

4 One Village, One People? The Colonization of Masters and Slaves

4.1 “They let them enter”: Looking Beyond Resistance in Mozambique

“They let them enter,”¹ Paulo Litumbe, the first Anglican bishop of the Diocese of Niassa, answered when asked about the resistance of the Anyanja against the Portuguese occupation as part of AHM’s oral history project in the early 1980s. In Maúá, a group of elders told the interviewers that it was their own people who went to the Portuguese and begged them to come to put an end to the (slave) wars.² Doubtlessly, the historians of newly independent Mozambique were looking for different narratives of colonization: “resistance” was the key plot of the era, and explanations going beyond the simple binary of colonizer and colonized were not very popular. Since then, research on colonialism in Africa has certainly transcended the dualism of collaboration and resistance. Talking about colonialism today also means talking about its “complexities, tensions, ambiguities, and contradictions.”³ Nevertheless, the resistance paradigm still looms large in the historiography of Africa in general and that of Mozambique in particular.⁴ This chapter at-

1 Certainly, statements about the colonial period of an Anglican bishop in socialist Mozambique have to be assessed critically. But one must also know that Litumbe was a prisoner of the PIDE/DGS during the Mozambican War of Independence. For his statement, see: AHM, Secção Oral, Transcrito MPC 011: N.º 88–89, Entrevista com Paulo Litumbe, October 15, 1980, 26. See also: Paulo Litumbe, “Appendix 4: Bishop Paulo Litumbe’s Memoirs,” in *Dancing Their Dreams: The Lakeshore Nyanja Women of the Anglican Diocese of Niassa*, by Helen E.P. van Koevering (Malawi, 2005), 145–70.

2 AHM, Secção Oral, Transcrito NI 6: N.º 398–399 Entrevista com um grupo de velhos de Maúá (Niassa), interview by Gerhard Liesegang, António Sopa, and Mueojuane Mainga Vicente, September 16, 1982, 26–27.

3 Harvey Amani Whitfield and Bonny Ibhawoh, “Problems, Perspectives, and Paradigms: Colonial Africanist Historiography and the Question of Audience,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines* 39, no. 3 (2005): 583. See also: Dennis Laumann, *Colonial Africa, 1884–1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

4 David Robinson’s observation from 2000 that, despite the criticisms of oversimplifications, “the dichotomization still affects research subjects, judgements, and basic interpretative texts” is in many ways still true today. See: David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 58. See as well the recent edited volume by Nuno Domingos, Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and Ricardo Roque, which sets out to question “simplistic dualisms underlying the opposition between resistance and domination”: Nuno Domingos, Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, and Ricardo

tempts to explain why some people of the region “let” the colonialists “enter.” By doing so, the chapter hopes to resolve blind spots in the historiography of the colonization of northern Mozambique.

Northern Mozambique was colonized not by the Portuguese state itself, but by a private chartered company, the *Companhia do Nyassa*. The historiographical assessment of the *Companhia*’s reign is unequivocal: weak, but brutal to the utmost. Leroy Vail referred to it as “the rule of the feeble.” His quotation of the British vice-consul based in Porto Amélia (today’s Pemba), who described the *Companhia*’s territories as “a land of blood and tears, where the most brutal ill-treatment is no crime and murder merely a slight indiscretion,” has found numerous recitations.⁵ The *Companhia*’s rule has been compared to the systems of rubber extraction in King Leopold’s Congo and cocoa cultivation on São Tomé.⁶ If there were a list of the worst examples of colonialisms in history, the *Companhia do Nyassa* would certainly rank among the top. William G. Clarence-Smith called it “a prime example of all that was worst in the system of colonial chartered companies,”⁷ and René Pélissier named it the “quintessence of the most egoist European domination,”⁸ stating that its methods “seem to have been taken from a catalog of the worst abuses of Portuguese colonization.”⁹ In light of such a verdict, the matter of what colonization meant for the population of Nkhlongue seems fairly straightforward. One is tempted to already know the perspective of the colonized.

Roque, eds., *Resistance and Colonialism: Insurgent Peoples in World History* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 24.

5 See: Leroy Vail, “Mozambique’s Chartered Companies: The Rule of the Feeble,” *The Journal of African History* 17, no. 3 (1976): 401; Barry Munslow, *Mozambique: The Revolution and Its Origins* (London: Longman, 1983), 30; Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution* (Boulder: Westview, 1983), 37; Barry Munslow, “State Intervention in Agriculture: The Mozambican Experience,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 22, no. 2 (1984): 201; Stuart, “Os Nyanja, o U.M.C.A. e a Companhia do Niassa, 1880–1930,” 23, 44; René Pélissier, *História de Moçambique: Formação e oposição 1854–1918*, vol. 1 (Lisboa: Estampa, 2000), 393; Galli, *Peoples’ Spaces and State Spaces*, 29; Harry G. West, *Kupilikula: Governance and the Invisible Realm in Mozambique* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 101. For an earlier use of the same quotation in connection with immigration from Mozambique to Nyasaland, see: Thomas Galligan, “The Nguru Penetration into Nyasaland,” in *From Nyasaland to Malawi: Studies in Colonial History*, ed. Roderick J. Macdonald (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1975), note 39.

6 Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years* (London: Longman, 1981), 85; Pélissier, *História de Moçambique: Formação e oposição 1854–1918*, 2000, 1:393.

7 William G. Clarence-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825–1975: A Study in Economic Imperialism*, (Manchester 1985), 133.

8 Pélissier, *História de Moçambique: Formação e oposição 1854–1918*, 2000, 1:396.

9 Pélissier, 1:391.

But previous research on the *Companhia* and its territories has its blind spots, and these become most visible when one looks at history through the micro-lens. The central blind spot is a consequence of the fact that pre-colonial “African societies” (not to speak of pre-colonial “African villages”) have been regarded as too homogeneous units living in a well-established equilibrium. This flaw is not a unique feature of research on the *Companhia do Nyassa* but rather a widespread problem of scholarship on colonial conquest and colonization in general. With the exception of the field of the study of slavery and its “abolition” in Africa (see below), many historians tend to neglect the heterogeneity and rivalries within Africa when discussing colonization.¹⁰ Derek Peterson has similarly argued that many accounts of modern Africa “treat colonialism as an encounter between two sides, measuring the inventions of colonial history against a pre-colonial baseline.”¹¹ The problem is that this idea of a baseline distorts history, falling prey to what I have called the Aboriginal Delusion in the introduction of this book. Take, for example, this remark by Malyn Newitt on the relative absence of the *Companhia*’s administration in much of its territories from his otherwise very thoughtful standard work on Mozambican history:

The first fifteen years of the Nyassa Company’s life were, in so far as economic development or the establishment of a modern state were concerned, a farcical failure. [...] But seen from another point of view, these fifteen years saw the chiefs of northern Mozambique mostly retaining their independence and the majority of the African population able to continue their traditional pattern of life without incorporation into the colonial state.¹²

Newitt is certainly right to point out that the *Companhia* had a very limited reach in transforming society in many ways and areas. But he ignores here what he himself so aptly described a few chapters earlier, namely that in reality there was no such thing as a “traditional pattern of life” (anymore) and that the long-distance

¹⁰ My criticism in this regard is certainly not new. For example, as early as 1977, Allen and Barbara Isaacman criticized “[t]he failure of most scholars, including ourselves, to consider carefully the process of class formation during the nineteenth century” with regard to the analysis of colonization. However, I am not entirely convinced that most later works, including their own, have really attempted, let alone managed, to lay open the complexities and implications of political and economic divisions with African societies at the time of colonization. See: Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, “Resistance and Collaboration in Southern and Central Africa, c. 1850–1920,” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 10, no. 1 (1977): 41.

¹¹ Derek R. Peterson, “Culture and Chronology in African History,” *The Historical Journal* 50, no. 2 (2007): 496.

¹² Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 373.

trade of the 19th century had brought about a very strong stratification of society.¹³ The blow of colonization had been preceded by other storms.

While previous storms are often mentioned, their implications are not always fully taken into consideration for the analysis of future ones. Thus, Rosemary Galli mentioned the impact of the slave trade on local society in her outline of the history of Unango, but then spoke only of the "Unango people" when analyzing colonization, implying that all people in Unango had the same perspective.¹⁴ Similarly, in his work on the Makonde Plateau, Harry West wrote how "powerful settlement heads" swallowed "local counterparts into their own settlements, making political subordinates of them and their people" in a pre-colonial region "wracked by drought, famine, interethnic conflict, and slave raiding," only to state somewhat later in the book how colonization "produced tensions between ordinary Muedans and elders [...] used as native intermediaries" and "alienated plateau youths from the heads of their settlements."¹⁵

The point here is not to deny the brutality of colonization nor to understate that colonialism created tensions but to emphasize that ignoring earlier tensions distorts the analysis of colonization and also of the moment when Africans had "moved from being the Enslavable Other to the Enslaving Other."¹⁶ With regard to northern Mozambique, no scholar has yet examined how colonization affected the social hierarchies produced by the slave trade of the 19th century, let alone how these hierarchies affected colonization. We know very little about what colonization meant for the former numerous slaves and serfs, and how they themselves approached this political change. With the lakeshore's "early history" in mind, it becomes clear that different actors had different viewpoints on this new blow of history.

Of course, we can expect that life was different at some point in the past, but I hope it has been adequately shown that the formation of Nkhlongue was anything but idyllic. Here, things had fallen apart long before actual colonization.¹⁷ Undoubtedly, it is easy (and correct) for the analyst to conclude that already Nkho-

¹³ See: Newitt, 267–297.

¹⁴ Galli, *Peoples' Spaces and State Spaces*, 22–32.

¹⁵ West, *Kupilikula*, 20, 83.

¹⁶ Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 104.

¹⁷ In contrast to Chinua Achebe's fictional but influential Igbo village where things began to fall apart with the arrival of the white man. See: Chinua Achebe, *Things Fall Apart* (1958; repr., London: Penguin, 2006). For examples of the questionable influence of Achebe's fictional account on historiography, see: Laumann, *African World Histories*, 14; Philip Curtin, "The European Conquest," in *African History: From Earliest Times to Independence*, by Philip Curtin et al., 2nd ed. (Harlow: Longman, 1995), 417.

longue's formation was conditioned by a global colonial regime (as has been shown in Chapter 2), and that consequently the village's social hierarchies were shaped by the activities of Europeans long before their actual arrival. But in order to understand the perspectives of the people living along the shores of Lake Malawi at the time of "effective occupation," we have to put this analysis aside. It is their perspectives that determined how they reacted to and assessed colonization, and it is their perspectives that I will try to reconstruct in this chapter and the next.

While such issues are new for northern Mozambique, they have been increasingly studied for other regions of Africa. This is especially true of the fate of slavery and slaves during the process of colonization.¹⁸ In addition, this chapter connects to works that have started to explore the role of "intermediaries, interpreters, and clerks" in the making of colonial Africa.¹⁹ However, rather than being a study of colonialism with African agency, it aims at analyzing people's lives at the time of colonization, showing how people saw their circumstances and made their decisions.²⁰

This is no easy task, as source-wise this is a difficult period in the history of Nkhlongue. The archives of the *Companhia do Nyassa* have apparently been de-

18 Frederick Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890–1925* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Ahmad Sikainga, *Slaves into Workers: Emancipation and Labor in Colonial Sudan* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996); Martin A. Klein, *Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Suzanne Miers and Martin A. Klein, eds., *Slavery and Colonial Rule in Africa* (Portland: Frank Cass, 1999); Mann, *Slavery and the Birth of an African City*; Jan-Georg Deutsch, *Emancipation without Abolition in German East Africa, c. 1884–1914* (Oxford: James Currey, 2006); Felicitas Becker et al., "Researching the Aftermath of Slavery in Mainland East Africa: Methodological, Ethical, and Practical Challenges," in *Slavery & Abolition* 44, no. 1 (2023).

