

6 Livelihoods and Lifestyles

- Je ne manque pas d'informations, lui affirme Vincent. Les orpailleurs nous parlent volontiers des autres sites d'orpaillage des environs. Tu sais, ces gens-là se promènent d'un site à l'autre à la recherche de l'Eldorado [. . .]
- Je n'en doute pas, mais les cartes [géophysiques] auraient été plus rentables pour orienter nos travaux de prospection. Il nous reste seulement dix mois pour trouver un dépôt intéressant [. . .]
- Écoute Louis! Il y a une façon d'y remédier. Tu me donnes les coordonnées GPS des sites d'orpaillage repérés sur les images satellites qui coïncident avec un contexte géologique favorable [. . .]
- Excellente idée. Je me mets à l'ouvrage une fois la communication terminée. Contacte-moi demain soir. Je vais t'envoyer un nouveau tube par courrier le plus tôt possible.¹

From the North American gold rushes in the mid- and late nineteenth century to corporate mining towns in South America during the interwar period and contemporary mining camps in Western Africa: the global history of mining has been described as one of female and male fortune seekers migrating to mining settlements.² The term “Eldorado” became a popular trope to describe imagined and actual existing sites of extraction where “all is and all becomes possible”. It implies “spatial fictions” about making quick money due to subsoil resource abundance and about frontier zones with individual and collective expressions of raucous lifestyles.³ In West Africa, such frontier mining settlements have

¹ “I don’t lack information, Vincent tells him. The gold diggers are happy to tell us about other gold mining sites in the area. You know, these people go from one site to another in search of the Eldorado [. . .]

– I’m sure they do, but [geophysical] maps would have been a more cost-effective way to guide our prospecting work. We only have ten months left to find an interesting deposit [. . .]

– Listen Louis! There’s a way to do something about it. You give me the GPS coordinates of the gold-digging sites identified on satellite images that coincide with a favourable geological context [. . .]

– That’s an excellent idea. I’ll start working once this communication is done. Contact me tomorrow evening. I will send you a new tube by post as soon as possible” (Delisle, *Alidou, l’orpailleur*, p. 57 [own translation]).

² L. Agustín, “MIGRATION and MOBILITY”, in: M. H. Ditmore (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Prostitution and Sex Work*, Westport: Greenwood, 2006, pp. 308–314, at 312–313; R. E. Dumett, *El Dorado in West Africa: The Gold-Mining Frontier, African Labor, and Colonial Capitalism in the Gold Coast, 1875–1900*, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1999.

³ See G. Pisarz-Ramírez, D. Bozkurt, and S. Wöll, “Spacial Fictions: Imaging (Trans)National Space in the Southern and Western Peripheries of the Nineteenth Century United States”, Leipzig, Working Paper Series des SFB 1199 an der Universität Leipzig 10 (2018).

been mainly associated with artisanal mining camps comprising mobile “frontier entrepreneurs” engaged in specific “frontier livelihoods”.⁴ The two studied mining regions in western Burkina Faso were deeply shaped by both small-scale and large-scale mining activities. Accordingly, changing livelihoods increasingly involved transforming lifestyles since the late 1990s. Both mining areas experienced important immigration movements due to “promises of fortune” attached to the resource gold. Within ten years, since the national census in 2006, the population of Houndé more than doubled from 76,998 to 150,000 inhabitants in 2017.⁵ Among the fortune-seekers migrating to the area figured notably artisanal miners from the northern regions, construction workers from neighbouring countries and overseas, and Nigerian or Togolese female migrants working in evolving entertainment industries.

The previous chapters have illustrated how the various negotiations around industrial mining activities in western Burkina Faso mostly entailed quite pragmatic notions about the promises attached to gold as a resource. Company, state, and community actors were aware about temporal and spatial limitations of resource abundance. However, people increasingly claimed agency in large-scale mining deals which they perceived as unequally distributed between “the global”, “the national”, and “the local”. According to cooperate agents, population attempts to get a share of the mining rent have resulted in “never ending demands” towards multinational mining corporations (see Chapter 3).⁶ Local populations, on the other hand, faced the destruction of previous livelihoods and an ever-pressing competition for access to land due to the involvement of global capital investments. As a result of specific access relationships in the mining sector emerged questions of intergenerational justice, appropriate compensation, and eventually debates on “who is entitled” to training and employment for “local people”. Access to direct and indirect jobs attached to the mining economy figured as the most pressing demands landowners and artisanal miners articulated during formal negotiations and popular protests in Houndé and Bagassi (see Chapters 4 and 5).

⁴ See, for example, Arnaldi Di Balme and Lanzano, *Entrepreneurs de la frontière*; T. Grätz, “The ‘Frontier’ Revisited: Gold Mining Camps and Mining Communities in West Africa”, ZMO Working Papers 10 (2013); Werthmann, *Following the Hills*; K. Werthmann and T. Grätz, “Introduction”, in: K. Werthmann and T. Grätz (eds.), *Mining Frontiers in Africa: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives*, Köln: Köppe, 2012, pp. 9–22.

⁵ Commune urbaine de Houndé, *Plan Communal de Développement (PCD) 2017–2021 de Houndé*, p. 17.

⁶ Zandvliet and Anderson, *Getting It Right*.

The present chapter discusses how multi-scalar labour relations in mining economies involve both changing livelihoods and lifestyles and competitions between “locals” and “strangers”. It will be explored how boundary-making in the mining economy potentially (re)produces these latter categories, and how the emergence of “Eldorados” of mineral abundance is usually accompanied by mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. More specifically, these mechanisms involve discussions on who is entitled to participate in, and who will be excluded from economies of extraction and the local labour market. In doing so, claims to “local content” and “local procurement” figure as recurrent topics that aim to provide solutions for (re)including “the local” into the global mining economy. Local content eventually aims to “disenclave” the mining economy on national and local levels through linkage creation and spill over effects. Yet notions of what “the local” is and who “the locals” actually are, are highly contested. With an emphasis on how global discourses around “local content promotion” in mining become translated locally, the chapter specifically analyses who is (made) responsible for the economic rise and decline in specific mining towns.

The emergence of local content agendas and the attempt to increasingly replace expatriate staff with skilled local workforce can be related to a number of recent developments in the regulation of the global mining industry. Evolved as “a derivation of the resource curse literature” in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the term “enclave economy” is mainly associated with a lack of linkages (backward and forward) and spill over effects of large-scale extraction projects into their local and national environments.⁷ Through changing domestic policies, as its more recent advocates stated, multinational companies can eventually become “catalysts” for socio-economic developments in countries and mining regions of the Global South.⁸ In practice, local content policies and legislations usually require foreign investors to purchase a significant amount of goods and services within the host country and to train and hire local and national staff. Local content agendas therefore figure as political tools and claims to create both linkages in the mining labour market and mobility between different labour markets. The aim of disenclaving mining investment and creating linkage

7 Bloch and Owusu, *Linkages in Ghana's Gold Mining Industry*, p. 435; Hansen, *From Enclave to Linkage Economies*; Singer, *The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries*.

