Chapter Three
Sharpening the edges of the standard model of authorial intention in the Renaissance

As the preceding chapters have shown, the basic concept of authorial intention in interpretation has been fundamentally stable over hundreds of years from the fifth century BC far into the fifteenth century AD – despite all major ruptures in political structures from Greek city states via Hellenism to the Roman Empire and beyond. Someone teaching about the *Iliad* in a Greek polis in the fifth century BC and then all of a sudden finding himself in a Latin school in the fourteenth century AD in the Netherlands would notice many differences, but not regarding how his colleague dealt with intention in the interpretation of, lets us say, Homer or Virgil. Like him, his colleague would start with reading the words on the page, explain them, add context and knowledge where thought necessary, and assume that the author had written what he intended to write, concerning genre and form. With regard to content, both would find many fragments of knowledge and morality in the text at hand. In regular cases both teachers would assume the concept of an intentional continuity of text, context, author and reader. If at all, this continuity can only be disturbed because of corruption in transmission or because of a "nap of Homer" (or Virgil). But such a disturbance would have been the exception: the general benevolence towards the classical authorities would have left little room for criticism. Amongst a rather homogenous readership concerned with the interpretation of texts, this benevolence would make teachers and critics tend more towards defending established authors against unjust or maybe even unfair criticism.

Looking the other way in time with the argument of the present book in mind, one might predict even more intentional continuity to come, using Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine's *From Humanism to Humanities* as an argument. Behind Renaissance western culture and societies they see "the legacy and the example of an idealised Rome, and Cicero, perfect orator" (Grafton and Jardine 1986, 220). Similarly, Classical rhetorical theory has been characterised as "the terrain onto which the Renaissance inevitably projected itself" (Dunn 1994, 1). If the rhetoric of antiquity is the compass by which the Renaissance production and reception of speech and texts sailed, it is most likely that the standard model of authorial intention in interpretation will prevail during the Renaissance, too.

 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110767858-004

Leaning on antiquity: Continuities in concepts of intention

Many examples that confirm this expectation can be taken from Ian Maclean's seminal work on *Interpretation and Meaning in the Renaissance* (1992). Concerning legal interpretation – the domain with the most outspoken views on intention in interpretation in the Renaissance – Alessandro Turamini for example shows in his *De Legibus* (On laws, 1590) a perfect illustration of the concept of intentional continuity. For him, the function of the words of the law is to "make the sense of the law and the intention of the legislator visible" ("nec verba legis existimanda sunt lex, nisi quatenus sensum legis et legislatoris voluntatem manifestant", qtd. from Maclean 1992, 88). The relation between the meaning of the text of the law (*ratio*) and the intention (*mens*) of the lawmaker is conceptualised as communicating vessels which under regular circumstances allow for knowledge about the level in all parts of the system, even if the observer has a clear view on one vessel only.

This view on intention was widely spread. One can find it already in the writings of influential jurists as early as Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313–1357), but also in publications that did not make their way into contemporary judicial discussions such as those of the Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suarez. His *De Legibus* (Coimbra, 1612) was reprinted several times though apparently never quoted by contemporaries, but he shared the same view on intentional continuity. For Suarez, there is no doubt that one must depart from the words since "no man can perceive another's thoughts except through his words" ("homines non possunt mentem alterius hominis percipere, nisi ex verbis eius"). To grasp the intention (*mentem*) and the meaning of the words, one has to take into account the context ("conjunctae omnes circumstantiae"): what the law was about and why it was made, its relation to other laws, to justice or injustice etc. All interpretive efforts serve the same thing: to extract the *mens legislatoris* from the *ratio legis*. The intention of the legislator, the context in which the law came about, the meaning of the words of the law and what the good interpreter makes of this are in normal cases perfectly compatible with each other (cf. Maclean 1992, 49 f., 89 f., 179 f.).

Yet, one must not forget that the idea of this intentional continuity in legal interpretation is the foundation for giving a persuasive interpretation in a situation where there is a dispute at stake, or at least possible – it is not a mathematical equation in which one side can be simply determined from the other. Johannes Goeddaeus prescribes in his *Commentarius* (1597) on the first book of the *Digest*, Emperor Justinian's collection of texts on Roman law in 50 books, dating from the sixth century:

> in legis latore et publice quid statuente primum attenditur, quid dixerit; deinde, qua occasione, quo intuit, qua mente.
>
> We must pay attention, in considering the words of legislators and those who lay down the law in public first to what they say; then to the occasion on which they said it, their meaning and intention. (qtd. from Maclean 1992, 97–98)

The rule "first to have a close look at the word" tries to remedy what the Renaissance sees as the basic problem of all interpretation: that the author goes from thought to expression, while the readers go from expression to thought (cf. Maclean 1992, viii). This phrasing not only shows in a spatial metaphor the concept of intentional continuity and the problem it is designed to tackle. It also indicates where the aim of the interpreter's efforts lies in the Renaissance: in the thought of the author.

This conviction is explicitly and generically phrased by Alberigo Gentili in his *In titulum Digestorum de verborum significatione commentarius* (Commentary on the meaning of words in the *Digest*, 1614): "I have said already, and it is true, that intention comes before words, as rhetoricians always conclude" ("dixi, verbis antestare sententiam, et verum est quod semper et Rhetores concludunt", qtd. from Maclean 1992, 146). Gentili found his confirmation concerning the priority of authorial intention in the rhetors – ancient *and* contemporary – and also in the *Digest* itself. The Roman politician and jurist Celsus holds for example that "the intention of a speaker is prior to and more important than speech" ("prior atque potentior est quam vox mens dicentis"), though he immediately adds the other part of the intentional continuum we touched upon: "yet nobody is thought to have said anything without having spoken" ("tamen nemo sine voce dixisse existimatur", qtd. from Maclean 1992, 145). Similarly, Paulus holds in D 26.2.30 concerning a case in which a "Titus" is appointed tutor in a testament, while both father and son have the same name Titus: "the man who is appointed tutor is the one intended by the testator" ("quem dare se testator sensit", qtd. from Maclean 1992, 129). The same privileging of authorial intention in combination with insisting on the relevance of the words spoken can be found in Marcellus' D 32.96: "one should only depart from the sense of words when it is clear that the testator meant something else" ("non aliter a significatione verborum recedi opportet, quam cum manifestum est aliud sensisse testatorem", qtd. from Maclean 1992, 96).

A representative example for the continuities in intention between the Renaissance and antiquity can be found in the work of the Italian jurist Andrea Alciato, who is often seen as the founder of humanist jurisprudence. Alciato's programme of interpretation from 1529 (*De verborum significatione*, On the meaning of words) goes as follows:

> Cum inuenta sunt uerba, ut dicentis sententiam exprimant, merito eius uoluntas in primis spectanda: Cognoscitur autem ex eo quod verba ipsa indicant.
>
> Because the words are chosen in order to express the intention of the one speaking, one has to focus primarily on what he wanted: But we recognise what he wanted from what the words themselves indicate. (qtd. from Kriechbaum 2001, 47)

Alciato's conceptual foundation is a perfect articulation of the standard model of authorial intention that we have come across on many occasions before: authorial intention is the pole star by which the interpreter should navigate, while this very aim is part of an intentional continuity that begins with the words of the text and the context in which they are written or spoken. Maximiliane Kriechbaum is therefore right when she attributes to Alciato that he conceptualises words (*verba*) and intention (*mens*) not as an opposition, but as related to each other, and that Alciato gives priority to authorial intention without neglecting the words in relation to the *mens* (cf. Kriechbaum 2001, 47, 48, 50). Kriechbaum is wrong, however, when she presents Alciato as an innovator turning away from what Kriechbaum claims to have been the standard until then ("wie bis dahin üblich") – a claim, by the way, that is corroborated only by selective quotes, not by a systematic historical argument. None of the examples we have given for the standard model since Augustine via Hugh of Saint Victor and beyond can be said to neglect the words spoken or written, nor would they see words and intention as an opposition in which one has to choose one side or the other – and the same goes for the Classical model, from Aristotle to the Classical Roman period. Kriechbaum seems to have been tempted into the pitfall of upgrading her object of study – Alciato – with claims of originality and newness. Apart from that, her analysis of the concept of authorial intention proposed by Alciato is very sound. Only, Alciato has to be situated within the tradition of intentional continuity of the Classical and the standard model dominating by then for at least two thousand years.

Circumstantial evidence for this historical contextualisation of Alciato's concept of authorial intention can be taken from Alciato's famous *Emblematum libellus*, which invented a new genre with its seminal three part text-image combination: an emblem consists of a title or motto (*inscriptio*), an image (*pictura*) and a poem on the connection between the former two (*subscriptio*). The first edition of Alciato's emblem book was published in Augsburg in 1531 by Heinrich Steyner. In the preface by the publisher, Steyner argues that the *pictura* in the book are not meant for the professional reader who does not need illustrations to understand the meaning of the poems. The illustrations are aimed at less experienced readers in order to help them understand what the author wants to say ("authoris intencio") as quickly and directly as possible (cf. Enenkel 2015, 578 f.). Al-

ciato will not have found any differences on a conceptual level in Steyner's preface compared to his own views on interpretation and authorial intention. The overall aim and focus of interpretation is on understanding the intention of the author ("eius uoluntas in primis spectanda"). But at the same time there is no doubt for Alciato, as we have seen, that a good reader must be able to arrive at this intention from the words on the page: "Cognoscitur autem ex eo quod verba ipsa indicant." The same concept can be recognised behind Steyner's views when he argues that experienced readers will not need the illustrations along with the poems – for them, the words should do.