19 Lawrance, Osborn, and Roberts, *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks*. For the increasing interest in the agency of "Africans" in the making and working of colonialism, see also: Joël Glasman, "Penser les intermédiaires coloniaux: Note sur les dossiers de carrière de la police du Togo," *History in Africa* 37 (2010): 51–81; John Parker and Richard J. Reid, "Introduction. African Histories: Past, Present, and Future," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History*, ed. John Parker and Richard J. Reid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 9; Heather J. Sharkey, "African Colonial States," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History*, ed. John Parker and Richard J. Reid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 151–152, 162–163; John Parker and Richard Rathbone, *African History: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 109.

20 I take inspiration from Cooper, who has argued for not overly foregrounding colonialism in people's lives but focusing primarily on their viewpoints. See: Cooper, "Conflict and Connection," 1534; Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 8–9.

stroyed,²¹ and the amount of material in the archives of the UMCA in Oxford drops off rapidly for the time after colonization. The interviews are not much help either: this period corresponds exactly to what Jan Vansina called the “floating gap,” the blurred interval between the plenty information of recent and the formalized traditions of origin of earlier times.²²

Still, I trust to be able to present certain insights. The analysis is divided into two parts. In the first part, we will look at colonization through the lens of Chingomanje bin M'ponda, the chief who ruled Nkhlongue at the time. Due to source limitations, this part will focus on the years between the arrival of the first Europeans in the region in the 1880s to about 1902. It will discuss how Chingomanje bin M'ponda skillfully adapted to the challenges of colonization and succeeded in avoiding direct confrontations with European powers despite his slave-trading activities. In the end, he even supported the forces of the *Companhia* in their fight against less compliant chiefs of the region.

The second part of this chapter will reflect on how colonization affected people's everyday lives. The focus will thereby not be on colonial exploitation, which will still be discussed in the next chapter, but on the changing relationships between (former) slaves and slave holders. It will be argued that colonization indeed opened up the space for (former) slaves to shake off their dependence from their masters. To demonstrate this, we will have a look at the changing settlement patterns. It will be shown that most settlements were highly concentrated in the decades before colonization. This changed with the end of the slave trade and the end of the wars connected to it. The end of these wars made it much more feasible for people to settle wherever they wanted. As a result, the previously compact settlements began to spread out all across the region.

4.2 Chief Chingomanje bin M'ponda: One Who Knows How to Speak and Act with Strangers

It is a common claim that many African chiefdoms were colonial inventions, and that many chiefs were appointed by the European powers only following coloniza-

21 Liesegang, “The Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique and Historical Research in Maputo,” 5. In 1938, a Portuguese inspector, however, wrote that the *Companhia's* officials had taken with them all the documents: AHU, N° 1665–1 1B MU ISAU: Armando Pinto Corrêa, “Relatório duma Inspeção às Circunscrições do Distrito de Moçambique (1936–37)” (Lourenço Marques, 1938), 126–127.

22 Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 23.

tion,²³ even though the “nature and extent of ‘invention’ has been called into doubt.”²⁴ This assertion also appeared in some of my interviews in varying guises. One version says that the land around Nkholongue belonged to Nsossa. Chingomanje had no power here. He was a mere visitor from Unango who came to Nkholongue to buy fish. But when he came here, he made friends with Nsossa. And later when Nsossa had to go to the other side of the lake to care for his sick brother, he asked Chingomanje to look after the village in his absence. Now it so happened that the white man arrived at that very moment and thus appointed Chingomanje as the chief of Nkholongue—wrongfully.²⁵

However attractive such a story might be in portraying the appointment of Chingomanje as the result of a cultural misunderstanding in which neither party understood what the other was talking about, or in which Chingomanje cleverly deceived the naive colonizers with long-lasting consequences, it has little to do with what happened in Nkholongue. Chingomanje was in power when the Anglican missionaries first came there in the 1880s, he was in power when a Portuguese military mission visited the place in 1889, and he was in power when the place was finally colonized by the *Companhia do Nyassa* in 1901.

In a way, Chingomanje was no exception. Most chiefs of the region were able to keep their power after colonization. Of course, their influence, rights, and duties changed. But there were fewer replacements than might be expected.²⁶ In another way, however, Chingomanje was an exception. For many of the other slave trading chiefs of some significance were drawn into wars with the European colonizers, and many of them were deposed in the course of colonization. Not so Chingomanje and his relative Kalanje. One might attribute this “accomplishment” to their advantage of being residents in what would become Portuguese territory, as this

23 Kate Baldwin, *The Paradox of Traditional Chiefs in Democratic Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 35–37; Justin Willis, “Chieftaincy,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History*, ed. John Parker and Richard Reid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 213–217; Kristin Phillips, *An Ethnography of Hunger: Politics, Subsistence, and the Unpredictable Grace of the Sun* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), 54–55.

24 Richard Reid, “States of Anxiety: History and Nation in Modern Africa,” *Past & Present* 229, no. 1 (2015): 262. See as well: Spear, “Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa.”

25 PA, I100: interview with P0025 (♀, 1948) (Nkholongue, February 22, 2016), min 00:37:59–00:42:22. For similar and other versions, see: PA, I144: interview with P0411 (♂, 1965) (Nkholongue, June 8, 2016), min 00:31:27–00:33:17; PA, I096: interview with P1216 (♂, 1957) (Malango, February 1, 2016), min 01:19:27–01:25:03.

26 For an exception, see: PA, Chadreque Umali, *História de Nyanjas* (Metangula, 1996), 19; Chauncy Maples, “Letter from Archdeacon Maples,” *CA* 12, no. 134 (February 1894): 26–29; PA, I030: interview with Chief Namtima (♀) and Councillors (Maniamba, April 6, 2012).

gave them more time to adjust to the new situation. However, other chiefs who were based in the future territories of the *Companhia*, such as Mataka or Malinganile, acted differently. They sought confrontation and were both defeated in the end.

For the British territories, John McCracken has argued that the colonial government's determination to impose its "rule by force ensured that there was little chance that even the most diplomatically astute of Yao chiefs could have avoided being sucked into the war."²⁷ The economic interests of the British clashed too much with those of the Yao chiefs. But Chingomanje managed to escape war and remain in power, even if weakened. And it must be emphasized that it was not only the dynasty of the Chingomanjes that survived the end of the slave trade era, but it was one and the same person who remained in power.

Flags and Diplomacy on the Eve of Colonization

Chingomanje bin M'ponda was born around 1850.²⁸ Oral history is very vague about the first Chingomanjes, and it is no easy task to reconcile the information from the interviews with the information from the written sources, since the holders of the title were usually depersonalized in both types of sources and thus just called "Chingomanje" after the name of the dynasty. However, we can assume that Chingomanje bin M'ponda was the second Chingomanje in oral history terms. He received the title in "the year of the comet" (1882) after the death of his predecessor and was probably the first Chingomanje to settle permanently in Nkhlongue.²⁹ From all the information we can gather, it seems most plausible that he died in 1921.³⁰

²⁷ McCracken, *A History of Malawi 1859–1966*, 67.

²⁸ One Anglican missionary estimated Chingomanje's age at 35 to 40 in 1886. See: Chauncy Maples, "Nyassa News," *CA* 4, no. 48 (1886): 186.

²⁹ According to the missionaries, his predecessor died in the "year of the comet," which the missionaries gave as 1882, probably referring to comet C/1882 R1. See: Bellingham, *Diary of a Working Man*; Augustine Ambali, *Thirty Years in Nyasaland* (Westminster: UMCA, 1931), 34–35.

³⁰ The death of Chingomanje in 1921 is reported by the Anglican priest Yohanna Abdallah. However, since the missionaries' reports about Nkhlongue become sparser over time, it is uncertain whether this was really Chingomanje II or already his successor. But we can be fairly certain that Chingomanje bin M'ponda was still in power in 1912, because at that time another missionary wrote that "the old chief Chingomanje has consented to receive a teacher again after the lapse of many years," obviously referring to the same Chingomanje who had sent the missionaries away in 1900. See: Yohanna B. Abdallah, "News from the Stations: VII. Unangu," *NDC*, no. 73 (Octo-

As we have already seen in Chapter 2, Chingomanje II bin M'ponda was a slave trader and slave owner. His village served as a transshipment point for other traders and as an outpost of the Wayao of Unango. Furthermore, he was an ally of the Jumbe of Nkhotakota. We can note that the dynasty of the Chingomanjes was a relatively important player in regional politics, certainly when compared to today. However, if one follows the interpretation laid out in Chapter 2, it can also be noted that the Chingomanjes had already lost political and economic ground on the eve of European colonization. Attacks by various opponents such as the Angoni, Makanjira, or Mataka had disputed their position and driven them from their previous bases in Mbemba and Lussefa. Their ally Jumbe showed little willingness to come to their assistance, as he was obviously in trouble himself. The Chingomanjes' loss of status becomes even more apparent if Roscher's "Kingomanga" is considered as part of this dynasty (see pp. 67–69). According to the testimony of Roscher's servant, Kingomanga was a territorial chief capable of mobilizing a considerable number of men. He put the strength of Kingomanga's force that arrested the murderers of Roscher at 50 men.³¹

Chingomanje II bin M'ponda still breathed some of this glory, but reality had made him a rather minor player in the slave traders' power struggle. "He had a few guns," is how missionary William Percival Johnson described him.³² The Anglican missionaries could observe his decline in real time. While William Bellingham described Nkhlongue as a large village in 1885, Chingomanje was said to have only very few people in 1887.³³ Bishop Smythies wrote that Chingomanje had lost many of his people in attacks by other Yao chiefs.³⁴ Johnson went so far as to pity "the wretched slaver, who has lost so many of his family," saying that he always appeared "to be very lonely in his house with the stockade round."³⁵ In 1894, Johnson estimated the population of Nkhlongue to be a mere 300.³⁶

Yet despite his insecure position, Chingomanje could still speak with a considerable amount of self-confidence. Johnson credited him with "plenty courage of a sort," and stated that Chingomanje would just laugh when he, Johnson, spoke about

ber 1921): 12–13; Frank Winspear and William Percival Johnson, "News from the Stations: II. The Chauncy Maples," *NDC*, no. 37 (October 1912): 935.

31 Rigby, "Proceedings No. 43 of 1860," lii.

32 Johnson, *The Great Water*, 101.

33 AUMCA, A1(VI)A, f. 946–949: Letter from William Bellingham to W.H. Penney ([Likoma], October 1, 1885), f. 947; AUMCA, A1(V)A Printed Matters, f. 19: Charles Alan Smythies, *A Journey from Zanzibar to Lake Nyassa and Back, in the Year 1887* (Westminster: UMCA, n.d.), 13.

34 AUMCA, A1(V)B, f. 368–404: Charles Alan Smythies, [Diary/Report of Bishop Smythies' Third Visit to Nyasa (July to Sept.)] (Likoma, 1887).