8 Auty, *Mining Enclave to Economic Catalyst*; See Bloch and Owusu, *Linkages in Ghana's Gold Mining Industry*; Conning and Robinson, *Enclaves and Development*; M. Morris, R. Kaplinsky, and D. Kaplan, “‘One Thing Leads to Another’ – Commodities, Linkages and Industrial Development”, *Resources Policy* 37 (2012) 4, pp. 408–416.

economies has been promoted and reinforced through multi-scalar governance schemes. Global CSR regimes have incorporated local content as a means to enact companies as corporate citizens in areas of extraction. However, different stakeholders may have different reasons for engaging in local content policies. From a company perspective, “local content represents the most strategic contribution a company can make to securing its social license to operate”.⁹ Beyond that, local content and procurement policies have cost-reducing side effects.¹⁰ On the other hand, local content policies are also dealt as a vehicle to regain national and local control of the natural resource sector and, can be considered as “perhaps the most widespread form of resource nationalism at present”.¹¹

Similar to other African countries, Burkina Faso recently witnessed a rise of local content policies discussed and applied by foreign large-scale mining firms and the national government. The present chapter describes how national and local regimes of control, regulation, and negotiation attempt to reinforce “local linkages” into a globalized mining industry. The term local content refers to attempts to resolve the multiple ruptures between “the global” and “the local” in access relations to the mining economy. However, as in many other mineral-producing countries, there is no officially agreed definition in Burkina Faso of what “local” and what “content” and “linkages” mean.¹² This question is rather subject to multi-scalar negotiation processes between different stakeholders with various agendas (i.e., mining executives, local populations, and political authorities). Empirical evidence from two mining regions in western Burkina Faso rather suggests that the introduction of “local content requirements” in mining governance does not automatically lead to an eradication of hierarchies, nor to inclusive labour markets.

The first subchapter highlights the various conflictive negotiations around “access” and “linkage creation” by discussing how “the local”, “the national”, and “the global” figure as important categories for employment in mine sites and among mining executives. The latter are involved in connecting professional subjectivities with access to different job categories (skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled). Categories of education and skills and their attachment to

⁹ D. O. Gbegi and J. F. Adebisi, “Managing Local Content Policies in the Extractive Industries”, *Research Journal of Finance and Accounting* 4 (2013) 7, pp. 90–98, at 90.

¹⁰ S. Lange and A. Kinyondo, “Resource Nationalism and Local Content in Tanzania: Experiences from Mining and Consequences for the Petroleum Sector”, *The Extractive Industries and Society* 3 (2016) 4, pp. 1095–1104, at 1100.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1096.

¹² See J. Korinek and I. Ramdoo, “Local Content Policies in Mineral-Exporting Countries”, *OECD Trade Policy Papers* 209 (2017).

“localness”, as will be discussed, eventually have very tangible consequences in terms of (non)access to direct and indirect jobs in and around mine sites. Moreover, the accompanying creation of scalar categories of workforce (“national”, “local”, and “local-local”) by corporations and governmental authorities contributes to a redefinition of mechanisms of belonging to mining areas. As will be shown throughout the second section of the chapter, multinational corporations seek to give priority to local procurement firms, suppliers, and workforce in order to secure their “social license”. They were therefore specifically engaged in setting up categories of “local-local” and “Project-Affected Persons” (PAP) in order to satisfy the attempts and needs of neighbouring populations. Government authorities, however, emphasized that mining projects have to benefit the entire population of Burkina Faso, thereby bringing “the national” back into the notion of “the mining community”. Since linkage economies are also supposed to stimulate various procurement industries and other local economies, the chapter lastly provides insights into unintended spill over effects within the local labour market. Due to the boom and bust-phases inherent to extractivism, changing lifestyles and livelihoods have led to a mushrooming of a sex work industry in the two studied mining regions. In Houndé, these industries (periodically) transformed the landscape of the mining town in significant ways. Yet the policing practices of sex work and a case of human trafficking reveal that hardly anyone in the local political arena felt responsible for such developments. The third subchapter eventually uncovers to what extent local authorities and civil society bodies (are able to) govern mining “Eldorados” and linkage economies.

Local Businesses and Expatriate (Knowledge) Economies

Countering “the spatial enclaving of production sites with the use of foreign crews of skilled workers and private security forces” figured as a recurrent topic of discussion in national policy debates about appropriate means of mining governance in Burkina Faso.¹³ Yet, in line with “enclave economy” discussions, national mining policies in Burkina Faso did not usually challenge the infrastructural make-up of sites of mineral production.¹⁴ It was in fact the promotion of linkage economies and local content that was seen as an engine to overcome the enclave-nature of the extractive industries and to create more inclusive

¹³ Ferguson, *Global Shadows*, p. 203.

¹⁴ See Rubbers, *Mining Towns, Enclaves and Spaces*.

business environments which would hence benefit both the national economy and local populations in the vicinity of large-scale mining endeavours. As the present chapter will discuss, the connection of local businesses with expatriate mining (and knowledge) economies has been a constant policy concern of government and industry actors, and of local civil society groups across scales.

Despite the legislative vagueness of local content requirements in Burkina Faso, the term figured as a buzzword and topic of interest and, as such, it featured prominently in policy debates on the overall contribution of the mining sector to national and local economies. According to Burkina Faso's economic and social development plan for 2016–2020 (PNDES), the country's President Roch Marc Kaboré aimed to increase both the proportion of local purchases for food consumption in the mining industries (from less than 14 per cent to 25 per cent) and the number of direct and indirect jobs created by the mining sector from less than 10,000 in 2015 to 20,000 in 2020.¹⁵ Countering “enclave economies” also figured as a prominent topic on the various panels of Burkina Faso's national mining fare SAMAO in September 2017 and 2018. Scholars, government, and industry representatives all agreed that “sustainable development” of West African countries is achievable only if the mining sector succeeds in “integrating” itself into national and local economies. Beyond fiscal inductions through state increased revenue from mining, panelists pointed to the various potential “linkages” a mining project could create nationally and locally thereby stimulating structural transformations. However, in September 2018, the invited Minister of Mines and Quarries from the neighbouring country Niger also brought into consideration that local content became extremely fashionable during the past years and that almost all national mining legislations now stipulate some form of local content requirement. At the same time, he admitted that implementation measures are usually incomplete or lacking, and that the degree to which “local content agendas actually benefit adjacent mining communities is difficult to measure”.

Burkina Faso's EITI report of 2017 listed a number of political initiatives under the header “local content”. These ranged from the implementation of the Mining Fund for Local Development (FMDL) to lower value-added tax (VAT) rates for locally produced mining furniture. Along with these legal requirements, the report invoked CSR projects and programmes as voluntary contributions to local content promotion.¹⁶ However, the 2017 report remained silent on current

¹⁵ Government of Burkina Faso, *Plan National de Développement Économique et Social (PNDES)*, p. 46.

¹⁶ Initiative pour la Transparence des Industries Extractives Burkina Faso, “Rapport ITIE 2017” [EITI Report 2017] (August 2019), pp. 36–37.

numbers of expatriates and national employees in the mining sector. One year later, the 2018 EITI report quoted that 12 mining companies have reported a proportion of 93.92 per cent nationals out of the 10.252 mining employees in the industrial sector.¹⁷ Do these figures eventually point to (relatively) inclusive labour markets in the Burkinabè mining sector? Alternatively, do industry practices confirm rather than invalidate their enclave nature?¹⁸ The present section discusses emerging practices in Burkina Faso to connect “the global” with “the local” through the implementation of local content agendas. In doing so, it specifically looks at the daily practices of mining executives in spatializing local content and procurement. Thus, they ascribe different categories of workforce, with different skills, salaries, and access to specific positions, thereby reproducing hierarchies in the mining labour market.

