My lady was sensual to such a degree that even Marquis de Sade could have taken lessons from her" (III, 275). The Prince sees little difference between such a deliberately assumed "Schillerism" for the purpose of enhancing sensual pleasure and genuine Schillerism, of which Miss Smith, the Prince's former victim, is a good example. Prefacing his story of their affair by announcing that "at the root of every human virtue lies the most profound egoism" and that "the more virtuous anything is, the more egoism there is in it" (III, 277), Valkovskij justifies his cruel treatment of Miss Smith by asserting that he would only have made her unhappy by returning the money he had taken from her.

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quaintance with at least two of Schiller's prose works as early as 1844, when in a letter of 30 September to his brother Mixail he recommends the inclusion of Schiller's letters on *Don Carlos* and the essay on the "naive" in his prospective translation. The conservatism of Čiževskij's estimate of Dostoevskij's familiarity with Schiller's prose works is further shown by a notation of Leonid Grossman to the effect that in a letter to his brother from the Fortress, in 1849, Fedor asked Mixail to send him a copy of Schiller's *History of the Thirty Years War (Žizn' i trudy F. M. Dostoevskogo* [Moscow, 1935], 60). A writer of fiction would not be likely to read Schiller's historical works before his aesthetic and critical writings. It may be added that, despite the skepticism of critics, there are indications that Dostoevskij possessed considerable command of German, great enough, most likely, to enable him to understand Schiller in the original. On receiving his brother's translation of *Don Carlos*, he praises it as generally competent, but points out five to six poor lines (*Pis'ma* I, 72). Moreover, Dostoevskij's wife records that Fedor spoke German fluently, at least on their travels in Germany in 1867 (*The Diary of Dostoevsky's Wife*, ed. René Fülöp-Miller and Fr. Eckstein, trans. Madge Pemberton [New York, 1928], 290).

[31] One may recall here Belinskij's one-time rejection of Schiller because of his "prekrasnodušie" [Schönseligkeit], which had become a jargon term for one-sided idealism (Malia, 184).

I should have deprived her of the pleasure of being unhappy entirely *owing to me* and of cursing me for it all her life. Believe me, my friend, there is even a sort of lofty spite in unhappiness of that kind, in feeling oneself magnanimous and completely in the right and in having every right to call one's offender a scoundrel. This "ecstasy of spite" is often met with in Schilleresque people, of course; afterwards, perhaps, she had nothing to eat, but I am convinced that she was happy.... Thus, my maxim is fully justified — that the greater and more conspicuous a person's magnanimity, the greater and the more revolting is the egoism underlying it (III, 279–280).

The notion of an "ecstasy of spite" will play an important role in Dostoevskij's later fiction.

Despite its absolute cynicism, the Prince's self-revelation does not lack a certain engaging quality. Compared to the self-delusions of the virtuous Schillerians, who refuse to recognize man's limitations or veil them in lofty verbiage, the Prince's anecdote about the "crazy official in Paris" who had the compulsion to exhibit himself stark naked "in all the ... purity of his heart" to anyone he would meet, "men, women and children," introduces a welcome note of candor. In a figurative sense, the Prince is "exhibiting" himself to Vanja as he reveals his innermost thoughts to him. He claims that to some degree "the same pleasure may be had by suddenly flabbergasting some Schiller and sticking out one's tongue at him when he least expects it" (III, 273). Valkovskij, naturally, is not "exhibiting" himself in the "purity of his heart"; his motive in removing his mask to Vanja is practical: he wants the young man to use his influence with Aleša and Nataša, so that there will be "no pastorals, no Schillerism," to further hamper his plans for his son's marriage (III, 280). Nevertheless, after being exposed for a long stretch of story to the sentimental complications of a "rectangular" intrigue, one welcomes the Prince's confidences because they introduce a badly needed realistic perspective. Indeed, his parody of the clichés of Schillerism is quite enjoyable.

The Prince's assumed "Schillerian" naiveté is so well acted that it seems quite genuine. He says to Vanja: "You simply have to keep me company today. I feel wonderful, and since I am soft-hearted to the point of sentimentality, I cannot be happy alone. Who knows, we may yet come to drinking *Brüderschaft*" (III, 264-265). The cynical outbursts of the Prince alternate with the clichés of eternal friendship and brotherhood. "You see how much sweet simplicity there is in me, what candor, what *bonhomie!* I confess everything to you, even my childish caprices. Yes, *mon cher*, yes, a little more *bonhomie* on your side, too, and we should come to an agreement and get on excellently, and in

the end we would understand one another perfectly" (III, 268). Sprinkling his talk with *mon cher* and *mon ami*, he produces a convincing semblance of beer-hall conviviality, *Gemütlichkeit*, appropriately transposed into a more elegant language: "*Buvons, mon ami*, allow me to fill your glass" (III, 274). Very cleverly, Dostoevskij manages the conversation in such a way that gradually the lofty idea of human brotherhood becomes debased to the mere social gesture of drinking *Brüderschaft*. Just before the end of the dialogue, Valkovskij says: "I hope we are parting as friends. Shouldn't we drink *Brüderschaft* together?" (III, 282).[32]

The upshot of *The Insulted and the Injured* in terms of ideas is the crystallization of two diametrical attitudes, the first organized around the concept of Schillerism, the second finding its most forceful statement in an utterance of Valkovskij's which echoes the solipsistic philosophy of Max Stirner. The only thing that is not nonsense, the Prince says, is "personality — myself. All is for me, the whole world is created for me" (III, 276).[33] The Schillerians are weaklings; furthermore, morally they seem but little superior to the avowed egoists. The latter, according to the Prince, are indestructible: "Everything in the world may perish, but we shall never perish" (III, 278). Variants of these attitudes will provide the basic dialectic of Dostoevskij's later novels. But Schillerism as it appears in *The Insulted and the Injured* will play a gradually decreasing role, whereas a more fully assimilated brand of the same "ism," crystallized around the quest for freedom, will unite with the insurgent individualism typified in this early novel by Prince Valkovskij. The pathos of abstract humanism will be replaced by the pathos of individual freedom. This change, however, does not become perceptible until Dostoevskij has projected a more radical and complete critique of Schillerian sentimentalism than is contained in *The Insulted and the Injured*. The trend of rejection is continued in *An Unpleasant Predicament* [*Skvernyj anekdot* (1862)] and achieves a climax in *Notes from Underground* (1864).

Meier-Graefe calls *An Unpleasant Predicament* a travesty on *The*

[32] For a passage which specifically links drinking *Brüderschaft* mockingly with Schillerism, one may turn to *The Eternal Husband*. After Vel'čaninov has been told that the young man who is in love with Trusockij's child-bride has been reconsiled with his aging rival, he exclaims: "So in the end they finished up with *Brüderschaft*! Ha-ha! They embraced and wept! Oh, you Schilleresque poets!" (IV, 570).

[33] For a note on Max Stirner's influence on Dostoevskij's thought, see Fülöp-Miller's preface to *The Diary of Dostoevsky's Wife*, 13.

Insulted and the Injured, a statement which requires some qualification. The fact that Valkovskij provides a concise parody, within the novel itself, of the complex of Schillerian attitudes presented, makes a travesty of the entire work pretty much an artistic impossibility. Not even the specific theme is parodied, since *An Unpleasant Predicament* has no love interest. Travesty applies only to the more general theme, the relationship between one social class and another, originally derived from Schiller's *Cabal and Love*. Schiller had shaped a tragedy around this theme, while Dostoevskij's treatment varies from pathos with a streak of comedy (*The Insulted and the Injured*) to pure farce (*An Unpleasant Predicament*). The latter story is a veritable burlesque on abstract humanism, "gumannost'," which is the catchword of the well-intentioned high official, Pralinskij, who endeavors to cross the class barrier. Pralinskij is nearly a diametrical opposite to Prince Valkovskij; with his genuine naiveté he is eager to experience a sense of brotherhood with those beneath him on the social scale. The ludicrous situations in which he gets involved as a result of his "Schillerian" humanism are a measure of Dostoevskij's advance in realism. Whatever comedy of situation exists in *The Insulted and the Injured* is there accidentally, not by design; and in the great scene of parody between Ivan Petrovič (Vanja) and Valkovskij, there is only dialogue. In *An Unpleasant Predicament* the entire story is bathed in the light of ridicule; a satirical intent informs character portrayal, incident, and dialogue alike. One notes, for example, that the portrait of the good man, the idealistic humanist, is drawn according to Prince Valkovskij's unflattering analysis of the Schillerian: though the latter will profess high idealism, he acts, without realizing it, upon purely practical, even base motives. However the official may glow at the prospect of exhibiting "gumannost'," he becomes even more fervent on the subject of his enhanced future reputation and popularity. Subsequently, the memory of his embarrassment at the wedding of his humble employee destroys his dream of "gumannost' " and turns him into a more severe — and more classconscious — official. Meier-Graefe calls the story "a big step towards the conquest of Schiller's banal superficialities." The "extravagant sentimentality" of *The Insulted and the Injured* is followed by a style of "terseness and concision never yet achieved."[34]

[34] Meier-Graefe, 132.

II

THE RISE OF NEW SCHILLERIAN THEMES: *NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND* AND *THE IDIOT*

And yet, despite the "big step" forward represented by *An Unpleasant Predicament*, neither this story nor *The Insulted and the Injured* is an impressive achievement. The latter is too imitative, the former belongs to a "low," facile genre, burlesque satire. With *Notes from Underground*, on the other hand, Dostoevskij produced something distinctive. It may not be a great story — if it is one at all — and there is little character interest apart from the main figure; but it does have a compelling and passionately argued theme. As in the previous two works, the theme is anti-Schillerian; in some ways the underground man is a new, more sympathetic version of Prince Valkovskij. Or he may be considered as an embodiment of Valkovskij's view of the Schillerian,[1] a view which entails the paradoxical mingling of good and evil, of the idealistic and the base. Thus, taking Schiller as his point of departure, Dostoevskij has projected an original concept of man.

Granted, Schillerism is not the only object of attack in this work; needless to say, it is combined with scientism, utilitarianism, and utopianism. But it is a major strain. A leitmotif is the phrase the "sublime and the beautiful" [*prekrasnoe i vysokoe*], which occurs at least fifteen times. By its insistent presence, this phrase — which perhaps a bit too neatly sums up Schiller's aesthetic idealism[2] — does not allow the reader to forget the ultimate target of Dostoevskij's satire.

[1] The "spiteful man" of the *Notes from Underground* (IV, 133) has a definite kinship with the "Schilleresque people" derided by Prince Valkovskij. The virtue of these people, according to the Prince, is frequently only an "ecstasy of spite" (III, 280).

[2] The coupling of these two concepts is not, of course, unique to Schiller. Edmund Burke's essay on the subject is well known, and Kant wrote a treatise entitled, in Russian translation, *O vysokom i prekrasnom*. The editors of the latest edition of Dostoevskij's works attribute the phrase as used in *Notes from Underground* to Kant, adding that in the 1830's and '40's the expression was a popular one in critical circles (*Sobranie sočinenij* IV, 598). Since, however, Dostoevskij's

The style of *Notes from Underground* is largely determined by the gap between ideal and reality, which in this work reaches grotesque proportions. Whereas in *The Insulted and the Injured* and *An Unpleasant Predicament* idealism figures as an aesthetic and an ethical norm respectively, in *Notes from the Underground* it appears largely in the guise of reverie. And it is analogous to a disease, manifesting itself in "attacks" [*prilivy*] (IV, 180). The narrator exclaims:

> But how much love, good Lord, how much love I used to experience in those dreams of mine, in those escapes to the sublime and the beautiful. Though this love was fantastic and though, in reality, it was never applied to anything human, there was so much of it ... that one did not feel any need of applying it in practice afterwards; that would have been superfluous luxury. Generally, everything always ended satisfactorily with an indolent and entrancing transition to art, that is, to the beautiful forms of existence, all ready-made, lifted forcibly from the poets and novelists and adapted to every possible use and need (IV, 180–81). [3]

Notably, the ideal supposed to comprehend the highest human values has completely lost touch with humanity; the attempt to embody it — which is made despite its stated gratuitousness — is grotesquely bathetic, even more so than in *An Unpleasant Predicament.* After three months of dreaming the underground man simply must "plunge into

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knowledge of Kant was at first largely indirect, derived from his wide reading in Schiller, it would seem farfetched to father upon Kant two terms which are constantly joined together in the aesthetic essays of Schiller. In fact, the distinction between these two kinds of beauty is central to Schiller's aesthetics. Suffice it to cite one sentence from *On the Sublime,* an essay in which Schiller consistently compares and contrasts these two aesthetic qualities: "The sublime ... provides an escape from the world of the senses, in which the beautiful always tends to hold us captive" (V, 222). For a Dostoevskian passage which indirectly associates the "sublime and the beautiful" with Schiller, see the article "Idealists-Cynics" in the *Diary of a Writer,* which discusses T. N. Granovskij's approach to politics. Granovskij, whom A. S. Dolinin calls a Schillerian "prekrasnaja duša" (Dostoevskij, *Pis'ma* II, 469), was held to be, in Dostoevskij's words, a " 'patented' preacher of 'the sublime and the beautiful' " (*Polnoe sobranie* ... XI, 342). A direct attribution of the concept to Schiller occurs in *The Brothers Karamazov* (X, 299).

[3] The maudlin self-indulgence of these dreams is grotesquely suggested by one of the more eccentric notions of the narrator. The occupation of his imagined *alter ego* would be "to drink to the health of all the sublime and the beautiful. I should have seized upon every chance to drop a tear in my glass and then drain it to all that was sublime and beautiful" (IV, 147-148). The idea of dropping a tear in the glass and drinking a toast is so extraordinary that here it can be said with all but complete certainty that Dostoevskij is parodying a Schillerian passage. Franz Moor, observing his incognito brother together with Amalia, soliloquizes: "Didn't I see how she let fall a couple of stealthy tears into the wine, which he downed so hurriedly behind my back that it was as though he wanted to devour the glass also!" (*The Robbers,* Act IV, sc. 2).

society," that is, visit Anton Antonovič, the head of his department and his "only permanent acquaintance." This visit took place, says the narrator, only after "my dreams had reached such a pinnacle of bliss that I must absolutely, and without delay, embrace my fellows and all humanity; but for that one had to have at least one man who actually existed. However, it was only on Tuesdays — his at-home day — that one could call on Anton Antonovič, and consequently it was necessary to whip up my need to embrace all mankind on that day" (IV, 182). The incongruity between idea and realization grows progressively wider; the situation is broadly comic. Anton Antonovič is the most prosaic of men, conversing with visitors about "excise duties, about business in the Senate, salaries, promotions, His Excellency, the best way to please him, etc., etc." The high-minded lover of humanity "became stupefied, kept breaking out in a sweat, and felt as if a stroke was imminent." But, he says, that was "good and useful to me. On returning home I would defer for some time my desire to embrace all mankind" (IV, 182).

This particular incident reads like a travesty of Marquis Posa's relationship with Don Carlos. When in Act I, Scene 2 his royal friend gives him a highly emotional reception, the Marquis upbraids him by pointing out his symbolic role:

> . . . I do not stand here now as Roderick,
> As the playmate of the boy Carlos.
> I embrace you as a deputy of all mankind.
> It is the Flemish provinces that weep on your neck
> And solemnly besiege you for salvation.

And Don Carlos, he later confesses to the Queen, used to hold a similar symbolic meaning for him:

> I loved the son of a prince; my heart,
> Dedicated to a single person, embraced
> The whole world! In the soul of my Carlos
> I created a paradise for millions.
> (Act IV, sc. 21.)

This kind of relationship is in Schiller, as in Dostoevskij, associated with the cult of the "beautiful." In his letters on "aesthetic education" Schiller states that the pleasures of sensuality we enjoy only as individuals, the pleasures of knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] as a species; the beautiful, however, we enjoy both as individuals and as a species (V, 406-407). Thus, in Schiller is united what Dostoevskij in *Notes from*

Underground emphatically and comically separates: the individual and humanity.

As the preceding discussion has shown, Schillerism as a negative influence is pervasive in *Notes from Underground.* Less immediately apparent is, perhaps, Schiller's positive contribution to ideas and attitudes here developed that are considered to be distinctively Dostoevskian. The most important of these are the concepts of moral-psychological ambiguity and individual moral freedom. I will try to show that there is considerable evidence for the notion of moral ambiguity in Schiller and that this notion may have helped Dostoevskij to deepen his understanding of man. As for moral freedom, which is central to Dostoevskij's major works, it is a paramount theme in Schiller's writings.

The idea of a deep disharmony in human nature is fundamental to Schiller's thought and appears both in his philosophical and his imaginative writings. Karl Moor in *The Robbers* refers to it in the moment of contemplating suicide. Why, he asks, should there be such a "dissonance" in man, when there is such a "divine harmony in inanimate nature?" (Act IV, sc. 5). The "dissonance" has its root in the dualism of mind and body; while the mind, according to Schiller, is independent of natural necessity, the body is not. On the moral plane, there is a permanent opposition between the traits of man's animality, determined by natural law, and those traits which flow from the "autonomous [*selbsttätige*] mind" (V, 198). Since only a perfect man would be able to work out the right mutual relations between these contrary forces (V, 352), most men are torn by conflict. By implication, traits of diametrically opposed moral tendencies often dwell together in the same inner environment. Statements to this effect are frequent in Schiller's writings. Already in *Theosophy of Julius* (1781?) the thought appears that "even the villain is often seized by a high zeal for excellence, [and] that even the weakling is occasionally fired by enthusiasm for sublime Herculean greatness" (V, 16). And in the preface to his story *Criminal from Lost Honor* Schiller says that the man who studies the thoughts which precede the execution of a criminal act will not be surprised to see "wholesome plants" flourishing side by side with the "poisonous hemlock," to find "wisdom and folly, vice and virtue together in *one* cradle" (III, 495). This thought is elaborated into an aesthetic principle in the essay *Thoughts on the Use of the Vulgar and the Base in Art* (V, 304-310).

This conception of man is found not only in Schiller's theoretical

writings, but also in his drama and fiction. The noble criminal, like Karl Moor and Fiesko, plays an ambiguous role, in which "crime and the glamor of crime, infamy and honor, force and ethical principle are closely intertwined."[4] Summarizing the characteristics of Schiller's plays, Benno von Wiese states:

> Schiller's characters lead and seduce at the same time. In his moralism there is always a hidden immoralism, which pursues the great resolution, the great adventure, or also the great defeat. However, the moralist always seeks the highest values, capable of ennobling our earthly existence. Nowhere is this so clear as in the youthful dramas, which have not yet been influenced by Kantian philosophy. But later as well, crime and heroism are closely related in Schiller.[5]

The same applies to *Criminal from Lost Honor,* where Schiller shows not only the double moral quality of character, but also of inner experience. The opposing forces of good and evil are manifest in one and the same psychological moment: "At the furthest point of his deterioration he [Christian Wolf] was perhaps nearer to the good than he had been before his first moral lapse" (III, 509).

Of particular relevance to Dostoevskij is a specific context of moral ambiguity in Schiller's works: murder under cover of friendship. In *Cabal and Love* Wurm reminds the President "with what sincerity" the latter had persuaded his predecessor to a game of piquet, and how he had caroused half the night with him on a "friendly burgundy"; "and yet, that was the very same night when the big mine was to explode and blow up the good man . . ." (Act III, sc. 1). In the more memorable form of dramatic action, the same situation appears at the end of *Fiesko.* Verrina, at a moment when he is resolved to kill Fiesko, addresses him as follows: "(. . . *with sadness*). 'But *embrace* me still once more, Fiesko! For no one is here who can see Verrina *weep* and touch a prince.' (*He hugs him warmly.*) 'Surely, never did two greater hearts beat together, for we loved one another so warmly, like brothers —' (*Weeping vehemently on Fiesko's neck.*) 'Fiesko! Fiesko! You will leave an empty place in my breast which mankind, tripled, could never fill' " (Act V, sc. 16). A moment later he causes Fiesko to be drowned.

Dostoevskij's works contain indications that Schiller's use of psychological ambiguity may have influenced his thinking considerably. One bit of evidence is a chapter in the *Diary of a Writer* entitled "Idealists-

[4] Benno von Wiese, *Schiller: Einführung in Leben und Werk* (Stuttgart, 1959), 25-26.

[5] *Ibid.,* 29.

Cynics," in which the author explores the "psychological significance" of a political article by the "Schillerian" T. N. Granovskij. The article was noteworthy for its "realistic" approach to politics, despite the writer's admittedly idealistic philosophy. Dostoevskij's explanation is that a Russian idealist "without fail will be ashamed of his idealism."[6] Held merely for a " 'patented' preacher of 'the sublime and the beautiful'," he will, when asked to express his opinion on a practical matter, suddenly turn, "by some sort of miracle," not only into a "downright realist and prosaist, but even into a cynic. And that is not all: the main thing is that he prides himself on this cynicism and prosiness. In giving his opinion he almost smacks his tongue: ideals — let's toss them aside; ideals are rubbish, poetry, little verses; let's have in their stead nothing but 'realistic truth.' But this realistic truth comes to nothing, since he overdoes it to the point of cynicism."[7]

In a less exuberant vein, this is a counterpart to what the underground man has to say about the Russian romantic, who never loses sight of "the useful and the practical (such as rent-free government quarters, pensions, decorations),"[8] while at the same time he is able to "preserve to his dying day an indestructible respect for 'the beautiful and the sublime' . . . Our romantic is a man of great breadth and the biggest rogue of all our rogues, I assure you — from experience" (IV, 170-171). The romantics, unlike many less patient people, seldom lose their heads. Consequently, they are quite successful socially.

> A countless number of romantics later in life rise to considerable rank in the service. Quite a remarkable versatility! And what a faculty they have for the most contradictory sensations! . . . That is why we have so many "broad natures" among us, who never lose their ideal even in the depths of degradation; and though they never lift a finger for their ideal, though they are arrant thieves and robbers, they tearfully cherish their original ideal and are extraordinarily honest at heart (IV, 171).

Judging from his own self-characterization, the underground man is himself one of those "idealist-cynics" and romantics — short of the social success they enjoy. He confesses that

[6] *Polnoe sobranie* . . . XI, 343.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] This sounds like an unconscious memory of a passage in Schiller's *Theosophy of Julius,* where, after admitting the possibility of noble and base tendencies coexisting in the psyche, Schiller cites the case of the "admired" poet Haller, who "unmasked the nothingness of vainglory, and yet was unable to scorn the even vainer nothingness of a knight's star, which was an insult to his greatness" (V, 118-119).

just at those moments — yes, at those very moments — when I was most capable of feeling every subtlety of "all the sublime and the beautiful," ... I would, as though purposely, not only feet but do such hideous things, that — well, in short, such as everyone probably does but which, as though on purpose, occurred to me at the very time when I was most conscious that they ought not to be done.... The more conscious I was of goodness and of all that was "sublime and beautiful," the more deeply did I sink into the mire and the more capable I became of getting stuck in it altogether (IV, 137).

The double nature of many of the most original characters of Dostoevskij is suggested by way of allusions to Schiller. Svidrigajlov, for example, takes huge delight in the combination of criminality and idealism in Raskol'nikov, in whose polarized psyche he perceives a developing replica of his own. He says:

So you are preaching to me about depravity and aesthetics! You are a Schiller! You are an idealist! That's all the way it should be, of course, and it would be surprising if it were otherwise; but even so, it still seems a little odd in reality. Oh, what a pity there is so little time, because you are an absolutely fascinating subject! By the way, do you like Schiller? I like him tremendously (V, 492).

Here Schiller is, on the one hand, used to represent idealism, as in *The Insulted and the Injured* and many other works; on the other hand, Svidrigajlov hints that Schillerian idealism inevitably has an obverse of cynicism and evil. As I have shown above, there is ample evidence of the presence of this idealist-cynic syndrome in the work of Schiller himself. In the absence of positive proof, the frequent association of Schiller's name with situations and figures exhibiting moral ambiguity is by itself presumptive evidence that Schiller contributed to the formation of this cardinal Dostoevskian concept.

The coincidence of Schiller's and Dostoevskij's use of "virtuous criminals" in their work supports this evidence. *The Brothers Karamazov* contains a passage which touches both on virtue and criminality and on the more general point being discussed. The defense counsel, Fetjukovič, tries to show the plausibility of a man like Mitja, "cruel, unruly, and uncontrolled on the surface,... loving Schiller — loving 'the sublime and the beautiful'!... these natures very often thirst for tenderness, beauty, and justice as though in contrast to themselves, to their unruliness, their cruelty — they thirst for it unconsciously..." (X, 298-299). At another point Fetjukovič asks the rhetorical question, "Why should you deny the prisoner a sense of honor?" Honor, Dostoevskij suggests, is not irreconcilable with criminality; this is also an

important point in Schiller's story *Criminal from Lost Honor* and in his essay on the use of the vulgar and the base in art. The juxtaposition of moral opposites in one individual, in effect, is Dostoevskij's conception of the "broad" Karamazov nature, capable of contemplating two abysses at once (X, 286). Fundamentally, this is Dostoevskij's summing up of his view of human nature, or man's psyche; it is done through the expansion and modification of certain ideas of Schiller.[9]

After this lengthy display of parallel ideas, a few instances of the *Brüderschaft*-murder complex in Dostoevskij will bring out detailed similarities between the two authors' psychology which hardly could be the result of pure chance; significantly, in one instance Schiller is referred to by name shortly after the ambiguous incident takes place. Trusockij in *The Eternal Husband* loves, or believes he loves, Vel'čaninov, yet, subconsciously, he wants to kill him. Trying to explain the "husband's" attempt on his life, Vel'čaninov ruminates: ". . . it must have happened that I made a tremendous impression on him at T—. Tremendous and 'gratifying' is just what it was, and it is just with a Schiller like that, in the shape of a Quasimodo, that such a thing could happen! He magnified me a hundredfold because I impressed him too much in his philosophic solitude." And a little later he says: "The most monstrous monster is the monster with noble feelings" (IV, 567).