35 Johnson, *African Reminiscences*, 146.

36 Johnson, "More about the Yaos," *TNN*, no. 3 (February 1894): 78.

the Angoni.³⁷ On one occasion, Chingomanje explained to Johnson that he “would willingly fight the Angoni in the day time,” but since they “came at any time in the night, it was worth while to throw them a truss of cloth (as you might throw something to the wolves) for they always went off with it.”³⁸ And another time Johnson heard him bargaining with a Swahili trader over “hides with two legs (i. e. slaves), and hides with four legs (i. e. goats).”³⁹

Chingomanje's self-confidence was not entirely without foundation. Although weakened by the course of events, Chingomanje II was no political nobody: when a group of Angoni threatened the region in 1887, many inhabitants of Metangula, including their chief Chilombe, sought refuge in his stockade.⁴⁰ In an interesting inversion of what happened exactly 100 years later during the Mozambican Civil War (see Chapter 9, pp. 345–346), Chilombe was said to always sleep in Nkholongue and only go to his village during daytime.⁴¹ The story of Chilombe's flight to Nkholongue during the Angoni wars was even related in two of my interviews.⁴² After all, Chingomanje still had armed men and he had powerful allies.⁴³

But Chingomanje's readiness to pay a ransom to the Angoni in order to prevent an attack on his village was certainly not a strong man's answer in everyone's eyes.⁴⁴ For Johnson, there was no doubt that Chingomanje's self-confident talk was above all a sign of his self-overestimation, and he emphasized Chingomanje's political insignificance whenever possible, and sometimes even in quite derogatory terms, describing his village, for example, as “completely pagan with a veneer of cosmopolitan brigandage.”⁴⁵ But precisely such formulations suggest that Johnson's repeated emphasis on Chingomanje's unimportance also resulted from his

³⁷ Johnson, *African Reminiscences*, 143.

³⁸ Johnson, *The Great Water*, 19, 101.

³⁹ Johnson, “More about the Yaos,” *TNN*, no. 3 (February 1894): 78. For other description of the same scene, see: Johnson, *African Reminiscences*, 145; Johnson, “Mohammedanism on Lake Nyasa (1st Part),” *CA* 18, no. 208 (1900): 54.

⁴⁰ Johnson, *African Reminiscences*, 142.

⁴¹ AUMCA, TC/G: George H. Swinny, “Nyasaland Diaries (1884–1887), Vol. III,” 37.

⁴² PA, I113: interview with P0367 (♂, 1936) (Nkholongue, April 13, 2016), min 01:27:51–01:29:20; PA, I017: interview with P0792 (♂, 1917), P0793 (♀, 1939) (Nkholongue, October 14, 2011), min 00:33:40–00:39:00.

⁴³ On the existence of guns in Nkholongue, see: Johnson, *The Great Water*, 101; AUMCA, TC/G: George H. Swinny, “Nyasaland Diaries (1884–1887), Vol. III,” 34–35.

⁴⁴ AUMCA, TC/G: George H. Swinny, “Nyasaland Diaries (1884–1887), Vol. III,” 41.

⁴⁵ Johnson, *African Reminiscences*, 141. See also: AUMCA, A1(XXIV), f. 202–207: Letter from William Percival Johnson to Bishop (Monkey Bay, [1890]); Johnson, “More about the Yaos,” *TNN*, no. 3 (February 1894): 78; Johnson, “Inclosure 2 in No. 2: Mr. Johnson to Commissioner Johnston,” 7–8. Johnson's view was also shared by Sheriff: Sheriff, “A Letter from Mr. Sheriff, Captain of the ‘Charles Janson,’” *CA* 9, no. 99 (March 1891): 38.

unease with other fellow missionaries who, in his eyes, had been successfully lulled by Chingomanje, the “wretched slaver.” Not without reason did Johnson attest to him being “a clever man [who] knew how to speak and act with strangers.”⁴⁶

Chingomanje played his cards quite successfully, at least if one considers his rather insecure position. It is obvious that he saw the appearance of a new player, the Anglican missionaries, as a chance to regain some of his standing or at least to protect himself from further losses. So it was probably not only the prospect of material gains or status symbols, which I have referred to in Chapter 3, but also political considerations that prompted him to let the missionaries come to his village. A very similar argument has been made by Ian Linden for the chief Mponda II at the south end of the lake, who accepted the Catholic missionaries of the White Fathers in his town. Linden wrote: “By being housed inside the town stockade the Catholics would [...] be a guarantee of intervention by at least one of the European powers if the town was again in danger of being overrun.”⁴⁷

According to William Bellingham, Chingomanje had even been anxious to have the missionaries in his village.⁴⁸ In any case, their presence seems to have helped prevent an attack by the Angoni in 1887. It was the missionaries who went ahead to the Angoni’s camp to negotiate. According to Swinny, the leaders of the Angoni “hid themselves, being afraid of the Europeans,” at the approach of the missionaries.⁴⁹ After the incident, Swinny claimed:

I may add that the [Angoni] appear to have lost none of their dread of a white face [...] Also the fact of our being resident just outside Chingomanje’s village may have had something to do with their temperate behaviour towards that chief.⁵⁰

Chingomanje’s attitude toward the missionaries was situational and calculated, depending on what they would provide him in changing circumstances. We have already seen that the relations between the mission and Chingomanje began to cool down considerably after Swinny’s death and froze up completely in 1890. The rea-

⁴⁶ Johnson, *African Reminiscences*, 141.

⁴⁷ Linden, *Catholics, Peasants, and Chewa Resistance in Nyasaland*, 23.

⁴⁸ AUMCA, A1(VI)A, f. 946–949: Letter from William Bellingham to W.H. Penney ([Likoma], October 1, 1885); Bellingham, *Diary of a Working Man*, 81.

⁴⁹ AUMCA, TC/G: George H. Swinny, “Nyasaland Diaries (1884–1887), Vol. III,” 39. These Angoni belonged to the chiefdom of the Angoni chief Mhalule. See: TNA, FO/84/1883, f. 250–256: Acting Consul Buchanan to Consul Hawes (Mudi, April 12, 1888), 2. Mhalule was the paramount chief of the Njelu chiefdom c. 1874–89. See: P.H. Gulliver, “Political Evolution in the Songea Ngoni Chiefdoms, 1850–1905,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 37, no. 1 (1974): 82–97.

⁵⁰ Swinny, “With Chingomanje,” *CA* 5, no. 56 (1887): 115. See also: Swinny, “With Chingomanje,” *CA* 5, no. 56 (1887): 118.

sons for his decision to expel the missionaries were certainly varied, but two main causes can be discerned: first, it had become obvious that the British presence could do more harm than good to his political and economic position. And second, there is reason to believe that the missionaries' place as gift-giver and European shield was to be filled by someone else, for, in the meantime, a new player had appeared on the scene.

The Portuguese military expedition under António Maria Cardoso reached the lake at its southern end on December 12, 1888. It was 1,200 men and 2,000 carriers strong. The original objective of Cardoso's expedition had been to establish a permanent Portuguese base in the town of Chief Cuirassia, who had already accepted Portuguese vassalage during an earlier mission in 1886. But Cardoso found out that Cuirassia had been driven from the lake by Makanjira in the meantime. He wrote back home that it would be impossible to comply with the original instructions since Makanjira was opposed to their aims. However, while waiting for new instructions, Cardoso began a rather successful series of treaty-making with chiefs along the eastern shores of Lake Malawi.⁵¹

Interestingly, most of these treaties were not made with chiefs living at the southern end of the lake, where the Portuguese mission was based, but with chiefs living in the area extending north from Makanjira's to present-day Cobué.⁵² The first of these chiefs to accept Portuguese vassalage on January 17, 1889, was none other than Kalanje. Other chiefs of the region followed him in March 1889, including Maniamba (Ngolocolo), Masanje (Messumba), Maendaenda (Chia), Mapunda (Ngofi), Chitesi (Chigoma) and Chingomanje bin M'ponda. Of all these chiefs, Kalanje was the only one who signed the treaty personally in his town.⁵³ All other chiefs, including Chingomanje bin M'ponda, sent an envoy to Cuirassia to sign the respective document. Three months later, Kalanje, Masanje, Maniamba, and Chingomanje sent emissaries to Quelimane on the Indian Ocean to confirm their vassalage in front of the Portuguese governor of the district.⁵⁴

In the treaties, the chiefs agreed to provide protection to all Portuguese travelers passing through their territory, to obey all orders of the Portuguese king, and

51 Eric Axelson, *Portugal and the Scramble for Africa: 1875–1891* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1967), 183–185.

52 Antonio M. Cardoso, "Documento N.º 38: O Sr. Antonio Maria Cardoso ao Ministro da Marinha, telegramma, transmitido por Lourenço Marques, 10 de Abril de 1889," in *Negocios externos: Documentos apresentados ás cortes na sessão legislativa de 1890* (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1890), 19.

53 According to the treaty, the signing took place in his capital on the eastern shores of the lake. This probably refers to Meluluca, as this was frequently called Kalanje's town on the lake.

54 *Termos de Vassallagem nos Territorios de Machona, Zambezia e Nyassa 1858 a 1889* (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1890), 4, 55–59.

to defend and honor the Portuguese flag they had received. The British—missionaries and civil servants alike—were furious over these treaties. They complained that the chiefs had been enticed into signing the documents by the offer of gifts and by the expectation of receiving guns and gunpowder.⁵⁵ To demonstrate the political worthlessness of these treaties, Johnson later recounted a moment when he was in Njiri (near Unango) looking for his list of his local parishioners, which he had misplaced. On that occasion, the people of Njiri allegedly handed him a piece of paper that turned out to be precisely such a treaty.⁵⁶ Johnson explained:

[I]t was supposed that it might be the piece of paper I was looking for, as one piece of paper was considered as good as another. This will show how little the natives understood the meaning of the agreements.⁵⁷

Writing in a similar vein, the British vice-consul of Quelimane, who had attended the ratification ceremony involving Chingomanje's envoy in June 1889, said that it had been a farce.⁵⁸ In his words:

Some five or 6 "sovas" (chiefs) were supposed to be represented, each by two ambassadors, who on being questioned did not seem to know in the least whom they represented; and so manifest was the muddle that the Governor postponed the ceremony for a couple of days to afford time for the proper schooling of the ambassadors.⁵⁹

55 William Percival Johnson, "The Portuguese Flag in Nyassaland," *CA* 7, no. 80 (August 1889): 123–124; Axelson, *Portugal and the Scramble for Africa*, 184–185; "Letters from Rev. W. P. Johnson," *CA* 7, no. 78 (June 1889): 95–96.

56 The chief of Njiri is Licole. A treaty with a "Licole Massussa," based "east of Lake Nyassa," was made on 19 August 1889. See: *Termos de Vassallagem nos Territorios de Machona, Zambezia e Nyassa 1858 a 1889*, 71–72.

57 Johnson, *African Reminiscences*, 195.

58 Vice-Consul Ross did not provide any information on the date of the ceremony or the chiefs involved. However, it is clear from the available documents that his account referred to the ratification ceremony that involved Chingomanje. According to Portuguese sources, four ratification ceremonies took place in Quelimane in the first half of 1889. One on April 6 involving two chiefs; one on April 11 again involving two chiefs; one on May 27 involving just one; and one on June 15 involving five chiefs including Chingomanje. The final clue pointing to this interpretation comes from the wording of Ross' message, which reads: "Since writing on [June] the 19th. no more 'termos de vassallagem' have been made by the natives from the Nyassa before the local authorities. The last one which I was invited to attend showed plainly what a farce these 'termos' have been." See: *Termos de Vassallagem nos Territorios de Machona, Zambezia e Nyassa 1858 a 1889*; TNA, FO/84/1969, f. 200–205; Vice-Consul Ross to Acting Consul Smith, July 11, 1889.