Emerging Local Content Policies in Burkina Faso

A 2017 published OECD report on local content policies claimed that “the resurfacing of local content policies (LCPs) has been particularly strong in countries where the capital intensive mining sector has developed as an enclave, with few links to the wider economy, and has not been successful in creating sustainable economic benefits”.¹⁹ In light of the relatively recent mining boom in the country, local content policies in Burkina Faso are generally to be seen as an attempt to preventing enclave economies from emerging in the first place. However, before the boom, the investor-friendly mining legislation prior to 2015 corresponded to a dominant donor-led mining governance model. Emerging in the mid-1980s, the latter prescribed the strongest link of African mining sectors to the national economies as fiscal (through macro-economic balances and the generation of state revenue), therefore emphasizing “the national” in mining governance.²⁰ At the same time, the liberalization and privatization of African mining sectors fuelled by the policies and programmes of multilateral financial institutions (namely the IMF and the World Bank) led to a “promotion of private

¹⁷ Initiative pour la Transparence des Industries Extractives Burkina Faso, *Rapport ITIE 2018*, p. 100.

¹⁸ See B. Radley, “The End of the African Mining Enclave? Domestic Marginalization and Labour Fragmentation in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, *Development and Change* 51 (2019) 3, pp. 794–816.

¹⁹ Korinek and Ramdoo, *Local Content Policies in Mineral-Exporting Countries*, p. 10.

²⁰ Bloch and Owusu, *Linkages in Ghana's Gold Mining Industry*, p. 435; Campbell, *Introduction*.

sector initiatives as the main engine driving socioeconomic change”.²¹ The general “shift in authority from government to industry actors” in the governance of natural resources as exemplified in Chapter 2 came along with a focus on tax exemptions and rates.²² The “Strategy for African Mining” published by the World Bank was hence concerned with politically downplaying the pursuit of “other economic or political objectives such as control of resources or enhancement of employment”.²³ The document clearly took a critical stance towards previous local content, local employment, and local ownership requirements in African mining legislations.²⁴ Yet with the global CSR movement “flowering” in the 1990s and its establishment “as quasi-legal regulatory regimes” in mining governance in the 2000s, donor policies began to incorporate local content as an important policy tool.²⁵ Hence, it figured prominently in a number of published reports and policy papers of the World Bank Group.²⁶ Multinational mining corporations with operations in western Burkina Faso, on the other hand, adhered to such frameworks (such as the IFC Performance Standards) in their attempt to enact their corporations as corporate citizens.²⁷

In addition, different African governments have in recent years established “Local Content Laws” (LCLs), prescribing legally binding measures for the employment of foreign workers at mine sites or to source a certain percentage of goods and services from local producers.²⁸ In the DRC, for instance, the number of expatriate workers cannot exceed ten per cent of the total workforce.²⁹ While local content promotion does not figure as an explicit aim in the 2015 mining

²¹ Campbell, Belem, and Nabe Coulibaly, *Poverty Reduction in Africa*, p. 36.

²² Jacobs, *An Overview of Revenue Flows from the Mining Sector*, pp. 18–22; Hilson, *Corporate Social Responsibility in the Extractive Industries*.

²³ World Bank, *Strategy for African Mining*, p. x.

²⁴ Lange and Kinyondo, *Resource Nationalism and Local Content in Tanzania*, p. 3.

²⁵ Carroll, *Managing Ethically with Global Stakeholders*, p. 116; Barkan, *Corporate Sovereignty*, p. 111.

²⁶ See, for example, World Bank, *Increasing Local Procurement by the Mining Industry in West Africa*; World Bank Group, *A Practical Guide to Increasing Mining Local Procurement in West Africa*.

²⁷ See Endeavour Mining Corporation, *2018 Sustainability Report*, p. 10; Roxgold Inc., *2018 Sustainability Summary*, p. 4.

²⁸ See J. S. Ovadia, “Local Content Policies and Petro-Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Analysis”, *Resources Policy* 49 (2016), pp. 20–30; J. S. Ovadia, “Local Content Policies, Natural Resource Governance, and Development in the Global South”, in: H. Besada (ed.), *Governing Natural Resources for Africa’s Development*, London: Routledge, 2017, pp. 156–170.

²⁹ B. Rubbers, “Mining Boom, Labour Market Segmentation and Social Inequality in the Congolese Copperbelt”, *Development and Change* 39 (2019) 6, pp. 1–24, at 12.

legislation of Burkina Faso, the latter provides some guidelines for local procurement and employment. Its Article 101 stipulates that concessionary owners are requested to preferentially engage Burkinabè companies, service providers, and sub-contractors in case of equivalent price, quality, and terms. The mining companies, their suppliers and subcontractors are further required to provide preferential access to jobs for nationals with equal qualification (Article 102). As future policy instruments, the reformed mining legislation of 2015 announces the elaboration of a national local procurement strategy, as of a “nomenclature des postes et les quotas d’emplois locaux requis suivant le cycle de vie de la mine” (a list of positions and the local employment quotas required according to the life span of the mine).³⁰ However, in late 2018, the legislative decrees which would translate the normative local content requirements into concrete policies, a goal announced in 2015, yet have not been in place.³¹

Beyond their enclosed and isolated spatial nature, Ferguson’s territorialized enclaves of mineral production share important characteristics with the export-oriented enclave economy. Both are typically characterized by the import of most inputs necessary for mining (such as machinery, staff and knowledge) and the export of largely unprocessed and unrefined ore.³² Apart from policy debates about the establishment of regional refinement infrastructures that were expressed at SAMAO 2018, mining governance in Burkina Faso has been seldom concerned with establishing forward linkages (in terms of processing and refining of minerals, final demand and consumption). In contrast, backward linkages for input supplying economies have been discussed all the more as a means of “disenclaving” the mining sector. Beyond their adherence to global ethical norms and standards in the industry, the practice of having company services done by suppliers also presented a strategic decision for corporations.³³ Some infrastructures, such as work clothing, transportation, and selected food was purchased locally in the mining areas, which evolved as important suppliers and service agglomerations. As in the petroleum industry, Peter Dicken has identified an “increasing importance of specialist service suppliers” in the global

30 Government of Burkina Faso, *Loi N° 036–2015/CNT*, p. 26.

31 See Hubert, *La nouvelle législation minière burkinabée*, p. 6; E. Kaboré, “Secteur minier: A quand la stratégie en matière de fourniture locale ?” [Mining sector: When will the local procurement strategy be implemented?], *L’Economiste du Faso*, 11 June 2018; Organisation pour le Renforcement des Capacités de Développement, Publiez Ce Que Vous Payez and Oxfam, *État des lieux de la mise en oeuvre du nouveau code minier du Burkina Faso*.

32 Ferguson, *Seeing Like an Oil Company*; Ferguson, *Global Shadows*; Bloch and Owusu, *Linkages in Ghana’s Gold Mining Industry*.