In all the evidence given above, within the standard model of authorial intention, the different aspects of intentional continuity (words, authorial intent, context) can of course be emphasised differently at different moments, depending on what is regarded as didactically necessary, misunderstood, underestimated, disputed etc. at a specific historical moment by the participating authors in the dialogue. But these different emphases must not be taken for different concepts, as our overview has shown. The idea of a choice between either the words on the page *or* the intention of the one who wrote them – as two distinct answers to the same question – would not have been regarded a legitimate concept of interpretation from Classical Greece until the Renaissance.

This broad consensus in the Renaissance concerning the dominating concept of interpretation is indirectly confirmed by the fact that up to 1630 only one single university disputation "which addressed directly the question of interpretation" (Maclean 1992, 31) can be found. Interpretation itself is obviously *not* seen as a problem as such and therefore hardly attracts systematic reflection in these centuries, too – it is "only" specific texts to be interpreted and the spectrum of different emphases within the standard model that trigger different wordings and foci of interpretation. This homogeneity includes two assumptions: the priority given to authorial intention as the point of orientation in interpretation, and the conviction that the words on the page will bring the good reader there. As Maclean (1992, 146) summarises: "I have found in none of these texts any argument which disputes the priority of thought over language or the impossibility of thought without language." Of course participants in the debate do differ regarding explicitness, range (genre, form, plot, moral etc.) and individuality of intention over time as they do regarding explicitness of stressing the importance of words. But the homogeneity presented here indicates that these differences are just variations of the standard model of authorial intention.

The edges of that picture might become sharper when we take into account the perspective of modern criticism, for example that of Maclean on Turamini (see above) and Renaissance criticism in general. According to Maclean, Turamini

> ingeniously distinguishes *mens* and *ratio* by describing them as the material and formal causes of the law; but he, like others, fails in the end to separate them except in so far as *mens* may be pursued through extraneous contextual matter to the law; and this contextual matter takes the form of historical information and inferences which belong to the category of *ratio legis*. Thus the opposition *mens*/*ratio* fails in the final analysis. (Maclean 1992, 151)

In other words: because Turamini uses arguments as contextual information and text (*ratio*) in order to determine intention (*mens*), he fails in distinguishing between *mens* and *ratio*, Maclean argues. Or, even more briefly: Turamini's failure lies on the level of argumentative hygiene of a very strict kind. Maclean's argument only holds on the basis of conceiving *mens* and *ratio* as an "opposition *mens*/*ratio*", and then even an opposition in the sense of an alternative: it is either *mens* or *ratio*. In that opposition, *mens* is about "recovery", while *ratio* is about "discovery" (ibid.). But these exclusive oppositions are nowhere to be found in the sources used in Maclean's book. None of the quotations in his book indicates an effort to distinguish between words, context (*ratio*) and intention (*mens*) as an alternative or exclusive *opposition*. The *distinction* is made in the Renaissance only in order to tackle a problem of interpretation in a systematic way from different angles, conceptualising text, context, author and reader on the basis of a concept of intentional continuity between its components. So Turamini did not fail on this point in the eyes of any of his contemporaries, nor in those of any of his predecessors, but only in the eyes of a twentieth-century view on intention in which a choice between either the text or the authorial intention has become conceptually possible *and* legitimate. And only those for whom this choice has become obligatory, and who are sceptical about a preference for authorial intentention (*mens*), can judge the mixing of the different aspects of Turamini's intentional continuity a "failure".

The impression that here Maclean is projecting modern concepts of intention back in time is strengthened by the fact that elsewhere Maclean holds "There is no originary *ratio* or *mens* to be recovered" (Maclean 1992, 158) and that intention is "totally irrecoverable" (Maclean 1992, 202) – views that sound familiar to the ears of "intentional fallacists", but definitely not to those of Alciato, Goeddaeus, Turamini or any of their contemporaries. Maclean's task of reconstructing historical views and reflecting on the differences between one's own and others' concepts and norms is lost here under an ahistorical normative judgment on matters of intention. What is more, this historical discrepancy is not limited to norms concerning the "best" concept of intention but also plays a central role in Maclean's book as a whole. In the introduction, he describes the goal of his book as setting out "to call into question the adequacy of the system of communication and language" of the Renaissance and to identify "those points where

the Renaissance conceptual scheme breaks down" (Maclean 1992, 10). This predictably leads to Maclean stating many "collapses" of Renaissance thinking on interpretation and meaning (cf. Maclean 1992, 97 f., 155, 158, 177 f., 202) – "collapses" that went unnoticed at the time of his object of research.

However, I agree completely with Maclean when he argues that there are no indications of "blindness or naivety on the part of Renaissance jurists", since they do see the limitations of their work and nowhere claim access to "apodictic knowledge of the real" (cf. Maclean 1992, 212). But they tackle what they see as problems of interpretation within the standard model of authorial intention – which is not problematised itself, and had no contemporary competitors as an alternative in their times, I would add.

New trends: More content, more individual intentions

The story of tradition and continuity that has been told in this book so far about Renaissance thinking on intention in interpretation would be incomplete without an elaboration on the changes within the framework of the standard model. In Chapter One, we already have quoted Paul Veyne in his effort to characterise what antiquity did or did not understand when someone talked or wrote about an "I":

> No ancient, not even the poets, is capable of talking about himself. Nothing is more misleading than the use of 'I' in Greco-Roman poetry. [...] He speaks in the name of all and makes no claim that his readers should be interested in his own personal state of mind. To talk about oneself, to throw personal testimony into the balance, to profess that personal conviction must be taken into account provided only that it is sincere is a Christian, indeed an eminently Protestant idea that the ancients never dared to profess. (Veyne 1987, 231 f.)

But apart from the confirmation that in antiquity individual messages in the sense of "personal convictions" expressed in poetry can hardly be found, the quote indicates something else. For Veyne, something has changed since the emergence of Christian faith, especially since the rise of its Protestant version in the early sixteenth century. Probably Veyne had the famous statement in mind with which Martin Luther ended his speech at the Diet of Worms on April 18, 1521, at least in its printed version:

> I am bound by the Scriptures I have quoted and my conscience is captive to the Word of God. I cannot and I will not retract anything, since it is neither safe nor right to go against conscience. I cannot do otherwise, here I stand, may God help me, Amen. (qtd. from Dunn 1994, 28)

Luther's view on Christian religion is expressed in his books, and it is expressed in such a carefully composed way that his conscience does not allow him to take back a single line or word. In the context of the argument presented here, it is not the careful composition that is new. What is new, is Luther's insisting on the individuality of his principled view, taken from an interpretation of the Scriptures, as being part of his authorial intention. In this case, the point for us is not so much whether Veyne is right in connecting this innovative shift with Protestantism, but whether it can be corroborated as a general tendency in the Renaissance by other sources.

To start contextually, there are indications for general changes in the interpretation and production of secular texts for the time under scrutiny here. Ian Maclean (1992, 35) for example speaks about an "interpretation boom [...] in all disciplines after 1550". This boom can be traced back to developments more than 400 years earlier. From the end of the eleventh century onwards, the rise of universities in Europe and especially the work of the glossators on the Roman *Corpus Juris Civilis* had started off a collective judicial interpretation enterprise in developing more and more material for specialists (cf. Maclean 1992, 13). This growing number of jurists' opinions was further boosted by towns employing academic lawyers: "in some cities, the whole university law faculty was involved in producing opinions after the documents and facts of the case had been submitted to them" (Maclean 1992, 17). The effect was what Maclean calls "the heyday in a broad European context of investigations into legal interpretation" between 1460 and 1630 (cf. Maclean 1992, 18 f.). The significant growth in interpretations was further fuelled by a steady rise in the number of students of law, climbing in all faculties especially since the founding of the new universities of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation from the sixteenth century onwards. The direct impact of Humanism can therefore be localised "in producing growing numbers of people fluent in the ancient languages" (Grafton and Jardine 1986, 122). More scholars and more students fluent in Latin (and to a lesser degree Greek) also meant a growth in the number of potential readers and producers of books, which was indicated by the number of books on offer at the Frankfurt Book Fair. This figure doubled in the first two decades of the seventeenth century compared to the last two decades of the sixteenth (cf. Maclean 1992, 18 f.).

The process was not restricted to law and Latin – there are many indications that something similar was occurring in poetry and the vernaculars. One case in point is the example of the spectacular growth of *poetae laureati*. It was not before 1341 that Petrarch was the first to revive this tradition and accept the title in Rome for himself. Between 1451 and 1600, already 282 investitures of a *poeta lau-*

reatus can been counted, only to double again in the 50 years to come until 1650 (cf. Enenkel 2015, 281).

As we have seen above, the exponentially growing number of interpreters and interpretations as well as producers of books did not lead to questioning the standard model of authorial intention. Nor did it lead to questioning any other basic convention of interpretation we might add, given the dearth of principle reflections on interpretation. What it did lead to, however, was more competition between scholars and poets for recognition and positions (be it at university, in town administrations, or under any other religious or worldly authority). The trigger for more distinction within the professional behaviour of a growing group of experts found its manifestation in more individual expressions of views within the standard model of authorial intention in interpretation (and in production, as the *poetae laureati* show).

