2 The semantics of λογικός and the definition of human beings

In this chapter, we will consider two aspects of the word λογικός. First, we will summarise the semantics of λογικός in conversation with the detailed analysis by Scott (2018). While his study is very helpful, it also is beset by methodological difficulties which we point out. We will also directly challenge the evidence Scott puts forward for his own reading of λογικός in Rom 12.1.

Second, we will perform a discourse analysis of the definition of human beings as θνητὰ λογικὰ ζῷα, showing that it was pre-Pauline, associated with Stoicism, but also percolated through other philosophical traditions, and would have been well known to broader audiences, such that it is plausible to assume that Paul could allude to the concept. Furthermore, we will demonstrate how the definition is used to construct discourse on the human place in the cosmos, on their vocation as rational living beings and on what it means to lead a genuinely human life.

2.1 The semantics of λογικός in conversation with Scott 2018

Scott's recent study is the most detailed attempt to investigate the semantics of λ ογικός in Greek literature. Scott's study achieves, despite some methodological questions one might raise, as much as a lexical study can contribute to the interpretation of a passage. While we argue for an approach that focuses on qualitative parallels, it will be useful to consider the results of Scott's investigation, before we raise some methodological points, and, finally, consider the evidence on which his own proposal for λ ογικός in Rom 12.1 rests.

2.1.1 Scott's seven categories of the use of λογικός

Scott observes, based on the distribution in his sample², that the word λογικός was "primarily a philosophical term with a high register" (502), in contrast to

¹ In this section, numbers in brackets refer to Scott 2018.

² See below, section 2.1.2.

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modern translation equivalents (503). He distinguishes "seven categories of use" for λονικός (504 – 515)³:

First, used in substantivised form (τὸ λογικόν) for "reasoned thought" (i.e. "logic" as a branch of study). Scott's preferred translation is "reasoned".⁴

Second, used to distinguish "rational beings from irrational animals". Here often a contrast is made between the λογικά ζῷα, including humans, and the ἄλογα. Scott's explanatory paraphrase here is that the one is "able to exercise reasoned thought", while the others are not (504). In this sense it is predicated of humans, gods, and even the cosmos itself (505). Scott claims for this sense that "[a]lthough rationality is our distinguishing feature, λογικός never merely means 'human'. To refer to human beings as τὰ λογικά in this sense is to highlight humanity's capacity for reasoned thought as our defining attribute" (505 – 506). The word "merely" in this statement makes it difficult to disagree, but what Scott misses is that, as part of the ancient cultural encyclopedia, (i) λογικός is used in this sense as part of the definition of human beings and (ii) this definition is often used in protreptic and normative contexts to speak about the role of a being within the cosmos. Thus, it can be used to talk about human beings in a normative or aspirational sense. This is based on the human capacity for reason and speech (which should not be split too neatly for ancient thought⁵). We shall come back to this point.

Third, used to distinguish "reasoning human beings from irrational people". In this sense λογικός refers not just to those endowed with reason, but to those who use it well. An example for this sense is Philo, *Cher.* 39 (τὸν μὲν αὐτῷ [sc. λόγω] χρῆσθαι δυνάμενον ὀρθῶς is called λογικὸν ὄντως, τὸν δὲ μὴ δυνάμενον ἄλογόν τε καὶ κακοδαίμονα). Scott claims that "[t]he mere capacity to reason is not enough to make a person fully λογικός (and so fully human) if that capacity is not regularly put to work in actual reasoned thought" (507). Here he rightly detects a normative and aspirational sense of λογικός, which he fails to detect in uses of the concept "human". More problematic is the use of the phrase "rea-

³ Cf. his own summary (515 – 6).

⁴ Scott cites as one of the examples Philo, Leg. 1.57, where the form is not substantivised as much as there is an ellipsis of μέρος.

⁵ As Scott himself recognises (514), even though his preferred glosses with variants of "reasoned" or "reasoning" may suggest otherwise.

⁶ Though here the adverb ὄντως is needed to disambiguate. Some of the examples offered by Scott in n. 23 do not neatly fall under his description of "setting those who often exercise reasoned thought over against those who are dominated by their passions."

⁷ On normative conceptions of being human in ancient philosophical context see Gill 1990.

soned thought" because it might be taken to focus too narrowly on syllogistic dexterity. It is better to take it more broadly, as we have indicated, for the good use of the human endowment with λόγος.

Fourth, to distinguish "the reasoning aspect of the soul from other aspects". This sense is applied to models of the soul in which several parts are assumed.⁸ An example is Philo, Leg. 2.2 (ἐγὼ πολλά είμι, ψυχὴ σῶμα, καὶ ψυχῆς ἄλογον λογικόν). Scott also subsumes here expressions like λογική δύναμις.

Fifth, "objects that consist of, result from, or are employed in reasoning". Scott's examples in this category are less than clear. For instance, geometrical lines (τὰς λογικὰς εὐθείας [Heron, *Definitiones* 135.8]) are subsumed here supposedly because they are "lines that exist only in reasoned thought" (510). Οτ λογική ορμή is paraphrased by Scott as "an impulse that arises from reasoned deliberation."9 Part of the problem may be that Scott seems to assume that adjectives can only mark out definite properties of "objects", whereas phrases with adjectives can also function differently, for instance as a generic reference to a domain or as a mere contrast term.

Sixth, used for "activities performed by or guided by reasoning". This is the sense which Scott proposes for Rom 12.1. He distinguishes between, first, mental activities (e.g. σκέψις, ζήτησις, ἑρμηνεία), in which case the combination with λογικός emphasises that they are "performed by reasoning" (511); second, for other actions, the combination with λογικός marks that their "execution is guided by reasoned thought" (513).10 Because it is these examples which Scott identifies as a parallel to the λογική λατρεία we will consider them separately in section 2.1.3.

Seventh, "distinguishing what is related to discourse in general". In this last category Scott admits examples where "λογική denotes discourse in a broad sense, not just reasoned deliberation" (514).11

⁸ For a brief discussion of ancient models of mind see Annas 1992, Long 2015. The early Stoics had a more unitary account which Posidonius modified. On Galen's polemical report on Posidonius, see Sorabji 2000, ch. 6.

⁹ Scott cites Arius Didymus, Phil. Sect. 73.2 for this sense. But that passage explicitly distinguishes two kinds of ὁρμή, namely τήν τε ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς γιγνομένην ὁρμήν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς άλόγοις ζώοις. This passage in fact is a parallel to DL 7.51 (see our discussion in section 6.3.3.4). For a discussion of impulse in Stoicism see Inwood 1985.

¹⁰ Scott distinguishes a third category, where acts of discourse are involved, but we may ignore it for our purposes.

¹¹ An example is Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Comp. 11 where the rhythms and melodic patterns (vocal accent) of speech and music are compared (p. 82 in the Loeb edition; transl. Stephen Usher).

One important corollary of Scott's study is the observation that λογικός is not used to offer a third-person evaluation upon an action (517-518). This rules out those interpretations of Rom 12.1 which see it as a comment on what is "reasonable".12

We have thus summarised the main findings of Scott's semantic analysis of λογικός, which is sufficient for our purposes. We have already indicated some reservations, and now turn to several problems with Scott's approach.

2.1.2 Problems with Scott's approach

In this section we indicate several problems with Scott's in many respects very useful work.

First, his choice of corpus. Scott has chosen to include in his sample every instance the TLG lists, in its chronological ordering, as later than Chrysippus and before Plutarch (349 instances) plus 71 earlier instances (503). This means that he considers roughly the evidence between 200 BC and AD 100. Unfortunately, this means that he does not include in his sample writers like Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom, or indeed Plutarch, who by many accounts are full of parallels worthwhile exploring when it comes to understanding the New Testament.¹³ Naturally, there needs to be some delimitation of workload. But chronology may not be a very good guide here: does Teucer the Astrologer offer better parallels to Paul than Epictetus? Scott does mention the problem that many of the instances that fall into the scope of his sample are fragments preserved in later authors (e.g. Diogenes Laertius), but dismisses the influence on his chosen sample.¹⁴ Further, Scott's results could be complemented by including more epigraphical evidence of λογικός.15

¹² See section 6.3.5 for how our interpretation takes this observation into account, but also goes beyond it.

¹³ In this respect McCartney 1991, 131 seems more appropriate.

^{14 501} n. 4. The chronological ordering of the TLG may be doubtful in certain cases, as Scott admits (502 n. 4). But this would suggest widening the sample to include further authors, not a sharp cut-off. There is also the problem that the TLG sometimes includes editions that are overlapping or based on less-well established texts. An example is Mullach's edition in 1867 of Arius Didymus' Liber de philosophorum sectis (included in Scott's sample), which at 53,2.25 ascribes to Arius Didymus text which Wachsmuth in 1882 recognised as in fact belonging to Epictetus (now frag. 1 in the ed. of Schenkl). This text is preserved in the fifth-century collection of Stobaeus. 15 Scott discusses one of the examples which LSI (s.v. λογικός) list, SEG 2.184 (515). Other epigraphic evidence in the Searchable Greek Inscriptions database (https://epigraphy.packhum.org) documents the following uses. First, it appears in the context of festivals, which staged compet-

Second, his use of his own translations. While this is in part inevitable, where no translations exist, or where lexicographical traditions need to be challenged, there is a risk of supplying one's own favourite rendering ("reasoned") in more cases than would be warranted and then presenting it with the supposed weight of statistical evidence.

Third, overspecification in cases of polysemy. Many instances of a phrase like λογικὴ δύναμις, for instance, are polysemous, without a possibility of neatly distinguishing between the various similar and related senses. In several instances this leads Scott to overspecification (e. g. Philo, *Congr.* 17 in n. 27 is broader than "rational" as the context makes clear).

Fourth, he does not account sufficiently for the different ways adjectives can modify nouns.¹⁶ (We will discuss some of these in section 6.3.3.1).

Fifth, while he is rightly sensitive to grammatical and syntactical features, the differences induced by the semantics of the noun modified are sometimes not given sufficient weight (see below). He thus contextualises too narrowly.

Sixth, missing aspects of the cultural encyclopedia and indirect evaluation. While it is not a problem for a lexical investigation, for the interpretation of the meaning in a concrete text¹⁷ one should account for the fact that words may re-

itions in various disciplines, not just music and athletics (cf. Price 1984, 90). In lists of victors of such competitions, the phrase ἐνκωμίωι λογικῶι indicates the category of prose encomia (IOropos 523 [c. 80 – 50 BC], IOropos 526 [c. 80 – 50 BC]; IG VII 2727 [first century BC], IG IX,2 531 [late first century BC or early first century AD]). At imperial festivals in the first century AD competitions in encomia to the emperor were held (cf. again Price 1984, 90), and the victors' list includes the category of prose encomia with the phrase ἐνκωμίωι λογικῶι (IKorinthMeritt 19 [reign of Claudius?]). Similarly, a second-century AD inscription from Antinoopolis (IPDésert 10) mentions an organiser of a contest in declamation (Iαγω]νοθήτης λογικοῦ ἀγῶνος; cf. Del Corso and Pintaudi 2016, 265).

Second, in several inscriptions λογικός appears to designate something like a profession, i.e. a logician (e.g. Τιβέριος Κλαύδιος Λογικὸς [*IG* IX,2 969 (Roman period)], similarly *TAM* II 48 [Roman period], *TAM* II 355 [Roman period]), though the dating is uncertain, and it might function simply as an epithet. In *IMaked* 13 (Λόγικὴ Διονύσω εὐχή) it even appears to function as a proper name, though the inscription is undated.

Besides these, there are two special cases. The first is SEG 2.184 (ca. 171–146 BC at Tanagra), in which the Athenian musician Hegesimachos is honoured for his theoretical and practical lectures (ἐποεῖτο ἀκροάσεις λογικάς τε καὶ ὀργανικὰς), which we already mentioned. The second is an inscription from the middle of the first century AD, in which a physician named Menecrates is honoured, among other things, as a founder of his own logical-empirical medical system (ἰδίας λογικῆς ἐναργοῦς ἰατρικῆς κτίστηι), on which see Benedum 1977, 386. This may be related to the school of medicine that styled itself "rational" (cf. Scott, 507).

16 Though in n. 83 he is aware of some of them.

17 For this difference, see the useful discussion of Eco 2014, especially 550.

call items of shared cultural knowledge from the ancient encyclopedia and may activate evaluative connotations which escape a narrowly semantic investigation. So the fact that λ oyukó ς is used in the definition of human beings means, as we will see, that broader themes of what it means to be human could be in view (see chapters 2.2 and 3).

The pertinence of these critical remarks may only become apparent in light of our own attempt at a broader contextualisation in the following chapters.

2.1.3 The evidence on which Scott's solution rests

In this section we briefly analyse the parallels Scott offers as the closest for understanding the λογικὴ λατρεία in Rom 12.1. Scott's proposed sense is that this is a λατρεία which is "guided by rational deliberation", since λατρεία is not, he assumes, a mental act, and it is one of the results of his study that in the case of acts which are not "mental in nature", the adjective "signals that the act is guided by rational deliberation" (516). Thus, in effect, based on the instances of his sample that he assigns to this category of use (513-514), ¹⁸ Scott's proposal

18 Some of Scott's examples cited in this category are not pertinent. For instance, Scott cites Philo, Det. 47, which he introduces as "Philo calls any action in which reasoning is not involved an 'irrational act' (μὴ λογικὴ φορά)", but this example is misleading. For Philo has just distinguished (Det. 46) two senses in which the term ἄλογος is used, first, to describe something παρὰ τὸν αἰροῦντα λόγον, as for example a foolish person (ἄφρων); second, to describe something in which there is no reason altogether (κατ' ἐκτομὴν λόγον), as in the case of animals not endowed with reason (ὡς τῶν ζώων τὰ μὴ λογικά). Philo then applies this distinction to the movements of the mind (τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀλόγους αὐτοῦ [sc. νοῦ, cf. Det. 45] φοράς [Det. 47]), which means this example is not a case "beyond the sphere of mental acts" (513) to which Scott has assigned it. And further, Philo describes the second sense of ἄλογος with μὴ λογικαί (τὰς δὲ καθ' ἑτέραν ἐκδοχὴν ἀλόγους [sc. φοράς], οὐχ αῗ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον εἰσὶν ἀλλ' ὅσαι μὴ λογικαί, ὧν καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ), not the first. These movements are such that they cannot and could not be directly controlled by "reasoned thought" (though they may be trained to be aligned with it); while Scott's sense requires that they could be so controlled. Thus, this example does not support Scott's analysis.

Similarly, Severus Iatrosophista, *De instrumentis* 7 (τέχνη ... λογικωτέρη) and 22 (λογικωτέρα μέθοδος), where the context is medical practice, are not good examples for acts "not mental in nature" (516). Again, Scott cites (n. 90) Posidonius, *Frag.* 309b which compares the variability of human actions with the uniformity of actions by other animals. Thus the λογικαὶ πράξεις are those performed by λογικὰ ζῷα. Naturally, these actions involve the exercise of reason, but that is not what is emphasised by the use of the adjective, which functions as a contrast term. Also, Scott cites Arius Didymus, *Phil. sect.* 58.1.24, but misconstrues λογικόν as adverbially modifying συναισθάνεσθαι, while it refers back to πάθος. (The ascription of frag. 309b to Posidonius is problematic, cf. section 2.2.)

amounts to the claim that the best parallels for the λογική λατρεία in Rom 12.1 are ὁ λογικὸς βίος in Philo, *Opif.* 119¹⁹ and *Somn.* 1.179, and the λογικὴ ζωή in Philo, Post. 68.20

But these parallels are mainly grammatical and syntactical; the semantical meanings of the nouns modified are all very similar (something with "life" or "living"); and none of them is very close to λατρεία or thematically close to something about which Paul might be speaking in Rom 12.1.

Thus, having looked at the evidence put forward by Scott, we maintain that a better approach is to evaluate qualitative parallels, which are linguistically close and also thematically pertinent. This is what we attempt to do with a re-reading of Epictetus 1.16 in chapter 4, for which chapter 3 provides a larger context in ancient discourse. Before we do this, however, it will be useful to establish that the definition of human beings as θνητὰ λογικὰ ζῷα was widely known in Paul's time.

2.2 The definition of human beings as ζῶον λογικόν

In this section our aim is to show that the definition of human beings as a $\zeta \tilde{\omega}$ ov λογικόν or as a ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν is pre-Pauline, that it is distinctly associated with Stoic philosophy, and that it is more widespread and widely known.²¹ Furthermore, we want to chart some of the discourses in which this idea is explored, with our result being that this notion is used to discuss the human place in the cosmos, the human vocation, and genuine humanness. We will also consider the question of which audiences might be supposed to have been familiar with this definition. The themes that appear in our discussions

¹⁹ The fragment from περὶ ἀριθμῶν which Scott lists in n. 87 is basically the same as *Opif.* 119. **20** Scott also cites Arius Didymus, *Phil. sect.* 93.1.25 – 26 (Θἶς γὰρ λογικόν ἐστι τὸ ζῆν, τούτοις καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχειν) but the context of this last example does not permit a clear determination of the sense which Scott sees documented here. Scott's phrase "guided by reasoned thought" or "steered by rational judgments" cannot be neatly separated from the senses which he rejects like "in keeping with reason". We might compare, for a similar statement, but with different import, namely a "vocational" sense for which we argue, Aspasius, In ethica Nicomachea commentaria 18.1-2 (λείπεται δὲ [τὸ] ἔργον [εἶναι] τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἡ πρακτικὴ καὶ λογική ζωή, τουτέστι τὸ ζῆν ὡς λογικόν), which comments on Aristotle's function (ἔργον) argument (cf. our discussion of Epictetus 1.16.21 in chapter 4).

²¹ Standard dictionaries used by New Testament scholars routinely note as evident that \(\lambda\) oyuκός, in the sense of "with reference to reason" is "a favourite term in Greek philosophy, especially among the Stoics" (TDNT, s.v.) or a "favourite expression of the philosophers since Aristotle" (BDAG, s.v.). This section aims to investigate the matter afresh with regards to ζῷον λογικόν.

as directly associated with the notion of human beings as rational mortal animals will then be investigated from a different angle in the next chapter, where we draw more on secondary literature to contextualise this discussion more broadly, before launching into a close reading of Epictetus, and finally, Paul.

Our aim for this section requires a closer investigation of the term $\zeta \tilde{\varphi}$ ov λ oyukóv and how it is used in the extant corpus of Greek literature. Our approach is to use the proximity text search function of the TLG and apply it to its corpus, using its inbuilt chronological ordering as a first approximation (which, however, needs to be critically evaluated). We have searched for instances of the lemma $\zeta \tilde{\varphi}$ ov occurring within 10 words near the lemma λ oyukó ς . This will generate some irrelevant search results (such as when the two occurrences belong to different texts, for instance in a collection of fragments; or when there are counting overlaps between phrases that occur closely together), but these can be eliminated by the examination of the search results. In this section, we will refer to the results of our search (before the elimination of false hits) as our "sample".

There are some methodological difficulties, which we will briefly discuss here by looking at concrete examples from among our sample. The first issue concerns the attribution of authorship in the TLG canon. In the case of early Stoic figures like Chrysippus (3d century BC) or Posidonius (*c*. 135–51 BC)²³ we only have access to their work through collections of fragments, ²⁴ which reflect the source-critical predilections of their times and their editors. The TLG canon includes for Posidonius the collections of Jacoby and Theiler, but not those of Edelstein and Kipp. While Edelstein and Kipp include as fragments only passages in which Posidonius is named, Theiler includes over 300 passages in which he detects Posidonius as a source, directly or in some way derived from him.²⁵ These passages include Posidonius frag. 309a Theiler,²⁶ which is taken from the work *De natura hominis* by the bishop of Emesa, Nemesius (written around 400).²⁷ In

²² Thus, we are using the method of "corpus-based" discourse analysis here (see our comments in section 1.4).

²³ For ancient authors, we follow the chronology offered in the respective articles in the DNP.

²⁴ Since von Arnim's collection *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, in volumes 2 and 3, presents the material attributed to Chrysippus alongside other generically assigned Stoic material, one cannot straightforwardly assign the material to Chrysippus (the same policy applies in volume 1 for Zeno).

²⁵ On Theiler's collection (1982) see the very useful review of Sandbach 1984.

²⁶ Which is not included in the collection of Jacoby or Edelstein and Kipp.

²⁷ For the dating, cf. DNP, s.v. "Nemesios". An excellent translation with introduction and notes is provided by Sharples and van der Eijk 2008. Theiler 1982, 2.188–189 supposes, following W. Jaeger and E. Skard, that Nemesius used both a lost treatise by Galen and, for the more obvious-

this fragment there are clear references to human beings as a ζῶον λονικόν²⁸ and the passage itself is a fascinating instance of ancient anthropological reflection. gathering many of the motifs and themes that we study in section 3.1.²⁹ However, due to the disputable nature of the evidence, we will, in a first instance, not admit such passages as evidence for Posidonius having used the phrase ζῶον λογικόν for human beings.

The second issue concerns the attribution of ideas and formulations. Among the earliest search hits for ζῷον λογικόν that occur in our sample there are multiple instances in fragment 44b³⁰ which is attributed to the philosopher Antisthenes (c. 445-365 BC), a student of Socrates. Fragment 44b is taken from Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria 1043 b23, p. 553,29 – 554,33. The commentary discusses the statements made by Aristotle in book 8 of his Metaphysica (1043b 23-28) concerning a problem about definitions "raised by the school of Antisthenes" (οἱ ἀντισθένειοι [1043b 24]).³¹ The commentary on Aristotle explains the point Antisthenes is supposed to have made using its own example (no example is provided in Aristotle for this point), namely the definition (ὁρισμὸς) of human beings, in the longer version ζῷον λογικόν, θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν ("rational animal, mortal and receptive of intellect and knowledge"), which using several words is a long formulation (λόγον μακρόν), whereas the term "human being" (τὸ ἄνθρωπος ὄνομα) uses only one word. Based upon this difference, they are supposed to have rejected the possibility of a definition (οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι). In this example, it is probable that the point about definitions itself does go back to Antisthenes (or one of his students),³² but it is highly unlikely that the formulation

ly Christian passages, Origen's commentary on Genesis (whose supposed teacher Ammonius Sakkas is assumed to have been familiar with the teaching of Posidonius). For a concise discussion of Posidonius as a source for Nemesius see Sharples and van der Eijk 2008, 21-23, who are sceptical of a systematical attribution to a work of Posidonius, even if they grant that it cannot be ruled out in some cases.

²⁸ For instance, in a longer version, "they define human being as a rational animal, mortal and receptive of intellect and knowledge" τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁρίζονται ζῷον λογικόν, θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν (Posidonius frag. 309 l. 143 Theiler = Nemesius, De natura hominis 1.11; transl. Sharples and van der Ejik, adapted).

²⁹ The text is important, for instance, for Dierauer 1977, whose work gathers many ancient passages that include reflection on human beings (see section 3.1).

³⁰ In the collection of Caizzi 1966.

³¹ Transl. W. D. Ross (in Barnes 1995).

³² Cf. also DL 6.3.

ζῶον λογικόν had already been used by Antisthenes. 33 The same holds true for the other instances in frag. 44b; they all use the definition of human beings as ζῶον λογικόν as an example for a definition, but since this has become the standard example for a definition, certainly by the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias (around AD 200), who uses it very frequently in his commentaries on Aristotle, this cannot be taken as evidence for Antisthenes' use of this formulation. However, in the case of fragment 44b it gets even trickier, since scholarship only considers the first five books of *In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria* as genuinely by Alexander of Aphrodisias, 34 the rest (including the passage which is fragment 44b) were probably written by Michael of Ephesus in the 12th century.³⁵ Thus we also have to rule out cases such as fragment 44b of Antisthenes, where the formulation appears to be later than the point formulated.

