IV

SCHILLER AND *THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV*: INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERS AND ASSOCIATED MOTIFS

The characters of *The Brothers Karamazov* fall into definite psychological categories, depending upon the psychic element that predominates in each. This applies not only to the main characters, but to others as well. Besides Ivan and Smerdjakov, the men of reason include Rakitin, Fetjukovič, Mme Xoxlakova and her daughter; Mitja and Fedor Pavlovič are representatives of the sensual man; and Aleša and Father Zosima correspond roughly to Schiller's aesthetic type. My discussion will focus mainly on the four brothers, including the illegitimate Smerdjakov. While greatly dissimilar, they are all descended from the same father, who, as a man of virtually pure sexuality, figures as the source of the hierarchy of human types.

The common origin of the three types suggests that, despite the different principles on which they are based, the lines of separation are not absolute. Čiževskij notes Fedor Pavlovič's enjoyment of Smerdjakov's "sophistries" and his preference for Ivan among his sons, Ivan's awareness of a "frantic and perhaps unseemly thirst for life" in himself, and Aleša's kinship with both the rational and the sensual man on the ground that he perfectly understands them.[1] Interestingly, transitional states and types were given considerable attention by Schiller, who was fully aware that his system was abstract and did not, strictly speaking, correspond to concrete human reality. Furthermore, the most constructive idea in his treatise on "aesthetic education" is the possibility of moving up the ladder of perfection. Schiller distinguishes between "three different moments or stages of development which both the individual and the entire species must of necessity go through, and in a definite order, if they are to accomplish the full cycle of their destiny" (V, 385). Naturally, this transcendence would be impossible unless the lower human types were capable of the higher response, as Mitja, for example, is capable of understanding the spirituality of Aleša. Con-

[1] "Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 17.

sidering *The Brothers Karamazov* in relation to Schiller's treatise, one notes how Dostoevskij dramatizes the gravitation of the older brothers toward the younger and the spiritual state he has attained, thereby producing a precise imaginative rendering of Schiller's scheme. Even their relative dates of birth reflect the order of succession within the psychological-cultural hierarchy.

To prevent misunderstanding of what is here attempted, a distinction must be made between indebtedness for motifs and for literary characters. The former can be freely transplanted and accommodated to any context, while characters, being inseparable from their ambience, are peculiar to a literary tradition. Moreover, they are conceived and visualized as wholes and concretely rather than abstractly and piecemeal. The great artist, however, is capable of combining imaginative and rational modes of conceiving character, as Dostoevskij has done in *The Brothers Karamazov*. Despite the fact that, in their interrelationships, the characters represent a conceptual scheme, their portrayal is quite natural. Indeed, Dostoevskij has projected such vividly imagined figures that, without careful analysis, one might easily miss the abstract scheme underlying them. Most important to Dostoevskij was, of course, Schiller's scheme in general, but the treatise may also have given the novelist some hints regarding the individual characters. Naturally, in this instance influences cannot be identified with the same degree of probability as in the case of motifs; the most one can expect to accomplish, perhaps, is to demonstrate striking similarities.

1. IVAN KARAMAZOV AND THE GRAND INQUISITOR

While Ivan Karamazov is related to both major characters of *The Robbers*, the traits which he has in common with Karl and Franz Moor cannot be entirely dissociated from those of Schiller's man of reason [*Vernunftmensch*]. Initially, the two one-sided types — sensual man and rational man — are opposed as "savage" and "barbarian"; in the former, feelings regulate principles, while in the latter principles destroy the feelings (V, 320). One is immediately reminded of Ivan's unhappy statement that he goes on living "in spite of logic" (IX, 288), suggesting a relentless conflict between nature and reason. However, while "the barbarian mocks and degrades nature, . . . in a more contemptible manner than the savage he often proceeds to become a slave to his slave" (V, 320). Significantly, though he despises the "insect" nature

of his father and elder brother, Ivan in time comes to realize his own enslavement by the same force. His contemptuous attitude accords with Schiller's attribution of a "cold heart" to the abstract thinker (V, 327). On the positive side, the rational man aims for freedom, self-identity, and an ethical universality reminiscent of Kant's categorical imperative. A decision on his part is a decision "for always. Hence, he embraces the entire succession of time; that is, he suspends time and change . . ." (V, 346).[2]

Like Schiller's "barbarian," Ivan Karamazov inspires respect, and his father, Fedor Pavlovič, clearly favors him over Mitja. At this point it is necessary to revert to the use of *The Robbers* within the structure of the novel, in order to examine the possible significance of Dostoevskij's elaborate allusion to Schiller's play. Karamazov *père* tells Father Zosima, pointing to Ivan: "That is my son, flesh of my flesh, my dearest flesh! He is my dutiful Karl Moor, so to speak, while this son who just came in, Dmitrij, against whom I am seeking justice from you, is the undutiful Franz Moor . . ." (IX, 92). Kurt Wais takes Fedor Pavlovič's words as an indication of Dostoevskij's artistic intent, whereby Mitja was meant to correspond to Franz Moor. He even suggests a reason why the author should have assimilated *The Robbers* to the design of his novel: "From the point of view of the song to joy, the later Schiller could, after all, no longer have doomed his one-time Franz Moor to perdition, and Dostoevskij was attracted precisely by the idea of making amends for this omission by the young Schiller."[3]

Meier-Graefe, on the other hand, reverses the father's identification of his two sons in relation to *The Robbers*, using as evidence Schiller's preface to the play,[4] in which, describing Franz, Schiller notes the combination of vice and analytic intellect: "Vice . . . in Franz dissolves all the confused terror of conscience into feeble abstractions, anatomizes the moral [*richtende*] sentiment and turns the earnest voice of religion into a jest. To someone who has gone so far as . . . to refine his under-

[2] One may note that Ivan's description of Katerina Ivanovna in the chapter "A Laceration in the Drawing Room" places her within the category of Schiller's rational type. After Katja's decision to devote her whole life to Dmitrij, Mme Xoxlakova interpolates the remark that this moment of decision is only a repercussion of the insult Katja had received the day before from Grušen'ka. Ivan counters by saying that with others this might have been the case, "but with Katerina Ivanovna's character, that moment will last all her life. What for others would be only a promise is for her an everlasting, painful, grim perhaps, but unflagging duty. And she will live on the feeling of this duty being fulfilled" (IX, 238).

[3] Wais, "Schillers Wirkungsgeschichte im Ausland," 499.

[4] Meier-Graefe, *Dostojewski, der Dichter*, 400.

standing at the cost of his heart, what is most holy is no longer holy — to him humanity and the deity are nothing —" (V, 733). In describing Karl Moor, Schiller stresses his fascination with vice "for the sake of the *greatness* that pertains to it, for the sake of the *power* which it demands, for the sake of the *dangers* which accompany it" (V, 733). If there is a simple correspondence of characters, it is certainly the reverse of that assumed by Fedor Pavlovič. Despite great differences, Karl is, like Mitja, a man of feeling, whereas Franz and Ivan are definitely not.

But why, if this is the correct relationship, did Dostoevskij choose to present, through Fedor Pavlovič, a false identification? Komarovič provides a good answer to this question on aesthetic grounds. The father's allusion to *The Robbers* is, according to him, a compositional artifice whereby Dostoevskij anticipates, in comic inversion, the outcome of the conflict in the novel.[5] Actually, a double irony is involved in the false identification. The dramatic, Sophoclean irony produced by the father's mock-serious allusion to parricide is compounded by the situational irony of his erroneous comparison.[6] Komarovič connects this tragi-comic anticipation with the theme of Russia and the West. For it is in Fedor Pavlovič's favorite son, the Westernist Ivan, not in Mitja who is Russian to the core, that the danger lurks.

The individual correspondence between the principal characters in the play and the novel does not go far beyond this specific allusion. However, the device of the double, present in rudimentary form in *The Robbers* and elaborated on an impressive scale by Dostoevskij, extends the parallels somewhat further. As already mentioned, Charles Passage has traced Dostoevskij's use of this device to E. T. A. Hoffmann, though, as a matter of fact, Schiller's claim is quite as good. Speaking with reference to *The Elixirs of the Devil*, Passage states: "The *alter ego* of Medardus was his half-brother Viktorin. . . . Ivan's *alter ego* is likewise a half-brother, Smerdjakov, and Smerdjakov, like Viktorin, embodies all the evil aspects of the hero's divided self."[7] The critic remedies the lack of external resemblance between Smerdjakov and Viktorin by showing that some of Smerdjakov's external qualities are derived from another character in *Elixirs*, namely, the

[5] *Die Urgestalt der Brüder Karamasoff*, 165.

[6] Interestingly, in his wrong identification of his sons in relation to Schiller's characters, Fedor Pavlovič acts very much like his own fictional parallel, Graf von Moor, whose misfortunes are chiefly due to an implicit trust in his scheming patricidal younger son.

[7] Passage, *Dostoevski the Adapter*, 170.

barber Pietro Belcampo, who is Medardus' second double. For like Ivan Karamazov, Hoffmann's central character also has two doubles.[8] In order to give both Hoffmann and Schiller their due, an intensive analysis would be required — if the question can be resolved at all. As a tiny boost for Schiller, a point of resemblance between Smerdjakov and Spiegelberg, Karl Moor's "double" in *The Robbers*, may be mentioned. Spiegelberg's sadism, like Smerdjakov's, manifests itself in the torturing of animals, such as dogs (Act I, sc. 2). One recalls the nasty trick Smerdjakov made Iljusha play on Žučka (X, 32-33).

Curiously, no critic has noted the close resemblance between the moral situation of Ivan Karamazov and Schiller's Wallenstein.[9] *Wallenstein's Death* develops as a theme the relationship between deed and thought, or desire, which is at the heart of Ivan's predicament. The context of the moral conflict is in both cases a kind of rebellion, in Wallenstein's case political. Here are some typical reflections of the latter at a decisive moment:

> Should I have to fulfil it in earnest
> Because I have toyed with the idea?
> Accursed is he who plays with the devil!
> (Act I, sc. 3.)
>
> Must I
> *Execute* the deed because I *thought* it,
> Because I did not repel temptation . . .?
> . . .
> It was not in earnest,
> It was never a settled thing.
> I merely indulged myself in the thought;
> Freedom lured me on and power.
> . . .
> I seem to be culpable, and I
> Cannot clear myself of guilt, try as I may;
> For I am accused by the ambiguity of life. . . .
> (Act I, sc. 4.)