This process was nurtured by a cultural policy which rewarded individual and original views with positions and money: "Eminent humanists with reputations for particular ways of approaching their teaching texts found up-and-coming students only too eager to tell them that everything they did was wrong." (Grafton and Jardine 1986, 63) There are quite some examples in which aggressively presenting one's new views in opposition to an established and well-paid scholar was the way to fame and income. Domizio Calderini had followed this track for becoming a professor under the Medicis, a track that also Angelo Poliziano followed when he tried to position himself against Calderini and the reigning master of the old school at Florence, Christoforo Landino (cf. Grafton and Jardine 1986, 94 ff.). Of course these scholars could claim that in antiquity there was disagreement, too. But what can be observed at Renaissance universities is another quality, given the number of positions, the closely watching of each other's moves and rewards, the aggressiveness of the personalised attacks and the actual rewards from the authorities in the form of professorships and other material securities. The following letter from 1499 shows that the scholars act within one arena, watching and documenting their competition for fame very closely:

> And so that you may see some examples of the fame that humanistic studies still enjoy in our time: Platina was head of the papal library with a salary of 700 ducats; not to mention Leonardo Bruni, Gregorio Tifernate, Lorenzo Valla and other early examples, Pomponio was famous throughout the world; Angelo Poliziano had eight hundred ducats at Florence and left immortal fame; Beroaldo has three hundred ducats at Bologna and more fame than any lecturer in that *studio* and more students ... Giorgio Merula had four hundred ducats at Milan, Francesco Filelfo eight hundred, and he went about dressed entirely in cloth of gold, since he was one of the Duke's highest-ranking courtiers. (qtd. from Grafton and Jardine 1986, 97 f.)

This document shows not only the rivalry between peers and a cultural policy rewarding that rivalry. In the context of the growing number of universities, staff, students, and books on the market, it is also a document that raises the question of how distinction works in the interpretative behaviour of these eagerly competing scholars.

As we have seen, the traditional way of commenting on canonical texts was taking out single words or lines and then adding all kinds of information regarded as relevant, from semantic and grammatical to related facts, be they geographical, historical, mythological, moral etc. The school of Guarino Guarini of Verona for example – according to Grafton and Jardine (1986, 1) "the greatest teacher in a century of great teachers" – worked in this tradition that can be dated back via the commentary on the *Aeneid* by Servius to the Greek scholia. The student notes on the lectures in Guarino's school show a vast dedication towards small and smallest details of the texts. Grafton and Jardine give an illustrative comparison for this kind of teaching and interpreting:

> It is as if the teacher had on his desk a beautiful completed jigsaw puzzle – the text. Instead of calling up his students to look at the puzzle, he takes it apart, piece by piece. He holds each piece up, and explains its significance carefully and at length. The students for their part busy themselves writing down each explanation before the piece in question vanishes into the box. And the vital question we have to ask ourselves is whether the accumulation of fragments which the student made his own could ever take shape as the whole from which they originated. (Grafton and Jardine 1986, 20)

The compelling comparison is perfectly in tune with our findings concerning authorial intention in antiquity: it does play its part in interpretation, but primarily on a technical level of details concerning genre and form. For the Classics, but also for the early Renaissance interpreters working in this tradition, it is authorial intention that gave the singular parts of the puzzle their shape. Grafton and Jardine's question – on the ability of students to reshape "the whole" – is "vital" only from today's perspective: none of the contemporary sources discuss this problem, as far as I can see. Having the knowledge about the pieces, their beauty and function in combination with the consecration of the text and its author was obviously sufficient for many to carry on with the vastly growing enterprise of interpretation. "The whole" was touched upon briefly in the introduction of the commentaries (as we have seen for example in the commentary by Servius above), as a miniature reproduction of the jigsaw puzzle always at hand, but not really necessary for the experts, since they already knew.

How did scholars then try to distinguish and position themselves within this tradition? Apart from aggressively attacking opponents or applying the traditional approach of detailed study to texts that were rarely taught – including Greek

ones (Grafton and Jardine 1986, 83ff., 99–121) – scholars increasingly tried to give original explanations of difficult or corrupt passages (cf. Enenkel 2015, 570). A typical example can be taken from the work of Poliziano on Statius in which he (nowadays historians say: wrongly) tried to argue that Statius had married Polla, Martial's widow. Poliziano still focused on details: words that Statius had used in a single sentence about Polla within a letter that precedes book II of his *Silvae*. But the way Poliziano dealt with these formal aspects was different from the grammarian tradition running from Servius to Guarini:

> Smell these words one by one. You will see that they are too familiar to fit another man's wife. He says "rarest of wives" – "wives", not "women" – "wives" because she both venerates the memory of her dead husband and sweetly loves her living one. "When we by chance considered this day" – both the adverb "by chance" and the plural number of the verb "we considered" clearly have a certain familiarity to them. (qtd. from Grafton and Jardine 1986, 96)

Even if Poliziano was wrong, the passage shows his striving for persuading his readers with an interpretation that no one had given before – and he does so *not* by exposing existing knowledge, but by paying attention to hidden knowledge only a very careful reader can bring into daylight. Poliziano's professional approach to interpretation is still close to holding up pieces of a puzzle, but now the holding up is combined with a specific argumentation to make one's point, or, in the comparison by Graff and Jardine: interpreting is more about the individual cleverness of how the critic holds up specific pieces of the puzzle and puts some of them together.

This individualisation on the level of interpretation is accompanied by a similar development on the level of the production of texts. In his substantial research on neo-Latin literature based on about 240 publications between 1350 and 1650, Karl Enenkel (2015) has shown very convincingly that there was an enormous increase and differentiation concerning paratexts over this timespan: prefaces by the author and/or others, dedications, standardisation of the title page, illustrations of dedication acts etc. More technically speaking, the paratexts grow in number, content and function. Since the beginning of the fifteenth century nearly all publications include for example a dedication (cf. Enenkel 2015, 53 et passim).

For Enenkel, this development can be explained primarily as an effect of authorisation ("wesentlich eine Sache von Autorisierungsprozessen", Enenkel 2015, 51). He understands authorisation as a compulsory proof of the right to be part of the Republic of Letters ("verpflichtender Berechtigungsnachweis", Enenkel 2015, 14). Apparently, the gates to the Republic of Letters open only after showing different passports ("Ausweise") or tickets ("Zugangspässe", Enenkel 2015, 51, 521

et passim) – the paratexts under analysis. However, from a field-theoretical perspective the rise of the number, content and functions of the paratexts between the fourteenth and the seventeenth century indicates primarily one thing: increasing individual efforts for self-presentation on the part of authors trying to distinguish themselves and their books from others. Authorial individualisation in this sense more and more uses the possibilities of paratexts as its form of distinction from 1350 onwards.

No doubt the paratexts contributed to the authorisation as an author, too. But concerning dedications for example, the material exposed by Enenkel shows even more a competition for honour and ranking than just for being "in" or "out". The ranking *within* the Republic of Letters is done in degrees, using different parameters such as books/authors without dedication and those with, and within the latter group those who dedicate to socially and/or intellectually more marginal figures and those having achieved permission from higher authorities to dedicate a book to them, with all shades in between. Paratexts clearly function in a complex game of individual distinction. What Kevin Dunn (1994, 9) has called "the space of the fullest exercise of self-authorising rhetoric in the Western literary tradition before the Romantics" turns out to be the space of the fullest exercise of fighting for positions in the Republic of Letters before the time around 1800, too.

Enenkel's criticism of existing research on this topic implicitly points in the same direction. Concerning the paratexts in the period 1350 – 1650 he writes:

> The strikingly increasing manifestations of prefaces and dedications in larger text formations with a richer argumentation and much more complex tasks cannot be explained plausibly with Reformation and the progress in the sciences (Dunn), nor through the rules of marketing printed books (Schottenloher), nor through what is called obsessive reproduction of existing topics (cf. Janson, Simon), nor through hypothetical philological filiation (Janson), nor through what is called the Individualism of Early Modernity (Dunn), nor through an emphatic need for self-expression of the Humanists (Schottenloher), nor through a suddenly strengthened self-consciousness of the Humanists (idem). (Enenkel 2015, 47, cf. 24 – 47; *my translation, RG*)

Enenkel argues convincingly that none of these aspects alone is able to explain the enormous growth of paratexts. But for our argument, the most important conclusion from his overview over the range of competing explanatory factors is that all of these factors separately may be seen as contributing to a literary arena in which the pressure on authors to distinguish themselves and the possibilities to do so increase vastly during the time span between 1350 and 1650. This distinction is functional given the background of a growing number of scholars and poets, increasingly perceived by themselves as rivals for a growing number

of positions, conducting their rivalry within the realm of more or less prominent competitors. From our perspective, this is the context in which the edges of the standard model of authorial intention become sharper through a tendency towards individualisation, expressed for example in individualised paratexts trying to steer the fate of a publication in the contest for more honour and reputation.

As far as the material presented by Enenkel shows, the paratexts are primarily about getting a specific text a maximum of attention and reputation in the competition with other texts – they hardly discuss content or individual messages. Paul Veyne's quotation above can be confirmed insofar as, compared with antiquity, Renaissance authors in fact do speak about themselves (at least to a greater degree than in antiquity) and their "I" is much closer to the one modernity is used to. But this development seems to have started long before Protestantism and Luther's "Here I stand", in the fourteenth century already. What Lutherism, Calvinism and other forms of Protestantism did bring about, though, was a polarisation within the Republic of Letters between the different kinds of Christian faith. Writing books in the context of clashes of different beliefs seems to go along with a shift towards moral content and more individual messages within the standard model of authorial intention in interpretation.