Having considered these examples in detail, we will begin by seeking to establish the main and incontrovertible points with the most robust evidence, and use the rest to complete the picture.³⁶

2.2.1 The phrase ζῷον λογικόν is pre-Pauline

First, we can be certain that the phrase ζω̃ον λογικόν for human beings was used in the first century AD, since it occurs in a papyrus from Herculaneum (no later than 79 AD, when Mount Vesuvius erupted). P. Herc 1065 represents a work by the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus (c. 110 – 40 BC), Περὶ φαινομένων καὶ σημειώσεων, in which he defends the method of logical inference based on analogies between the world of appearances and things not directly recognisable.³⁷ As one example mentioned in this work we find the phrase:

³³ In addition, the extension νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν appears to have originated in Neoplatonic circles (cf. Sharples and van Eijk 2008, 46 n. 232).

³⁴ That is, up to page 439 in the edition of Hayduck.

³⁵ On which see DNP, s.v. "Alexander von Aphrodisias".

³⁶ In a few cases, we will also complete the picture by using passages where the phrase ζῷον λογικόν does not occur as such but is implied, or when it is clear on contextual grounds that the same thought is expressed as in a related passage, which does use the phrase. We will also occasionally bring in evidence from Latin sources. While Cicero (104-43 BC) understood himself to be an Academic philosopher, his philosophical writings are nevertheless important sources for Stoicism. For instance, Cicero draws heavily on the Stoic Panaetius (c. 185-109 BC) in his De officiis. In book 2 of De natura deorum, he presents Stoic theological material, drawing also on Posidonius (cf. ND 2.88).

³⁷ Cf. DNP, s.v. "Philodemus von Gadara".

Thus, it is clearly already established that the phrase in its use for humans is pre-Pauline, attested in the first century BC (and by an Epicurean).

2.2.2 Early Stoics used ζῷον λογικόν for human beings

Second, we can be quite certain that already the early Stoic Chrysippus used ζ $\tilde{φ}$ ον λογικόν for human beings, because Plutarch (c. AD 45– before AD 125) provides us with a valuable quotation that appears to be quoting directly from a work of Chrysippus himself.

In his De virtute morali, Plutarch tries to refute those who deny the distinction between a "passionate and irrational" part (τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον) and one that is "reasoning and judging" (τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ κρίνοντος), and charges his opponents with conceding the distinction in all but name.³⁹ He seeks to show this by directly quoting from Chrysippus' Περὶ ἀνομολογίας (450C). We can be confident that he is working with a copy of the text and not just relying on a handbook by the fact that he indicates the order in which the statements appear in his Vorlage, using characteristic formulations (ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ ἀνομολογίας ὁ Χρύσιππος εἰπὼν ὅτι "in his books on inconsistency Chrysippus says that"; μικρὸν προελθών "proceeding a little further" [450C]) and that he even quotes the words of Menander, which he claims Chrysippus adduced as evidence after the first two quotations (εἶτα χρῆται μάρτυρι τῷ Μενάνδρῳ λέγοντι [450C]). 40 The first two statements concern anger (ἡ ὀργή) and passions generally and how they drive out "processes of reasoning" (πάθη ἐκκρούει τοὺς λογισμούς [450C]). This context of the passions makes it absolutely clear that Chrysippus is speaking of human beings; the Stoic gods and the sage do not suffer from these conditions.

Then comes the relevant quotation, which clearly demonstrates that already Chrysippus used ζῷον λογικόν for human beings:

³⁸ Our translation.

³⁹ Plutarch, Virt. mor. 450B. Transl. W. C. Helmbold, here and below, adapted.

⁴⁰ Furthermore, there are other polemical works by Plutarch that could only be written with access to written sources, e.g. *De Stoicorum repugnantiis, Stoicos absurdiora poetis dicere, De communibus notitiis contra stoicos.*

καὶ πάλιν ὁ Χρύσιππος προελθὼν "τοῦ λογικοῦ" φησι "ζώου φύσιν ἔχοντος προσχρῆσθαι εἰς ἕκαστα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κυβερνᾶσθαι πολλάκις ἀποστρέφεσθαι⁴¹ αὐτὸν⁴² ἡμᾶς ἄλλῃ βιαιοτέρᾳ φορᾳ χρωμένους," ὁμολογῶν τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὸν λόγον τοῦ πάθους διαφορᾶς.

And again, Chrysippus proceeds to say that "every rational creature is so disposed by nature as to use reason in all things and to be governed by it; yet often reason is rejected when we are under the impulse of some other more violent force." Thus in this passage he plainly acknowledges what conclusion is to be drawn from the difference which exists between passion and reason. (Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 450D = SVF 3.390)⁴³

Again, there are indicators that we have a direct quotation by Chrysippus (προελθών ... φησι), and the transition to the commentary by Plutarch is clearly marked (ὁμολογῶν), given his intent to demonstrate that Chrysippus admits the difference between reason and passion (or affections). Helmbold's translation "rational creature" is apposite here, because the statement in which ζῷον λογικόν itself occurs is only positive and normative (from τοῦ λογικοῦ to κυβερνᾶσθαι), nature (φύσιν) as it can and should be. In principle, in this statement ζῷον λογικόν could also apply to other rational beings in the cosmos. But human beings are certainly included among the referents here, and they come into focus in the second statement (from πολλάκις ... χρωμένους), where ἡμᾶς refers to "us humans." Thus this passage is also relevant in showing that ζῷον λογικόν was already used by Chrysippus in a normative sense for the nature of human beings, to which they should aspire to live up. The passage further shows the close connection between ζῷον λογικόν and (λόγος), which here must be reason, and not only speech, given that it is contrasted with affections.

Our conclusions concerning Chrysippus are strongly confirmed by direct quotations of Chrysippus in Galen's *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, which is very similar to the Plutarchean passage we have just discussed.⁴⁴ Galen aims to expose inconsistencies in Chrysippus' definitions of affection (τῶν κατὰ τὸ πάθος ὁρισμῶν [4.2.8]), one as "an irrational and unnatural movement of the soul" (ἄλογόν τε καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κίνησιν ψυχῆς [4.2.8]), the other as "excessive conation"⁴⁵ (πλεονάζουσαν ὀρμήν [4.2.8]), and to show how they contra-

⁴¹ Cf. also the similar statement in DL 7.89 (διαστρέφεσθαι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον), where contextually it is possible that Diogenes Laertius is still reporting on Chrysippus.

⁴² Sc. λόγον.

⁴³ We have inserted the quotation marks to indicate the direction quotation (the same words are marked in SVF).

⁴⁴ For PHP, we use the edition and translation of de Lacy 1978. Galen's polemical interaction with Chrysippus is excellently analysed in Sorabji 2000, cf. especially chapter 2.

⁴⁵ Or "excessive impulse".

dict the Chrysippean thesis that "affections are judgments" (κρίσεις εἶναι τὰ πάθη [4.2.8]). Galen introduces the following as quoting Chrysippus' own words (τὰς ῥήσεις αὐτοῦ παραγράψαντες [4.2.9]), which thus include the phrase ζῷον λογικόν used for human beings:

"δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ἐντεθυμῆσθαι ὅτι τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα πρακτικόν. πολλάκις μέντοι καὶ ἄλλως φέρεται ἐπί τινα καὶ ἀπό τινων, ἀπειθῶς τῷ λόγῳ ὡθούμενον ἐπὶ πλεῖον".

First one must keep in mind that the rational animal is by nature such as to follow reason and to act with reason as his guide. (11) But often they move in another way toward some things and away from some things in disobedience to reason when they are pushed too much. (Galen, PHP 4.2.10-11, part of SVF 3.462)

In the passage quoted by Galen, Chrysippus applies both definitions of affections to this irrational movement. He compares them to expressions found in ordinary language (somebody is "pushed and moved irrationally, without reason and judgment" $\dot{\omega}$ θεῖσθαι καὶ ἀλόγως φέρεσθαι ἄνευ λόγου <καὶ> κρίσεως [4.2.12]). The last sentence of the quotation again includes the phrase λογικὸν ζῷον for human beings:

<ού γὰρ> ... 46 ταῦτ' ἐπισημαινόμεθα, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα καθ' ἣν ὑπογράφει φοράν, οὐ πεφυκότος τοῦ λογικοῦ ζψου κινεῖσθαι οὕτως κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον."

[For when we use these expressions ...] we use them most of all with reference to the movement that he describes, since it is not the nature of a rational animal to move thus in his soul, but in accordance with reason. (Galen, PHP 4.2.13, part of SVF 3.462)

Galen clearly marks off what he claims is a direct quotation (τῶν τοῦ Χρυσίππου ῥήσεων) from Chrysippus' first book "On the affections" (τὸ πρῶτον σύγγραμμα περὶ παθῶν [4.2.14]). The context of the discussion makes it abundantly clear that the phrase λογικὸν ζῷον is again used for the nature (πεφυκότος) of human beings; it is again related to reason (κατὰ τὸν λόγον), in a normative conception (from which, however, there is often [πολλάκις] a deviation). Thus we have established that at least since Chrysippus (3d century BC) the phrase λογικὸν ζῷον is used for human beings, in a normative and ethical context (the emotions under control of reason). Perhaps it is possible to push this even further, to the founder of the Stoic school, Zeno of Citium (c. 334–262/1 BC), given that

⁴⁶ We have omitted a few words.

⁴⁷ The similarities with the Plutarchean passage are apparent, and they make the attribution to Chrysippus even more probable.

the referent of ὑπογράφει ("he describes" [4.2.13]) might be Zeno, ⁴⁸ but of course that does not yet show that the statement that follows goes back already to Zeno, for which our sample offers no specific evidence. ⁴⁹ However, given the importance of Chrysippus for the Stoic school, ⁵⁰ we can conclude that Stoics were familiar with the phrase λογικὸν ζῷον as applied to human beings at least since Chrysippus became head of the school. ⁵¹

2.2.3 Early Stoics used ζῷον λογικόν for the cosmos and God

Third, Stoics at least since Chrysippus applied the phrase ζῷον λογικόν to the cosmos. There is some evidence that might indicate that the phrase ζῷον λογικόν was already applied to the cosmos as a whole by Zeno himself. The Pyrrhonean Sceptic Sextus Empiricus (end of the 2nd century AD), in his *Adversus Mathematicos* attributes several arguments to Zeno of Citium which aim to show that the cosmos itself is an animal and rational. ⁵² He compares some of them to those of Socrates in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (AM 9.101), ⁵³ whose conclusion is that the cosmos is rational (λογικὸν ⁵⁴ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος [AM 9.101, 9.104, cf. 9.103]; also "intelligent" [νοερός (AM 9.104)]). Sextus then discusses arguments in Plato's *Timaeus* (29d–30b), and quotes, in AM 9.106 the following passage:

⁴⁸ This is suggested by Sorabji 2000, 60, who, however, adds a question mark to his suggestion.

⁴⁹ In SVF 1, fragments 230 and 244 use the phrase in a way that applies to human beings, but they are both generic statements about Stoic doctrine and not specific in pointing to Zeno. The phrase οἱ τὰ τοῦ Κιτιέως Ζήνωνος φιλοσοφοῦντες ("the philosophers who follow Zeno of Citi-um" [Origen, *Cels.* 7.63 = SVF 1.244]; transl. Chadwick 1986) is simply designating the school by its founder.

⁵⁰ Cf. the famous statement that there would be no Stoa if it were not for Chrysippus (DL 7.83).

⁵¹ The ascription of DL 7.61 (which uses ζῷον λογικόν to illustrate a division [διαιρέσις], quoted below) to the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon (*c*. 240–150 BC, a student of Chrysippus), listed as a part of frag. 25 in von Arnim's collection (at SVF 3, p. 214), has been challenged by Mansfeld 1986, 367; so we will disregard this passage as evidence for early Stoic use of the notion of ζῷον λογικόν, though of course it documents general Stoic use.

⁵² For Sextus Empiricus, AM we adapt the translation of R. G. Bury. Note that AM 7-8 = Adversus logicos 1-2, AM 9-10 = Adversus physicos, AM 11 = Adversus ethicos.

⁵³ Sextus Empiricus quotes from Xenophon, Mem. 1.4.2 at AM 9.92-94. Cf. section 3.1.6.

⁵⁴ The fact that in AM 9.104 λογικόν (contrast with νοερός; cf. λογικός [AM 9.103]) is not congruent with \dot{o} κόσμος might suggest that a neuter like ζ $\ddot{\phi}$ ov is to be supplied. However, the construction with a "neuter adjective used as predicative complement" is a noted exception to the basic rule of agreement in CGCG 27.8.

Guided by this reasoning (λογισμὸν) he put (συνιστὰς) intelligence (νοῦν) in soul (ἐν ψυχῆ), and soul in body (ἐν σώματι), and so he constructed (συνετεκταίνετο) the Universe (τὸ πᾶν). He wanted to produce a piece of work that would be as excellent and supreme as its nature would allow (ὅτι κάλλιστον εἴη κατὰ φύσιν ἄριστόν τε ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος). This, then, in keeping with our likely account (κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα), is how we must say divine providence brought our world into being as a truly living thing, endowed with soul and intelligence (τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῆ ἀληθεία διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν). (Plato, *Tim* 30b)⁵⁵

Then follows the passage, which perhaps suggests that Zeno applied the phrase $\zeta \tilde{\varphi}$ ov λ oy κ ov to the cosmos, though it is tricky to evaluate, given that Sextus presents a sort of blended quotation (the elements which also figure in the Timaeus passage are underlined in the following):

δυνάμει δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ Ζήνωνι λόγον ἐξέθετο· καὶ γὰρ οὖτος τὸ πᾶν κάλλιστον εἶναί φησι, κατὰ φύσιν ἀπειργασμένον ἔργον καὶ κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον, ζῷον ἔμψυχον νοερόν τε καὶ λογικόν.

In terms of its sense, he (Plato) has put forth the same argument as Zeno. For he (Zeno) also affirmed that "the All is most fair, being a work executed according to nature and according to the likely account a living creature endowed with soul, both intelligent and rational." (Sextus Empiricus, AM $9.107 = SVF \ 1.110)^{56}$

It does not seem possible, then, to consider this passage as providing robust evidence for Zeno having used the words ζῷον λογικόν for the cosmos, given that Sextus put the point he understands Zeno to have made in terms of the words of Plato's *Timaeus* (in order to show how Plato's argument is the same as Zenos). Only for the summary phrase overlapping with what he had already presented from Zeno (νοερόν τε καὶ λογικόν) can we safely infer that it seems to be material from Zeno (though it could just be a paraphrase added by Sextus to the words from the *Timaeus*); for ζῷον this is not possible, given the kind of quotation Sextus employs. But we can be relatively certain that Zeno already used the word λογικός in the sense of "endowed with reason" in speaking of the cosmos.⁵⁷

While the phrase $\zeta \tilde{\varphi}$ ov λ oyıκ \acute{o} v used for the cosmos cannot be established for Zeno, there is more robust evidence that Chrysippus already used it. In the

⁵⁵ Transl. of the *Timaeus* Donald J. Zeyl (in Cooper 1997).

⁵⁶ Transl. R. G. Bury, which we have revised (indicated by italics). Bury's translation here seems confusing; he renders οὖτος as "the former" (i.e. Plato), when it should have been "the latter" (i.e. Zeno). SVF, volume 1 figures under "Zeno" in the TLG canon.

⁵⁷ Because $\tau \grave{o} \pi \tilde{\alpha} v$ (the whole) appears in the passage of the *Timaeus* we cannot be sure whether Sextus implies they are found as such in a work of Zeno.

doxographer Diogenes Laertius (3d. century BC), who summarises Stoic doctrine in his seventh book of his *Vitae philosophorum*, we find the following evidence for Chrysippus' and other Stoics' use of ζῶον λογικόν⁵⁸ for the cosmos:

The doctrine that the world is a living being, rational, animate and intelligent ($^{\prime\prime}$ Οτι δὲ καὶ ζῷον ὁ κόσμος καὶ λογικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον 59 καὶ νοερὸν) is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Providence (Περὶ προνοίας), by Apollodorus in his Physics, and by Posidonius. (143) It is a living thing (ζῷον) in the sense of an animate substance endowed with sensation (οὐσίαν ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικήν); for animal (ζῷον) is better than non-animal, and nothing is better than the world (κόσμου), ergo the world is a living being (ζῷον ἄρ' ὁ κόσμος). And it is endowed with soul (ἔμψυχον), as is clear from our several souls being each a fragment of it (τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ἐκεῖθεν οὔσης ἀποσπάσματος). Boëthus, however, denies that the world is a living thing. (DL 7.142–143 = SVF 2.633 [Chrysippus] 60 = Apollodorus, frag. 10 [in SVF, vol. 3] = Posidonius frag. 304 Theiler) 61

In addition to Chrysippus and Posidonius, the phrase ζῷον λογικόν for the cosmos is here also attributed to the Stoic Apollodorus of Seleucia⁶² (2nd century BC). The same point is also noted in an earlier passage in Diogenes Laertius, where, in the light of the evidence already discussed, the connection to providence⁶³ is noteworthy:

The world, in their view, is ordered by reason and providence (Τὸν δὴ κόσμον διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν) ... ⁶⁴ inasmuch as reason pervades every part of it (εἰς ἄπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ), just as does the soul in us. Only there is a difference of degree; in some parts there is more of it, in others less. (139) For through some parts it passes as a "hold" or containing force (ὡς ἔξις κεχώρηκεν), as is the case with our bones and sinews; while through others it passes as intelligence (δι' ὧν δὲ ὡς νοῦς), as in the ruling part of the soul (ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ). Thus, then, the whole world is a living being, endowed with soul and reason (τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῷον ὅντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικόν). (DL 7.138–139 = SVF 2.634 [Chrysippus] = Posidonius frag. 345 Theiler)

⁵⁸ Though the formulations (καὶ ζῷον ... καὶ λογικὸν [DL 7.143], ζῷον ὄντα ... καὶ λογικόν [DL 7.139] are not yet as closely tied together as the phrase ζῷον λογικόν is. We will pass over this slight difference henceforth.

⁵⁹ We note that here ζ $\tilde{\phi}$ ον $\tilde{\epsilon}$ μψυχον (which was uncertain in Sextus Empiricus, AM 9.107) is explicitly stated.

⁶⁰ Note that SVF 2.633-645 are all under the heading of the cosmos as a rational animal.

⁶¹ Transl. R. D. Hicks, for Diogenes Laertius, here and below, adapted.

⁶² Cf. SVF 3, p. 259.

⁶³ This will be important also in chapter 4 on Epictetus.

⁶⁴ We have omitted the explicit references to the works of Chrysippus and Posidonius to which this point about providence is attributed.

This passage also suggests that the cosmos being a $\zeta \tilde{\phi}$ ov $\lambda o \gamma \iota \kappa \acute{o} \nu$ can be explained with reference to its being pervaded by reason ($\nu o \tilde{\nu} \varsigma$), which comes in different forms. In human beings ($\delta \iota' \tilde{\omega} \nu \delta \dot{\epsilon}$), 65 or, to be more precise, in the ruling part of their soul ($\tau o \dot{\eta} \gamma \epsilon \mu o \nu \iota \kappa \acute{o} \nu$), however, it takes the form of intelligence ($\nu o \tilde{\nu} \varsigma$). The connection between reason in human beings and in the world as a whole is important (see below).

Given the close association or identification of God and the cosmos in Stoic thought, 66 it is no surprise to find that in early Stoic sources God (θέος) is also called a ζῷον λογικόν:

Θεὸν δ' εἶναι ζῷον ἀθάνατον, λογικόν, τέλειον⁶⁷ ἢ νοερὸν ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, κακοῦ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτον, προνοητικὸν κόσμου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ· μὴ εἶναι μέντοι ἀνθρωπόμορφον. εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων καὶ ὥσπερ πατέρα πάντων κοινῶς τε καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ τὸ διῆκον διὰ πάντων.

God, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting nothing evil [into him], taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he is not of human shape. He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the father of all, both in general and in that particular part of him which is all-pervading, and which is called many names according to its various powers. (DL 7.147 = SVF 2.1021)

Besides being a clear testimony for the Stoic use of the phrase ζ $\tilde{\phi}$ ον λογικόν for God (θεός), this passage also hints at several other aspects of the Stoic doctrine of God which are condensed here in the definitory formula.⁶⁸ We have already

⁶⁵ Other beings could be in view, but human beings are clearly included.

⁶⁶ Note that the first of three senses of cosmos (κόσμος) offered in DL 7.137 is God (θεός): Λέγουσι δὲ κόσμον τριχῶς· αὐτόν τε τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιόν, ὂς δὴ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγένητος, δημιουργὸς ὢν τῆς διακοσμήσεως "The term universe or cosmos is used by them in three senses: of God himself, the individual being whose quality is derived from the whole of substance; he is indestructible and ingenerable, being the artificer of this orderly arrangement." At DL 7.148, the "substance of God" (Οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ) is said to be "the whole world and the heaven" (τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν); the view is ascribed to Zeno, Chrysippus, Posidonius. In Philodemus, *De pietate* 14 (= SVF 2.636) there is a statement that Chrysippus (cf. SVF 3, p. 204), in the fifth book *On nature* (περὶ Φύσεως) "asked for accounts on whether the cosmos is a living being and rational and understanding and a god" (καὶ λόγους ἐρωτᾶ περὶ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ζῶον εἶναι καὶ λογικὸν καὶ φρονοῦν καὶ θεόν [our translation]).

⁶⁷ Several terms used in DL 7.147 are also interesting in view of Rom 12.1–2: τέλειον and κακοῦ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτον for Rom 12.2 (τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον). Further, we note (δι' ὂν τὰ πάντα [DL 7.147]) in comparison with Rom 11.36 (δι' αὐτοῦ). Cf. also (τοῦ ζῆν αἴτιός [DL 7.147]) with Rom 12.1 (ζῶσαν).

⁶⁸ Cf. also the links of θεός with νοῦς and λογός implied in the following statements: "God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus" ("Εν τ' εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ εἰμαρμένην καὶ Δία

established the use of νοερὸν and λογικόν, applied to the cosmos, in Zeno. There is again a statement about providence (προνοητικόν), both for the cosmos as a whole and for its parts (including humans). The first term applied to God is άθάνατον. Given that both human beings and gods are designated as a ζῶον λογικόν, the term άθάνατος serves to distinguish, where required, between humans, who are also θνητός, and gods.⁶⁹

This distinction is explained explicitly in another passage in Plutarch's De communibus notitiis contra stoicos, 70 which offers further confirmation for God as a ζῶον λογικόν, and links it to Chrysippus and the Stoic Cleanthes (c. 331/ 0-230/29 BC).⁷¹ Plutarch seeks to show that the common conception of God's indestructibility and eternity⁷² militate against the Stoic statements⁷³ that "all the gods have come into being and will be destroyed (φθαρησομένους) by fire."⁷⁴ This prompts the following argument:

Now, as the notion that human beings are immortal (τὸ ἄνθρωπον ἀθάνατον εἶναι) is at odds with the common conception so also is the notion that God is mortal (τὸ θεὸν θνητὸν),

[DL 7.135]) and fate (εἰμαρμένη) defined as "the reason or formula by which the world goes on" (λόγος καθ' ὃν ὁ κόσμος διεξάγεται [DL 7.149]).