It is also worth mentioning that Wallenstein constantly senses the presence of a "demon." However different this demon is from Ivan's devil, he is of interest because of the similarity in the moral situation. Wallenstein more than once speaks of the "evil spirit" that haunts him,

[8] *Ibid.*, 170-172.

[9] After this was written, I discovered that Anna Seghers has had the same idea. See "Woher Sie Kommen, Wohin Sie Gehen: Über den Ursprung und die Weiterentwicklung einiger Romangestalten Dostojewskijs, besonders über ihre Beziehungen zu Gestalten Schillers," *Sinn und Form* 15 (1963), 26.

and once he asks his daughter to sing for him to drive "him" away.

> I need such a force now
> To expel the evil demon
> Who beats his black wings about my head.
> (Act III, sc. 4.)

Subsequently, the "demon" appears to Wallenstein as Buttler, the man who, though posing as a friend, has vowed to kill him. "Buttler! Buttler! / You are my evil demon . . ." (Act III, sc. 16). Thus, *Wallenstein's Death* contains not only the thought-deed polarity so important to *The Brothers Karamazov*, but the "demon" and Buttler could be seen as rudimentary doubles.

The wide ramifications of Ivan's possible ancestry in the works of Schiller show the creative independence Dostoevskij had attained in regard to these works: he used what suited his purpose, without imitating or parodying. The same independence is evident in his handling of poetic allusions. Attempts have been made to assess the temperament and moral character of the two older brothers by the way they use such allusions, particularly to Schiller. Such attempts are predicated on the assumption that Dostoevskij used allusion chiefly as a means of character portrayal. While this may be a reasonable assumption, it can lead to rather fantastic results. One critic, for example, claims that whereas Mitja uses quotation to make a forceful statement, Ivan quotes to cite authority, and with questionable honesty.[10] Another critic says that Ivan uses Schiller "as literature, the way socialites do," and he refers to his allusion to Schiller's *The Glove*, "for which a foolish female highly admires him. The real state of things is revealed by the fact that Dostoevskij makes him misinterpret one of Schiller's profoundest poems."[11] The poem is *Resignation*; the matter of Ivan's interpretation will be taken up later.

It is true that, to Mitja, Schiller offers a means of self-expression, while Ivan uses him with deliberation, to climax a situation or to epitomize an intellectual position. However, the latter does not cite Schiller as authority; Ivan's mind is not that of a scholar. Rather, he uses allusions like a witty conversationalist or a poet *manqué*. Meier-Graefe says that Ivan has the formal possibilities of the poet,[12] which

[10] Ralph Matlaw, *The Brothers Karamazov: Novelistic Technique. Musagetes* VI ('s-Gravenhage 1957), 17.
[11] Wais, 497.
[12] Meier-Graefe, 403.

means, by implication, that he lacks inspiration. Wherever Ivan quotes, he does so for effect — without, however, jeopardizing his honesty. Though the allusion does not always have profound reverberations, it is invariably apt. But while the presumed triviality of Ivan's allusions — particularly his quotation from *The Glove*[13] — has often enough been noted, no-one has looked into their contexts carefully enough to discover their appropriateness.

The occasion on which Ivan quotes from *The Glove* is quite dramatic: Ivan is saying goodbye to Katerina Ivanovna, who, though she knows he loves her, gladly sends him away so that he may inform her Moscow aunt about the state of affairs between her and Mitja. To Ivan, her attitude causes great anguish, as Aleša clearly realizes; he tells Katja: ". . . you are torturing Ivan simply because you love him — and torturing him because you love Dmitrij through self-laceration . . ." (IX, 241). Though Ivan denies that Katerina Ivanovna loves him, claiming that she loves Mitja in order to be able to contemplate her "heroic fidelity," he admits that she has tormented him. On leaving he says: " 'Goodbye! I don't want your hand. You have tortured me too deliberately for me to be able to forgive you at this moment. I shall forgive you later, but now I don't want your hand. "*Den Dank, Dame, begehr' ich nicht*",' he added, with a twisted smile, showing, however — quite unexpectedly — that he could read Schiller, and read him till he knew him by heart, something Aleša would never have believed" (IX, 242). In Schiller's poem a lady throws her glove into an arena full of wild animals, after which she challenges her knight to step down among the animals and retrieve it. This he does, but instead of responding to the promising look of love in her eye, he throws the glove in her face, uttering the quoted words. Then the knight leaves her for ever.

There exists a certain emotional congruity between the two situations. Katerina Ivanovna's expectations of the man who loves her, like those of the lady in the ballad, go beyond honorable measure, and Ivan, considering himself humiliated beyond forgiveness, like the knight, decides to depart. At the same time, however, there is something theatrical in Ivan's gesture, as he probably realizes himself, judging by the "twisted smile." In this he is like the woman who has offended him, to

[13] *The Glove* must have been a favorite poem of Dostoevskij's, since already in 1849 he used the poem, together with *Ritter Toggenburg*, as the basis for the chevaleresque love of the boy in *A Little Hero*. For an interesting study of these poems by Schiller in relation to Dostoevskij's use of them, see Pierre R. Hart, "Schillerean Themes in Dostoevskij's 'Malen'kij geroj'," *Slavic and East European Journal* 15 (Fall, 1971), 305-315.

whom Aleša says: "He is going to Moscow, and you cried out that you were glad — you did that on purpose! And then, right away, you began explaining that you were not glad of it but, on the contrary, you were sorry to be losing — a friend. But that was acting, too — you were playing a part as in a theater!" (IX, 240). Ivan, though sincere, overdramatizes himself, displaying his bleeding heart with too great readiness and masochistically enjoying the sight of it bleeding.

Ivan's other allusions to Schiller not only fit meaningfully into his mental universe, but reflect a definite emotional and moral attitude. Romano Guardini has some interesting comments on this attitude, though he overstates Ivan's vileness. According to Guardini, Ivan "wants to avoid disorder, which produces suffering, and nevertheless he reveals himself as voluptuously cruel. He is tortured by another's suffering, but he seeks this torture and enjoys it. The roots of this pity are rotten; but Ivan's 'vileness' proceeds directly from it."[14] The quotations from *Resignation* and *Longing* [*Sehnsucht*] may be interpreted in the light of this attitude.

In these quotations Ivan's tone is one of pity, for mankind as well as for himself. *Resignation* presents a man who, having renounced happiness to follow truth, is standing before the portals of eternity claiming his reward. The stanza which Ivan paraphrases reads:

> Here I stand on your dark bridge,
> Terrible eternity.
> Take my warrant for happiness,
> I bring it back to you unopened.
> I know nothing about bliss.
> (III, 112–113.)

The man's plaint is marked by self-pity. In Ivan's formula of rejection the pity has been universalized, but his words about returning his "entrance ticket . . . as soon as possible" on account of all the "unavenged suffering and unappeasable indignation" (IX, 308) there is in the world, betray a lacerated ego.

Longing, from which Ivan quotes immediately before he tells his "legend," is a kind of parable on the necessity of faith. It presents a vision of paradise, one that can be reached only by crossing a stormy river. The poem ends with the following exhortation:

> You must believe, you must take risks,

[14] Romano Guardini, "The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor," *Cross Currents* 3 (Fall, 1952), 70.

Because the gods do not give any pledge.
Only a miracle can bring you
Into the lovely wonderland.
(III, 380.)

Ivan quotes the first two lines of this stanza, rendered by Žukovskij as follows: "Ver' tomu, čto serdce skažet, / Net zalogov ot nebes" (IX, 311). The context of Ivan's quotation is his comment on humanity's disappointed hopes of a speedy return of Christ. Even though the promise is not fulfilled, says Ivan, "humanity awaits him with the same faith and with the same tender emotion. Oh, even with greater faith, for fifteen centuries have now passed since the pledges from heaven ceased for man.... There is nothing left but faith in what the heart says" (IX, 311). The exhortation to "believe in what the heart says" is in this context ironic, whereas the comparable lines of Schiller's poems are meant seriously. The basis of the irony is Ivan's unrestrained pity for mankind's deluded hopes and his self-pitying awareness of his own lack of faith.

I have attempted to show the consistency of tone in Ivan's allusions. Whatever we may think of his pity, whether we agree or not with Guardini's view of it, Dostoevskij certainly succeeds in making us feel the full weight of the problem of theodicy with which Ivan is grappling. While this problem has been sufficiently discussed, a couple of interpretive questions may be asked in regard to the wider implications of the poems as used in the novel. One notes that, in complete contrast with *To Joy*, the theme of *Resignation* includes no hope of ultimate harmony; it shows a world without transcendence. The man who stands before the bar of eternity is told that there is no final judgment, that "world history is the last judgment" (III, 115). The final stanza runs:

You *hoped,* and have carried away your reward,
Your *faith* was your allotted happiness.
You could have asked your sages —
What has been punched out by the clock
No eternity gives back.
(III, 115.)

Kurt Wais asserts that, by ascribing to Ivan a faulty interpretation of the poem, Dostoevskij meant to discredit him. If Ivan, he says, had known the entire poem, like Dostoevskij, he would have been one step ahead spiritually. To prove his point, Wais paraphrases the ending of the poem, of which he presumes Ivan to be ignorant: "There awaits us no Last Judgment and no subsequent indemnifications on the part of

the beyond; the judgment is being continually accomplished in life."[15] Implicitly, Wais blames Ivan for not following Schiller's naturalist-pragmatic lead in the poem, despite the fact that in other poems, including *To Joy*, Schiller is decidedly theistic and develops the theme of theodicy. In any case, there is no need to expect that the *entire* poem should be relevant to the context of Ivan's rebellious paraphrase.[16] As the title indicates, the general tone of Schiller's poem is one of "resignation" to the world's imperfections. In the poem's terms, there are two flowers, Pleasure and Hope, that man may pick; but once having chosen one, he cannot have the other. Ivan's attitude comes nearer to that of the young pleader before eternity than it does to Schiller's, though one difference should be noted. The persona in Schiller's poem still believes that by divine action reward will eventually be adjusted to merit and that suffering will be made good; Ivan assumes the possibility of such a harmony, but rejects it. However, only someone who believes that Ivan quotes Schiller as an "authority" will see his peculiar use of Schiller's line as presumptive evidence that the author desires to discredit him. As will be shown, Dostoevskij's particular use of *Resignation* has a quite different explanation.