59 TNA, FO/84/1969, f. 200–205; Vice-Consul Ross to Acting Consul Smith, July 11, 1889.

It is of course tempting to follow the cynicism inherent in these two statements. At first glance, one is invited to question the general authenticity of these contracts: if there were no other circumstantial evidence it would seem highly justified to doubt whether these encounters took place at all. The treaties instead seem to constitute an arbitrary compilation of names of alleged chiefs and their entourage. The spelling of the names is totally different from that used by the Anglicans, Kalanje given as “Carange” and Chingomanje as “Quingomage bin Maponda.” References to the locations of the respective chiefdoms are almost non-existent, usually indicating just “East of Nyassa.” Without historical and geographical knowledge of the region it is impossible to get anything out of these contracts. From a legal perspective, they appear to be as improvised and worthless as the British vice-consul depicted them.

However, the cynicism masks the fact that this treaty-making was not just about buying off “ignorant natives” with dubious presents. There is no doubt that both the British vice-consul and missionary Johnson themselves either misinterpreted or misrepresented the political and cultural codes of the whole business.

The central clue to this can be found by a close reading of the proper contracts through our microhistorical lens: among Chingomanje’s envoys in Quelimane was one of his sons, named as Mussélímo Chingomanje in the contract.⁶⁰ The point is that this Mussélímo Chingomanje also appears as a witness to Kalanje’s ratification, but this time he is identified as Kalanje’s nephew. This is a detail which perfectly reflects the brotherly relationship between the two rulers, and a detail that would hardly have found its way into the treaties had these encounters taken place with the sort of randomness as pictured by the British vice-consul.

It is likely that the Portuguese were indeed somewhat ignorant of the specific state of affairs of their new “vassals” and may have even missed the fact that Kalanje and Chingomanje were related, since they even spelled Mussélímo’s name differently in the two treaties. But the fact that the initial agreement with the most important of these five chiefs was signed in his country, while the other lesser chiefs had sent envoys to the Portuguese camp, suggests that the Portuguese were well aware of the local power hierarchies. These hierarchies are also reflected from the perspective of the “vassals”: while the other chiefs all sent family members as “ambassadors,” Kalanje’s group included his scribe. The fact that Kalanje indeed had his own clerk is supported by other sources from the Anglican missionaries.⁶¹

⁶⁰ One wonders if this “Mussélímo Chingomanje” might be identical with “Salimo Chingomanje” (see Chapter 3, p. 97).

⁶¹ “Notes,” *TNN*, no. 6 (November 1894): 207; J.E. Hine, “Opening of a New Station at the Yao Country,” *CA* 12, no. 134 (February 1894): 25.

Kalanje, Chingomanje, and the other chiefs would barely have sent emissaries to Quelimane, which is more than 350 miles away from their homes, if they had not considered these treaties important. There is no doubt that Kalanje, Chingomanje and some other chiefs did indeed recognize the treaties as some form of political allegiance. They knew perfectly well that the hoisting of the Portuguese flag had a political meaning, and those who had not yet grasped that meaning would now quickly learn it. This becomes clear when one looks at what happened on the ground after the signing of the treaties.

Shortly after Chief Chitesi, who was based opposite Likoma Island, had received and hoisted the flag, missionary Johnson rushed to him to persuade him to give it back.⁶² In May 1889, Bishop Maples wrote with satisfaction that none of the chiefs on the shores who had received the flag still retained it. He also attributed this development to the fact that Makanjira had sent an envoy as far as Chitesi's to "make quite certain that Chitesi was not flying the flag, and to tell him that Makanjira had utterly rejected all Portuguese overtures, and begged all his friends, *i.e.* those Nyanja chiefs, Chitesi, Maendaenda, Masanje &c., to do the same, and to persist in so doing."⁶³ While this allayed the missionaries' fear of a Portuguese "invasion," it clearly shows that, by May 1889 at the latest, even the most "out-of-the-way" chiefs must have been aware of the political nature of the whole affair.

Interestingly, some chiefs did neither what Makanjira demanded nor what the missionaries thought they did. Instead, they kept the flag and when the *Companhia* arrived to colonize the territory more than ten years later, they were still in possession of it and now could try to utilize their asset if they so wanted. In the case of Chingomanje, an officer of the *Companhia* reported in 1901:

This chief has the Portuguese flag given to him by Mr. A. M. Cardoso on 6 May 1889, and he ratified his vassalage in the middle of June of the same year in front of the ex-district of Quelimane. He is a friend of the Portuguese and obsequious.⁶⁴

Even more revealing is a look at what had happened in the meantime. By 1893, the Portuguese forces had long since disappeared from the lake, and there was no sign of them returning any time soon. The British, however, were becoming firmly es-

⁶² Johnson, "The Portuguese Flag in Nyassaland," *CA* 7, no. 80 (August 1889).

⁶³ It is "Chitezi," "Makanjila," and "Nyassa" in the original. See: Chauncy Maples, "The Portuguese on the Nyassa," *CA* 7, no. 82 (October 1889): 147.

⁶⁴ AHM, Códice 11 – 2485: Documento N.º XXXVII: Extractos dos apontamentos particulares do Capitão Trindade dos Santos, relativos estabelecimentos das missões na região do Lago, in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 58.

tablished on the other side of the lake. Moreover, they were fighting the slave trade with full force, controlling traffic on the lake and confiscating dhows if necessary. At this point of time, Chingomanje sent a message to the Anglican mission of Msumba. The incident was reported in *Mtenga Watu*, the mission's Chinyanja “news-paper,” as follows:

In the month of January, the children of Chingomanje, by the name of Bwana Azizi and Abdallah, came here. They were together with the children of Achibwana, Kachapuchapu Kanza and Medi. All of them brought a letter [saying] that Bwana Chingomanje wishes to reconcile with the whites and that Mdachi (Kalanje) wanted the English to give him the flag for his dhow.⁶⁵

Missionary Johnson later reported the case to the British commissioner of the British Central Africa Protectorate (later Nyasaland) with the following words:

I HAVE [sic] had the pleasure of conveying to you wishes for peace and for the Flag from Kalanje of Unango, and Mkalawili—this in the substantial form of messengers of some rank, amongst them Kalanje has sent his heir. Chingomanje, who sends his heir, is Kalanje's younger relative, only important from his dhows. Kalanje and Mkalawili own the country from Msumba to Makanjira's boundary. Kalanje is most afraid of his dhows, and Mkalawili most afraid of his neighbour Makanjira. I have told them a Flag means “kushika mguu,” [“to become subject to someone”] and that I, as a teacher, have nothing to do with it, but hope for peace. Kalanje sends the largest caravans to the coast, and promises (as far as that goes) to stop slaves going. Mr. Nicoll [the British Resident in Nkhotakota] last time received these people civilly, and said he would refer the matter to you. This trip they come down again, and wish to go on in our boat to wait on you in person. I can but recommend their suit to your kind attention, rejoicing meanwhile that their country is reopened to Europeans.⁶⁶

I was unable to find any explicit evidence regarding a possible response from the British commissioner. Certainly, one can expect that the British government did not really consider this an opportunity to colonize the area around Nkholongue, since this territory had been granted to Portugal in the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1891

⁶⁵ It is “Chingomanji” in the original. See: Richard Philipo Mzinda, “Nkani Za Msumba,” *Mtenga Watu* 2, no. 12 (April 1893). The sentence about Kalanje's desire for a flag is somewhat corrupted in the Chinyanja original, which makes an accurate translation difficult. There is however little doubt that the meaning has been correctly reflected, since the same request was described unambiguously by another member of the Anglican church in another article. See: William Y., “Nkani Za Kumuka Kuunangu,” *Mtenga Watu* 2, no. 19 (August 1894): 282–285.

⁶⁶ It is “Unengo,” “Msumbu,” and “Makanjila” in the original. See: Johnson, “Inclosure 2 in No. 2: Mr. Johnson to Commissioner Johnston.”

in spite of Portugal's total absence from the region.⁶⁷ However, a little over a year after these diplomatic endeavors, the British vice-consul Sharpe observed how Kalanje was flying the British flag on his dhows.⁶⁸ At the same time, Bishop Maples reported that Kalanje was still "sporting" the Portuguese flag on his Unango hill.⁶⁹ Obviously, Kalanje and Chingomanje were serving two masters, but primarily their own ends. It is also noteworthy in this context that Kalanje—who hoisted the Portuguese flag and the Union Jack simultaneously—was calling himself *mdachi*, the Kiswahili expression for "a German," ostensibly because in this way Kalanje, whose caravans also crossed into German territory, wanted to express his status, since the "Germans" were said to be such a powerful nation.⁷⁰

Kalanje and Chingomanje had adapted to the new situation fairly quickly. These were not the seducible chiefs of imperial imaginations, but experienced diplomats. And it seems that Chingomanje himself thought that he was coping well with the new challenges. For it was around this time that missionary Johnson heard a Swahili trader flatter Chingomanje by expressing admiration at "his having the flags of all nations in his village."⁷¹ Johnson, who should have known better, refuted this flattery and rather triumphantly assured his readers that Chingomanje's village "had no flag of any kind."⁷²

Johnson missed the punchline. Chingomanje, together with his relative Kalanje, not only had "the flags of all nations," but also successfully hosted the representatives of different "nations" in his village: the missionaries reopened their school in Nkholongue in 1895 or 1896, this time run by what they called a "native teacher."⁷³ And at the same time, Nkholongue was also the place of residence of some Swahili traders and the aforementioned Sheik Bwana, Jumbe's former

⁶⁷ Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 352–355.

⁶⁸ TNA, FO/2/66, f. 179–191: Alfred Sharpe (Vice-Consul) to the Commissioner, March 14, 1894. For another identical observation at around the same time, see: AUMCA, E1, f. 1001–1002: Letter from William Percival Johnson to Bishop ([1894]). It needs to be emphasized that this observation was made before the British took direct political control of Nkhotakota and officially began to hand out British flags to all dhows going there. For this development, see: Sim, *Life and Letters*, 111.

⁶⁹ Maples, "Unangu," *TNN*, no. 2 (November 1893): 49.

⁷⁰ Abdallah, "A Letter From Unangu," *African Tidings*, no. 68 (June 1895). For Kalanje being called *mdachi*, see also: Mzinda, "Nkani Za Msumba," *Mtenga Watu* 2, no. 12 (April 1893). For Kalanje's caravans going to German territory, see: AUMCA, A1(XI), f. 457–462: Letter from Bishop Hine to Travers (Unangu, May 22, 1901). According to the Anglican priest Abdallah, Kalanje had received a black *joho*—a sort of a cloak—as a present from the "Germans" and was gladly wearing it whenever possible. See: Abdallah, "A Letter From Unangu," *African Tidings*, no. 68 (June 1895).

⁷¹ Johnson, "More about the Yaos," *TNN*, no. 3 (February 1894): 78.

⁷² Johnson, "More about the Yaos," *TNN*, no. 3 (February 1894): 78.