The Idiot (1868-1869), which came out only one year before *The Eternal Husband*, has a more fully elaborated relationship of love rivalry between two men. Moreover, the *Brüderschaft*-murder motif is amplified through anecdote. Just before Rogožin and Myškin exchange crosses, the latter relates an anecdote about two peasants, "middle-aged men, friends who had known each other for a long time and were not drunk," of whom one had noticed that the other was wearing a silver watch. "He took a knife and, when his friend had turned away, approached him cautiously from behind, took aim, turned his eyes heavenwards, crossed himself and, praying fervently, 'Lord, forgive me for Christ's sake!' cut his friend's throat at one stroke, like a sheep, and took his watch" (VI, 249). The religious element, which is lacking in the comparable situations in Schiller, does not alter the basic picture. The motif of *Brüderschaft*, with embrace, is obviously

[9] There exists in this regard an interesting parallel with Aleksandr Gercen, whose concept of the broad nature [*širokaja natura*], according to Malia, was a nationalized version of Schiller's "schöne Seele." The modification of Schiller's concept came about, Malia suggests, through the anarchistic, day-dreaming nature of early socialism, in which the pursuit of the ideal coexisted with the idea of fearless struggle" (op. cit., 198).

present in the situation that follows, where Myškin and Rogožin exchange crosses. The main difference between Schiller's and Dostoevskij's situations is not in the conception, but in the psychological exploration, which Dostoevskij has extended in depth. For instance, Rogožin is reluctant to embrace Myškin. "'Don't be afraid! Though I've taken your cross, I won't murder you for your watch!' he muttered indistinctly, with a sudden strange laugh." Then he embraces Myškin "heartily" (VI, 253). In the evening of the same day Rogožin attempts to murder him. These instances of enacted moral ambiguity serve to illustrate the general concept discussed as well as to lend further strength to the possibility that Dostoevskij's psychology in this particular area may have received a stimulus from Schiller.

The second complex of ideas in Dostoevskij's mature production which has one of its sources in Schiller is the dialectic of freedom and necessity. While it may seem presumptuous to trace to one particular influence a theme which is so universal, one so close to the very heart of tragedy, its profound and enduring importance to both Schiller and Dostoevskij justifies the attempt. For, with all its universality, the theme is not equally prominent in every age, or every writer. Moreover, as will be seen, Dostoevskij utilizes in this context situations and symbolic images which are traceable to Schiller.

Schiller's concepts of necessity and freedom are closely related to his aesthetic thought. Speaking in terms of the three drives [*Triebe*] which in his view determine personality, the sensual drive [*Sinntrieb*; also *Lebenstrieb:* vital impetus], the formal drive [*Formtrieb*], and the play drive [*Spieltrieb*], the poet writes:

> The sensual drive excludes from its subject all autonomy and freedom, the formal drive excludes all dependence, all suffering. While exclusion of freedom is tantamount to physical necessity, exclusion of suffering amounts to moral necessity. Thus, both drives coerce the spirit, the former through laws of nature, the latter through laws of reason. Accordingly, the play drive, in which both partake jointly, will coerce the spirit morally and physically at the same time; therefore, because it abolishes all contingency, it will abolish all coercion and set man free, both physically and morally (V, 353).

Freedom thus depends upon the dialectic of *Sinntrieb* and *Formtrieb*, and exists only where both are present. Further, since it is only at a stage where man is not yet developed — in the cultural sense — that the sensual drive is unopposed and "acts as nature and necessity," "in man himself there can exist no other power than the will" (V, 372).

Schiller repeatedly emphasizes the dialectic of the two forces and their subsumption by the superior will:

> . . . precisely because both, of necessity, strive toward contrary objectives, this double compulsion cancels itself out, and the will affirms complete freedom between both of them. Hence, the will relates to both drives as a power (as the basis of reality), while neither of the two can by itself be a power in relation to the other (V, 370).

It is the condition of indeterminacy which results from the mutual cancellation of the two drives that Schiller calls the aesthetic condition (V, 373).

According to Schiller, therefore, the beginning of humanity in man is not signalized by the emergence of reason (V, 387), but by "delight [*Freude*] in *appearance*, the inclination towards *adornment* and play" (V, 395). Interest in appearance testifies to the presence of both outward and inward freedom: first, it is only when the natural needs are fulfilled that man develops imagination; second, in using the imagination he shows independence of "the reality of things," which is the work of nature, and delights in what he creates, not in what he receives (V, 395). However, not all art is equally apt for the demonstration of freedom. A central distinction in the essay *On Grace and Dignity* [*Über Anmut und Würde* (1793)] is relevant in this connection. Grace, the author says, consists in the freedom of voluntary movements, whereas dignity consists in the control of involuntary ones (V, 274). The latter, needed chiefly in meeting suffering and death, is the more important in the present context.

For if, even in one single instance, man must do what he does not will, he cannot be defined as the being that wills; then "his boasted freedom is absolutely nothing . . ." (V, 215). Therefore, death must be overcome, and this can be done only through the sublime. Though the beautiful, too, is an expression of freedom, it cannot generate that freedom which "elevates us above the power of nature and frees us from bodily influence, but . . . [only] that which we enjoy as men within nature" (V, 218). The sublime appeals to man as a free spirit: "We feel free in the presence of beauty because the physical drives are in accord with the law of reason; we feel free in the presence of the sublime because the physical drives have no influence upon the legislation of reason, because the mind here acts as if it were subject to no other laws but its own" (V, 218). Therefore, though we willingly subject our "prosperity" and our "existence" to physical necessity, this very subjection reminds us that our principles are not thus subject:

"man is in . . . [necessity's] hand, but man's will is in his own" (V, 220). The freedom so realized Schiller calls a "high demonic freedom" (V, 223); for while the beautiful benefits man only, the sublime activates "the pure spirit [*Dämon*] in him" (V, 229). Hence, the sublime is necessary in order to complete man's aesthetic education.

Freedom, in its various facets, is a permanent theme in Schiller's plays down to the unfinished "Demetrius," which he was working on when he died. *The Robbers* (1781) deals with the freedom of the exceptional man as against the cringing conventionalism of the average, *Fiesko* (1784) with the problem of political liberty and autocratic ambition, *Don Carlos* (1787) with the clash between autocracy and the desire for "freedom of thought" (Act III, sc. 10); while rich in thematic material, *Wallenstein's Death* (1799) has as a central idea the relation between necessity, or fate, and freedom of choice, as do also *Maria Stuart* (1800) and *The Bride of Messina* (1803); and *William Tell* (1804) is a celebration of political independence. Naturally, these themes could not all have affected Dostoevskij equally. One particular expression of moral freedom enacted or alluded to in a number of plays, namely suicide, is noteworthy. As an instance of the sublime, this particular manifestation of freedom may have had a powerful impact upon Dostoevskij's work.

In his aesthetic writings Schiller does not say much about suicide as a means of dramatic dénouement. In the essay *The Stage Considered as a Moral Institution* (1784), he cites one particular play where suicide is not contrary to the moral sense (V, 97-98). More importantly, in a later work, *About the Basis of Our Enjoyment of Tragic Objects* (1791), he claims that the suicide of a criminal hero may be more satisfying to the moral sense than the voluntary self-sacrifice of a virtuous one (V, 138-139). Curiously, in only one of Schiller's plays does expiatory suicide actually occur, namely, that of Don Cesar in *The Bride of Messina.* In the last two lines of the play, after Don Cesar has stabbed himself and is dying, the theme of expiation is accentuated by the Chorus: "Life is *not* the highest good, / Guilt, however, is the greatest evil."

Significantly, the *freedom* of the act is stressed, as when Don Cesar says: "Dying, I dissolve the old curse upon the house, / Only death chosen freely [*der freie Tod*] breaks the chain of fate" (Act IV, sc. 8). These lines, like Schiller's treatment of the sublime, express the transcendence of natural necessity in a free act, an idea that appears throughout Schiller's dramatic production. Though Karl Moor in *The*

Robbers ends by giving himself up, just before he decides to do so he says: "'. . . this freedom you cannot take away from me.' (*He loads his pistol. . . .*)" (Act IV, sc. 5). In *Wallenstein's Death* Countess Terzky in the last scene announces to Octavio Piccolomini:

> . . . we think royally
> And regard a free, courageous death
> As more seemly than a dishonored life.
> — I have poison —

Mortimer in *Maria Stuart*, whom Dostoevskij mentions as one of his youthful idols,[10] directs the following words to the officer of the guard who wants to arrest him:

> What do you want, you venal slave of tyranny?
> I defy you, I am free! *(Pulling a dagger.)*
> . . .
> And in the last moment my heart, free,
> shall open up, my tongue shall speak
> (Act IV sc. 4.)

Finally, the prospectus for the third act of "Demetrius" reveals that Schiller intended Boris Godunov to take poison. Once more the suicide is treated as an act of heroism (II, 799-801).

Suicide as an assertion of moral freedom is related to another Schillerian theme, that of the "higher man," to be discussed in detail in connection with *The Brothers Karamazov*. This theme is particularly important in *The Robbers*, where it is embodied in Karl Moor and, by way of caricature, in Franz Moor. The views of the two brothers differ little on the surface, the main difference hinging on Karl's realization that absolute freedom presupposes nobility of character. Franz crudely expresses the point of view that might makes right: "The right belongs to the conqueror, and the limit of our strength is our law" (Act I, sc. 1). In his first naive admiration of greatness, Karl too speaks slightingly of the law, while extolling its opposite. However, after his experience with crime he assumes a more reserved attitude towards the morality of absolute freedom. This is how he warns Kosinsky when the latter wants to join the band: "Here, as it were, you step outside the sphere of humanity — either you must be a higher man, or you are a devil" (Act III, sc. 2). Ultimately, Karl Moor renounces the privileges of the "higher man," choosing to give himself up rather than commit

[10] Dostoevskij, *Pis'ma* I, 57.

suicide.[11] The predicament of Raskol'nikov in *Crime and Punishment* immediately comes to mind.

To sum up, the concept of freedom has been shown to be at the center of Schiller's thought. His essay *On the Sublime* (1801) contains a striking statement of his position, one which must have had a powerful appeal to the future author of "The Grand Inquisitor": "To noble minds freedom with all its moral contradictions and physical evils is an infinitely more interesting spectacle than prosperity and order without freedom, where the sheep patiently follow the shepherd and the autonomous [*selbstherrschende*] will degrades itself to a subservient part of a clockwork" (V, 225). It is only the concept of freedom which bestows sublimity upon the course of history: "As a historical object the world is fundamentally nothing but the conflict of natural forces among themselves and with man's freedom, and history relates to us the outcome of this struggle" (V, 226). Similarly, it has been shown in the preceding that the entire aesthetic philosophy of Schiller is grounded in the idea of freedom.

It is with *Notes from Underground* that the dialectic of freedom and necessity on the ideological plane enters into Dostoevskij's production. Previously, compulsion is social rather than moral, practical rather than theoretical; and except for Prince Valkovskij there is little assertion of individuality. In *Notes from Underground* the narrator stages a veritable revolt both against natural and formal necessity, for him incarnate in the laws of natural science and mathematics: ". . . what do I care," he exclaims, "for the laws of nature and arithmetic if for some reason or other I don't like those laws of twice-two?" (IV, 142). However, despite the close kinship between Dostoevskij's and Schiller's thought in this area, an influence can hardly be asserted unless tangible similarities of detail are present. Such similarities do exist. To epitomize the view of those who believe that human behavior will ultimately, as a result of scientific advances, become entirely rational, the narrator uses the symbolic image of the "piano key or organ stop" (IV, 152). That is all man would be under the circumstances. "A man desiring by rule . . . will at once be transformed from a human being into an organ stop, or something of the sort; for what is a man without desires, with-

[11] This idea of the "higher man" inevitably calls to mind the superman philosophy developed by Nietzsche, who in so many respects has been compared to Dostoevskij. Similarities have been found between the views of Schiller and Nietzsche in other respects as well; in fact, the entire range of their thought exhibits striking resemblances. See Udo Gaede, *Schiller und Nietzsche als Verkünder der tragischen Kultur* (Berlin, 1908).

out free will, and without choice but a stop in an organ pipe?" (IV, 154). This symbol becomes so charged with meaning that it imperils man's very existence, and the "whole work of man seems really to consist in nothing but man proving to himself every moment that he is a man and not an organ stop!" (IV, 158).

Very likely, the piano-key symbol is Dostoevskij's elaboration of a reminiscence from *The Robbers*, reinforced by a similar image in *Don Carlos*. Shortly before his suicide, Franz Moor is engaged in refuting all possible evidences of immortality. In his talk with Pastor Moser he says, among other things: "Sensation is the vibration of a few strings, and the shattered piano sounds no more. When I . . . break this Venus to bits, it *used* to be symmetry and beauty. Look, that is your immortal soul!" (Act V, sc. 1). The metaphor is the same, and the context is one of scientific materialism in both authors. The principal difference is that, while Franz is concerned with disproving the existence of a spiritual dimension in order to destroy the possibility of immortality, the narrator in Dostoevskij's story feels compelled to postulate such a dimension in order to establish the possibiilty of freedom. Interestingly, a scene in Schiller's play *Don Carlos* contains a similar metaphor within a context of freedom versus tyranny. In his audience with King Philip, Marquis Posa asks:

> Since you humiliated man [*herunterstürzten*]
> To be your instrument [*Saitenspiel*],
> Who shares harmony with you?
> . . .
> [What] if freedom,
> Which you destroyed, were the only thing
> That can bring your wishes to fruition?
> (Act III, sc. 10.)

Mixail Dostoevskij's translation of these lines contains the more specific musical term "piano key," used extensively in *Notes from Underground*. The lines run:

> You yourself turned man
> Into a mere piano key —
> Who will share harmony with you?
> [Čeloveka sami
> Vy sdelali liš' klaviš'j svoeju —
> Komu ž sozvuč'em s vami podelit'sja?][12]

[12] "Don Karlos," *Biblioteka dlja čtenija* 87, 2 (1848), 27.–It is only fair to mention that Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, which more than any single literary work has set its mark on *Notes from Underground*, contains a scene in which a musical instrument

Rebellion against the idea of necessity is also implicit in a series of animal images which from this time on become fairly common in Dostoevskij's work.[13] The plays, poems, and prose writings of Schiller make extensive use of such images, with specific social and philosophical meanings. The most common image, *Wurm*, is variously applied — as an epithet for a pitiful or contemptible person, as a symbol of man's animality, or as a metaphor of evil and corruption. The word *Wurm* comprehends all these meanings because it can denote "vermin," "serpent," and also "worm"; back of Schiller's usage in regard to this word lies both Scriptural and theological usage. In the sense of "vermin," *Wurm* is applied derogatively not only to individuals — such as Franz Moor in *The Robbers* (Act III, sc. 1) — but also to man as a species.[14] With a sense of pathos the word appears in the same sense in *Cabal and Love*, particularly in the scene between Lady Milford and Luise. Here Luise, the socially inferior of the two rivals, speaks sympathetically of "vermin" — meaning, usually, noxious, parasitic animals and insects — as being "injured" and provided with a sting in self-defense.[15] In her last appeal, where *Wurm* is a metaphor of her own oppression by a tyrannical authority, Luise even invokes God's justice for the "vermin": "Lady! The last spasm of the squashed vermin, too, cries into the ear of the All-knowing One . . ." (Act IV, sc. 7). In this scene Luise also uses *Insekt* in the same sympathetic sense. While in both instances the usage of the musician's daughter is heavily ironic — she sees herself neither as "vermin" nor as "insect" — the word *Wurm* as employed in this play is surrounded with an unmistakable aura of injury and undeserved suffering.

Because of its connection with man's Fall, *Wurm* in the sense of

is a metaphor of man. Guildenstern and Rosencrantz, who are hired by the King to disclose Hamlet's secret plans, are put to shame when Hamlet compares himself fancifully to a recorder as the players and musicians enter. After Guildenstern has admitted that he does not know how to play the recorder, Hamlet retorts: "Why, look you now, how unworthy a thing you make of me! You would play upon me, you would seem to know my stops, you would pluck out the heart of my mystery, you would sound me from my lowest note to the top of my compass; and there is much music, excellent voice, in this little organ, yet you cannot make it speak. 'Sblood, do you think I am easier to be played on than a pipe? Call me what instrument you will, though you can fret me, yet you cannot play upon me" (Act III, sc. 2).

[13] For a survey of such images, see Ralph E. Matlaw, "Recurrent Imagery in Dostoevsky," *Harvard Slavic Studies* 3 (1957), 201-225.

[14] See *The Robbers* Act V, sc. 1 and 2; *Fiesko* Act I, sc. 9; *Cabal and Love* Act II, sc. 5; and "Hymn to the Infinite One" (III, 68). In the poem the phrase "rational worm" is used as an epithet for man.

[15] For the same idea, see *Wallenstein's Death* Act II, sc. 6.

"serpent" might seem a natural choice if one wanted a symbol of lust, voluptuousness, and pleasure of the senses in general. Curiously, Schiller uses the word sparingly in this sense, except in set phrases like "Wurm des Paradieses" (*Fiesko*, Act V, sc. 16). A particular phrasing in the poem *The Artists* suggests that, to symbolize animal pleasure, he preferred the lowly "earthworm" to the wily "serpent." In that poem Schiller speaks of man as being "buried in the worm's appetite, / Wrapped in sensual pleasure" (III, 146). Most likely, the earthworm is also intended in the much quoted lines from *To Joy*: "To the worm was given sensual pleasure, / And the cherub stands before God" (III, 116).[16] The "worm" as a symbol of sensuality [*Sinnlichkeit*] appears in Schiller's prose as well (V, 195).

Finally, *Wurm* in the sense of "worm" may be a symbol of evil. In his eloquent defense of intellectual freedom before King Philip in *Don Carlos*, Marquis Posa makes an elaborate application of this symbol. The Marquis draws an analogy between King Philip's state and God's creation:

> He, the great creator, throws the worm
> Into a drop of dew and, more,
> Lets sheer caprice [*Willkür*] run riot
> In the dead expanses of putrefaction —
> *Your* creation, how poor and narrow!
> . . .
> *He* — so as not to upset
> The enchanting thing called freedom —
> Prefers to let the dreadful army of evil
> Rage in his universe. . . .
> (Act III, sc. 10.)[17]

Here the worm, agent of physical corruption, is a symbol of the evil which has to be accepted as the price of freedom.

Dostoevskij rarely uses the insect or the worm as epithets or symbols before *Notes from Underground*.[18] The first instance in which the term

[16] Tjutčev's translation of "Wurm" as *nasekomoe* [insect] in these lines could be the reason why insects and their sub-species by far outnumber similar animal images in Dostoevskij's work.

It may be noted that Čiževskij mistakenly attributes the translation of *To Joy* to Žukovskij ("Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'." 21, note). The most recent edition of Dostoevskij's works makes the correct attribution (*Sobranie sočinenij* X, 495). For the translation, see F. I. Tjutčev, *Polnoe sobranie stixotvorenij* (Leningrad, 1957), 71-74.

[17] See also *Cabal and Love* Act III, sc. 1. Appropriately, the character by the name of Wurm in this play is an incarnation of evil.

[18] See *Uncle's Dream* and *The Village of Stepančikovo* (II, 385 and 478) for a

is more than a gesture of contempt occurs in *The Insulted and the Injured*, where it vividly suggests the diabolism of Prince Valkovskij.[19] Vanja says that "he produced upon me the impression of some sort of reptile, some huge spider, which I felt an intense desire to crush. He was reveling in his taunts at me" (III, 267). But this is an isolated example compared to the swarms of flies and other insects that invade *Notes from Underground* and most of the later novels. Incidentally, Tjutčev's free rendering of *Wurm* as *nasekomoe* [insect] in a just quoted line from Schiller's *To Joy* may have had something to do with transforming the crawling worm into one with wings.

As Dostoevskij uses these animal images, they stand for fairly specific qualities. "Fly" is usually an epithet of contempt and commiseration. Oddly, far from implying lack of consciousness, it suggests an excess of it, along with impotence. Walking on the street in his shabby outfit, the underground man says he suffered a "regular martyrdom, an incessant, unbearable humiliation at the thought... that I was a fly in the eyes of this whole world, a nasty, obscene fly — more intelligent, more highly developed, more noble than any of them... but a fly that was continually making way for everyone, insulted and injured by everyone" (IV, 176). Sensuality is symbolized by the word "insect," implying a definite lack of human consciousness and moral values. The use of the word in this particular sense is probably due to its association with "sensual lust" in the above-mentioned translation, which is also the basis of a frequently used abstract noun in Dostoevskij's work, *nasekomost'*.[20] Finally, "spider," as in *The Insulted and the Injured*, connotes vice, corruption, and evil. The underground man confesses that he "suddenly realized vividly how absurd, loathsome as a spider, was the idea of vice which, without love, grossly and shamelessly begins directly with that in which true love finds its consummation" (IV, 207).

Whatever the shade of meaning conveyed by these metaphorical or symbolic words, it invariably implies subjection or submission to, even diabolical acceptance of, a necessity or weakness of nature, what Schiller called *Sinnlichkeit*, the realm of the physical. This is one of the forces against which the underground man rebels, though he attains

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few examples. The images here used (cockroach, beetle, fly) are mere epithets of contempt. For a more extended list, see Matlaw, 202.

[19] One may note that the Prince comprises the roles of both President von Walter and his secretary, whose name is Wurm.

[20] Čiževskij, "Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 20-21.

no true freedom, but remains in subjection to his own "insect" nature. As previously noted, reason poses a second threat to freedom in the story. Just as Schiller thinks of both reason and sensuality as excluding freedom, so Dostoevskij in *Notes from Underground* shows not only man's slavery to the physical, but also the danger that reason, through science, may turn man into a robot. In terms very similar to those used by Schiller in his treatise *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795), the underground man celebrates will rather than reason as the central human function or faculty. Both reason and sensuality are partial expressions of life, "while will is a manifestation of all life, that is, of all human life, including reason. . . . I, for example, quite naturally want to live in order to satisfy all my capacity for living and not simply my reasoning faculty, that is, only a twentieth part of my capacity for living" (IV, 155). As an ideal this may seem quite acceptable; however, the prime example of the assertion of will in the story is a grotesque parody of it. The young man's abject condition when he comes across Liza, the prostitute, gives him an irresistible appetite for power: "I had been humiliated, so I too wanted to humiliate; I had been treated like a rag, so I too wanted to show my power. . . . Power, power was what I wanted then . . ." (IV, 236). Only through mastering the life of someone else does the underground man achieve a sense of identity and an illusion of freedom.[21]

In later novels of Dostoevskij, necessity and freedom are given even more extreme embodiments. Most striking in its dialectic is the Ippolit section of *The Idiot,* which Meier-Graefe has called a "Schillerian intermezzo"; according to this critic, Ippolit would like to "turn into a reptile from rage."[22] An analysis of this "intermezzo" will reveal specific evidence of Schillerian echoes, which serve to amplify and intensify the themes of freedom and necessity.

Ippolit's "Explanation" contains reminiscences from two of Schiller's essays, namely, *Philosophical Letters* (1786) and the just cited treatise on "aesthetic education." Between the former essay and Ippolit's statement there are external as well as ideological similarities. Both are the expression, at times anguished, at times ecstatic, of the thought of a young man pondering the last things. Like Julius, Ippolit has written

[21] A good example of a similar situation appears in Schiller's story *Criminal from Lost Honor.* When the young man comes out of prison for the third time and finds that the girl he had been intimate with has become a camp follower and has caught venereal disease, he is greatly pleased. "It pleased me that there was still *one* creature *beneath* me in the scale of the living" (III, 500).

[22] Meier-Graefe 239.

his "Explanation" for one man in particular, Prince Myškin, though he reads it to a gathering of friends and acquaintances. The final attitudes may differ, but many ideas are nearly identical. Most important, perhaps, is the conception of unselfish love as the highest expression of humanity. In both cases, this love lacks a religious motivation. It does not flow from obedience to conscience or commandment, nor from the prospect of being rewarded in the life to come. It acquires meaning through the concept of a developing humanity, which to the n-th generation may benefit from a good deed that love has initiated.

Fundamentally, Schiller conceives of love as "based on a momentary exchange of personality, an interfusion of beings.... when I love, I become that much richer for my love" (V, 120). In another passage Julius asks Raphael to imagine "a truth ... which will benefit all mankind up to remote future centuries," but which requires for its proof that the originator die for it; then he asks him to picture that man, with the "sun-bright glance of genius," foreseeing the consequences of his discovery. "Let the complete ideal of that great result rise in your soul, let all those that he will make happy pass by him in dim anticipation, let the present and the future come together in his mind — and then answer yourself whether this man needs a voucher for another life" (V, 123). Ippolit, who uses the word "charity" for the same kind of love (VI, 458), asks:

> How can you tell ... what significance such an association of one personality with another may have on the destiny of those associated? ... You know it is a matter of a whole lifetime and of an infinite number of ramifications hidden from us.... In scattering the seed, scattering your "charity," your kind deeds, ... *you are giving away part of your personality, and taking into yourself part of another;* you are in mutual communion with one another.... all your thoughts, all the seeds scattered by you and perhaps already forgotten by you, will take form and grow up; he who has received them from you will hand them on to another. *And how can you tell what part you may have in the future determination of the destinies of mankind?* (VI, 459; my italics).[23]

These ideas of Ippolit's can be considered as a less sentimental version

[23] Columbus' discovery of America constitutes another echo from *Philosophical Letters,* though the similarity may seem rather external. Julius uses it to illustrate the possibility that faith, even when lacking a tangible guarantee, is by itself an intimation of spiritual reality (V, 127-128). As used by Ippolit, it illustrates the point that man finds happiness in the ceaseless process of striving rather than in the ultimate result. The principal common feature in the two applications is the uncertainty it denotes. With Julius this uncertainty is the inevitable condition of religious faith, with Ippolit an opportunity for high spiritual adventure.

of Dostoevskij's early "Schillerism," with its emphasis on love of humanity.

Philosophical Letters also contains ideas which must have given rise to thoughts of a quite different tenor. Two statements are significant: "God and nature are two magnitudes which are perfectly equivalent to one another" (V, 124), and ". . . God is banished to a world of worms" (V, 113). In the same passage where the last of these statements appears, the mortal body to which the spirit is bound is compared to a "rigid unchanging clockwork." However the connection may have been made, it is quite possible that the scattered pessimistic reflections on nature in the *Philosophical Letters* became associated in Dostoevskij's mind with a far more optimistic paragraph in the essay on "aesthetic education," in which Schiller shows the beginning of *Spiel*, and thus freedom, already in nature. The examples include lion, insect, singing-bird, and tree. Curiously, all but one of these occur as images and symbols in Ippolit's explanation; there is no lion, but an unspecified "beast" is of central importance. In one sentence the similarity is particularly striking. As Myškin walks in the park after Ippolit's talk, he hears a bird singing in a tree; "suddenly the bird darted out of the tree, and in the same moment he recalled for some reason the 'fly' in the 'hot sunbeam,' of which Ippolit had written that 'it knew its place and was a participant in the general chorus . . .' " (VI, 480). Schiller's sentence runs: "The insect swarms, full of joyous life, in the sunbeam; also, it is surely not the cry of appetite which we hear in the melodious song of the warbler" (V, 402). The use of "fly" instead of "insect" is a minor variation, not sufficiently different to affect the argument. It is true that one crucial term is absent from Schiller's passage: that of the "endless festival" in nature from which both Ippolit and Myškin feel excluded (VI, 469). But while the term is absent from Schiller's description, the reality is very much present. The lion enjoys its "exuberant strength" for its own sake, the insect revels in its "joyous life," and all of nature displays a "luxury of energies" which could be called "play" (V, 402). Moreover, the idea of a "festival of nature," including man, is not a stranger to Schiller; indeed, it is at the very center of a poem which, judging from its use in *The Brothers Karamazov*, Dostoevskij knew thoroughly: *To Joy*.