69 The phrase ζῷον λογικὸν ἀθάνατον is also applied to the cosmos in works containing Stoic doxographical material, cf. Pseudo-Galen, De historia philosophica 124 (κόσμος), Pseudo-Plutarch (c. 2nd century AD), Placita philosophorum 908F (κόσμος), Stobaeus, Anthologium 1.43 (κόσμος). Diels 1879 (DG = Doxographi Graeci) has reconstructed from various sources, but including all three works mentioned here, a doxographical work by the first century AD philosopher Aëtius, which features the passage on page 432. Curiously, Stobaeus and Aëtius, also mentioned someone (or something?) inspired by a god (τὸν ἔνθεον) as a ζῶον λογικὸν ἀθάνατον. The critical editions indicate certain corruptions in the text. Diel's reconstruction of Aëtius is now to be replaced by Mansfeld and Runia 1996 – 2020.

- 70 Transl. Harold Cherniss for Comm. not., here and below, adapted.
- 71 They are mentioned at Comm. not. 1075A.
- 72 Cf. Comm. not. 1074F ("For what other human being is there or has there been in whose conception the divinity is not indestructible and everlasting?" τίς γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ἣ γέγονεν, ὃς οὐκ ἄφθαρτον νοεῖ καὶ ἀίδιον τὸ θεῖον); 1075A ("not a single man has there been who having a conception of God did not conceive him to be indestructible and everlasting" θεὸν δὲ νοῶν μὴ νοῶν δ' ἄφθαρτον μηδ' ἀίδιον ἄνθρωπος οὐδὲ εἶς γέγονεν). Cf. Rom 1.23 (τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ).
- 73 Plutarch notes that these statements are found "expressly stated" (διαρρήδην) in their works "on the Gods and Providence, on Destiny and Nature" (ἐν τοῖς περὶ Θεῶν καὶ Προνοίας Εἰμαρμένης τε καὶ Φύσεως γράμμασι [Comm. not. 1075B]).
- 74 τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς ἄπαντας εἶναι γεγονότας καὶ φθαρησομένους ὑπὸ πυρός (Comm. not. 1075C). Cf. Plutarch, Stoic. Rep. 1052A, where Plutarch quotes Chrysippus and paraphrases him very similarly. For further Stoic texts where it is stated that the cosmos (κοσμός) is perishable (φθαρτός), see SVF 2.589 – 595, especially DL 7.41 (ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ φθαρτὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον "they hold that the world is perishable").

or rather I do not see what difference there would be between God and human beings (τίς ἕσται θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον διαφορά) if God too is an animal rational and subject to destruction (εί καὶ ὁ θεὸς ζῷον λογικὸν καὶ φθαρτόν ἑστιν). For, if they retort with this fine subtlety that human beings are mortal (θνητὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον) whereas God is not mortal but is subject to destruction (οὐ θνητὸν δὲ τὸν θεὸν ἀλλὰ φθαρτόν), look at their predicament: they would be saying either that God is at once immortal and subject to destruction or that he is neither mortal nor immortal (ἢ γὰρ ἀθάνατον εἶναι φήσουσιν ἄμα τὸν θεὸν καὶ φθαρτόν, ἢ μήτε θνητὸν εἶναι μήτ' ἀθάνατον). (Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1075C)

This passage is notable because it shows that even someone as critical of Stoics as the Platonist Plutarch can take for granted that both God and human beings should be defined as ζῷον λογικόν (and it does not seem like he is simply adopting his opponent's premises for the purposes of refutation). The addition of either θνητὸν or ἀθάνατον then serves as the differentia needed in their respective definitions. The same applies to the following passage in Sextus Empiricus, in which he criticises a definition of φαντασία ("impression") made by Zeno on the grounds that it fails to distinguish adequately from other things which also fit the same description, but are obviously different. To illustrate this point about a bad definition, Sextus resorts to a comparison with the definition of ζῶον λογικόν, which applies both to human beings and to God:

The definition (ὅρος), therefore, is a bad one, as it suits many different things; and just as he who defines "human being" (ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁρισάμενος) and says that "humans are a rational animal" (ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον λογικόν) does not give a sound description of the notion of "human being" (τὴν ἕννοιαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) because "God" also is a rational animal (διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸν θεὸν ζῷον εἶναι λογικόν). (Sextus Empiricus, AM 7.239)

Here Sextus seems to take for granted that ζ φ ον λογικ ον applies equally to human beings and to God, though in his case it seems to be simply a sceptical strategy of adopting the premises of an opponent and exposing their internal contradictions. That the definition of human beings serves as a useful example to illustrate points about definitions can also be seen in Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes* 2.209, where the measure of wrong definitions is that they "include any attributes not belonging either to all or to some of the objects de-

⁷⁵ This is clear not least from Plutarch's own use of the phrase at Am. prol. 495C.

⁷⁶ Thus it is explicitly stated in Alexander of Aphrodisias' *In Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria*, p. 353 l. 22–24: εἴδη μὲν γὰρ ζώου λογικοῦ ἄνθρωπος καὶ θεός, διαφορὰ δὲ αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὸ θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον "For the species of the rational animal are human beings and God, and their *differentia* is according to 'mortal' and 'immortal'" (our translation).

⁷⁷ Cf. his criticism of definitions at Sextus Empiricus, *Pyr.* 2.205–212. For the *Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes* we adapt the translation of R. G. Bury.

fined", so, for instance, defining human beings (τὸν ἄνθρωπον) as "a rational, immortal animal" (ζῷον λογικὸν ἀθάνατον) or as "a rational mortal literary animal" (ζῷον λογικὸν θνητὸν γραμματικόν).

This is also the place to discuss a peculiar attestation of the phrase $\zeta \tilde{\omega}$ ov λογικόν being used both for human beings and for God, and for that being which in the view of his followers straddles the boundaries between the human and the divine, namely Pythagoras. The Platonist Iamblichus (c. 245 – 325 AD), in his De vita Pythagorica writes:

ίστορεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς Πυθαγορικῆς φιλοσοφίας διαίρεσίν τινα τοιάνδε ύπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν τοῖς πάνυ ἀπορρήτοις διαφυλάττεσθαι· τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου τὸ μέν ἐστι θεός, τὸ δὲ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ οἶον Πυθαγόρας.

Aristotle relates in his books On the Pythagorean Philosophy that the following division was preserved by the Pythagoreans as one of their greatest secrets: of rational living creatures, some are gods, some men, and some beings like Pythagoras. (Iamblichus, De vita Pythagorica 6.31 = Pythagoras, Testimonia frag. 7 DK⁷⁸ = Aristoteles, frag. 192 Rose)⁷⁹

If these words could be traced back to Aristotle or even the "Pythagoreans", they would be the earliest attestation for ζω̃ον λογικόν, but this is very unlikely. Not just because it is hard to be sure about the exact wording of "unmentionable" secrets of an exclusive society, on which Neoplatonists and others liked to foist their own views. It also does not seem like Iamblichus signals he is quoting the point from Aristotle's work (διαίρεσίν τινα τοιάνδε "some such distinction"; ίστορεῖ). Furthermore, this would be the only instance of the phrase ζῷον λογικόν in the Aristotelian corpus, which, had it really been used by Aristotle, we might have expected much more frequently. A division into gods, ordinary humans and Pythagoras may well have been related in Aristotle's work, but the formulation very likely belongs to a much later period.

2.2.4 For Stoics, God and human beings as ζῷα λογικά are related

Fourth, the Stoic use of ζῶον λογικόν for God (or the cosmos) and human beings is closely related.80 This can be seen already in an argument for the existence of

⁷⁸ In the chronological ordering of the TLG, these are listed as 6th/5th century BC.

⁷⁹ Transl. Jonathan Barnes and Gavin Lawrence (in Barnes 1995).

⁸⁰ Cf. already the notion of ἀπόσπασμα used in DL 7.143 quoted above.

God (i.e. the cosmos as a rational living being) Sextus Empiricus ascribes to Zeno of Citium:81

"That which projects (προϊέμενον) the seed of the rational (σπέρμα λογικοῦ) is itself rational (λογικόν); but the Universe projects the seed of the rational (ὁ δὲ κόσμος προΐεται σπέρμα λογικοῦ); therefore the Universe (κόσμος) is rational (λογικὸς). And thereby the existence thereof is also concluded." (Sextus Empiricus, AM 9.101)

Thus the rationality ascribed to the cosmos is linked in Zeno's argumentation to that of the "seed of the rational" (σπέρμα λογικοῦ), which seems to refer to human beings as λογικός, but it might include other beings or be more abstract in its diction, owing to the terse nature of syllogistic arguments. Sextus explains the direct quotation in words that seem to reflect later Stoic sources (which his aim will then be to refute). Sextus first refers to a principle that links the ruling part with each particular thing:

For the origin of motion (ἡ καταρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως) in every nature and soul seems to come from "the regent part," (ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ) and all the powers that are sent forth into the parts of the whole (αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου ἐξαποστελλόμεναι δυνάμεις) are sent forth in the part exists also in the whole owing to its being distributed from its regent part ($\pi\tilde{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\nu$ δύναμιν τὴν περὶ τὸ μέρος οὖσαν καὶ περὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγεμονικοῦ διαδίδοσθαι). (Sextus Empiricus, AM 9.102)

Given a principle that the ruling part must be better than the parts, he reports an interpretation in terms of ζ $\tilde{\omega}$ α λογικά (including human beings) which is as follows:

Consequently, if the Universe projects the seed of a rational animal (λογικοῦ ζώου), it does not do so, like man (ἄνθρωπος), by frothy emission, but as containing (περιέχει) the seeds of rational animals (σπέρματα λογικῶν ζώων); but it does not contain them in the same way as we might speak of the vine "containing" its grapes, - that is, by way of inclusion (κατὰ περιγραφήν), - but because the "seminal reasons" of rational animals (λόγοι σπερματικοὶ λογικῶν ζώων) are contained in it. So that the argument is this (ὥστε εἶναι τοιοῦτο τὸ λεγόμενον) – "The Universe contains (ὁ δέ γε κόσμος περιέχει) the seminal reasons of rational animals (σπερματικούς λόγους λογικῶν ζώων); therefore the Universe (κόσμος) is rational (λογικὸς)." (Sextus Empiricus, AM 9.103)

⁸¹ Which we referenced, but have not quoted above.

⁸² Cf. also Philo's use of λογική πηγή in Det. 83, Migr. 47, Somn. 1.115 (God), Spec. Leg. 2.202. Cf. also Marcus Aurelius 8.35.

Thus, in the interpretation of Zeno's argument as reported by Sextus, the σπέρμα λογικοῦ is paraphrased as λόγοι σπερματικοὶ λογικῶν ζώων, using the Stoic technical term λόγοι σπερματικοἱ ("seminal principles"),⁸³ and more particularly the seminal principles of human beings, addressed as ζῷα λογικά. The upshot from this passage is that the rationality of the cosmos and that of human beings within it are closely linked.

This link expressed in arguments for the existence of God also has ethical implications, ⁸⁴ as the following passage from Diogenes Laertius makes clear with regard to Chrysippus. As Diogenes Laertius relates (DL 7.87), Zeno had given, in his work Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως (On the nature of human beings), a formula for the goal of life (τέλος) in terms of "living in agreement with nature" (τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῆ φύσει ζῆν). This is explained as "a virtuous life" (κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν), given that nature is said to lead us towards the goal of virtue (ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην [sc. ἀρετὴν] ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις). Chrysippus' own variation is rendered as "living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature" (κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων ζῆν). The reason for Chrysippus' definition of the *telos* is given in a statement which expresses the close link between human beings and the whole:

For our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe (μέρη γάρ εἰσιν αἰ ἡμέτεραι φύσεις τῆς τοῦ ὅλου). And this is why the end (τέλος) may be defined as life in accordance with nature (τὸ ἀκολούθως τῆ φύσει ζῆν), or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe (κατά τε τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων), a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things (ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός), that is to say, the right reason (ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος), which pervades all things (διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος), and is identical with this Zeus (Διί), lord and ruler of all that is (καθηγεμόνι τούτφ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι). (DL 7.88)

The same point is then repeated about Chrysippus, in contrast to Cleanthes:

Φύσιν δὲ Χρύσιππος μὲν ἐξακούει, ἦ ἀκολούθως δεῖ ζῆν, τήν τε κοινὴν καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην· ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης τὴν κοινὴν μόνην ἐκδέχεται φύσιν, ἧ ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους.

⁸³ Long and Sedley (1987, 1.277, cf. 2.272) explain λόγοι σπερματικοί as "seminal principles", which "describe the mode of god's activity in matter, a rational pattern of constructive growth which is both the life of god and the ordered development of all particular things."

⁸⁴ Cf. also Forschner 2018, 149, who comments on the aims of Stoic proofs of the existence of God as follows: "der göttliche Grund, so das übergeordnete Ziel aller Argumente der stoischen Theologie, sichert die durchdringende Rationalität der Weltordnung und ermöglicht es dem Menschen, aufgrund seiner Rationalität sich passend in das vernünftige Weltgeschehen einzufügen."

By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of human beings, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual. (DL 7.89)

Given that both human nature and the natural order are understood as rational (being $\zeta \tilde{\phi} \alpha \lambda \sigma \kappa \dot{\alpha}$), living in agreement with nature or according to virtue can simply be explained as living in agreement with reason ($\lambda \dot{\phi} \sigma \dot{\phi}$):

But when reason (λόγου) by way of a more perfect leadership (κατὰ τελειοτέραν προστασίαν) has been bestowed on the beings we call rational (τοῖς λογικοῖς), for them life according to reason rightly (τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν) becomes the natural life (ὀρθῶς γίνεσθαι <τού>τοις κατὰ φύσιν). For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically (τεχνίτης γὰρ οὖτος [sc. λόγος] ἐπιγίνεται τῆς ὀρμῆς). (DL 7.86)

Here both human beings and gods are addressed as rational beings ($\tau o i \varsigma \lambda o \gamma \iota \kappa o i \varsigma$) and both are able (at least in principle) to live in accordance with nature at the level of reason, in contrast to other animals.⁸⁵

Having established that reason and their rational nature is what connects human beings and the gods with regard to pre-Pauline Stoics, we can confirm this basic picture by drawing on later Stoics, such as the Roman Emperor and Stoic Marcus Aurelius (AD 121–180), who repeatedly makes these points explicitly, in the following passages, in which the phrase $\zeta \tilde{\omega}$ ov λ oy $\iota \kappa \dot{o} \nu$ is used for both human beings and gods, emphasising their relations:

Τῷ λογικῷ ζώω ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ λόγον.

For a rational being, to act in accordance with nature is also to act in accordance with reason. (Marcus Aurelius 7.11)⁸⁶

For Marcus Aurelius, rational creatures include both gods and human beings, both understood as part of a polity $(πολιτεία)^{87}$ or a community (κοινωνία):

τέλος δὲ λογικῶν ζώων τὸ ἔπεσθαι τῷ τῆς πόλεως καὶ πολιτείας τῆς πρεσβυτάτης λόγῳ καὶ θεσμῷ.

And the end for rational creatures is to follow the reason and the rule of that most venerable archetype of a governing state – the Universe. (Marcus Aurelius 2.16.1)

⁸⁵ See the context of οἰκείωσις in DL 7.85 – 86.

⁸⁶ We have adapted the translation of Martin Hammond for the *Meditations* (Τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν).

⁸⁷ Cf. Marcus Aurelius 9.16, 10.2.

Each creature is made in the interest of another; its course is directed to that for which it was made (πρὸς ὂ δὲ κατεσκεύασται, πρὸς τοῦτο φέρεται); its end (τὸ τέλος αὐτοῦ) lies in that to which its course is directed; and where it ends, there also for each is its benefit and its good (ὁ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκάστου). It follows that the good of a rational creature is community (τὸ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου κοινωνία). ** It has long been shown that we are born for community (πρὸς κοινωνίαν γεγόναμεν**). (Marcus Aurelius, 5.16)

Marcus Aurelius takes up Chrysippus' point about following one's own nature and the nature of the whole, discussed above, and expresses it in terms of the constitution of rational creatures (τῆ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου κατασκευῆ). The implications for Marcus Aurelius are not only a relation towards the gods (τὴν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀκολουθίαν) but also to fellow human beings (τὴν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους οἰκείωσιν):

Revere your power of judgment (ὑποληπτικὴν δύναμιν). All rests on this to make sure that your directing mind (τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ) no longer entertains any judgment (ὑπόληψις) which fails to agree with the nature or constitution of a rational being (ἀνακόλουθος τῇ φύσει καὶ τῷ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου κατασκευῇ). And this state guarantees (ἐπαγγέλλεται) deliberate thought (ἀπροπτωσίαν), affinity with other human beings (τὴν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους οἰκείωσιν), and obedience to the gods (τὴν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀκολουθίαν). (Marcus Aurelius 3.9)

Such ethical implications towards fellow humans are developed in the following passage:

And what is it you will resent (δυσχερανεῖς)? Human wickedness (τἥ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κακίᾳ)? Recall the conclusion that rational creatures are born for each other's sake (τὰ λογικὰ ζῷα ἀλλήλων ἕνεκεν γέγονε), that tolerance is part of justice (τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι μέρος τῆς δικαιοσύνης), that wrongdoing is not deliberate (ἄκοντες ἀμαρτάνουσι). (Marcus Aurelius 4.3.2)

Marcus Aurelius even makes the relation of humans' rational nature to community explicit in definitory formulae, such as when he speaks of himself, in a normative context of human nature, as wanting "to follow the nature of a rational

⁸⁸ Cf. also especially Marcus Aurelius 9.9.2 ("among the rational creatures there were civic communities, friendships, households, assemblies: and in war, treaties and truces" ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν λογικῶν ζώων πολιτεῖαι καὶ φιλίαι καὶ οἶκοι καὶ σύλλογοι καὶ ἐν πολέμοις συνθῆκαι καὶ ἀνοχαί). Cf. further, Cicero, *Off.* 1.22.

⁸⁹ We note here also in particular the language for the "human vocation" that is used. See section 3.2.

⁹⁰ Cf. Marcus Aurelius 10.2 ("Next, you should observe what your nature as an animate being requires [τί ἐπιζητεῖ σου ἡ ὡς ζώου φύσις]: again, adopt all of this, as long as your nature as a rational being will not be impaired [εἰ μὴ χεῖρον μέλλει διατίθεσθαι ἡ ὡς ζώου λογικοῦ φύσις]"), where the rational being's "vocation" is based on its constitution. See section 3.2.

and social being " (θέλω δὲ <ἃ> κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ κοινωνικοῦ ζώου [5.29]) or when he states that actions constitute "good or ill" for a "rational, social being" (τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ πολιτικοῦ ζώου κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν [9.16]). Further, the common rational nature of human beings and the gods is also expounded in terms of its implications for freedom, for justice and for self-control:

There are two things common (δύο ταῦτα κοινὰ) to the souls of all rational creatures, God or human beings (τῆ τε τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῆ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ παντὸς λογικοῦ ζώου ψυχῆ): they are immune to any external impediment (μὴ ἐμποδίζεσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλου), and the good they seek resides in a just disposition and just action (ἐν τῆ δικαϊκῆ διαθέσει καὶ πράξει ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν), with this the limit of their desire (τὴν ὄρεξιν ἀπολήγειν). (Marcus Aurelius 5.34) 92

In the constitution of the rational being (ἐν τῇ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου κατασκευῇ), I can see no virtue that counters justice (Δικαιοσύνης κατεξαναστατικὴν ἀρετὴν): but I do see the counter to pleasure (ἡδονῆς) – self-control (ἐγκράτειαν). (Marcus Aurelius 8.39)

Injustice is sin (Ὁ ἀδικῶν ἀσεβεῖ). When universal Nature has constituted rational creatures for the sake of each other (τῆς γὰρ τῶν ὅλων φύσεως κατεσκευακυίας τὰ λογικὰ ζῷα ἕνεκεν ἀλλήλων) – to benefit one another as deserved (ώφελεῖν μὲν ἄλληλα κατ' ἀξίαν), but never to harm (βλάπτειν). (Marcus Aurelius 9.1.1)

2.2.5 Mainly Stoics but also many others: The use of ζῷον λογικόν

Fifth, among the texts in our sample in which $\zeta \tilde{\varphi}$ ov λ oyικόν is used in the time before Paul and up to the second century AD, most are by philosophers, and in fact most of them are from Stoic philosophers, especially before the first century BC, or found in authors which interact in some way with Stoic philosophy.

⁹¹ Cf. Marcus Aurelius 9.9.2 (ἔστι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν εὐθὺς καὶ πολιτικόν "rational directly implies social").

⁹² Cf. also Marcus Aurelius 8.35, where human beings as rational beings are compared to nature as a whole with regards to its power to "turn things to its own purpose" (πᾶν τὸ ἐνιστάμενον καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον ἐπιπεριτρέπει): "the rational being can also convert any obstacle into material for its own use" (τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον δύναται πᾶν κώλυμα ὕλην ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ). In 8.35 the nature of the whole is also said to be the source of all faculties in rational beings (τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἑκάστψ τῶν λογικῶν † σχεδὸν ὅσον ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις). Cf. also Marcus Aurelius 10.28 ("Think of all the threads that bind us, and how only rational creatures are given the choice of submitting willingly to events" [μόνψ τῷ λογικῷ ζψψ δέδοται τὸ ἑκουσίως ἔπεσθαι τοῖς γινομένοις]).

2.2.5.1 Predominantly among Stoics, especially before the first century BC

So far we have quoted passages documenting the use of the phrase by the Stoics Zeno of Citium, Chrysippus, (possibly) Cleanthes, Apollodorus, and Posidonius. But to this list we can add the Stoic philosopher Arius Didymus (1st century BC), 93 the Stoic geographer Strabo (c. 62 BC-AD 20), 94 the Roman Stoic Cornutus (1st century AD), 95 and the Stoic astronomer Cleomedes (between 50 BC and 250 AD).⁹⁶ In the following passages, Arius reports Stoic ethical doctrine; Strabo defends the use of poetry against Eratosthenes; Cornutus, in explaining the name of a Greek god, mentions that only human beings have been made ζῶα λογικά on earth – and Cleomedes considers even the antipodes:

Τοῦ δ' ἀνθρώπου ὄντος ζώου λογικοῦ θνητοῦ, φύσει πολιτικοῦ, φασὶ καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν πᾶσαν τὴν περὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ζωὴν ἀκόλουθον ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην φύσει.

As humans are a rational creature, political by nature, they also say that every virtue which is associated with human beings and the happy life is consistent with and in agreement with nature. (Arius Didymus, Epitome 2.7.6)97

In the first place, I remark that the poets (ποιηταί) were not alone in sanctioning myths (μύθους), for long before the poets the states (πόλεις) and the lawgivers (νομοθέται) had sanctioned them as a useful expedient, since they had an insight into the natural affections of the reasoning animal (βλέψαντες είς τὸ φυσικὸν πάθος τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου); for human beings are eager to learn, and their fondness for tales are a prelude to this quality. (Strabo, Geogr. 1.2.8)98

⁹³ The identification of Didymus the Doxographer and the Stoic philosopher Arius, who was a confidant of Augustus, is generally accepted, though uncertainties remain (cf. DNP, s.v. "Arius Didymus"; Pomeroy 1999, 2). On his Stoicism see Pomeroy 1999, 3 (though again it can only be inferred indirectly). For Arius Didymus, we indicate the paragraphs in terms of Wachsmuth's edition of Stobaeus, Anthologium (from which they are extracted). Note that the edition of Arius Didymus in the TLG canon is outdated.

⁹⁴ On his professed adherence to Stoicism, see DNP, s.v. "Strabon".