Resignation is used to articulate rebellion; *Longing*, though at first mockingly ironic, becomes associated — through the legend of the Grand Inquisitor that immediately follows — with an attitude of faith. Here is another example of Dostoevskij's completely free use of Schillerian materials. The lines, "believe in what the heart says, / There are no pledges from heaven," epitomize Dostoevskij's religious attitude in the novel. In the context of the quotation the pledges are miracles. With the "realist," says Dostoevskij, "faith . . . does not spring from the miracle but the miracle from faith. Once the realist believes, he is bound by his very realism to admit miracles too" (IX, 35). To Mme Xoxlakova Father Zosima says that there is no proof of God and immortality; only through the experience of "active love" can one become convinced. This active love is the voice of the heart of Ivan's

[15] Wais, 498.

[16] If one conceives of the context in the broadest possible sense, as embracing "The Grand Inquisitor" as well as "Rebellion," the entire poem does become relevant. Schiller makes the same distinction in the poem as Dostoevskij does, in "The Grand Inquisitor," between two categories of values, spiritual and material: hope and pleasure. It is impossible to realize both at the same time; either one lives in eternal hope, without seeking its realization in earthly life, or one enjoys without hope. This distinction is nearly identical with the one Ivan draws in his tale between faith and material well-being. One must choose, at one's own risk, between these two alternatives.

quotation. Further, the Grand Inquisitor pointedly contrasts his own version of Christianity with Christ's through his dissenting view of miracles: "... you would not enslave man by a miracle and desired faith given freely, not based on miracle" (IX, 321).

Faith springing from love rather than from evidence is a minor motif in *The Brothers Karamazov*. The ending of the Legend suggests that even Ivan yearns for this kind of faith. The next, and final lines of *Longing* read: "Only a miracle can bring you / Into the lovely wonderland." A definite miracle does happen in Ivan's Legend: Christ returns; however, this is merely a device for dramatizing the two contrary attitudes towards religion and the Church. But a less obvious miracle takes place at the end, when Christ kisses the old Inquisitor. The kiss of forgiveness, of love, creates faith enough in the Inquisitor to make him let Christ go.[17] If only for a moment, the hoary old man is won over to the religion of Christ; and though he "sticks to his idea," the kiss "burns in his heart" (IX, 330). Also, Aleša's response to Ivan's question whether his formula "all is lawful" will make his younger brother renounce him, is relevant here. Ivan goes into "rapture" over Aleša's kiss, which imitates the kiss bestowed by Christ. And he tells his brother that if he will ever love the "sticky little leaves," he will "only love them, remembering you. It is enough for me that you are somewhere here, and I won't lose my desire for life yet.... Take it as a declaration of love if you like" (IX, 331). Thus, Ivan's Legend ends on a note of promise, and the purely ironic use of the exhortation to "believe in what the heart says" acquires a new, serious tonality. A kind of development *in ovo* is suggested by the order of the two related quotations from Schiller: the first, from *Resignation*, is entirely negative, while the second, from *Longing*, conceals springs of faith beneath its ironic surface.[18]

Ivan does not only sprinkle his meditations with allusions to Schiller's poetry; his story, the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, is also indebted to Schiller. If these statements seem overly literal — the indebtedness being Dostoevskij's rather than Ivan's — it is well to recall the principle of verisimilitude, which dictates that a character shall not do, or have done, anything violating his fundamental nature. Despite Aleša's

[17] Ivan himself implies the miraculousness of Christ-like love. To Aleša he says: "In my opinion, Christ-like love for men is, in its way, a miracle impossible on earth" (IX, 297).

[18] Wais has pointed out the possibility of hope for Ivan, but his ground for assuming it is, it seems, mistaken. According to him, the miracle is the return of Christ, which, as I have indicated, is sheer literary artifice. (See *op. cit.*, 498-499.)

surprise at hearing Ivan quote Schiller, there is no valid reason why Ivan should not have been an avid reader of Schiller.

In 1879 Dostoevskij told his friend Pucykovič in Berlin that he had "carried the thought of the Grand Inquisitor in his soul during his entire life."[19] Many books and articles have taken up the question of Dostoevskij's sources for Ivan's Legend.[20] Both the setting and the main character of the tale indubitably derive from Schiller's *Don Carlos*, though these may be the least important of its components. Schiller describes his Grand Inquisitor as "an old man of ninety, blind and supporting himself on a stick. . . . As he walks through the ranks, all the grandees prostrate themselves before him and touch the hem of his garment" (Act V, sc. 10). Dostoevskij's figure, a cardinal like Schiller's, is an "old man almost ninety, tall and erect, with a withered face and sunken eyes, in which there is still a gleam of light, like a little fiery spark." After Christ has been arrested, "the crowd instantly bows down to the earth, like one man, before the old inquisitor, who blesses the people in silence and passes on" (IX, 313). Meier-Graefe in his discussion of Ivan's "poem" emphasizes the extent to which Schiller's material has been transformed, particularly the scene between King Philip and the Inquisitor, in which he sees Dostoevskij's point of departure. While the Russian has retained the "petrified gesture" of Schiller's character, his own inquisitor is enveloped in "demonic tragedy. The rigid power of the dignitary shatters on the higher majesty of his partner." The change in dramatis personae, the critic says, allowed Dostoevskij to develop the "inner action" which Schiller had neglected.[21]

However, another scene in *Don Carlos* does have an "internal action" in many ways comparable to that of Dostoevskij's Legend, namely, scene 10 of Act III, where King Philip gives audience to Marquis Posa. Quite apart from the theme of freedom which is at the center of their exchange, the diametrical opposition of the King and the Marquis produces a close congruity with the protagonists of Dostoevskij's tale. As Čiževskij has indicated, in Schiller's play the un-

[19] Reinhardt Lauth, "Zur Genesis der Grossinquisitor-Erzählung," *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 5, 1 (1954), 267.

[20] See Antanas Maceina, *Der Grossinquisitor* (Heidelberg, 1952); A. Rammelmeyer, "Dostojevskijs Begegnung mit Belinskij," *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie* 21 (1951 / 52), 1-21 and 273-292; Ernst Benz, "Der wiederkehrende Christus," *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 6, 4 (1954), 305-323; Meier-Graefe, 396-399; and Bem, "Dostojevskij, der geniale Leser," 475-476.

[21] Meier-Graefe, 396.

canny figure of the Grand Inquisitor stands behind King Philip. In fact, the fearful tribunal is referred to in this very scene, in that the King, having developed a great sympathy for Marquis Posa, admonishes him to "flee" his Inquisition. On the other hand, though Marquis Posa is no Christ, he is, like the Christ of the Legend, in the position of a heretic (Act V, sc. 10), as is also, ultimately, Don Carlos. After his friend has been assassinated, the Prince actually compares Marquis Posa to Christ:

> As long as mothers
> Have given birth, only *one* — *one*
> Has died so unjustly.
> (Act V, sc. 4.)

Similarly, the predicament of Don Carlos in the scene preceding his arrest — a predicament which, in the present context of freedom, is inseparable from Marquis Posa's entire cause — is compared with that of the dying Christ. The King asks: "Can you found a new faith for me / Which justifies the bloody murder of a child?,"[22] to which the Inquisitor answers: "To propritiate eternal justice / God's son died on the cross" (Act V, sc. 10).

It is, nonetheless, mainly for its thematic material that the scene between the King and the Marquis is of interest in relation to "The Grand Inquisitor." Among the many-levelled themes in the Legend, freedom in the context of religious faith assumes a prime place. Happiness without freedom and freedom with suffering are the cornerstones of the attitudes represented by the Inquisitor and Christ. To Dostoevskij one value, freedom, justifies every pang of uncertainty and physical suffering which man is heir to; it becomes the principal ground of his theodicy. In this respect the entire legend follows the implications of the two lines from *Longing* quoted by Ivan. The contrast of values in *Don Carlos* is quite similar, namely, between a happiness rooted in freedom of thought and a "bliss" propagated by the royal establishment. Marquis Posa says:

> Can I consider . . . [my brother] happy — before he may think?
> You shall not choose me, Sire, to disseminate
> The bliss which you coin for us. (Act III sc. 10.)

Interestingly, in referring to this kind of "bliss," the King makes use of

[22] Here is another possible source of the motif of children's suffering as associated with the theme of theodicy.

two words also frequently uttered by the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoevskij's work: quiet and peace. The King tells the Marquis,

> Look
> Around you in my Spain. Here the citizen's
> Happiness flourishes in never-clouded peace;
> And this quiet I wish the Flemings to have,

to which Marquis Posa retorts: "The quiet of a graveyard!" Dostoevskij's Inquisitor says that man prefers "peace, and even death, to freedom of choice" (IX, 320), and he boasts that whereas "you have only the elect, . . . we give rest to all" (IX, 324). To Marquis Posa, as to Dostoevskij, happiness is little worth unless founded in freedom. Consequently, excepting the fact that in "The Grand Inquisitor" religious and secular autocracy is associated with socialism, the dialectic is fairly similar in the two works. Noteworthy is Marquis Posa's version of the Schillerian theodicy in a previously quoted passage where the narrowness and poverty of King Philip's world is contrasted with the liberality of God's creation, in which evil is allowed to riot so that freedom may flourish (Act III, sc. 10).

There is an equally close relationship between the psychological premisses underlying the contrasting ideologies. The Grand Inquisitor has a low opinion of man, whom he calls "weak, vicious, worthless, and rebellious" (IX, 318) and thus "baser by nature than you have believed him to be!" (IX, 322). Indeed, his whole argument is based on the injustice he ascribes to Christ of leaving the majority of mankind unsaved, since they cannot rise to the perilous freedom he offers. Likewise, Marquis Posa repeatedly upbraids the King for his dim view of "human dignity." Subsequently, he turns this view around in a manner which brings out a further point of contact with the Legend, namely, in regard to the unwelcome burden of freedom. People, he says, deliberately "flee / Before the ghost of their inner greatness." While in *Don Carlos* men in the mass "voluntarily forgo their nobility, / Voluntarily place themselves on this lower level," preferring to "adorn / their chains with cowardly wisdom," in the Legend man looks tormentedly for someone to whom he can hand over the "gift of freedom" with which the "unfortunate creature is born" (IX, 319).

It is not surprising that, with such close similarities between the moral-religious attitudes and their foundation, the spiritual condition of the ruling elite in the two works should also converge. That condition is paradoxical: though worshiped as gods, the rulers are lonely and unhappy. Marquis Posa sensitively touches the weakest spot of the King's

entire position when he notes that, despite assuming a divine role in relation to his people, he has remained an ordinary mortal and needs "compassion" [*Mitgefühl*]. The Grand Inquisitor says that the weak millions "will marvel at us and look upon us as gods, because we . . . have consented to endure freedom and to rule over them . . ." (IX, 318-319). On the other hand, he admits that those who "keep the mystery . . . shall be unhappy" (IX, 326), because they cannot share their secret with those they "save."