⁷³ AUMCA, E2, f. 142: R. Webb, "African Tour May 1896 – Nov. 1896," 161; Robert Webb, *A Visit to Africa 1896* (Westminster: UMCA, 1897), 24.

head teacher in Nkhotakota, who had come here into exile after the last Jumbe had been deposed by the British administration.⁷⁴

Chingomanje and Kalanje cast their nets wide and did not cease their trading activities either. They, however, adapted to the new situation and seem to have avoided trading in slaves, concentrating instead on the “legitimate” ivory trade. Certainly, the missionaries always suspected that Kalanje had not given up the “illegitimate” trade,⁷⁵ but Kalanje and Chingomanje were clever or lucky enough to not get caught in slave trading on the lake. There is little concrete evidence about the continuation of trading activities in Nkhlongue in the 1890s, but in 1895 Nkhlongue was still described as “a favourite port for the dhows.”⁷⁶ Furthermore, in 1899, shortly before Nkhlongue’s colonization by the *Companhia*, a new dhow was built in the village.⁷⁷ This can be taken as a clear sign that Chingomanje was not willing to leave the trade to the British, who were about to oust the local traders from the lake transport.⁷⁸

By the time the *Companhia*’s troops arrived in late 1900, Kalanje and Chingomanje had certainly already lost some of their former power; but in some ways their hold also seemed less threatened than it had been some 20 years before. Their arch enemy Makanjira had been deposed by the British, and the Angoni subjugated by German forces. Mataka, another of their enemies, had already been challenged by a joint British-Portuguese military expedition, which was reportedly actively welcomed by the Yao chiefs of Unango.⁷⁹ For Kalanje and Chingomanje, the future did not look so bleak on the eve of colonization.

The Arrival of the *Companhia* in Late 1900

The way they were colonized must therefore have come as a surprise to them, if not a blow to their ideas. We have to be critical of the reports about the *Compan-*

74 For the traders, see: “Notes,” *TNN*, no. 8 (May 1895): 8. For Sheik Bwana, see Chapter 3, p. 100.

75 Glossop, “From Likoma to Unangu,” *CA* 13, no. 154 (October 1895): 149; Sim, *Life and Letters*, 116, 144. This suspicion was certainly also fueled by the fact that Kalanje repeatedly expressed his opposition to the policy of abolition in front of the missionaries. See for example: Maples, “Unangu,” *TNN*, no. 2 (November 1893): 49.

76 Glossop, “From Likoma to Unangu,” *CA* 13, no. 154 (October 1895): 1895.

77 AUMCA, A1(XII), f. 414–423: Letter from Herbert Barnes to His Mother (Losefa, November 26, 1899).

78 For the ousting of local traders, see: TNA, FO/2/68, f. 79–80: John L. Nicoll to C. A. Edwards (Kajulu, August 28, 1894); Glossop, “From Likoma to Unangu,” *CA* 13, no. 154 (October 1895): 149.

79 AUMCA, A1(X-XI), f. 275–279: Letter from Bishop Hine to Mr. Travers (S.S. Charles Janson, March 9, 1898).

hia's arrival in the region, because they mainly represent the views of the missionaries of the UMCA on the events. They were certainly not neutral observers of these events. However, that the *Companhia*'s initial appearance was accompanied by a particularly high level of violence and injustices is beyond question. Still, there is also reason to believe that the British missionaries and their supposed "subjects" were disproportionately intimidated compared to other residents of the region as the Portuguese officers were obviously anxious to demonstrate who the new masters of the territory were.

It was certainly no coincidence that Messumba, which had become the center of the Anglican church on the "Portuguese" mainland, was chosen as location for the *Companhia*'s first headquarters. On December 23, 1900, the Portuguese commander José Nolasco selected a site for the construction of the Portuguese fort, "a spot close to the Mission and between it and the main part of the village—a spot also crowded with houses."⁸⁰ According to missionary Herbert Barnes, Nolasco ordered the immediate demolition of these 30 to 40 houses. If one follows Barnes, the situation escalated on Christmas Day. In the morning, a "foraging excursion" of the *Companhia*'s *askaris* ("native" soldiers) in the village had startled the inhabitants of Messumba, causing many to flee into the hills. Then, in the afternoon, the remaining people were herded to work at the fort's construction site, and even required to continue working after sunset. According to Barnes, Christmas Day culminated with the Portuguese forces surrounding the church during the evening service and pointing their rifles through the building's "open" windows. When people left the church after worship, many of them were beaten up.⁸¹

Most probably, the *Companhia*'s construction plans in Messumba at a moment so central to the Christian liturgical year were little more than a show of force as the building site in Messumba was abandoned before anything substantial had been built, and the headquarters was moved to Metangula, which had actually been designated as the location for the *Companhia*'s headquarters before the *Companhia*'s troops arrived at the lake.⁸² But while much of the "preliminary bluster"⁸³

⁸⁰ AUMCA, C4, f. 112–119: Herbert Barnes, "The Portuguese on the East Side of Lake Nyasa," December 1900, 2.

⁸¹ AUMCA, C4, f. 112–119: Herbert Barnes, "The Portuguese on the East Side of Lake Nyasa," December 1900. For a description of the same events by another member of the UMCA, see: Ambali, *Thirty Years in Nyasaland*, 54–57.

⁸² AUMCA, A1(X-XI), f. 275–279: Letter from Bishop Hine to Mr. Travers (S.S. Charles Janson, March 9, 1898). Metangula had even been inspected by Portuguese officers in 1898 with a view to future occupation. See: MNA, 2/KOM/1/1: "Kota Kota Mission Diary, 1894 August 17–1911 January 2," entry dated February 26, 1898.

⁸³ AUMCA, C4, f. 50–51: Letter from [Bishop Hine] to Mr. Travers (Mponda's, December 31, 1900), 4.

was directed against the mission and its “subjects,”⁸⁴ abuses were reported from everywhere, seemingly arbitrarily directed against everyone. At the construction site of the *Companhia*’s headquarters in Metangula, “multitudes of men and women” were reportedly forced “to work at building and getting materials without any pay whatever.”⁸⁵ The *Companhia*’s *askaris*, it was stated, had “free license to insult, outrage, rob and ill-use in any way the native population in all the places they enter”⁸⁶ and “to seize for immoral purposes any women they come across.”⁸⁷ The missionaries mainly attributed this “abominable ill-treatment” of the “natives” to the fact that the *Companhia*’s *askaris*—mostly Makua soldiers from the coast—were not provided with food, but had to procure it themselves by looting in the villages.⁸⁸

Even though Chingomanje was called a “friend” by one of the *Companhia*’s officials, his village does not seem to have been spared such mistreatment. According to missionary Eyre, in December 1901, Chingomanje was ordered to send a woman to the Portuguese fort or else his village would be punished—a woman was sent. And at an unspecified date of the same year, Chingomanje told the missionaries that a woman of his village had been forcibly taken to Metangula by the *askaris*, but that he had managed to get her back by going to the Portuguese commander.⁸⁹

Chingomanje was not the only chief to face such demands. In October, the Unango chiefs Kalanje and Nampanda were also forced to send a woman each to the *Companhia*’s headquarters. Bishop Hine explained this practice by saying that the Portuguese officers wanted concubines for themselves and their *askaris*.⁹⁰ However, the fact that each chief was required to send one woman clearly shows that this

84 Other examples come from Meluluca where the *Companhia*’s officers were said to have threatened to tie up the Anglican teacher unless he closed the school. While, in Mtonya, the teacher Petro was said to have been flogged for no reason “except that he was one of ‘the English’.” See: AUMCA, C4: Letter from [Bishop Hine] to Mr. Travers (Likoma, December 9, 1900).

85 “The Nyasa Disturbances,” CA 19, no. 221 (May 1901): 80.

86 AUMCA, C4, f. 50–51: Letter from [Bishop Hine] to Mr. Travers (Mponda’s, December 31, 1900), 1.

87 AUMCA, C4, f. 50–51: Letter from [Bishop Hine] to Mr. Travers (Mponda’s, December 31, 1900), 2.

88 AUMCA, C4, f. 112–119: Herbert Barnes, “The Portuguese on the East Side of Lake Nyasa,” December 1900, 7; MNA, UMCA 1/2/17/1: Letter from C.B. Eyre to the Chairman and Directors of the *Companhia do Nyassa*, Lisbon (Westminster, April 23, 1902), 4.

89 MNA, UMCA 1/2/17/1: C.B. Eyre, “Appendix to a Letter from C.B. Eyre to the Chairman and Directors of the *Companhia do Nyassa*, Lisbon” (April 23, 1902), 3–4. A copy of the same letter can also be found in: AUMCA, TC/G2: Letter from C.B. Eyre (Westminster, April 23, 1902); AHM, Códice 11–2485: Documento N.º LXXVII: Relatório, de 23 de Abril de 1902, de Reverendo Eyre ao Presidente das Secções Estrangeiras, in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 115–134.

90 AUMCA, A1(XIII), f. 5–8: Letter from Bishop Hine to Mr. Travers (Msumba, October 6, 1901). See as well: MNA, UMCA 1/2/17/1: Letter from C.B. Eyre to the Chairman and Directors of the *Companhia do Nyassa*, Lisbon (Westminster, April 23, 1902), 6.

sexual abuse was certainly also intended as a show of force not only against the abused women but also against the newly colonized chiefdoms as a whole.

Still, we can doubt whether this was really perceived as a humiliation by the (former) slave-trading chiefs like Chingomanje or Kalanje, as long as they could choose which woman was to be sent. It is telling that Chingomanje sent a woman when summoned to do so but reclaimed another who had been taken by the *askaris* without his consent. It must also be considered that other chiefs acted differently: in Chilowelo (south of Lussefa), for example, many women were said to have gone into hiding because their chief had refused the *Companhia's* demand stating that no woman was available for such a purpose.⁹¹

But the task of reconstructing Chingomanje's perspective and of analyzing his actions in this matter is even more complicated. For around the time of the arrival of the *Companhia*, Nkhologue's Anglican "native" teacher—who, by the way, lived with his wife in the village⁹²—had eloped into British territory with one of Chingomanje's wives.⁹³ While this was possibly—provided she left voluntarily—not so bad for the woman concerned, it seems evident that for Chingomanje this must have come as a great personal humiliation, for which he held the missionaries responsible. As consequence of the incident, Chingomanje barred the missionaries from having a teacher in his village for more than ten years.⁹⁴

The most interesting part of this story is, however, related to the fact that Chingomanje filed a complaint about this case at the *Companhia's* headquarters. The *Companhia's* officials then turned to the authorities of British Central Africa in order to get the woman back—without success.⁹⁵ Chingomanje thus complained to the missionaries about the *Companhia's* misconduct, and to the *Companhia's*

91 MNA, UMCA 1/2/17/1: C.B. Eyre, "Appendix to a Letter from C.B. Eyre to the Chairman and Directors of the Companhia do Nyassa, Lisbon" (April 23, 1902), 3.

92 Wimbush, "A Survey of the Work of the 'Charles Janson,'" CA 16, no. 183 (March 1898): 44.

93 The missionaries remained rather vague about this incident in their publications, only referring to the misconduct of their teacher in articles published many years later: Winspear and Johnson, "News from the Stations: II. The Chauncy Maples," NDC, no. 37 (October 1912): 935; William Percival Johnson and H.A. Machell Cox, "News from the Stations: Station III," NDC, no. 65 (October 1919): 17–22. More detailed information on the case can only be found in unpublished material of the mission. See: AUMCA, AI(VI)B, f. 1802: Notes for a Biog. of W. P. Johnson, pt. Natives, N. 4.