⁹⁵ Cornutus was banned from Rome between AD 63 and 65 according to Cassius Dio 62.29.2-3 (cf. DNP, s.v. "Cornutus").

⁹⁶ On the dating see Brown and Todd 2004, 2-3; on his Stoicism and the influence of Posidonius, see Brown and Todd 2004, xi-xii.

⁹⁷ For Arius Didymus, we use the translation of Pomeroy (1999).

⁹⁸ Transl. Horace Leonard Jones. In another passage (Geogr. 15.1.42), in which he draws on the fourth century BC historian Megasthenes' Indika, Strabo relates how elephants are captured and tamed. Strabo comments on one stage of this process with the following remarks, in which he uses ζῶον λογικόν for a comparison of elephants with human beings: "After this they are taught to obey commands (πειθαρχεῖν διδάσκουσι), some through words of command (διὰ λόγου) and others charmed by certain songs and the beating of drums. It is rare that they are hard to tame,

τυγχάνει δὲ ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὁ λόγος ὤν, ὃν ἀπέστειλαν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐξ οὐρανοῦ οἱ θεοί, μόνον τὸν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ζώων λογικὸν ποιήσαντες, ὃ παρὰ τἆλλα ἐξοχώτατον εἶχον αὐτοί.

And "Hermes" happens to be reason, the preeminent possession of the gods, which they sent to us from heaven, making humans alone of the terrestrial animals rational. (Cornutus, *De natura deorum* $20.18-21)^{99}$

The theory of Nature teaches us that circumhabitants, antipodes, and contrahabitants must exist, since none of these [groups] are described by direct reports. We simply cannot travel to our circumhabitants because the Ocean separating us from them is unnavigable and infested by beasts (θηριώδη); nor to the inhabitants of the contratemperate zone, since we cannot traverse the torrid zone. Yet the regions of the Earth that are equally temperate are necessarily inhabited to an equal extent, given that Nature loves Life (φιλόζφος γὰρ ἡ φύσις), and Reason requires (λόγος αἰρεῖ) that all [parts] of the Earth, where possible, be filled with animal life, both rational and irrational (τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐμπεπλῆσθαι καὶ λογικῶν καὶ ἀλόγων ζψων). (Cleomedes, *Caelestia* 1.1.262)¹⁰⁰

Other Stoics, including those later than Paul up to the second century, who use ζ $\tilde{φ}$ ον λογικόν, are Epictetus, ¹⁰¹ and Marcus Aurelius (as we have seen).

There are two instances of ζῷον λογικόν for human beings in Dio Chrysostom, 102 who combines in his philosophical approach elements from Stoicism and Cynicism. In his second discourse on Fortune (Or. 64), 103 Dio Chrysostom aims to show that the charges humans lay at the door of Fortune (τύχη) should rather be turned into occasions of her praise (64.1). He finds support for his side in Socrates:

for by nature their disposition is mild and gentle (φύσει γὰρ διάκεινται πράιως καὶ ἡμέρως), so that they are nearly rational animals (ἐγγὺς εἶναι λογικῶι ζώωι)." (Transl. Duane W. Roller.)

This passage is also listed in collections fragments of Megasthenes, which would make it one of the earliest instances, if these words could be ascribed to Megasthenes himself. Given that the phrase ζῷον λογικόν is taken for granted and not geared to a philosophical audience, it seems on balance more probable, however, that the formulation is Strabo's (in any case later than Megasthenes). On Megasthenes, cf. *Brill's New Jacoby*, s.v. "Megasthenes (715)" (where the translation by Duane W. Roller is published). Note that a very similar point and formulation are used in Origen, though concerning other animals: "so that the action (ἔργον) of hunting dogs (τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἰχνευταῖς κυσὶν) and war horses (ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἵπποις) comes close, if I may speak thus, to the rational faculty (ἐγγύς που εἶναι, ἵν' οὕτως εἵπω, τοῦ λογικοῦ)" (Origen, *Princ.* 3.1.3 = SVF 2.988; transl. Behr 2017, here and below). Cf. further Nemesius, *De natura hominis* 1.4.15.

100 Transl. Brown and Todd 2004. This passage is similar to Cicero, Tusc. 1.69.

101 Epictetus uses the phrase ζῷα λογικά for human beings at Epictetus 1.2.1, 1.6.12, 1.10.10, 1.19.13, 2.9.2, 3.1.25, 4.6.34, 4.77. In this chapter, we will only discuss those Epictetean examples which are not treated in chapter 4.

102 We will discuss one of them, Or. 36, in detail below.

103 Some have doubted its authenticity.

Socrates, at any rate, counted himself fortunate for many reasons – not only because he was a rational being, but also because he was an Athenian (ὅτι ζῷον λογικὸν καὶ ὅτι ἀθηναῖος). (Dio Chrysostom, Or. 64.7) 104

2.2.5.2 Doxographers and philosophers from other schools from the first century BC onwards

But then also a range of other authors, who are not Stoics or not known to be Stoics use it, showing that the definition of human beings as ζῷον λογικόν is much more widespread. Among them are the first century AD doxographer Aëtius, the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus, ¹⁰⁵ the Middle Platonists ¹⁰⁶ Philo of Alexandria (c. 15 BC–c. AD 50), ¹⁰⁷ Plutarch (c. 45 – before 125), ¹⁰⁸ Alcinous (2nd century AD), ¹⁰⁹ an anonymous commentator on Plato (2nd century AD), ¹¹⁰ and

107 Cf. the statement of David T. Runia (in DNP, s.v. "Philo of Alexandria [I 12]") that "Philo's philosophical ideas are closest to contemporary Middle Platonism; Stoic and Aristotelian ideas are also significantly present, above all in the area of ethics." For Sterling 2010, Philo's philosophy is eclectic, drawing on different philosophical systems, but with Platonism as his "basic frame of thought" (1069). Niehoff 2018 sees development in Philo's philosophical thought "from Alexandria to Rome", distinguishing an earlier period with "overall Platonic concerns" (though interest in Stoicism) from a later period, after his embassy to Rome, in which he "interpret[s] his essentially Platonic theology in a more Stoic light" (10–11 and throughout). For Philo we adapt the translation by G. H. Whitaker and F. H. Colson.

Philo assumes the definition of human beings as a ζῷον λογικόν unproblematically at QG 1 frag. 31 Petit (the snake was called clever [φρόνιμος] because it intended to deceive the rational animal, the human [τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον τὸν ἄνθρωπον]) and Ebr. 69 (the people slain in Exod 32.27 are interpreted allegorically: "For it is not human beings [ἀνθρώπους], as some suppose, who are slain by the priests, not living reasoning animals composed of soul and body [ζῷα λογικὰ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνεστῶτα]. No, they are cutting away from their own hearts and minds all that is near and dear to the flesh [οἰκεῖα καὶ φίλα τῇ σαρκὶ ἀποκόπτουσι τῆς διανοίας ἑαυτῶν]."). Further examples below.

108 See the references quoted in this chapter; cf. also *Am. Prol.* 495C quoted in section 3.1.10. **109** Note that the author of the *Didaskalikos is* referred to as Albinus in the TLG canon based on a disputed identification with Albinus of Smyrna.

110 The phrase ζῷον λογικόν θνητόν for human beings is used as a standard example of a correct definition (as Socrates searches for the definition of knowledge) in the Anonymous "Theaetetus" Commentary (P. Berol. inv. 9782 Fragment D), which is dated to the second century, and perhaps goes back to Eudorus of Alexandria. It occurs, in the edition of Diels and Schubart (by column and line) at 18.41-46, 20.7-9, 22.5-14, and 22.45-47 (where it is pointed out that, while indeed it would be strange to greet Socrates as "Hello, rational mortal animal" [Χαῖρε ζῶιον

¹⁰⁴ Transl. H. Lamar Crosby.

¹⁰⁵ As we have seen.

¹⁰⁶ The label is of course modern and its application debatable. We simply use the label here based on whether the author is discussed by Dillon 1996 [1977].

Galen (AD 129 to c. 216), 111 the Pyrrhonist Sextus Empiricus (end of the 2nd century AD). 112 and the Peripatetics Aspasius, the commentator on Aristotle (first half of the second century AD), 113 and Alexander of Aphrodisias (around 200 AD).¹¹⁴ It is important to note that most of these are also our sources for the reconstruction of Stoicism before the first century BC, including Philodemus, Philo of Alexandria, Aëtius, Plutarch, Galen, Sextus Empiricus, and Alexander of Aphrodisias.115

λο[γ]ικὸν θνητόν (22.46 – 47)], the purpose of definitions is not their use in greetings [ἀσπάζεσθαι (23.2)] but the clarification of common conceptions [πρὸς τ[ὸ ἀ]ναπλῶσαι τὰς κο[ινὰ]ς ἐννοίᾳς (23.5 - 8)]).

111 We have already quoted instances of Galen above; further ones see below. Galen presupposes ζῷον λογικόν for human beings at Adhortatio ad artes addiscendas 1.18-19, 9.14-15 (θνητόν), Galen, De usu partium 3.184.16, 3.190.12, 3.192.13, 3.245.12 – 13, 4.126 – 127.1, 4.156.7; De semine libri ii 4.514.11; PHP 4.2.10, 4.2.12, 4.4.33, 5.1.10, 9.3.23; De sanitate tuenda libri vi, 6.13.14, 6.52.9; De alimentorum facultatibus libri iii 6.584.8; De symptomatum causis libri iii 6.584.8; De differentia pulsuum libri iv 8.739.10 (θνητόν), 8.752.16 (θνητόν); De methodo medendi libri xiv 10.38.18, 10.129.6 – 7 (θνητόν), 10.151.11 (θνητόν), 10.151.16 (θνητόν); In Hippocratis librum vi epidemiarum commentarii vi 17b 227.3 - 4 (where the edition of Kühn is cited by volume, page, and line, except for PHP; we have added θνητόν, regardless of the form in which it appears in instances of ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν).

112 We have quoted some instances of Sextus Empiricus already. He uses ζῷον λογικόν for human beings at Pyr. 2.25, 2.209 (implied by two examples of an incorrect definition). He pokes fun at the definition at Pyr. 2.211. He uses it in a wider sense (including human beings) at Pyr. 2.225. Further, he presupposes it at AM 7.238, in a longer version at AM 7.269 (ἄνθρωπός έστι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν), also at 7.271, 274, 277, 8.87, and in an introduction to a quotation ascribed to Empedocles at 8.286. Further, at 9.103, 10.288 (ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν), 11.8 (to illustrate a logical point [= SVF 2.224, though the formulation falls outside what can be attributed to Chrysippus]) and at 4.16. He uses it for God at AM 7.238, cf. 9.107 (discussed above).

113 We refer to his commentary on the Nicomachean ethics (In ethica Nicomachea commentaria) simply by his name. Aspasius presupposes human beings as ζῷον λογικόν at 4.10-11, 27.11-19, 44.1-3, 130.6-12 (cf. with Rom 1.28-31, section 5.2.2), 153.7-9 (see also below). For Aspasius, we adapt the translation by David Konstan (2006) throughout.

114 In the works listed as belonging to Alexander of Aphrodisias, there are a great many occurrences of ζῷον λογικόν, though most of these simply employ the definition of humans as the standard example for illustrating a logical point. Furthermore, in his In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria, only those covering the first five books of Aristotle's Metaphysica are probably genuine, while the others were probably written by Michael of Ephesus in the 12th century AD (as mentioned above). Hence only those occurrences up to page 439 in the edition of Hayduck should be considered.

115 Cf. the list in Forschner 2018, 30, where, as further sources, Cicero, Clement of Alexandria, and Diogenes Laertius are mentioned.

Aëtius, relating the opinion of Aristotle on whether plants (τὰ φυτά) are also animals (ζῷα), says:

Άριστοτέλης ἔμψυχα μέν, οὐ μὴν ζῷα. τὰ γὰρ ζῷα ὁρμητικὰ εἶναι καὶ αἰσθητικά, ἔνια δὲ καὶ λογικά.

Aristotle affirms that they have a soul, but denies that they are animals. For, says he, animals have impulse and sensation, and some of them are also rational. (Aëtius, DG 438 = Pseudo-Plutarch, *Placita* 910B = Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 1.45.2)¹¹⁶

Alcinous seems to take a reference to human beings as a ζῷον λογικόν for granted, when, in discussing friendship and love, he distinguishes three kinds of "erotic love" (ἐρωτική), the "honourable" (ἀστεία), the "base" (φαύλη), and the "median" form (μέση), and points out how they correspond to three different states of the soul:

Therefore, even as there are three states of the soul of a rational being (τρεῖς εἰσὶν ἕξεις ψυχῆς λογικοῦ ζώου), the one good, the other bad, and a third which is median, so it would follow that there are three forms of erotic love, differing from each other in form. (Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* 33.3)¹¹⁷

The phrase ζ $\tilde{\omega}$ ον λογικ $\acute{\omega}$ ν for human beings has further spread to various other writers, ¹¹⁸ such as the Greek Sophist Aelian (2nd century AD), ¹¹⁹ the astronomer

¹¹⁶ Our translation. Given that Aristotle (apart from frag. 192 Rose, where we have argued already against the formulation ζῷον λογικόν being Aristotle's) does not use the formulation ζῷον λογικόν, this report by Aëtius shows that doxographical accounts are not restricted to the terminology used by the authors on which they report. Since Aëtius depends on sources (cf. Runia 1992) which go back to Theophrastus (c. 371/0 - 287/6 BC), the student and successor of Aristotle, it is tempting to wonder whether perhaps already Theophrastus had used the phrase. We have discussed Aëtius, DG 432 above.

¹¹⁷ Transl. Dillon 1993.

¹¹⁸ We have excluded in this list certain instances whose dating in the TLG canon seems doubtful, e.g. in the case of the rhetor Cocondrius (probably Byzantine), or the Pseudo-Clementines (probably fourth century AD), though *Hom.* 10.17 is fascinating, scolding Egyptian animal worship because "they bow before irrational animals, even though they themselves are rational beings" (ἐπεὶ ἄλογα ζῷα λογικοὶ ὄντες προσκυνοῦσιν).

¹¹⁹ Aelian explains at *Nat. an.* 2.11.56 – 57, that, by contrast to the elephants – about whom he has just reported that they can be tamed to such a degree that they can even dance and march in step with music –, it is no wonder that there should be humans who are experts at music, since after all humans are a "rational animal capable of understanding and logical thought" (ζῷόν ἐστι λογικὸν καὶ νοῦ καὶ λογισμοῦ χωρητικόν; transl. A.F. Schofield). At *Nat. an.* 7.10, having shared a story of the fidelity of dogs, Aelian laments the fact that even though nature gave human beings as rational animals (τῷδε τῷ ζώφ τῷ λογικῷ) an altogether greater share in kindness and love than the irrationals (τοῖς ἀλόγοις, i.e. here: dogs), humans are not using this gift

Claudius Ptolemy (2nd century AD),¹²⁰ the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus (1st half of the 2nd century),¹²¹ and (perhaps) to his son, the grammarian Aelius Herodianus (2nd century AD),¹²² and to the Platonic mathematician Nicomachus of Gerasa (c. 100 AD).¹²³ It is further found in works of a lexical nature, though the ascription in such cases can be difficult.¹²⁴

2.2.5.3 Christian authors in the second century

Among Christian authors living in the second century, the philosopher Justin Martyr (died AD 165), ¹²⁵ Irenaeus (c. 130/140–after 190 AD), Athenagoras (2nd century AD), and Tatian (born around 120 AD) seem to take for granted that human beings are ζῷα λογικά. ¹²⁶ The same applies for Clement of Alexandria (died before AD 215/221), ¹²⁷ and Origen (185/6–254 AD).

very well. It pains him that a dog should show more loyalty than a human being (κύων ... ἀνθρώπων πιστότερος). (Note that in the TLG canon this passage is also listed among the fragments of the grammarian Aristophanes of Byzantium [c. 265/257–190/180 BC].)

- **120** The definition of human beings as ζῷόν ἐστι λογικὸν is employed in *De judicandi facultate et animi principatu* (Περὶ κριτηρίου καὶ ἡγεμονικοῦ) at vol. 3.2 p. 6 and p. 17 (where it is explained that humans share with horses their being a ζῷον, but differ in being λογικόν). With regard to this work, Claudius Ptolemy has been described as combining the views of Stoics and Aristotle (cf. DNP, s.v. "Ptolemaeus [65]").
- **121** At *De adverbiis*, part 2, vol. 1.1, p. 123 (humans are included in the reference to λογικὰ ζῶα).
- **122** At *Partitiones*, p. 83 (ed. Boissonade) we find, among various etymological explanations that treat words as compounds, the statement "for humans alone among the other animals are rational" (μόνον γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὁ ἄνθρωπος λογικός [our translation]). This work could, however, very well be spurious.
- **123** In his *Theologoumena arithmeticae* (Θεολογούμενα τῆς ἀριθμητικῆς), a numerological work, at pp. 25 and 65 in the ed. of de Falco.
- **124** For instance it is attested in a fragment of the first-century BC grammarian Philoxenus of Alexandria (λογικὸν γὰρ ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος "for the human is a rational living being").
- **125** Justin Martyr was acquainted with other schools but was an adherent of a middle Platonic school of philosophy prior to the time of his conversion to Christianity (cf. DNP, s.v. "Iustinus [6]").
- 126 In the case of the *Seniores Alexandrini* frag. 6 (ed. Pitra) (2nd century AD [?]), who offer a christological exegesis of Ps 115.1 LXX, the words ἐγὼ δὲ ἐταπεινώθην σφόδρα are explained as being the effect of human beings reflecting upon how great the truths are with which their shortlived nature may become acquainted. The speaker of the psalm is interpreted as being humbled by the insight into how among so many rational beings, humans are the lowliest (συνεὶς ὅσων λογικῶν ἐστιν ζώων ταπεινώτερος ἄνθρωπος). (On a partitive genitive used with a comparative as marking the highest degree cf. CGCG 32.1 and 32.9.) The dating into the second century is based on Pitra's claim that Origen used these texts for his commentary on the Psalms.

Justin Martyr uses the phrase ζῷον λογικόν to explain who is one's neighbour:¹²⁸

πλησίον δὲ ἀνθρώπου οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ὁμοιοπαθὲς καὶ λογικὸν ζῶον, ὁ ἄνθρωπος But a human's neighbour is nothing other than a similarly-feeling and rational animal, i.e. a human. (Justin, Dial. 93.3)¹²⁹

Irenaeus argues (in language redolent of Paul) that the resurrection of human bodies will be much easier than their creation from nothing. He seems to take for granted that human beings are a λογικὸν ζῷον:

For if he will not make alive (ζωοποιεῖ) what is mortal (τὸ θνητὸν) and will not lead what is perishable (τὸ φθαρτὸν) into incorruption (ἀφθαρσίαν), then God is not powerful (δυνατὸς). But that he is powerful in all these things, we should understand from our own origin (ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἡμῶν συννοεῖν), that God took dust from the earth (χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς), and made human beings (ἐποίησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον), even though it was much more difficult and incredible that he should have made them exist from non-existent bones and sinews and the rest of the disposition which accords to human beings, and have produced an animate and rational creature (ἐκ μὴ ὅντων ὀστέων τε καὶ νεύρων καὶ τῆς λοιπῆς τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οἰκονομίας ποιῆσαι εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικὸν ἀπεργάσασθαι ζῷον), than that he restore again (αὖθις ἀποκαταστῆσαι) what had already been made, and then dissolved into earth, which had proceeded into those things, from which, at the beginning, when they had not yet come to be, human beings were made (ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδέπω γεγονὼς ἐγενήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος). For how much more will he – who at the beginning made them, at any time he wanted – restore again those that have already come to be, should he want to, into that life which is being given by him. (Irenaeus, $Adv.\ haer.\ frag.\ 5)^{130}$

Athenagoras does not directly use the phrase ζῷον λογικόν, though by implication of the following text passage he must have been familiar with it. The following passage is further important since the idea of a human vocation (cf. section 3.2) is clearly expressed in it (and hence the link between the language of λογικός and such a vocation), such that its inclusion in our discussion is well mer-

¹²⁷ In a context of teaching about definitions, Clement uses as example the definition of human beings as ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν at *Strom.* 8.6.18.7 and 8.6.21.1 (where the further characteristics χερσαῖον "terrestrial", πεζόν "going on one's feet", and γελαστικόν "able to laugh" are included), cf. *Strom.* 8.6.21.5. Human beings as ζῷον λογικὸν are presupposed further, in a vocational context, at *Paed.* 1.12.100.3; in an ethical context, at *Paed.* 2.5.46.2 (moderation in laughter).

¹²⁸ Lev 19.18, cf. Mk 12.31; Mt 19.19, 22.39; Rom 13.9.

¹²⁹ Our translation.

¹³⁰ Our translation. Fragment 5 in the edition of Doutreleau, Mercier, and Rousseau of Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* corresponds to the Latin translation at *Adv. Haer.* 5.3.2.

ited.¹³¹ In *De resurrectione* 13, Athenagoras wants to demonstrate the resurrection (ἡ ἀνάστασις) of human beings based on the purpose of their creator and the cause for which they have been brought into the world (τῆ τῆς γενέσεως αἰτία καὶ τῆ γνώμη τοῦ ποιήσαντος [13.2]). Christians hope in assurance that they will perdure in incorruptibility (τὴν ἐν ἀφθαρσία διαμονὴν ἐλπίζομεν βεβαίως),

trusting the most unerring pledge, the intention of the one who fashioned us (τῆ τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος ἡμᾶς γνώμη), with respect to which he made human beings out of an immortal soul and a body (καθ' ἣν ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ σώματος), and at the same time constituting them with intellect (νοῦν τε συγκατεσκεύασεν αὐτῷ) and an inborn law for the preservation and care of all those things, which have been given to them by him (καὶ νόμον ἔμφυτον ἐπὶ σωτηρία καὶ φυλακῆ τῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ διδομένων), the things which are befitting to a life of understanding and a life of reason (ἔμφρονι δὲ βίφ καὶ ζωῆ λογικῆ προσηκόντων), well aware, that he would not have constituted this sort of living being (οὐκ ἂν τοιοῦτον κατεσκεύασεν ζῷον) and would not have adorned it with things suited for perdurance (πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸς διαμονὴν ἐκόσμησεν), if he had not wanted that what had come to be should perdure (εἰ μὴ διαμένειν ἐβούλετο τὸ γενόμενον [13.1]). 132

While the adjective λογικός modifies ζωή and not ζ $\tilde{\omega}$ ον,¹³³ the fact that it is the kind of living being (τοιοῦτον ζῷον) which can have such a life seems to make it probable that Athenagoras is aware of the notion of humans as rational beings. This passage resonates with the traditions about the role of human beings in the cosmos, yet Athenagoras thinks these traditions through in terms of resurrection. Here νοῦς and the life of reason (ζωῆ λογικῆ) are closely linked, and part of the constitution of human beings (the language of κατασκευάζειν and κατασκευή is important).

Tatian disparagingly challenges the definition of human beings, but in turn confirms that this is an established doctrine of the philosophers:

¹³¹ This passage is not discussed by Heinemann 1926 (cf. section 3.2).

¹³² Our translation. Athenagoras, De resurrectione 12 contains further relevant language on a human purpose in the cosmos (see section 3.2).

¹³³ Cf. also Aspasius, In ethica Nicomachea commentaria 17.29 – 18.2 (where λογική ζωή is explained as τὸ ζῆν ὡς λογικόν). Cf. further, the text listed as Origen, Fragmenta in Psalmos 1–150 (ed. Pitra), whose provenance is doubtful, but that probably was written before the fourth century, which, in commenting on Psalm 118.107 LXX, states that rational animals live in a way that makes use of reason, insofar as in respect of their nature they have been constituted as rational, in contrast to irrational animals (Τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα ζῇ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄλογα· τὰ ζῷα δὲ λογικὰ λογικῶς, ὄσον ἐπὶ τῆ φύσει κατασκευασθέντα λογικά).