To sum up, the central dialectic shared by "The Grand Inquisitor" and *Don Carlos* turns on the choice between freedom with sin and suffering, on the one hand, and autocracy with innocence and "happiness," on the other. For in *Don Carlos*, too, the idea that the Church assumes the sins of its children is important. A contrast exists between Princess Eboli, who refuses to pass on to the Church the responsibility for her acquiescence in the King's lust, and King Philip, who surrenders his freedom of conscience to the Church, showing what Sartre would call "bad faith." In proceeding against Don Carlos, his son, the Church will take upon itself the guilt incurred. The permissiveness of Dostoevskij's Inquisitor is almost masochistic: men will be allowed to sin "because we love them," and the masters will take the punishment upon themselves (IX, 326).

The fact that the formulation of the question is individual in *Don Carlos*, collective in "The Grand Inquisitor," does not detract from the similarities of the moral-religious predicaments. Nevertheless, Schiller's play contains only the beginnings of the ideas which Dostoevskij has "embodied in figures and images of extraordinary vividness, plasticity and depth."[23] For example, while the theme of theodicy is only hinted at in *Don Carlos*, Dostoevskij has placed it at the center of his philosophical fable, which with uncanny insight dramatizes two possible ways of coming to terms with the problem. Only if man is capable of freedom, and of free, uncompelled faith, can the disorder in creation and the sufferings of men be justified. Those to whom freedom is a burden, and who have no faith, will be spared much of the suffering incurred by their more venturesome brothers, but, in retribution, their lives will be based on a subtly fabricated tissue of official lies.[24] To ask where Dostoevskij's sympathies lie is unnecessary; but it is inter-

[23] Čiževskij, "Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 28.

[24] Čiževskij notes that Schiller's prose narrative *The Visionary* [*Der Geisterseher*] contains a close counterpart to the means of enticement used by the elite in Dostoevskij's legend. The frame of the narrative is "the endeavors of the Inquisition to lure the Prince, the story's hero, into its net with the help of miracles, mystery,

esting to note that even Ivan seems, implicitly, to show a preference for the free faith which he so mercilessly ridicules in his story.

It remains to explore the possible influence of Belinskij upon Dostoevskij's use of Schillerian ideas in the "Rebellion" and "The Grand Inquisitor" sections of *The Brothers Karamazov*. A. Rammelmeyer, who was the first to deal extensively with this question, assumes that memories of Dostoevskij's conversations with Belinskij, recorded in the *Diary of a Writer*, were before his mind in the composition of "The Grand Inquisitor."[25] His quotations from Belinskij's letters, however, could be nothing more than suggestive until it was known how Dostoevskij became acquainted with their contents. Subsequently, M. Karpovič showed where Dostoevskij could have read the letters, namely, in A. N. Pypin's biography, in which Belinskij's correspondence was generously quoted.[26] Pypin's work was first printed in *Vestnik Evropy* before appearing in book form in 1876.

It is necessary, first, to enumerate those elements of thought and attitude which Dostoevskij may have carried over to Ivan Karamazov from his experience with Belinskij, regardless of their source. According to Rammelmeyer they are the following: the motifs of the returning Christ and of Christ as socialist,[27] the idea that Christ demands too much from men, freethinking within the Roman Church, and anti-Catholicism; the problem of theodicy and rebellion against Hegelianism, invariably associated with a pro-Schiller attitude; rejection of individual salvation at the cost of the unhappiness of millions, cynicism in regard to human nature, and an ironical manner of presentation. I might add Belinskij's interpretation of and repeated references to Schiller's poem *Resignation* from the perspective of a conflict between universal harmony and the individual personality,[28] and the idea that Christ suffered on the cross for human personality.[29]

It is quite possible that entities that seem to be traceable directly to *Don Carlos* were filtered through Belinskij. Rammelmeyer states a broader possibility, namely, that Ivan's "rebellion" in general may have been conceived by Dostoevskij as a counterpart to Belinskij's rebellion against Hegelianism, further that — as Leonid Grossman had suggested

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and material need" ("Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 28).

[25] Rammelmeyer, "Dostojevskijs Begegnung mit Belinskij," 279.

[26] M. Karpovič, "Dostoevskij, Belinskij, Šiller," *Novyj žurnal* 45 (1956), 283.

[27] This idea, by the way, is mentioned by Kolja Krasotkin and ascribed to Belinskij (X, 59).

[28] Belinskij, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij* XI, 386; XII, 32.

[29] *Ibid.*, XI, 577.

earlier — in "The Grand Inquisitor" Dostoevskij continued his battle with Belinskij, whom he held chiefly responsible for the growth of atheism in Russia.[30] In this connection, Rammelmeyer comments, "it is an irony of genius that Belinskij's ideas are conjured into the figure of the Grand Inquisitor, of Catholicism, which Belinskij hated with all the strength of his impatient soul."[31] Some points of resemblance between the two "rebellions" will be noted.

It has been pointed out that Ivan's use of Schiller's poem *Resignation* to articulate his rejection of "eternal harmony" is not in accord with the total meaning of the poem. Instead of constituting evidence that the author intended to discredit Ivan, this deviation may reflect Belinskij's previous use of the poem, and of a similar formula, in his battles both with Schiller and with Hegel. In a letter to N. V. Stankevič of 29 September 1839, in his Hegelian period, Belinskij interprets *Resignation* as an expression of the conflict between the individual and the universal order. "In *Resignation*," he writes, "he [Schiller] makes a sacrifice to the general of everything particular and steps out into a vacuum, because his 'general' was a Moloch which eats up its own offspring, and not an eternal love which reveals itself in everything that is alive."[32] Here Belinskij is still on the side of the universal order, of which Schiller, he thinks, has a false conception. When, subsequently, he rejects the Hegelian harmony, he does so largely in terms of a return to Schillerian individualism. In a highly significant letter to V. P. Botkin of 1 March 1841, he says he has a personal reason to be angry with Hegel, because faithfulness to Hegel caused him to hate Schiller. His rejection of Hegel, therefore, is sprinkled with echoes from Schiller.

> I thank you humbly, Egor Fedoryč [nickname for Hegel], . . . but with all respect to your philosophical philistinism, I have the honor to inform you that if I could manage to climb to the highest level of the ladder of development, I would there ask you to give me an account of all the victims of the conditions of life, and the history of all the victims of accidents, superstition, the Inquisition, Philip II, etc. Otherwise I will throw myself from this highest level, head downwards.[33] I don't want happiness

[30] Rammelmeyer, 10, 273, and 279-280.

[31] *Ibid.*, 287.

[32] Belinskij, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij* XI, 386.

[33] There may be an echo of Belinskij's phrasing where Mitja describes how he plunges into the abyss, "headlong with my heels up" (IX, 137), though *The Robbers* has a similar passage. In the latter, Karl Moor is likened to Lucifer being hurled into hell:" . . . the outcry of abandoned mothers roars after your heels . . ." (Act II, sc. 3).

even as a gift if I can't be tranquil about every one of my blood brothers — bones of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. They tell me that disharmony is the condition of harmony; perhaps this is very comfortable and delightful for music lovers, but certainuy who are fated to evpress with their partitheir participation the idea of disharmony.[34]

This is a close counterpart to Ivan's rejection of the Christian theodicy. In using the line from *Resignation* to climax Ivan's rejection, Dostoevskij, it seems, has aligned his interpretation of the poem with Belinskij's general reevaluation of Schiller, through which the German poet became a symbol of revolt.[35]

The abundance of ideas in "The Grand Inquisitor" traceable to Belinskij as well as to Schiller may be due to the inseparability of the two figures in Dostoevskij's mind at the time of his acquaintance with the critic. And it seems possible that the reading of Pypin's biography served to bring back to Dostoevskij's mind both his own and Belinskij's early admiration of Schiller, precipitating the creative process which was to bring forth a conglomerate of their ideas in Ivan's "Rebellion" and "The Grand Inquisitor." Particularly important in this respect is Belinskij's hatred of Roman Catholicism, shared also by Dostoevskij but differently motivated. The hatred of Belinskij, a man who lived wholly in literature, may have had a purely literary origin, namely Schiller.[36] Though this is hardly a realistic possibility in the case of Dostoevskij, he may have been influened by Belinskij — or, rather, the memory of Belinskij — when he chose to make the Grand Inquisitor a pivotal figure in his masterwork. In Rammelmeyer's words, "the characterization of the Grand Inquisitor as an atheist seems to point to a dependence on Belinskij, secondly, the main theme of the 'returning Christ'."[37]

To conclude, more Schillerian themes and motifs are presented through Ivan Karamazov than through any of the other characters in *The Brothers Karamazov*. In him come together in a remarkable synthesis the cult of humanity associated with the young impractical dreamers of *The Insulted and the Injured*, and the superhuman individualism of Kirillov. These elements are united in such a way that Ivan repels and attracts at the same time. Love of humanity is com-

[34] Belinskij, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij* XII, 22-23.
[35] For confirmation of this symbolism, see Malia, 186. Malia notes that the symbol was "not quite the real Schiller"; it was more "left" and social.
[36] Rammelmeyer, 279.
[37] *Ibid.*, 281.

monly taken as a sign of nobility, but Ivan's love is abstract and cold. Similarly, to believe in the total freedom of the individual mind and personality is a lofty ideal, but in Ivan moral freedom turns into moral slavery. This is an elaboration of the Schillerian motif of the "higher man." In the world of Dostoevskij, he who claims this status becomes entrapped precisely in those low elements of common humanity which he despises in others but disregards in himself. This predicament hinges on the "broadness" of human nature, psychological ambiguity, an idea that is prominent in Schiller's works. In moral terms, it signifies the coexistence in man's mind of unlimited potentials for both good and evil. However, through Dostoevskij's new application of the concept of the double the possibility of regeneration is opened up for Ivan. By recognizing the "broadness" of one's nature and one's common humanity, its expression can become limited to moral acts. Perhaps the most promising new Schillerian motif associated with Ivan is that of religious faith without guarantee. Despite the many "negative" ideas that are projected through Ivan, the quotation from *Longing* which formulates this motif expresses his deepest need. Though he may seem to be a lost soul, Ivan yearns for faith and hope, maybe even charity.

2. DMITRIJ KARAMAZOV

Precisely because Ivan Karamazov is connected with such a large number of themes from Schiller, he is not a "Schillerian" type, while Mitja, who voices far fewer ones, comes much closer to being such a type. The topics that will be taken up in the following are, first, his relationship to Schiller's sensual type, secondly, the implications of his quoting Schiller's poetry — particularly *The Eleusinian Festival* — and, thirdly, his reflection of Schiller's view of the criminal hero.