This tendency can be discovered among others in the domain of poetics, for example when comparing the *Poetices Libri Septem* (Seven Books on Poetry) by Julius Caesar Scaliger, published posthumously in 1561, with the poetics developed in the first decennium of the seventeenth century by Daniel Heinsius, professor at Leiden university – the *star pupil* (Otterspeer) of Scaliger's famous son Josephus Justus Scaliger (1540 – 1609).

Julius Caesar Scaliger's large work was encyclopaedic in purpose and grew to be the largest poetics of the sixteenth century, directed at poetry in Latin and oriented towards antiquity (cf. Deitz 1994, xxxii). In effect, much of what Scaliger writes sounds familiar after having read the preceding chapters of the present book. According to Scaliger, every aspect of the form of poetry is intended by the poet – and the very best poet is Virgil. Virgil was able to choose his words in a way that perfectly describes what he wants to describe ("Quod vero addidit, consummate opus"). If the object of description was for example a storm, Virgil even was able to choose the number and kind of vowels in such a way that one hears the opening of the door behind which the storms were bound ("audis portam in tota vocalibus", cf. Scaliger 5.3, p. 72 (217b)). Scaliger's interest in many formal details seen as intentional choices of the poet is evident. Furthermore, there is no doubt for Scaliger that the final end of poetry is and should be its moral teaching, ideally presented in a pleasant way (cf. Deitz 1994, 48). What that moral is, is only touched upon in very general tones. Scaliger for example

finds the poetry of Dampetrius full of insights ("sententiarum ver plena omnia"), but in such a way that they please, satisfy, tempt the hearer and do not repel and force him ("ducant, non angant, saturent, non afficiant fastidio, alliciant, non rapiant", Scaliger 6.4, p. 118 (304b)). In short, Scaliger can be subsumed under the standard model of authorial intention. Accordingly, for him the role of the critic is to bring out that what the author intended to do, from genre to vowels, under a general moral heading, including more specific *sententiae*. However, to judge from the amount of pages spent on signalling errors and shortcomings, the most important role of the critic for Scaliger seems to have been that of a self-conscious corrector (cf. Deitz 1994, xxxii–xxxiv).

For Heinsius as well, criticism is essentially about correcting errors. In the first chapter of his *De Tragoediae Constitutione* (1611, transl. in 1971 into English as *On Plot in Tragedy:* all quotes from this edition: Sellin 1971) he praises Aristotle concerning tragedy for being the first one "to note faults" ("vitia notavit") *and* construct a coherent poetics of a specific genre of art himself ("unam fecit artem"). After the remark on "to note faults" Heinsius comments: "the mark of a precise critic" ("quod critici est accurati", cf. *On plot in tragedy*, I, 7). Also concerning the concept of authorial intention, there can be no doubt that Scaliger and Heinsius basically share the same view: "The fundamental premise of his interpretation is to come to an understanding of the poet's intent." (Meter 1984, 85) This authorial intent is part of the intentional continuity we saw above, including reader, text and context. With regard to tragedy, for example, for Heinsius – following here and elsewhere primarily Aristotle – the main purpose of the tragedy is *katharsis*. This is what the whole structure of the text should lead to, what the author should strive for, and what the reader should undergo from reading or watching a tragedy: catharsis is "utility and end of tragedy" ("usus tragoediae et finis", cf. *On Plot in Tragedy*, II, 11) By arousing pity and fear through events on the plot level ("misericordia et horror"), the structural design of the tragedy, as a result of intentional choices by the poet, should in the end lead to purifying the reader from exactly these affects (cf. *On Plot in Tragedy*, II, 10). Looked at from this angle, the poetics of Heinsius does not show any differences to what we have seen in other sources, including Scaliger.

But there is at least one aspect that does differ. In his writings on poetry, Heinsius is particularly concerned to give a substantial moral legitimation for the existence of the genre of tragedy. The psychological-aesthetic motivation along the lines of genre on an Aristotelian foundation, as elaborated in *De Tragoediae Constitutione*, is closely intertwined with the more ethical function of tragedy as discussed in Heinsius' inaugural lecture from around 1610, "On the utilities to be taken out of reading tragedies". The legitimation of the genre is grounded upon a distinction between a general and a more specific moral lesson

tragedy teaches (cf. Meter 1984, 156 – 174). According to Heinsius, the general one is that tragedy reminds all mankind that life is short, and that everything that humans can do on this planet is vain and idle against the backdrop of eternity. The specific message is taken by Heinsius from the unhappy fate of many rulers in the plots of the tragedy which he sees as a warning for those in power: those who fall from high positions will never climb up again and therefore should rule wisely. It is not difficult to see behind this careful presentation of the poetics of tragedy in the first decennium of the seventeenth century a necessity felt by Heinsius to legitimise tragedy on specific, especially moral grounds. Given Heinsius' biographical background, it is plausible to connect his poetics with the fact that his Calvinist Leiden University, from 1596 onwards, had banned all theatre performances. This ban could be lifted only in exceptional cases: Heinsius' tragedy *Auricacus siue Libertas Saucia* (Orange or Freedom Violated) from 1602 on the murder of the Dutch father of the fatherland, Willem of Orange, was one of the exceptions. Meter (1984, 36) notes convincingly: "It is obvious that Heinsius's struggle to justify poetic art can be related to the strict stand which Calvinist preachers took against it at the time in the Netherlands as well as in England, France and Switzerland."

Apparently, the pressure of conflict and polarisation along religious lines fostered a more moral, more specific and more explicit shaping of the intentions attributed to poetry on the content level, and not only in the case of Heinsius. It shall be argued in the rest of this chapter that from the perspective of the concept of authorial intention, Heinsius' turning towards a more explicit and specific moral intention in interpretation is exemplary for (1) the historical context of growing pressure along religious lines from the sixteenth century onwards, and (2) the growing number of possible positions to compete for from Renaissance onwards. Our case to underline these points will be the reception of Erasmus' *Praise of Folly*.

"My intentions were good": The case of Erasmus' *Praise of Folly*

Erasmus' *Praise of Folly* – "moria" in Greek – was published under the title *Moriae Encomium* in 1511 and was widely spread over Europe, as the first four editions between August 1511 and October 1512 from Strasburg, Antwerp and Paris indicate. According to Erasmus, *Moria* was even reprinted more than seven times within a few months after its first publication (cf. Miller 1979, 14 f.). During Erasmus' lifetime (he died in 1536) 36 editions from 21 different printers in 11 different cities are known (cf. Miller 1979, 29). The *Moria* was pop-

ular, but it was controversial, too. The first official steps against it were taken in Paris: in 1527 Erasmus learned that the university had condemned his book as not compatible with Christian faith and morals. But this was only the beginning: no sixteenth century index "that included any works of Erasmus ever omitted his masterpiece" (Miller 1979, 29). From our perspective, the *Moria* therefore promises not only a fierce discussion about its meaning, but also a relatively high degree of explicitness about authorial intention (on the part of the author as well as on that of the readers), given the pressure on Erasmus and the book. This constellation promises to make the *Praise of Folly* an exemplary case study for the concept of authorial intention in interpretation in the sixteenth century. In the following, all Latin quotes from Erasmus' *Moria* are taken from the historical critical edition by Clarence H. Miller from 1979 and will be quoted as *Moria*, plus page and lines. The English translations are by Hoyt Hopewell Hudson, edited by Princeton UP 2015, and will be quoted as *Folly*, plus page.

Right from the start, Erasmus tried to steer the reception of his *Moria* with a preface in the form of a dedication. This launch is basically according to the rules of the paratextual boom we touched upon earlier. In addition, the content of Erasmus' preface is conventional in the sense that his primary concern seems to be about the question of genre. His intention in that regard is clear and explicit: "I was pleased to have some sport with a eulogy of folly" (*Folly*, 1; "visum est Moriae encomium ludere", *Moria*, 67, l. 10). This "eulogy of folly" can be characterised in terms of genre as a paradoxical encomium, taking as object of praise someone or something usually not regarded as worthy of such a treatment. Accordingly, the playful aspect expressed in the word "ludere" and its variations (*lusus*, *ludicrum*) is mentioned five times in the introduction (*Moria*, 67–69, l. 14, 26, 37, 38), underlined elsewhere in the dedication by characterising the book as "jokes of a kind" ("huius generis iocis", l. 14).

Such a "eulogy of folly" is, according to Erasmus, not only about laughing but also about bringing weaknesses to light: along with the lightness of humour ("partim leuiores", l. 22; "argumenti leuitas", l. 25–26) goes criticism ("partim mordaciores", l. 23; "mordacitatis", l. 46), though not a biting one, as in satire. In a prophylactic answer to possible critiques on his work, Erasmus defends the genre profile he has chosen with the argument of tradition: something similar had been written for example by Homer, Virgil and Plutarch (ll. 26–33). Plutarch had presented in his *Gryllus* a dialogue between Ulysses and Gryllus (as an enchanted pig): the latter prefers pigs to men, among others with regard to reason and virtue. Concerning the two dimensions of a paradoxical encomium, humour and criticism, Erasmus is very explicit about his main intention: "my end is pleasure rather than censure" (*Folly*, 4; "nos voluptatem magis quam morsum quaesisse", *Moria*, 68, ll. 60–61). But at the same time he makes clear that he

is not aiming at humour for humour's sake: witty play is a route that can lead the reader to serious thoughts ("nugae seria ducant", l. 37) from which he will profit more than from long serious reflections of some scholars ("ex his aliquanto plus frugis referat lector non omnino naris obesae", ll. 37–38). Conceptually speaking, the preface by Erasmus aims at intentions on a technical, genre level. The effect on the content level is only touched upon in general terms: intending to write the *Moria* as a paradoxical encomium means intending primarily to please, but in such a way that the readers will be amused *and* profit from reading it, too. What the profit will be exactly, is not made explicit.