Human beings are not (ἔστι γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐχ), as those with a croaking voice like a raven pontificate (ὤσπερ οἱ κορακόφωνοι¹³⁴ δογματίζουσι), rational animals, receptive of understanding and knowledge (ζῶον λογικὸν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν), for against them speaks the fact that also irrational animals $(\tau \grave{\alpha} \, \check{\alpha} \lambda o \gamma \alpha)$ are capable of understanding and knowledge: Human beings alone, however, are made in the image and likeness of God (μόνος δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰκὼν καὶ ὁμοίωσις τοῦ θεοῦ) – I speak of those humans who are not behaving like animals (ἄνθρωπον οὐχὶ τὸν ὅμοια τοῖς ζώοις πράττοντα), but of those who have advanced in their movement from humanity (ἀνθρωπότητος) towards God himself (πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν θεὸν). (Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos 15.1)¹³⁵

2.2.6 The phrase ζῶον λογικόν used in discourse on the human place and role in the cosmos

Having thus established that the phrase ζωον λογικὸν is pre-Pauline, strongly associated with Stoics, but then also, that is has reached wider educated circles, we turn to an investigation of the discursive function that the use of the definition of human beings as rational mortal living beings serves. While a considerable number of uses of the definition are either for the purpose of explaining a logical point, or as a standard example of a definition (often in commentaries on the logical works of Aristotle), the examples we discuss here are those in which the notion of humans as rational yet mortal creatures figures in anthropological reflection. The three main themes that emerge concern the place of humans in the cosmos (section 2.2.6.2), the vocation of human beings (section 2.2.6.3) and the reflection on what it means to be genuinely human (section 2.2.6.4). But before we turn to these three themes, we consider the question about the place of human beings itself.

2.2.6.1 Raising the question about the place and role of human beings in the cosmos

A passage in Epictetus explicitly raises the question of the role of human beings, articulating it in terms of the notion of human beings as a ζῷον λογικόν. (We will

¹³⁴ The pun in this reference to the philosophers may have to do with the fact that they as human beings, capable of reason and speech, are nevertheless speaking in the manner of an animal (cf. the use of ravens [κόρακες] as an example of an animal that can produce articulate sound [ἐνάρθρους προφέρονται φωνάς] at Sextus Empiricus, AM, 8.275). It probably also trades on negative connotations of curses such as ές κόρακας.

¹³⁵ Our translation. On the traditions about assimilation to God, cf. van Kooten 2008 (though this passage is not explicitly discussed).

discuss Epictetus in detail in chapter 4.) His remark regarding the works of Chrysippus, albeit incidental, suggests this question resonates already with earlier tradition too. Epictetus parodies an imagined petition an overly busy Roman administrator receives requesting permission to export grain¹³⁶ by imagining the kind of request a philosopher should receive concerning his reading programme on a given day:

παρακαλῶ σε παρὰ Χρυσίππου ἐπισκέψασθαι τίς ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις καὶ ποίαν τινὰ χώραν ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχει τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον· ἐπίσκεψαι δὲ καὶ τίς εἶ σὺ καὶ ποῖόν τι σοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν.

I request you to examine what Chrysippus has to say about the administration of the universe, and the place that a rational animal occupies within it; and to consider also what you are, and what is good for you, and what is bad. (Epictetus 1.10.10)¹³⁷

Note that the term ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις ("administration of the universe") also appears in a fragment attributed to Chrysippus. Indeed, our passage clearly shows that in a broader Stoic tradition the question of the role of human beings in the cosmos can be asked in terms of their being a λογικὸν ζῷον. Interestingly, the question about the place of human beings in the cosmos (ποίαν τινὰ χώραν ἐν αὐτῷ [sc. κόσμῳ] ἔχει τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον) is raised in similar terms in Middle Platonic tradition (τίνα χώραν ἐν κόσμῳ ἔχων):

The aim of theology is knowledge of the primary, highest, and originative causes (περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια καὶ ἀνωτάτω τε καὶ ἀρχικὰ γνῶσις). The aim of physics is to learn what is the nature of the universe (τίς ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φύσις), what sort of an animal humans are (τι ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος), and what place they have in the world (καὶ τίνα χώραν ἐν κόσμῳ ἔχων), if God exercises providence over all things (εἰ θεὸς προνοεῖ τῶν ὅλων), and if other gods are ranked beneath him, and what is the relation of humans to the gods (ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς σχέσις). (Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* 7.1)¹⁴⁰

Although in this passage the phrase λογικὸν ζῷον is not used, it is clearly in view as the answer to the question posed (τι ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος), given that the *Didaskalikos* uses this definition as well (as quoted above). Having considered the

¹³⁶ παρακαλῶ σε ἐπιτρέψαι μοι σιτάριον ἐξαγαγεῖν (1.10.10). Note the use of παρακαλῶ (cf. Rom 12.1).

¹³⁷ Transl. R. Hard, here and below.

¹³⁸ SVF 2.1005 (taken from Alexander of Aphrodisias' *De fato*; the phrase is found at 210.16-17, 211.1, 211.4-5).

¹³⁹ Which confirms the importance of Platonic tradition to Epictetus, on which cf. the literature at Long 2002, 178.

¹⁴⁰ Transl. Dillon 1993.

question itself, we turn to the answers given in the sources that use the notion of humans as rational living beings.

2.2.6.2 Logical divisions and placing humans on a scala naturae

As our first main theme, we consider in this section how the attempts at logical classification of beings according to their natures serve the function of placing humans in the cosmos. This often takes the form of locating humans on a scala naturae. There is a discourse on human beings as on the boundary between what is mortal and what is immortal, between rational and irrational, between good and evil. Other texts order human beings as rationals in terms of purposive relations or in terms of different "powers" within beings of various natures. These classifications are often put to use in ethical-protreptic contexts, and are linked to discussion of human freedom, responsibility, and happiness.

2.2.6.2.1 Humans as a being on the boundary

Discourse on human beings, then, often involves the conception of a scala naturae, in which different beings are ordered in an ascending order. The place of human beings, as a ζω̃ον λογικὸν θνητόν, is compared both with regards to

This can be seen, first, from a passage in Philo of Alexandria. In De confusione linguarum, Philo offers a division of beings into rationals and irrationals, putting human beings in between animals (with, naturally, bodies) and unbodied souls (which he explicitly designates as angels):141

141 Philo identifies the unbodied souls as angels at Conf. 174 (ἀγγέλους). This may also be the place to note a few other things sometimes called ζ $\tilde{\omega}$ α λογικά. Since the stars are also considered to be gods for the Stoics (cf. Cicero, ND 2.39 = SVF 2.684, where, having considered the divinity of the cosmos, it is argued that "the same divinity [must be assigned] to the stars" [tribuenda est sideris eadem divinitas], such that they may rightly be called "to be living beings endowed with sensation and intelligence" [et animantia esse et sentire atque intellegere]; on the Stoic views on the stars cf. SVF 2.681-692), they are also called ζῷα λογικά as, for instance, in Origen, Cels. 5.10 (= SVF 2.685): "supposing that the stars in heaven are also rational and good beings" (εἴπερ καὶ οἱ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀστέρες ζῷά εἰσι λογικὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα). Similarly, Marcus Aurelius 9.9.2 describes the higher form of unity within the class of rational creatures (τῶν λογικῶν ζώων) found among the higher beings (ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἔτι κρειττόνων), including the stars (ἐπὶ τῶν ἄστρων).