The two first-mentioned topics are inseparable, since the "sensual type" of Schiller's aesthetic treatise has much in common with the "troglodyte" of *The Eleusinian Festival*. When cultural rather than psychological terminology is used, the sensual man is a "savage" [*Wilder*] (V, 320), a word [Russian *dik*] used twice in the stanzas recited. This word becomes a minor motif in the novel, amplified by figurative expressions with animal imagery.[38] Here is a passage from the treatise which has literal correspondences with the poem:

[38] Ivan, for example, calls man a "savage, vicious beast" (IX, 294), and comparable epithets are applied to Mitja by Grušen'ka and himself.

> . . . only the favor of circumstances can dissolve the chains of the physical state and lead the savage to beauty. . . . Not where man hides *as a troglodyte* in caves, is eternally isolated and never finds humanity *outside himself;* also not where he treks around *nomadically* in massive armies, is for ever only a number and never finds harmony *in himself* — but only where he is quiet with himself in his own cottage and speaks with his whole kind as soon as he steps out, will its lovely bud unfold (V, 394–395).

Here, indeed, is the entire theme of *The Eleusinian Festival,* though the context is more aesthetic than in the poem, which celebrates the institution of civil society through Ceres, the goddess of Earth.

Among the qualities of the sensual type as described by Schiller, the momentary nature of experience finds a close parallel in Mitja. Whereas the formal drive wants permanence, the sensual drive demands "that there be change, that time should have a substance. This condition of merely filled time is called sensation, and it is through it alone that physical existence manifests itself" (V, 344). The ultimate consequence of this insistence on "filled time" is lack of psychic identity. Man in this state is "nothing but a unit of magnitude, . . . or rather, *he* is not, for his personality is suspended as long as sensation controls him and carries time along with it" (V, 344-345). Language, Schiller comments in a note, "has for this condition of selflessness [*Selbstlosigkeit*] under the dominion of sensation the very apt expression *to be beside oneself,* i.e., beside one's I" (V, 345). Thus, the individual is reduced to being a succession of states of mind.

Such, broadly speaking, is Mitja's condition. Describing him on his way to Mme Xoxlakova, Dostoevskij writes: "As he worked out this new idea [of the loan], Mitja went into a state of rapture, but that always happened with him in all his undertakings, in all his sudden decisions. He gave himself up to every new idea with passion" (IX, 477-478). Perhaps the most unmistakable sign of inner discontinuity in Mitja is his incoherence in speech, several times remarked upon by the author and sensed by the reader. One may also note his awareness of disorder in himself and his delight in confusion.[39] Concerning the former, he says to his friend Perxotin: "There's no order in me, no higher order. . . . My whole life has been disorder, and one must set it in order" (IX, 505). Eventually, Mitja does reach a point where order is emerging; a "new man has risen up in me," he says (IX, 105), and he expresses an intense sense of self. ". . . I seem to have such strength

[39] At Mokroe, when an "absurd confusion" developed, Mitja seemed to be in his "natural element, and the more absurd it became, the more his spirits rose" (IX, 538).

in me now that I could stand anything, any suffering, only to be able to say and to repeat to myself every moment, 'I exist.' In thousands of torments — I exist. I'm writhing in agony — but I exist!" (X, 106).

The conquest of discontinuity forms an important part of the change that Mitja goes through. Schiller devotes much attention to showing how the sensual man can transform himself into a man of reason and thus, through the formal drive which is inherent in the latter, acquire the personal and moral identity lacking in the sensual state. This process of transformation will take place by way of beauty: "Through beauty, sensual man is led on to form and to thought" (V, 364). It is the "disinterested free appreciation of pure appearance" (V, 401) which marks the beginning of his humanity. The rational-moral stage comes later, prepared by the more objective attitude fostered through aesthetic contemplation. ". . . through the aesthetic frame of mind, the autonomy [*Selbsttätigkeit*] of reason is already started in the domain of sensuality, the power of sensation is shattered within its own borders, and physical man is so far ennobled that, henceforth, spiritual man has only to evolve from the former according to the laws of freedom" (V, 382).

The increase in objectivity which results from aesthetic perception is strikingly presented by way of a comparison of the sensory contact with the world in the sensual and the aesthetic stage. To the sensual man, the world is either booty or an enemy: "He either hurls himself at things and wants to devour them, in desire, or the objects encroach upon him destructively and he repels them, in disgust. In both cases his relationship to the sensory world is one of immediate *touch* . . ." (V, 386). The two senses which raise man from actuality to appearance, and thence to knowledge of reality, are sight and hearing. "As long as man is still a savage, he enjoys only with the senses of touch. . . . As soon as he begins to enjoy with the eye, and sight acquires independent value to him, then he is already aesthetically free and the play drive has evolved" (V, 396-397). Though Dmitrij Karamazov gives the impression of a man who "hurls himself at things" rather than of one who contemplates them, his development is in the direction of greater objectivity, largely reflected in a clearer and more sober self-knowledge.

At this point one of the more pleasing ironies of *The Brothers Karamazov* becomes apparent. While Mitja's presentation of himself as the "naked troglodyte" hiding "wild and fearful in his cavern" cannot be taken literally, it is precisely this loathsome self-identification which holds out promise of redemption for the "savage." Despite his

passionate self-absorption, he is already at the outset capable of stepping aside from himself sufficiently to see his features reflected in the mirror of art. Though he admits that repeated readings of the poem about Ceres have not reformed him (IX, 137), this does not necessarily mean that they have not affected him at all. Lapšin, in his study of Dostoevskij's aesthetic, claims that Mitja's case provides a "clear example of symbolic recognition and, at the same time, of inhibition — to some extent." For in his "debauch, in his lowest degradation, he preserved the capacity to feel the beauties of the ideal. . . . Schiller did not save Mitja Karamazov from degradation and shame, but he prevented him from becoming another copy of his father. . . ."[40]

Lapšin's views offer a welcome relief from those who all too readily acquiesce in Mitja's self-portrayal as someone who does not respond to beauty. In actual fact, Mitja responds to more than just beauty, as shown particularly through the reverberations of the hymn and cavern motifs, in which aesthetic perception and religious feeling merge in an ecstasy of self-transcendence.[41] It is above all through Mitja's spiritual and moral growth that Dostoevskij creates an analogue to the movement upwards on Schiller's ladder of perfection, a movement through which sensual man gains moral freedom by way of aesthetic contemplation.

The poem *The Eleusinian Festival*, from which Mitja recites a few stanzas, throws an interesting light on this development, while further enriching the novel's motif structure. One of the themes of the poem, cannibalism, permeates the entire novel; among other things, it becomes a symbol of Ivan's immoralism, thereby degrading Ivan, with his high intellectual culture, to the level of Mitja's troglodyte. But to understand the implications of this as well as other patterns, it is necessary to have an idea of the poem itself.

In *The Eleusinian Festival* Schiller celebrates the initiation of human culture in its most basic as well as in its higher meaning: Ceres, the goddess of Earth, institutes agriculture and settled living as well as religion and morality. The keynote of the new state is joy, announced in the chorus:

> Wind the golden spikes into wreaths,
> Interweave some blue cornflowers,
> Joy shall transfigure every eye,
> For the Queen is making her entrance. (III, 355.)

[40] I. I. Lapšin, *Èstetika Dostoevskogo* (Berlin, 1923), 60-61.

[41] That this is no exaggeration appears from Mitja's own visualization of the convict in the cave not as an insect of "sensual lust," but as a potential "angel, . . a hero" (X, 105). Here the opposition of "insect" and "angel" in the last lines recited

In glaring contrast to the new happy state stands that of primitive man, whose description is climaxed by the intimation of human sacrifice and cannibalism:

> No fruits of the fields or sweet clusters
> Shine at the feasts;
> Only the remnants of bodies smoke
> On the bloody altars.
> (*Sobr. soč.* IV, 137.)

The motif of cannibalism is anticipated by Miusov's account of a "characteristic anecdote" told by Ivan, in which he claimed that with the loss of belief in immortality, "every living force maintaining the life of the world would at once be dried up. Moreover, nothing would be immoral any more, everything would be lawful, even cannibalism" (IX, 90). Ivan once more turns to these themes when he has his Grand Inquisitor combine "science and cannibalism" (IX, 324); finally, the devil also alludes to the motif (X, 178). All these contexts are intellectual, dignified by knowledge and culture, yet the loathsome anti-human crime seems to be taken for granted. Figurative expressions are used, but they suggest that the crime is not merely a theoretical possibility. Such is Ivan's utterance, "One reptile will devour the other. And serve them both right, too." In this perspective, the central theme of parricide becomes an aspect of the motif of cannibalism — or vice versa.

Ivan figuratively calls his brother a cannibal, an epithet quite in keeping with Mitja's self-appraisal as he recites the poem about "Ceres and man" (IX, 137).[42] Yet, Ivan himself eventually becomes more nearly involved with cannibalism, if its association with parricide be taken seriously. This difference may derive from the fact that Mitja, however primitive psychologically, has the ability to use art creatively: not only does he find his own wretched moral state reflected in it, as in the Ceres poem, but he also finds inspiration there. Ivan, on the other hand, uses poetry intellectually, to decorate or climax an argument or to express a yearning; it never forces him to face himself. Consequently,

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from *To Joy* has become dynamic, as the lowest is being transformed into the highest. One notes again how integral the Schillerian motifs are both to the structure of the novel and to the development of the characters.

[42] Two other works by Schiller of central relevance to the novel, *The Robbers* and *To Joy,* also contain allusions to cannibalism. In the former it is immediately associated with parricide (Act IV, sc. 5); in the latter it is presented as one of the evils that are cured by the spirit of joy and sworn brotherhood (III, 117).

in his case more compelling self-reflections — by way of the double — are necessary.