33 See B. Baatartogtokh, W. S. Dunbar, and D. van Zyl, “The State of Outsourcing in the Canadian Mining Industry”, *Resources Policy* 59 (2018), pp. 184–191.

production network of metal mining. Among them figure large transnationally operating consulting firms that integrate, for instance, engineering, construction activities and catering.³⁴ The capital Ouagadougou became such an important place of “globalized” outsourcing and procurement industries. Outsourcing in mining mainly concerned the domains of corporate security, construction (and sometimes production), and camp accommodation. While the “leader burkinabè des services de sécurité globale” (Burkinabè leader in global security services) BBS holding had employees in almost all of the 14 industrial mine sites in 2018 (except for example in Bagassi),³⁵ others were specialized in engineering tasks or catering. Among the globalized mining services for operations at the Yaramoko mine in Bagassi figured primarily the Australia-based contractor African Underground Mining Services (AUMS). It provided “mechanized underground mining services for clients in Africa” with the “highest” global safety and operating standards.³⁶ All Terrain Services (ATS), a South-African based company enabling “companies to work in the most remote locations in Africa”, on the other hand, was constructing and operating mining camps all over Burkina Faso.³⁷ For their food and cleaning services, “operating at the highest international levels of quality, taste and hygiene”, ATS owned and operated the necessary infrastructure to transport dry goods, cleaning materials, and frozen food. It organized catering, cleaning, and accommodation in Houndé and Bagassi.³⁸

Officially, ATS aimed at developing and integrating local suppliers into the global supply chains of multinational corporations enabling the latter to leave a “lasting legacy of community upliftment”.³⁹ In practice, however, a lot of food and goods for their services were not purchased locally or nationally. At the 2018 SAMAO excursion to the Houndé mine, company representatives had presented in lengths the various engagements of the company with local suppliers from Houndé. While lunch was later served in the air-conditioned compound restaurant, a Burkinabè participant made a critical comment about hibiscus juice originating from Senegal, instead of being purchased in the immediate

³⁴ Dicken, *Global Shift*, p. 419.

³⁵ N. Coulibaly, “Sahel: des opérateurs miniers sous la menace terroriste” [Sahel: mining operators under terrorist threat], *Jeune Afrique*, 31 January 2020.

³⁶ Barminco, “The AUMS Story”, <https://barminco.com.au/who-we-are/the-aums-story/> (accessed 12 November 2019).

³⁷ All Terrain Services, “Home”, <https://www.atsgroup.net/> (accessed 13 November 2019).

³⁸ D. Ayeh, “What’s ‘Local Labor’ in Burkina Faso’s Mining Sector?”, *Africa Is a Country*, 25 June 2020, <https://africasacountry.com/2020/06/what-counts-as-local-labor-in-burkina-fasos-mining-sector> (accessed 18 December 2020).

³⁹ All Terrain Services, “Services”, <https://www.atsgroup.net/services/#remotecamps-row> (accessed 12 November 2019).

area. This example is one of many I came across during my research about different understandings of what “localness” and “content” means to different actors in the mining sector. Similar to the non-existence of laws for MIDR, lacking precise requirements for local content and procurement (for example through binding quotas and sanctions in case of non-compliance), generally rescaled the negotiation and definition of what these terms imply primarily to the mine-site level. However, a constant concern and argument of the industry spanning the national headquarters to sites of extraction, was that local people still lacked the needed capacities and skills to participate in global supply chains of the sector.⁴⁰ In order to meet global norms and standards of the industry, education, skill development and training were considered as the main engines to establish linkage economies.

Multi-Scalar Categories of Workforce

While “local content” as a globalized concept attempts to connect the global mining economy with local livelihoods in the mining areas, its translation into mining policies is deeply shaped by the everyday recruitment practices of mining executives. In Houndé and Bagassi, one result of corporate attempts to meet local content requirements was that different categories of workforce were deployed at the mine sites. As demonstrated in the present section, local content requirements do not necessary diminish hierarchies in the mining labour market but tend to reproduce them. A look into existing research on capital and labour in the extractive industries highlights that similar practices can be found in other African countries.⁴¹ Benjamin Rubbers has recently identified jobs for mining and jobs for subcontracting companies as one out of three intersecting lines for labour market segmentation in African countries.⁴² In his analysis of hiring and labour market practices in the DRC, he depicted the latter as key to evaluating the mining-development-nexus. “Occupational segmentation”, he argued, becomes expressed in different recruitment practices, hierarchical positions, job security, and the level of remuneration. These often correlate with different social characteristics of workforce such as education, place of residence, and language skills. Hiring practices in multinational corporations thus often

⁴⁰ S. Geenen, “Hybrid Governance in Mining Concessions in Ghana”, IOB Working Papers 5 (2016), p. 20.

⁴¹ B. Rubbers (ed.), “Capital and Labor”, *Africa is a Country*, 25 June 2020, <https://africasacountry.com/series/capital-and-labor> (accessed 27 February 2021).

⁴² Rubbers, *Mining Boom*.

results in “ethnotechnical hierarchies”.⁴³ The latter comprise significant correlations between the socio-cultural background of workers and different job categories. This corresponds to Paula Butler’s accounts on narratives of Canadian mining professionals in African states. She has illustrated how notions of sustainable development and local content promotion often come along with stereotypes about uneducated workers to the point of overtly racist statements about local peoples’ inability to comply with the global standards of the mining industry. She has described mining executives as being engaged in “distancing work” in that they ascribed different spatial and temporal belongings to local workforce.⁴⁴

At national head offices and in the mine sites, mining executives usually considered people of the immediate environment of mining projects as in need for capacity building, and skill development. In fact, mining executives in Burkina Faso often understood their tasks as a kind of “pioneering work” in that they developed local skills and expertise in the mining areas, thereby engendering socio-economic transformation on various scales: “There was no expertise. Today we are creating jobs and we are creating national expertise”, as an executive of IAMGOLD stated at a SAMAO panel in September 2018. An Australian manager of the HGO construction project acknowledged during one of the conducted interviews that community engagement and skills development would be pivotal to meet local content requirements. He recognized the potential Houndé as a 150,000-inhabitant town has a supplying and recruitment zone for corporate material and labour. Yet he insisted that the necessary level of education, qualification, and training among local people would be lacking. “The skill base is very low in Houndé. [. . .] to fix it, it takes years, not days”, he summarized in December 2016. Similar to managers in Houndé, executives at the Yaramoko mine perceived a lack of skills and education as a main obstacle for local content promotion. While they categorized people of Bagassi as not yet able to comply with the global standards of the mining industry and thus not yet “employable”, local content was seen as both a voluntary form of community engagement and as complying with the self-interest of the firm. A security manager of the Yaramoko site and former French Army Special Forces Senior Officer hence mentioned two main reasons for recruiting large parts of his security workforce locally. Besides the compliance of the company with international human rights standards and the performance criteria of the IFC,

⁴³ G. Hecht, “Rupture-Talk in the Nuclear Age: Conjugating Colonial Power in Africa”, *Social Studies of Science* 32 (2002) 5–6, pp. 691–727; Rubbers, *Mining Boom*, p. 16; Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*, p. 81.

⁴⁴ Butler, *Colonial Extractions*; See Appel, *Walls and White Elephants*.

he stated in March 2017 that you should not “give the keys of the suitcase to someone who does not belong to the house”. Working for the company since the late exploration phase in 2013, he asserted that understanding the local culture would be the key to peaceful neighbour relationships between the mine and the adjacent communities. Yet he distanced himself from his local workforce outside by referring to their level of education: “An educated person reasons in different ways. [. . .] the culture of the Bwabas [inhabitants of Bagassi] is one million kilometres away from European culture.” Executives regularly referred to Roxgold’s Security Department as exemplary for corporate local content promotion. The preference of local workers for tasks that corresponded to their level of education and the prioritization of locally sourced materials and services was part of the corporate citizenship campaign.⁴⁵ For Benoît, a manager in the head offices in Ouagadougou, the recruitment and training of local security forces was a consequence of a predominant lack of skills and education in Bagassi. In March 2017, he highlighted:

One of the problems we had quite from the beginning was that they [people of Bagassi] don’t have a higher level of education. We could not simply say we do not need them. Therefore, we engaged ourselves in recruiting all [workforces for] non-skilled jobs in the village.