This authorial intention is in tune with the circumstances of writing that Erasmus sketches (cf. Miller 1979, 13 f.). His preface tells us that the idea of writing the *Moria* came to his mind on his way back from Italy to England. While travelling, no serious work was possible and so he kept himself busy with composing a "eulogy of folly". Within this context of production – however stylised it may be (cf. Enenkel 2015, 517 f.) – playfulness is embedded in different ways. First of all, there is the pun of the praise of *Moria* being also a praise of (Thomas) More. Furthermore, we read in the dedicatory letter that More likes this kind of joke. The dedication of the *Moria* to More is persuasive against this background – and the context sounds plausible, given the dedication, too. Opposing or even doubting this authorial intention would be equivalent to a disturbance of intentional continuity of the standard model: it can only be the result of misreading or other errors on the side of the reader, such as those in search of a quarrel ("vitilitigatores", *Moria*, 68, l. 22), for example. But a fair and reasonable reader ("cordatus lector", l. 60) will easily ("facile", l. 60) derive the same meaning and intention from the *Moria* as the author had given it: it is primarily about pleasure, less about critique.

More generally speaking, Erasmus seems to assume that an explicitly given authorial intention in terms of genre, general remarks on the level of content, and a suitable context of production should be sufficient to steer the reception in the right direction. In this case, as in all the others within the range of the standard model of authorial intention, the choice of genre and the function of the genre chosen seem to be something like communicating vessels: with writing a paradoxical encomium, Erasmus aims at being witty, and, as a side effect, exactly through this wit giving some serious thoughts on what people should or should not do. Choosing a genre is choosing its general intention, and that intention can be retrieved in the interpretation on the basis of knowledge of the genre. Within this manifestation of the standard model of authorial intention, at least two aspects can be said to show a tendency towards individualisation. The first is Erasmus' participation through dedication and preface in the paratextual boom of his times. On top of that, one could also say that the genre of the paradoxical

encomium is a quite exceptional choice: the genre did exist in antiquity, but only very few examples have survived (cf. Miller 1979, 17).

However, there are early indications that there seems to be a problem with precisely this general genre intention of *Moria*. In a letter from Erasmus in July 1514 to Servatius Roger – former fellow-monk and now Prior of the Augustinian cloister in Steyn to which Erasmus still belonged at that point, although he had left it with permission in 1492 – he tells Servatius about the books he has written in the meantime. Erasmus starts with his *Enchiridion*, his handbook for the Christian, that has inspired many to a life of piety ("quo non pauci fatentur sese ad pietatis stadium inflammatos"), then turns to his collection of proverbs (*Adagia*) that has been a very useful work for any kind of learning ("ad omnem doctrinam vtilissimum") and to his *De rerum verborumque copi* which has proven a very helpful work for those preparing to preach ("opus vtilissimum concionaturis", Allen 1906, 570). Furthermore, Erasmus mentions his revisions of St. Jerome's epistles and of the New Testament from a collation of Greek manuscripts as well as the series of commentaries on Paul's epistles he is working on, only to end with his decision that he will dedicate the rest of his life to the study of the sacred literature ("Nam mihi decretum est in sacris immori litteris", Allen 1906, 570). The genre intentions Erasmus connects to his writings (a Christian handbook that convinces to lead a pious life, studies are useful etc.) look familiar from our perspective. Yet, it is most interesting what Erasmus does not mention: there is not a word about the *Moria*, though it had appeared nearly three years earlier and had attracted a lot of attention.

The probability that this omission was on purpose grows when we add the context of this letter: the Prior of Erasmus' monastery had just demanded that Erasmus should return to his cloister after 22 years of leave (cf. Enenkel 2008, 467 ff.). Erasmus does not like this idea at all, dragging a wide range of arguments into battle: he cannot see what he should do in Holland; the climate and the diet would kill him; in Holland he would have the contempt of the lowest while now he receives the respect of the highest (of whom he gives many examples), etc. (Allen 1906, 564–573) – and finally he gives the list of his works just quoted. The strategic dimension of the letter is obvious: to get dispensation from returning to the cloister (cf. Enenkel 2008, 467–512). The presentation of Erasmus' books as pious, useful etc. fit perfectly into his strategic goal. But the striking thing is that in 1514, Erasmus judges it not appropriate to include his *Moria* in the list.

Authorial intention regarding genre under pressure

A letter by Erasmus' friend and later rector of the university of Leuven, Maarten van Dorp, from some months later (September 1514) gives an idea why Erasmus might have omitted the *Moria*. Dorp tells Erasmus that many in Leuven feel greatly offended by the book and only very few defend it at all points, especially within the theological faculty – a faculty for which it is very important to keep the respect of the public, Dorp adds. With regard to this faculty he asks "what good did it do, indeed how much harm it will do, to attack it [i. e. *the faculty, RG*] so bitterly" ("quid profuit, immo vero quantam oberit, tam acriter suggillasse?", Allen 1910, 12; transl. Mynors and Thomson 1976, 18). This group of readers obviously did not follow the intentional line of play, humour and mild criticism – instead they saw the intention of Erasmus and the book as sharply ridiculing ("acriter suggillasse"). The members of the theological faculty feel they are the target of a biting attack by Erasmus.

This clash is fuelled by another argument Dorp chews on. According to him, there is one passage in the *Moria* that must be felt as impious. Dorp writes:

> Praeterea de Christo vitaque beata, an hoc piae ferant aures, quod illi stulticiam tribuat, hanc nihil aliud dicat futuram quam demenciae quiddam? (qtd. from Allen 1910, 12)
>
> And then Christ, and the life in Heaven – can the ears of a good Christian endure to hear foolishness ascribed to him, while life in Heaven, [*Moria*] says, is likely to be nothing but a form of lunacy? (Mynors and Thomson 1976, 18 f.)

The passage that Dorp here refers to can be found towards the end of the *Moria* and reads as follows:

> Sed posteaquam semel *tìn leontin* induimus, age doceamus et illud, felicitatem Christianorum, quam tot laboribus expetunt, nihil aliud esse quam insaniae stulticiaeque genus quoddam; absit inuidia verbis, rem ipsam potius expendite. (*Moria*, 190, ll. 156 – 158)
>
> Come, now that I have "put on the lion's skin," I shall show this also, that the happiness of Christians, which they pursue with so much travail, is nothing else but a kind of madness and folly. Let these words give no offense; instead, keep your mind on the point. (*Folly*, 119)

The benevolent Dorp himself does not simply ascribe to Erasmus the hidden intention of picking on his former brothers, as Dorp's faculty members do. But Dorp does not agree with the publication of the *Moria* either, be it for other reasons: "Et profecto, Erasme eruditissime, quid isthuc sit velle solis litteratis place haud satis intelligo." (Allen 1910, 13; "And that is the point, Erasmus most learned friend: I cannot see what you mean by wishing to please only those who are steeped in humane studies." (Mynors and Thomson 1976, 19).

From both readings, that of the Leuven faculty of theology and that of Dorp, a polarisation of the readership can be derived that sets Erasmus' explicit authorial intention regarding genre under pressure. The *Moria* obviously has encountered a readership too heterogeneous for a reception along the lines set out in Erasmus' preface. There are academic readers who see Erasmus' explicit intention with the *Moria* either as a bad disguise under which the real intention (biting satire by someone from the other side) is hidden, or as an unintentional insult due to an in-crowd pleasure between humanists. Dorp's own suspicion of witnessing here the irony of exclusionary elitist in-groups at work (cf. Hutcheon 1994, 47) might have been corroborated with a quote from Erasmus himself, when he stated at the end of the dedication letter to More: why do I say all this to you, More? ("Sed quid ego haec tibi patrono tam singulari", Miller 1979, 70, l. 65), implying: since you know all this already.

Looking at the three clashing interpretations – that of Erasmus' letter to More, that of large parts of the Leuven faculty and Dorp's – from a conceptual level, they can be taken as another illustration for the heterogeneity and polarisation among the readership at the beginning of the sixteenth century that sets authorial intention under pressure. Dorp himself, though, has not given up the hope of keeping the heterogeneous groups and readings together:

> Atqui humanum quid paciuntur qui te tuaque damnant; infirmitate faciunt, non malicia; nisi forte putes sola humanitatis studia, non eciam philisophiam, non sacras litteras, bonos efficere. (qtd. from Allen 1910, 13)
>
> But those who condemn you and your work are only human; they do it from weakness and not wickedness – unless you think nothing but the humanities, not even philosophy or sacred study, can make a good man. (Mynors and Thomson 1976, 20)

Dorp is not implying that Erasmus was not sincere with the authorial intention given in his preface, nor that there is something wrong with Erasmus' intention. What he sees as problematic, though, is that Erasmus has not been thinking enough about the reception of his book by others, especially non-humanists. That Dorp attributes "weakness" to these readers shows that he has no doubts whatsoever about the legitimacy and adequacy of Erasmus' intentions: the readings that are critical towards Erasmus are the result of shortcomings on the part of some readers. But Erasmus should have anticipated such "wrong" readings, Dorp is implying.