Plutarch finds it absurd that Stoics categorise as bodies (σώματα ποιουμένους) even such things as virtues (ἀρετὰς), vices (κακίας), skills (τέχνας), memories (μνήμας), mental images (φαντασίας), affections (πάθη), impulses (ὁρμὰς), acts of assent (συγκαταθέσεις) (Comm. not. 1084AB; cf. the translation of H. Cherniss), and utterly ridiculous that they make these

```
ή μὲν φύσις τῶν ζώων
εἴς τε ἄλογον καὶ λογικὴν μοῖραν,
ἐναντίας ἀλλήλαις, ἐτμήθη τὸ πρῶτον,
ἡ δ' αὖ λογικὴ πάλιν εἴς τε τὸ φθαρτὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον εἶδος,
φθαρτὸν μὲν τὸ ἀνθρώπων,
ἀθάνατον δὲ τὸ ψυχῶν ἀσωμάτων,
αἳ κατά τε ἀέρα καὶ οὐρανὸν περιπολοῦσι.
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Living nature was primarily divided into two opposite parts, the unreasoning and reasoning, this last again into the mortal and immortal species, the mortal being that of human beings, the immortal that of unbodied souls which range through the air and sky. (Philo, *Conf.* 176)¹⁴²

All beings have their places, either here below, or up there. We may note here that a similar division occurs at Agr. 139, where Philo does not use the term ζῶα, but the more abstract formulation ψυχὴν ἔχοντα. 143 Philo divides the ψυχὴν ἔχοντα ("animates") into λογικά ("rationals") and ἄλογα ("irrationals"), and further subdivides the λογικά into θνητά ("mortals") and θεῖα ("divine existences"). Finally, the mortal rationals are divided into male and female [ἄρρεν – θῆλυ]. Philo indicates that such a division is representative for broadly held philosophical views by introducing this division as one in which "the whole choir of philosophers ... [are] harping on their wonted themes" (καὶ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων χορὸς ἄπας τὰ εἰωθότα διεξιών [Agr. 139]). 144 This estimation is confirmed by similar divisions in other philosophers. 145

things also rational animals (μὴ μόνον σώματα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῷα λογικὰ [1084B]). (The list is even extended in 1084C to include walking, dancing and a host of other activities.) Philo, *Decal.* 33 calls the voice that spoke to Israel in the wilderness a living rational being. Cf. also one of several different images Stoics use to explain the three parts of philosophy, logic, ethics and physics (at DL 7.40), in which philosophy itself is compared to a living being (ἰκάζουσι δὲ ζώφ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν) and the discipline of logic with the bones and sinews (ὀστοῖς μὲν καὶ νεύροις τὸ λογικὸν). But this is not properly an instance of ζῷον λογικόν.

¹⁴² We have divided the Greek text into lines to highlight the divisions.

¹⁴³ Perhaps he considered this more appropriate with respect to divine natures, given that ζ $\tilde{\phi}$ ov is typically used for mice and men. Similarly, the distinction is sometimes expressed as between "inanimate beings" (τὰ ἄψυχα) and "animated beings" (τὰ ἔμψυχα), as for instance in Origen, *Princ.* 3.1.2.

¹⁴⁴ For a stemmatic diagram of *Agr.* 139 see Terian 1981, 35 (from which the glosses above are taken).

¹⁴⁵ See Früchtel 1968, 42-45 who presents diagrams of similar divisions in the Platonist Antiochus of Ascalon (c. 130/120-68/67 BC), the Middle Platonist Maximus of Tyre (2nd century AD), and Seneca, which supports the notion that such divisions are widespread. Seneca's exposition of a similar division at Ep. 53.13-15 "seems muddled" (Inwood 2007, 120), given that he presents

Philo's division in *De confusione linguarum* logically amounts to the same as the definition of human beings as rational mortal animals. 146 Philo's point is not. however, just classification for its own sake. Philo's point in this context is that the "unbodied" souls, just like the "irrationals" are exempt from wickedness (κακίας ἀμέτοχοι [Conf. 177]), which Philo locates only in the mortal rational animal. 147 The notion of what it means to be a ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν is not just incidental here but directly used in Philo's exposition, as he argues that human beings alone have both freedom and responsibility, rooted in their being rational, and, at the same time, are exposed and vulnerable to evil, because of their being bodily and mortal. Having stated that the unbodied souls are "immune from wickedness", Philo continues:

And this immunity is shared by unreasoning natures (ἀμέτοχοι δὲ καὶ <αί> τῶν ἀλόγων), because, as they have no gift of understanding (ἀμοιροῦσαι διανοίας), they are also not guilty of wrongdoing willed freely as a result of deliberate reflection (τῶν ἐκ λογισμοῦ συμβαινόντων εκουσίων άδικημάτων άλίσκονται). (178) Humans are practically the only beings who having knowledge of good and evil (μόνος δὲ σχεδὸν ἐκ πάντων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἔχων ἐπιστήμην) often choose the worst (αἰρεῖται μὲν πολλάκις¹⁴⁸ τὰ φαυλότατα), and shun what should be the object of their efforts (φεύγει δὲ τὰ σπουδῆς ἄξια), and thus they stand apart as convicted of sin deliberate and aforethought (αὐτὸν μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκ προνοίας ἁμαρτήμασι καταγινώσκεσθαι). (Philo, Conf. 177–178)

the division in an unusual ordering. The comparison with others suggests there is some flexibility in the terminology. For instance, Philo (at Her. 138) divides the εἶδος λογικῶν (or λογικόν) into ἄφθαρτον and θνητόν, while Maximus of Tyre frequently simply divides into θνητός and άθάνατος.

An instructive passage on life as a shared characteristic between humans and gods, which differs in its quality (ζωὴ αἰώνιος versus ἐφήμερος), is Maximus of Tyre, Dissertationes 6.1. Cf. also the very detailed division in Maximus of Tyre, Dissertationes 11.8.9 - 29, which expressly notes the principle that one part of these divisions into two is always better (11.8.5-7). Thus, for instance: "The perceptive can be divided into the rational and the irrational, of which the rational is superior" (τοῦ δὲ αἰσθητικοῦ τὸ μὲν λογικόν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον· κρεῖττον δὲ τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ ἀλόγου [11.8.13-15]; transl. Trapp 1997). The passage ends with an ascent to the highest form of intellectual contemplation.

146 An example which illustrates this connection between division and definitions, which ultimately goes back to Plato's explanation of the diairetic method in the Sophistes, can be found in Maximus of Tyre, Dissertationes 11.8 (which we referenced in the previous note).

147 The further context is that God delegated those parts of his creation to lower beings which would be unworthy of him, drawing on ideas in Plato's Timaeus (cf. Runia 1986, 242-249). 148 The term πολλάκις in this context recalls similar passages quoted above (Plutarch, Virt. mor. 450D = SVF 3.390, Galen, PHP 4.2.10 – 11 = SVF 3.462, cf. also Nemesius, *De natura hominis* 1.10.6 – 8), though the word is of course so frequent that this may not indicate more than analogous points being expressed in the most straightforward manner.

When speaking of the irrationals here, Philo perhaps has in mind not only animals, but also children or "crazed" persons. 149 In any case, it appears that reflection on humans' place in the order of things situates them at the boundary between good and evil, in a way that depends on the exercise of their freedom.

A second elaboration of how humans fare with respect to both the gods and other animals can be found in Galen's Adhortatio ad artes addiscendas, which is a protreptic speech seeking to encourage the study of medicine. Galen employs the definition of human beings as a ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν to express how they occupy a middle position:

τὸ δὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, ὧ παῖδες, ἐπικοινωνεῖ θεοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις, τοῖς μὲν καθ' ὄσον λογικόν ἐστι, τοῖς δὲ καθ' ὅσον θνητόν.

For humankind, O children, has something in common both with the gods and with the irrational animals, with the former insofar as they are rational, with the latter, insofar as they are mortal. (Galen, Adhortatio ad artes addiscendas 9.15-16)150

149 For children, see Philo's discussion of the development of capacities of humans in steps of seven years at Leg. 1.10 ("they say that humans become a reasoning being during their first seven years" λογικόν τέ φασιν ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑπταετίαν γίνεσθαι). For a discussion of Stoic theories about the development of reason, see Frede 1994.

As to the "crazed" person, Philo distinguishes two different senses of ἄλογος at Sacr. 46-47, which concern precisely this point: the first sense of ἄλογος is to refer to what "defies convincing reason" (τὸ παρὰ τὸν αἰροῦντα λόγον), for which the example is a "the foolish man" (τὸν ἄφρονά), the second sense is "the state from which reason is eliminated", for which the example is the "unreasoning animals" (τῶν ζώων τὰ μὴ λογικά). (Philo draws a different contrast at Det. 38, where he is concerned with giving a favourable interpretation of Moses' professed ineloquence in Exodus 6.12 [ἐγὼ δὲ ἄλογός εἰμι], which, he informs us, is not to be confused with ἄλογος in the sense used for the "animals without reason" [τὰ μὴ λογικὰ τῶν ζώων].)

For children as not yet λογικός in the full active sense of the word, yet at the same time λογικός given their nature as such beings who are capable in principle of developing to its full sense, see also the exposition of the Peripatetic commentator Aspasius 27.14-17 ("For a child too is by nature capable of performing such actions [i.e. the fully rational activities in which according to Aristotle happiness consists], since he is a rational animal [φύσει μὲν καὶ ὁ παῖς πρακτικός, ὢν λογικὸν ζῷον], but because of his youth [διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν] he is not yet capable of performing them. For a child too is somehow a non-rational creature [ἄλογον μὲν γάρ πώς ἐστι καὶ ὁ παῖς], but he differs from nonrational animals because he is rational by nature [διαφέρει δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ὅτι φύσει λογικός ἐστιν]").

150 Our translation, here and below. There follows a disparaging remark on women in a comparison with Fortune personified as a woman (2.3-7). On Galen's mostly negative view of women cf. Hankinson 2008, 2 (with note 8 on page 25).

In the prooemium Galen explains, again using the notion of human beings as rational animals, how humans stand between the world of animals and the gods. Being capable of learning the arts, humans could go either way. They can strive to emulate the gods through the arts, or they can disregard them and consign their fate to Fortune or a life devoted to less refined pleasures.

Galen begins by declaring the question whether the animals called "irrational" (τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα) do not have any form of reason-and-speech (λόγος) as unsettled (1.1–2). 151 Perhaps they do not have reason as expressed in speech (κατὰ τὴν φωνήν, δυ καὶ προφορικὸν ὀνομάζουσιν), but are nevertheless capable of think-ἄνθρωποι) surpass the other animals by far when it comes to reason, is clear from the "multitude of the arts which this animal cultivates" $(\pi\lambda\tilde{\eta}\theta\circ\zeta\ \tau\tilde{\omega}\nu$ τεχνῶν ὧν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ ζῷον τοῦτο) and from the fact that "only humans, being capable of knowledge, are able to learn any art they wish" (καὶ ὅτι μόνος ἄνθρωπος ἐπιστήμης ἐπιδεκτικὸς ἣν ἂν ἐθελήση τέχνην μανθάνει [1.4–7]). For the other animals (τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα) are almost all without arts (σχεδὸν ἄτεχνα πάντ' ἐστί), with few insignificant exceptions, which occur by nature, not by deliberate exercise of an art (φύσει μᾶλλον ἢ προαιρέσει τεχνῶν [1.8-9]). By contrast, human beings (ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος) are not only able to imitate (ἐμιμήσατο) whatever animals can do (weave like spiders, 153 shape like bees, swim though made for walking $[\pi \epsilon \langle \dot{o} c \rangle]$, but have acquired even the divine arts (καὶ τῶν θείων τεχνῶν), competing with Asclepius in the art of medicine¹⁵⁴, with Apollo in his arts (archery, poetry, divination, and all those associated with the Muses), even geometry and astronomy (1.9 – 14). By industriousness (φιλοπονίας) he has even figured out (ἐξεπορίσατο) the "greatest of divine goods, philosophy" (τὸ μέγιστον τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν φιλοσοφίαν [1.16 – 17]). Based on all this, Galen concludes:

¹⁵¹ Cf. the literature on the ancient debates on animal rationality cited in section 3.1.1.

¹⁵² On the distinction between λόγος προφορικός and ἐνδιάθητος, cf. Sextus Empiricus, AM 8.275-276.

¹⁵³ A similar point is made by Aspasius, 2.26–3.2: "For there are also products (ποιήματα) made by non-rational creatures (τῶν ἀλόγων), for example the honeycombs of bees and what are called spiders' 'webs'. But none of these produces in a way accompanied by reason (μετὰ λόγου ποιεῖ); rather, animals employ natural instinct (ὁρμῆ φυσικῆ χρώμενα τὰ ζῷα). Artistic products, however, are products made by rational creatures who make use of reason (τὰ δὲ τεχνικὰ ποιήματα λογικῶν ἐστι ποιήματα καὶ τῷ λόγῳ χρωμένων)."

¹⁵⁴ For the example of medicine in reflections on what it means to be human cf. the famous passage from Sophocles' *Antigone* discussed in section 3.1.5.

διὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν <εί> καὶ λόγου μέτεστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις, κατ' ἐξοχὴν αὖθις πάλιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος μόνος ὀνομάζεται λογικός.

Therefore, then, even if the other animals have a share in reason, again, in a preeminent sense, it is humans alone who are called rational. (Galen, *Adhoratio ad artes addiscendas* 1.18–19)

Given its protreptic context, the definition of human beings as $\zeta \tilde{\phi}$ ov λ oyıκόν becomes the occasion for the encouragement to make the best use of that specific capacity (by taking up study):

πῶς οὖν οὖκ αἰσχρόν, ῷ μόνῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν κοινωνοῦμεν θεοῖς, τούτου μὲν ἀμελεῖν, ἐσπουδακέναι δὲ περί τι τῶν ἄλλων, τέχνης μὲν ἀναλήψεως καταφρονοῦντα, Τύχη δ' ἑαυτὸν ἐπιτρέποντα.

How then is anything but shameful, to neglect that within us in which alone we share with the gods, but to show eagerness about the other things, thinking little of the acquisition of the arts, yet committing ourselves to Fortune. (Galen, *Adhoratio ad artes addiscendas* 2.1–3)

Thus, as this example shows, discourse involving the notion of humans as $\zeta \tilde{\phi}$ ov λ oyıkóv can focus on the development of the arts and the capacity for knowledge as one of the signatures of being human.

A third example for reflection on humans as being on the boundary between other animals and the divine realm is the extract from Nemesius' *De natura hominis*, which scholars such as Theiler have ascribed to Posidonius. We have explained in section 2.2. why we have not used Posidonius frag. 309a Theiler as direct evidence to support the claim that already Posidonius used the phrase $\zeta \tilde{\varphi}$ ov $\lambda o \gamma \iota \kappa \acute{o} v$ for human beings. But as a clear instance of reflection on what it means to be human, employing the notion of a rational mortal animal, it merits being included in our discussion. Even though written around 400 AD, it draws on many philosophical sources that we have already discussed and hence may also be illuminating even for the purposes of a comparison with thinkers in the first century AD. 156

In the first book of his work, Nemesius discusses the human place in the cosmos. He begins early with the observation that, as a rational mortal animal, hu-

¹⁵⁵ On the sources for Nemesius, cf. Sharples and van Eijk 2008, 18–23, who discuss, among others, Origen, Philo, Porphyry, Aëtius, Arius Didymus, Galen, and, of course, Posidonius (21–23).

¹⁵⁶ Though admittedly other authors could have been discussed, the amount of attention this text has received by scholarship on Stoic and other philosophical traditions may provide a sufficient basis for this decision.

mans occupy a position in the middle, bound simultaneously both to the divine and to the creaturely and even the earthly:

γνώριμον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις κοινωνεῖ καὶ τῆς τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων μετέχει ζωῆς καὶ τῆς τῶν λογικῶν μετείληφε νοήσεως.

It is well known that humans have something in common even with inanimate things, that they have a share in the life of non-rational animals, and that they participate in the thinking of rational beings. (Nemesius, De natura hominis 1.2.13-15 = Posidonius frag. 309a Theiler)157

Having neatly introduced these three aspects, he continues to expand upon each of them in turn, once more, ascending the steps of the scale, in terms very similar to the other texts already discussed, 158 which build up additively, the lower contained in a transformed form in the higher as well:

[Human being] is associated with inanimate things (κοινωνεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἀψύχοις) in virtue of the body (κατὰ τὸ σῶμα) and the mixture of the four elements (τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κρᾶσιν),

with plants (φυτοῖς) both in virtue of these things and in virtue of the power of growth and generation (κατά τε ταῦτα καὶ τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ σπερματικὴν δύναμιν),

and with non-rational beings (τοῖς δὲ ἀλόγοις) both in virtue of these things (καὶ ἐν τούτοις) and, for good measure, in virtue of movement by impulse (τὴν καθ' ὁρμὴν κίνησιν), desire (ὄρεξιν), spirit (θυμὸν), and the power of sensation and breathing (τὴν αἰσθητικὴν καὶ ἀναπνευστικήν δύναμιν). For all these are common to humans and to non-rational animals (ταῦτα γὰρ ἄπαντα κοινὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἐστίν), even if not all to all.

But humans are linked by rationality to the incorporeal and intellectual natures (συνάπτεται δὲ διὰ τοῦ λογικοῦ ταῖς ἀσωμάτοις καὶ νοεραῖς φύσεσι), in reasoning and apprehending and judging each matter (λογιζόμενος καὶ νοῶν καὶ κρίνων ἕκαστα), pursuing the virtues (τὰς ἀρετὰς μεταδιώκων) and cherishing piety, the coping stone of the virtues (τῶν ἀρετῶν τὸν κολοφῶνα τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἀσπαζόμενος). (Nemesius, De natura hominis 1.2.15 – 23)

¹⁵⁷ Translation here and below by Sharples and van Eijk (2008), adapted. We have divided the Greek into lines, which happen here to be isocola, reinforcing the sense of an orderly layering which is presented.

Posidonius frag. 309a Theiler begins with the quotation above and includes all the other quotations from the first book of Nemesius' De natura hominis, but we will only refer to Nemesius' work from this point on.

¹⁵⁸ And which already point forward to the aspect of an ascending scale of inner "powers" that will be discussed in section 2.2.6.2.3.

The element of rationality (διὰ τοῦ λογικοῦ) is what links humans up (συνάπτεται) to the higher elements of the cosmos, and allows the activities of reasoning and apprehending the truth about the cosmos, which is the basis for the virtues and piety.¹⁵⁹ At the same time humans share in themselves, by virtue of their embodied existence, all that is mortal and finite: sensation, desire, generation, growth, the elements.

This is the boundary at which human beings are placed. Nemesius, probably inspired by Philo, 160 expresses this in terms of their being "on the boundary between intelligible and perceptual being", which he combines with an explicit exposition of the notion of human beings as a ζῷον λογικόν:

διὸ καὶ ὤσπερ ἐν μεθορίοις ἐστὶ νοητῆς καὶ αίσθητῆς οὐσίας, συναπτόμενος κατά μέν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰς σωματικὰς δυνάμεις τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις τε καὶ άψύχοις,

κατά δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ταῖς ἀσωμάτοις οὐσίαις.

So they are, as it were, also on the boundary between intelligible and perceptual being. They are joined together with non-rational and inanimate beings in virtue of the body and bodily powers, and to incorporeal beings in virtue of reason. (Nemesius, De natura hominis 1.2.24 - 1.3.2)161

Nemesius uses the same language of humans as a being placed at the boundary (though here between rational and non-rational nature) in another remarkable passage, in which he even alludes to and quotes Paul on 1 Cor 15.47-49¹⁶² in order to explain the ethical implications of the placement of humans in the cosmos and what genuine humanness requires:

Therefore humans were assigned a place on the boundary between the non-rational and the rational nature (Έν μεθορίοις οὖν τῆς ἀλόγου καὶ λογικῆς φύσεως ὁ ἄνθρωπος

¹⁵⁹ On the connection between the virtues towards God and towards fellow humans in ancient tradition cf. Dihle 1968. Cf. also the explication of piety (εὐσέβεια) as "contemplation of realities" (ἡ τῶν ὄντων θεωρία [Nemesius, De natura hominis 1.5.23]).

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Philo, Opif. 135 calls humans themselves the boundary (μεθόριον): "Hence it may with propriety be said that humankind is the borderland between mortal and immortal nature (τὸν ἄνθρωπον θνητῆς καὶ ἀθανάτου φύσεως εἶναι μεθόριον), partaking of each so far as is needful (ἑκατέρας ὄσον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι μετέχοντα), and that they were created at once mortal and immortal (γεγενῆσθαι θνητὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀθάνατον), mortal in respect of the body (θνητὸν μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα), but in respect of the mind immortal (κατὰ δὲ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀθάνατον)." Cf. Clement of Alexandria's use of the idea at Strom. 2.18.81.2 (cf. also the preceding statement about assimilation to Christ and agreement with God at Strom. 2.18.80.5).

¹⁶¹ We have again divided the Greek into lines.

¹⁶² And, for good measure, Gen 3.19 and Ps 48.13, 21 LXX.

ταχθείς 163). If they incline towards the body and love more the things of the body (έὰν μὲν έπὶ τὸ σῶμα ῥέψη καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος πλέον ἀγαπήση), then they embrace the life of the non-rational beings (τὸν τῶν ἀλόγων ἀσπάζεται βίον) and will be reckoned among them (συναριθμηθήσεται), and they will be called "earthy" (χοϊκὸς), as by Paul (κατὰ Παῦλον), and will be told "For you are earth, and to earth you will return" 164 and "he was compared to the foolish cattle and made like unto them" (παρεσυνεβλήθη τοῖς κτήνεσι τοῖς ἀνοήτοις καὶ ὡμοιώθη αὐτοῖς). 165 But, if they move towards the rational and despise all the bodily pleasures (ἐπὶ τὸ λογικὸν χωρήση καταφρονήσας τῶν σωματικῶν πασῶν ἡδονῶν), they will enter into the divine life that is most dear to God (τὴν θείαν τε καὶ θεοφιλεστάτην ζωὴν μετέρχεται) and pre-eminently human (ὡς ἀνθρώπου προηγουμένως), and they will be like a heavenly being (ἐπουράνιος), in accordance with the saying "As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy, and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly."166 But the summit of the rational nature is to flee from and turn away from evils, but to pursue and choose things that are good (τῆς δὲ λογικῆς φύσεως τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι φεύγειν μὲν καὶ ἀποστρέφεσθαι τὰ κακά, μετιέναι δὲ καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι τὰ καλά). (Nemesius, De natura hominis 1.5.9 – 1.5.19)167

This passage is, for our concerns, remarkable for several reasons. It makes the point of humans as beings at the boundary, here between the rational and the non-rational. It connects it with an ethical and protreptic appeal, which concerns human actions in the body and opposing its desires. It shows how the contrast with animals can function in ethical contexts (τὸν τῶν ἀλόγων ἀσπάζεται βίον). He weaves in the motif of a divine life (τὴν θείαν ... ζωὴν), which is also a feature of discourse on humans as rationals, as we have seen. He the concept and language of genuine and true humanness (ὡς ἀνθρώπου προηγουμένως), based on the proper exercise of the endowment with reason. The

¹⁶³ For the language of τάξις used by Epictetus 1.16 cf. sections 4.4.2–3.

¹⁶⁴ Gen 3.19 LXX.

¹⁶⁵ Ps 48.13, 21 LXX.

^{166 1} Cor 15.48 (οἶος ὁ χοϊκὸς τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ χοϊκοί, καὶ οἶος ὁ ἐπουράνιος τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἰ ἐπουράνιοι).

¹⁶⁷ Naturally, all the biblical references have been removed in Theiler's reconstruction of Posidonius frag. 309a.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Rom 6.12.

¹⁶⁹ Epictetus makes this move as well in Epictetus 2.9.2 (see section 4.2), where, we note, Epictetus also expounds the definition of human beings as rational mortal animals.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. Aspasius 153.7–9, and reason as that which binds the gods and humans together in Stoic thought (section 2.2.4).

¹⁷¹ Cf. also Nemesius, *De natura hominis* 1.4.16, where human beings are called the truly rational animal (τὸ ἀληθῶς λογικὸν ζῷον τὸν ἄνθρωπον), in contrast to those animals that "appear near to the rational animal" (ὡς ἐγγὺς λογικῶν [1.4.15], cf. Strabo, discussed above). Further, Nemesius, *De natura hominis* 1.5.23 – 1.6.1 "Now such as choose to live a human life as that of

quotations from Genesis, the Psalms and Paul are interesting in their own right, though not our central concern here. But finally, the last sentence (τῆς δὲ λογικῆς φύσεως τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι φεύγειν μὲν καὶ ἀποστρέφεσθαι τὰ κακά, μετιέναι δὲ καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι τὰ καλά), which Theiler assigns to Posidonius, 172 seems like a remarkable parallel to Paul in Rom 12.9, 12.17, 12.21 (cf. Rom 7.19, 16.19), 173 especially when, as we argue, Paul draws in Rom 12.1c on the idea of humans as λογικοί and the concept of a human vocation, and connects it to what one does with the body (12.1b, with links to Rom 6). 174

We may sum up our discussion with a passage in Nemesius that explains the elements of the definition of human beings as a ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν (in an expanded version), which is worth quoting, because it provides further evidence for how the definition of human beings is not just incidental to discussions about what it means to be human, but an important means for the condensation of further anthropological reflection:

They also define (ὀρίζονται) humans (τὸν ἄνθρωπον) as a rational animal, mortal and receptive of intellect and knowledge (ζῷον λογικόν, θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν). An animal (ζῷον), because humans too are an animate, sensitive being (οὐοία ἐστὶν ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική): for this is the definition of an animal (ὄρος ζῷου). "Rational", in order to separate them from non-rational animals (λογικὸν δέ, ἴνα χωρισθῆ τῶν ἀλόγων). "Mortal" (θνητόν), in order to separate them from rational immortals (χωρισθῆ τῶν ἀθανάτων λογικῶν). "Receptive of intellect and knowledge", because it is by learning that we acquire skills (διὰ μαθήσεως προσγίνονται ἡμῖν αὶ τέχναι) and the sciences (ἐπιστῆμαι); for we have a capability to receive both intellect and skills (δύναμιν δεκτικὴν καὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν), but the actual possession of these is the result of learning (τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν κτωμένοις ἐκ τῶν μαθημάτων). (Nemesius, *De natura hominis* 1.11.3 – 9)¹⁷⁶

With this concluding passage from Nemesius, we have now seen several examples of how human beings as rational animals are described as standing at the boundary between two domains and how their behaviour aligns with either of

a human and not just the life of a mere animal" (ὅσοι τοίνυν τὸν ἀνθρώπου βίον ὡς ἀνθρώπου ζῆν προαιροῦνται καὶ μὴ ὡς ζώου μόνου, τὰς ἀρετὰς μετέρχονται καὶ τὴν εὐσέβειαν).

¹⁷² There seems at least to be a Stoic parallel here, as the formulation αἰρεῖσθαί τε δέῃ τἀγαθὰ καὶ φεύγειν τὰ κακά "you have to choose what is good and flee what is evil" appears in Ariston of Chios (around 250 BC), frag. 374 (in SVF 1, p. 85 [= Galen, PHP 7.2.3, which notes the controversy of Ariston with Chrysippus (SVF 3.256)]). Cf. also Sextus Empiricus, AM 11.113.

¹⁷³ Even though Paul uses the language of πονηρόν in 12.9.

¹⁷⁴ See sections 5.3.2 and 6.3.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. with Epictetus 2.9.2, section 4.2.

¹⁷⁶ Nemesius continues with a report on an alternative explanation that the addition "being receptive of intellect and knowledge" to the definition, serves to distinguish human beings from "nymphs" and "other kinds of demons" (1.11.10-14).

them. This alignment depends on human actions. According to the Stoics, though, other things turn out to have already been aligned by nature with humans as rational beings in view.

2.2.6.2.2 Ascending scales of value and purposive relations

Hence, the ascending scales in which humans as rational animals are placed can also be discussed in terms of value and purposive relationships. In the following texts from Origen's Contra Celsum, which reflect Stoic doctrine at this point, rational beings tower high above the irrational animals. All other beings are made for the sake of rational natures. The imagery used to express this superiority of rational beings is drastic:

They [i.e. the Stoic school of philosophers (οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς φιλόσοφοι)] quite rightly put humankind (προταττόντων τὸν ἄνθρωπον) and the rational nature in general above all irrational beings (καὶ ἀπαξαπλῶς τὴν λογικὴν φύσιν πάντων τῶν ἀλόγων), and say that providence has made everything primarily for the sake of the rational nature (διὰ ταύτην λεγόντων προηγουμένως τὴν πρόνοιαν πάντα πεποιηκέναι). Rational beings (τὰ λογικά) which are the primary things (προηγούμενα) have the value¹⁷⁷ of children who are born (παίδων γεννωμένων); whereas irrational and inanimate (τὰ δ' ἄλογα καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα χορίου) things have that of the afterbirth which is created with the child (συγκτιζομένου τῶ παιδίω). (Origen, Cels. 4.74 = SVF 2.1157)178

While the usefulness of farm animals for humans might be obvious, the Stoic view Origen relates holds that even wild animals serve a useful function for rational animals:

εί δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις τῶν ζώων τροφὰς κατεσκεύασεν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· καὶ ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ ζῷα καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν φιλοσοφησάντων εἰρήκασι γυμνασίου ἕνεκα γεγονέναι τῷ λογικῷ ζώω.

Even if He also made nourishment for the wildest of animals, there is nothing remarkable about that; for other philosophers have said that even these animals were made for the exercise of the rational being. (Origen, Cels. 4.75 = SVF 3.1173)

The idea is that all things are subservient to rational creatures:

¹⁷⁷ Here the word λόγος appears close to λογικός (λόγον μὲν ἔχει τὰ λογικά ... παίδων γεννωμένων), but is used in the sense of value, not reason (cf. GE, s.v. λόγος, 4D for other examples of the phrase "to have the value of").

¹⁷⁸ Transl. of Origen's Contra Celsum by Chadwick 1986, here and below, adapted.

Δοῦλα οὖν πάντα τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς αὐτοῦ συνέσεως κατεσκεύασεν ὁ δημιουργός.

The Creator, then, has made everything to serve the rational being and its natural intelligence. (Origen, *Cels.* 4.78)

This will also be important for Epictetus 1.16, as we shall see. 179

2.2.6.2.3 Ascending scales of faculties, impulses and impressions

Furthermore, as we have already seen, but shall explore more here, the ascending scale in which human beings are placed goes along with an ascending scale of "powers", "faculties" and "capacities". This idea is clearly expressed in the following longer passage from Philo's *Legum Allegoriae*, which reflects Stoic ideas and terminology:¹⁸⁰

The mind when as yet unclothed and unconfined by the body (ὁ γυμνὸς καὶ ἀνένδετος σώματι νοῦς) ... has many powers (δυνάμεις). It has the power of holding together (ἐκτικὴν), of growing (φυτικὴν), of conscious life (ψυχικὴν), of thought (διανοητικήν), and countless other powers, ¹⁸¹ varying both in species and genus.

Lifeless things, like stones ..., share with all others the power of holding together (ἕξις κοινὴ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων), of which the bones in us, ... partake.

"Growth" (φύσις) extends to plants (ή δὲ φύσις διατείνει καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτά), and there are parts in us, such as our nails and hair, resembling plants; "growth" (φύσις) is coherence capable of moving itself (ἕξις ἤδη κινουμένη).

(23) Conscious life (ψυχή) is the power to grow, with the additional power of receiving impressions and being the subject of impulses (φύσις προσειληφοῖα φαντασίαν καὶ ὁρμήν). This is shared also by creatures without reason (κοινή καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων). Indeed our mind (ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς) contains a part that is analogous to the conscious life of a creature without reason (τι ἀλόγου ψυχῆ). Once more, the power of thinking (ἡ διανοητική δύναμις) is peculiar to the mind (νοῦ), and while shared, it may well be, by beings more akin to God (κοινή μὲν τάχα καὶ τῶν θειοτέρων φύσεων), is, so far as mortal beings are concerned, peculiar to human beings (ἰδία δὲ ὡς ἐν θνητοῖς ἀνθρώπου).

This power or faculty is twofold. We are rational beings, on the one hand as being partakers of mind (μὲν καθ' ἢν λογικοί ἐσμεν νοῦ μετέχοντες), and on the other as being capable of discourse (καθ' ἢν διαλεγόμεθα). (Philo, Leg. 2.23-24)¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ See section 4.4.1. The Stoic material on this topic is collected at SVF 2.1152–1167.

¹⁸⁰ Witness its inclusion in collections such as SVF 2.458, LS 47P.

¹⁸¹ Philo adds ἡ αἰσθητική at Leg. 2.24.

¹⁸² We have omitted several details from this passage (some of which, such as the mention of wood as an example, would render the link to other passages, such as Origen's *De oratione* 6.1–2

This account is additive in so far as the higher forms include the "powers" of the lower forms. At the level of animals, what is added are "impressions" and "impulse" (φαντασίαν καὶ ὁρμήν). The various "powers" (δυνάμεις), all associated with mind (vous) in its non-embodied form, are distributed among embodied creatures to various degrees. Only in rational beings does the power of "mind" show itself in the form of thinking (ἡ διανοητική δύναμις). The highest manifestation of this power is peculiar to humans, among mortal creatures (as there may be higher ones).183

The same account is given in the following passage by Clement of Alexandria, who also makes an ethical point:

Of "holding together" (ἔξεως), then, even stones (οἱ λίθοι), of "growth" (φύσεως) also plants (τὰ φυτά), of "impulses" (ὁρμῆς) and "impressions" (φαντασίας) and the two just mentioned, even irrational animals partake (καὶ τὰ ἄλογα μετέχει ζῶα). But the rational capacity (ἡ λογικὴ δὲ δύναμις), being peculiar to the soul of humans (ἰδία οὖσα τῆς ἀνθρωπείας ψυχῆς), is not supposed to be impelled in the same manner as the irrational animals (οὐχ ὡσαύτως τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις ὁρμᾶν ὀφείλει), but to distinguish the impressions and not to be carried away by them (άλλὰ καὶ διακρίνειν τὰς φαντασίας καὶ μὴ συναποφέρεσθαι αὐταῖς). (Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 2.20.111.1–2) 184

The same point is repeated in Origen, who expands on the ethical implications, including the attribution of praise and blame:

The rational animal (λογικὸν ζῷον), however, in addition to its imaginative nature (πρὸς τῆ φανταστική φύσει), also has reason (λόγον ἔχει), which judges the images, rejecting some and accepting others, so that the animal may be led in accordance with them (τὸν κρίνοντα τὰς φαντασίας, καὶ τινὰς μὲν ἀποδοκιμάζοντα, τινὰς δὲ παραδεχόμενον, ἵνα ἄγηται τὸ ζῷον κατ' αὐτάς). Therefore, since there are, in the nature of reason (ἐν τῆ φύσει τοῦ λόγου), means to contemplate both the good and the shameful (ἀφορμαὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν) – following which, contemplating (θεωρήσαντες) the good and the shameful, we choose (αἰρούμεθα) the good but avoid (ἐκκλίνομεν) the shameful – we are praise-

[see below], even more conspicuous). By inserting paragraphs, we have sought to highlight the various "levels" of being and, concomitantly, capacities. Cf. similarly and more succinctly, Philo, Aet. 75, where "the nature of the world or cosmic system" (τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν) is described as closely unified and hence as "appearing as cohesion in wood and stone (τὴν ξύλων μὲν καὶ λίθων ἔξιν), growth in crops and trees (σπαρτῶν δὲ καὶ δένδρων φύσιν), conscious life in all animals (ψυχὴν δὲ ζώων ἀπάντων), mind and reason in humans (ἀνθρώπων δὲ νοῦν καὶ λόγον) and the perfection of virtue in the good (ἀρετὴν δὲ σπουδαίων τελειοτάτην)." Cf. further Philo, Deus 35 (where various bodies are inseparable from "in some cases cohesion [ἕξει], in others growth [τὰ δὲ φύσει], in others life [τὰ δὲ ψυχῆ], in others a reasoning soul [τὰ δὲ λογικῆ ψυχῆ]").

¹⁸³ As we have seen at Philo, Conf. 176.

¹⁸⁴ Our translation.

worthy (ἐπαινετοί) when devoting ourselves to the practice of the good (ἐπιδόντες ἑαυτοὺς τῆ πράξει τοῦ καλοῦ), but blameworthy (ψεκτοί) in the opposite case. (Origen, *Princ.* 3.1.3 = part of SVF 2.988)185

This theme of appropriately discriminating the impressions (φαντασίαι), making the right use of them, i.e. rationally, is of great importance to Epictetus, as we shall see in chapter 4, but may here already be illustrated by the following passage, in which Epictetus makes a point about personal adornment and what should be made beautiful:

Learn first to know who you are (γνῶθι πρῶτον τίς εἶ), and then adorn (κόσμει) yourself accordingly. You're a human being (ἄνθρωπος εἶ); that is to say, a mortal animal who has the capacity to make use of impressions in a rational manner (θνητὸν ζῶον χρηστικὸν φαντασίαις λογικῶς). And what does it mean, to use them rationally (τὸ δὲ λογικῶς τί έστιν)? To use them in accordance with nature and perfectly (φύσει ὁμολογουμένως καὶ τελέως). What is superior in you, then (τί οὖν ἐξαίρετον ἔχεις)? The animal in you (τὸ ζῷον)? No. The mortal (τὸ θνητόν)? No. The capacity to make use of impressions (τὸ χρηστικὸν φαντασίαις)? No. The rational element in you (τὸ λογικὸν ἔχεις ἐξαίρετον) – that is what is superior in you. Adorn and beautify that (τοῦτο κόσμει καὶ καλλώπιζε); but as for your hair, leave it to him who made it in accordance with his will. (Epictetus 3.1.25 – 26)186

The distinction between the impressions (φαντασίαι) in the case of animals and human beings is also noted in the following passage from Diogenes Laertius:

Έτι τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι λογικαί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι· λογικαὶ μὲν αἱ τῶν λογικῶν ζώων, ἄλογοι δὲ αὶ τῶν ἀλόγων. αὶ μὲν οὖν λογικαὶ νοήσεις εἰσίν, 187 αὶ δ' ἄλογοι οὐ τετυχήκασιν ονόματος.

Another division of presentations is into rational and irrational, the former being those of rational creatures, the latter those of the irrational. Those which are rational are processes of thought, while those which are irrational have no name. (DL 7.51 = SVF 2.61)

We note that this passage is an important grammatical parallel for our reading of Rom 12.1.188

¹⁸⁵ Transl. Behr 2017.

¹⁸⁶ This passage is similar to Plato, *Resp.* 591c. For Epictetus, we adapt the translation of R. Hard (2014), here and below.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Stobaeus, Anthologium 1.48.5: Ἡ γὰρ ἐν λογικῷ ζώω φαντασία ἐδέδοκτο αὐτοῖς νόησις ("They have determined that impression in a rational creature is a thought" [our translation]). Cf. also the distinctions between reason and speech in the context of a contrast between humans and animals in Sextus Empiricus, AM 8.275 – 276.

¹⁸⁸ See section 6.3.3.4.

2.2.6.2.4 Freedom, responsibility, happiness

Finally, the discourse on human beings as ζῶον λογικόν is also developed in terms of human freedom, responsibility, and happiness. A notable example for freedom can be found in Origen's De oratione 6.1–2.189 In 6.1, Origen describes different forms of motion, beginning from the lowest forms and moving up, along a scala naturae to the higher forms. 190 He begins at the first level with things like stones or pieces of wood (which have "lost" their power of motion [τὸ φύειν ἀπολωλεκότα]). If they move, it is only because something else outside of them moves them (τὸ κινοῦν ἔξωθεν ἔχει). At the second level, there are plants, 191 which are themselves moving (i.e. growing), albeit, it is said, only because nature moves them, so they still belong to the first kind of motion, the source being outside of them. At the third level, there are animals, which also move "from out of themselves" (ἐξ αὑτῶν κινεῖσθαι) and thus represent a second kind of motion, as they are moved from their own internal nature or soul (κινούμενα τὰ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνυπαρχούσης φύσεως ἢ ψυχῆς κινούμενα). 192 However, there is a third kind of motion, which applies at the fourth level, to humans as rational beings, who are also moving "through themselves" (δι' αὐτῶν):

A third kind of motion is that found in living beings (ή ἀφ' αὐτῶν κίνησις), which is called motion "from" themselves (ή ἀφ' αὐτῶν κίνησις). And I believe that the motion of rational beings is motion "through" themselves (ή τῶν λογικῶν κίνησις δι' αὐτῶν ἐστι κίνησις). Now if we take motion "from" itself away from a living being (ἀπὸ τοῦ ζώου τὴν ἀφ' αὐτοῦ κίνησιν), it cannot any longer be supposed to be a living being, but will be like a plant moved only by nature (ὑπὸ φύσεως μόνης κινουμένῳ) or like a stone hurled by something outside itself. But if something follows along by its own motion (παρακολουθῆ τι τῆ ἰδία κινήσει), since we call this motion "through" itself (δι' αὐτοῦ κινεῖσθαι), then it must necessarily be rational (τοῦτο εἶναι λογικόν). (Origen, *De oratione* 6.1)¹⁹³

¹⁸⁹ Cf. also Philo, Conf. 176-178 quoted above.

¹⁹⁰ This text is very similar to the one we have cited above, Philo, *Leg.* 2.23 – 24. Cf. also Origen, *Princ.* 3.1.2 – 3.

¹⁹¹ Origen also adds the bodies of living beings (τὰ τῶν ζώων σώματα) because when they are moved, they are not moved in the capacity of living beings (οὐχ ξ ζῷα ... μετατίθεται). These kinds of distinctions bear a remote resemblance, though here in the context of "psychology", to the kind of "prepositional metaphysics" (cf. Sterling 1997) which one might also detect, inter alia, in Rom 11.36; cf. 1 Cor 8.6.

¹⁹² Origen signals the use of technical language here by his reference to the Stoics as those who "who use words in their stricter senses" (παρὰ τοῖς κυριώτερον χρωμένοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι), cf. Inwood and Gerson 1997, 164.

¹⁹³ Transl. Greer 1979, here and below.

This hierarchy of natures and movements is the basis for a clear argumentation for human freedom and responsibility, based on an interpretation of the definition of human beings. Here it must be noted that Origen uses a very Epictetean term, namely $\dot{\epsilon}\phi$ ' $\dot{\eta}\mu\tilde{\nu}$, that "which depends on us" or is "in our power" or is "up to us", which corresponds to a primary distinction of his ethical thought:¹⁹⁴

Therefore, those who want to say that we have no freedom (μηδὲν εἶναι ἐφ' ἡμῖν) must necessarily admit something extremely foolish – first, that we are not living beings (ὅτι οὐκ ἐσμὲν ζῷα) and, second, that we are not rational beings (ὅτι οὐδὲ λογικὰ). On their view, since we are in no way moved by ourselves but by something moving outside ourselves (ὑπὸ ἔξωθεν κινοῦντος αὐτοὶ οὐδαμῶς κινούμενοι), we may be said to do what we suppose we are doing ourselves only because of that external cause. On the contrary, let anyone pay special attention to his own experiences and see whether he will not say without blushing that it is he who wills, he who eats, he who walks, he who gives his assent and acceptance to certain opinions (συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ παραδέχεσθαι ὁποῖα δή ποτε τῶν δογμάτων), and he who rejects others as false (ἀνανεύειν πρὸς ἕτερα ὡς ψευδῆ). (Origen, *De oratione* 6.2)

Freedom and responsibility of human beings are discussed in terms of their nature as rational beings. A similar link between the definition of human beings as rational animals and their happiness (εὐδαιμονία) is made by Aspasius, who explains Aristotle's statement at the very beginning of his Nicomachean ethics that "the good is what everything aims at" (τἀγαθόν, οὖ πάντ' ἐφίεται [Aristotle, EN 1094a 2–3]) as follows:

That is how one must understand "aiming at", in the sense that everything is equipped by nature for a resemblance to the most perfect and primary cause in the way that it can (παρεσκευασμένου ἑκάστου ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως εἰς τὴν τοῦ τελειοτάτου καὶ πρώτου αἰτίου ἦ δυνατὸν ἐξομοίωσιν). For each thing is eagerly drawn by its own nature to its proper perfection (τὴν ἰδίαν τελειότητα). It is drawn to this because it is inclined to that which is most perfect of all. If Aristotle takes "good" (ἀγαθὸν) in the sense of "happiness" (ἀντὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας λαμβάνει), then rational animals (λογικὰ ζῷα) only would strictly be meant (ὀρθῶς αν λέγοιτο). (Aspasius 4.7-11)

¹⁹⁴ It occurs frequently in Epictetus. Cf. only the first sentence of the *Enchiridion*: Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ("Some things are within our power, while others are not" [*Ench.* 1.1 (transl. R. Hard)]).

¹⁹⁵ Cf. also the statement in Aspasius 67.1-3, who adds the term λ oyukòv in the discussion to Aristotle's words on children, animals and the $\dot{\epsilon}$ kovoʻ(ov (the "voluntary", though the translation can be misleading). On moral responsibility cf. also the attribution of praise and blame at Origen, *Princ.* 3.1.3, quoted above.

Thus for Aspasius, in the stricter sense of the term, only humans, as rational animals, should be called "happy". 196 Related to this is the statement in Aspasius that only rational animals have something divine in their pursuit of those activities in which, according to Aristotelian tradition, happiness consists. 197

This concludes our discussion of how human beings are placed within the cosmos in discourse employing the definition of human beings as rational living beings. We turn to the related notion of the vocation of a rational animal.

2.2.6.3 The vocation of rational animals

As our second main theme, we show in this section that the notion of a human vocation is often expressed by drawing on the notion of human beings as rational animals. In a first section, we show this with regards to the language of being "fashioned" for a particular purpose. Here the texts reflect in particular on how the human body and the human mind are made fittingly in order to equip human beings for their role in the cosmos.

In a second section, we show that reflections on the human vocation which use the idea of humans as rational often emphasise a two-part structure to that vocation, consisting of contemplation and corresponding action, to describe which we resort to the language of sign production.

In a third section, we consider how the commentator Aspasius uses the language of λογικός to paraphrase and explain Aristotle's function (ἔργον) argument in the Nicomachean ethics. This is important because the ἔργον language is one of the ways in which Epictetus expresses the concept of a human vocation (see section 4.2).

2.2.6.3.1 Fashioned for a purpose

In several of the examples we have already surveyed, we find a discursive pattern of λογικά ζῷα being "fashioned", "constituted" or "equipped" (κατασκευάζειν, κατασκευή) for a certain purpose. We have already quoted Marcus Aurelius 3.9 (where right judgments must agree with the constitution of rational animals [τῆ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου κατασκευῆ]), Marcus Aurelius 9.1.1 (where nature has con-

¹⁹⁶ Cf. also Aspasius' distinguo concerning children at 27.11–19 (quoted above).

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Aspasius 153.7–9: ἔστι δὲ θεῖόν τι ἐν τοῖς ζώοις καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς, εἴ τις ἐφίεται τῆς οἰκείας ἐνεργείας καὶ ἀνεμποδίστου καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡδονῆς. "There is something divine in animals and above all in rational ones, if someone aims at his proper and unimpeded activity and therefore at pleasure." (The pleasure in question here being that which accompanies the rational activities.)

stituted rational creatures for the sake of each other [τῆς γὰρ τῶν ὅλων φύσεως κατεσκευακυίας τὰ λογικὰ ζῷα ἕνεκεν ἀλλήλων] and their mutual benefit [ὤφελεῖν μὲν ἄλληλα κατ' ἀξίαν]), Marcus Aurelius 8.39 (where constitution of rationals [ἐν τῆ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου κατασκευῆ] is suitable for justice [δικαιοσύνη]) and, in a Christian key, Athenagoras, De resurrectione 13.1 (where God has made "this sort of living being" [τοιοῦτον κατεσκεύασεν ζῶον] with all the things "befitting to a life of understanding and a life of reason" [ἔμφρονι δὲ βίω καὶ ζωῆ λογικῆ προσηκόντων]).

This is significant for our purposes because there is a connection between the concept of a human vocation and the notion that human beings are made in a certain way, either by God or nature, specifically suitable to the purpose that accords with the intentions of either God or nature. 198 The passages we have thus combined serve to confirm how this cluster of ideas is associated with discourse involving human beings as rational. As we shall see in the next chapter, there is a broader ancient reflection on humans, in which specifically the bodily makeup of human beings is compared and contrasted with other animals, and correlated with their endowment with reason.¹⁹⁹ Such traditions can condense into formulations such as the definition of human beings as ζῶα λογικά, while other language such as κατασκευάζειν succinctly expresses associated themes.

This nexus of themes and language is important for Epictetus as well, as we shall see in chapter 4, and here already in a passage from a discourse on how to behave towards tyrants (1.19). Having just presented his hearers with a vivid dialogue between a tyrant threatening shackles and a fearless and hence free person (with a self-understanding of having been liberated by Zeus [ἐμὲ ὁ Ζεὺς έλεύθερον ἀφῆκεν] and being "his own son" [τὸν ἴδιον υἱὸν (1.19.9)]), Epictetus explains that such a person is not paying attention to a tyrant in his presence, but to himself (1.19.10), as it is "in the nature of every living creature that it does everything for its own sake (οὕτως τὸ ζῷον· αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα πάντα ποιεῖ [1.19.11]), and the same applies to the sun and even to Zeus himself (1.19.11). The point here is not of course a universal principle of selfishness. Rather, as Epictetus continues to explain with regard to Zeus, he can only do his own thing as

¹⁹⁸ Cf. section 3.2 on these links.

¹⁹⁹ In this context, a passage such as Galen, De usu partium 3.184.16-18 Kühn is noteworthy because, using the language of κατασκευάζειν, it links the notion of humans as ζῷα λογικά expressly with a consideration of the usefulness of the parts of the body, as Galen's aim is to show that "each of the parts of our body are constructed in such a way as to be of most use to the twofooted rational animal" (ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων οὕτω κατεσκευασμένον, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα χρηστὸν ἔσοιτο δίποδι ζώω λογικῷ).

the "Rain-giver (Υέτιος) and Fruit-bringer (Ἐπικάρπιος) and father of gods and humans (πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε)" by contributing to the "common benefit (εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀφέλιμος)" (1.19.12). And given the close link between humans as rational living beings and the gods, this same principle applies to all human beings:

καθόλου τε τοιαύτην <τὴν> φύσιν τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου κατεσκεύασεν, ἵνα μηδενὸς τῶν ἰδίων άγαθῶν δύνηται τυγχάνειν, <ἄν> μή τι είς τὸ κοινὸν ὡφέλιμον προσφέρηται.

And in general he [Zeus] has constituted the rational animal to have such a nature that he cannot attain any of his own particular goods without contributing to the common benefit. (Epictetus 1.19.13)

Thus, these texts show that the idea of a human vocation, the idea of humans as rational animals, and the idea of humans being constructed in a way suited to this purpose can be linked and may extend even into the domain of the social.²⁰⁰

2.2.6.3.2 Contemplation and action: sign production

The notion of human beings as ζῶα λογικά is also employed in discourse on the human vocation in the cosmos. In some of these texts, we find the idea of humans being able to perceive and understand, based on their endowment with reason, the highest truths about the cosmos, and hence to act in a manner which reflects this vision:

Βίων δὲ τριῶν ὄντων, θεωρητικοῦ καὶ πρακτικοῦ καὶ λογικοῦ, τὸν τρίτον φασὶν αἰρετέονγεγονέναι γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐπίτηδες τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον πρὸς θεωρίαν καὶ πρᾶξιν.

Of the three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the rational, they declare that we ought to choose the last, for that a rational being is expressly produced by nature for contemplation and for action. (DL 7.130)

This passage is particularly important in view of Epictetus and Paul because it expresses the vocation of human beings as a λογικὸν ζῶον in terms of a twopart structure: first, contemplation of the cosmos ($\theta \epsilon \omega \rho i\alpha$) and, second, a sort of action which is informed by this contemplation (πρᾶξις).²⁰¹ In a passage of Cicero's De natura deorum, in which he reports Stoic theology, the purpose of hu-

²⁰⁰ As Epictetus implies in 1.19.14: the principle of doing "everything for one's one sake" (πάντα αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖν) is not "anti-social" (ἀκοινώνητον).

²⁰¹ In this context our term "sign production" (see section 1.4) would highlight the way in which the praxis reflects and is shaped by the "seeing" of the cosmos. The same point applies to mundum contemplandum and imitandum (Cicero, ND 2.37).

mans and other beings is related in similar ways, where for human beings the same two-part structure of their vocation is present (mundum contemplandum and imitandum):

For as Chrysippus cleverly put it, just as a shield-case is made for the sake of a shield and a sheath for the sake of a sword, so everything else except the world was created for the sake of some other thing (sic praeter mundum cetera omnia aliorum causa esse generata); thus the corn and fruits produced by the earth were created for the sake of animals (animantium causa), and animals for the sake of human beings (animantes autem hominum): for example the horse for riding (ecum vehendi causa), the ox for ploughing (arandi bovem), the dog for hunting and keeping guard (venandi et custodiendi canem); humans themselves however came into existence for the purpose of contemplating and imitating the world (ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum). (Cicero, ND 2.37)²⁰²

It is important to note that in the context of this passage, reason language for the world and for human beings is used in a manner very similar to the arguments we have discussed above.²⁰³

The same two-part structure is also present in Philo's *De praemiis et poenis*. Having extolled the importance of hope²⁰⁴ for human beings in various occupations (the tradesman, the skipper, the ambitious politician, the athlete), Philo turns to the life of contemplation:

The hope of happiness (ἐλπὶς εὐδαιμονίας) incites also the devotees of virtue (τοὺς ἀρετῆς ζηλωτὰς) to study wisdom (φιλοσοφεῖν), believing that thus they will be able to discern the nature of all that exists (δυνησομένους καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν ἰδεῖν) and to act in accordance with nature and so bring to their fullness the best types of life, the contemplative and the practical (δρᾶσαι τὰ ἀκόλουθα πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρίστων βίων θεωρητικοῦ τε καὶ πρακτι-

²⁰² Cf. Forschner 2018, 200 - 201. Note the parallel to Epictetus 1.6.19 (see section 4.5). Note also the discussion of stars in the context of this passage (at ND 2.39). Transl. H. Rackham, here and below, adapted.

²⁰³ For the reason language in the immediate context of this passage: at ND 2.36 Cicero relates Stoic arguments to the effect that the world (mundum) has a share in understanding (intelligentem) and wisdom (sapientem), is a living being (animantem), rational and capable of insight (rationis et consilii compotem); like humans it shares in reason (rationis particeps), but while humans can become wise (homo ... sapiens fieri potest), it is wise from the beginning (a principo sapiens). Further, in ND 2.38 we find the statement that nothing is better than mind and reason (nihil autem est mente et ratione melius).

²⁰⁴ On the importance of hope (ἐλπίς) in Philo's characterisation of genuine humanness see also the passages discussed below. Note that Philo (Praem. 10) mentions hope ($\mathring{\epsilon}\lambda\pi(\varsigma)$ as the "most vital form of seed (τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην σπορὰν) which the creator (ὁ ποιητὴς) sowed in the rich soil of the rational soul (λογικῆ ψυχῆ)".

κοῦ τελείωσιν), which necessarily make their possessor a happy man (ὧν ὁ τυχὼν εὐθύς ἐστιν εὐδαίμων). (Philo, *Praem.* 11)²⁰⁵

Philo also makes the link between the notion of humans as rational beings and their vocation as human beings explicit. In a first passage, he explicitly links the idea of a contemplative calling to the notion of a rational being (λ oyıκόν), which from the context clearly includes humans:

θεωρητικοῦ γὰρ τίς ἀμείνων βίος ἢ μᾶλλον οἰκειούμενος207 λογικῷ;

For what life is better than a contemplative life, or more appropriate to a rational being? (Philo, *Migr.* 47).

In another passage, Philo uses the language of "worship" (θεραπεία) and links it to human beings as ζῷα λογικά: 208

For, abandoning the foreign alien tongue (γλῶτταν) of Chaldaea, the tongue of sky-prating astrology, he betook him to the language that befits a living creature endowed with reason (τὴν ἀρμόττουσαν [sc. γλῶτταν] λογικῷ ζώῳ), even the worship of the First Cause of all things (τὴν τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου θεραπείαν). (Philo, Somn. 1.161)

Finally, we add here an example by a Christian author, which expresses the vocation of human beings as rational animals again in terms of contemplation and

²⁰⁵ This passage is very similar to Cicero, *Tusc.* 5.9, where Pythagoras is said to have considered, at Olympia, the athletes, the merchants, and the spectators (as in *Praem.* 11) and to have compared the philosopher to the third class of those who are "studying the nature of things zealously" (*rerum naturam studiose intuerentur*), which he calls "zealous for wisdom" (*sapientiae studiosos*, cf. τοὺς ἀρετῆς ζηλωτὰς [*Praem.* 11]).

²⁰⁶ Though not all: The "seeing" (ἰδεῖν) of "things whose allotted place is nearer to the divine" (τὰ θειοτέρας μοίρας λαχόντα) is reserved to the "most keen-eyed class", to whom "the Father of all things, by showing them his own works (τὰ ἴδια ἐπιδεικνύμενος … ἔργα), bestows an all-surpassing gift (μεγίστην πασῶν χαρίζεται δωρεάν)" (*Migr.* 46). Immediately following this reference, the contrast between the word of God and the voice of human beings is made by referring to human beings simply as "mortal beings" (τῆς τῶν θνητῶν ζώων φωνῆς), confirming that "rational beings" here includes reference to humans.

²⁰⁷ The use of the term οἰκειοῦσθαι seems suggestive for Philo's use of Stoic traditions in this context, cf. e.g. DL 7.85.

²⁰⁸ This is relevant for our discussion of Paul's use of λατρεία in Rom 12.1, cf. section 6.3.1.3 (quoting Philo, *Spec.* 1.303, where θεραπεία can be glossed as "service").

a fitting response in life. The focus is the divine Pedagogue, Christ, who is the image (εἰκών): 209