This is not meant to imply that Mitja's insights come to him easily. Quite the contrary, there is uncertainty in his mind about the meaning of the poetry he loves. Like a typical beginner, he first tries to make a literal application of *The Eleusinian Festival.* Apropos, of Schiller's lines to the effect that, in order to become fully humanized, man must enter into an "eternal union" with Mother Earth, Mitja asks: "How am I to enter into an eternal union with Mother Earth? I don't kiss the earth, I don't cleave to her bosom. Shall I turn myself into a peasant or a shepherd?" (IX, 137). Modest as it is, Dostoevskij uses Mitja's attempt at understanding the poem as the basis of a considerable number of permutations of the motif. Just before Mitja is charged with murder, Grušen'ka reflects on their future together, saying they had "better go and work the land. I want to dig the earth with my own hands. We must work, do you hear?" What immediately follows places the motif in a context of expiation. When Dmitrij says, "I'll love you in Siberia," Grušen'ka answers, "Oh, well, Siberia if you like. I don't care — we'll work —" (IX, 550). The last recurrence of this peasant-Mother Earth motif is mock-serious in tone, associated with America rather than Siberia. On arriving there, Mitja says, they will "plough and work, in solitude, somewhere very remote, with wild bears." Afterwards they will return to Russia and, if recognized, go to Siberia, "somewhere in the wilds"; and, he concludes, "we'll die on our native soil" (X, 323).

The development of this motif deviates considerably from its Schillerian meaning. The basic meaning of culture as cultivation of the soil is present in both authors, but Schiller's idea of settled living as the source of higher culture is not developed by Dostoevskij. In fact, the key idea of *The Eleusinian Festival,* namely, that only through a bond with the earth can man attain a fully human state, assumes a slightly parodistic flavor by the way Dostoevskij uses the motif of "ploughing" and living in the wilds. Also, the motif as elaborated in the novel has overtones of national pathos and religious piety that do not appear in the original. It is the *Russian* soil which Mitja has dishonored and with which he will enter an eternal union,[43] and it is only on Russian soil that effective expiation can be made.

[43] That Mitja feels he has dishonored the Earth is apparent from what he tells Aleša even before the catastrophe has taken place. He has just been thinking of suicide; for, he says, "why burden the earth any longer, dishonoring it with my

Interestingly, the very first possibility of uniting with Ceres suggested by Mitja — that of kissing the earth — is shown as an integral part of the life of Father Zosima and Aleša, whose mystical rapture after the dream of the Biblical wedding has been noted. Father Zosima says: "If all men abandon you and drive you away by force, then when you are left alone fall on the earth and kiss it, water it with your tears and the earth will yield fruit from your tears even though no one has seen or heard you in your solitude" (IX, 402). And then he repeats: "Love to throw yourself on the earth and kiss it. Kiss the earth and love it with an unceasing, consuming love . . ." (IX, 403). Vjačeslav Ivanov thinks that the roots of this "mystical realism" of Father Zosima actually lie in the ancient conception of Demeter, the Earth Mother,[44] from whose name, by the way, that of Dmitrij is derived.

One matter concerning Mitja remains to be discussed, namely, his relation to the Schillerian criminal hero.[45] Dostoevskij's use of the criminal hero was not solely a reflection of his experience of prison. E. H. Carr, one of his biographers, writes: "In his youth he had borrowed from Schiller that familiar lay-figure of the Romantics — the criminal with the heart of gold; he had even written a story called *The Honest Thief*."[46] Indeed, the title of this story, written in 1848, seems to derive directly from a phrase in Schiller's prose tale *Criminal from Lost Honor*. Christian Wolf, the hero of the tale, "saw . . . only one expedient ahead of him — which thousands before him and after him have availed themselves of with better luck — the expedient *of stealing honorably*" (III, 496). The crime of theft is very much to the point, because Dostoevskij seems to share with Schiller one of his pet ideas, namely, that it is baser to steal than to be a scoundrel, or even a murderer.

Dmitrij tells Aleša: "I may be a low man, with low and dissolute passions, but a thief, a pickpocket . . . Dmitrij Karamazov can never be" (IX, 152). Ivan tells Smerdjakov that Dmitrij "could have killed him [his father] yesterday because of Grušen'ka, like the frantic, vicious

vile presence!" (IX, 195). This is the first, rather tentative, recurrence of the Ceres motif.

[44] Vyacheslav Ivanov, *Freedom and the Tragic Life: A Study in Dostoevsky* (New York, 1952), 45.

[45] A complete treatment of the significance of criminality in the work of Dostoevskij and Schiller is not envisaged here. Such a treatment would have to consider in detail Schiller's critical pronouncements on the subject as well as his dramaturgy, before correlating the results with the practical aesthetics of Dostoevskij. In effect, it would amount to a comparative study in the theory of tragedy.

[46] E. H. Carr, *Dostoevsky: A New Biography* (Boston, 1931), 66.

fool he is, but he won't steal" (IX, 342). The fullest statement of Mitja's feelings in regard to the relative baseness of theft and murder is made at the preliminary investigation. He says he has been tortured less by the thought of having killed the servant than by the "damned consciousness that I had torn that damned money off my breast at last and spent it, and so had become a downright thief!" (IX, 612). In Schiller's works there are several comments on the use of theft as a literary motif. In *The Stage Considered as a Moral Institution* (1784) the author says that "no crime is more infamous than the crime of the thief . . ." (V, 97). An elaborate treatment of the subject appears in the essay *Thoughts on the Use of the Vulgar and the Base in Art* (pub. 1802). Here Schiller states that base actions may be introduced into tragedy if the circumstances are such as to cause the feelings of disgust to be dissolved in a sense of terror. "Stealing, for example is something *absolutely base* . . . and aesthetically he [the thief] always remains a base object" and unsuitable for any "poetic representation of serious substance." However, if he becomes a murderer as well, he may be morally even "more reprehensible, but *aesthetically* he thereby becomes to a degree more usable" (V, 307). Though Mitja commits no murder, suspicion of murder, or of any crime, may produce a comparable effect, according to Schiller (V, 308-309).

As a character Dmitrij Karamazov, like Raskol'nikov, could have been conceived on the Schillerian model of the tragic criminal, whose base actions are overshadowed by the force of his passions and the terror of his destiny. For although he does want to get money from his father, Dmitrij's deeper feelings of repulsion and hatred are otherwise motivated. Schiller's first two plays, *The Robbers* and *Fiesko*, are the purest embodiments of these ideas. Karl Moor in particular corresponds to the notion of the noble criminal who is able to kill, but unable to rob. The looting he invariably leaves to his band. The preservation of a kind of moral integrity in spite of crime is a crucial point of resemblance between Karl Moor and Dmitrij Karamazov. In other respects, the latter is more similar to other Schillerian heroes, or heroines, conceived according to a somewhat different concept of tragedy. While in the early plays, the hero's main attribute is his "huge stature" [*kolossale Grösse*], subsequently this is replaced by suffering and repentance. In the essay *On the Pathetic* (1793), Schiller writes: "The first law of tragic art was the representation of suffering nature. Its second law is representation of the moral resistance to suffering" (V, 193). In *On the Sublime* (pub. 1801) Schiller more clearly defines this

concept.[47] When man has no physical means of freeing himself from the yoke of necessity, his only recourse is a mental one: physical necessity is transcended, annihilated, "*according to its concept*," opening the way to moral freedom (V, 216).

The Schillerian play which most strikingly embodies this idea of moral freedom is *Maria Stuart*. During most of the play Maria is rebellious, because she knows herself innocent of the act of treason with which she is charged. Before her execution, however, she has come to accept her punishment as a means of expiating an old guilt which, all churchly penance notwithstanding, still gnaws her conscience. She says to Melvil, the priest: "God deems me worthy, through this unjust death / To expiate my heavy former crime [*Blutschuld*]" (Act V, sc. 7). While the punishment differs, Maria Stuart's situation corresponds quite closely to that of Dmitrij Karamazov, who, innocent of the main charge of murder, admits guilt for the disorder of his life and acquires a personal identity and moral freedom through this consistently upheld admission. Thus, the conception underlying the creation of Mitja not only reflects Schiller's early admiration for dynamic greatness, but also his later demand for the development of moral consciousness in the tragic hero.

3. ALEŠA KARAMAZOV AND FATHER ZOISMA

Among all the characters in *The Brothers Karamazov*, Aleša is no doubt closest to Dostoevskij's heart. Perhaps, as Ljubov' Dostoevskaja thought, Aleša was modelled on the novelist as an adolescent.[48] Others have suggested that Vladimir Solov'ev, Dostoevskij's close friend in his last years, was the model. Beyond these possible live models, one discerns the outlines of Schiller's "aesthetic" man,[49] who was able to reconcile the physical drive [*Stofftrieb*] and the rational drive [*Vernunfttrieb*] in a higher synthesis.[50] It is true that Rakitin sees Aleša as

[47] For a suggestive comparative study of this subject, see John D. Simons, "The Nature of Suffering in Schiller and Dostoevsky," *Comparative Literature* 19 1967), 160-173.

[48] *Dostojewski: Geschildert von seiner Tochter*, 250.

[49] In this connection, one may note a striking comment by Močgul'skij, based on a statement by Anna Grigor'evna, that Dostoevskij loved Solov'ev because he reminded him of Schiller (*op. cit.*, 17).

[50] The pattern underlying the relationship between the three types is strongly reminiscent of Hegel's dialectical philosophy. Whether Hegel exerted any real influence on Dostoevskij is uncertain, though after his exile the novelist did become

combining sensuality and what could be called a religious drive when he says, "You're a sensualist from your father, a saintly fool [*jurodivyj*] from your mother" (IX, 103); nevertheless, a comparison with Schiller's *Spielmensch* will reveal significant resemblances.[51]

The *Spielmensch* is described and analyzed not only in *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795), but also in *On Grace and Dignity* (1793), which is a less ambitious treatment of the same subject. The purpose of Schiller's main treatise, according to Čiževskij, was to defeat Kantian dualism and replace it with a more humane theory. "For him [Schiller] the ethical ideal is a personality in which both forces contending with one another in man's soul are reconciled, unified, brought into harmony with one another."[52] These two forces — sensuality and reason, or inclination and duty — may be related in two ways: one of both principles may rule, or they may be harmonized. The first two possibilities are not conformable with "beauty of expression." Only

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acquainted with his thought. However, it is believed that even where one finds Hegel's words in Dostoevskij, it is quite possible to trace them to related ideas in German and Russian Romantic philosophy. "Much more evident is in Dostoevskij the influence of Schiller and Romanticism, even that of Kant on many points, but through Schiller as an intermediary" (D. Čyžev'skyj, ed., *Hegel bei den Slaven* (= *Veröffentlichungen der Slavistischen Arbeitsgemeinde an der Deutschen Universität in Prag.* Reihe I: *Untersuchungen* 9) [Reichenberg, 1934], 350).