Sharper edges of the standard model

The pressure from polarisation and distinction on authorial intention has been made plausible, I think. At least with religious topics, following the established procedure to explain one's intention with the genre chosen is obviously no longer sufficient to steer the relevant parts of the reception. Accordingly, Erasmus' answer to Dorp from more than half a year later, May 1515, is long and principled. Its programmatic character can be seen in the fact that it was part of all future editions of the *Moria* during Erasmus' lifetime (Miller 1979, 25). In parts, the answer was along the lines that Erasmus had set out earlier. In all his books, Erasmus claims, his only intention has always been ("hic unicus semper mihi fuit scopus", Allen 1910, 92) to do something useful ("aliquam adferrem utilitatem"), or, in other words, he always had only one goal: to do good ("semper spectaui vt, si possem, prodessem", ibid.). Furthermore, he relates again how he came to write and publish the *Moria*, though this time with more details, and in a rather defensive way. After his success in publicly reading parts of the *Moria* in the house of More, he judged ill in an idle moment in order to please his friends and publish the *Moria*. Erasmus adds: who can be wise all the time? (cf. Allen 1910, 96) Nevertheless, according to Erasmus, all that *Moria* needs is a fair reader. Someone pious and fair ("legat pius et aequus", Allen 1910, 104) or fair and with integrity ("aequus et integer", Allen 1910, 105) will simply do his job of understanding what is written ("quod scriptum est intellegat", ibid.). Accordingly, Erasmus counters the criticism reported to him by Dorp in several places with the argument that criticism of the *Moria* would disappear if the reader were to stick to what has been written ("referantur ut scripta sunt", Allen 1910, 103). Consequently, for him, the offence is in the interpretation, not in his book ("In tua recitatio offendiculum est, non in meo libello.", ibid.).

The dominance of the standard model of authorial intention – with the intentional continuity of author, text, context and readers – seems to be strong. But in Erasmus' letter to Dorp, the edges of the model receive sharper outlines. While the unfair reader was touched upon only briefly in the preface ("vitilitigatores", those in search of trouble), he receives much more attention now. This attention does not show the slightest doubt that the interpretations of those who do not follow the line of Erasmus' preface are distorted and full of malevolence ("maleuolentia", Allen 1910, 103). They are interpreters

> qui primum nullo sunt ingenio praediti, minore iudicio; deinde nihil omnino bonarum litterarum attigerunt, sordida tantum ista perturbataque doctrina infecti potius quam eruditi; denique infensi omnibus qui sciunt quod ipsi nesciant. (qtd. from Allen 1910, 105)

> who in the first place have no brains and even less judgment; second, have never been in touch with liberal studies but are infected rather than educated by that mean and muddled schooling of theirs; and lastly, hate everyone who knows what they themselves do not know. (Mynors and Thomson 1976, 129)

The readings of these others are not only inferior. They are illegitimate due to the limitations and weaknesses of character and expertise of those who propose them: no brains, uneducated, narcistic nitwits with aggressive behaviour. However, also Erasmus himself could hardly have been more belligerent, contributing from his side to the growing polarisation. Many similar quotations from the letter could be given stressing the malevolent interpretations of the *Moria* by "those pestilent experts in calumny" ("isti calumniatores pestilentissimi", Allen 1910, 102; Mynors and Thomson 1976, 126) who either do not understand or are so cantankerous by nature that they do not like anything at all ("qui vel non intelligent vel inuideant vel natura sint adeo morose vt nihil omnino probent", Allen 1910, 98 f.). Bad characters, dramatic lack of learning and distorted interpretations hang closely together, or, speaking more theoretically: Erasmus' presentation of his critics is just another manifestation of the undisputed belief that radically opposing interpretations within the standard model occur only when one of the two sides – author or reader – are lying or do not function adequately for some lack of character or schooling – for a lack of *ethos*, so to speak. From the perspective of the author, Erasmus' delegitimising his critics can be explained in that way. From the perspective of his critics, the reverse image must have been similarly compelling: most of them they do not believe that what Erasmus wrote in his preface is what he actually meant. Both perspectives taken together are an illustration of the polarisation along religious lines in the sixteenth century and the pressure this ideological polarisation put on authorial intention.

The counterpart to Erasmus' strategy to denounce his critical readers is to show that the text has been approved by many authorities in the way the author had intended it to be read, or, as we quoted earlier on: in the way it had been written. Erasmus mentions for example the appreciation of the archbishop of Canterbury for the *Moria:* the archbishop is so endowed with every virtue that it does not cross his mind that only one of the human weaknesses exposed by the *Moria* might target him ("Nempe quia vir omni virtutum genere absolutus nihil horum ad se pertinere iudicat.", Allen 1910, 98). But that is not the only example: Erasmus could give many other names of eminent princes, cardinals, bishops, abbots and famous scholars who have read and approved the *Moria* in the way it must be read, he says.

More moral

The polarisation of the readership also had its effect on the way Erasmus presented his authorial intention. As we have seen, he had set down his *Moria* as a "eulogy of folly", primarily for pleasure, but said it included mild criticism, too. Both aspects are still touched upon in the letter to Dorp from four years later, but by now, their hierarchy has changed. While in the initial introduction of his book pleasure, wit and humour had been dominant ("nos voluptatem magis quam morsum quaesisse", *Moria*, 68, ll. 60 – 61), now it seems the other way round:

> Proinde videbar mihi repperisse rationem vt delicatis animis hac arte tanquam obreperem et cum voluptate quoque mederer. Et sepenumero conspexeram festiuum hoc et iocosum admonendi genus multis felicissime cedere. (qtd. from Allen 1910, 94)
>
> And so I thought I had found a way to insinuate myself in this fashion into minds which are hard to please, and not only cure them but amuse them too. I had often observed that this cheerful and humorous style of putting people right is with many of them most successful. (Mynors and Thomson 1976, 115)

Humour and wit are presented in 1515, four years after first publication, as an instrument to get into the minds of those who should be corrected. Precisely because of this specific power of humour (its wit and liveliness, "lepos et iucunditas sermonis", Allen 1910, 96), it is the perfect means for curing wrongs of mankind ("medicandi communibus hominum malis", Allen 1910, 97). In other words: Erasmus' dominant aim in 1515 is curing, and the humour is comparable to the sweetness in which bitter medicine is enclosed, so that those in need will take it. It seems as if Erasmus in his response is going to steer a more moral course, closer to "utile" than to "dulce", in deviation of his priorities at the outset in 1511.

This goes along with the fact that now the *Moria* as a whole gets a more specific message on the content level, in tune with the rest of Erasmus' work:

> Nec aliud omnino spectauimus in Moria quam quod in caeteris lucubrationibus, tametsi via diuersa. In Enchiridio simpliciter Christianae vitae formam tradidimus. In libello De prinicipis institutione palam admonemus quibus rebus principem oporteat esse instructum. In Panegyrico sub laudis praetextu hoc ipsum tamen agimus oblique quod illic egimus aperta fronte. Nec aliud agitur in Moria sub specie lusus quam actum est in Enchiridio. Admonere voluimus, non mordere; prodesse, non laedere; consulere moribus hominum, non officere. (qtd. from Allen 1910, 93)
>
> Nor was the end I had in view in my *Folly* different in any way from the purpose of my other works, though the means differed. In the *Enchiridion* I laid down quite simply the pattern of a Christian life. In my book on the education of a prince I openly expound the subjects in

> which a prince should be brought up. In my *Panegyricus*, though under cover of praising a prince, I pursue indirectly the same subject that I pursued openly in earlier work. And the *Folly* is concerned in a playful way with the same subject as the *Enchiridion*. My purpose was guidance and not satire; to help, not to hurt; to show men how to become better and not to stand in their way. (Mynors and Thomson 1976, 114 f.)

The connection to his earlier presentation runs clearly via the aspects of playfulness ("sub specie lusus") and indirectness ("sub laudis praetextu ... oblique") of praise, making it possible to say something other than what is stated explicitly. But what is new, is the roof under which these genre possibilities of the paradoxical encomium are sheltered: this roof is the vision of "the pattern of a Christian life" as in the *Enchiridion*, but then via a different route ("via diuersa").

The message on the content level is still a rather general one, and with regard to the *Enchiridion* we might even call it pleonastic from the perspective of genre, in the sense given above: a handbook for the Christian gives "the pattern of a Christian life". For our purpose it is less important whether this intention is plausible or not – the reception history of the *Moria* shows a lively debate precisely about this question (cf. Grüttemeier 1996). What is important from our perspective, however, is the shift Erasmus makes between 1511 and 1515 towards explicating a positive moral message with regard to a genre that traditionally has done without such explicit messages. When relating this observation back to the general context outlined above, it seems plausible to explain this shift to explicit moral views as a result of pressure on authorial intention through a criticism situated in a field with growing numbers of participants and positions, and growing religious polarisation.

Specifically with regard to polarisation, evidence can be found in the writings of Erasmus himself. In 1526, fifteen years after the publication of the *Moria* and five years after Luther's appearance before the Diet of Worms, Erasmus claimed that he had written the *Moria* in quiet times when the whole world was in a deep sleep. He would probably not have written it, if he had known which storms lay ahead (cf. Miller 1979, 27). The same thought is expressed by the one to whom the *Moria* was dedicated. Not only with regard to the *Moria* but also to his own writings, Thomas More wrote in 1532 about translations from Latin into English:

> In these dayes in whyche men by theyr owne defaute mysseconstre and take harme of the very scrypture of god, vntyll menne better amende, yf any man wolde now translate *Moria* in to Englyshe, or some works eyther that I haue my selfe wryten ere this, al be yt there be none harme therin / folke yet beynge (as they be) geuen to take harme of that that is good / I wolde not onely my derlynges bokes but myne owne also, helpe to burne them both with my owne hands, rather then folke sholde (though thorow theyr own faute) take any harme

> of them, seynge that I se them likely in these dayes so to do. (qtd. from Schuster et al. 1973, 178 f.)