Yet, as Dostoevskij uses Schiller's images and concepts, their implications are exactly the reverse of what they signify in their original context. Schiller describes various forms of natural life to demonstrate that even at the vegetable and animal level the highest human value —

freedom — is incipient. In *The Idiot* the "lowest" becomes, in a way, the "highest," insofar as both Myškin and Ippolit in their yearning to be part of the natural harmony envy the "tiny fly." Ippolit says: "What is there for me in all this beauty when, every moment, every second I am obliged, forced, to recognize that even the tiny fly buzzing in the sunbeam beside me fully takes part in the festival and the chorus, knows its place, loves it and is happy; and I alone am an outcast . . ." (VI, 469). And Myškin, recalling an experience he had in Switzerland, thinks to himself:

> What was this festival? What was this great, eternal celebration to which there was no end and to which he had always, from his earliest childhood, been drawn and which he could never join? Every morning the same bright sun rises; every morning the rainbow in the waterfall; every evening that highest snow-covered mountain glows with a flush of purple against the distant horizon; every "little fly that buzzes about him in the hot sunbeam participates fully in the chorus: it knows its place, loves it and is happy." . . . now it seemed to him that he had said all this then also, those very words, and that the thing about the "fly" Ippolit had taken from him, from his words then and his tears. He felt sure of it, and somehow the thought set his heart beating (VI, 481).

And yet the exclusion from this "festival" is a minor misery when compared to that of seeing it from below, in "worm perspective," so to speak. The despair of a Karl Moor, who also feels an outcast, excluded from the joys of nature through loss of innocence, is at least tempered by the idea of God — though God, he thinks, is no longer his father (Act III, sc. 2). Dostoevskij, in Ippolit's "Explanation," has discarded God, at any rate as a reality worthy of man's love. Expounding the predicament of consciousness as the basis of the self, a consciousness that, "kindled by the will of a higher power," is doomed to "annihilation by that power," Ippolit asks why he cannot be "devoured" without being expected to "praise" what devours him (VI, 470). The world here envisaged is one without transcendence; God, in Schiller's phrase, has been "banished to a world of worms." There remains only a closed system of natural events, Schiller's "rigid unchanging clockwork," to which man is subject with iron necessity. Within this system there is no graduated scale of being or value; there is complete uniformity, everything existing on the level of matter and brute force. It is as if Dostoevskij, contemplating these two lines from *To Joy* — "To the worm was given sensual pleasure, / And the cherub stands before God" — imagined a world from which the superior part of the polarity has been removed. Alternatively, this vision could be traced back to a

deromantization of pantheism, a philosophy articulated in the already cited statement from the *Philosophical Letters* that "God and nature are two magnitudes which are perfectly equivalent to one another" (V, 124).

The climax to the horror of Ippolit's world is presented in his nightmarish dream, in which he has seen "a horrible animal, a sort of monster. It was like a scorpion, but was not a scorpion, it was more repulsive and much more horrible. . . ." Ippolit's description gives it the appearance of a phallic symbol: "it was . . . a crawling reptile about seven inches long, two fingers thick at the head and tapering off towards the tail, so that the point of the tail was no more than a sixth of an inch thick." The triangularity characteristic of the male sexual symbol is also unmistakably present: its two legs, set "at an angle of forty-five degrees," gave it the appearance of a "trident, if viewed from above" (VI, 441). And when the venomous monster is bitten in two by Ippolit's dog, it emits "from its half-crushed body, onto the dog's tongue, a quantity of white fluid similar to that of a squashed blackbeetle" (VI, 443). Subsequently, the sinister reality symbolized by the reptile becomes all of nature. Reflecting on the painting of the dead Christ in Rogožin's house, Ippolit says it shows nature as "an enormous merciless, dumb beast or, rather, . . . a huge machine of the most modern construction which, dull and insensible, has senselessly seized, crushed and devoured a great priceless being, a being that was worth all of nature and its laws, the whole earth, which was created, perhaps, solely for the advent of that being" (VI, 464). Then, in a hallucinatory moment, the sinister reality takes the form of "a huge and loathsome spider," which, he was assured, was "that same dark, dull and almighty" power (VI, 464). The horror of Ippolit's universe is due to the fact that God has been dethroned or, rather, has become an immanent diabolical force in nature of which all individual living creatures are the victims. His vision is that of a pantheistic Inferno.[24]

It is in this context of utter subjection to a mechanical and diabolical nature that Dostoevskij, through Ippolit, develops the idea of suicide as a means of asserting moral freedom. I have shown above how important suicide in this sense is in Schiller's drama. "If," Ippolit says, "I'd had the power not to be born, I would certainly not have accepted existence upon conditions that are such a mockery. But I still have the power to die, though the days that I give back are numbered. It is no

[24] Cf. Svidrigajlov's idea of eternity as just "one little room, something like a village bath-house, grimy and with spiders in every corner" (V, 299-300).

great power, it is no great mutiny." Clearly, the chief "temptation" is the possibility of freedom: "Nature has so limited any activity by its three weeks' sentence that perhaps suicide is the only action I still have time to begin and end by my own will. What if, perhaps, I want to avail myself of the last opportunity for *action.* A protest is sometimes no small action . . ." (VI, 471).[25]

The failure of Ippolit's suicide turns the critical light of parody on his attempt. Though this may seem to suggest that Dostoevskij rejects the entire reasoning of Ippolit, it should be kept in mind that the problem raised in the "Explanation" has a wider bearing; Rogožin, for example, is intimately related to the brute force which makes any real freedom an illusion.[26] The situation is far too complex to be treated in polar terms of acceptance or rejection. *The Idiot* is a tragic novel, and the philosophical and moral problem of Ippolit — that of necessity and freedom in a strangely and horribly exacerbated form — is central to much tragedy. Not only did the dialectic of these two forces remain a major concern of the novelist, but it continued to assume extreme forms. The same predicament is dramatized in a most bizarre manner through Kirillov in *The Devils* (1871-1872).

Kirillov unites certain qualities of Myškin and Ippolit: like the former he experiences moments of "eternal harmony" (VII, 614), like the latter he is in rebellion against the laws of nature. He even uses the

[25] There may be an echo from Schiller also in an ironical comment by Ippolit to the effect that "all that is needed is my worthless life, the life of an atom, to complete some universal harmony, for some sort of plus and minus, for the sake of some sort of contrast, and so on, just as the life of millions of creatures is needed every day as a sacrifice, since without their death the rest of the world couldn't go on . . ." (VI, 470). In his audience with King Philip, Marquis Posa asks the King with whom he shares "harmony," since he has elevated himself to godhead and debased his subjects.

> But to you
> This sacrifice does not mean a thing. And
> That makes you unique — your own genus.
> This is the price for being a God. And how
> Terrible if it were *not* so — if, for this price,
> For the shattered happiness of millions,
> You had gained nothing! (Act III, sc. 10.)

The echo is the more likely because the question at issue is freedom, which happens to be what is closest to Ippolit's heart as well.

[26] Dostoevskij has made this clear by his description of Ippolit's hallucination, in which the youth sees Rogožin enter his room. During the whole time he is there, Rogožin does not say a word. Ippolit repeatedly mentions his annoying silence. This he relates immediately after describing the "infinite power" as a "dull, dark, *dumb* force" (VI, 464; my italics).

same examples as Ippolit. Thus he calls Christ "that for which . . . [the earth] was created" and, he says, if "the laws of nature did not spare *Him*, did not even spare their own miracle . . ., the very laws of the planet are a lie and a farce of the devil" (VII, 643). Once more nature is seen as an infernal system, and suicide is the vehicle of liberation. However, there are two differences between Kirillov's and Ippolit's "suicide." Kirillov's succeeds; moreover, his suicide is not simply an assertion of the will, but the gesture of a self-appointed man-god. He has found, he says, the "attribute" of his divinity, namely, "Self-Will!" He stresses his "new terrible freedom. For it is very terrible. I am killing myself to show my defiance and my new terrible freedom" (VII, 644). Here, around an act which in Schiller's dramas is a simple assertion of moral freedom, Dostoevskij has created an entire philosophy.

It might be useful at this point to summarize the results of the discussion. Though the argument, in its winding course, has covered a wide range of topics, the central aim has been to show the development of Dostoevskij's response to and use of Schillerian ideas. His early years after the return from Siberia testify to an absorption in Schiller's abstract humanism; this phase is best typified by *The Insulted and the Injured*. But despite heavy Schillerian influence both on situation, character, and mental attitudes, Dostoevskij at the same time presents, through Prince Valkovskij, a biting satire of Schillerism in the novel. The satire continues in *An Unpleasant Predicament* and *Notes from Underground*. In the latter work, however, a new trend of Schillerian influence begins. Now we cannot speak of Schillerism any more, because Dostoevskij has largely ceased to draw upon Schiller for a *Weltanschauung*; rather, he uses and further develops ideas and images available to him in Schiller's plays, poems, and prose writings. I have suggested that Belinskij's revised view of Schiller as the great champion of personality may have been a contributing cause to Dostoevskij's different use of Schiller. Without question, the new perspective gained was one of the chief vehicles of Dostoevskij's literary breakthrough.

At this stage the outstanding theme is no longer universal love and harmony, but the dialectic of freedom and necessity. This theme is presented in forms that are far more extreme and challenging than any the German dramatist had ever attempted. Another difference is that entities which in Schiller's works are fairly simple and non-philosophical, in Dostoevskij's elaboration acquire metaphysical and theological resonance. This process of transformation is the main reason one cannot speak of a new Schillerism — one which, for example, Ippolit and

Kirillov could be said to embody and Dostoevskij to refute, as he formerly refuted the sentimental variety. At this stage Schiller simply provides materials, in the form of images, dramatic gestures and ideas, and Dostoevskij utilizes these materials to dramatize his own particular dialectic. Nor does the fact that his predominant dialectic is widely present in Schiller's writings make the Russian a direct borrower, since everything is worked out on a grand scale and in a searching and profound spirit. This defines the manner in which Dostoevskij "borrowed" from Schiller during the second principal stage of influence: the borrowings are largely in the form of suggestions; their complex elaboration inspires even deeper respect than the author would command if he had invented it all. We are reminded of Shakespeare, the master "plagiarist" of all time.

As Dostoevskij progressively assimilated Schiller's ideas, he seemingly came to feel less and less self-conscious about alluding to them directly and using quotations from his works. There is an excess of self-consciousness in *The Insulted and the Injured*, a tendency which comes to the surface in Valkovskij's parody of Schillerism. In other works of the '60's and those of the '70's Schiller is rarely mentioned, but Schillerian themes abound. Only with *The Brothers Karamazov*, apparently, did Dostoevskij feel confident enough in his independence of Schiller to draw freely upon his works for allusions, motifs and themes, while at the same time indicating their source. Strange as it may seem, it is in this work, Dostoevskij's most original and most thoroughly finished novel, that Schiller's influence culminates. Its analysis in terms of what Schiller contributed and inspired will be the main task of what follows.

III

SCHILLER AND *THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV:* PERVASIVE THEMES AND MOTIFS

The scholar who has written most extensively on the subject of this and the following chapter, Dmitrij Čiževskij, claims that in *The Brothers Karamazov* Dostoevskij frequently has "arguments" [*Auseinandersetzungen*] with Schiller; that is, he endeavors "to overcome the 'Schillerism' which Dostoevskij himself had gone through at one time and which, as he thought, had deeply affected part of the Russian society of the day."[1] I have in the preceding chapters discussed both Dostoevskij's battle with Schillerism and his creation of a new universe of thought. By the time he wrote his last novel, Schiller's thought must have been so closely assimilated to his own that no such "arguments" as Čiževskij postulates could have taken place. Kurt Wais is probably closer to the truth when he stresses the absence of any polemical intent in the novel, as well as Dostoevskij's endeavor to carry further certain lines of religious thought to which Schiller had failed to do full justice.[2] It may even seem as if the one-time Schiller enthusiast has come full circle in his attitude to the German author, since among over thirty allusions to or quotations from Schiller, none is in a mocking tone. Yet, the image of the circle is misleading, since it suggests a reversion to the point of departure. Nothing could be more false. Whereas the early admiration as well as the later rejection were somewhat strained and partly, therefore, failed to find embodiment in artistically pleasing or impressive forms — except in brief passages like Ippolit's "Explanation" in *The Idiot* — the Schillerian elements in *The Brothers Karamazov* are fitted into an intricate and harmonious artistic design.

One is struck by the wide range of the Schillerian materials embodied in the work; they represent Schiller the dramatist, the philosophical essayist, the poet. *The Robbers* gave Dostoevskij suggestions for situation, character and theme, and *Don Carlos* influenced a crucial chapter

[1] "Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 15.
[2] Wais, 476.

of the novel, "The Grand Inquisitor." Schiller's treatise *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* provided the intellectual framework for the three psychological types represented by the Karamazov brothers, as well as the important motif of the "higher man," also present in *The Robbers*. Finally, Dmitrij and Ivan introduce, through their quotations from Schiller's poetry, significant ideas which become essential parts of the novel's ideological structure.

The range of attitudes and ideas associated with these elements from Schiller is equally broad. The two polarities of Schiller's thought as reflected in Dostoevskij's earlier work, the cult of humanity and of the great individual, are both present in *The Brothers Karamazov*. The former, repeatedly a focus of mockery, has found an attractive embodiment in Aleša Karamazov, who at the outset is called "an early lover of humanity" (IX, 26). The attitude of proud individualism, formerly incorporated in such figures as Ippolit and Kirillov and traceable as far back as the underground man, is represented by Ivan. Mitja, the "hero" of the novel as it exists, seems to be an entirely new type, though clearly akin to Rogožin. Čiževskij correctly calls Mitja a wholly Russian type, but this does not, as he suggests, make Schiller's contribution superfluous.[3]

As a matter of fact, Mitja is associated with several concepts developed from Schillerian ideas in earlier novels, such as expiatory suicide and the "broadness" of human nature. Moreover, the Schillerian poetry that Mitja recites is not merely a convenient means of portraying an ecstatic personality; it also enables Dostoevskij to prefigure the dynamics of his hero's future development. For Mitja is the only character in the novel who undergoes significant growth. Aleša at the end differs little from what he was at the beginning, and Ivan, though vastly changed, can hardly be said to have "grown." When one considers how important spiritual development was to Schiller, the author of tragedies of expiation and of an aesthetic treatise based on the possibility of evolving a harmonious man, Dmitrij Karamazov comes to seem the most Schillerian of all the three brothers. In his way, he is initially a great egoist, like Ivan, but through his suffering he moves gradually closer to Aleša and begins to speak his language. Thus, within the movement from intellectual and spiritual anarchy to order which constitutes the overall rhythm of the novel, Schiller in one way or another is present at virtually every point.

The following analysis will proceed from the whole to the parts,

[3] "Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 26.

starting with central themes and pervasive motifs; a subsequent chapter will take up motifs associated with the individual characters. Unlike Čiževskij, I shall not be concerned with defining what he calls the "Schiller motif," which hardly exits — except, perhaps, in a trivial sense. For Schiller is not a subject of debate in the novel. Čiževskij apparently believes he is, a conviction that may be rooted in a mistaken distinction, impossible to maintain, between Dostoevskij the artist and Dostoevskij the thinker. This distinction comes to the surface in his puzzled query concerning the significance of Aleša's Schillerian association of art and play in a conversation with Kolja Krasotkin. Čiževskij asks: "Did Dostoevskij put this thought into Aleša's mouth because he shared it, or did it belong to the 'orchestration' of the novel that Aleša, too, was a 'Schillerian' in one respect — this, to be sure, is difficult to decide."[4] The distinction here made between ideological and purely aesthetic qualities does not seem justified. No attempt is made in *The Brothers Karamazov* to develop an anti- or pro-Schillerian theme; the Schillerian elements are fully and unobtrusively embodied in the characters and in the aesthetic structure of the novel. If one argues that the Schiller motif is constituted precisely by Dostoevskij's association of all the members of the Karamazov family with Schiller, it must be noted that this usage of the word "motif" trivializes its meaning. The association in question is far from being a motif in the sense, for example, of the suffering of children or moral responsibility for others, just to mention two of those articulated by Čiževskij. Thus, though there are numerous Schillerian motifs in the novel, there is no Schiller motif worth discussing.

[4] *Ibid.*, 12. –Perhaps this question is not as difficult to answer as Čiževskij intimates. Presumably, Dostoevskij would put into the words of his most positive character views with which he himself agreed. Besides, if all he wanted to show was that Aleša, too, had read Schiller, it would have been sufficient to let him repeat a line or so from a Schiller poem, something like Ivan's "Den Dank, Dame, begehr' ich nicht." On the other hand, the relative triviality of an allusion like Ivan's does not justify the inference that the author is not involved with his problems. But, again, to ask the question whether Dostoevskij *agrees* with the Schillerian ideas and interpretations of Ivan is, within the context of the novel, meaningless. The wide dramatic and poetic production of Schiller contains many ideas which Schiller himself did not share. The very fact that Dostoevskij uses such a great variety of Schillerian material in *The Brothers Karamazov* shows that there is no Schiller motif in the book. The possibility of such a motif would require a well-defined concept of Schillerism, and such a concept is no longer present. The time was long past when Dostoevskij was either advocating or battling with the *Weltanschauung* of the German poet.

1. *THE ROBBERS:* PARRICIDE, THEODICY AND RELATED MOTIFS

The relationship of *The Brothers Karamazov* to Schiller's first play, *The Robbers*, is indicated in the very text of the novel. The subject of Schiller's play is the feud between a father and his two sons, the oldest of which, Karl Moor, becomes an outlaw and organizes a band of robbers, while the younger, Franz, does his evil best to kill his father and to seduce his brother's fiancée, Amalia. Despite the rather hysterical rhetoric and the lack of structural logic in the play,[5] it seems to have been one of Dostoevskij's favorites from the very moment when he first saw it performed in 1831. His deep involvement with the play becomes strikingly evident from an incident reported by his daughter Ljubov', who as a child was entertained to a reading of it by her father. Perhaps, Ljubov' writes, her father was in such a hurry to sow good ideas by reading aloud from great authors because he knew his illness was fatal. The first literary evening, she recalls, took place when she was seven years old and her brother six (1874); *The Robbers* was the work chosen to introduce this series of educational readings. Her father, she says, read with "passion, [and] often paused to explain a too difficult expression to us." Apparently, even at that age Dostoevskij was gripped by the play, because to the little girl he seemed very strange during the reading. Though she did not understand the work, she fully understood that "this enigmatic drama interested . . . [her] father very much." When, however, he noticed that, instead of entertaining them, the play served as a soporific, Dostoevskij realized how foolish had been the hope of sharing with his children the philosophical and moral reflections of his own mature mind. Ljubov' exclaims: "Poor father! He had hoped to experience once more with us the emotion which Schiller's dramas had once conveyed to him...."[6] According to Leonid Grossman, Dostoevskij read *The Robbers* to his children again in the summer of 1880, the very year when *The Brothers Karamazov* was published.[7]

This enduring fascination with *The Robbers* notwithstanding, it has been suggested that Dostoevskij's treatment of parricide was inspired by *The Covetous Knight* of Puškin.[8] Alfred Bem claims that Dostoevskij

[5] Benno von Wiese says that "the characters are falsely drawn, the plot is fantastic, the dramatic complication remote from reality" (*op. cit.*, 13).

[6] Aimée Dostojewski, *Dostojewski: Geschildert von seiner Tochter* (Zürich, 1920), 215-216.

[7] *Žizn' i trudy F. M. Dostoevskogo*, 305.

[8] That this was one of Dostoevskij favorite poems is evident from a comment made by the "raw youth," whose literary taste may safely be taken to mirror the

was the first to grasp the full depth of the collision between father and son in that poem. "He presents his interpretation of this collision in the story of the clash between Dmitrij Karamazov and his father. . . . It is even more remarkable that in Albert, the 'fool and spendthrift,' the 'parricide in thought,' he perceived the moral originator of the sort of crime he later relates in *The Brothers Karamazov*."[9] Puškin's "little tragedy" does contain one suggestive idea which is absent from *The Robbers*, namely, that of a "parricide in thought"; yet, since Dostoevskij chose to make allusion to Schiller rather than to Puškin, it must be assumed that *The Robbers* had a broader relevance to his theme. His recurrent reading of and meditation on this work was, indeed, unusually productive.

On the surface, the implementation of the theme of parricide differs greatly in the two works. In Schiller's play, the "murder" is coldbloodedly planned by Franz, the younger son, for no apparent motive except greed and envy; he manipulates the existing misunderstanding between his father and Karl to serve his own nefarious ends. There is no jealousy between Franz and his father; on the other hand, Franz does feel jealous on account of Amalia's love for his brother. Though it need not be assumed that Dostoevskij had to seek his themes in literary works, one might mention that two other Schiller plays, *Don Carlos* and *The Bride of Messina*, do contain the motif of jealousy between father and son so crucial to the plot of *The Brothers Karamazov*. In *Don Carlos*, which has left traces of a different order on the novel, most of the action springs from Carlos' love for his stepmother and his consequent jealousy of King Philip. Before her marriage to the King, Elizabeth had been Don Carlos' affianced bride.[10] In *The Bride of Messina*, the plot of which turns on the love of two brothers for the same woman, the rivalry between father and son is resolved by the victorious son reaping the curses of his father for himself and his descendants (Act II, sc. 1). The necessity of having recourse to additional works by Schiller to complete the list of cardinal plot motifs in Dostoevskij's novel, shows the complexity of the latter as compared to *The*

young Dostoevskij's: "Already as a child I learned by heart the monologue of Puškin's Covetous Knight. Puškin never produced anything with a loftier conception than that! I have the same ideas now" (VIII, 100).

[9] Alfred Bem, "Dostojevskij, der geniale Leser," *Slavische Rundschau* 3 (July, 1931), 473.

[10] In the audience which Don Carlos has with the King in Act II, the latter even suggests that his son may have ideas of murder in his mind. On Carlos' request that he entrust him with Flanders, the King retorts: ". . . My best field-army to your lust for power? / The knife to my murderer?" (Act II, sc. 2).

Robbers. Scrutinizing the situation in the play more closely, one realizes that its psychological complexity is only apparent: Franz's gratuitous evil is the unique source of the plot and ultimately entraps him as well as most of the other characters. That close similarities in the area of plot and its psychological basis are absent should not be surprising, since action and motivation, perhaps more than any other element in a work of art, are dependent upon the particular condition of the author's society and the literary conventions of the age.

The *reductio ad absurdum* of the attempt to find close approximations between *The Robbers* and *The Brothers Karamazov* on the level of plot and motivation occurs in an article by Marcel Weinreich. Though Weinreich mentions works by George Sand and Balzac as additional sources of inspiration for *The Brothers Karamazov*, he seems to imply that in the treatment of parricide Dostoevskij follows Schiller's blueprint to the last detail. For instance, he says that in *The Robbers*, too, the father is an "old tyrant," whereas in actuality old Graf von Moor is much like King Lear, an old man abused.[11] Weinreich presses the similarities by saying that in both works "moral and emotional torture proves to be deadly. It is the venom of words, not of poison, with which the jealous son kills the despotic Karamazov *père*, the same subtle and insidious means by which Franz breaks the life of his father, the old tyrant Moor." The "jealous son" must be Mitja, who, however, cannot be said to kill his father in any way. Subsequently, while intending to stress similarities, the critic mainly brings out differences between the two works: "Dostoyevski's hero covets the same gain as Schiller's: access to the inheritance and to his relative's bride-to-be by eliminating the competitor thru paternal curse and ostracism."[12] This makes little sense whether the "hero" is taken to be Ivan or Mitja: the former, as V. Ermilov has stated, was not covetous,[13] and he did not have great cause to fight Mitja on the score of Katerina Ivanovna, since his brother had become quite indifferent to her. If the statement applies to Mitja, it makes even less sense. The most significant affinities between the two works do not exist on the level of plot and motivation; these affinities are ideological, relating to religious and moral conceptions.

[11] *King Lear* clearly influenced Schiller in the conception of his play. Notable is the close similarity of the relationships between old Gloucester and his two sons, Edgar and Edmund, and those between Graf von Moor and his two sons.

[12] Marcel Weinreich, "Ideological Antecedents of the *Brothers Karamazov*," *Modern Language Notes*" 64 (June, 1949), 401.

[13] V. Yermilov, *Fyodor Dostoyevsky*, trans. J. Katzer (Moscow, n. d.), 285.

Benno von Wiese's definition of the nature of Schiller's dramaturgy in *The Robbers* will point the way to these affinities. According to von Wiese, Schiller aspired to implement the "tragic dialectic of man, the world, and the deity." Only such a conception can make sense of the "monumental simplicity" of the play's structure, its apocalyptic pathos, and the presence of the deity as a main actor in the tragedy. Von Wiese sees Schiller's dramatic conception in relation to Greek and Christian baroque tragedy. Like Aeschylus, young Schiller also endeavored to "articulate the world of tragic drama and the theological world of belief as an inner unity; he, too, was playwright and theologian at the same time."[14]

Of Dostoevskij it can be said with even greater justification that he was a literary artist and a theologian at the same time. The external action, or plot, of *The Brothers Karamazov* is an embodiment of religious-ideological attitudes, and the underlying conflict is between such attitudes. One may note, for example, how important the questions of God and immortality are to the two works. In *The Robbers* nearly the entire first scene of Act V — in which Franz converses, first, with the pious old servant Daniel, later with Pastor Moser — is devoted to these questions; the same questions are lengthily discussed by the members of the Karamazov family in Book III, Chapter 8: "Over the Brandy."[15] In both works the characters adopt polar attitudes of rejection and affirmation. In Schiller's play, the negative moral consequences of the radical skepticism and rationalism of Franz Moor are best exemplified by the actions which follow from his cold-blooded "critique" of paternity. The counterpart to this in Dostoevskij's novel is Ivan's slogan that "everything is lawful," which indirectly causes his father's murder. Dostoevskij considered Franz's rebellious questions and reflections important enough to put the gist of them into the mouth of the counsel for the defense at Mitja's trial. I shall present the crucial parts of these passages to show how closely Dostoevskij here echoes Schiller.

First, Franz implicitly distinguishes between two notions of paternity: "Not flesh and blood, but the heart makes us fathers and sons," he says to his father. Alone, Franz reflects on the "droll" incongruities between what he calls "blood-love" and "harmony of spirit." A father

[14] *Op. cit.*, 15.