As the examples suggest, mining executives often engaged in discursive strategies of drawing lines between themselves and “the locals outside”. Education (or lack thereof) functioned as a key category in setting up differences between non-locals and locals. The everyday practices of Human Resources (HR) officers, CSR executives, and security managers of mine sites thus revealed quite ambivalent dynamics in (dis)connecting local businesses to and with expatriate (knowledge) economies. Practices of “giving preference to the local community” potentially (re)inscribed existing social hierarchies between “uneducated” locals and “over skilled expatriates” while resulting in socio-cultural access criteria to employment. One example for these practices are the manifold skill development programmes HGO set in place during the construction phase of the mine. The training facility they provided for 123 young people of the locality, as will be described in more detail in the course of the chapter, eventually resulted in community unrest and demonstrations. This was mainly the case because the company’s skill development policies did not translate into the hiring of large parts of the trainees at the mine site. Moreover, the “unskilled” label often implied heavy-duty tasks, precarious working conditions, and particularly low incomes in relation to company standards, according to inhabitants of Bagassi.

⁴⁵ See Roxgold Inc., *2018 Sustainability Summary*, p. 5.

The latter also identified various gaps between the official corporate local content policy and its translation into recruitment and procurement practices at the mine site level. As in Houndé, this led to major conflicts occurring at the Yaramoko mine in October 2018. During protests, a local youth movement mainly contested the local recruitment and procurement policies of the company.

What company executives later referred to as an “internal community problem”, was in fact an expression of discontent with three intersecting forms of labour market segmentation: (1) employment in industrial and artisanal mining, (2) jobs for mining or subcontracting companies, and (3) jobs for expatriate, national, and local workers.⁴⁶ First, employment in industrial mining was perceived as generating less direct and indirect benefits for the Bagassi area than the artisanal or semi-industrial mine sites. With the vanishing of *Bagassi Sud* in 2018, a whole local labour market (with important backward and forward linkages) completely disappeared. In 2018, the Yaramoko mine provided direct employment for 900 people (including subcontractors) with 49 per cent of employees from the immediate area.⁴⁷ Contrary to the majority of other large-scale mining projects in Burkina Faso, such as the Houndé mine, “security” was not outsourced to a subcontractor. According to one of the heads of the department, 90 per cent of corporate security workforces were hired “locally”. Other important segments of labour at the Yaramoko mine, however, were outsourced to supplying companies, namely All Terrain Services (ATS) for catering and accommodation, and African Underground Mining Services (AUMS) for the underground mining activities.⁴⁸ The contractors employed half of all employees at the Yaramoko mine in 2017 and 2018, among them expatriate technical engineers for the highly specialized underground mining tasks (25 per cent out of 200 AUMS employees in 2017), expatriate camp managers or people hired locally.⁴⁹ A number of local employees had received several months of training in specialized mining tasks in the capital Ouagadougou, and were later all hired at the mine site (unlike the case in Houndé). In contrast, it was mainly workers of the catering supplier ATS who described their working conditions as precarious and underpaid. At the beginning of 2018, interns of the company reported a low rate of employment after several months of almost unpaid voluntary work and qualification efforts. Similar to work in the Roxgold’s Security Department, employment at ATS often represented the only income generating strategy for locals at the mine site, especially for female workers from the Bagassi area of which only few had a

⁴⁶ See Rubbers, *Mining Boom*.

⁴⁷ Roxgold Inc., *Mining High Grade Gold in Burkina Faso*, p. 72.

⁴⁸ K. Reipas, R. Hairsine, and A. Caitlyn, *Technical Report for the Yaramoko Gold Mine*, p. viii.

⁴⁹ Roxgold Inc., *2018 Sustainability Summary*, p. 12.

secondary school degree. This points to a third form of segmentation in mining labour markets, which is occupational in nature.⁵⁰ In the Yaramoko concession, the nature, quality, and hiring practices of jobs for people of the “immediate area” differed to a great extent from those for national and expatriate employees. A large extent of the employees of the immediate area were recruited by CVD village council leaders (CVD). On request of the CSR Department, they selected potential candidates for “non-skilled” positions or as daily labourers, according to the needs of the company. During the 2018 uprisings, the youth movement has accused the committee of non-transparency and corruption.⁵¹

The narratives of mining executives thus reveal how perceptions about local skills and education intersect with different job categories. Having access to jobs listed as “skilled” or not, was therefore highly shaped by the perceptions of individuals and the formal requirements they set in place. In compliance with professional hierarchies across mine sites of multinationals operating in African countries, the internal occupational segmentation of workforce in the two studied mine sites relied on categories of labour reaching from local unskilled staff to top management positions occupied by expatriates.⁵² Hiring practices of differently categorized workforce corresponded to disparities in terms of authority, job security, and remuneration. A Human Resources (HR) coordinator in Bagassi illustrated the company’s different hiring practices by referring to labour categories A, B, and C through a chart similar to the one below (see Figure 6.1).⁵³ While the majority of local people (from the municipality or the province where the mine is located in) were employed in “unskilled” jobs, a number of them had also access to category B, “skilled national”.

What differentiated skilled from unskilled labour was primarily the different requirements for applicants, the different recruitment process and policy, and, most importantly, differences in wages paid per month. While unskilled labour was hired through the CSR Department, which delegated this task to local intermediaries who were in charge of deciding on the “localness” of workforce, skilled workers were selected through the HR Department.⁵⁴ Skilled job positions had to be subject to an official recruitment notice which was published

⁵⁰ See Rubbers, *Mining Boom*, pp. 10–16.

⁵¹ See Ouédraogo, *Manifestation à la mine d’or de Bagassi*; Residents of Bagassi, *Plateforme revendicative des populations riveraines de la société Roxgold SANU SA de Yaramoko*.

⁵² Rubbers, *Mining Boom*, p. 10; Ayeh, *What’s ‘Local Labor’ in Burkina Faso’s Mining Sector*.

⁵³ Own compilation. The figure is based on a chart presented during an interview with a corporate Human Resources (HR) coordinator in Bagassi in March 2017.

⁵⁴ For similar company policies in Ghana see Geenen, *Hybrid Governance*.

| | A | B | C |
|---|---|---|---|
| Category | Unskilled | Skilled national | "Over" skilled expats |
| Requirements | [Age, gender etc.] | Diploma, experiences, qualification | ? |
| Process | Head of Department HR [/contractor] ↔ CSR ↔ Community (CVD, mayor, district head) | Head of Department HR ↔ [CSR] ↔ Recruitment notice Online announcement | Head office ↔ International HR firm |
| Recruitment policy | 80% Community 20% Others | Existing staff Community Burkinabè | ? |
| Number in total in 2017 (without contractors) | 123 (73% Security Department) | 295 (53% "locals" from the municipality) | 38 (50% "non-African") |
| ~ Wage in USD/month | ~ 108 | ~ 901 | ? |

Figure 6.1: Human Resources chart with intersecting categories for labour, skills, and "localness".

online and in public buildings and meeting venues in Bagassi (for instance at the municipality, the prefecture building, or at the local youth centre). While the CSR Department also had an observing function in giving preference to the local community, it was not directly engaged in this recruitment process. Applicants usually applied through online advertisements. Because of the skill requirements, only few people from the immediate area actually succeeded acquiring jobs from category B. According to the mayor of Bagassi, it was only a handful of around 20 "actual villagers" that had "skilled" positions at the concession site in September 2017. Conversations with local staff illustrated that most of local workers of

category B had their extended families in Bagassi, but had grown up, studied, or worked in other parts of Burkina Faso before being hired at the mine site. Occasionally, Roxgold succeeded in hiring people with previous mining experiences “from the village”, who had left the latter years ago to work in other mining projects in the north of the country. In March 2017, Benoît described these instances as “win-win”: the person got a job as a “skilled national” with a relatively stable and high income, while the company was able to increase its local content quota. The specific function of “skilled nationals” in both mining companies, Roxgold and HGO, corresponds to what some authors have described as providing “traction” for the global mining and petroleum industries in specific contexts. Benjamin Rubbers, for example, has pointed to the strategic engagement of nationals in HR departments of multinational mining corporations in the DRC.⁵⁵ Since the beginning of 2018, Endeavour Mining has deliberately hired a Burkinabè country manager whose task was to act as an executive intermediary during both negotiations with the Burkinabè government and with local populations.