94 Winspear and Johnson, "News from the Stations: II. The Chauncy Maples," NDC, no. 37 (October 1912): 935.

95 AHM, Códice 11–2485: Documento N.º XXXIX: Extracto do relatório do Sargento Mario Viegas, Chefe do Concelho do Lago, escripto no Ibo, em 20 de Dezembro de 1901, in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 68. See also: AHM, Códice 11–2485: Documento N.º XXXVII: Extractos dos apontamentos particulares do Capitão Trindade dos Santos, relativos estabelecimentos das missões na região do Lago, in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 58.

men about the missionaries' misconduct, demonstrating once more his diplomatic flexibility.

But Chingomanje's personal business aside, the arrival of the *Companhia* made the chiefs' previous diplomacy appear to be of little value. This is at least the impression one gets when following the descriptions of the missionaries. In April 1901, the first Yao priest of the UMCA, Yohanna B. Abdallah, wrote that the Unango chiefs were "afraid of these Portuguese officials," and that they did "not know what to do."⁹⁶ And in mid-1901, Bishop Hine said that Kalanje was in a "state of fright" because the village of a neighboring chief had been sacked by the Portuguese *askaris* in what Hine called a "clear sweep."⁹⁷ It must be added that the chief whose village had been destroyed had been an opponent rather than an ally of Kalanje. This shows all the more how uncertain the situation had become in just a couple of months.

Yet it probably escaped the missionaries' notice that some chiefs were quicker to come to terms with the new situation than the missionaries themselves. Kalanje, for example, in his alleged "state of fright," asked Hine to write a letter in French on his behalf to the Portuguese commander to inquire of the country's new authorities whether his annual caravan would still be allowed to enter German territory or would now have to head for a port on the Portuguese coast.⁹⁸ Obviously, diplomacy, anticipation, and accommodation still seemed to be better weapons to Kalanje than resistance or flight.

Chingomanje's Role in the Making of the Colonial State

Chingomanje was also ready to accept the new authorities. This is shown by a case related to orders given to the chiefs after the arrival of the new Portuguese commander Mario Viegas in Metangula in 1901. Viegas had informed all the chiefs that the missionaries were no longer allowed to buy firewood for the engines of their steamers without his permission. The first place the missionaries were denied the purchase of firewood as a result of this order was Malango. Proud of his success, Viegas wrote to his superiors that the chief in question—obviously Chingomanje or his representative in Malango—had notified the missionaries about the new regulation. The missionaries were not allowed to buy firewood in Malango until they had obtained a license for "wooding" at the *Companhia*'s head-

⁹⁶ AUMCA, A6, f. 189: Letter from Y.B. Abdallah to a Friend (Unangu, April 18, 1901).

⁹⁷ J.E. Hine, "News from Nyasa," CA 19, no. 225 (September 1901): 154.

⁹⁸ AUMCA, A1(XI), f. 457–462: Letter from Bishop Hine to Travers (Unangu, May 22, 1901).

quarters. Viegas concluded his report by saying: “That’s the way how I made [the chiefs] understand that the real authorities were the Portuguese.”⁹⁹

But while Chingomanje apparently accepted the new rulers and their rules rather quickly, other chiefs were less compliant.¹⁰⁰ By the end of 1901, the villages around Ngofi, near Cobué, were said to be in open rebellion because local officials of the *Companhia* had acted in a “cruel and rapacious manner [toward the inhabitants of the area], tying up and flogging numbers of them, and exacting from them fines of Ivory, cattle etc.”¹⁰¹ Four chiefdoms of the area—including that of Mataka of Cobué (not to be confounded with Mataka of Muembe) and that of Chitesi—were among the rebels. Following a few minor skirmishes, the Portuguese forces evacuated their local military base to Metangula on January 8, 1902. After they had left, the insurgents burnt the base.¹⁰²

It is necessary to highlight this episode, first, to show that other chiefs opted differently, and second, because of the role that Chingomanje II was to play in it. Chingomanje II had not only reluctantly accepted Portuguese authority, but rather began to actively support the *Companhia*’s colonizing endeavors, carrying their goods and troops. Chingomanje’s dhow, formerly used to transport slaves, was now used to colonize the eastern shores of Lake Malawi. The evidence is as follows:

On January 7, 1902, the commander of the relief forces dispatched to Ngofi wrote to the headquarters in Metangula asking his superiors to urgently send him Chingomanje’s dhow, first to bring food and then to evacuate himself as he was sick.¹⁰³ Later, when the Portuguese forces were fearing an attack on Metangula as a consequence of the events around Ngofi, they began to reinforce their contin-

99 AHM, Códice 11–2485: Documento N.º XXXIX: Extracto do relatório do Sargento Mario Viegas, Chefe do Concelho do Lago, escripto no Ibo, em 20 de Dezembro de 1901, in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 65–66.

100 Already in the first half of 1901, the chief Mataka of Cobué reportedly refused to accept Portuguese authority. See: “The Nyasa Disturbances,” CA 19, no. 221 (May 1901).

101 MNA, UMCA 1/2/17/1: Letter from C.B. Eyre to the Chairman and Directors of the *Companhia* do Nyassa, Lisbon (Westminster, April 23, 1902), 7.

102 MNA, UMCA 1/2/17/1: Letter from C.B. Eyre to the Chairman and Directors of the *Companhia* do Nyassa, Lisbon (Westminster, April 23, 1902), 7–13; TNA, FO/2/605, f. 177–186: C.B. Eyre, “Re Portuguese Nyassaland Co.,” enclosed in C.B. Eyre to Mr. Sharpe (Blantyre, February 9, 1902), f. 178. For the perspective of the *Companhia*’s officers on the matter, see: AHM, Códice 11–2485: Documento N.º LXVIII: Informação, de 16 de Janeiro de 1902, do 1.º Cabo João Rosa Junior, in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 99–101; AHM, Códice 11–2485: Documento N.º LXIX: Declaração do soldado José Guerreiro, in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 101–103.

103 AHM, Códice 11–2485: Documento N.º LXVII: Carta, de 7 Janeiro de 1902, do 1.º Cabo João Rosa Junior, mandado em socorro a N’gofi ao Sargento Lopes Branco, Chefe do Concelho do Lago, in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 98–99.

gent there with troops from Luwangwa, again using Chingomanje's dhow according to missionary Eyre.¹⁰⁴ In early February 1902, when there were still rumors of war, Eyre reported that the Portuguese forces were "keeping close to the [fort]," and once more it was "Chingomanje's Dhow" that was "in attendance."¹⁰⁵ And when in April 1902 the commander of the *Companhia's* headquarters in Metangula traveled with his troops to Ngofi to clarify the situation, he again explicitly referred to using Chingomanje's dhow for transportation.¹⁰⁶

Of course, we can suspect that Chingomanje was forced to provide his dhow to the *Companhia*. However, there is more to suggest that he retained full control over it, probably making it available in exchange for payment and/or privileged status: first, a dhow is of little use without a skipper and a crew. It must have been safer for the *Companhia's* officials to provide incentives in this case than to risk having a dhow without the necessary navigational skills. And second, this is also indicated by the fact that both the *Companhia's* officials and missionary Eyre explicitly referred to the dhow as that of Chingomanje. The *Companhia's* commander even gave the dhow a name, writing that he traveled "on board of the dhow 'Patria'¹⁰⁷ of chief Chingomanje" ("a bordo da lancha 'Patria' do régulo Chingomange").¹⁰⁸ We can assume that he would hardly have used such a wording if he had considered the dhow to be under his sole command.

Further evidence that the *Companhia* was actively supported by people from Nkholongue can be found in the documents relating to the controversy between the Anglican mission and the representatives of the *Companhia*. After the arrival of the *Companhia* on the lakeshore, the missionaries lodged several complaints against officials of the *Companhia*.¹⁰⁹ Probably the most severe complaint was

104 TNA, FO/2/605, f. 177–186: C.B. Eyre, "Re Portuguese Nyassaland Co.," enclosed in C.B. Eyre to Mr. Sharpe (Blantyre, February 9, 1902), f. 184–185. On the *Companhia's* fear of an attack, see: AHM, Códice 11–2485: Documento N.º LXV: Nota n.º 7, de 11 de Janeiro de 1902, do Sargento Lopes Branco, Chefe do Concelho do Lago, ao Governador Intérino M. Pereira, in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 97.

105 TNA, FO/2/605, f. 177–186: C.B. Eyre, "Re Portuguese Nyassaland Co.," enclosed in C.B. Eyre to Mr. Sharpe (Blantyre, February 9, 1902), f. 186.

106 AHM, Códice 11–2485: Documento N.º CV: Nota, de 13 de Abril de 1902, do Sargento Lopes Branco, Chefe Interino do Concelho do Lago, ao Commandante da Força Policial (Ibo), in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 184.

107 "Pátria" is the Portuguese word for "fatherland/motherland." We can of course doubt that this was the actual name of the dhow, although it could have been a translation.

108 AHM, Códice 11–2485: Documento N.º CV: Nota, de 13 de Abril de 1902, do Sargento Lopes Branco, Chefe Interino do Concelho do Lago, ao Commandante da Força Policial (Ibo), in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 184.

109 "Troubles at Nyasa," CA 19, no. 220 (April 1901): 57. See as well: AUMCA, TC/G2.

made by missionary Eyre in February 1902 after the incidents around Ngofi. In his letter to the *Companhia's* headquarters in Lisbon, he described and listed a wide range of mistreatment and abuse, including the two cases of sexual exploitation of women from Nkhlongue. The *Companhia's* officials, for their part, actively documented evidence of the missionaries' misconduct, listing the case of the Anglican teacher who had "abducted" one of Chingomanje's wives. After Eyre's official complaint, the *Companhia's* commissioner in Metangula, Lopes Branco, began to support certain allegations against the mission with testimonies from "natives."

One claim was that the mission had facilitated the escape of Chief Manhica, a chief wanted by the *Companhia* for an alleged attempt at rebellion. To support his claim, Branco presented three "native" witnesses, all of whom have already made appearances in Chapter 3.¹¹⁰ The first was Abdallah Mkwanda,¹¹¹ identified as the local shopkeeper of the Swiss trader Ludwig Deuss in Metangula and said to be from M'ponda at the south end of the lake. We can be fairly certain that this is the same Abdallah Mkwanda who was characterized by Greenstein as the most influential Muslim teacher of the Lake Malawi region.¹¹² The second witness was Azize b. Chingomanje, identified as son of Chingomanje b. M'ponda and said to live in Nkhlongue. The third witness was a certain "Tubair," identified as a teacher and said to live in Nkhlongue. There is little doubt that "Tubair" is identical with Thubiri, the Muslim disciple of Sheik Bwana.

It is important to know that around this time Abdallah Mkwanda was somewhat like the chief interpreter of the *Companhia* in Metangula. However, he had not only supported the *Companhia's* activities with his language skills, but, according to the missionaries' reports, also used the *Companhia's* authority for his own aims. Missionary Hine described Mkwanda as a "fanatical Mohamedan" and char-

110 AHM, Códice 11–2485: Documento N.º CXV: Auto de investigação levantado contra o Reverendo Bispo de Likoma, pelo Chefe Interino do Concelho do Lago, sargento Lopes Branco, in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 198–200.