[51] The material evidence for Aleša's connection with Schiller's aesthetic type is presumed to be a comment on art in relation to play which Aleša makes in a conversation with Kolja Krasotkin. "Grown-up people . . . go to the theater and there . . . the adventures of all sorts of heroes are represented – sometimes there are robbers and battles, too – and isn't that just the same thing [as children's games], in a different form, of course? And young people's games of soldiers or robbers in their play-time are also, for sure, art in the process of being born, the need for art arising in the youthful soul . . ." (X, 37). Actually, I have found no passage in Schiller's treatise which compares children's games to art. Schiller, however, does show a relationship between the games practised in a culture and the ideal of beauty prevailing there. "One never will go wrong if one seeks a person's ideal of beauty on the very same path where he satisfies his drive for play" (V, 357). He follows up this statement with examples from Greece and Rome to illustrate the connection. Schiller's essay on the "naive" has much to say about children in relation to art in its treatment of the idyl. As the child is described, it represents a state of mind similar to the aesthetic state so thoroughly analyzed in his letters on "aesthetic" education. We are, says Schiller, moved by the activities of children because by comparison with us they represent an "infinite possibility of determination [*grenzenlose Bestimmbarkeit*]" (V, 436). The aesthetic state as defined in the "letters" is one of "real and active possibility of determination" (V, 373). Though the analogy between children's play and art may very well have been otherwise suggested, the materials for it are available in Schiller's aesthetic and literary essays. But if Schiller is the source, Dostoevskij has synthesized rather than directly reproduced the ideas in question.

[52] Čiževskij, "Schiller und die 'Brüder Karamazov'," 15.

"that state of mind in which *reason and sensuality* — duty and inclination — *are in mutual accord* [will] provide a condition under which the beauty of play can occur" (V, 260). Aleša, to whom what others would consider irksome duty seems pleasure, appears to have realized the harmony here defined by Schiller, who, incidentally, held it incapable of complete embodiment; only in a state of perfection could man achieve such harmony. Perhaps Dostoevskij was able to present Aleša in seeming perfection only because he confronted him with no serious predicament. Aleša's predecessor, Prince Myškin, who was faced with such predicaments, foundered on them.

The moral-psychological result of the balance between the two basic drives can also be differently viewed. "Active" and "passive" are basic categories for describing personality types and attitudes toward the world; Schiller uses these terms to characterize the attitudes of the rational and the sensual man, respectively. The first subdues the world to himself, the second receives the world into himself. "Where both qualities unite, man will combine the highest plenitude of existence with the greatest independence and freedom and, instead of foundering on the world, will rather absorb the world with all its infinite phenomena into himself and subject it to the unity of reason" (V, 349). With the substitution of intuitive comprehension for reason, the passage would present a fairly accurate outline of Aleša's personality.

Furthermore, Schiller's detailed portrait of the aesthetic man in the essay *On Grace and Dignity* may have offered suggestions for the appearance and bearing of Aleša. Since these external features manifest the inner personality, the similarities between Schiller's and Dostoevskij's portrayals could, of course, be due to the influence of Schiller's general conception. Anyway, here are some of the hints for the physical features of a "schöne Seele." The expression of such a "soul," where duty and inclination are in harmony, is grace, even in the absence of "architectonic beauty." Not surprisingly, grace is one of Aleša's notable qualities. Schiller distributes this all-informing grace to the various parts of the body. The movements are free of all strain, light, soft, and yet lively; the eye is sparkling and irradiates feeling; no distortions spoil the natural grace of the mouth; and the musical voice speaks directly to the heart (V, 265-266). Naturally, Dostoevskij — known for his perfunctory description of his characters' physical appearance — has little to compare with this elaborate enumeration of features, yet there seems to be a fair amount of correspondence. Aleša is presented as a "stately, red-cheeked, bright-eyed youth of nineteen, the

picture of health. He was at that time very handsome, too, well-proportioned, modestly tall with dark-brown hair, a regular, rather oval-shaped face and wide-set dark gray shining eyes; he was very thoughtful and apparently very serene" (IX, 35).

The general response to this character is the same in both writers: love. In *On Grace and Dignity* Schiller says: "Beauty has admirers, only grace has lovers" (V, 266). In another passage in the same essay Schiller says that love is inseparable from grace and beauty (V, 279). The same idea is expressed in *On the Aesthetic Education of Man.* One of the first bits of information the reader receives about Aleša is that "everyone, indeed, loved this young man wherever he turned up, and this was so from his earliest childhood. . . . The gift of evoking, spontaneously and unaffectedly, a special love for himself was inherent in him, in his very nature, so to speak" (IX, 27-28). This is one of the most powerful forces in the novel, affecting everyone, from his father and his two elder brothers to Grušen'ka and Lise Xoxlakova. Maybe it springs from Aleša's capacity for love, which, the author says, "was always of an active character. He was incapable of loving passively; if he loved anyone, he at once set to work to help him" (IX, 235).

The traits shared by Aleša and Schiller's aesthetic type approximate an ideal being, a being in which the infinite has become manifest. Schiller often alludes to the infinite possibilities of the aesthetic state, in contrast to the limited and fixed condition of other states. "Here alone we feel, as it were, lifted out of time, and our humanity expresses itself with purity and *integrity*, as if it had not yet suffered any injury from the action of external forces" (V, 377). In another passage he suggests how an object of beauty may become a symbol of this state and of infinity.

> . . . if there were instances in which he [man] became conscious of his freedom and at the same time felt his existence, in which he felt himself simultaneously as matter and learned to know himself as spirit, he would have . . . complete perception of his humanity, and the object which bestowed this perception on him would become to him a symbol of his *fulfilled destiny* and, consequently, . . . serve as a representative of the infinite (V, 352).

This function of beauty of symbolizing infinity and enabling man to know his integral humanity finds a direct parallel in Dostoevskij. Reinhard Lauth paraphrases Dostoevskij's central aesthetic conviction thus: "Since man wants to, and must, see the ideal realized in order to believe in it, he inevitably has a need of beauty. Without it he would

not, and could not, live." Man needs realized ideal forms in order to proceed to the realization of the beautiful in his own life. Since the latter realization will always be only a partial success, he is even more grateful to find "the ideal incarnated . . . in the beautiful."[53]

The word "incarnated" recalls Dostoevskij's idea of Christ as the highest realization of the ideal; the figure of Christ seemed so beautiful precisely because "in him the ideal had become embodied."[54] Here is Zen'kovskij's transcription of a relevant passage from Dostoevskij's materials for *The Devils*: "Christ walked on earth to show mankind that even in its earthly nature the human spirit can manifest itself in heavenly radiance, in the flesh, and not merely in a dream or ideal — and that this is both *natural* and *possible*."[55] This view of Christ as the bodily incarnation of the highest beauty was, no doubt, why Dostoevskij had him in mind when creating Prince Myškin.[56] Though Aleša cannot be said to symbolize Christ, he does embody the dream of human perfection of which Christ, in Dostoevskij's view, was the unique incarnation. Zen'kovskij stresses the aesthetic rather than the religious aspects of Dostoevskij's intention as expressed through the character of Aleša. Aleša's dream of "holiness," of a world in which everybody is a child of God, is, according to this critic, aesthetic rather than religious. "Holiness" is the radiance of the original beauty of man. "The 'secret of renewal' does not consist of that 'deification' of which the early fathers of the Church speak, but of the recovery of the original beauty in the soul; only the 'appearance' of the beautiful renews, i.e. the realization of the ideal figure. . . . Its beauty and holiness will renew the world. . . ."[57] It will appear from the above that Dostoevskij's idealistic aesthetics — largely traceable to Schiller —[58] was not confined to the literary domain, but also influenced his religious views. From his early years, when Dostoevskij thought a great deal about the function of Christianity in art, to the end of his life, the figure of Christ and Christianity itself were interpreted aesthetically.

In portraying Aleša and his associates, the children, Dostoevskij may also have drawn, consciously or unconsciously, upon Schiller's

[53] Lauth, *Die Philosophie Dostojewskis* (München, 1950), 360-361.
[54] *Ibid.*, 360.
[55] Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy* I, 423.
[56] See Romano Guardini, "Dostoyevsky's Idiot, A Symbol of Christ," *Cross Currents* 6 (Fall, 1956), 359-382, and Ernest J. Simmons, *Dostoevski: The Making of a Novelist* (New York, 1940), 212.
[57] *Aus der Geschichte der ästhetischen Ideen . . .*, 30.
[58] Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy* I, 428.

literary treatise *On Naive and Reflective Poetry*, where a conception of the childlike and the naive is set forth which closely resembles the concept of the aesthetic state presented in his essay on aesthetic education. "The child is to us . . . a realization of the ideal, not, to be sure, the fulfilled but the abandoned ideal, and it is thus by no means the idea of its indigence and limits but, quite the contrary, the idea of its pure and free power, its integrity, its infinity, that moves us" (V, 436).[59] Schiller is careful to distinguish sharply between childish [*kindisch*] and childlike [*kindlich*] qualities, only the latter of which have positive value. The concept of the "naive" is closely related to childlikeness. "The naive is *childlikeness where it is no longer expected* and can therefore, in the strictest sense, not be attributed to actual childhood" (V, 438). Here is an application of the "naive" to behavior: "We attribute a naive disposition to a person when, in his judgments of things, he overlooks artificial and affected relationships and relates them only to nature pure and simple" (V, 440). Interestingly, the physical expression of naiveté is the same as that of beauty: "From the naive frame of mind there also proceeds of necessity a naive expression in words as well as in movements, and this is the most important component of grace" (V, 444). Schiller's high estimate of the "naive" is epitomized in his comment that every true genius must be naive: "His naiveté alone makes him a genius. . ." (V, 443).

This romantic view of the child and the childlike, and the associated concept of the naive, may very likely have contributed to the portraits of Prince Myškin and Aleša, both of whom show a directness of observation of the world which corresponds exactly to Schiller's "naiveté." Also, both of these characters are inseparable from the children with whom they associate. Typical of Aleša's naiveté is his sudden exclamation in the drawing room of Mme Xoxlakova that Katerina Ivanovna was playing a part, that she did not love Dmitrij, but Ivan. Though he is called a "little pious fool" [*jurodivyj*] for this by the young lady (IX, 241), he has, in a way, won a victory — a victory over conventional dissimulation and hypocrisy. Aleša's naiveté is, indeed, an essential condition of his intuitive knowledge of men and largely endows him with that physical and spiritual grace for which he is so universally loved. The naive and the aesthetic man express different facets of the same perfect image.

[59] Thomas Mann has stressed the importance of what he calls "Verkindlichung" in Schiller's entire production; he defines this quality as "earthly susceptibility to the highest" (*Versuch über Schiller* [Berlin, 1955], 12).