[15] This title looks like a reminiscence of a phrase used in a comparable context in *The Robbers*, where Franz Moor remarks to Pastor Moser: "I've often toasted you with a sneer *over the burgundy:* there is no God" (Act V, sc. 1; my italics).

gives one life — "you are his flesh, his blood — therefore he is sacred to you!" But "*why*," he asks, "did he make me? Surely not out of love of me, who first would have to become an I? Did he know me before he made me? Or did he think about me as he was making me? . . . Can I recognize a love which is not based on esteem for my *self*?" (Act I, sc. 1). Later, physical fatherhood is further stripped of its meaning and dignity. The father, perhaps stimulated by too much wine, gets an "itch," and "out of that comes a man"; but that was hardly the reason for his "Herculean labor," Franz mocks (Act IV, sc. 2).

Fetjukovič, who like Ivan adheres to Euclidic reason, brings into the open the contrast between a mystical and a rational conception of paternity which is implicit in Franz's reflections. Like Franz, he rejects the mystical conception, which should be "kept outside the sphere of actual life" (X, 301). The legitimate questions asked by young people concerning an "unworthy father" cannot, says Fetjukovič, be answered in the conventional manner:

> "He begot you, and you are his flesh and blood, and therefore you ought to love him." The youth involuntarily starts pondering: "But did he love me when he begot me?" he asks, wondering more and more. "Was it for my sake he begot me? He did not know me, not even my sex, at that moment, at the moment of passion, perhaps flushed with wine, and he has, perhaps, only passed on to me a tendency to drunkenness . . ." (X, 301–302).

The most extreme example of Fetjukovič's way of thinking is Smerdjakov's double crime of murder and suicide. Both acts are covered by Franz Moor's analogy between the "itch" which leads to the conception of a child and the "itch" to murder; in each case there is nothing but bestiality. If a man's life originates in a "bestial impulse," who, Franz asks, would have any qualms about the "denial of his birth?" (Act IV, sc. 2). Smerdjakov's rejection of his own birth is confessed to Marja Kondrat'evna, the neighbor's daughter. "Grigorij Vasil'evič," he says, "blames me for rebelling against my birth, . . . but I would have authorized their killing me while still in the womb so as not to come into the world at all" (IX, 281). In his case, as with Franz, "denial of his birth" leads first to murder, then to suicide.

Both in *The Robbers* and *The Brothers Karamazov* the surface theme of parricide, as approved by Euclidic reason, is related to the religious theme: rebellion against the physical father is paralleled by rebellion against God, the heavenly father. Franz's corrosive analysis of the concept of paternity is accompanied by an equally destructive criticism of religious belief. Ivan, though too civilized to defend parricide out-

right, comes close to doing so indirectly when he expresses a kind of regret at having helped his father during the latter's stormy encounter with Mitja. When Aleša reacts with a horrified "God forbid!" to the idea of murder, " 'Why should he forbid?' Ivan went on in the same whisper, with a malicious grimace. 'One reptile will devour the other. And serve them both right, too!' " (IX, 179). Ivan's wish that father and brother destroy one another parallels Franz's double exposure of the irrational basis of brotherhood and fatherhood alike, as well as his assaults on both relatives (Act I, sc. 1).

Nevertheless, Franz's rebellion against God is too gratuitous to offer many fruitful suggestions to a realistic novelist. Accordingly, it is Karl Moor, the passionate idealist, who is of greatest significance to Dostoevskij's development of the theme of rebellion in *The Brothers Karamazov*. Though Karl's revolt against society is directly caused by the presumed mistreatment he has suffered from his father, he universalizes his condition, identifying it with that of all sufferers, and relates his father's injustice to the idea of a bungling Providence. Typical of his attitude is the epithet he applies to Kosinsky — "accuser of the deity" — during the latter's recital of his wrongs (Act III, sc. 2). Here is an indication of the intent of theodicy which informs Schiller's drama,[16] as well as a meaningful counterpart to Ivan's rebellion against God's world.

Certain differences between the two characters' attitudes, and their consequences, may be noted. Ivan's rebellion is passive and theoretical; Karl Moor actively tries to rectify the shortcomings of the providential order. When he sends his men to catch his brother, for example, he speaks of the revenge in religious terms. Their "handiwork," he says, is "ennobled" by an "invisible power," and he calls them "the terrible angels of his [God's] dark judgment" (Act IV, sc. 5). Toward the end, however, Karl's and Ivan's destinies seem to merge, though imperfectly. The rebellion against the divine order — whether in the form of destructive criticism and unconscious conniving with evil as in Ivan's case, or of attempts at improving this order as in Karl's — in both cases this rebellion entails fatal consequences. After his father's and Amalia's deaths, for which he considers himself partly or wholly guilty, Karl realizes that his strategy of "beautifying the world through

[16] For treatments of the problem of theodicy in Schiller's work, see Josef Kremer, *Das Problem der Theodicee in der Philosophie und Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Kant und Schiller* (Berlin, 1909) and Hans Lindau, *Die Theodicee im 18. Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 1911).

outrage and maintaining the laws through lawlessness" has tragically failed. The endeavor to improve on Providence turns out to have been not only childish folly, but the most pernicious immoralism: "*two people like myself*," he says, "*would destroy the entire structure of the moral world.*" At this point there is only one way by which he can reconcile the "wronged laws . . . and again heal the abused order." When his associates fear that he will commit suicide, he asks: "Do you believe that the harmony of the world will gain through this godless discord?" And he goes to turn himself in (Act V, sc. 2). The religious rebellion of both characters ends in capitulation, as they submit themselves to trial for crimes committed through mistaken idealistic rationalism. But Dostoevskij had in mind to restore Ivan, whereas for Moor no such prospects are held out. "Where for Schiller there was an end, a downfall, there is, for Dostoevskij, the beginning of rebirth, the beginning of 'a new novel,' which unfortunately was never written."[17]

The chief motif related to theodicy in *The Brothers Karamazov*, that of children's suffering, represents only one of the many unexplained evils in the world which theodicy purports to rationalize. The attempt to rationalize evil, particularly suffering, goes back as far as history itself, informing many Greek plays as well as Biblical stories. Indeed, it permeates the entire Old Testament, particularly the Prophets, whose vision of the divine purpose made the afflictions of the Jews more bearable. Perhaps the most dramatic Biblical formulation of the problem of evil and suffering is the Book of Job, alluded to both in *The Robbers* (Act II, sc. 2) and in *The Brothers Karamazov* (IX, 365). Generally, in the Bible suffering is justified by a condition of future harmony, a paradise on earth that will come in due time. It is in these terms that the theodicy appears also in *The Brothers Karamazov*.

The prominence of theodicy in the Bible might seem to put in question the validity of any search for a different provenience of the associated motifs. However, Ivan's presentation of his counter-theodicy differs from most earlier versions by the central position in it of children's suffering. True, the humanitarian nineteenth century abounded with fictional treatments of the suffering of children, but neither Dickens, nor the earlier Dostoevskij — when, as in *The Insulted and the Injured*, he portrays children's suffering — had exploited this motif in a philosophical spirit. In *The Robbers*, on the other hand, it is the heartless murder of a child by one of the men which first disillusions Karl Moor about the idea of improving on the order of Providence

[17] Čiževskij, "Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 39.

(Act II, sc. 3). Though the gratuitous death of the child spoils the harmony which Karl Moor is trying to establish rather than that of God's world, the fundamental function of the child — to symbolize the ethical imperfections of the order within which man exists — is the same in *The Robbers* as in Ivan's "Rebellion."

The motif of children's suffering, essential to the Dostoevskian theodicy, goes through a number of permutations in the course of the novel. In Ivan's "Rebellion," constituting the fourth chapter of Book V, it is the chief argument for rejection of God and of ethical responsibility. Subsequently, through the story of the crucified child related by Ivan to Lise Xoxlakova (X, 95-96), it becomes associated with attitudes of sado-masochism, which, seemingly, Dostoevskij meant to present as the emotional counterpart to atheism. On the other hand, through Father Zosima and particularly Mitja, children become the focus of a religion of enraptured acceptance and of the idea of responsibility for all. In Mitja's case, the dream of the suffering child initiates a process of spiritual growth. While no murderer, he accepts the guilt for his own life and is ready to suffer to expiate it. "It's for that babe I am going to Siberia now; I did not kill, but I must go to Siberia!" (X, 77). Through Mitja, Dostoevskij also expands the motif of children's suffering to include the suffering of all men. To Aleša Mitja says: "It's for the babe I'm going. Because everyone is guilty for everyone else. For all the 'babes,' for there are little children and big children. All are 'babes.' I go for all, because someone must go for all" (X, 105). Here the theodicy is complete, taking in all the suffering in the world; and the solution is not rejection of God's creation for the sake of love of humanity as in Ivan's case, but the free acceptance of guilt for all, and for all suffering. The only way suffering can be countered and overcome is by humbly, and actively, accepting it.

2. THE HYMN MOTIF AND ITS PERMUTATIONS

V. Ermilov, the Soviet critic, has expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which Dostoevskij answers Ivan's rebellion. "Instead," he says, "of discussing the essence of Ivan's words regarding the cynicism of any attempt to justify the tormenting of little children, Dostoevskij prefers to discredit Ivan himself."[18] Ivan certainly is discredited, but this is not the entire answer to his revolt. True, there is no attempt at

[18] *Op. cit.*, 278.

a reasoned rebuttal; in this respect Ermilov is right. The most dramatic counterpoise to Ivan's rejection of God's world is Mitja's absurd enraptured insistence on singing his hymn, even from the bowels of the salt mines — this despite the fact that he is himself one of those abused children whose sufferings, to Ivan's thinking, negate the moral order. It is through Schiller's poem *To Joy* [*An die Freude*], which Mitja calls a "hymn to joy" (IX, 136), that Dostoevskij develops this counter-motif to rebellion.[19]

That it is meant to be such a motif becomes clear from Ivan's association of "eternal harmony" with a song of praise to God (IX, 307).[20] Close to the end of the novel, in Ivan's exchange with the devil, the latter twice refers to the same idea, though in a different tone. First, the devil tells an anecdote of the atheist who, indignant at finding his principles contradicted by the continuance of life after death, was sentenced to walk "a quadrillion kilometers in the dark" and after the penance had been performed was allowed to enter Paradise (X, 171). After "two seconds" he was so overwhelmed by the new experience that he started singing " 'hosanna' and overdid it so that some persons there of a noble cast of thought wouldn't even shake hands with him at first — he had changed too rapidly into a conservative, they said" (X, 173). The devil amplifies the anecdote by relating a similar experience of his own, which occurred when Christ ascended into Heaven with the penitent thief upon his "bosom." Though he refused to give in to his longing to "join the chorus and shout 'hosanna' with them all" (X, 177), his reasons were not those for which Ivan rejects the "eternal harmony."[21] Anyway, the devil admits that ultimately he will be reconciled (X, 177). The point of the difference between the devil's and

[19] Though the part of *To Joy* used by Dostoevskij fails to show the importance of theodicy in the poem, a casual inspection will make one realize its central position in the poem as a whole. Except for stanza four, which is one of those recited by Mitja, all of the eight stanzas imply the existence of a God who rewards and judges and of ultimate universal harmony.

[20] Documentary evidence from Dostoevskij's notes for *The Brothers Karamazov* confirms the association of Schiller's *To Joy* with the counter-motif to rebellion. In one passage the Inquisitor says: "Why does it make us feel sorry? We are more humane than you. We love the earth. Schiller celebrates joy . . ., but with what is this joy purchased: with what torrents of blood, torments, baseness and bestial savagery, impossible to endure" (F. M. Dostojewski, *Die Urgestalt der Brüder Karamasoff*, ed. W. Komarowitsch [München, 1938], 545).

[21] At this point Dostoevskij's devil approaches the Goethean, Mephistopheles. If he had joined the choir, the devil says, "everything on earth would have been extinguished at once and no events could have occurred" (X, 177). The underlying conception is that of a being which serves as an irritant to human activity and

Ivan's attitude toward the hosanna is most likely to show that, unconsciously, Ivan is changing, while consciously he remains much the same. Mitja tells Aleša that "Ivan understands about the hymn, too; he understands, only he doesn't answer — he doesn't speak. He doesn't believe in the hymn" (X, 110). Through the new perspective on the "eternal harmony" projected by the devil, Dostoevskij shows that, subconsciously, Ivan is turning towards faith.

It is through Mitja that the hymn motif achieves its fullest statement. After reciting three stanzas from Schiller's *The Eleusinian Festival* centered on the ritual initiation of civilization and the taming of the wild, cannibalistic "troglodyte," Mitja identifies himself with this savage and, next, having recited two stanzas from *To Joy*, with the insects to whom is given "sensual lust." At this point I shall deal only with what is immediately relevant to the motif of the hymn.

There is a neat consistency in the images associated with the hymn. The opening of Mitja's recital runs: "Wild and fearful in his cavern / Hid the naked troglodyte" (IX, 136). Mitja thinks of himself as belonging in that cavern: "I think about that man because I am that man myself," he tells Aleša (IX, 137). Next, the cavern motif, which in *The Eleusinian Festival* appears in a context of Greek religion, assumes Christian form as the pit of hell, a permutation of images in accord with the relative position of the two poems by Schiller that are the vehicle of Mitja's "confession." For *The Eleusinian Festival* is pagan in inspiration, *To Joy* fundamentally Christian. Similarly, within the total action of the novel Mitja's development proceeds from Dionysian ecstasy to Christian adoration. However, it is not simply a question of one being superseded by the other; there is permanence as well as change. As is the case in *To Joy*, the two religious and cultural outlooks — Greek and Christian — are intimately fused. On the level of symbolism, the primitive cavern inheres in the new image. And in this cavern, in the pit, Mitja will "begin a hymn. Let me be accursed, let me be mean and base, only let me kiss the hem of the vestment in which my God is clothed. Though I may be following the devil, at the same time I am still your son, my Lord, and I love you, and I feel the joy

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accomplishment. In the Prologue in Heaven, the Lord speaks in these words to Mephistopheles:

> Man's activity can all too easily slacken off,
> Soon he will love to have absolute rest;
> Therefore I am glad to give him a companion,
> Who acts and provokes and must as devil create.

(Johann Wolfgang Goethe, *Goethes Werke* III: *Faust* [Basel, 1944], 12.)

without which the world cannot stand or exist" (IX, 137).

At the end of the second stanza of *To Joy* recited by Mitja — characteristically in reverse order — appear the two lines which have already been mentioned: "To insects — sensual lust, / And the angel stands before God" (IX, 138). Though Mitja identifies with the insect, the lowest creature in the hierarchy of creation, he will, like the angels who see God — and like Aleša, consistently called "angel" or "cherub" — render thanks to God, despite the "terrible amount of suffering for man on earth" (IX, 137). Mitja's hymn, of course, is quite different from the one referred to by Ivan and the Devil. Mitja, ready to intone a hymn in hell, the perennial symbol of absence of eternal harmony, requires no faith in a future harmony to justify his acceptance of life. Much less would he reject creation on the ground that even such an eventual harmony could not justify the suffering of the innocent. Here is total, unquestioning, and ecstatic affirmation, a Dostoevskian *amor fati*.

The chief permutation of the cavern is the mine, which Mitja envisages as his place of expiation. The hymn returns, now associated with several other motifs, but principally that of the individual's responsibility for all. As one of the innocent "big children," Mitja takes upon himself freely the suffering for which Ivan holds God guilty. To Aleša he says:

> There are many of them there, hundreds of them underground, with hammers in their hands. Oh, yes, we'll be in chains and there won't be any freedom, but then, in our great sorrow, we shall rise again to joy, without which man cannot live nor God exist, for God gives joy: it's his privilege, a great one.... If they banish God from the earth, we'll shelter him underground. It's impossible for a convict to be without God, even more impossible than for a non-convict. And then we men underground will sing from the bowels of the earth a tragic hymn to God, with whom is joy. Hail to God and his joy! I love him (IX, 105).

Once more the cavern motif from *The Eleusinian Festival* and the hymn and joy motifs from its companion poem are intimately connected.[22] Uniting Greek and Christian elements, the joy of life here celebrated is the chief "argument" against Ivan's denial — joy shared in the consciousness of mutual responsibility.

Not that Mitja's mind is unclouded by doubts. Katja, reporting what she has heard from Mitja himself, associates the hymn with "some cross he has to bear, some duty" (X, 317); and after he is sentenced, Mitja

[22] As a curiosity it may be mentioned that Mme Xoxlakova's "gold mines" constitute a comic permutation of the cavern motif.

questions his readiness to carry the cross: "I have been lying here all night, passing judgment on myself. I'm not ready! I'm not able to resign myself. I wanted to sing a 'hymn,' but if a guard acts familiar with me I cannot bear it" (X, 321). These doubts, however, do not affect the basic pattern: the joy of existence, wrested from suffering and reverberated whether from the cavern, the pit of hell, or the salt mine, remains the chief alternative to atheistic denial in the book. And it is by exploiting and expanding images and ideas from two of Schiller's poems that Dostoevskij has made this counterthrust to unbelief.

However, the function of *To Joy* within the structure of *The Brothers Karamazov* is broader than this; in fact, it provides images that cut across the various philosophical attitudes presented in the novel. This is clearly evident from the manner in which Dostoevskij develops a verbal motif which occurs only in the Russian translation of the poem. The two stanzas recited by Mitja have, in the translation by Tjutčev used by Dostoevskij, a metaphorical structure consisting largely of images of drinking.[23] One phrase, *kubok žizni* [the "cup of life"], reverberates with a variety of meanings throughout the novel. Tjutčev

[23] I shall give the two stanzas in Russian translation and indicate Tjutčev's major changes:

Dušu bož'ego tvoren'ja
Radost' večnaja poit,
Tajnoj siloju brožen'ja
Kubok žizni plamenit;
Travku vymanila k svetu,
V solncy xaos razvila
I v prostranstvax, zvezdočetu
Nepodvlastnyx, razlila.

U grudi blagoj prirody
Vse, čto dyšit, radost' p'et;
Vse sozdan'ja, vse narody
Za soboj ona vlečet;
Nam druzej dala v nesčast'e,
Grozdij sok, venki xarit,
Nasekomym—sladotrast'e . . .
Angel—bogu predstoit.

(Dostoevskij, *Sobranie sočinenij* IX, 138).

Tjutčev's main changes appear in the initial four lines of the first stanza, where mechanical images – joy is called a "strong spring" [*Feder*] which "drives the wheels / In the great world clock" – have been consistently replaced by images of fermentation, drinking and fire, a change which is poetically justified by the imagery of Schiller's initial stanza:

Joy, lovely divine spark,
. . .
We enter, drunk with fire,

may have had the first stanza of Schiller's poem in mind when he made this translation. There, joy is called a "divine spark" [*Götterfunken*], and the worshipers are "drunk with fire" [*feuertrunken*]. Ivan Karamazov, not a particularly Dionysian character, is the one who expresses his attitude towards the world most consistently by means of the "cup of life" metaphor. As he uses the phrase, it is associated with alternate shame and longing rather than with joy, and it is tinged with irony. Whatever disillusionments he may meet with, he tells Aleša, "I'd want to live and, once having tasted of the cup, I wouldn't turn away from it till I'd emptied it! At thirty, though, I'll most likely renounce the cup, even if I've not emptied it, and turn away — I don't know where" (IX, 288). Because Ivan has no faith, joy does not fire "the cup of life with flame." And, therefore, at thirty he will "dash "the cup of life with flame."[24] And, therefore, at thirty he will "dash suicide; it could also mean sinking "into debauchery" and stifling one's soul "with corruption" (IX, 331). These contexts of the phrase suggest that the "cup of life" represents not simply the appetite for life, but also higher values. This is clearly apparent from what Ivan says about his father, who stands "on his sensuality as though on a rock — though after thirty, it is true, there may be nothing else to stand on" (IX, 290). There is an implication in all this that without higher values, and joy, life is not worth living; without these the "cup of life" will lose its savor. Feeling he possesses neither, Ivan can only envisage following his as yet healthy youthful instincts until such time as corruption sets in.

Interestingly, apart from the recital of the poem, Mitja never once uses the phrase being discussed: Mitja *drinks*, enjoying life in its most obvious physical aspect, the sensual. Yet, his attitude cannot be said to violate the spirit of Schiller's poem,[25] where drinking is ritual in char-

Into your celestial shrine.
(III, 115.)

Moreover, Tjutčev's rendering informs the poem as a whole with a religious sentiment that is more specifically Christian in character than that produced by Schiller's poem in the original.

[24] The lines in which this phrase occurs are accurately as well as forcefully rendered in Mrs. Garnett's translation of Dostoevskij's novel. See *The Brothers Karamazov* (New York, 1950), 126.

[25] Mitja is not simply a drunkard, though critics have applied both this and worse epithets to him. It is not inappropriate that he should be in an "exhilarated condition" (IX, 133) when he recites *To Joy*, which is so Dionysian despite its Christian ideas. We should believe Mitja, however, when he tells Aleša: "Don't think I'm jabbering away in drunkenness. I'm not drunk at all. Brandy is brandy, but I need two bottles to get me drunk .... But I haven't even drunk a quarter of a bottle ..." (IX, 136).

acter. While Mitja's toasts contain no promises or oaths — "Let's drink to life, dear brother," he says to his friend Petr Il'ič Perxotin. "What can be more precious than life? Nothing!" (IX, 505) — he has the true gift of joy, which requires no wine or brandy. As he tells his friend, "I'm drunk in spirit, Petr Il'ič, drunk in spirit!" (IX, 500). Like the worshippers in *To Joy* he is "drunk with fire," though he visits no "shrine" [*Heiligtum*]. It is through the hymn motif, as we have seen, that Mitja's religious yearnings are articulated and developed.

A masterly permutation of the "cup of life" motif is associated with Aleša and Father Zosima. It occurs in the strange chapter entitled "Cana of Galilee." The miracle at the center of this chapter, the turning of the water into wine, is crucial to the theme that "life is paradise." In context, the miracle is most important as a symbol of transfiguration [*preobraženie*]. " 'We are rejoicing,' the... little old man [Father Zosima] went on. We are drinking the new wine, the wine of a new great joy; do you see how many guests? Here are the bridegroom and the bride, here is the wise governor of the feast, he is tasting the new wine" (IX, 451). Viewed in the light of Schiller's *To Joy*, the Biblical story has become a vehicle of significant ritual; for they are drinking the *new* wine, the wine of the "*new*, great joy" (my italics). While it may seem that, with this permutation of the "cup of life" motif, Dostoevskij has passed beyond the sphere of thought and feeling associated with Schiller's poem, the central scene within Aleša's dream can be viewed as an enactment of the final line of *To Joy* quoted in Mitja's "confession": "And the angel stands before God" (IX, 138). As previously noted, the epithet "angel" is more than once applied to Aleša

I have shown how fertile the quoted stanzas of *To Joy* were as a source of symbolic motifs and how consistently Dostoevskij worked the latter into the larger structure of his novel. The last instance discussed, the "cup of life" motif, is used to epitomize three fundamental attitudes. Ivan fears he will lose his zest for life and that, ultimately, he will sink into a life of debauchery from lack of faith. Mitja has a true Dionysian inspiration, along with a kind of animal faith, but his purpose is as yet inchoate. Only Aleša among the brothers has a faith capable of informing life with meaning and with a "new, great joy." The motif can be interpreted in terms of theodicy as well: Ivan's idea of dashing the cup to the ground parallels his handing back the "entrance ticket" and his refusal to participate in the hymn; Mitja's ecstasies, whether purely Bacchic or Dionysian, are in harmony with the hymn, which is his deepest response to the problem of theodicy; and

the new wine of Father Zosima and Aleša is a religious symbol of the transformation of life, here and now, into paradise. This is Dostoevskij's ultimate answer to Ivan: transfiguration of life through love will do away with the evils on which Ivan bases his rejection;[26] indeed, these evils can vanish at any moment.

The spirit of ecstatic acceptance and universal brotherhood animating Schiller's poem, as well as *The Brothers Karamazov*, finds its ultimate expression in the idea of the resurrection of the dead; this idea can be seen as the answer to the surface theme of the novel, parricide, with which this discussion began. According to S. Frank, "Dostoevskij's notes show that, to him, parricide signified the greatest crime, man's deepest temptation, the epitome of sinfulness in general, as it were." Ultimately, parricide means falling away from the divine harmony of being, a view hinging upon Fedorov's concept of paternity. To Fedorov, " 'paternity,' the unity of the sons with the father, is the general foundation of human existence, the only possible basis of an all-embracing brotherhood of man. . . ."[27] This unity of the sons with the father demands as its utmost consequence and symbol the universal resurrection of the dead. Whether such a dénouement to history could satisfy an Ivan Karamazov is another matter.

[26] Though Ivan does not quote the context of Schiller's poem *Resignation* from which his formula of rejection is taken, it is noteworthy that the phrase "earthly paradise" appears in the Russian translation of the stanza where the phrase occurs. Here are the lines from Danilevskij's translation, which was printed in Gerbel' 's edition of Schiller's works, owned, according to Leonid Grossman, by Dostoevskij:

I gramotu na vxod' k zemnomu raju
Tebe neraspečatav vozvraščaju—
Blaženstvo bylo čuždo mne.

(Čiževskij, "Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 11). Though Ivan speaks of "eternal harmony," the phrase "earthly paradise" used in the stanza from which he makes his paraphrase suggests that he would also reject the collective paradise of the Grand Inquisitor. The meaning of the term "earthly paradise" embodied in Father Zosima's autobiography is not applicable to *Resignation*.

It is well known that the "earthly paradise" or "golden age" is a widespread motif in Dostoevskij's work; it is particularly important in *A Raw Youth* and *The Dream of a Ridiculous Man*. Močul'skij claims that the idea of the golden age and world harmony, the "most sacred and most 'holy' of his ideas," stood in the center of Dostoevskij's *Weltanschauung* and creation (*op. cit.*, 96. See also V. Komarovič, "Mirovaja garmonija Dostoevskogo," *Atenej* 1-2 [1924], 141). Very possibly, Schiller's concept of the idyllic affected Dostoevskij's thought on this subject. For treatments of the motif, see L. Pogoževa, "Mečta Dostoevskogo o 'zolotom veke'," *Krasnaja nov'*, Feb. 1941, 173-181, and V. Setschkareff, "Dostojevskij und das Goldene Zeitalter," *Festschrift für Dmytro Čiževskyj zum 60 Geburts-Tag* (Berlin, 1954), 271-274.

[27] S. Frank, "Aus Dostojevskijs geistiger Werkstatt," *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie* 7 (1930), 138-140.