Category C that the one of Roxgold’s HR coordinators described as comprising of “over” skilled expats was reserved for qualifications “that you do not necessarily find in Burkina Faso”. The non-Australian or non-Canadian managers of the company mostly had other African backgrounds, often originating from countries with a longer mining tradition such as Ghana, Tanzania, and Mali. As a rule, expatriate “over” skilled labour forces were hired through the Toronto-based corporate head office and Globe 24–7, a “Professional Human Resource consulting in the global mining industry”.⁵⁶ The site-based HR Department had few if any influence on that category of labour. As Rubbers has emphasized, the choice to recruit expatriates instead of nationals cannot always be justified by a person’s specific skills. Besides professional criteria, their recruitment is often based on socio-cultural criteria, such as a shared language or previous work experiences with the same person.⁵⁷ This is all the more significant since expatriate employees cost the company significantly more than nationals or locals. After having deliberately talked about the average wages of category A (unskilled local) and B (skilled national), the Bagassi HR officer was reluctant to speak about the exact amount of money those expatriates receive monthly.

55 See Golub and Mooweon, *Traction*; Rubbers, *Mining Boom*; B. Rubbers, “Governing New Mining Projects in D. R. Congo. A View from the HR Department of a Chinese Company”, *The Extractive Industries and Society* 7 (2020) 1, pp. 191–198.

56 Globe 24–7, “Human Resource Management & Consulting Firm”, <https://globe24-7.com/> (accessed 13 November 2019).

57 Rubbers, *Mining Boom*, p. 11.

The expatriate management positions were generally shaped by a high degree of mobility of their executives (see Chapter 3). Executives with whom I spoke to often described how mining projects and a given local context started to “bore” them at some point and how they then decided to “go for another project”. The mining executive Benoît, for instance, had been recruited through a specialized head-hunter agency. He had previously worked in other Africa-based mining companies, but had no specific ties to Burkina Faso prior to 2013. “16 years as an expatriate in Africa”, as he asserted in May 2017, have brought him to corporate projects in Mozambique, Madagascar, the DRC and eventually to Burkina Faso. Asked about his reasons for wanting to leave Burkina Faso and Roxgold again for another executive position in a Bauxit mining project in Guinea, he stated some months later: “I am like a dolphin, I want to regain the ocean.” Only one year later, in October 2018, he came back to Burkina Faso to work again for a large-scale mining project in the central region. According to his own accounts, it was notably high levels of corruption and “lacking work discipline” among Guineans that encouraged him to resettle in Burkina Faso, despite the worsening security situation in the country. Together with the “distancing work” he was engaged in, his high degree of mobility was emblematic of persisting “ethnotechnical hierarchies” in the Burkinabè (and in the global) mining sector.⁵⁸

Labour Relationships and (Local) Belonging

It is not managers alone who contribute to the establishment of certain categories of labour and workers in the mining areas. As the present section will highlight, local populations, different political authorities, and civil society organizations are themselves involved in establishing and reacting to local content requirements. Local content and procurement definitions and requirements are thus not only established from within the corporate fence. Negotiations around the recruitment of “semi”- and “unskilled” labour in Houndé illustrate how people make use of a multinational corporation’s presence to articulate their political agendas of who belongs to the “mining community” and who does not. These debates similarly point to multi-scalar negotiation practices about the mining economy’s local, national, and global anchoring. Mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion into the Burkinabè mining labour market

⁵⁸ See Appel, *Offshore Work*; Hecht, *Rupture-Talk in the Nuclear Age*.

through place-based rhetoric eventually transform the “Eldorados” of mining towns into social spaces of belonging.

One important strand of anthropological CSR literature has analyzed different corporate policies as instruments and mechanisms engendering entification, containment, and exclusion in the vicinity of industrial (gold) mining projects.⁵⁹ “Entification” generally points to the process of “making” or “doing” entities or things out of what have been implicit or contingent categories prior to this process.⁶⁰ Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in Guinean gold mining areas, Matthieu Bolay demonstrated, for instance, how the label “community development” requires a definition of a “host community”.⁶¹ The corporate distribution of mining benefits in Burkina Faso, such as the provision of employment or the design of CSR projects, therefore leads to a categorisation of who is the receiving community, and eventually a transformation of social space. As the following accounts will highlight, their notions of “local content” sometimes correspond to, but are often contrary to perceptions of “localness” among different segments of society, most notably mining communities themselves and Ouagadougou and Houndé-based political authorities. Alongside categories attached to specific skill requirements, companies have to find ways of incorporating those populations who are most affected by their mining activities into their ethical programmes. They therefore rely on the category of “Project-Affected Persons” (*Personnes Affectées par le Projet*, PAP), which in recent years has become a recurrent term in global mining governance. Used synonymously with “displaced persons” (DPs), the World Bank Group refers to PAPs as persons experiencing either physical or economic displacement due to large-scale project activities.⁶² PAPs are thus subject to forms of loss of land, livelihoods, or other immovable assets, but not necessarily to resettlement. This necessarily implies spatial and scalar dimensions of corporate responsibility, which need to be mediated: can a shop woman selling goods to “illegally installed” artisanal miners in an industrial concession be considered as a PAP? To which degree, for instance, do local content quotas apply for neighbouring villages and municipalities of large-scale mining endeavours whose inhabitants were not subject to forced resettlement?

In the rural context of Bagassi, Roxgold delegated the recruitment of local (unskilled) workforce to the CVD members as local intermediaries. One reason

⁵⁹ Ballard and Banks, *Resource Wars*, pp. 301–302; see, for example, Golub, *Leviathans at the Gold Mine*; Luning, *Processing Promises of Gold*; Rajak, ‘HIV/AIDS Is Our Business’.

⁶⁰ Ballard and Banks, *Resource Wars*, p. 300.

⁶¹ Bolay, *When Miners Become ‘Foreigners’*.

⁶² See World Bank Group, *Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook: Planning and Implementation in Development Projects*, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014, p. 5.

was that the mine site was developed during the political transition period in 2014/15 with no elected municipal council and mayors in place. Over the years, the consultation of the CVD became an established corporate employment policy for local labour. Since the population considers them to be “political representatives of the village”, they would naturally know who belongs to their communities and who does not, according to mining professionals. A CSR executive admitted in March 2017, that “affinity” and some personal relationships certainly played a role during these recruitment processes. However, he also stated that all community members could contest patronage in recruitment decisions by CVD members at the monthly corporate-community meetings. The CVD members proposed candidates to the CSR Department who were then recruited based on spatial distance to the concessionary site. In so doing, Roxgold classified surrounding villages according to impact levels 1 to 5. Figuring among “impact level 1”, Bagassi, whose inhabitants were considered as PAPs, would receive 40 per cent of all local positions. The other 60 per cent were gradually distributed to local populations in other villages adjacent to the mine site.