A more drastic image for the massive polarisation at the beginning of the sixteenth century in the European Republic of Letters along religious lines is hardly possible than this fictional and prophylactic burning of the *Moria* and one's own books – a kind of *auto-auto-da-fé*. Still, More holds that deviations from what the author intended with his writings are misreadings by deficient readers ("by theyr owne defaute mysseconstre", "thorow theyr own faute"). Accordingly, there is no doubt about the intentional continuity of author, text, context and what the fair reader will make of the book – a book which remains "good" ("al be yt there be none harme therin", "that that is good"). When the regular road from writing via publication to interpretation is not accessible, this is only due to malevolence and limitations of the readers at a certain moment in history. It is not due to what Erasmus or More himself wanted, nor to what they wrote.

Against this backdrop, the adaptations of the standard model of authorial intention we derived from Erasmus' reaction to his reception can be taken as exemplary. They illustrate a tendency towards sharpening the edges of the standard model by polemising against ill-minded readers, articulating more individual and more content-based intentions, without raising doubts about the endurance of the conceptual basic principles of the model.

More arguments on content level

The sharpening, however, not only took place on the level of polemics against malevolent readers, nor was it limited to constructing a moral roof over the whole text in cases when the general genre legitimation failed. Sharpening the edges of the standard model can also be retraced in the fierce discussions about its parts. As we have seen above, the growing competition between a growing number of scholars triggered larger numbers of original interpretations and emendations of parts of classical texts. This professional behaviour was functional with regard to the positioning of scholars, for example by way of detailed text-based argumentations (think of Poliziano), and with regard to many interpreters still sticking to connecting single words with existing knowledge of a kind, as in the commentary tradition in the style of Servius. Both ways of interpreting are recognisable in our case study, but now much more is at stake than different readings of classics. Now the question of on which side of the right-or-wrong-belief the living author had to be placed was a question that could lead in extreme cases to actually burning books, or maybe even more than that.

A typical example of the traditional way of interpreting the *Praise of Folly* in connection with religious content is by the Carthusian theologian Petrus Sutor, first published in 1526. On the basis of Folly's claim that she invented science ("cognitio disciplinarum … in summam perniciem excogitauit", cf. *Moria* 110, ll. 717–743), Petrus Sutor made Erasmus a blasphemist in one sentence only: since God invented science, but Erasmus attributes its invention to Moria, Erasmus is blasphemous against God ("Deus scientiarium dominus est, et Erasmus harum inuentionem tribuit Moriae; blasphemus igitur est in Deum.", qtd. from Miller 1979, 27).

The reading by Sutor may be a very condensed example, but its structure is not exceptional, since Erasmus criticised *avant la lettre* this kind of interpretation already in his letter to Dorp of 1515, speaking about those "pestilent experts in calumny" mentioned above. According to Erasmus, they take some words out of their context ("duo verba decerpere"), sometimes change them a little, and leave out those passages that soften and explain what sounds harsh without them (cf. Allen 1910, 102). While this is the wrong way of interpreting according to Erasmus, the right one is programmatically explained in the *Methodus*, the introduction to Erasmus' edition of the New Testament in Greek (1516). Again, the opposition starts off from a picture of a way of reading that only pays attention to isolated details. But that is not what a scholar should do, according to Erasmus:

> Idque quod certius fiat, non sat habeat quattuor aut quinque decerpsisse verbula, circumspiciat, unde natum sit quod dicitur, a quo dicatur, cui dicatur, quo tempore, quo occasione, quibus verbis, quid praecesserit, quid consequatur. Quandoquidem ex hisce rebus expesnis collectisque deprehenditur, quid sibi velit quod dictum est. (qtd. from Winkler 1967, 64)
>
> Let him not consider it adequate to pull out four or five little words; let him consider the origin of what is said, by whom it is said, to whom it is said, when, on what occasion, in what words, what precedes it, what follows. For it is from a comprehensive examination of these things that one learns the meaning of a given utterance. (qtd. from Grafton and Jardine 1986, 147)

What this approach means in practice is demonstrated by Erasmus himself in his letter to Dorp of 1515. In answering the criticism that one of Folly's claims – that life in Heaven is a form of lunacy – must sound impious in the ears of many Christians ("an hoc piae ferant aures", cf. Allen 1910, 12), Erasmus gives a close reading argumentation that is reminiscent of the example of Poliziano's way of interpreting that was quoted above. But now the interpretation concerns not whom Statius married or not. It concerns Erasmus' own writing, and the existential question of whether Erasmus wrote something impious or not. In order

to show how Erasmus interpreted, the passage answering the criticism of impiety must be quoted in full:

> Sic enim propono. "Sed posteaquam semel *tìn leontin* induimus, age doceamus et illud, felicitatem Christianorum, quam tot laboribus expetunt, nihil aliud esse quam insaniae stulticiaeque genus quoddam. Absit inuidia verbis. Rem ipsam potius expendite." Audisne? Primum quod Moria de re tam arcana disputat, id mitigo prouerbio, quod iam leonis exuuium induerit. Nec simpliciter appello stulticiam aut insaniam, sed "stulticiae insaniaeque genus", vt piam stulticiam et felicem intelligas insaniam, iuxta distinctionem quam mox subiicio. Nec hoc contentus, addo "quoddam", vt appareat figuram subesse, non simplicem esse sermonem. Nec his contentus, offensam deprecor, quam verborum sonus possit gignere, et admoneo vt magis obseruent quid dicatur quam quibus dicatur verbis; atque haec quidem in ipsa statim propositione. Iam vero in ipsa rei tractatione quid est omnino quod non pie, quod non circumspecte sit dictum ac reuerentius etiam quam vt conueniat Moriae? (qtd. from Allen 1910, 104 f.)

> What I say is this: 'But now that I have donned the lion's skin, let me tell you another thing. The happiness which Christians seek with so many labours is nothing other than a certain kind of madness and folly. Do not be put off by the words, but consider the reality.' Do you see? To begin with, the fact that Folly holds forth on such a solemn subject is softened by a proverb, where I speak of her having donned the lion's skin. Nor do I speak just of folly or madness, but of 'a kind of folly and madness,' so that you have to understand a pious folly and a blessed madness, in accordance with a distinction which I go on to make. Not content with that, I say 'a certain kind' to make it clear that this is meant figuratively and is not literal. Still not content, I urge people not to take offence at the mere sound of my words, and tell them to watch more what is said than how I say it; and this I do right at the very beginning. Then in the actual treatment of the question, is there anything not said in a pious and thoughtful fashion more reverently in fact than really suits Folly? (Mynors and Thomson 1976, 128)

From our perspective, two things are striking in this interpretation: first, every word is presented as having been written with a purpose. The utmost care that Erasmus takes to explain how this passage must be interpreted is equivalent to the utmost care with which Erasmus claims to have written every word of it, culminating in the rhetorical question: is there anything not said in a pious and thoughtful fashion ("quid est omnino quod non pie")? What has been written is what must have been written, and not one word is superfluous or can be washed out, is Erasmus' implication – a claim on which Horace could not have agreed more, as we saw in Chapter One. Second, the sum of Erasmus' argumentation aims at one point: it is wrong to transform the words of Folly into a referential claim (Christian Heaven is madness and folly) and then take this claim literally as in a discourse ("vt appareat figuram subesse, non simplicem esse sermonem"). Instead, every single word that Folly speaks is made functional by Erasmus in order to serve the playful setting of "Folly praising Folly". His de-

tailed argumentation on the basis of words in their context aims not only at strengthening the genre intention of the book (paradoxical encomium), but also the general moral intention given in an indirect, playful way ("Nec aliud agitur in Moria sub specie lusus quam actum est in Enchiridio."). From this perspective, the detailed arguments of the interpretation can also be said to contribute to sharpening the edges of the standard model of authorial intention: they aim at consolidating an individual presentation of an overarching message that goes further than conventional genre intentions might take the reader.