3. ELEMENTS OF MYSTICISM COMMON TO DOSTOEVSKIJ AND SCHILLER

As is well known, certain ideas of Dostoevskij's have an aura which is difficult to define and for which the term "mystical" and "mysticism" have often been used. Some of these ideas are fairly traditional, or they are such as Dostoevskij could easily have arrived at by himself on a Christian basis. For example, no superhuman genius would be required to transform the Biblical saying "the kingdom of God is within you" to Father Zosima's "life is paradise." Nevertheless, Dostoevskij was clearly influenced by certain native interpreters of Christianity with whose works he was familiar, especially Tixon Zadonskij and Nikolaj Fedorov.[28] However, several of the thoughts supposedly derived from Fedorov — to choose the figure whose influence is presumed to have been the strongest — were widely current and cannot definitely be traced to Fedorov; secondly, these, as well as associated ideas to which there is nothing comparable in Fedorov, have close counterparts in various works of Schiller.[29] Three such thoughts are the mystical unity of all life, the ecstatic embrace of nature, and planetary-spiritual parallelism.

There is a profound similarity between the mystical philosophy of nature expressed in *The Brothers Karamazov* and Schiller's philosophy as expressed in *Theosophy of Julius* and several poems. The basic metaphysical conception in the *Theology of Julius* is that of a mystical unity through which nature and man become absorbed in the divine. The ruling force within this unity is love, which rewards its votaries with the most intense joy. Though these ideas are nothing extraordinary and could be found in any number of sources, detailed similarities between Schiller's and Dostoevskij's imagery give a special status to *Theosophy of Julius.*

To illustrate the organic relationship of the individual and humanity, for example, Schiller uses the image of flow, suggesting the most intimate fusion of elements. The context of the passage is the infinite ramifications of one's actions, the awareness of which confuses the borderline between the ego and mankind: mankind is a "body in which *his* [the individual's] life, forgotten and dispensable, swims like a drop of blood."[30] In *The Brothers Karamazov* the image of the sea which is

[28] *Ibid.*, 137-141.
[29] Čiževskij, "Šiller v Rossii," 133.
[30] In *The Idiot,* as I have shown, Ippolit's "Explanation" draws upon *Theosophy of Julius* for a similar conception.

potential in "swims" comes to the surface in Father Zosima's deathbed talk, except that the organic concept here implied embraces nature as well as man. Recollecting the attitude of his brother before he died, Father Zosima develops a panpsychistic philosophy in oceanic terms: "for all is like an ocean, all is flowing and blending; if you touch one place, it reverberates at the other end of the earth." In this universal interfusion of living forms, the relationship between man and nature is characterized by an "all-embracing love" and "rapture" (IX, 400). Interestingly, *Theosophy of Julius* also contains a passage in which the relationship of man and nature is compared to that of lover and beloved. Schiller speaks of certain moments in which we are "disposed to press every flower and every remote star, every worm and every imagined higher spirit to our bosom — an embrace of all nature as our beloved." Through this embrace man approaches the divine: "The entire creation dissolves in his personality" (V, 121). After Aleša's dream of the wedding in Cana, this conception becomes a living experience. In this passage Dostoevskij reveals himself as a genuine lyrical poet. The stillness, the "shining stars," the slumbering flowers — all is permeated with mystery: "the mystery of earth was one with that of the stars." Aleša's response is to throw himself down, embracing the earth and kissing it (IX, 452).

Of particular interest is the star-spirit parallelism in both authors' work. Schiller uses such parallelism in several poems, namely, *Fantasy: To Laura, The Friendship* — a truncated version of which appears in *Theosophy of Julius* — and *To Joy*. The first of these, belonging to a group of poems with which Dostoevskij shows intimate familiarity in his article against Dobroljubov and the utilitarian conception of art,[31] works out the parallel between the material and the spiritual, and the union of the two realms through love. Here are a few lines: "Love guides the spheres within one another, / World systems endure only through it," and, "Without love no spring returns, / Without love no being praises God!" (III, 34). In *The Friendship*, after stating that the same "turn of the wheel" drives both "the world of spirits and the tumult of the material world," Schiller elaborates the parallel. While the "spheres" move in their "labyrinthine orbits" around the "heart of the great cosmos,"

> *Spirits* in embracing systems
> Stream toward the great sun of the spirits [*Geistersonne*]
> As brooks rush to the sea. (III, 73.)

[31] F. F. Doestoevskij," –Bov i vopros ob iskusstve," *Polnoe sobranie xudožest-*

In *To Joy* the realms of the stars and of the spirit are variously juxtaposed, with joy rather than love as the all-penetrating, uniting element.

In *The Brothers Karamazov* this mystical analogy appears most explicitly in the chapter entitled "Cana of Galilee." Of the objects that are part of Aleša's experience of rapture, only one, the "shining stars," is repeated. "Oh! in his rapture he was weeping even over those stars, which were shining to him from the abyss, and 'he was not ashamed of that ecstasy.' Threads from all those innumerable worlds of God seemed to come together in his soul, and it was trembling all over 'in contact with other worlds' " (IX, 452). The fusion of star and soul also manifests itself in metaphor. After Aleša has returned to the monastery, "fragments of thoughts flashed through his soul, burned like stars and went out again at once, to be succeeded by others; and yet there reigned in his soul a sense of the wholeness of things . . ." (IX, 448-449). Star and spirit come together even more intimately in a question which Father Zosima directs to Aleša at the dream-wedding: "Do you see our sun, do you see him?" (IX, 451). This question, in which the sun symbolizes Christ, sounds like an echo of the last lines quoted above from Schiller's poem *The Friendship.*

4. THE "HIGHER MAN" MOTIF

The Schillerian materials so far discussed serve as vehicles of religious and philosophical ideas. Because the moral-ethical concepts for which Dostoevskij is partially indebted to Schiller have received close attention from other scholars, the following discussion will be brief. Reference has been made to the "higher man" and to universal responsibility. As a mediating concept between these contrary notions, Dostoevskij holds the idea that every man, regardless of whether he be a "higher" man or not, participates in the lowest human attributes. In *The Brothers Karamazov*, as also in *A Raw Youth*, its chief manifestation is the "broadness" of human nature. In the former, it is introduced by Mitja, who after reciting *To Joy* tells Aleša: "Yes, man is broad, too broad, indeed; I'd have him narrower" (IX, 138). The symbol for this attribute of participation in the lowest is the ubiquitous insect to which is given "sensual lust." Even the saintliest man has his part in *nasekomost'*, the insect nature. To Aleša, Mitja says: "All we Karamazovs are such insects and that insect lives in you too, angel, and will stir up a tempest

vennyx proizvedenij XIII, 87-88.

in your blood" (IX, 138). While Dostoevskij's use of insects and reptiles in *The Brothers Karamazov* is consistent with his previous practice, in no other work do references to lower animals constitute a strand of imagery of comparable force.

All men participate in the lowest animal attributes of human nature, yet they often fail to draw the moral consequences from this fact. The Karamazov brothers, Ivan included, recognize their insect nature, but Ivan differs from the others by morbidly indulging it in a sado-masochistic spirit. Čiževskij says that "Ivan's tales of the tortured children are saturated with a cruel lust. . . ."[32] Yet, Ivan is quite self-righteous and, unlike Aleša and Mitja, puts himself up as a judge over his father and his older brother. "One reptile will devour the other. And serve them right, too," he tells Aleša (IX, 179). These words imply that he has passed judgment on them both. Curiously, Ivan's hate for those closest to him is not irreconcilable with an abstract love of man; he rejects the "eternal harmony" precisely "from love of humanity" (IX, 307). Only a violent emotional upheaval can resolve such a paradoxical moral situation.

The moral position of Ivan is not dissimilar to that of Karl Moor in *The Robbers*. Karl seemingly holds himself to be a "higher man" and from his great height judges mankind — that is, the common run of men.[33] But gradually he realizes that he is intimately involved with the atrocities of the band of robbers that he leads, especially with the evils of those closest to him, such as Spiegelberg, who can be considered as his double.[34] Ivan Karamazov, with his pseudo-idealistic rejection of world harmony on account of the suffering of children and his preference for merely loving one's neighbors in the abstract, can only be made aware of his moral responsibility by learning how inescapably he shares in the moral nature of the lowest "reptile" of the book, Smerdjakov. Through his recognition of sharing guilt for parricide with Smerdjakov, Ivan is finally emerging from his moral self-sufficiency.

Besides the distinction between "higher" and ordinary which runs through *The Robbers* and several works of Dostoevskij, both authors employ the notion of a three-level hierarchy of human types. Schiller's dramatization of the idea of the "higher man" inevitably assumes the pattern of tragedy. However, his treatise on "aesthetic education" sets

[32] "Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 21.
[33] *Ibid.*, 29.
[34] *Ibid.*, 32. –Besides Karl Moor and Spiegelberg, Čiževskij mentions Fiesko and the Moor as examples of the same moral phenomenon.

up a scheme whereby man can transcend this pattern and move toward perfection. The aesthetic type, embodying an equilibrium between the one-sided drives of the two lower — the sensual and the rational types — represents the highest perfection attainable by man.

The differences between the rational "higher man," such as Karl Moor, and the aesthetic type — "ideal" man — are crucial; yet Schiller displays a certain ambiguity in regard to their relative status. Interestingly, in Dostoevskij's novel a similar feeling is expressed. Mitja, who is used to focus the reader's attention upon the two rival images of man, seems unable to choose between them; that is, he cannot tell which of his two brothers, Ivan or Aleša, is the better man. To the latter he says: "You are everything to me. Though I say that Ivan is superior to us, you are my angel. Only your decision will decide it. Perhaps it's you that is superior and not Ivan" (X, 109-110). Mitja's puzzlement has a counterpart in Schiller's intellectual vacillation in his treatise. Though the general scheme assumes that the aesthetic man is the highest, often the order of the hierarchy is altered, so that the "man of reason" appears to be the highest. In these contexts, the aesthetic state seems purely transitional, as the only means through which sensual man may become rational (V, 380-385). Nevertheless, despite the tragic stature of rebels of reason like Karl Moor and Ivan Karamazov, the sympathies of the authors are never fundamentally in doubt.

Critics disagree about the philosophical basis of Dostoevskij's concept of the ideal man. While Čiževskij, for example, admits that the formal characteristics of Schiller's and Dostoevskij's ideal image of man are similar, even identical, he asserts that the bases of their conceptions lie in quite different spheres. Indeed, he says, "Dostoevskij attacks Schiller's conception of the 'higher' [ideal] man as one who is higher in beauty, as 'aesthetic' man. . . . Dostoevskij does not believe that beauty can create a stable equilibrium between two contending powers in the human soul."[35] Instead, Čiževskij concludes the author intended to present the *homo religiosus* as the highest type of man, and religion as the only means of salvation. Kurt Wais, on the contrary, discerns no intent in *The Brothers Karamazov* of refuting Schillerian aestheticism.[36]

Zen'kovskij's view provides a reconciling *tertium quid*. Despite his profound awareness of evil in man, Zen'kovskij asserts, Dostoevskij never gave up his early "Christian naturalism." This conception is a

[35] "Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 23.
[36] "Schillers Wirkungsgeschichte im Ausland," 498.

"specific combination of *Rousseauism* and *Schillerism*, refracted through the prism of Christianity, a faith in 'nature' and an acknowledgement of the natural nobility — even though it may be concealed under outer crusts — and hidden 'sanctity' of the human soul; or, as Dostoyevsky expressed it in an article on George Sand, a recognition of the '*perfection* of the human soul'."[37] Elsewhere, Zen'kovskij says that the foundation of Dostoevskij's *Weltanschauung* consisted in "the aesthetic conception of the problem of life and of Christianity."[38] In view of this alleged aesthetic bias, it is interesting that the two divine events which were at the focus of Dostoevskij's religious thought, the Incarnation and the Transfiguration,[39] are also those which present the closest symbolic analogues to the process and purpose of literary creation.

[37] V. Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy* I, 413.
[38] *Aus der Geschichte der ästhetischen Ideen in Russland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Musagetes* VII, ed. D. Čiževskij ('s-Gravenhage, 1958), 25.
[39] Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy* I, 424.

IV

SCHILLER AND *THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV*: INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERS AND ASSOCIATED MOTIFS

The characters of *The Brothers Karamazov* fall into definite psychological categories, depending upon the psychic element that predominates in each. This applies not only to the main characters, but to others as well. Besides Ivan and Smerdjakov, the men of reason include Rakitin, Fetjukovič, Mme Xoxlakova and her daughter; Mitja and Fedor Pavlovič are representatives of the sensual man; and Aleša and Father Zosima correspond roughly to Schiller's aesthetic type. My discussion will focus mainly on the four brothers, including the illegitimate Smerdjakov. While greatly dissimilar, they are all descended from the same father, who, as a man of virtually pure sexuality, figures as the source of the hierarchy of human types.

The common origin of the three types suggests that, despite the different principles on which they are based, the lines of separation are not absolute. Čiževskij notes Fedor Pavlovič's enjoyment of Smerdjakov's "sophistries" and his preference for Ivan among his sons, Ivan's awareness of a "frantic and perhaps unseemly thirst for life" in himself, and Aleša's kinship with both the rational and the sensual man on the ground that he perfectly understands them.[1] Interestingly, transitional states and types were given considerable attention by Schiller, who was fully aware that his system was abstract and did not, strictly speaking, correspond to concrete human reality. Furthermore, the most constructive idea in his treatise on "aesthetic education" is the possibility of moving up the ladder of perfection. Schiller distinguishes between "three different moments or stages of development which both the individual and the entire species must of necessity go through, and in a definite order, if they are to accomplish the full cycle of their destiny" (V, 385). Naturally, this transcendence would be impossible unless the lower human types were capable of the higher response, as Mitja, for example, is capable of understanding the spirituality of Aleša. Con-

[1] "Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 17.

sidering *The Brothers Karamazov* in relation to Schiller's treatise, one notes how Dostoevskij dramatizes the gravitation of the older brothers toward the younger and the spiritual state he has attained, thereby producing a precise imaginative rendering of Schiller's scheme. Even their relative dates of birth reflect the order of succession within the psychological-cultural hierarchy.

To prevent misunderstanding of what is here attempted, a distinction must be made between indebtedness for motifs and for literary characters. The former can be freely transplanted and accommodated to any context, while characters, being inseparable from their ambience, are peculiar to a literary tradition. Moreover, they are conceived and visualized as wholes and concretely rather than abstractly and piecemeal. The great artist, however, is capable of combining imaginative and rational modes of conceiving character, as Dostoevskij has done in *The Brothers Karamazov*. Despite the fact that, in their interrelationships, the characters represent a conceptual scheme, their portrayal is quite natural. Indeed, Dostoevskij has projected such vividly imagined figures that, without careful analysis, one might easily miss the abstract scheme underlying them. Most important to Dostoevskij was, of course, Schiller's scheme in general, but the treatise may also have given the novelist some hints regarding the individual characters. Naturally, in this instance influences cannot be identified with the same degree of probability as in the case of motifs; the most one can expect to accomplish, perhaps, is to demonstrate striking similarities.

1. IVAN KARAMAZOV AND THE GRAND INQUISITOR

While Ivan Karamazov is related to both major characters of *The Robbers*, the traits which he has in common with Karl and Franz Moor cannot be entirely dissociated from those of Schiller's man of reason [*Vernunftmensch*]. Initially, the two one-sided types — sensual man and rational man — are opposed as "savage" and "barbarian"; in the former, feelings regulate principles, while in the latter principles destroy the feelings (V, 320). One is immediately reminded of Ivan's unhappy statement that he goes on living "in spite of logic" (IX, 288), suggesting a relentless conflict between nature and reason. However, while "the barbarian mocks and degrades nature, . . . in a more contemptible manner than the savage he often proceeds to become a slave to his slave" (V, 320). Significantly, though he despises the "insect" nature

of his father and elder brother, Ivan in time comes to realize his own enslavement by the same force. His contemptuous attitude accords with Schiller's attribution of a "cold heart" to the abstract thinker (V, 327). On the positive side, the rational man aims for freedom, self-identity, and an ethical universality reminiscent of Kant's categorical imperative. A decision on his part is a decision "for always. Hence, he embraces the entire succession of time; that is, he suspends time and change . . ." (V, 346).[2]

Like Schiller's "barbarian," Ivan Karamazov inspires respect, and his father, Fedor Pavlovič, clearly favors him over Mitja. At this point it is necessary to revert to the use of *The Robbers* within the structure of the novel, in order to examine the possible significance of Dostoevskij's elaborate allusion to Schiller's play. Karamazov *père* tells Father Zosima, pointing to Ivan: "That is my son, flesh of my flesh, my dearest flesh! He is my dutiful Karl Moor, so to speak, while this son who just came in, Dmitrij, against whom I am seeking justice from you, is the undutiful Franz Moor . . ." (IX, 92). Kurt Wais takes Fedor Pavlovič's words as an indication of Dostoevskij's artistic intent, whereby Mitja was meant to correspond to Franz Moor. He even suggests a reason why the author should have assimilated *The Robbers* to the design of his novel: "From the point of view of the song to joy, the later Schiller could, after all, no longer have doomed his one-time Franz Moor to perdition, and Dostoevskij was attracted precisely by the idea of making amends for this omission by the young Schiller."[3]

Meier-Graefe, on the other hand, reverses the father's identification of his two sons in relation to *The Robbers*, using as evidence Schiller's preface to the play,[4] in which, describing Franz, Schiller notes the combination of vice and analytic intellect: "Vice . . . in Franz dissolves all the confused terror of conscience into feeble abstractions, anatomizes the moral [*richtende*] sentiment and turns the earnest voice of religion into a jest. To someone who has gone so far as . . . to refine his under-

[2] One may note that Ivan's description of Katerina Ivanovna in the chapter "A Laceration in the Drawing Room" places her within the category of Schiller's rational type. After Katja's decision to devote her whole life to Dmitrij, Mme Xoxlakova interpolates the remark that this moment of decision is only a repercussion of the insult Katja had received the day before from Grušen'ka. Ivan counters by saying that with others this might have been the case, "but with Katerina Ivanovna's character, that moment will last all her life. What for others would be only a promise is for her an everlasting, painful, grim perhaps, but unflagging duty. And she will live on the feeling of this duty being fulfilled" (IX, 238).

[3] Wais, "Schillers Wirkungsgeschichte im Ausland," 499.

[4] Meier-Graefe, *Dostojewski, der Dichter*, 400.

standing at the cost of his heart, what is most holy is no longer holy — to him humanity and the deity are nothing —" (V, 733). In describing Karl Moor, Schiller stresses his fascination with vice "for the sake of the *greatness* that pertains to it, for the sake of the *power* which it demands, for the sake of the *dangers* which accompany it" (V, 733). If there is a simple correspondence of characters, it is certainly the reverse of that assumed by Fedor Pavlovič. Despite great differences, Karl is, like Mitja, a man of feeling, whereas Franz and Ivan are definitely not.

But why, if this is the correct relationship, did Dostoevskij choose to present, through Fedor Pavlovič, a false identification? Komarovič provides a good answer to this question on aesthetic grounds. The father's allusion to *The Robbers* is, according to him, a compositional artifice whereby Dostoevskij anticipates, in comic inversion, the outcome of the conflict in the novel.[5] Actually, a double irony is involved in the false identification. The dramatic, Sophoclean irony produced by the father's mock-serious allusion to parricide is compounded by the situational irony of his erroneous comparison.[6] Komarovič connects this tragi-comic anticipation with the theme of Russia and the West. For it is in Fedor Pavlovič's favorite son, the Westernist Ivan, not in Mitja who is Russian to the core, that the danger lurks.

The individual correspondence between the principal characters in the play and the novel does not go far beyond this specific allusion. However, the device of the double, present in rudimentary form in *The Robbers* and elaborated on an impressive scale by Dostoevskij, extends the parallels somewhat further. As already mentioned, Charles Passage has traced Dostoevskij's use of this device to E. T. A. Hoffmann, though, as a matter of fact, Schiller's claim is quite as good. Speaking with reference to *The Elixirs of the Devil*, Passage states: "The *alter ego* of Medardus was his half-brother Viktorin. . . . Ivan's *alter ego* is likewise a half-brother, Smerdjakov, and Smerdjakov, like Viktorin, embodies all the evil aspects of the hero's divided self."[7] The critic remedies the lack of external resemblance between Smerdjakov and Viktorin by showing that some of Smerdjakov's external qualities are derived from another character in *Elixirs*, namely, the

[5] *Die Urgestalt der Brüder Karamasoff*, 165.

[6] Interestingly, in his wrong identification of his sons in relation to Schiller's characters, Fedor Pavlovič acts very much like his own fictional parallel, Graf von Moor, whose misfortunes are chiefly due to an implicit trust in his scheming patricidal younger son.

[7] Passage, *Dostoevski the Adapter*, 170.

barber Pietro Belcampo, who is Medardus' second double. For like Ivan Karamazov, Hoffmann's central character also has two doubles.[8] In order to give both Hoffmann and Schiller their due, an intensive analysis would be required — if the question can be resolved at all. As a tiny boost for Schiller, a point of resemblance between Smerdjakov and Spiegelberg, Karl Moor's "double" in *The Robbers*, may be mentioned. Spiegelberg's sadism, like Smerdjakov's, manifests itself in the torturing of animals, such as dogs (Act I, sc. 2). One recalls the nasty trick Smerdjakov made Iljusha play on Žučka (X, 32-33).

Curiously, no critic has noted the close resemblance between the moral situation of Ivan Karamazov and Schiller's Wallenstein.[9] *Wallenstein's Death* develops as a theme the relationship between deed and thought, or desire, which is at the heart of Ivan's predicament. The context of the moral conflict is in both cases a kind of rebellion, in Wallenstein's case political. Here are some typical reflections of the latter at a decisive moment:

> Should I have to fulfil it in earnest
> Because I have toyed with the idea?
> Accursed is he who plays with the devil!
> (Act I, sc. 3.)
>
> Must I
> *Execute* the deed because I *thought* it,
> Because I did not repel temptation . . .?
> . . .
> It was not in earnest,
> It was never a settled thing.
> I merely indulged myself in the thought;
> Freedom lured me on and power.
> . . .
> I seem to be culpable, and I
> Cannot clear myself of guilt, try as I may;
> For I am accused by the ambiguity of life. . . .
> (Act I, sc. 4.)

It is also worth mentioning that Wallenstein constantly senses the presence of a "demon." However different this demon is from Ivan's devil, he is of interest because of the similarity in the moral situation. Wallenstein more than once speaks of the "evil spirit" that haunts him,

[8] *Ibid.*, 170-172.

[9] After this was written, I discovered that Anna Seghers has had the same idea. See "Woher Sie Kommen, Wohin Sie Gehen: Über den Ursprung und die Weiterentwicklung einiger Romangestalten Dostojewskijs, besonders über ihre Beziehungen zu Gestalten Schillers," *Sinn und Form* 15 (1963), 26.

and once he asks his daughter to sing for him to drive "him" away.

> I need such a force now
> To expel the evil demon
> Who beats his black wings about my head.
> (Act III, sc. 4.)

Subsequently, the "demon" appears to Wallenstein as Buttler, the man who, though posing as a friend, has vowed to kill him. "Buttler! Buttler! / You are my evil demon . . ." (Act III, sc. 16). Thus, *Wallenstein's Death* contains not only the thought-deed polarity so important to *The Brothers Karamazov*, but the "demon" and Buttler could be seen as rudimentary doubles.

The wide ramifications of Ivan's possible ancestry in the works of Schiller show the creative independence Dostoevskij had attained in regard to these works: he used what suited his purpose, without imitating or parodying. The same independence is evident in his handling of poetic allusions. Attempts have been made to assess the temperament and moral character of the two older brothers by the way they use such allusions, particularly to Schiller. Such attempts are predicated on the assumption that Dostoevskij used allusion chiefly as a means of character portrayal. While this may be a reasonable assumption, it can lead to rather fantastic results. One critic, for example, claims that whereas Mitja uses quotation to make a forceful statement, Ivan quotes to cite authority, and with questionable honesty.[10] Another critic says that Ivan uses Schiller "as literature, the way socialites do," and he refers to his allusion to Schiller's *The Glove*, "for which a foolish female highly admires him. The real state of things is revealed by the fact that Dostoevskij makes him misinterpret one of Schiller's profoundest poems."[11] The poem is *Resignation*; the matter of Ivan's interpretation will be taken up later.

It is true that, to Mitja, Schiller offers a means of self-expression, while Ivan uses him with deliberation, to climax a situation or to epitomize an intellectual position. However, the latter does not cite Schiller as authority; Ivan's mind is not that of a scholar. Rather, he uses allusions like a witty conversationalist or a poet *manqué*. Meier-Graefe says that Ivan has the formal possibilities of the poet,[12] which

[10] Ralph Matlaw, *The Brothers Karamazov: Novelistic Technique. Musagetes* VI ('s-Gravenhage 1957), 17.
[11] Wais, 497.
[12] Meier-Graefe, 403.

means, by implication, that he lacks inspiration. Wherever Ivan quotes, he does so for effect — without, however, jeopardizing his honesty. Though the allusion does not always have profound reverberations, it is invariably apt. But while the presumed triviality of Ivan's allusions — particularly his quotation from *The Glove*[13] — has often enough been noted, no-one has looked into their contexts carefully enough to discover their appropriateness.

The occasion on which Ivan quotes from *The Glove* is quite dramatic: Ivan is saying goodbye to Katerina Ivanovna, who, though she knows he loves her, gladly sends him away so that he may inform her Moscow aunt about the state of affairs between her and Mitja. To Ivan, her attitude causes great anguish, as Aleša clearly realizes; he tells Katja: ". . . you are torturing Ivan simply because you love him — and torturing him because you love Dmitrij through self-laceration . . ." (IX, 241). Though Ivan denies that Katerina Ivanovna loves him, claiming that she loves Mitja in order to be able to contemplate her "heroic fidelity," he admits that she has tormented him. On leaving he says: " 'Goodbye! I don't want your hand. You have tortured me too deliberately for me to be able to forgive you at this moment. I shall forgive you later, but now I don't want your hand. "*Den Dank, Dame, begehr' ich nicht*",' he added, with a twisted smile, showing, however — quite unexpectedly — that he could read Schiller, and read him till he knew him by heart, something Aleša would never have believed" (IX, 242). In Schiller's poem a lady throws her glove into an arena full of wild animals, after which she challenges her knight to step down among the animals and retrieve it. This he does, but instead of responding to the promising look of love in her eye, he throws the glove in her face, uttering the quoted words. Then the knight leaves her for ever.