However, the urban context of Houndé, where recruitment for the HGO mining project started in early 2016, demanded other forms of local labour relations. The urban context certainly had advantages for the recruitment of local labour and the establishment of procurement industries due to the relative availability of (skilled) workforce and materials. Geographically well-positioned between Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou and the economic capital Bobo-Dioulasso, the new mine also attracted significant numbers of immigrants from other parts of Burkina Faso, notably people with siblings in Houndé but living abroad. In contrast to Bagassi, the municipality of Houndé has been host to local branches of relatively well-organized national civil society structures, such as those of the MBDHP and ODJ. Claims for the implementation of local content requirements therefore became expressed through multi-scalar negotiation practices and occasionally resulted in non-conventional forms of popular pressure by local coalitions as the previous chapter has shown. When industrial mining activities gained momentum, local populations and authorities increasingly expressed their fears that the mining boom would cause a “real estate boom” and that it generally implies increasing costs of living in the municipality. Workers of artisanal mine sites, of whom sometimes 60 to 70 per cent originated from Houndé, contested the destruction of their livelihoods due to the industrial presence. Moreover, the mining project evolved in an era of political (mining) reform. Soon after construction for the industrial mine site started in April 2016, the first municipal elections in the post-Compaoré era led to the involvement of new political stakeholders in mining governance. As in Bagassi, the means of

local content and procurement promotion hence figured as a major issue of debate in company-state-community relations.

Certificates for “Localness” in Houndé

At the official opening ceremony of the construction works in Houndé in June 2016, Endeavour Mining’s CEO Sébastien de Montessus announced that a significant proportion of their workforce would be recruited nationally, with a preference for inhabitants from the Houndé area: “Wherever possible, we will favour local recruitment. In this respect, [. . .] a database highlighting the skills available in the vicinity of the mine is being set up (own translation).”⁶³ The employment of “95 per cent” local staff was a figure mentioned at the opening ceremony and circulated in Houndé ever since. It was used by both HGO representatives to refer to corporate efforts in local content promotion and local populations who perceived the “95 per cent” number as a promise and an engagement that the company is required to meet. However, early attempts to establish mechanisms and criteria for local labour partially failed. For the identification of local community members with appropriate skills, HGO employees had distributed 3,000 registration forms (*fiches d’inscription*) in the different sectors and villages of Houndé. The aim, as Endeavour Mining’s CEO expressed in June 2016, was to establish a database with 3000 CVs of potential local workforce in Houndé seeking unskilled and semi-skilled positions at the mine site.⁶⁴ However, the circulating registration forms were reportedly subject to misuse. Some “recruitment agents” made a business out of selling the forms to potential candidates, friends and “strangers” for an amount of XOF 2,000 to 20,000 (~ USD 3–33) each.

This section explores how the formalization of local content through the establishment of the category PAP and requirements to deliver residency certificates (re)produced notions of citizenship and belonging in Houndé. In late 2016 and early 2017, inhabitants of Houndé claimed that contrarily to one of the main claims they expressed during the opening ceremony, the “sons of the locality”

⁶³ “Nous privilégierons chaque fois que sera possible, le recrutement local. A ce propos, [. . .] une base de données faisant ressortir les compétences disponibles à proximité de la mine, est en cours de constitution.” (N. Ouédraogo, “Burkina: La 10ème mine d’or du pays a débuté ses travaux de construction” [Burkina Faso: The country’s 10th gold mine has started construction work], *leFaso.net*, 1 July 2016).

⁶⁴ See Endeavour Mining Corporation, “Houndé Project: Construction Launch” (April 2016), p. 19.

did not receive their share of benefits in terms of employment. The local entrepreneurs and suppliers regrouped in the CCJ coalition in 2015, complained that HGO would continue to purchase most of the materials for their construction works from Ouagadougou.⁶⁵ Many positions at the Houndé mine construction site and for the various supplying services the local workforce was qualified for, such as for mechanics and driving, were reportedly occupied by non-locals instead of “autochthons” of Houndé. As in Bagassi, HGO referred to different categories of “(un)skilled” labour and degrees of “localness” implying different labour conditions and forms of recruitment. “Skilled labour” was recruited through official announcements and online advertisements, and candidates were directly selected by the Human Resources Department of the company. On the other hand, defining people as “PAP” and establishing criteria for “localness”, notably served as access criteria for the manifold “non”- and “semi-skilled” forms of labour the construction and extraction activities required. However, inhabitants of Houndé also challenged the categories of unskilled and semi-skilled labour and the corresponding requirements applicants had to fulfil. In December 2016, a MIDR-affected person contested, for instance, requirements stipulating that potential company drivers had to prove a secondary school degree. The driving license, he emphasized, would be a qualification in itself, entitling the person for a skilled position. “People think that these criteria were set in place to eliminate them”, he stated regarding the corporate local content requirements. Corporate managers, on the other hand, defended the corporate policy of requiring the ability to read and write, even for non-skilled positions. If a driver would not be able to read security instructions, they would eventually be held responsible for any occurring (fatal) accident, a CSR executive stressed in October 2018.

The negotiations around local labour requirements in Houndé demonstrate how the definition of what “local content” means and what it does not, remained somehow unclear to different community actors and therefore figured as a constant issue of debate. During these negotiations, actors expressed different scalar notions of “localness”, ranging from Africans, Burkinabè nationals, Haut-Bassin region citizens, to inhabitants of Houndé and the villages closest to the mine site, Koho and Bente. That primarily inhabitants of Koho and Bente – villages of the municipality of Houndé adjacent to the mine site – were considered as “PAP” by company representatives had to do with their level of affectedness by MIDR. Due to the spatial extent of large-scale mining activities, many of them had lost their fields and homes. More generally, the mining professionals

⁶⁵ See Coordination des Corps socioprofessionnels et des associations de la Jeunesse du Tuy, *Mémoire*.

differentiated between “direct” and “indirect” actors with whom they interacted to different degrees. The different forms of interaction were mentioned in a corporate community engagement plan (*plan d’engagement des acteurs prenants*), which one of HGO’s CSR agents described in December 2016 as a sort of “bible” for their CSR activities. In practice, PAPs thus not only received compensation for lost livelihoods and homes, but also were a privileged group in the distribution of CSR programmes and projects. According to different company, state and community actors, representatives of the exploration company Avion Gold (later acquired by Endeavour Mining) and of consultancy firms promised prior to the mine construction that one member of each PAP family in the future would get a job at the mine site. While this promise has not been written down, it would today engender a “de facto right” of MIDR-affected populations to mining jobs, as a civil society activist stated in early 2017.

To implement the local content requirements, the company officially adhered to it and assured that MDIR-affected people and actual residents and not strangers would be hired by the company, a local recruitment committee for “non”- and “semi-skilled” work was set in place in October 2016.⁶⁶ The established committee can be seen as a reaction to the three related instances. First, it was a response to (partially) failed corporate attempts of creating a “local workforce” database via the registration forms. Second, the local recruitment committee responded to different means of popular pressure primarily expressed by CCJ since the beginning of construction.⁶⁷ Third, by occupying an important mediating function between the protestors and the company, the mayor sought to establish himself as an important authority in local mining governance through the committee. To ensure the local representation of its members, the committee included CVD members of the different sectors and villages of the municipality of Houndé and corporate and civil society representatives. During one of its sessions at the end of November 2016, the committee decided to establish specific quotas for local labour. After long debates, the different parties agreed on the following “consensus”: henceforward, 40 per cent of the candidates for non- and semi-skilled jobs would be chosen from the already established database of HGO. The local recruitment committee would be in charge of selecting 60 per cent of overall candidates for semi- and unskilled labour. Twenty per cent of the final selection list had to be economically “directly” affected populations of the mining activities. While the official protocol of

⁶⁶ See Government of Burkina Faso, *Arrêté N°2016-007/MATDSI/RHBS/P-TUY/CHUND*; Houndé Gold Operation S.A., *Protocole d’accord*.