What Erasmus shares with his critics, though, is the attention paid to every word in every single sentence which must be justified or at least justifiable. Within the Classical *and* the standard model of authorial intention, this attitude is not only legitimate but the only way the responsibility of an author for his text can be conceived of. This goes for both sides, the side of the reader and that of the author. Therefore, Clarence Miller's diagnosis of a contradiction in Erasmus' argumentation against his opponents has an ahistorical dimension in it:

> The major difficulty [...] is that Erasmus tacitly agrees with his opponents' assumption that Folly expresses Erasmus' opinions. Erasmus, briefly but explicitly, denies this assumption, but he implicitly grants it by continually defending Folly's statements because of their precision and restraint. (Miller 1979, 28)

To start with, there is no contradiction in Erasmus' argumentation, as far as I can see. In his footnotes Miller gives the reference to the place in which he reads an explicit denial of the assumption that Folly expresses Erasmus' opinions. This is a passage in which Erasmus answers in 1531 for the second time to an attack by Alberto Pio running since 1529 (cf. Gilmore 1969):

> *Loquitur*, inquit [Pio], *Moria, sed loquitur ore* Erasmi. Cum *Gryllus* docet plus rationis ac virtutem esse in brutis animantibus quam in homine, nonne *Plutarchi* ore loquitur? Quis tamen unquam vocavit illum in jus? Sed quid dicit haeretica *Moria?* Ait disciplinas esse repertas a Daemone Teuth, quod est apud Platonem 91[...]. (qtd. from Clericus 1963, 1136E)
>
> *Moria speaks*, he [Pio] says, *but Moria speaks with the voice of Erasmus*. When *Gryllus* teaches that there is more intelligence and virtue in wild animals than in man, does he not speak with the voice of *Plutarch?* But who has ever called him to defend himself? Now what says the heretical *Moria?* She says that the daemon Teuth has invented the sciences, which can be found in Plato's writings [...]. (*my translation, RG*)

First of all, Erasmus does not deny the assumption that Folly expresses Erasmus' opinions. All he does is make an analogy with the *Gryllus* by Plutarch, in which Gryllus as an enchanted pig tries to convince Odysseus of the advantages of pigkind over mankind and speaks with the voice of Plutarch, as Folly does with that

of Erasmus. We already came across the same reference to Gryllus and Plutarch in the dedicatory letter to More where it was used to legitimise the choice of the genre of a playful "eulogy of folly" with examples from antiquity (cf. Moria 68, ll. 31–32). So it seems most likely that all Erasmus is saying in 1531 is: when reading a text, you have to be aware of the genre you are reading, and the genre is that which the author intended to use. In the case of Plutarch and his *Gryllus*, readers have honoured that rule – why not in my case? What Erasmus is denying here – implicitly – is that one could take the words of Folly within this paradoxical encomium as being a tract by Erasmus as a scholar or theologian. But when the reader takes the specific frame of the genre into account, what Folly says indirectly and in a playful, humorous way is obviously what Erasmus himself says, within the genre of the paradoxical encomium – as did Plutarch. Folly unmasks the world and so does Erasmus, but at the same time, due to Erasmus' playful irony, Folly's statements are not statements of Erasmus-the-humanist (cf. Hutcheon 2005).

Accordingly, in his letter to Dorp, when discussing the impious passage and dealing with quotes spoken by Folly, Erasmus always uses Latin verbs in the first person singular: *mitigo*, *apello*, *addo*, *admoneo* etc. (cf. Allen 1910, 194 f.), meaning: I, Erasmus soften, say, add, warn etc. What Folly says is what Erasmus says *within the genre context chosen*. Therefore, Miller's "major difficulty" with Erasmus' many defences turns out to be an ahistorical projection of the modern narratological difference between the author and the narrator back in time – it is not how Erasmus, one of his contemporary defenders or any of his many contemporary critics looked at the debate (cf. Mayer 2003; Whitmarsh 2013). The difference between Erasmus and the other side is not one in terms of narratology or concepts of intention. Primarily, the critics do not accept the genre claim of Erasmus in his preface, because they do not think this was Erasmus' real intention. Whether they thought so because they saw Erasmus *or* the text as one of the "others" (in terms of religion or in terms of the humanist elite), and then concluded from the wrongness/deceit of the one aspect the deceit/wrongness of the other, is hard to tell within a conception of intentional continuity. The same goes for the question whether the critics did not believe the preface and therefore read the text in a literalist way as a tract, or that they did not accept such content as legitimated by this genre and formal choices, and therefore felt not bound by the preface. But the result is in all cases the same: text, author, context and reader do form an intentional continuity. What the text says within its genre and historical context is what the author intended to say – which basically leaves the question of whether his stated intentions were trustworthy, or: whether his intentions were good or bad.

All the participants in the debates that touch upon intention in interpretation between the fourteenth and the seventeenth century share the standard model of authorial intention. This model was, as far as I can see, dominating without any competitor in that period. Sharing this model meant sharing several beliefs, whatever side of a debate on interpretation one was on. This included, first of all, the belief of authors and interpreters that the author was responsible for every detail of what was written. This concept of responsibility in production and reception during the Renaissance included the assumption of writing as an intentional act of an individual human being. During the period 1350 to 1650 the intentional act was in large parts still primarily an act in terms of genre and form, and only very generally in terms of content, as our evidence has shown. At the same time, the growing competition due to growing numbers of authors and positions, as well as the growing polarisation along religious lines, led towards individualisation of authorial intention in the production as well as the reception of texts. Scholars competed with original interpretations in terms of rarely discussed classical authors, bringing new solutions for corrupt passages, explaining obscure ones for the first time, combining aspects of a text in an argument that led to more knowledge about antiquity etc. At the same time, from the fourteenth century onwards, authors increasingly marked their texts with paratexts aiming at achieving individual distinction of books and authors. Especially when sensitive topics related to religion attracted fierce criticism in a polarised context, authorial intention came under pressure. This pressure led to emphasising more explicitly and sharply the edges of the standard model of authorial intention: concerning the supposed deficits of readers, concerning a more explicit and more moral legitimation of genres and texts, and concerning a more detailed argumentation connecting every aspect of the text with the general ethical roof extended over it. In this sense, a tendency towards individualisation and sharper edges of the standard model of authorial intention also manifested itself on the content level during the Renaissance, as has been demonstrated above exemplarily with the reception of Erasmus' *Praise of Folly*.

Works cited

Allen, P.S. (ed.). *Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterrodami. Tomus I. 1484 – 1514*. Oxford: Frowde, 1906.

Allen, P.S. (ed.). *Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterrodami. Tomus II. 1514 – 1517*. Oxford: Frowde, 1910.

Clericus, J. (ed.). *Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamensis. Opera Omnia. Tomus IX*. Repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963.

Deitz, Luc. "Einführung." *Iulius Caesar Scaliger. Poetices libri septem. Sieben Bücher über die Dichtkunst*. Band 1. Ed. Luc Deitz. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: fromman-holzboog, 1994. xi–lxxiv.

Dunn, Kevin. *Pretexts of Authority. The Rhetoric of Authorship in the Renaissance Preface*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994.

Enenkel, Karl A.E. *Die Erfindung des Menschen. Die Autobiographik des frühneuzeitlichen Humanismus von Petrarca bis Lipsius*. Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2008.

Enenkel, Karl A.E. *Die Stiftung von Autorschaft in der neulateinischen Literatur (ca. 1350 – ca. 1650). Zur autorisierenden und wissensvermittelnden Funktion von Widmungen, Vorworttexten, Autorporträts und Dedikationsbildern*. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2015.

Gilmore, Myron P. "Erasmus and Alberto Pio, Prince of Carpi." *Action and Conviction in Early Modern Europe. Essays in Memory of E.H. Harbison*. Eds. Theodore K. Rabb and Jerrold E. Seigel. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1969. 299 – 318.

Grafton, Anthony and Lisa Jardine. *From Humanism to the Humanities. Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1986.

Grüttemeier, Ralf. "Intentionis laus: Über Nutzen und Grenzen von Intentionalität anhand von Erasmus' *Lob der Torheit*." *Neophilologus* 80 (1996), nr. 3 (July): 341 – 357.

Hudson, Hoyt Hopewell (transl.). *Desiderius Erasmus: Praise of Folly*. Preface Anthony Grafton. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2015. [*online source*]

Hutcheon, Linda. *Irony's Edge. The Theory and Politics of Irony*. London etc.: Routledge, 2005.

Kriechbaum, Maximiliane. "*Verba* und *mens* bei Andreas Alciatus (1492 – 1550)." *Theorie der Interpretation vom Humanismus bis zur Romantik – Rechtswissenschaft, Philosophie, Theologie*. Beiträge zu einem interdisziplinären Symposion in Tübingen. Ed. Jan Schröder. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2001. 47 – 72.

Maclean, Ian. *Interpretation and Meaning in the Renaissance. The Case of Law*. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge UP, 1992.

Mayer, Roland G. "Persona<l> Problems. The Literary Persona in Antiquity Revisited." *Materiali e discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici* 50 (2003): 55 – 80.

Meter, J.H. *The literary theories of Daniel Heinsius. A study of the development and background of his view on literary theory and criticism during the period from 1602 to 1612*. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1984.

Miller, Clarence H. (ed.). *Opera Omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami. Ordinis Quarti. Tomus Tertius. Moriae Encomium id est stultitiae laus*. Amsterdam/Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1979.

Mynors, R.A.B. and D.F.S. Thomson (transl.). *Erasmus. The correspondence. Letters 142 to 297. 1501 to 1514*. Annotated by Wallace K. Ferguson. Toronto/Buffalo: Toronto UP, 1975.

Mynors, R.A.B. and D.F.S. Thomson (transl.). *Erasmus. The correspondence. Letters 298 to 445. 1514 to 1516.* Annotated by James K. McConica. Toronto/Buffalo: Toronto UP, 1976.

Scaliger, Iulius Caesar. *Poetices libri septem. Sieben Bücher über die Dichtkunst.* Eds. Luc Deitz and Gregor Vogt-Spira, with assistance of Manfred Fuhrmann. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1994 – 2003.

Schuster, Louis A. et al. (eds.). Thomas More. *The Complete Works. Vol. 8, Pt. 1. The Confutation of Tyndale's Answer.* New Haven: Yale UP, 1973.

Sellin, Paul R. (ed.). *Daniel Heinsius: On plot in tragedy.* Transl. Paul R. Sellin and John J. McManmon. Northridge CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1971.

Veyne, Paul. *The Roman Empire.* Transl. Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge/Mass. and London: Harvard UP, 1987.

Whitmarsh, Tim. "An I for an I: reading fictional autobiography." *The Author's Voice in Classical and Late Antiquity.* Eds. Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 233 – 247.

Winkler, G.B. (ed.). *Erasmus: Methodus.* [*Ausgewählte Schriften III*, ed. W. Welzig] Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967. 38 – 77.