There exists a certain emotional congruity between the two situations. Katerina Ivanovna's expectations of the man who loves her, like those of the lady in the ballad, go beyond honorable measure, and Ivan, considering himself humiliated beyond forgiveness, like the knight, decides to depart. At the same time, however, there is something theatrical in Ivan's gesture, as he probably realizes himself, judging by the "twisted smile." In this he is like the woman who has offended him, to

[13] *The Glove* must have been a favorite poem of Dostoevskij's, since already in 1849 he used the poem, together with *Ritter Toggenburg*, as the basis for the chevaleresque love of the boy in *A Little Hero*. For an interesting study of these poems by Schiller in relation to Dostoevskij's use of them, see Pierre R. Hart, "Schillerean Themes in Dostoevskij's 'Malen'kij geroj'," *Slavic and East European Journal* 15 (Fall, 1971), 305-315.

whom Aleša says: "He is going to Moscow, and you cried out that you were glad — you did that on purpose! And then, right away, you began explaining that you were not glad of it but, on the contrary, you were sorry to be losing — a friend. But that was acting, too — you were playing a part as in a theater!" (IX, 240). Ivan, though sincere, overdramatizes himself, displaying his bleeding heart with too great readiness and masochistically enjoying the sight of it bleeding.

Ivan's other allusions to Schiller not only fit meaningfully into his mental universe, but reflect a definite emotional and moral attitude. Romano Guardini has some interesting comments on this attitude, though he overstates Ivan's vileness. According to Guardini, Ivan "wants to avoid disorder, which produces suffering, and nevertheless he reveals himself as voluptuously cruel. He is tortured by another's suffering, but he seeks this torture and enjoys it. The roots of this pity are rotten; but Ivan's 'vileness' proceeds directly from it."[14] The quotations from *Resignation* and *Longing* [*Sehnsucht*] may be interpreted in the light of this attitude.

In these quotations Ivan's tone is one of pity, for mankind as well as for himself. *Resignation* presents a man who, having renounced happiness to follow truth, is standing before the portals of eternity claiming his reward. The stanza which Ivan paraphrases reads:

> Here I stand on your dark bridge,
> Terrible eternity.
> Take my warrant for happiness,
> I bring it back to you unopened.
> I know nothing about bliss.
> (III, 112–113.)

The man's plaint is marked by self-pity. In Ivan's formula of rejection the pity has been universalized, but his words about returning his "entrance ticket . . . as soon as possible" on account of all the "unavenged suffering and unappeasable indignation" (IX, 308) there is in the world, betray a lacerated ego.

Longing, from which Ivan quotes immediately before he tells his "legend," is a kind of parable on the necessity of faith. It presents a vision of paradise, one that can be reached only by crossing a stormy river. The poem ends with the following exhortation:

> You must believe, you must take risks,

[14] Romano Guardini, "The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor," *Cross Currents* 3 (Fall, 1952), 70.

Because the gods do not give any pledge.
Only a miracle can bring you
Into the lovely wonderland.
(III, 380.)

Ivan quotes the first two lines of this stanza, rendered by Žukovskij as follows: "Ver' tomu, čto serdce skažet, / Net zalogov ot nebes" (IX, 311). The context of Ivan's quotation is his comment on humanity's disappointed hopes of a speedy return of Christ. Even though the promise is not fulfilled, says Ivan, "humanity awaits him with the same faith and with the same tender emotion. Oh, even with greater faith, for fifteen centuries have now passed since the pledges from heaven ceased for man.... There is nothing left but faith in what the heart says" (IX, 311). The exhortation to "believe in what the heart says" is in this context ironic, whereas the comparable lines of Schiller's poems are meant seriously. The basis of the irony is Ivan's unrestrained pity for mankind's deluded hopes and his self-pitying awareness of his own lack of faith.

I have attempted to show the consistency of tone in Ivan's allusions. Whatever we may think of his pity, whether we agree or not with Guardini's view of it, Dostoevskij certainly succeeds in making us feel the full weight of the problem of theodicy with which Ivan is grappling. While this problem has been sufficiently discussed, a couple of interpretive questions may be asked in regard to the wider implications of the poems as used in the novel. One notes that, in complete contrast with *To Joy*, the theme of *Resignation* includes no hope of ultimate harmony; it shows a world without transcendence. The man who stands before the bar of eternity is told that there is no final judgment, that "world history is the last judgment" (III, 115). The final stanza runs:

You *hoped,* and have carried away your reward,
Your *faith* was your allotted happiness.
You could have asked your sages —
What has been punched out by the clock
No eternity gives back.
(III, 115.)

Kurt Wais asserts that, by ascribing to Ivan a faulty interpretation of the poem, Dostoevskij meant to discredit him. If Ivan, he says, had known the entire poem, like Dostoevskij, he would have been one step ahead spiritually. To prove his point, Wais paraphrases the ending of the poem, of which he presumes Ivan to be ignorant: "There awaits us no Last Judgment and no subsequent indemnifications on the part of

the beyond; the judgment is being continually accomplished in life."[15] Implicitly, Wais blames Ivan for not following Schiller's naturalist-pragmatic lead in the poem, despite the fact that in other poems, including *To Joy*, Schiller is decidedly theistic and develops the theme of theodicy. In any case, there is no need to expect that the *entire* poem should be relevant to the context of Ivan's rebellious paraphrase.[16] As the title indicates, the general tone of Schiller's poem is one of "resignation" to the world's imperfections. In the poem's terms, there are two flowers, Pleasure and Hope, that man may pick; but once having chosen one, he cannot have the other. Ivan's attitude comes nearer to that of the young pleader before eternity than it does to Schiller's, though one difference should be noted. The persona in Schiller's poem still believes that by divine action reward will eventually be adjusted to merit and that suffering will be made good; Ivan assumes the possibility of such a harmony, but rejects it. However, only someone who believes that Ivan quotes Schiller as an "authority" will see his peculiar use of Schiller's line as presumptive evidence that the author desires to discredit him. As will be shown, Dostoevskij's particular use of *Resignation* has a quite different explanation.

Resignation is used to articulate rebellion; *Longing*, though at first mockingly ironic, becomes associated — through the legend of the Grand Inquisitor that immediately follows — with an attitude of faith. Here is another example of Dostoevskij's completely free use of Schillerian materials. The lines, "believe in what the heart says, / There are no pledges from heaven," epitomize Dostoevskij's religious attitude in the novel. In the context of the quotation the pledges are miracles. With the "realist," says Dostoevskij, "faith . . . does not spring from the miracle but the miracle from faith. Once the realist believes, he is bound by his very realism to admit miracles too" (IX, 35). To Mme Xoxlakova Father Zosima says that there is no proof of God and immortality; only through the experience of "active love" can one become convinced. This active love is the voice of the heart of Ivan's

[15] Wais, 498.

[16] If one conceives of the context in the broadest possible sense, as embracing "The Grand Inquisitor" as well as "Rebellion," the entire poem does become relevant. Schiller makes the same distinction in the poem as Dostoevskij does, in "The Grand Inquisitor," between two categories of values, spiritual and material: hope and pleasure. It is impossible to realize both at the same time; either one lives in eternal hope, without seeking its realization in earthly life, or one enjoys without hope. This distinction is nearly identical with the one Ivan draws in his tale between faith and material well-being. One must choose, at one's own risk, between these two alternatives.

quotation. Further, the Grand Inquisitor pointedly contrasts his own version of Christianity with Christ's through his dissenting view of miracles: "... you would not enslave man by a miracle and desired faith given freely, not based on miracle" (IX, 321).

Faith springing from love rather than from evidence is a minor motif in *The Brothers Karamazov*. The ending of the Legend suggests that even Ivan yearns for this kind of faith. The next, and final lines of *Longing* read: "Only a miracle can bring you / Into the lovely wonderland." A definite miracle does happen in Ivan's Legend: Christ returns; however, this is merely a device for dramatizing the two contrary attitudes towards religion and the Church. But a less obvious miracle takes place at the end, when Christ kisses the old Inquisitor. The kiss of forgiveness, of love, creates faith enough in the Inquisitor to make him let Christ go.[17] If only for a moment, the hoary old man is won over to the religion of Christ; and though he "sticks to his idea," the kiss "burns in his heart" (IX, 330). Also, Aleša's response to Ivan's question whether his formula "all is lawful" will make his younger brother renounce him, is relevant here. Ivan goes into "rapture" over Aleša's kiss, which imitates the kiss bestowed by Christ. And he tells his brother that if he will ever love the "sticky little leaves," he will "only love them, remembering you. It is enough for me that you are somewhere here, and I won't lose my desire for life yet.... Take it as a declaration of love if you like" (IX, 331). Thus, Ivan's Legend ends on a note of promise, and the purely ironic use of the exhortation to "believe in what the heart says" acquires a new, serious tonality. A kind of development *in ovo* is suggested by the order of the two related quotations from Schiller: the first, from *Resignation*, is entirely negative, while the second, from *Longing*, conceals springs of faith beneath its ironic surface.[18]

Ivan does not only sprinkle his meditations with allusions to Schiller's poetry; his story, the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, is also indebted to Schiller. If these statements seem overly literal — the indebtedness being Dostoevskij's rather than Ivan's — it is well to recall the principle of verisimilitude, which dictates that a character shall not do, or have done, anything violating his fundamental nature. Despite Aleša's

[17] Ivan himself implies the miraculousness of Christ-like love. To Aleša he says: "In my opinion, Christ-like love for men is, in its way, a miracle impossible on earth" (IX, 297).

[18] Wais has pointed out the possibility of hope for Ivan, but his ground for assuming it is, it seems, mistaken. According to him, the miracle is the return of Christ, which, as I have indicated, is sheer literary artifice. (See *op. cit.*, 498-499.)

surprise at hearing Ivan quote Schiller, there is no valid reason why Ivan should not have been an avid reader of Schiller.

In 1879 Dostoevskij told his friend Pucykovič in Berlin that he had "carried the thought of the Grand Inquisitor in his soul during his entire life."[19] Many books and articles have taken up the question of Dostoevskij's sources for Ivan's Legend.[20] Both the setting and the main character of the tale indubitably derive from Schiller's *Don Carlos*, though these may be the least important of its components. Schiller describes his Grand Inquisitor as "an old man of ninety, blind and supporting himself on a stick. . . . As he walks through the ranks, all the grandees prostrate themselves before him and touch the hem of his garment" (Act V, sc. 10). Dostoevskij's figure, a cardinal like Schiller's, is an "old man almost ninety, tall and erect, with a withered face and sunken eyes, in which there is still a gleam of light, like a little fiery spark." After Christ has been arrested, "the crowd instantly bows down to the earth, like one man, before the old inquisitor, who blesses the people in silence and passes on" (IX, 313). Meier-Graefe in his discussion of Ivan's "poem" emphasizes the extent to which Schiller's material has been transformed, particularly the scene between King Philip and the Inquisitor, in which he sees Dostoevskij's point of departure. While the Russian has retained the "petrified gesture" of Schiller's character, his own inquisitor is enveloped in "demonic tragedy. The rigid power of the dignitary shatters on the higher majesty of his partner." The change in dramatis personae, the critic says, allowed Dostoevskij to develop the "inner action" which Schiller had neglected.[21]

However, another scene in *Don Carlos* does have an "internal action" in many ways comparable to that of Dostoevskij's Legend, namely, scene 10 of Act III, where King Philip gives audience to Marquis Posa. Quite apart from the theme of freedom which is at the center of their exchange, the diametrical opposition of the King and the Marquis produces a close congruity with the protagonists of Dostoevskij's tale. As Čiževskij has indicated, in Schiller's play the un-

[19] Reinhardt Lauth, "Zur Genesis der Grossinquisitor-Erzählung," *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 5, 1 (1954), 267.

[20] See Antanas Maceina, *Der Grossinquisitor* (Heidelberg, 1952); A. Rammelmeyer, "Dostojevskijs Begegnung mit Belinskij," *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie* 21 (1951 / 52), 1-21 and 273-292; Ernst Benz, "Der wiederkehrende Christus," *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 6, 4 (1954), 305-323; Meier-Graefe, 396-399; and Bem, "Dostojevskij, der geniale Leser," 475-476.

[21] Meier-Graefe, 396.

canny figure of the Grand Inquisitor stands behind King Philip. In fact, the fearful tribunal is referred to in this very scene, in that the King, having developed a great sympathy for Marquis Posa, admonishes him to "flee" his Inquisition. On the other hand, though Marquis Posa is no Christ, he is, like the Christ of the Legend, in the position of a heretic (Act V, sc. 10), as is also, ultimately, Don Carlos. After his friend has been assassinated, the Prince actually compares Marquis Posa to Christ:

> As long as mothers
> Have given birth, only *one* — *one*
> Has died so unjustly.
> (Act V, sc. 4.)

Similarly, the predicament of Don Carlos in the scene preceding his arrest — a predicament which, in the present context of freedom, is inseparable from Marquis Posa's entire cause — is compared with that of the dying Christ. The King asks: "Can you found a new faith for me / Which justifies the bloody murder of a child?,"[22] to which the Inquisitor answers: "To propritiate eternal justice / God's son died on the cross" (Act V, sc. 10).

It is, nonetheless, mainly for its thematic material that the scene between the King and the Marquis is of interest in relation to "The Grand Inquisitor." Among the many-levelled themes in the Legend, freedom in the context of religious faith assumes a prime place. Happiness without freedom and freedom with suffering are the cornerstones of the attitudes represented by the Inquisitor and Christ. To Dostoevskij one value, freedom, justifies every pang of uncertainty and physical suffering which man is heir to; it becomes the principal ground of his theodicy. In this respect the entire legend follows the implications of the two lines from *Longing* quoted by Ivan. The contrast of values in *Don Carlos* is quite similar, namely, between a happiness rooted in freedom of thought and a "bliss" propagated by the royal establishment. Marquis Posa says:

> Can I consider . . . [my brother] happy — before he may think?
> You shall not choose me, Sire, to disseminate
> The bliss which you coin for us. (Act III sc. 10.)

Interestingly, in referring to this kind of "bliss," the King makes use of

[22] Here is another possible source of the motif of children's suffering as associated with the theme of theodicy.

two words also frequently uttered by the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoevskij's work: quiet and peace. The King tells the Marquis,

> Look
> Around you in my Spain. Here the citizen's
> Happiness flourishes in never-clouded peace;
> And this quiet I wish the Flemings to have,

to which Marquis Posa retorts: "The quiet of a graveyard!" Dostoevskij's Inquisitor says that man prefers "peace, and even death, to freedom of choice" (IX, 320), and he boasts that whereas "you have only the elect, . . . we give rest to all" (IX, 324). To Marquis Posa, as to Dostoevskij, happiness is little worth unless founded in freedom. Consequently, excepting the fact that in "The Grand Inquisitor" religious and secular autocracy is associated with socialism, the dialectic is fairly similar in the two works. Noteworthy is Marquis Posa's version of the Schillerian theodicy in a previously quoted passage where the narrowness and poverty of King Philip's world is contrasted with the liberality of God's creation, in which evil is allowed to riot so that freedom may flourish (Act III, sc. 10).

There is an equally close relationship between the psychological premisses underlying the contrasting ideologies. The Grand Inquisitor has a low opinion of man, whom he calls "weak, vicious, worthless, and rebellious" (IX, 318) and thus "baser by nature than you have believed him to be!" (IX, 322). Indeed, his whole argument is based on the injustice he ascribes to Christ of leaving the majority of mankind unsaved, since they cannot rise to the perilous freedom he offers. Likewise, Marquis Posa repeatedly upbraids the King for his dim view of "human dignity." Subsequently, he turns this view around in a manner which brings out a further point of contact with the Legend, namely, in regard to the unwelcome burden of freedom. People, he says, deliberately "flee / Before the ghost of their inner greatness." While in *Don Carlos* men in the mass "voluntarily forgo their nobility, / Voluntarily place themselves on this lower level," preferring to "adorn / their chains with cowardly wisdom," in the Legend man looks tormentedly for someone to whom he can hand over the "gift of freedom" with which the "unfortunate creature is born" (IX, 319).

It is not surprising that, with such close similarities between the moral-religious attitudes and their foundation, the spiritual condition of the ruling elite in the two works should also converge. That condition is paradoxical: though worshiped as gods, the rulers are lonely and unhappy. Marquis Posa sensitively touches the weakest spot of the King's

entire position when he notes that, despite assuming a divine role in relation to his people, he has remained an ordinary mortal and needs "compassion" [*Mitgefühl*]. The Grand Inquisitor says that the weak millions "will marvel at us and look upon us as gods, because we . . . have consented to endure freedom and to rule over them . . ." (IX, 318-319). On the other hand, he admits that those who "keep the mystery . . . shall be unhappy" (IX, 326), because they cannot share their secret with those they "save."

To sum up, the central dialectic shared by "The Grand Inquisitor" and *Don Carlos* turns on the choice between freedom with sin and suffering, on the one hand, and autocracy with innocence and "happiness," on the other. For in *Don Carlos*, too, the idea that the Church assumes the sins of its children is important. A contrast exists between Princess Eboli, who refuses to pass on to the Church the responsibility for her acquiescence in the King's lust, and King Philip, who surrenders his freedom of conscience to the Church, showing what Sartre would call "bad faith." In proceeding against Don Carlos, his son, the Church will take upon itself the guilt incurred. The permissiveness of Dostoevskij's Inquisitor is almost masochistic: men will be allowed to sin "because we love them," and the masters will take the punishment upon themselves (IX, 326).

The fact that the formulation of the question is individual in *Don Carlos*, collective in "The Grand Inquisitor," does not detract from the similarities of the moral-religious predicaments. Nevertheless, Schiller's play contains only the beginnings of the ideas which Dostoevskij has "embodied in figures and images of extraordinary vividness, plasticity and depth."[23] For example, while the theme of theodicy is only hinted at in *Don Carlos*, Dostoevskij has placed it at the center of his philosophical fable, which with uncanny insight dramatizes two possible ways of coming to terms with the problem. Only if man is capable of freedom, and of free, uncompelled faith, can the disorder in creation and the sufferings of men be justified. Those to whom freedom is a burden, and who have no faith, will be spared much of the suffering incurred by their more venturesome brothers, but, in retribution, their lives will be based on a subtly fabricated tissue of official lies.[24] To ask where Dostoevskij's sympathies lie is unnecessary; but it is inter-

[23] Čiževskij, "Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 28.

[24] Čiževskij notes that Schiller's prose narrative *The Visionary* [*Der Geisterseher*] contains a close counterpart to the means of enticement used by the elite in Dostoevskij's legend. The frame of the narrative is "the endeavors of the Inquisition to lure the Prince, the story's hero, into its net with the help of miracles, mystery,

esting to note that even Ivan seems, implicitly, to show a preference for the free faith which he so mercilessly ridicules in his story.

It remains to explore the possible influence of Belinskij upon Dostoevskij's use of Schillerian ideas in the "Rebellion" and "The Grand Inquisitor" sections of *The Brothers Karamazov*. A. Rammelmeyer, who was the first to deal extensively with this question, assumes that memories of Dostoevskij's conversations with Belinskij, recorded in the *Diary of a Writer*, were before his mind in the composition of "The Grand Inquisitor."[25] His quotations from Belinskij's letters, however, could be nothing more than suggestive until it was known how Dostoevskij became acquainted with their contents. Subsequently, M. Karpovič showed where Dostoevskij could have read the letters, namely, in A. N. Pypin's biography, in which Belinskij's correspondence was generously quoted.[26] Pypin's work was first printed in *Vestnik Evropy* before appearing in book form in 1876.

It is necessary, first, to enumerate those elements of thought and attitude which Dostoevskij may have carried over to Ivan Karamazov from his experience with Belinskij, regardless of their source. According to Rammelmeyer they are the following: the motifs of the returning Christ and of Christ as socialist,[27] the idea that Christ demands too much from men, freethinking within the Roman Church, and anti-Catholicism; the problem of theodicy and rebellion against Hegelianism, invariably associated with a pro-Schiller attitude; rejection of individual salvation at the cost of the unhappiness of millions, cynicism in regard to human nature, and an ironical manner of presentation. I might add Belinskij's interpretation of and repeated references to Schiller's poem *Resignation* from the perspective of a conflict between universal harmony and the individual personality,[28] and the idea that Christ suffered on the cross for human personality.[29]

It is quite possible that entities that seem to be traceable directly to *Don Carlos* were filtered through Belinskij. Rammelmeyer states a broader possibility, namely, that Ivan's "rebellion" in general may have been conceived by Dostoevskij as a counterpart to Belinskij's rebellion against Hegelianism, further that — as Leonid Grossman had suggested

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and material need" ("Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 28).

[25] Rammelmeyer, "Dostojevskijs Begegnung mit Belinskij," 279.

[26] M. Karpovič, "Dostoevskij, Belinskij, Šiller," *Novyj žurnal* 45 (1956), 283.

[27] This idea, by the way, is mentioned by Kolja Krasotkin and ascribed to Belinskij (X, 59).

[28] Belinskij, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij* XI, 386; XII, 32.

[29] *Ibid.*, XI, 577.

earlier — in "The Grand Inquisitor" Dostoevskij continued his battle with Belinskij, whom he held chiefly responsible for the growth of atheism in Russia.[30] In this connection, Rammelmeyer comments, "it is an irony of genius that Belinskij's ideas are conjured into the figure of the Grand Inquisitor, of Catholicism, which Belinskij hated with all the strength of his impatient soul."[31] Some points of resemblance between the two "rebellions" will be noted.

It has been pointed out that Ivan's use of Schiller's poem *Resignation* to articulate his rejection of "eternal harmony" is not in accord with the total meaning of the poem. Instead of constituting evidence that the author intended to discredit Ivan, this deviation may reflect Belinskij's previous use of the poem, and of a similar formula, in his battles both with Schiller and with Hegel. In a letter to N. V. Stankevič of 29 September 1839, in his Hegelian period, Belinskij interprets *Resignation* as an expression of the conflict between the individual and the universal order. "In *Resignation*," he writes, "he [Schiller] makes a sacrifice to the general of everything particular and steps out into a vacuum, because his 'general' was a Moloch which eats up its own offspring, and not an eternal love which reveals itself in everything that is alive."[32] Here Belinskij is still on the side of the universal order, of which Schiller, he thinks, has a false conception. When, subsequently, he rejects the Hegelian harmony, he does so largely in terms of a return to Schillerian individualism. In a highly significant letter to V. P. Botkin of 1 March 1841, he says he has a personal reason to be angry with Hegel, because faithfulness to Hegel caused him to hate Schiller. His rejection of Hegel, therefore, is sprinkled with echoes from Schiller.

> I thank you humbly, Egor Fedoryč [nickname for Hegel], . . . but with all respect to your philosophical philistinism, I have the honor to inform you that if I could manage to climb to the highest level of the ladder of development, I would there ask you to give me an account of all the victims of the conditions of life, and the history of all the victims of accidents, superstition, the Inquisition, Philip II, etc. Otherwise I will throw myself from this highest level, head downwards.[33] I don't want happiness

[30] Rammelmeyer, 10, 273, and 279-280.

[31] *Ibid.*, 287.

[32] Belinskij, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij* XI, 386.

[33] There may be an echo of Belinskij's phrasing where Mitja describes how he plunges into the abyss, "headlong with my heels up" (IX, 137), though *The Robbers* has a similar passage. In the latter, Karl Moor is likened to Lucifer being hurled into hell:" . . . the outcry of abandoned mothers roars after your heels . . ." (Act II, sc. 3).

even as a gift if I can't be tranquil about every one of my blood brothers — bones of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. They tell me that disharmony is the condition of harmony; perhaps this is very comfortable and delightful for music lovers, but certainuy who are fated to evpress with their partitheir participation the idea of disharmony.[34]

This is a close counterpart to Ivan's rejection of the Christian theodicy. In using the line from *Resignation* to climax Ivan's rejection, Dostoevskij, it seems, has aligned his interpretation of the poem with Belinskij's general reevaluation of Schiller, through which the German poet became a symbol of revolt.[35]

The abundance of ideas in "The Grand Inquisitor" traceable to Belinskij as well as to Schiller may be due to the inseparability of the two figures in Dostoevskij's mind at the time of his acquaintance with the critic. And it seems possible that the reading of Pypin's biography served to bring back to Dostoevskij's mind both his own and Belinskij's early admiration of Schiller, precipitating the creative process which was to bring forth a conglomerate of their ideas in Ivan's "Rebellion" and "The Grand Inquisitor." Particularly important in this respect is Belinskij's hatred of Roman Catholicism, shared also by Dostoevskij but differently motivated. The hatred of Belinskij, a man who lived wholly in literature, may have had a purely literary origin, namely Schiller.[36] Though this is hardly a realistic possibility in the case of Dostoevskij, he may have been influened by Belinskij — or, rather, the memory of Belinskij — when he chose to make the Grand Inquisitor a pivotal figure in his masterwork. In Rammelmeyer's words, "the characterization of the Grand Inquisitor as an atheist seems to point to a dependence on Belinskij, secondly, the main theme of the 'returning Christ'."[37]

To conclude, more Schillerian themes and motifs are presented through Ivan Karamazov than through any of the other characters in *The Brothers Karamazov*. In him come together in a remarkable synthesis the cult of humanity associated with the young impractical dreamers of *The Insulted and the Injured*, and the superhuman individualism of Kirillov. These elements are united in such a way that Ivan repels and attracts at the same time. Love of humanity is com-

[34] Belinskij, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij* XII, 22-23.
[35] For confirmation of this symbolism, see Malia, 186. Malia notes that the symbol was "not quite the real Schiller"; it was more "left" and social.
[36] Rammelmeyer, 279.
[37] *Ibid.*, 281.

monly taken as a sign of nobility, but Ivan's love is abstract and cold. Similarly, to believe in the total freedom of the individual mind and personality is a lofty ideal, but in Ivan moral freedom turns into moral slavery. This is an elaboration of the Schillerian motif of the "higher man." In the world of Dostoevskij, he who claims this status becomes entrapped precisely in those low elements of common humanity which he despises in others but disregards in himself. This predicament hinges on the "broadness" of human nature, psychological ambiguity, an idea that is prominent in Schiller's works. In moral terms, it signifies the coexistence in man's mind of unlimited potentials for both good and evil. However, through Dostoevskij's new application of the concept of the double the possibility of regeneration is opened up for Ivan. By recognizing the "broadness" of one's nature and one's common humanity, its expression can become limited to moral acts. Perhaps the most promising new Schillerian motif associated with Ivan is that of religious faith without guarantee. Despite the many "negative" ideas that are projected through Ivan, the quotation from *Longing* which formulates this motif expresses his deepest need. Though he may seem to be a lost soul, Ivan yearns for faith and hope, maybe even charity.

2. DMITRIJ KARAMAZOV

Precisely because Ivan Karamazov is connected with such a large number of themes from Schiller, he is not a "Schillerian" type, while Mitja, who voices far fewer ones, comes much closer to being such a type. The topics that will be taken up in the following are, first, his relationship to Schiller's sensual type, secondly, the implications of his quoting Schiller's poetry — particularly *The Eleusinian Festival* — and, thirdly, his reflection of Schiller's view of the criminal hero.