111 In Branco's report, the name appears as "Abdalla Mekuanda."

112 Greenstein's Mkwanda was born at Makanjira's and not at M'ponda's. However, there is ample evidence that it must have been the same person. See: Greenstein, "Shayks and Tariqas," 14–16; AHM, Códice 11–2485: Documento N.º CIII: Auto de investigação levantado em 13 de Abril de 1902, em M'tangula, pelo Chefe Interino do Concelho do Lago, Lopes Branco, contra um padre da Missão, in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 178–180; AHM, Códice 11–2485: Documento N.º CIV: Auto de investigação levantado em 15 de Abril de 1902, em M'tangula, pelo Chefe Interino do Concelho do Lago, Lopes Branco, contra padres da Missão, in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 180–183; William Percival Johnson, "The Yaos: A Defence, and a Suggestion," *TNN*, no. 2 (1893): 57; "Letters from From Rev. W. P. Johnson," *CA* 7, no. 78 (June 1889): 92.

acterized him as a fierce opponent of Christianity.¹¹³ He was already present at the above-mentioned confrontations in Messumba during Christmas and reportedly played a central role in coordinating the “assaults” against the mission.¹¹⁴ He was further said to have used the *Companhia*’s power to resolve economic feuds with the local population to his advantage.¹¹⁵

Azizi b. Chingomanje was not just any son of Chingomanje II, he was the most prominent son of Chingomanje. He has already appeared above as the leader of the envoy sent by Chingomanje II to the missionaries in 1893 to ask for the British flag. He is comparatively well remembered in oral tradition and was called “Bwana Azizi” as a sign of respect.¹¹⁶ We do not know anything about Azize b. Chingomanje’s religious convictions at the time of the incident with certainty, but many years later he was said to be a “prominent and sincere Mohammedan.”¹¹⁷

Branco’s coalition of anti-mission witnesses is at any rate an interesting one, since at least two of them were Muslims and two of them were residents of a village whose chief had just expelled the mission school. It is likely that Branco had also chosen his witnesses because of their common anti-mission disposition, and that the three witnesses also had their motives for testifying against the mission. In any case, we have another indication that Chingomanje and his entourage were not among the early opponents of the *Companhia*, but rather supported it in the early making of the colonial state.

This making was, however, not a linear process. While it seemed to make sense for Chingomanje II, his son Bwana Azizi and Thubiri to side with the *Companhia* in early 1902, they may have regretted their support later. This is because the decision-makers of the *Companhia* preferred not to further antagonize the British residents of the lakeshore area. In June 1902, the interim governor of the *Companhia*’s territories wrote that it was clear that the *Companhia*’s officials bore the brunt of the blame for the whole affair. He called Lopes Branco’s attempts to prove alleged misconduct on the part of the missionaries “a further blatant foolery” that only

113 AUMCA, A1(XI), f. 457–462: Letter from Bishop Hine to Travers (Unangu, May 22, 1901).

114 AUMCA, A1(XI), f. 457–462: Letter from Bishop Hine to Travers (Unangu, May 22, 1901); Ambali, *Thirty Years in Nyasaland*, 56.

115 “News from the Stations: S.S. ‘C.M.’,” *LDQP*, no. 4 (July 1904): 78–79; AUMCA, C4, f. 50–51: Letter from [Bishop Hine] to Mr. Travers (Mponda’s, December 31, 1900), 3; C.B. Eyre, “Travelling to Unangu,” *CA* 25, no. 289 (January 1907): 6; Sutherland, *Adventures*, 177–179.

116 “Bwana” translates as much as “master” in Kiswahili.

117 See: “News from the Stations: V. Msumba,” *NDC*, no. 130 (January 1936): 7–9.

added to the bad image of the *Companhia*'s authorities in the eyes of the missionaries.¹¹⁸ Consequently, the *Companhia*'s local officials were recalled.

After the arrival of the *Companhia*'s new "men on the spot," relations between the *Companhia* and both the mission and the rebellious villages improved considerably.¹¹⁹ In April 1903, the missionaries reported that peace had been made with the "natives,"¹²⁰ and five months later the missionaries and 1,500 "natives" gathered in Metangula to celebrate the birthday of the king of Portugal. On that occasion, the Anglican bishop thanked Metangula's new commissioner "and congratulated him in his successful efforts to bring order out of chaos."¹²¹

One may wonder whether the change of administration resulted in reprisals against men like Abdallah Mkwanda or Chingomanje II, who had sided with the very people who had fallen from grace. Unfortunately, the sources do not allow us to examine this question as virtually nothing can be gleaned from the documentary evidence about the relations between Chingomanje II and the *Companhia* with regard to the period after mid-1902.

4.3 Changing Settlement Patterns as a Sign of Emancipation

While the reaction of Chingomanje to colonization can be reconstructed at least until 1902, the possibilities of doing so for the majority of Nkhlongue's inhabitants are much more limited. Observations by Europeans about changing social relations must be treated with caution. Their talk of "social revolution" fits all too well with the propaganda of the European civilizing mission.¹²² In any case, European accounts of the fate of slavery in the area around Nkhlongue are not only potential-

118 AHM, Códice 11–2485: Documento N.º XCII: Extracto do officio confidencial extra de 20 de Junho de 1902, do Governador Intérino Martins Pereira, ao Presidente do Concelho d'Administração, in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 165–166.

119 AUMCA, A1(XV), f. 45–46: Letter from Bishop Trower to Mr. Travers (Likoma, October 8, 1902); AUMCA, A1(XV), f. 35–38: Letter from Bishop Trower to Mr. Travers (Malindi, August 9, 1902); Herbert Barnes, "Portuguese Troubles in Nyasaland," *CA* 22, no. 264 (1904): 241–246.

120 H., "News of Portuguese East Africa," *CA* 21, no. 244 (April 1903): 65.

121 P. Y., "Notes: King of Portugal's Birthday," *LDQP*, no. 1 (October 1903): 15–16.

122 The British resident of Nkhotakota, for example, reported in 1896 that "[t]he natives of this district are becoming much more independent of their chiefs than they were formerly and slaves are shaking off the yoke of slavery. [...] a social revolution is being rapidly accomplished[.]" See: Alfred J. Swann, "Summary of 1895 Report on the Marimba District," *British Central Africa Gazette*, April 15, 1896.

ly biased, but also superficial.¹²³ Nevertheless, it can be stated that colonization did indeed reduce the dependence of slaves on their masters regionally. This becomes clearest if we look at the changing settlement patterns.

Chapter 2 revealed that the lakeshore area was anything but a peaceful place in the second half of the 19th century. Nkholongue was attacked and even burnt to the ground at least twice. As a result of the political instability, most people lived in very compact villages, which were usually surrounded by some sort of barrier. In the case of Unango, people lived on the escarpments of a mountain.¹²⁴ In the case of Nkholongue, the village was protected by a stockade. The ruins of this fortification are still visible today on a peninsula called *linga*, after the Chinyanja word for “stockade” (see Map 3 on p. 216).

I have already explained that the political situation at that time facilitated the control of slaves and serfs. Even if slaves could have escaped their masters, they simply had nowhere to go. Rather than risk being captured by other groups, many may have preferred to stay under the “protection” of their present master. Others who were nominally free may have even sought the shelter of powerful chiefs, placing themselves in a state of servitude to avoid a worse fate.

These conditions changed significantly with European colonization. The arrival of the European powers not only brought an end to the slave trade, but also to the wars tied to the trade. Even oral tradition clearly attributes the end of these wars to the arrival of the Europeans.¹²⁵ In this context, the special situation of the area around Nkholongue must be highlighted. This area had been conceded

123 For examples, see: AHM, Códice 11 – 2485: Documento N.º CLVI: Extractos do relatório, de 26 de Setembro de 1908, do Chefe do Concelho do Lago, Dr. Guerra Lage, intitulado: “Concelho do Lago – Informações relativas aos annos de 1905, 1906 e 1907,” in *Documentos sobre as Missões Inglesas das Universidades*, 248–260; Augusto Neuparth, “A Fronteira Luso-Allemã de Moçambique VI,” *Revista Portuguesa Colonial e Marítima* XIX, No. 138 (1908), 13; AHM, SNI, Secção B, cx. 1097: Jaime Asdrubal Casqueiro: “Inquerito sobre escravidão ou servidão indígena” (Maniamba: Administração da Circunscrição Civil de Lago, February 15, 1937); AHM, SNI, Secção B, cx. 1097: Gastão Porto de Moraes: “Inquerito sobre escravidão ou servidão indígena” (Unango: Secretaria do Posto Administrativo, February 6, 1937).

124 For this process of agglomeration in the region, see: Liesegang, “Guerras, terras e tipos de povoações.”

125 PA, I001: interview with P0050 (♂, ~1922) (Nkholongue, August 17, 2010), min 01:17:05–01:17:37; PA, I009: interview with P0128 (♂, 1928) (Nkholongue, September 1, 2010), min 01:15:51–01:17:09; AHM, Secção Oral, Transcrito NI 12: N.º 139–142, Entrevista com um grupo de velhos em Lumbiza (Unango, Niassa), interview by Gerhard Liesegang, Teresa Oliveira, and Muejuane Mainga Vicente, July 17, 1981, 5; AHM, Secção Oral, Transcrito NI 13: N.º 142–143, Entrevista com o ex-régulo Nam-panda em Mapudje (Unango, Niassa), July 17, 1981, 7; AHM, Secção Oral, Transcrito NI 15: N.º 145–147, Entrevista com Ali Bonomali e um grupo de velhos em Nazinhendje (Unango, Niassa), July 18, 1981, 7.

to Portugal in treaties with Germany (1886) and the United Kingdom (1891). The fact that the British and German forces began colonizing the adjacent territories years before the arrival of the *Companhia* in 1900 had the effect that important slave traders of the region were brought down before the “Portuguese” lakeshore area was “effectively occupied.” By 1895, both the Jumbe and Makanjira had been deposed by the British, and by 1898 the Angoni living in the north had been subdued by German forces.¹²⁶ Consequently, the threat of slave raids had already declined around Nkhlongue before 1901.

The inhabitants of the region seem to have quickly grasped the new opportunities and started to leave the previously compact settlements. The process of disaggregation could be observed everywhere as early as 1899. People began to “spread out thin all along the lakeshore,”¹²⁷ and in places like Unango they started to come down from the mountain.¹²⁸ By 1904, only a few houses were reportedly still located on the mountain, and the former town of up to 5,000 inhabitants was now scattered within 10 to 20 miles of Mount Unango.¹²⁹ In retrospect, missionary Barnes described this process as follows:

The scattering referred to was a result of the peace from raiding enjoyed by the lakeside people after the establishment of British power on the Lake. Formerly every village was a crowded collection of huts inside a stockade, the *linga*. In 1899 these were beginning to disappear and by now nothing is left in most villages but the name *linga*, referring to the line of the vanished stockade. The crowded village or town became a widely separated group of tiny hamlets planted in every suitable bay.¹³⁰

Not only did the houses begin to spread out, but also, and most importantly, people’s fields, which had formerly been located as close as possible to the villages.¹³¹ Undoubtedly, the more dispersed way of life facilitated people’s daily lives, mainly

¹²⁶ McCracken, *A History of Malawi 1859–1966*, 57–65; Redmond, “A Political History of the Songea Ngoni from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Rise of the Tanganyika African National Union,” 179–181.

¹²⁷ Herbert Barnes, “Work in the Nyasa Villages,” *CA* 17, no. 203 (November 1899): 199–203. See as well: Robert Howard, *Five Years Medical Work on Lake Nyasa: A Report to the Medical Board of the Universities’ Mission on the Health of the European Missionaries in the Likoma Diocese* (London: UMCA, 1904), 37.