A final point to be discussed relates to the preceding, but is also relevant to Schiller's belles-lettres. Both Aleša and Father Zosima place a great emphasis on memory, and so does Dostoevskij in portraying them. One of the first things we are told about Aleša is that, though his mother died when he was in his fourth year, he still remembers her " 'as though she stood living before me'." And the author continues: "Such memories may be retained . . . from an even earlier age, even from two years old, but barely standing out throughout life like spots of light out of darkness, like a corner torn off a huge picture which has all faded and disappeared except that fragment. That is how it was with him" (IX, 26). One notes the pictorial metaphor; the specific memory as well is conveyed in pictorial terms: "He remembered a still summer evening, an open window, the slanting rays of the setting sun (he recalled those slanting rays most of all);[60] in a corner of the room the icon, before it a lighted lamp, and on her knees before the image his mother. . . ." She was "sobbing hysterically," holding him out toward the icon, when a nurse came in and took him away. "That was the picture! Aleša remembered his mother's face at that minute. He used to say that it was frenzied and beautiful, judging by what he could recall" (IX, 26-27). The decisiveness of the memory for Aleša's life is evident from Dostoevskij's hint that it may have motivated him to assume the cowl. "Perhaps the slanting rays of the setting sun before the holy image to which his poor 'possessed' mother had held him up still had an effect upon him" (IX, 37).

Father Zosima's recollections are accompanied by a belief in their great value. In his death-bed talk, time becomes suspended; as he says, "all my childhood seems to rise up again before me, and I breathe now as I breathed then, with the breath of a little child of eight, and I feel as I did then, awe and wonder and joy." Speaking of the Book of Job, which he first heard read in a church as a little boy under circumstances which made a vivid impression upon his imagination, he says that "ever since then — only yesterday I took it up — I've never been able to read that sacred story without tears" (IX, 365). Father Zosima's conception of the working of memory is not abstruse, but neither is it over-simple. He recognizes, for instance, that though memories may be submerged by living, they do not vanish. The memories of his brother

[60] The setting sun is a pervasive motif in Dostoevskij's work. For an informed study of its use, see S. Durylin, "Ob odnom simvole Dostoevskogo:opyt tematičeskogo obzora," *Dostoevskij: Trudy gosudarstvennoj akademii xudožestvennyx nauk*. Literaturnaja sekcija (Moscow, 1928), 163-198.

Markel, especially of his death, came to mean a great deal to him later in life. "I was young then, a child," he says, "but a lasting impression, a hidden feeling, remained in my heart. It was all bound to rise up again and respond when the time came. So indeed it happened" (IX, 363).

Before discussing Aleša's discipline of memory, I shall refer to a number of statements in Schiller's two main treatises and to a particular situation in *Don Carlos*. The account of the *Spieltrieb* contains a definition of aesthetic man's attitude toward time which can be applied both to Aleša and Father Zosima. "That drive . . . in which both [drives] work together would be addressing itself to suspending time *within time*, to reconcile becoming with absolute being, change with identity" (V, 353). The effect of the constant impingement of the past on the present in Father Zosima's and Aleša's experience is precisely to transcend time as perpetual succession and to fill every passing moment with a core of permanence. Secondly, Schiller's eulogy of the child and childlikeness in his discussion of the "naive" stresses the significance of childhood memories through the concept of the Golden Age. "All peoples that have a history have a paradise, a state of innocence, a Golden Age; indeed, every single person has his paradise, his Golden Age, which — depending on whether he has more or less of the poetic in his nature — he recalls with more less enthusiasm" (V, 484). Interesting in this connection is also Schiller's distinction between two kinds of idyls, one of which is backward-looking, the other forward-looking, leading to our "majority, in order to make us feel the higher harmony, which rewards the fighter and makes the conqueror happy." This idyl leads not to Arcadia, but to Elysium (V, 488). Father Zosima's and Aleša's recapture of the past is not a passive self-indulgent reverie, but a passionate experience which exalts their spirits to the heights of ecstasy and to the hope that paradise may be realized here and now.

Aleša's eulogy of memory in the last few pages of *The Brothers Karamazov* and Dostoevskij's decision to end his book on this note may not, of course, have anything to do with Schiller. Nevertheless, several considerations make it not improbable that Dostoevskij's sense of the significance of memory was strengthened through his intimate acquaintance with Schiller's work. First, in an already cited letter to N. L. Ozmidov of August, 1880, the author stresses the necessity of receiving beautiful impressions in childhood and mentions his own experience of seeing *The Robbers* on the stage as a decisive one for his

entire life.[61] In a subsequent letter to a certain Nikolaj Aleksandrovič who had asked advice about reading matter for his young son, Dostoevskij says that he should read what creates "beautiful impressions and engenders high thoughts";[62] among the writers mentioned, again Schiller comes first. Secondly, one may recall what Dostoevskij told his brother concerning his experience with Schiller. "The very name Schiller became to me an intimate and sort of magic sound, which evokes in me so many memories and dreams."[63] Finally, one of Schiller's plays which was a favorite of Dostoevskij's, *Don Carlos*, contains an important memory motif.

At the return of Marquis Posa, Don Carlos reproaches him with coldness and, in the hope of changing his friend's attitude, recalls their past intimacy. Specifically, the Prince reminds him of an incident in which he sacrificed himself to save his friend's honor — and skin. Don Carlos speaks proudly:

> In the presence of all the royal servants,
> Who stood, sympathizing, in a circle, . . .
> Servile [revenge] was wreaked on your Karl.
> I looked at you and did not cry. The pain
> Made me clench and grind my teeth;
> I did not cry. My royal blood flowed
> Ignominiously under the merciless strokes;
> I looked at you and did not cry — You came;
> Crying loudly you dropped to my feet. Yes,
> Yes, you exclaimed, my pride is conquered.
> I shall pay when you are king. (Act I, sc. 2.)

On the strength of his promise to requite the sacrifice, the Marquis not only helps Don Carlos gain access to the Queen — whom the Prince loves — but, when the game is up, he gives his life for Don Carlos. In any case, that is his own view: in the hour of his death he reminds the Prince of their boyhood adventure and his promise:

> Was
> I, too, so quick, so scrupulous
> When you bled for me — as a boy? (Act V, sc. 3.)[64]

[61] Dostoevskij, *Pis'ma* IV, 196.

[62] *Ibid.*, 222. –Reinhard Lauth has noted the centrality in Dostoevskij's aesthetic of this idea of acquiring "beautiful impressions." "The soul is stirred and transformed through the sight of the beautiful; the impression that is transmitted to it by the beautiful remains in it, consciously or unconsciously, for the rest of one's entire life" *(Die Philosophie Dostojewskis'* 360).

[63] Dostoevskij, *Pis'ma* I, 57.

[64] This situation must have left a deep impression on Dostoevskij, for in an early work, *Netočka Nezvanova*, it is almost literally repeated. Netočka, the foundling,

This incident contains two elements: a memory and a promise, both of which decisively affect Marquis Posa's destiny. Similarly, Aleša in his speech at the stone does not merely recall the past; more importantly, he creates a memory and exacts a promise which will bear fruit in the future lives of the boys and himself. Among other things he says:

> You must know that there is nothing higher and stronger and more wholesome and helpful for life in the future than some good memory, especially a memory of childhood, of home. People talk to you a great deal about your education, but some beautiful sacred memory, preserved from childhood, is perhaps the best education. If a man brings many such memories with him into life, he is saved for life. And even if only one good memory is left in our hearts, even that may sometime be the means of saving us (X, 335–336).

On the strength of this belief, Aleša asks the boys to join him in a solemn promise: "Let us make a compact here, at Iljuša's stone, that we will never forget, first, Iljuša and, secondly, one another. And whatever happens to us later in life, . . . let us always remember how we buried the poor boy at whom we once threw stones. . . . And . . . let us never forget how good we felt here once, all together, united by a good and kind feeling which made us, for the time we were loving that poor boy, better perhaps than we actually are" (X, 335). The last brief exchanges between Aleša and the boys have an antiphonal quality about them, investing the entire scene with a quality of ritual. Aleša ends the main body of his talk by expressing the wish that Iljuša's "memory live for ever in our hearts from this time forth!" The boys respond. Aleša repeats the injunction to remember, this time drawing a memorable picture of the boy's appearance and circumstances; the boys again make the promise. After some affectionate exchanges, Aleša reverts to Iljuša for the last time: " 'And may the dead boy's memory live for ever!' Aleša added again with feeling. 'For ever!' the boys chimed in once more" (X, 337).

In terms of the Schillerian elements actually present in *The Brothers Karamazov*, Aleša's speech at the stone could be seen as the final repetition of the hymn motif.[65] It is true that the stanzas from *To Joy* which

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loves Katja, the little princess, who is extremely proud and repels any advances. Then comes Netočka's opportunity: Katja lets Falstaff, the dog, into the room of her grandmother; Netočka assumes the guilt and is severely punished. This act of sacrifice completely conquers Katja, as it conquered Marquis Posa, and a passionate scene follows (II, 161 ff.).

[65] Victor Amend has made a suggestion to this effect. He writes: "The novel ends with a 'Hurrah for Karamazov!' – a hymn to joy in which is given 'to angels –

are quoted do not contain anything resembling the kind of promise Aleša exacts from the boys. Another stanza, however, enjoins high spiritual virtues through "oaths sworn to eternity," after which the chorus affirms the sacred "vow":

> Close the holy circle tighter,
> Swear by this golden wine
> To be faithful to your vow,
> Swear it by the celestial judge! (III, 117–118.)

In another perspective, the novel's ending could be related to Fedorov's conception of paternity. According to Fedorov, the ideal of universal brotherhood demands a general resurrection as the counterpoise to patricide. It is not a coincidence that Aleša refers to the resurrection in the last scene of the novel. His exhortation to the boys that they do not allow the memory of Iljuša to die, is an individual variation on the theme of resurrection. In not permitting Iljuša to die, in remembering the ritual moment at the stone, they will all be affirming the ideal of human solidarity and brotherhood so close to Dostoevskij's heart. And once more we hear the solemn and exuberant strains of Schiller's *To Joy:*

> Deine Zauber binden wieder,
> Was die Mode streng geteilt,
> Alle Menschen werden Brüder
> Wo dein sanfter Flügel weilt.

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a vision of God's throne.' If Schiller's 'Hymn to Joy' is not given mention at the end of the novel, it is nevertheless in the spirit of the poem that the novel ends" ("Theme and Form in 'The Brothers Karamazov'," *Modern Fiction Studies* 4 [Autumn, 1958], 251).