The two first-mentioned topics are inseparable, since the "sensual type" of Schiller's aesthetic treatise has much in common with the "troglodyte" of *The Eleusinian Festival*. When cultural rather than psychological terminology is used, the sensual man is a "savage" [*Wilder*] (V, 320), a word [Russian *dik*] used twice in the stanzas recited. This word becomes a minor motif in the novel, amplified by figurative expressions with animal imagery.[38] Here is a passage from the treatise which has literal correspondences with the poem:

[38] Ivan, for example, calls man a "savage, vicious beast" (IX, 294), and comparable epithets are applied to Mitja by Grušen'ka and himself.

> . . . only the favor of circumstances can dissolve the chains of the physical state and lead the savage to beauty. . . . Not where man hides *as a troglodyte* in caves, is eternally isolated and never finds humanity *outside himself;* also not where he treks around *nomadically* in massive armies, is for ever only a number and never finds harmony *in himself* — but only where he is quiet with himself in his own cottage and speaks with his whole kind as soon as he steps out, will its lovely bud unfold (V, 394–395).

Here, indeed, is the entire theme of *The Eleusinian Festival,* though the context is more aesthetic than in the poem, which celebrates the institution of civil society through Ceres, the goddess of Earth.

Among the qualities of the sensual type as described by Schiller, the momentary nature of experience finds a close parallel in Mitja. Whereas the formal drive wants permanence, the sensual drive demands "that there be change, that time should have a substance. This condition of merely filled time is called sensation, and it is through it alone that physical existence manifests itself" (V, 344). The ultimate consequence of this insistence on "filled time" is lack of psychic identity. Man in this state is "nothing but a unit of magnitude, . . . or rather, *he* is not, for his personality is suspended as long as sensation controls him and carries time along with it" (V, 344-345). Language, Schiller comments in a note, "has for this condition of selflessness [*Selbstlosigkeit*] under the dominion of sensation the very apt expression *to be beside oneself,* i.e., beside one's I" (V, 345). Thus, the individual is reduced to being a succession of states of mind.

Such, broadly speaking, is Mitja's condition. Describing him on his way to Mme Xoxlakova, Dostoevskij writes: "As he worked out this new idea [of the loan], Mitja went into a state of rapture, but that always happened with him in all his undertakings, in all his sudden decisions. He gave himself up to every new idea with passion" (IX, 477-478). Perhaps the most unmistakable sign of inner discontinuity in Mitja is his incoherence in speech, several times remarked upon by the author and sensed by the reader. One may also note his awareness of disorder in himself and his delight in confusion.[39] Concerning the former, he says to his friend Perxotin: "There's no order in me, no higher order. . . . My whole life has been disorder, and one must set it in order" (IX, 505). Eventually, Mitja does reach a point where order is emerging; a "new man has risen up in me," he says (IX, 105), and he expresses an intense sense of self. ". . . I seem to have such strength

[39] At Mokroe, when an "absurd confusion" developed, Mitja seemed to be in his "natural element, and the more absurd it became, the more his spirits rose" (IX, 538).

in me now that I could stand anything, any suffering, only to be able to say and to repeat to myself every moment, 'I exist.' In thousands of torments — I exist. I'm writhing in agony — but I exist!" (X, 106).

The conquest of discontinuity forms an important part of the change that Mitja goes through. Schiller devotes much attention to showing how the sensual man can transform himself into a man of reason and thus, through the formal drive which is inherent in the latter, acquire the personal and moral identity lacking in the sensual state. This process of transformation will take place by way of beauty: "Through beauty, sensual man is led on to form and to thought" (V, 364). It is the "disinterested free appreciation of pure appearance" (V, 401) which marks the beginning of his humanity. The rational-moral stage comes later, prepared by the more objective attitude fostered through aesthetic contemplation. ". . . through the aesthetic frame of mind, the autonomy [*Selbsttätigkeit*] of reason is already started in the domain of sensuality, the power of sensation is shattered within its own borders, and physical man is so far ennobled that, henceforth, spiritual man has only to evolve from the former according to the laws of freedom" (V, 382).

The increase in objectivity which results from aesthetic perception is strikingly presented by way of a comparison of the sensory contact with the world in the sensual and the aesthetic stage. To the sensual man, the world is either booty or an enemy: "He either hurls himself at things and wants to devour them, in desire, or the objects encroach upon him destructively and he repels them, in disgust. In both cases his relationship to the sensory world is one of immediate *touch* . . ." (V, 386). The two senses which raise man from actuality to appearance, and thence to knowledge of reality, are sight and hearing. "As long as man is still a savage, he enjoys only with the senses of touch. . . . As soon as he begins to enjoy with the eye, and sight acquires independent value to him, then he is already aesthetically free and the play drive has evolved" (V, 396-397). Though Dmitrij Karamazov gives the impression of a man who "hurls himself at things" rather than of one who contemplates them, his development is in the direction of greater objectivity, largely reflected in a clearer and more sober self-knowledge.

At this point one of the more pleasing ironies of *The Brothers Karamazov* becomes apparent. While Mitja's presentation of himself as the "naked troglodyte" hiding "wild and fearful in his cavern" cannot be taken literally, it is precisely this loathsome self-identification which holds out promise of redemption for the "savage." Despite his

passionate self-absorption, he is already at the outset capable of stepping aside from himself sufficiently to see his features reflected in the mirror of art. Though he admits that repeated readings of the poem about Ceres have not reformed him (IX, 137), this does not necessarily mean that they have not affected him at all. Lapšin, in his study of Dostoevskij's aesthetic, claims that Mitja's case provides a "clear example of symbolic recognition and, at the same time, of inhibition — to some extent." For in his "debauch, in his lowest degradation, he preserved the capacity to feel the beauties of the ideal. . . . Schiller did not save Mitja Karamazov from degradation and shame, but he prevented him from becoming another copy of his father. . . ."[40]

Lapšin's views offer a welcome relief from those who all too readily acquiesce in Mitja's self-portrayal as someone who does not respond to beauty. In actual fact, Mitja responds to more than just beauty, as shown particularly through the reverberations of the hymn and cavern motifs, in which aesthetic perception and religious feeling merge in an ecstasy of self-transcendence.[41] It is above all through Mitja's spiritual and moral growth that Dostoevskij creates an analogue to the movement upwards on Schiller's ladder of perfection, a movement through which sensual man gains moral freedom by way of aesthetic contemplation.

The poem *The Eleusinian Festival*, from which Mitja recites a few stanzas, throws an interesting light on this development, while further enriching the novel's motif structure. One of the themes of the poem, cannibalism, permeates the entire novel; among other things, it becomes a symbol of Ivan's immoralism, thereby degrading Ivan, with his high intellectual culture, to the level of Mitja's troglodyte. But to understand the implications of this as well as other patterns, it is necessary to have an idea of the poem itself.

In *The Eleusinian Festival* Schiller celebrates the initiation of human culture in its most basic as well as in its higher meaning: Ceres, the goddess of Earth, institutes agriculture and settled living as well as religion and morality. The keynote of the new state is joy, announced in the chorus:

> Wind the golden spikes into wreaths,
> Interweave some blue cornflowers,
> Joy shall transfigure every eye,
> For the Queen is making her entrance. (III, 355.)

[40] I. I. Lapšin, *Èstetika Dostoevskogo* (Berlin, 1923), 60-61.

[41] That this is no exaggeration appears from Mitja's own visualization of the convict in the cave not as an insect of "sensual lust," but as a potential "angel, . . a hero" (X, 105). Here the opposition of "insect" and "angel" in the last lines recited

In glaring contrast to the new happy state stands that of primitive man, whose description is climaxed by the intimation of human sacrifice and cannibalism:

> No fruits of the fields or sweet clusters
> Shine at the feasts;
> Only the remnants of bodies smoke
> On the bloody altars.
> (*Sobr. soč.* IV, 137.)

The motif of cannibalism is anticipated by Miusov's account of a "characteristic anecdote" told by Ivan, in which he claimed that with the loss of belief in immortality, "every living force maintaining the life of the world would at once be dried up. Moreover, nothing would be immoral any more, everything would be lawful, even cannibalism" (IX, 90). Ivan once more turns to these themes when he has his Grand Inquisitor combine "science and cannibalism" (IX, 324); finally, the devil also alludes to the motif (X, 178). All these contexts are intellectual, dignified by knowledge and culture, yet the loathsome anti-human crime seems to be taken for granted. Figurative expressions are used, but they suggest that the crime is not merely a theoretical possibility. Such is Ivan's utterance, "One reptile will devour the other. And serve them both right, too." In this perspective, the central theme of parricide becomes an aspect of the motif of cannibalism — or vice versa.

Ivan figuratively calls his brother a cannibal, an epithet quite in keeping with Mitja's self-appraisal as he recites the poem about "Ceres and man" (IX, 137).[42] Yet, Ivan himself eventually becomes more nearly involved with cannibalism, if its association with parricide be taken seriously. This difference may derive from the fact that Mitja, however primitive psychologically, has the ability to use art creatively: not only does he find his own wretched moral state reflected in it, as in the Ceres poem, but he also finds inspiration there. Ivan, on the other hand, uses poetry intellectually, to decorate or climax an argument or to express a yearning; it never forces him to face himself. Consequently,

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from *To Joy* has become dynamic, as the lowest is being transformed into the highest. One notes again how integral the Schillerian motifs are both to the structure of the novel and to the development of the characters.

[42] Two other works by Schiller of central relevance to the novel, *The Robbers* and *To Joy,* also contain allusions to cannibalism. In the former it is immediately associated with parricide (Act IV, sc. 5); in the latter it is presented as one of the evils that are cured by the spirit of joy and sworn brotherhood (III, 117).

in his case more compelling self-reflections — by way of the double — are necessary.

This is not meant to imply that Mitja's insights come to him easily. Quite the contrary, there is uncertainty in his mind about the meaning of the poetry he loves. Like a typical beginner, he first tries to make a literal application of *The Eleusinian Festival.* Apropos, of Schiller's lines to the effect that, in order to become fully humanized, man must enter into an "eternal union" with Mother Earth, Mitja asks: "How am I to enter into an eternal union with Mother Earth? I don't kiss the earth, I don't cleave to her bosom. Shall I turn myself into a peasant or a shepherd?" (IX, 137). Modest as it is, Dostoevskij uses Mitja's attempt at understanding the poem as the basis of a considerable number of permutations of the motif. Just before Mitja is charged with murder, Grušen'ka reflects on their future together, saying they had "better go and work the land. I want to dig the earth with my own hands. We must work, do you hear?" What immediately follows places the motif in a context of expiation. When Dmitrij says, "I'll love you in Siberia," Grušen'ka answers, "Oh, well, Siberia if you like. I don't care — we'll work —" (IX, 550). The last recurrence of this peasant-Mother Earth motif is mock-serious in tone, associated with America rather than Siberia. On arriving there, Mitja says, they will "plough and work, in solitude, somewhere very remote, with wild bears." Afterwards they will return to Russia and, if recognized, go to Siberia, "somewhere in the wilds"; and, he concludes, "we'll die on our native soil" (X, 323).

The development of this motif deviates considerably from its Schillerian meaning. The basic meaning of culture as cultivation of the soil is present in both authors, but Schiller's idea of settled living as the source of higher culture is not developed by Dostoevskij. In fact, the key idea of *The Eleusinian Festival,* namely, that only through a bond with the earth can man attain a fully human state, assumes a slightly parodistic flavor by the way Dostoevskij uses the motif of "ploughing" and living in the wilds. Also, the motif as elaborated in the novel has overtones of national pathos and religious piety that do not appear in the original. It is the *Russian* soil which Mitja has dishonored and with which he will enter an eternal union,[43] and it is only on Russian soil that effective expiation can be made.

[43] That Mitja feels he has dishonored the Earth is apparent from what he tells Aleša even before the catastrophe has taken place. He has just been thinking of suicide; for, he says, "why burden the earth any longer, dishonoring it with my

Interestingly, the very first possibility of uniting with Ceres suggested by Mitja — that of kissing the earth — is shown as an integral part of the life of Father Zosima and Aleša, whose mystical rapture after the dream of the Biblical wedding has been noted. Father Zosima says: "If all men abandon you and drive you away by force, then when you are left alone fall on the earth and kiss it, water it with your tears and the earth will yield fruit from your tears even though no one has seen or heard you in your solitude" (IX, 402). And then he repeats: "Love to throw yourself on the earth and kiss it. Kiss the earth and love it with an unceasing, consuming love . . ." (IX, 403). Vjačeslav Ivanov thinks that the roots of this "mystical realism" of Father Zosima actually lie in the ancient conception of Demeter, the Earth Mother,[44] from whose name, by the way, that of Dmitrij is derived.

One matter concerning Mitja remains to be discussed, namely, his relation to the Schillerian criminal hero.[45] Dostoevskij's use of the criminal hero was not solely a reflection of his experience of prison. E. H. Carr, one of his biographers, writes: "In his youth he had borrowed from Schiller that familiar lay-figure of the Romantics — the criminal with the heart of gold; he had even written a story called *The Honest Thief*."[46] Indeed, the title of this story, written in 1848, seems to derive directly from a phrase in Schiller's prose tale *Criminal from Lost Honor*. Christian Wolf, the hero of the tale, "saw . . . only one expedient ahead of him — which thousands before him and after him have availed themselves of with better luck — the expedient *of stealing honorably*" (III, 496). The crime of theft is very much to the point, because Dostoevskij seems to share with Schiller one of his pet ideas, namely, that it is baser to steal than to be a scoundrel, or even a murderer.

Dmitrij tells Aleša: "I may be a low man, with low and dissolute passions, but a thief, a pickpocket . . . Dmitrij Karamazov can never be" (IX, 152). Ivan tells Smerdjakov that Dmitrij "could have killed him [his father] yesterday because of Grušen'ka, like the frantic, vicious

vile presence!" (IX, 195). This is the first, rather tentative, recurrence of the Ceres motif.

[44] Vyacheslav Ivanov, *Freedom and the Tragic Life: A Study in Dostoevsky* (New York, 1952), 45.

[45] A complete treatment of the significance of criminality in the work of Dostoevskij and Schiller is not envisaged here. Such a treatment would have to consider in detail Schiller's critical pronouncements on the subject as well as his dramaturgy, before correlating the results with the practical aesthetics of Dostoevskij. In effect, it would amount to a comparative study in the theory of tragedy.

[46] E. H. Carr, *Dostoevsky: A New Biography* (Boston, 1931), 66.

fool he is, but he won't steal" (IX, 342). The fullest statement of Mitja's feelings in regard to the relative baseness of theft and murder is made at the preliminary investigation. He says he has been tortured less by the thought of having killed the servant than by the "damned consciousness that I had torn that damned money off my breast at last and spent it, and so had become a downright thief!" (IX, 612). In Schiller's works there are several comments on the use of theft as a literary motif. In *The Stage Considered as a Moral Institution* (1784) the author says that "no crime is more infamous than the crime of the thief . . ." (V, 97). An elaborate treatment of the subject appears in the essay *Thoughts on the Use of the Vulgar and the Base in Art* (pub. 1802). Here Schiller states that base actions may be introduced into tragedy if the circumstances are such as to cause the feelings of disgust to be dissolved in a sense of terror. "Stealing, for example is something *absolutely base* . . . and aesthetically he [the thief] always remains a base object" and unsuitable for any "poetic representation of serious substance." However, if he becomes a murderer as well, he may be morally even "more reprehensible, but *aesthetically* he thereby becomes to a degree more usable" (V, 307). Though Mitja commits no murder, suspicion of murder, or of any crime, may produce a comparable effect, according to Schiller (V, 308-309).

As a character Dmitrij Karamazov, like Raskol'nikov, could have been conceived on the Schillerian model of the tragic criminal, whose base actions are overshadowed by the force of his passions and the terror of his destiny. For although he does want to get money from his father, Dmitrij's deeper feelings of repulsion and hatred are otherwise motivated. Schiller's first two plays, *The Robbers* and *Fiesko*, are the purest embodiments of these ideas. Karl Moor in particular corresponds to the notion of the noble criminal who is able to kill, but unable to rob. The looting he invariably leaves to his band. The preservation of a kind of moral integrity in spite of crime is a crucial point of resemblance between Karl Moor and Dmitrij Karamazov. In other respects, the latter is more similar to other Schillerian heroes, or heroines, conceived according to a somewhat different concept of tragedy. While in the early plays, the hero's main attribute is his "huge stature" [*kolossale Grösse*], subsequently this is replaced by suffering and repentance. In the essay *On the Pathetic* (1793), Schiller writes: "The first law of tragic art was the representation of suffering nature. Its second law is representation of the moral resistance to suffering" (V, 193). In *On the Sublime* (pub. 1801) Schiller more clearly defines this

concept.[47] When man has no physical means of freeing himself from the yoke of necessity, his only recourse is a mental one: physical necessity is transcended, annihilated, "*according to its concept*," opening the way to moral freedom (V, 216).

The Schillerian play which most strikingly embodies this idea of moral freedom is *Maria Stuart*. During most of the play Maria is rebellious, because she knows herself innocent of the act of treason with which she is charged. Before her execution, however, she has come to accept her punishment as a means of expiating an old guilt which, all churchly penance notwithstanding, still gnaws her conscience. She says to Melvil, the priest: "God deems me worthy, through this unjust death / To expiate my heavy former crime [*Blutschuld*]" (Act V, sc. 7). While the punishment differs, Maria Stuart's situation corresponds quite closely to that of Dmitrij Karamazov, who, innocent of the main charge of murder, admits guilt for the disorder of his life and acquires a personal identity and moral freedom through this consistently upheld admission. Thus, the conception underlying the creation of Mitja not only reflects Schiller's early admiration for dynamic greatness, but also his later demand for the development of moral consciousness in the tragic hero.

3. ALEŠA KARAMAZOV AND FATHER ZOISMA

Among all the characters in *The Brothers Karamazov*, Aleša is no doubt closest to Dostoevskij's heart. Perhaps, as Ljubov' Dostoevskaja thought, Aleša was modelled on the novelist as an adolescent.[48] Others have suggested that Vladimir Solov'ev, Dostoevskij's close friend in his last years, was the model. Beyond these possible live models, one discerns the outlines of Schiller's "aesthetic" man,[49] who was able to reconcile the physical drive [*Stofftrieb*] and the rational drive [*Vernunfttrieb*] in a higher synthesis.[50] It is true that Rakitin sees Aleša as

[47] For a suggestive comparative study of this subject, see John D. Simons, "The Nature of Suffering in Schiller and Dostoevsky," *Comparative Literature* 19 1967), 160-173.

[48] *Dostojewski: Geschildert von seiner Tochter*, 250.

[49] In this connection, one may note a striking comment by Močgul'skij, based on a statement by Anna Grigor'evna, that Dostoevskij loved Solov'ev because he reminded him of Schiller (*op. cit.*, 17).

[50] The pattern underlying the relationship between the three types is strongly reminiscent of Hegel's dialectical philosophy. Whether Hegel exerted any real influence on Dostoevskij is uncertain, though after his exile the novelist did become

combining sensuality and what could be called a religious drive when he says, "You're a sensualist from your father, a saintly fool [*jurodivyj*] from your mother" (IX, 103); nevertheless, a comparison with Schiller's *Spielmensch* will reveal significant resemblances.[51]

The *Spielmensch* is described and analyzed not only in *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795), but also in *On Grace and Dignity* (1793), which is a less ambitious treatment of the same subject. The purpose of Schiller's main treatise, according to Čiževskij, was to defeat Kantian dualism and replace it with a more humane theory. "For him [Schiller] the ethical ideal is a personality in which both forces contending with one another in man's soul are reconciled, unified, brought into harmony with one another."[52] These two forces — sensuality and reason, or inclination and duty — may be related in two ways: one of both principles may rule, or they may be harmonized. The first two possibilities are not conformable with "beauty of expression." Only

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acquainted with his thought. However, it is believed that even where one finds Hegel's words in Dostoevskij, it is quite possible to trace them to related ideas in German and Russian Romantic philosophy. "Much more evident is in Dostoevskij the influence of Schiller and Romanticism, even that of Kant on many points, but through Schiller as an intermediary" (D. Čyžev'skyj, ed., *Hegel bei den Slaven* (= *Veröffentlichungen der Slavistischen Arbeitsgemeinde an der Deutschen Universität in Prag.* Reihe I: *Untersuchungen* 9) [Reichenberg, 1934], 350).

[51] The material evidence for Aleša's connection with Schiller's aesthetic type is presumed to be a comment on art in relation to play which Aleša makes in a conversation with Kolja Krasotkin. "Grown-up people . . . go to the theater and there . . . the adventures of all sorts of heroes are represented – sometimes there are robbers and battles, too – and isn't that just the same thing [as children's games], in a different form, of course? And young people's games of soldiers or robbers in their play-time are also, for sure, art in the process of being born, the need for art arising in the youthful soul . . ." (X, 37). Actually, I have found no passage in Schiller's treatise which compares children's games to art. Schiller, however, does show a relationship between the games practised in a culture and the ideal of beauty prevailing there. "One never will go wrong if one seeks a person's ideal of beauty on the very same path where he satisfies his drive for play" (V, 357). He follows up this statement with examples from Greece and Rome to illustrate the connection. Schiller's essay on the "naive" has much to say about children in relation to art in its treatment of the idyl. As the child is described, it represents a state of mind similar to the aesthetic state so thoroughly analyzed in his letters on "aesthetic" education. We are, says Schiller, moved by the activities of children because by comparison with us they represent an "infinite possibility of determination [*grenzenlose Bestimmbarkeit*]" (V, 436). The aesthetic state as defined in the "letters" is one of "real and active possibility of determination" (V, 373). Though the analogy between children's play and art may very well have been otherwise suggested, the materials for it are available in Schiller's aesthetic and literary essays. But if Schiller is the source, Dostoevskij has synthesized rather than directly reproduced the ideas in question.

[52] Čiževskij, "Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 15.

"that state of mind in which *reason and sensuality* — duty and inclination — *are in mutual accord* [will] provide a condition under which the beauty of play can occur" (V, 260). Aleša, to whom what others would consider irksome duty seems pleasure, appears to have realized the harmony here defined by Schiller, who, incidentally, held it incapable of complete embodiment; only in a state of perfection could man achieve such harmony. Perhaps Dostoevskij was able to present Aleša in seeming perfection only because he confronted him with no serious predicament. Aleša's predecessor, Prince Myškin, who was faced with such predicaments, foundered on them.

The moral-psychological result of the balance between the two basic drives can also be differently viewed. "Active" and "passive" are basic categories for describing personality types and attitudes toward the world; Schiller uses these terms to characterize the attitudes of the rational and the sensual man, respectively. The first subdues the world to himself, the second receives the world into himself. "Where both qualities unite, man will combine the highest plenitude of existence with the greatest independence and freedom and, instead of foundering on the world, will rather absorb the world with all its infinite phenomena into himself and subject it to the unity of reason" (V, 349). With the substitution of intuitive comprehension for reason, the passage would present a fairly accurate outline of Aleša's personality.

Furthermore, Schiller's detailed portrait of the aesthetic man in the essay *On Grace and Dignity* may have offered suggestions for the appearance and bearing of Aleša. Since these external features manifest the inner personality, the similarities between Schiller's and Dostoevskij's portrayals could, of course, be due to the influence of Schiller's general conception. Anyway, here are some of the hints for the physical features of a "schöne Seele." The expression of such a "soul," where duty and inclination are in harmony, is grace, even in the absence of "architectonic beauty." Not surprisingly, grace is one of Aleša's notable qualities. Schiller distributes this all-informing grace to the various parts of the body. The movements are free of all strain, light, soft, and yet lively; the eye is sparkling and irradiates feeling; no distortions spoil the natural grace of the mouth; and the musical voice speaks directly to the heart (V, 265-266). Naturally, Dostoevskij — known for his perfunctory description of his characters' physical appearance — has little to compare with this elaborate enumeration of features, yet there seems to be a fair amount of correspondence. Aleša is presented as a "stately, red-cheeked, bright-eyed youth of nineteen, the

picture of health. He was at that time very handsome, too, well-proportioned, modestly tall with dark-brown hair, a regular, rather oval-shaped face and wide-set dark gray shining eyes; he was very thoughtful and apparently very serene" (IX, 35).

The general response to this character is the same in both writers: love. In *On Grace and Dignity* Schiller says: "Beauty has admirers, only grace has lovers" (V, 266). In another passage in the same essay Schiller says that love is inseparable from grace and beauty (V, 279). The same idea is expressed in *On the Aesthetic Education of Man.* One of the first bits of information the reader receives about Aleša is that "everyone, indeed, loved this young man wherever he turned up, and this was so from his earliest childhood. . . . The gift of evoking, spontaneously and unaffectedly, a special love for himself was inherent in him, in his very nature, so to speak" (IX, 27-28). This is one of the most powerful forces in the novel, affecting everyone, from his father and his two elder brothers to Grušen'ka and Lise Xoxlakova. Maybe it springs from Aleša's capacity for love, which, the author says, "was always of an active character. He was incapable of loving passively; if he loved anyone, he at once set to work to help him" (IX, 235).

The traits shared by Aleša and Schiller's aesthetic type approximate an ideal being, a being in which the infinite has become manifest. Schiller often alludes to the infinite possibilities of the aesthetic state, in contrast to the limited and fixed condition of other states. "Here alone we feel, as it were, lifted out of time, and our humanity expresses itself with purity and *integrity*, as if it had not yet suffered any injury from the action of external forces" (V, 377). In another passage he suggests how an object of beauty may become a symbol of this state and of infinity.

> . . . if there were instances in which he [man] became conscious of his freedom and at the same time felt his existence, in which he felt himself simultaneously as matter and learned to know himself as spirit, he would have . . . complete perception of his humanity, and the object which bestowed this perception on him would become to him a symbol of his *fulfilled destiny* and, consequently, . . . serve as a representative of the infinite (V, 352).

This function of beauty of symbolizing infinity and enabling man to know his integral humanity finds a direct parallel in Dostoevskij. Reinhard Lauth paraphrases Dostoevskij's central aesthetic conviction thus: "Since man wants to, and must, see the ideal realized in order to believe in it, he inevitably has a need of beauty. Without it he would

not, and could not, live." Man needs realized ideal forms in order to proceed to the realization of the beautiful in his own life. Since the latter realization will always be only a partial success, he is even more grateful to find "the ideal incarnated . . . in the beautiful."[53]

The word "incarnated" recalls Dostoevskij's idea of Christ as the highest realization of the ideal; the figure of Christ seemed so beautiful precisely because "in him the ideal had become embodied."[54] Here is Zen'kovskij's transcription of a relevant passage from Dostoevskij's materials for *The Devils*: "Christ walked on earth to show mankind that even in its earthly nature the human spirit can manifest itself in heavenly radiance, in the flesh, and not merely in a dream or ideal — and that this is both *natural* and *possible*."[55] This view of Christ as the bodily incarnation of the highest beauty was, no doubt, why Dostoevskij had him in mind when creating Prince Myškin.[56] Though Aleša cannot be said to symbolize Christ, he does embody the dream of human perfection of which Christ, in Dostoevskij's view, was the unique incarnation. Zen'kovskij stresses the aesthetic rather than the religious aspects of Dostoevskij's intention as expressed through the character of Aleša. Aleša's dream of "holiness," of a world in which everybody is a child of God, is, according to this critic, aesthetic rather than religious. "Holiness" is the radiance of the original beauty of man. "The 'secret of renewal' does not consist of that 'deification' of which the early fathers of the Church speak, but of the recovery of the original beauty in the soul; only the 'appearance' of the beautiful renews, i.e. the realization of the ideal figure. . . . Its beauty and holiness will renew the world. . . ."[57] It will appear from the above that Dostoevskij's idealistic aesthetics — largely traceable to Schiller —[58] was not confined to the literary domain, but also influenced his religious views. From his early years, when Dostoevskij thought a great deal about the function of Christianity in art, to the end of his life, the figure of Christ and Christianity itself were interpreted aesthetically.