¹²⁸ AUMCA, A1(XII), f. 352–355: Letter from Herbert Barnes to His Mother, July 10, 1899, f. 355; AHM, Secção Oral, Transcrito NI 12: N.º 139–142, Entrevista com um grupo de velhos em Lumbiza (Unango, Niassa), interview by Gerhard Liesegang, Teresa Oliveira, and Muejuane Mainga Vicente, July 17, 1981, 5; Howard, *Five Years Medical Work*, 67.

¹²⁹ Howard, *Five Years Medical Work*, 67.

¹³⁰ Barnes, *Johnson of Nyasaland*, 134.

¹³¹ Herbert Barnes, “A Year’s Changes at the Lake,” *CA* 20, no. 229 (1902): 7–8.

because it met their economic needs much better than a life in compact settlements. This concerned not only the easier access to and control over agricultural land, but also the potentially closer proximity to resources such as (drinking) water, building materials and firewood. While the missionaries acknowledged that this development was “probably a good thing for the people,” they themselves were far less happy about it, as it complicated evangelism substantially.¹³²

After the arrival of the *Companhia*, the dispersal was likely even accelerated, as this way of life perfectly facilitated evading the dangers of the new era, especially taxation and forced labor. In 1919, the Anglican missionary Cox summed up the motives as follows:

Year by year the villages have been getting more and more split up mainly I think in search of better fields, and also partly that each little group of houses wanted to be quite on their own, and partly in the hope that they might evade taxation.¹³³

We can expect that the increasing freedom of movement made possible by the end of the slave wars also benefited the (former) slaves and serfs, because it reduced the hold their masters had over them.¹³⁴ Therefore, social stratification within villages like Nkhologue presumably decreased with colonization.

The increasing freedom of the (former) slaves is also reflected in the fact that some of them returned to their places of origin. Thus, the British Resident in Nkhokotakota wrote in his annual report of 1910/1911 about the people who had immigrated to the district:

Some of these have been sold in the old days of the slave trade and are now returning home again. A certain number of such native[s] have thus been gradually repatriating themselves for many years past.¹³⁵

132 The quotation is from: Frank Winspear, “News from the Stations: III. The Chauncy Maples,” *NDC*, no. 44 (July 1914): 63. See as well: Barnes, “A Year’s Changes at the Lake,” *CA* 20, no. 229 (1902); “Notes on the Mtonya and Yao Plateau,” *LDQP*, no. 6 (January 1905): 159–161; Yohanna B. Abdallah, “News from the Stations: VI. Unangu,” *NDC*, no. 46 (January 1915): 15; H.A. Machell Cox and Lawrence Chisui, “News from the Stations: V. Msumba,” *NDC*, no. 62 (January 1919): 14–16; Augustine Ambali, “News from the Stations: IV. Ngoo,” *NDC*, no. 65 (October 1919): 22.

133 Johnson and Cox, “News from the Stations: Station III,” *NDC*, no. 65 (October 1919): 21. Note that the *Companhia* tried to counteract this development, albeit with limited success. See: Johnson and Cox, “News from the Stations: Station III,” *NDC*, no. 65 (October 1919); Yohanna B. Abdallah, “News from the Stations: VII. Unangu,” *NDC*, no. 65 (October 1919): 25–26.

134 The same point has been made for other regions of Africa. See: Law, *From Slave Trade to “Legitimate” Commerce*, 16.

135 It is “Kota Kota” in the original. See: MNA, NCK/5/1/1: G. F. Manning, “Annual Report: Marimba District, 1910–11” (Kota-Kota, April 12, 1911), 23.

Seven years later, this return of former slaves was still evident:

The Nkhotakota population is still in many ways more unsettled than other Districts owing to the terrible extent to which it was devastated by slave raids as a result of which there is still a steady return of natives to their old homes.¹³⁶

Although there is little evidence of the course of these developments in the specific case of Nkholongue, the village was at least partly affected by them. The formation of Malango coincides exactly with the first phase of dispersion in the 1890s. And those who had moved to Malango did not stay there for long, but left the lakeshore under the leadership of Salimo Chingomanje's son Saide Salimo to live in a more fertile region.¹³⁷ We can assume that this happened in the 1910s, when many people left the lakeshore area for the hills after the final subjugation of Mataka and Malinganile, the last resistant chiefs from the slave trade era.¹³⁸ However, it must also be said that, in comparison to other villages, Nkholongue remained a comparatively compact settlement until the 1950s. But this was mainly owed to the village's role as a "wooding station" of the Anglican steamships, which made the village's population less dependent on agriculture (see Chapter 6).

An impression of possible changes in Nkholongue's social structure is also provided by the "ethnographic census" of 1940, according to which the population of Nkholongue was 287, of whom 85 (29.6%) were identified as Wayao and 202 (70.4%) as Anyanja.¹³⁹ This ratio suggests that the proportion of slave descendants in 1940 was somewhat lower than the proportion of slaves at the end of the 19th century. However, such a calculation ignores considerations of marriage practices, the reliability of the data of this census, and the instability of ethnic ascriptions. Today, for example, almost all villagers of Nkholongue refer to themselves as Anyanja. This indicates, however, that identities based on one's "origin" were still more salient in 1940 than they are today.

136 MNA, NCK/5/1/2: Annual Report: Kota-Kota District, 1917–18 (Kota-Kota, n.d.), 4.

137 PA, Chadreque Umali, *História de Nyanjas* (Metangula, 1996), 58; PA, I099: interview with P1420 (♂, ~1922) (Ngongo, February 16, 2016), min 00:04:14–00:04:51; PA, I114: interview with P1074 (♀, ~1940), P1141 (♂, 1932) (Malango, April 15, 2016), min 00:06:25–00:10:30.

138 Winspear and Johnson, "News from the Stations: II. The Chauncy Maples," *NDC*, no. 37 (October 1912). According to the logbook, the Anglican steamship CM "wooded" in Malango in April 1918. This is an indication that people may still have lived there at that time. However, this was the last documented occurrence of "wooding" at Malango. See: Archives of the Society of Malawi (ASM), Chauncy Maples Log 1914–1924.

139 AHM, Biblioteca, 1282j: Manuel Simões Alberto, *Os negros de Moçambique: Censo etnográfico* (Lourenço Marques, 1942), 59.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter started by noting that previous research on colonization has often ignored the pre-colonial political and social heterogeneity of societies in northern Mozambique. Accordingly, I have sought to challenge historical portrayals that tend to homogenize people's experiences of and reaction to colonization. To achieve this goal, I have tried to analyze the experience of colonization from two distinct perspectives, that of Nkhlongue's slave-trading chief Chingomanje II bin M'ponda and that of the village's majority population.

The first part has shown that Chingomanje II bin M'ponda was an able diplomat who skillfully adapted to ever new situations and thus succeeded in holding on to power despite his previous involvement in the slave trade. While he doubtlessly acted in an independent manner vis-à-vis the Europeans, he was ultimately no opponent of colonial rule. Rather, he ended up supporting the colonizing forces in their fight against other rebellious chiefs of the region.

The second part has highlighted that while the old power relations of the village thus remained intact on the surface, many people may have indeed benefited from improved economic and social opportunities as a result of colonization. This was less because the European powers were fighting for their emancipation¹⁴⁰ than because they had fought the slave-trading chiefs, and thus put an end to the wars that had so severely curtailed people's freedom in the decades before. It has been argued that this development can be measured best by the dispersal of the earlier compact settlements. Previous research has often analyzed this dispersal as the result of colonial violence and the state's attempt to integrate people into the colonial economy.¹⁴¹ My findings, however, clearly show that while this (forced) integration of people into the colonial economy may have catalyzed the process, the change in settlement patterns preceded these attempts and first and foremost reflected people's need for adequate farming possibilities. It thus supports other research on other parts of Africa that has described similar processes

¹⁴⁰ As other researchers have shown, the colonial powers were generally reluctant in fighting slavery as an institution. See: Deutsch, *Emancipation without Abolition*, 2; Christine Whyte, "Freedom but Nothing Else": The Legacies of Slavery and Abolition in Post-Slavery Sierra Leone, 1928–1956," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 48, no. 2 (2015): 231–250; Emily Lynn Osborn, "Work and Migration," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History*, ed. John Parker and Richard J. Reid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 197.

¹⁴¹ McCracken, *A History of Malawi 1859–1966*, 67–68; Barry Neil-Tomlinson, "The Nyassa Chartered Company: 1891–1929," *The Journal of African History* 18, no. 1 (1977): 118; William Finnegan, *A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 114.

of settlement dispersal during colonization.¹⁴² However, this way of emancipation only existed in regions of the continent where there was abundant land for settlement.¹⁴³

There is no doubt that the end of the slave trade and wars reduced the hold of chiefs over their subjects and made ordinary people less dependent on the protection of powerful players. This is not to say that colonization did not bring significant new hardships into people's daily lives, as has already been hinted at in this chapter and will be further elaborated on in the next.¹⁴⁴ This is only to echo the findings of Jan-Georg Deutsch who has argued that "it is sometimes overlooked that after the conquest some of the socially marginalised groups, such as slaves, encountered a new range of economic and social opportunities, notably a greater freedom of movement, that were previously unavailable to them."¹⁴⁵ In this context, one could also add what was discussed in the previous chapter regarding the opportunities that Islamization offered people to improve their social status. In the end, "enslaved men and women had their own expectations about the colonial conquest and readily grasped the change of power and the opportunities it offered."¹⁴⁶

Overall, this chapter hopes to have succeeded in contributing to the reconstruction of "the lived experience of African peoples under colonial rule in all

142 See for example: Michael B. Gleave, "Hill Settlements and Their Abandonment in Western Yorubaland," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 33, no. 4 (1963): 343–52; Marilyn Silberfein, "Cyclical Change in African Settlement and Modern Resettlement Programs," in *Rural Settlement Structure and African Development*, ed. Marilyn Silberfein (New York: Routledge, 1998), 48–49; Sara Berry, *No Condition Is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 37. The importance of accurately analyzing chronology and causality in this context is shown by the fact that some researchers have presented the situation of settlement patterns at the time of colonization in contradictory ways. Iva Peša, for example, described the pre-colonial settlements of Zambia as defensive and concentrated on one page only to portray them as dispersed and scattered on the next without providing any explanation for this difference. See: Peša, *Roads through Mwinilunga*, 3–4.

143 On this point, see as well: Martin Chanock, "A Peculiar Sharpness: An Essay on Property in the History of Customary Law in Colonial Africa," *The Journal of African History* 32, no. 1 (1991): 71.

144 In this regard, there is good reason why Eric Allina has called his study of the colonial system of forced labor in Central Mozambique *Slavery by Any Other Name*. However, as Allina himself points out, it is also important to reflect on the different characteristics of different types of unfree labor and status and the implications of these different characteristics for people's lives. Furthermore, around Nkhonlongue, forced labor never took on the lasting significance it did in the areas Allina has analyzed. See: Eric Allina, *Slavery by Any Other Name: African Life under Company Rule in Colonial Mozambique* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012).

145 Deutsch, *Emancipation without Abolition*, 209.

146 Bellagamba, Greene, and Klein, "When the Past Shadows the Present," 6.

its complexities and contradictions.”¹⁴⁷ The following three chapters will delve further into this diversity of experiences of colonial rule, highlighting in particular their stark variations in temporal perspective.

¹⁴⁷ Parker and Rathbone, *African History*, 93.