For what else shall we say the rational animal (ζῷον τὸ λογικόν), I mean human beings (τὸν ἄνθρωπον λέγω), must do, than to contemplate the divine (ἢ θεάσασθαι τὸ θεῖον δεῖν)? It is necessary, too, I say, that humans contemplate human nature (Θεάσασθαι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν) and live in such a manner that truth leads the way (ὑφηγεῖται ἡ ἀλήθεια), admiring beyond measure (ἀγαμένους ὑπερφυῶς) the Pedagogue himself and his commandments (τόν τε παιδαγωγὸν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ), and how they fittingly correspond (πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις) and harmonise (ἀρμόττοντα), according to which image we must also conform ourselves towards the Pedagogue (καθ' ἢν εἰκόνα καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀρμοσαμένους χρὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν παιδαγωγόν), making our speech and deeds agree (σύμφωνον τὸν λόγον ποιησαμένους τοῖς ἔργοις), in order truly to live (τῷ ὄντι ζῆν). (Clement of Alexandria, *Paed.* 1.12.100.3)²¹⁰

2.2.6.3.3 The function (ἔργον) of human beings

The idea of humans as a ζῷον λογικόν is closely connected to the idea of a human vocation (τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) in a section of Aspasius' commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics. There Aspasius seeks to explain and paraphrase Aristotle's famous function (ἔργον) argument (at EN, 1097b 22–1098a 20). This passage is full of reason language and connects it to various concepts having to do with the role and purpose of human beings (ἀνθρώπου τὸ τέλος), also in relation to the purposes of other things. In particular it discusses the term ἕργον in a way that is helpful for Epictetus 1.16.19–21, our most important parallel for Rom 12.1. It contains a clear expression of the specific vocation of something being based on what is peculiar to it. It also paraphrases Aristotle's image of the functions of the parts of the body, in a way that is close to our interpretation of Paul's use of the image of the body in Rom 12.3–8. This warrants our extensive quotation of the passage.

Aspasius begins to explain Aristotle's third approach at defining happiness (εὐδαιμονία), namely by considering the function of human beings, 213 as follows:

²⁰⁹ On the importance of the concept of assimilation for Clement of Alexandria, see van Kooten 2008, 177–180, in particular on Christ as the true εἰκών, 178–179, with a discussion of Clement, *Paed.* 1.12.98–99, immediately preceding the passage quoted here.

²¹⁰ Our translation.

²¹¹ Cf. section 4.2.

²¹² A passage not discussed by Heinemann 1926 (cf. section 3.2).

²¹³ Cf. Aristotle, EN 1097b 22-25.

But supposing they would agree that happiness (εὐδαιμονίαν) is the most final good (τέλειον ἀγαθὸν) and the best one, one must still grasp clearly what it is. ... For the end of anything (παντὸς γὰρ τὸ τέλος) ... is believed to reside in its work [or product] (ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ), for example the end of the art of shoemaking (σκυτικῆς τέλος) is in the work [that is the result] of shoemaking (ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ τῷ τῆς σκυτικῆς). If, then, the work of the shoemaking art is a sandal, but we are investigating what the end of humans is (ἀνθρώπου δὲ ζητοῦμεν τὸ τέλος τί ποτέ ἐστιν), one would have to grasp the work of humans as humans (τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἦ ἄνθρωπον). That there is a work of humans as humans (ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ἦ ἄνθρωπος), he renders plausible first on the grounds that it is unreasonable to agree that there is a product of a builder (τέκτονος) and a shoemaker (σκυτέως)²¹⁴ and that there are works [or functions] of the parts of a human being (ἀνθρώπου τῶν μορίων εἶναι ἔργα), for example seeing (τὸ ὁρᾶν) in the case of the eye (ὀφθαλμοῦ), walking in any other of the things that pertain to a hand (χειρὸς δὲ τὸ λαμβάνειν καὶ διδόναι καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν προσηκόντων τῆ χειρί). If there is a work pertaining to each of his parts (τῶν μορίων ἑκάστου ἐστὶν ἔργον), there should be one of the human being as well (εἴη α̈ν καὶ άνθρώπου). (Aspasius 17.18 - 29)²¹⁵

The use of the term τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ("the work of human beings") is one of the ways to express the idea of a vocation of human beings. Aspasius continues his explanatory paraphrase of Aristotle, turning to the question of what is specific to human nature and hence to the purpose of human beings as such, which is grounded in it. Aspasius explicitly expresses the general notion of a specific work based on peculiar properties (τὸ δὲ ἔργον ἑκάστου ἴδιον). Moving from what is shared with plants and animals to what is specifically human, Aspasius focuses on humans being λογικός:

What, then, is this work, qua human being (τi) οὖν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ † ἄνθρωπος)? Would it be to live (τi) ζῆν)? But this is common even to plants (κοινὶν καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς), and in any case it is not his work to have a share in life (τi) μετέχειν ζωῆς): this, rather, belongs to him by nature (i)πάρχον ἐκ φύσεως). If living then is common not only to animals $(\tau οῖς ζ ψοις)$ but also to plants, and the work of each thing is specific (τi) δὲ ἔργον ἑκάστου ἴδιον), ²¹⁶ one would have to separate out nutritive life (τi) ν θρεπτικὴν ζωήν), on the grounds that the work of a human being does not reside in this (οἰκ ἐν ταύτη ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου ἔργου). Similarly, neither would it reside in growth-related life (τi) αἰσθητικῆ, for this too is common to plants. But nor again would it reside in perceptive life (τi) αἰσθητικῆ ζωῆ), for this is common also to non-rational animals $(\tau οῖς ἀλόγοις ζ ψοις)$. The productive and rational life, then, is left to be the work of a human being, that is, to live as a rational

²¹⁴ Cf. Epictetus 2.9.10 also using the example of a τέκτων (see section 4.2).

²¹⁵ For Aspasius, we have adapted the translation of David Konstan (2006), here and below, including his remarks in square brackets.

²¹⁶ Compare with Aristotle, EN 1097b 34 (ζητεῖται δὲ τό ἴδιον).

being (λείπεται δὲ [τὸ] ἔργον [εἶναι] τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἡ πρακτικὴ καὶ λογικὴ ζωή, τουτέστι τὸ ζῆν ὡς λογικόν). (Aspasius 17.29 – 18.2)

Thus the "rational life" (λογική ζωή) is explained as one that is lived as a rational being should (τὸ ζῆν ὡς λογικόν). ²¹⁷

It is very instructive, too, for our attempts at charting the use of the ζῷον λογικόν, to compare the paraphrase of Aspasius with the original text of Aristotle. For what Aspasius renders as ἡ πρακτικὴ καὶ λογικὴ ζωή corresponds in Aristotle's text to the following passage:

But this too [i.e. sense-perception] appears to be shared (κοινὴ) by horses (ἵππω), oxen (βοῖ), and animals generally (παντὶ ζώω). There remains therefore what may be called the practical life of the rational (λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις [sc. ζωή] τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος). (Aristotle, EN 1098a 3-4)²¹⁸

We have rendered the phrase τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος deliberately vague as "rational" allowing either the interpretation that Aristotle refers to the rational part in human beings (as τὸ λόγον ἔχων is used for a part of the soul [ψυχή] in Aristotle, EN 1102a 27–28), or an understanding in which the word ζῷον would have to be supplied from the preceding context, i.e. τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος (sc. ζώου) "of the rational being." The parenthetical remarks which follow the quoted sentence (EN 1098a 4–5) suggest the former, i.e. an interpretation in terms of "rational part." Yet, due to its irrelevance in context, this sentence has been suspected of being an interpolation (which Aspasius, however, also reads and explains), and then the context of the passage would decisively favour the latter interpretation. ²¹⁹

It would then be one of the instances in Aristotle in which the phrase ζ $\tilde{\phi}$ ον λόγον ἔχων ("animal endowed with reason") could be understood as implicit in the syntax (though it never appears explicitly in this form). It seems likely, then,

²¹⁷ Note that this makes it an important parallel to our understanding of the phrase λογική λατρεία in Rom 12.1, in that it relates the λατρεία to its subject (see section 6.3.3). The difference, however, is that whereas we argue that λατρεία should be understood in terms of the concept of a vocation (and hence more like what is expressed here as ἔργον), the ζωή here refers to the state in which human beings are when they exercise, to use our term, their vocation as human beings. 218 Transl. H. Rackham, adapted (indicated by the italics).

²¹⁹ On the issue of the interpolation, cf. the note in Rackham's translation ad loc., which suggests that in this case the translation of the preceding words should be "the practical life of a rational being".

that Aristotle did not yet use the phrase ζῷον λογικόν, 220 as he appears, on this construal, to have resorted to the longer formulation ζῷον λόγον ἔχων. However, by the time of Aspasius, the formulation ζῷον λογικόν and its related sense of λογικός, have been established, such that Aspasius renders *the latter* understanding of πρακτική τις [ζωή] τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος in the paraphrase ἡ πρακτική καὶ λογική ζωή, as can be seen clearly from his explanatory gloss that immediately adds τουτέστι τὸ ζῆν ὡς λογικόν.

Aspasius then continues to explain the parenthetical remark (EN 1098a 4-5), and hence to discuss the rational part in human beings, which he has no trouble connecting to the preceding statements in Aristotle:

In this resides what is specific to a human being (ἐν γὰρ τούτ ψ^{221} τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου), namely the rational part of the soul (τὸ λογικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς). He calls it "rational" (λογικὸν), separating it out in relation to the nutritive (τὸ θρεπτικὸν) and perceptive parts (τὸ αἰσθητικὸν) and the other capacities that are common to the other animals (τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις, ὅσαι κοιναὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζψοις). Of this same rational part (τοῦ λογικοῦ), one part is so called as being naturally so constituted as to obey reason (πεφυκὸς πείθεσθαι τῷ λόγψ), while another part is so naturally constituted as to contain reason in itself (πεφυκὸς ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ λόγον). Elsewhere²²²² he calls the part that is so constituted as to obey (πεφυκὸς πείθεσθαι) "non-rational" (ἄλογον), because it does not contain its own reason (τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ἴδιον λόγον); from this it is clear that this non-rational and emotive part differs from that of animals (διαφέρει τοῦτο τὸ ἄλογον καὶ παθητικὸν τοῦ τῶν ζψων): for the one is obedient to reason (ἐπιπειθὲς λόγψ), whereas that of animals (τῶν ἀλόγων ζψων) is not obedient. (Aspasius 18.2–9)

After these statements, which compare human beings with the other animals, Aspasius discusses another distinction made in Aristotle's text, which we quote here because of its close integration of reason language, including λογική and λογικῶς, with the concept of a function of human beings (ἔργον ἀνθρώπου), such as we argue is important for Epictetus 1.16.19 – 21 and Rom 12.1:

Since the rational life is spoken of in two senses ($\delta_{\rm I}\chi\tilde{\omega}$ ς $\delta\dot{\epsilon}$ λεγομένης τῆς λογικῆς ζωῆς), the one potentially (κατὰ δύναμιν), which we have even when we are sleeping (καθεύδοντες) and, when awake, when we are not acting as rational beings (ἐγρηγορότες μηδὲν δὲ πράττοντες ὡς λογικοί), and the other actively (τῆς δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν), in accord with which,

²²⁰ Though he uses the designation $\tau \grave{\alpha}$ ἄλογα for "irrational animals" for instance at EN 1111b 12–13 (cf. EN 1111b 9 mentioning "the other animals").

²²¹ Note the word τούτφ here does not refer back to the words of Aristotle, understood in terms of "the rational part", but forward in the sentence: ἐν γὰρ τούτφ τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὸ λογικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς. On this use of οὖτος as "proleptic with respect to an epexegetical clause" cf. GE, s.v.

²²² Cf. EN 1102b 25-34.

when we are acting consistently with what is rational (ἣν πράττοντες τοῖς λογικοῖς ἀρμο-ζόντως²²³), we are said to be living rationally (ζῆν λεγόμεθα λογικῶς), he says that the work of a human being (ἔργον ἀνθρώπου) must be posited as being an actively rational life (κατ' ἐνέργειαν λογικὴν ζωήν). (Aspasius 18.9-13)

Aspasius thus demonstrates that the notion of human beings as a ζ $\tilde{\phi}$ ον λογικόν (we have listed his uses of the phrase above) can be closely connected with a discussion of a human vocation. While Aspasius confirms that there is a Peripatetic tradition on this point, our reading of Epictetus in chapter 4 will explore this in a Stoic thinker.

2.2.6.4 The genuine humanness of rational animals

As our third main theme, we show in this section that discourse on what it means to be genuinely human can also employ the notion of human beings as a $\zeta \tilde{\phi}$ ov λ oyıkov. We will discuss here two examples in Philo of Alexandria, but will see this also in Epictetus, and, as we shall argue, in Paul.

The first passage is from *De Abrahamo*, where Philo interprets the description of Noah in Gen 6.9 LXX ("Noah, a human being just and perfect in his generation, was well-pleasing to God" Νῶε ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος, τέλειος ἐν τῇ γενεῷ αὐτοῦ, τῷ θεῷ εὐηρέστησεν) in terms of genuine humanness. Philo gives indirect confirmation that the notion of humans as λογικὸν θνητὸν ζῷον has wide currency by noting it as "the common form of speech" (κοινῷ τύπῳ), which he seeks to better, following his interpretation of Moses:

But we must not fail to note that in this passage [i.e. Gen 6.9] he gives the name of human not according to the common form of speech, to the mortal animal endowed with reason (ὅτι νῦν ἄνθρωπον οὐ κοινῷ τύπῳ τὸ λογικὸν θνητὸν ζῷον καλεῖ), but to the human who is human pre-eminently (τὸν μέντοι κατ' ἐξοχήν), who verifies the name (ὅς ἐπαληθεύει τοὔνομα) by having expelled from the soul the untamed and frantic passions (τὰ ἀτίθασα καὶ λελυττηκότα πάθη) and the truly beast-like²²⁴ vices (τὰς θηριωδεστάτας κακίας τῆς ψυχῆς). (33) Here is a proof (σημεῖον). After "human" (ἄνθρωπον) he adds "just" (δίκαιον), implying by the combination *just human being* (ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος) that the unjust is no human (ὡς ἀδίκου μὲν οὐδενὸς ὅντος ἀνθρώπου), or more properly speaking a beast in human form (ἀνθρωπομόρφου θηρίου), and that the follower after righteousness alone is (*truly*) human (μόνου δὲ ὅς ἄν ζηλωτὴς ἦ δικαιοσύνης). (Philo, *Abr.* 32–33)

²²³ This formulation recalls the Stoic formulation of the τέλος, cf. DL 7.87 (τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῆ φύσει ζῆν).

²²⁴ Philo seems to draw on Plato's *Respublica* here (δικαιοσύνη, θηριώδης).

In this passage, the definition of human beings is presupposed, but used as the contrast term denoting ordinary humanity. The notion of genuine humanness is developed in terms of expulsion of the passions of the soul and in terms of justice (δικαιοσύνης). The close link between notions of genuine humanness and justice (δικαιοσύνη) is going to be very important for our interpretation of Romans. 225

In another passage, Philo makes a statement about genuine humanness in terms of hope on the true God. Philo combines the statement made about Enosh in Gen 4.25 LXX ("hoped to call upon the name of the lord" ἤλπισεν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ) with the Hebrew meaning of his name ("humankind")²²6 and with the statement in Gen 5.1 LXX (ἡ βίβλος γενέσεως ἀνθρώπων), which he seems to interpret in a normative sense of being human ("the book of the creation of true human beings"). This is the occasion to better the usual definition of the composite human being, for which the definition is rational mortal animal (ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν), with Moses' definition of the genuine human being:

μόνος εὔελπις ἄνθρωπος, ὥστε κατὰ τὰ ἐναντία ὁ δύσελπις οὐκ ἄνθρωπος. ὅρος οὖν τοῦ μὲν συγκρίματος ἡμῶν ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν ἐστι, τοῦ δὲ κατὰ Μωυσῆν ἀνθρώπου διάθεσις ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸν ὄντως ὄντα θεὸν ἐλπιζούσης.

Only the one of good hope is (in the true sense) a human, so that the converse therefore is true, that he that is lacking in hope is not a human (in the full sense). The definition, then, of our complex being is "a living creature endowed with reason subject to death", but that of humans as Moses portrays them "a soul so constituted as to hope on the God that really IS." (Philo, Det. 139)²²⁷

²²⁵ Note the use of reason language in the context of this passage, the ruling mind (τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν [Abr. 30]) and of speech (ὁ προφορικὸς λόγος [Abr. 29]). Both the term τέλειος and τῷ θεῷ εὐηρέστησεν used in Gen 6.9, and Philo's exposition of them in Abr. 34 and 35 are noteworthy parallels to Rom 12.1–2, especially Philo's link between being well-pleasing (εὐαρεστῆσαι) and happiness (εὐδαίμονες) in Abr. 35. On the link between creation theology and Abraham's discovery of monotheism in De Abrahamo see Niehoff 2018, 102–103, which coheres well with our reading of Rom 1.18–21 in section 5.2.

²²⁶ Of which Philo is aware, cf. *Praem*. 14 (making a similar point about being human and hope, so also at *Abr*. 8). Cf. also *Praem*. 11 quoted above.

²²⁷ We have revised the translation of Whitaker in the first sentence (indicated by italics), whose translation at this point seems not to bring out the nuance of genuine humanness we submit is present in the Greek.

Thus, Philo here shows how discourse on genuine humanness can be linked with the definition of human beings as ζ $\tilde{\omega}$ α λογικά θνητά.²²⁸

2.2.7 Which audiences might have been familiar with the definition?

In this section we argue, through a close analysis of a passage in Dio Chrysostom's *Borysthenitic* speech (*Or.* 36), that it is plausible that both Paul and his hearers would have been familiar with the definition of human beings as rational mortal animals. This passage by a philosopher and orator (c. AD 40–after 112) is instructive for the question of how widely known the definition of human beings as rational beings would have been in the first century precisely because at first sight it might appear to provide evidence against it being widely known.

In his *Borysthenitic* speech Dio Chrysostom relates to his fellow citizens of Prusa a conversation reportedly having taken place at Borysthenes, a Greek settlement at the Black Sea (i.e. close to "barbarian" territory²²⁹). The noteworthy point is that he directs his speech not to philosophers in particular, but rather to all townspeople of Prusa willing to listen to his exposition. Dio tells us how he ends up in a setting where he is asked to speak about the topic of what a city is before most of the townspeople of Borysthenes, who were present in arms due to a recent raid by "Scythians".²³⁰ His first point is that one should proceed from the definition of the thing one is going to speak about.²³¹ He then draws a distinction between the educated, who are able to provide definitions of the things they speak about and the masses, who are not able to do so, and as the example to illustrate the point he speaks about what a human being (ἄνθρωπος) is:

For most men (οί ... πολλοί ... ἄνθρωποι), said I, know and employ merely the names of things (τὸ ὄνομα αὐτὸ), but are ignorant of the things themselves (τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμ' ἀγνοοῦσιν). On the other hand, men who are educated (οἱ δὲ πεπαιδευμένοι) make it their business to know also the meaning (τὴν δύναμιν) of everything of which they speak. For example, an-

²²⁸ Note that Philo, following Plato, sometimes associates the true human being only with the $vo\tilde{u}_{\varsigma}$, such as in *Conf.* 42, *Congr.* 47, *Fug.* 71, *Plant.* 42, *Somn.* 2.267. Cf. also van Kooten's discussion of the concept of the "inner man" (2008, 358–370). Such links however indirectly confirm how there is a reason discourse that overlaps in several ways with discourse on genuine humanness.

²²⁹ *Or.* 36.7–17. For examples of drawing on stereotypes about Scythians, see *Or.* 36.7 and 36.17. **230** *Or.* 36.16.

²³¹ The first order of business is ὅ τι ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑπὲρ οὖ ὁ λόγος γνῶναι σαφῶς (*Or.* 38.18).

thropos is a term (τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὄνομα) used by all who speak Greek (οἱ ἑλληνίζοντες), but if you should ask any one of them (ἐἀν δὲ πύθη τινὸς αὐτῶν) what anthropos really is (ὅ τι ἐστὶ τοῦτο) – I mean what its attributes are and wherein it differs from any other thing (ὁποῖόν τι καὶ καθ' ὅ μηδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταὐτόν) – he could not say (οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰπεῖν), but could only point to himself or to someone else in true barbarian fashion (δεῖξαι μόνον αὐτὸν ἢ ἄλλον, ὤσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι).²³²

We take note of the following points here. First, Dio, like others we have studied, uses ἄνθρωπος as an example for a definition. And even though at first reading, the passage might seem to indicate that the definition of a human being would not be widely known (ἐὰν δὲ πύθη τινὸς αὐτῶν ... οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰπεῖν), we will argue that in fact it must be, for rhetorical effectiveness, one of the stock examples for a definition that everyone knows. Second, knowing definitions is a mark of education, and knowing them distinguishes one from the mass of uneducated people. Third, definitions identify characteristic properties and such as mark out things uniquely (ὁποῖόν τι καὶ καθ' ὁ μηδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταὐτόν).²³³ Fourth, and related to the second point, the uneducated masses may be familiar with a thing and point out that an exemplar is indeed a specimen of the sort required, but they have no conceptual grasp of its nature such as knowing the definition might afford. Fifth, the implicit comparison with the ignorant barbarians (ὥσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι), who are unable to find the right words to say but are reduced to pointing, works rhetorically at two levels. In the literary setting, it puts some distance between the narrated audience of Greek settlers at Borysthenes, assembled to listen to Dio's speech, and the surrounding raiding barbarians. But at the same time, it works for the audience of the speech (the inhabitants of Prusa) to flatter them as being among the educated who are in the know when it comes to these matters (captatio benevolentiae). Dio of Prusa is far too clever a rhetor to blunder with guessing what his audience will know: and if much of his audience would be ignorant of what the example he provides is about, it would simply not work or might even be implicitly insulting. Not that frank or even insulting harangue is inconceivable for a Cynic, but it would not serve any rhetorical purpose here.

Dio then moves on to the expert, who knows the definition of things, and thus also the definition of human being. But *in this case* at least, we can suppose that most of Dio's audience would be thoroughly familiar with the definition that follows:

²³² Or. 36.18 - 19. Transl. Lamar Crosbv.

²³³ Corresponding to the Aristotelian distinctions that have come down in the tradition as definitions indicating the *genus proximum* and the *differentia specifica*.

But the man who has expert knowledge (ὁ δὲ ἔμπειρος), when asked what *anthropos* ²³⁴ is (τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος), replies that it is a mortal animal endowed with reason (ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν). For that happens to be true of *anthropos* alone and of nothing else (μόνψ ἀνθρώπφ συμβέβηκε καὶ οὐδενὶ ἄλλψ). ²³⁵

Here we have the definition of a human being as ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν, a living being, mortal (to distinguish it from the gods) and, crucially, endowed with λόγος, both reason and speech. The feature picked out, for human beings, is their being the λογικά among the ζῷα. We stress here that for rhetorical purposes Dio must think everyone well acquainted with the content of the definition, even though *prima facie* he attributes this definition to expert level knowledge (ὁ δὲ ἔμπειρος). For while the expert is the one who knows the various definitions in his field of expertise, the definition of human beings is one which Dio can easily draw on as an illustration for his general point about definitions and experts while at the same time remaining understandable to the larger crowd which he addresses. How else could he illustrate the point about expertise and knowledge of definitions than with a definition about which also the non-experts may know enough to count themselves, at least on this occasion, among those flattered as educated?

Having established the point about definitions, he proceeds to the definition of a city, ²³⁸ in which, naturally, the human being figures as well:

Well, in that way also the term "city" is said to mean a group of *anthropoi* dwelling in the same place and governed by law (πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐν ταὐτῷ κατοικούντων ὑπὸ νόμου διοικούμενον).²³⁹

²³⁴ In the English translation, the word "*anthropos*" stands out in its linguistic context as being "mentioned" not "used", in a manner which does not correspond to the Greek.

²³⁵ Or. 36.19.

²³⁶ Reason and speech could, obviously, be kept apart conceptually, but were understood to be closely related. The point made in this connection by Forschner 2018 about the term $\lambda \acute{o} \gamma o \varsigma$ as used by Stoic philosophers, applies more generally to the use of the word $\lambda \acute{o} \gamma o \varsigma$ in the ancient world: "Logos als der eine Grundbegriff der stoischen Philosophie bedeutet sowohl Sprache als auch Geist und Vernunft" (32). So also Sorabji 1993, 80.

²³⁷ It seems plausible to suggest that the content of the definition (humans as those living beings endowed with reason) would be familiar even to those who might not be able to answer with the technical term λογικός when asked for it. They might still easily understand the gist of the definition when confronted with it: any speaker of Greek would be able to derive the word λογικός from λόγος. For a detailed investigation of the Greek suffix -ικος see Chantraine 1956.

²³⁸ Cf. a similar progression in Aristotle's Politics (see section 3.1.8).

²³⁹ Or. 36.20.

Dio wants to prove that being well-ordered by $v \acute{o} \mu o \varsigma$ is constitutive for the nature of a city and thus part of its definition. And in order to argue his point, he goes back to the comparison with the definition of human beings and the central element of the shared anthropological outlook that undergirds it, the endowment with reason:

For just as that person is not even an *anthropos* who does not also possess the attribute of reason, so that community is not even a city which lacks obedience to law.

ώσπερ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ῷ μὴ πρόσεστι τὸ λογικόν, οὕτως οὐδὲ πόλις, ἦ μὴ συμβέβηκε νομίμω εἶναι. 240

Human beings are those endowed with reason, they have a "rational part" (τὸ λογικόν), one related to reason and its use in reasoning and speaking. This definition of human beings has thus served as an example for philosophical knowledge that is widely known; Dio can use it to establish other points. On the plausible assumption that Paul's audiences would, on the whole, be comparable in terms of their cultural knowledge to Dio's target audience in his hometown Prusa in Bithynia, around the turn of the second century, ²⁴¹ we may infer that many of them would have been familiar with the definition as well.

Hence, our analysis of Dio's *Borysthenitic* speech confirms that knowledge of the definition of human beings as rational mortal animals was widespread. That Paul himself knew it (on other grounds than based on an inference from his language in Rom 12.1) can be made plausible in terms of his probable rhetorical education, which usually included exposure to philosophical material as well,²⁴² or as simply because of it being widely known at the time.²⁴³ Thus we conclude that it is probable that Paul knew the definition and could have expected many of his hearers to be familiar with it.

²⁴⁰ Or. 36.20.

²⁴¹ For the dating, see Russell 1992.

²⁴² Tor Vegge (2006) has argued that Paul's rhetorical education is evident from his composition of 2 Cor 10-13, and further demonstrated how rhetorical education and exposure to the basic tenets of some of the schools would closely together. On Greco-Roman education see also Morgan 1998. Cf. also our remarks in section 4.1.

²⁴³ Such as we have argued with regards to Dio's *Borysthenitic* speech. Cf. also the statement of Bonhöffer 1911, 159: "Wie sollte z. B. die stoische Definition des Menschen als eines ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν nicht weithin bekannt geworden sein?"

2.3 Conclusion

We have thus summarised the main findings of Scott's analysis of the semantics of λογικός, indicated some of the problems of his proposal, and have thus confirmed the need for a broader contextualisation of Paul's reason language. We approach this broader contextualisation in two steps. We have undertaken the first step by a corpus-based discourse analysis of ζῶον λογικόν, by showing that the definition of human beings as θνητά λογικά ζῷα was pre-Pauline, distinctly Stoic, but also more widespread and could be assumed to be known in Paul's time to larger audiences. We have further shown how the notion of human beings as rational beings is used in discourse on the human role in the cosmos, their vocation as human beings and what it means to be genuinely human. In the next chapter, where we take the second step of our approach (mainly from an evaluation of sources discussed in the secondary literature) we will look at the wider ancient discourse on what it means to be human and the role of human reason, including the language used to speak about a human vocation. These two steps complement each other and will set us up for Epictetus and Paul.