In portraying Aleša and his associates, the children, Dostoevskij may also have drawn, consciously or unconsciously, upon Schiller's

[53] Lauth, *Die Philosophie Dostojewskis* (München, 1950), 360-361.
[54] *Ibid.*, 360.
[55] Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy* I, 423.
[56] See Romano Guardini, "Dostoyevsky's Idiot, A Symbol of Christ," *Cross Currents* 6 (Fall, 1956), 359-382, and Ernest J. Simmons, *Dostoevski: The Making of a Novelist* (New York, 1940), 212.
[57] *Aus der Geschichte der ästhetischen Ideen . . .*, 30.
[58] Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy* I, 428.

literary treatise *On Naive and Reflective Poetry*, where a conception of the childlike and the naive is set forth which closely resembles the concept of the aesthetic state presented in his essay on aesthetic education. "The child is to us . . . a realization of the ideal, not, to be sure, the fulfilled but the abandoned ideal, and it is thus by no means the idea of its indigence and limits but, quite the contrary, the idea of its pure and free power, its integrity, its infinity, that moves us" (V, 436).[59] Schiller is careful to distinguish sharply between childish [*kindisch*] and childlike [*kindlich*] qualities, only the latter of which have positive value. The concept of the "naive" is closely related to childlikeness. "The naive is *childlikeness where it is no longer expected* and can therefore, in the strictest sense, not be attributed to actual childhood" (V, 438). Here is an application of the "naive" to behavior: "We attribute a naive disposition to a person when, in his judgments of things, he overlooks artificial and affected relationships and relates them only to nature pure and simple" (V, 440). Interestingly, the physical expression of naiveté is the same as that of beauty: "From the naive frame of mind there also proceeds of necessity a naive expression in words as well as in movements, and this is the most important component of grace" (V, 444). Schiller's high estimate of the "naive" is epitomized in his comment that every true genius must be naive: "His naiveté alone makes him a genius. . ." (V, 443).

This romantic view of the child and the childlike, and the associated concept of the naive, may very likely have contributed to the portraits of Prince Myškin and Aleša, both of whom show a directness of observation of the world which corresponds exactly to Schiller's "naiveté." Also, both of these characters are inseparable from the children with whom they associate. Typical of Aleša's naiveté is his sudden exclamation in the drawing room of Mme Xoxlakova that Katerina Ivanovna was playing a part, that she did not love Dmitrij, but Ivan. Though he is called a "little pious fool" [*jurodivyj*] for this by the young lady (IX, 241), he has, in a way, won a victory — a victory over conventional dissimulation and hypocrisy. Aleša's naiveté is, indeed, an essential condition of his intuitive knowledge of men and largely endows him with that physical and spiritual grace for which he is so universally loved. The naive and the aesthetic man express different facets of the same perfect image.

[59] Thomas Mann has stressed the importance of what he calls "Verkindlichung" in Schiller's entire production; he defines this quality as "earthly susceptibility to the highest" (*Versuch über Schiller* [Berlin, 1955], 12).

A final point to be discussed relates to the preceding, but is also relevant to Schiller's belles-lettres. Both Aleša and Father Zosima place a great emphasis on memory, and so does Dostoevskij in portraying them. One of the first things we are told about Aleša is that, though his mother died when he was in his fourth year, he still remembers her " 'as though she stood living before me'." And the author continues: "Such memories may be retained . . . from an even earlier age, even from two years old, but barely standing out throughout life like spots of light out of darkness, like a corner torn off a huge picture which has all faded and disappeared except that fragment. That is how it was with him" (IX, 26). One notes the pictorial metaphor; the specific memory as well is conveyed in pictorial terms: "He remembered a still summer evening, an open window, the slanting rays of the setting sun (he recalled those slanting rays most of all);[60] in a corner of the room the icon, before it a lighted lamp, and on her knees before the image his mother. . . ." She was "sobbing hysterically," holding him out toward the icon, when a nurse came in and took him away. "That was the picture! Aleša remembered his mother's face at that minute. He used to say that it was frenzied and beautiful, judging by what he could recall" (IX, 26-27). The decisiveness of the memory for Aleša's life is evident from Dostoevskij's hint that it may have motivated him to assume the cowl. "Perhaps the slanting rays of the setting sun before the holy image to which his poor 'possessed' mother had held him up still had an effect upon him" (IX, 37).

Father Zosima's recollections are accompanied by a belief in their great value. In his death-bed talk, time becomes suspended; as he says, "all my childhood seems to rise up again before me, and I breathe now as I breathed then, with the breath of a little child of eight, and I feel as I did then, awe and wonder and joy." Speaking of the Book of Job, which he first heard read in a church as a little boy under circumstances which made a vivid impression upon his imagination, he says that "ever since then — only yesterday I took it up — I've never been able to read that sacred story without tears" (IX, 365). Father Zosima's conception of the working of memory is not abstruse, but neither is it over-simple. He recognizes, for instance, that though memories may be submerged by living, they do not vanish. The memories of his brother

[60] The setting sun is a pervasive motif in Dostoevskij's work. For an informed study of its use, see S. Durylin, "Ob odnom simvole Dostoevskogo:opyt tematičeskogo obzora," *Dostoevskij: Trudy gosudarstvennoj akademii xudožestvennyx nauk*. Literaturnaja sekcija (Moscow, 1928), 163-198.

Markel, especially of his death, came to mean a great deal to him later in life. "I was young then, a child," he says, "but a lasting impression, a hidden feeling, remained in my heart. It was all bound to rise up again and respond when the time came. So indeed it happened" (IX, 363).

Before discussing Aleša's discipline of memory, I shall refer to a number of statements in Schiller's two main treatises and to a particular situation in *Don Carlos*. The account of the *Spieltrieb* contains a definition of aesthetic man's attitude toward time which can be applied both to Aleša and Father Zosima. "That drive . . . in which both [drives] work together would be addressing itself to suspending time *within time*, to reconcile becoming with absolute being, change with identity" (V, 353). The effect of the constant impingement of the past on the present in Father Zosima's and Aleša's experience is precisely to transcend time as perpetual succession and to fill every passing moment with a core of permanence. Secondly, Schiller's eulogy of the child and childlikeness in his discussion of the "naive" stresses the significance of childhood memories through the concept of the Golden Age. "All peoples that have a history have a paradise, a state of innocence, a Golden Age; indeed, every single person has his paradise, his Golden Age, which — depending on whether he has more or less of the poetic in his nature — he recalls with more less enthusiasm" (V, 484). Interesting in this connection is also Schiller's distinction between two kinds of idyls, one of which is backward-looking, the other forward-looking, leading to our "majority, in order to make us feel the higher harmony, which rewards the fighter and makes the conqueror happy." This idyl leads not to Arcadia, but to Elysium (V, 488). Father Zosima's and Aleša's recapture of the past is not a passive self-indulgent reverie, but a passionate experience which exalts their spirits to the heights of ecstasy and to the hope that paradise may be realized here and now.

Aleša's eulogy of memory in the last few pages of *The Brothers Karamazov* and Dostoevskij's decision to end his book on this note may not, of course, have anything to do with Schiller. Nevertheless, several considerations make it not improbable that Dostoevskij's sense of the significance of memory was strengthened through his intimate acquaintance with Schiller's work. First, in an already cited letter to N. L. Ozmidov of August, 1880, the author stresses the necessity of receiving beautiful impressions in childhood and mentions his own experience of seeing *The Robbers* on the stage as a decisive one for his

entire life.[61] In a subsequent letter to a certain Nikolaj Aleksandrovič who had asked advice about reading matter for his young son, Dostoevskij says that he should read what creates "beautiful impressions and engenders high thoughts";[62] among the writers mentioned, again Schiller comes first. Secondly, one may recall what Dostoevskij told his brother concerning his experience with Schiller. "The very name Schiller became to me an intimate and sort of magic sound, which evokes in me so many memories and dreams."[63] Finally, one of Schiller's plays which was a favorite of Dostoevskij's, *Don Carlos*, contains an important memory motif.

At the return of Marquis Posa, Don Carlos reproaches him with coldness and, in the hope of changing his friend's attitude, recalls their past intimacy. Specifically, the Prince reminds him of an incident in which he sacrificed himself to save his friend's honor — and skin. Don Carlos speaks proudly:

> In the presence of all the royal servants,
> Who stood, sympathizing, in a circle, . . .
> Servile [revenge] was wreaked on your Karl.
> I looked at you and did not cry. The pain
> Made me clench and grind my teeth;
> I did not cry. My royal blood flowed
> Ignominiously under the merciless strokes;
> I looked at you and did not cry — You came;
> Crying loudly you dropped to my feet. Yes,
> Yes, you exclaimed, my pride is conquered.
> I shall pay when you are king. (Act I, sc. 2.)

On the strength of his promise to requite the sacrifice, the Marquis not only helps Don Carlos gain access to the Queen — whom the Prince loves — but, when the game is up, he gives his life for Don Carlos. In any case, that is his own view: in the hour of his death he reminds the Prince of their boyhood adventure and his promise:

> Was
> I, too, so quick, so scrupulous
> When you bled for me — as a boy? (Act V, sc. 3.)[64]

[61] Dostoevskij, *Pis'ma* IV, 196.

[62] *Ibid.*, 222. –Reinhard Lauth has noted the centrality in Dostoevskij's aesthetic of this idea of acquiring "beautiful impressions." "The soul is stirred and transformed through the sight of the beautiful; the impression that is transmitted to it by the beautiful remains in it, consciously or unconsciously, for the rest of one's entire life" *(Die Philosophie Dostojewskis'* 360).

[63] Dostoevskij, *Pis'ma* I, 57.

[64] This situation must have left a deep impression on Dostoevskij, for in an early work, *Netočka Nezvanova*, it is almost literally repeated. Netočka, the foundling,

This incident contains two elements: a memory and a promise, both of which decisively affect Marquis Posa's destiny. Similarly, Aleša in his speech at the stone does not merely recall the past; more importantly, he creates a memory and exacts a promise which will bear fruit in the future lives of the boys and himself. Among other things he says:

> You must know that there is nothing higher and stronger and more wholesome and helpful for life in the future than some good memory, especially a memory of childhood, of home. People talk to you a great deal about your education, but some beautiful sacred memory, preserved from childhood, is perhaps the best education. If a man brings many such memories with him into life, he is saved for life. And even if only one good memory is left in our hearts, even that may sometime be the means of saving us (X, 335–336).

On the strength of this belief, Aleša asks the boys to join him in a solemn promise: "Let us make a compact here, at Iljuša's stone, that we will never forget, first, Iljuša and, secondly, one another. And whatever happens to us later in life, . . . let us always remember how we buried the poor boy at whom we once threw stones. . . . And . . . let us never forget how good we felt here once, all together, united by a good and kind feeling which made us, for the time we were loving that poor boy, better perhaps than we actually are" (X, 335). The last brief exchanges between Aleša and the boys have an antiphonal quality about them, investing the entire scene with a quality of ritual. Aleša ends the main body of his talk by expressing the wish that Iljuša's "memory live for ever in our hearts from this time forth!" The boys respond. Aleša repeats the injunction to remember, this time drawing a memorable picture of the boy's appearance and circumstances; the boys again make the promise. After some affectionate exchanges, Aleša reverts to Iljuša for the last time: " 'And may the dead boy's memory live for ever!' Aleša added again with feeling. 'For ever!' the boys chimed in once more" (X, 337).

In terms of the Schillerian elements actually present in *The Brothers Karamazov*, Aleša's speech at the stone could be seen as the final repetition of the hymn motif.[65] It is true that the stanzas from *To Joy* which

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loves Katja, the little princess, who is extremely proud and repels any advances. Then comes Netočka's opportunity: Katja lets Falstaff, the dog, into the room of her grandmother; Netočka assumes the guilt and is severely punished. This act of sacrifice completely conquers Katja, as it conquered Marquis Posa, and a passionate scene follows (II, 161 ff.).

[65] Victor Amend has made a suggestion to this effect. He writes: "The novel ends with a 'Hurrah for Karamazov!' – a hymn to joy in which is given 'to angels –

are quoted do not contain anything resembling the kind of promise Aleša exacts from the boys. Another stanza, however, enjoins high spiritual virtues through "oaths sworn to eternity," after which the chorus affirms the sacred "vow":

> Close the holy circle tighter,
> Swear by this golden wine
> To be faithful to your vow,
> Swear it by the celestial judge! (III, 117–118.)

In another perspective, the novel's ending could be related to Fedorov's conception of paternity. According to Fedorov, the ideal of universal brotherhood demands a general resurrection as the counterpoise to patricide. It is not a coincidence that Aleša refers to the resurrection in the last scene of the novel. His exhortation to the boys that they do not allow the memory of Iljuša to die, is an individual variation on the theme of resurrection. In not permitting Iljuša to die, in remembering the ritual moment at the stone, they will all be affirming the ideal of human solidarity and brotherhood so close to Dostoevskij's heart. And once more we hear the solemn and exuberant strains of Schiller's *To Joy:*

> Deine Zauber binden wieder,
> Was die Mode streng geteilt,
> Alle Menschen werden Brüder
> Wo dein sanfter Flügel weilt.

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a vision of God's throne.' If Schiller's 'Hymn to Joy' is not given mention at the end of the novel, it is nevertheless in the spirit of the poem that the novel ends" ("Theme and Form in 'The Brothers Karamazov'," *Modern Fiction Studies* 4 [Autumn, 1958], 251).

V

CONCLUSION

The literary response of Dostoevskij to Schiller is marked by three major phases: fervent admiration, parody and satire, and creative assimilation. The admiration is evident from Dostoevskij's letters to his brother Mixail as also from some of his early stories, where Schillerian situations appear in a fairly pure form. What became an object of mockery later on, in *The Insulted and the Injured*, is in the 1840's treated in full seriousness. One situation runs through several stories: a triangle of one woman and two men, one of whom sacrifices himself for the love of the other. In *White Nights* the narrator, who loves Nasten'ka, offers to mediate between her and her dilatory lover; after the lover has turned up, she still believes it possible to maintain the same relationship with the narrator. In *A Weak Heart* there is the theme of friendship versus love, with alternating expressions of the reconcilability of these feelings, and the reverse. At one time, Vasja thinks that when he marries his friend's beloved, their friendship will be intensified (I, 534); at another, he feels that he has betrayed the friendship (I, 545). The girl, being the most simple-hearted of the three, even conceives of the possibility that the three of them could live together in a kind of friendship-love relationship. " 'We three shall live like one!' she cried with extremely naive enthusiasm" (I, 534). In this work appears also the idea of the universal embrace; all enemies would be reconciled "so that they might all embrace one another in the middle of the street for joy . . ." (I, 546).

The emotions of love and friendship, interpreted in a romantic-mystical spirit, are in these stories embodied in characters who dream about a perfect state.[1] Their mentality is that of Don Carlos, Marquis Posa, and Mortimer, three ideal characters referred to enthusiastically by Dostoevskij in a much-quoted letter to his brother. More specifically,

[1] For the genealogy and importance of the "dreamer" in Dostoevskij's work, see V. Komarovič, "Junost' Dostoevskogo," *Byloe* 23 (1924), 3-43.

one may mention the theme of love and friendship in *Don Carlos* and *Maria Stuart*. Marquis Posa, like so many of Dostoevskij's narrators, decides to further his friend's passion and becomes an intermediary between Don Carlos and the Queen. And an intermediary he remains, even after the Queen has touched his own heart.[2] Mortimer, the impetuous young noble in *Maria Stuart*, serves in the same capacity between Maria and Leicester, despite being passionately in love with Maria himself. These Schillerian situations, and the emotions surrounding them, are fairly exact counterparts to those just mentioned from Dostoevskij's early work. Whatever modifications appear, largely because of the absence of Schiller's high tragic themes, have turned Schiller's romantic idealism into sheer sentimentalism.

Thus, despite the fact that Dostoevskij's consciousness of his literary vocation came to him by way of an experience in which the lofty figures of Marquis Posa and Don Carlos were replaced by ordinary men of real life,[3] the spirit behind the superseded Romantic characters of Schiller remained strong in Dostoevskij's work. In the second stage of his literary relationship with Schiller, as I have shown in the first chapter, the attitude is ambivalent. The story of *The Insulted and the Injured* in its main features follows Schiller's bourgeois tragedy *Cabal and Love*,[4] and the young "quadrangle" of lovers and friends embody in their conduct Dostoevskij's early concept of Schillerism. At the same time, Prince Valkovskij strips the veils of illusion away from Schillerian idealism and finds baseness at its source. The hampering effects of Dostoevskij's Schillerism become manifest in this novel through the uncreative use of Schiller's play, demonstrated, perhaps, most clearly in his failure to make the meeting of the two women rivals integral to his plot design. In *Cabal and Love* this is a striking scene, beginning with the asserted superiority of Lady Milford and ending with her complete humiliation through Luise, the musician's daughter (Act IV, sc. 7). Dostoevskij stages the meeting, but it serves no purpose whatsoever (III, 321-325). And one suspects that it was precisely because of his "Schillerism," centered in ready-made feelings of self-sacrifice and universal love, that he was unable to make effective

[2] Martin Malia has stressed the curious participation of Marquis Posa in his friend's passion for the Queen, who represents an ideal beyond attainment (*op. cit.*, 193).

[3] Dostoevskij, "Peterburgskie snovidenija . . .," *Polnoe sobranie xudožestvennyx proizvedenij* XIII, 158.

[4] Meier-Graefe has, somewhat mockingly, indicated the close similarities in

use of it.[5] It is not surprising that he should use Prince Valkovskij to vent his pent-up frustration, especially since this frustration must, to a great extent, have been literary.

The climax of Dostoevskij's emancipation from Schillerism, though not from Schiller, comes with *Notes from Underground*, which can be considered the novelist's declaration of independence. Abstract humanism, brotherhood, and mutual sacrifice are now replaced by individual freedom and a sense of power; and instead of lofty idealism there is an acute consciousness of the moral complexity and ambiguity of human nature. Through showing detailed as well as general similarities between themes and motifs developed by the two authors, I have opened up the possibility that Dostoevskij was aided in his liberation from cliché Schillerism precisely by a deeper and a more imaginative assimilation of Schiller's own thought. For Schiller, after all, was himself no Schillerian!

It is not possible, of course, to fix the exact time at which Dostoevskij ceased to do battle with Schillerism. Suffice it to say that by the time he wrote *Crime and Punishment* (1865-1866) he had achieved complete mastery of his medium and had assimilated all literary influences. The magnificent result of this assimilation in the case of Schiller manifests itself in *The Brothers Karamazov*, where early Schillerism, religiously transformed, coexists with the themes and motifs developed partly by way of Schiller in the period of rejection. For Aleša's and Father Zosima's values are, at first glance, not so very different from those of the young Schillerians in *The Insulted and the Injured*; both sets of characters are idealists who have the highest concerns of mankind at heart. But the difference is crucial: the values of Aleša and

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situation and character in the two works. After pointing out that the background of the action is intrigue, he goes on to say: "The Prince does what he can to come up to the President, Luise and Lady Milford have disguished themselves a bit, and the estate manager curses like the town musician. Only Aleksej in the age of Balzac does not dare risk the role of Ferdinand and must therefore content himself with his shadowy existence" (*op. cit.*, 127).

[5] Dostoevskij's dramatic use of the same scene in later novels, *The Idiot* (VI, 639-648) and *The Brothers Karamazov* (IX, 188-194), illustrates the tremendous progress he had made in the use and adaptation of literary materials. In both cases the intention of those who arrange the meeting is noble, but this noble, one might say Schilleresque, intention founders on a very human weakness, jealousy. Accordingly, in both scenes, the socially and morally superior of the rivals – Aglaja and Katerina Ivanovna, respectively – fall to the level of their inferior opponents, if not lower. I might mention that Schiller also uses the same scene effectively in *Maria Stuart*, where the attempt to reconcile Maria and Elizabeth fails because of aroused jealousies (Act III, sc. 4).

Father Zosima are based on religious faith, however aestheticized, and are founded in an unwavering moral consciousness. In this context of maturity and tested faith, the Schillerian dreams become acceptable. The second principal strain coming from Schiller is embodied mainly in Ivan Karamazov, in association with the broadly developed theme of theodicy. A third, and new strain, represented by Dmitrij Karamazov, Dostoevskij associates directly with Schiller, in particular with the ecstatic lyricism of *To Joy*.

In view of this complex use of Schillerian elements, it is virtually impossible to define the contribution of Schiller to *The Brothers Karamazov*. Carr's statement that Schiller is used to represent one side of the Russian temperament, the idealistic, is certainly an over-simplification.[6] Ernest Simmons made a truer assessment of this contribution. The characters of the novel, he writes, "are all deeply imbued with a Schiller-like moral consciousness. Indeed, the ecstasy of love in Schiller's *Hymn of Joy* is one of the basic elements of the whole ideological conception of the novel. . . ."[7] The centrality of the hymn and associated motifs is evident. Yet, the stance of denial taken by Ivan is also partly developed through Schillerian materials. Dostoevskij, whose thought, according to V. V. Zen'kovskij, ran in antinomies,[8] in this novel drew a great part of the substance for both poles of his thought from Schiller. All materials, needless to say, have been creatively transformed.

Perhaps the broadest perspective from which one could consider the Schillerian elements in *The Brothers Karamazov* is that of the East-West synthesis, which pervades Dostoevskij's thought. Komarovič, touching on this topic in connection with the use of *The Robbers*, suggests that Dostoevskij has employed the Western work invidiously rather than to intimate a synthesis. He put his own theme, the critic says, "into the borrowed model of a Western theme, only to proceed tearing the latter apart from within, changing its main lines and carrying out the resolution in a manner that was directly opposed to that indicated in the model."[9] On one level, this opposition is no doubt present; but it is not absolute. Indeed, looked at from a higher point of view, *The Brothers Karamazov* seems to embody to near perfection one of Dostoevskij's favorite ideas: namely, that Russian culture is

[6] Carr, *Dostoevsky*, 262.

[7] Ernest J. Simmons, *Dostoevski: The Making of a Novelist* (New York, 1940), 348.

[8] Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy* I, 417.

[9] Komarowitsch, ed., *Die Urgestalt der Brüder Karamasoff*, 166.

most purely Russian when it assimilates to itself the different national cultures of Europe. The novel is firmly rooted in the Western tradition, represented by Schiller and others, but at the same time it is wholly Russian. The aesthetic fact fits the political-cultural theory so neatly that one is almost tempted to believe that, in writing his novel, Dostoevskij deliberately set out to prove it.[10]

No one can fully explain the permanent attraction Schiller held for Dostoevskij—for the attraction was permanent; the rejection of "Schillerism" made no break in Dostoevskij's high regard for Schiller.[11] The tone of admiration persists up to the last year of his life, when, in the Puškin Speech, Schiller appears as a member of a triumvirate of literary greats: Shakespeare, Cervantes, Schiller. Apart from emotional involvement, one might mention what George Steiner calls the "rare . . . creative equilibrium between poetic and philosophical powers" in both writers.[12] More important, perhaps, is the similarity in the focus and the quality of their thought. Zen'kovskij suggests that Dostoevskij's paramount concern is the theme of man; the same is true for Schiller. Furthermore, their thought moves in antinomies; spanning the ex-

[10] Thomas Mann has suggested that Dostoevskij's idea of the universal mission of Russia in regard to the national cultures of Europe came to him from Schiller's fragmentary poem "German Greatness" [*Deutsche Grösse*], where the German poet ascribes to his own country the same role. The Puškin Speech, Mann says, attributes to "the Russian nationality the same destiny in quite similar, often identical words" (*Versuch über Schiller,* 71). Zen'kovskij notes that this idea was expressed by Dostoevskij as early as 1861, in the subscription blank for *Vremja* (*A History* . . . I, 414). The most extended later statements appear in *A Raw Youth* and the Puškin Speech. Čiževskij notes the possibility of a Hegelian ancestry, but admits that the idea was first introduced by the followers of Schelling. Lacking the competence to arbitrate between these possibilities, I shall content myself with giving a few statements from Schiller's notes to his poem: "He [the German] is destined for the highest [goal], to perfect universal humanity in himself and to unite in one wreath the most beautiful things that blossom in all nations –and just as he finds himself in the middle of Europe's nations, so is he the fruit [*Kern*] of humanity, the others are the blossom and the leaf. He is elected by the universal spirit . . . not to shine and play his role in the moment, but to win the great race [*Prozess*] of time. Every nation has its day in history; the day of the German, however, is the harvest of all time–" (III, 443).

[11] This is quite evident from a short notice in *Vremja* in 1861, the date of publication of *The Insulted and the Injured,* in response to a statement in the periodical *Vek* that "we do not place Schiller very high." Dostoevskij writes: "*We should particularly value Schiller,* not only because he was a great poet, but because he was our poet. The poetry of Schiller is more accessible to the heart than the poetry of Goethe and Byron, and this is its merit; because of this Russian literature owes much to Schiller" ("Nečto o Šillere," *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij,* ed. L. Grossman XXII [Petrograd, 1918], 238-239).

[12] George Steiner, *Tolstoy or Dostoevsky: An Essay in the Old Criticism* (New York, 1959), 228.

tremes of human nature, it explores its demonic as well as its angelic principle.[13] Because of this double vision, both compose tragedy. Yet, both attempt to transcend tragedy, through the idea of a man whose psychic forces are in perfect balance and who, therefore, has achieved inner harmony. Perhaps it was his awareness of such an endeavor in Schiller which made Goethe call him a " 'savior figure' in whom 'the Christ tendency was innate'."[14] Goethe's words could also be applied to Dostoevskij, whose best work is the expression of a passionate quest to reconcile East and West, body and spirit, and to make all men experience the truth of Father Zosima's words, "life is paradise."

[13] Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy* I, 418-419.
[14] Letter to Eckermann of 11 September 1829, as quoted by Wais, 490.

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