⁶⁷ See Guiro, *Houndé gold opération*.

the committee session did not feature any definition of “directly affectedness”, this category, in practice, mainly corresponded to global MIDR standards and HGO’s established definition of “PAPs”.⁶⁸ The final selection of “pre-selected” candidates was proceeded by the drawing of lots to allow for an equal competition among local applicants.

Nevertheless, this new mechanism of assuring “localness” in labour relations still required an adequate definition of who should be considered a local and by what criteria. This primarily applied to the non-PAP residents of Houndé, as the latter could be spatially surveyed, and were already identified prior to compensation and resettlement measures HGO had been engaged in between 2013 and 2016. Corporate and municipality authorities thus decided to make the candidates’ eligibility subject to a residency certificate they had to exhibit in the application process. In 2016, this certificate was obtainable at the municipality for a lump sum of XOF 3,500 (~ USD 6). This in turn caused a rush for these resident certificates and thus Houndé citizenship. Until the criteria for obtaining a residence certificate were significantly tightened in January 2017, over 3,000 people became official inhabitants of Houndé. An employee of the municipal registry office stated in August 2017 that the number of delivered residency certificates more than tripled from 985 in 2015, to 3,477 in 2016. Applicants had to prove that they had lived for a minimum of three months in the municipality. Being born in Houndé or having parents born in Houndé was another, more precise criteria. If the person was not at all known by inhabitants or municipal authorities, the latter required two local witnesses of the person’s Houndé-based residency, as municipal authorities emphasized. Prior to 2017, however, several job seekers received residency certificates without being local. This was, for instance, the case for two construction workers from Ouahigouya with whom I spoke in December 2016. Previously they had worked in the Essakane mine in northern Burkina Faso and were now seeking their fortune in the Houndé labour market. Despite the lack of kinship in Houndé, they somehow managed to obtain a residency certificate.

According to the mayor of Houndé, the residency certificate was implemented to “localize” categories of labour one can find in the municipality. This, he stated in February 2017, would hopefully calm down social tensions in local mining governance. While mining professionals made use of the new citizenship certificate as a means to meet their own local content policies, they were rather pragmatic about proving the “localness” of populations. “You can’t prove if someone is local [. . .] they say they’re from Houndé”, an Australian mining

⁶⁸ See Commune urbaine de Houndé, “Compte rendu de réunion” [Meeting minutes] (2016).

executive stated in December 2016. Two years later, in October 2018, his Burkinabè colleague in the CSR Department admitted that proving local citizenship in Houndé reveals practically impossible:

We are not a mine in a village; we are a mine surrounded by 100,000 inhabitants with [our] 1,000 [work] places, maybe 900 for nationals. Among these places are skilled and non-skilled ones. [. . .] If it would be a village, we could consider every family and find work for them. But here, how are we going to do this? There are how many families in Houndé? The approaches cannot be the same for Houndé as for other mine sites. But we have to find solutions to give [equal] chances to everyone.

Nationalizing Local Content

In Houndé as elsewhere, corporate local content policies were based on two main assumptions: first, not everyone could get a job at the mine site. HGO's local content policy therefore incorporated significant measures to stimulate the local mining labour market by linkage economy creation. In 2016 and 2017, for instance, the company reportedly spent a corresponding value of USD 20 million on purchased materials and services of the Houndé labour market during construction.⁶⁹ Second, the attempts to define entitlements to “local content” are contested among different actors and groups of actors, and hence imply and shape scalar dimensions of mining governance. Mining corporations are primarily concerned with gaining and maintaining their social license to operate (SLO) and thus to engage ethically with those closest and most impacted by their activities, namely Project-Affected Persons (PAP). However, they also rely on “over skilled” globalized workforce to realize their extraction endeavours. Municipal authorities and stakeholders, on the other hand, primarily define “locals” and “strangers” in terms of “sons of the locality” in their respective commune or province. Since the end of 2016, access to employment of the Houndé mine site was officially tied to institutionalized categories of being and becoming local. The discussions on these new forms of citizenship, however, were also taken up in policy debates beyond the local context of Houndé.

The following account discusses how local content in Houndé has become a “national issue”, centred on who has the greatest claim to profits from industrial mining in Burkina Faso. It was above all the visit and intervention by the

⁶⁹ The 2018 figure of USD 3.7 million, however, only corresponds to 2.2 per cent of procurement budget spent on local suppliers (in contrast to 80.3 and 17.5 per cent of budget respectively spent on national and international suppliers) (Endeavour Mining Corporation, 2018 *Sustainability Report*, p. 30).

Minister of Mines and Quarries in Houndé in February 2017, that points to political attempts to “(re)nationalize” the mining economy. During his visit to Houndé and the contested exchange with local authorities and civil society representatives (see Chapter 4), the minister emphasized that “the owner” of the Houndé mine cannot be “the daddy of everyone in the municipality of Houndé”. According to the minister, the Houndé mine should benefit Burkina Faso’s entire population and not just the inhabitants of Houndé or the province of Tuy. The speech of the minister was later primarily criticized for “downplaying” the importance of local scales in mining governance. Although many found the minister’s tone “rather arrogant”, some agreed that the youth protesters’ demands were too “self-centred” and “self-referential”. “We cannot say that all jobs of the mine have to go to people of Houndé, because Houndé is nonetheless [part of] Burkina [Faso]”, as a former government official and Houndé resident affirmed in March 2017.

The visit of the minister was not the first instance where nationalization tendencies came into play in Houndé’s local content debate. Similar to HGO’s local labour requirements, applicants of the long-awaited training facility for 123 young people “of the locality” had to prove their “localness” to become eligible for the training in Ouagadougou and the internships at the Houndé mine site. According to reports of municipal agents, within the first ten days of February 2017, 1,407 persons applied for the 123 positions available. Not all of them, of course, were “locals” in the literal sense of the term. CSR agents later described how they were meticulously arranging and selecting applications during four days. Applicants were required to deposit a residence certificate of one of the municipalities of the province of Tuy and the demanded scholar certificates.⁷⁰ Beyond that, the CSR agents tried to localize their place of birth, of primary education and other potential traces and connections to the province. Furthermore, the recruitment process comprised quotas for PAP, inhabitants of Houndé, and female applicants, as a CSR executive explained. In January and February 2017, I came across several young people in Houndé who had unsuccessfully applied for their residency certificate since their ties to Houndé and the Tuy province could not be proven. The process of localizing access criteria to professional training facilities was anything but uncontested. When one of Houndé’s civil society leaders published the training facility’s call for tender on his and other CCJ-related Facebook page(s) in January 2017, a debate on “who” should be a beneficiary of the industrial mining project took place. Several commentators

⁷⁰ See G. Guiro, “Houndé Gold Operation lance un appel à candidatures” [Houndé Gold Operation launches a call for applications], *Burkina Demain*, 2 February 2017.

from other Burkinabè regions expressed their dissatisfaction about the fact that access to such facilities has been regionally defined and restricted. The argument of “division” and even of infringement of the national employment law was raised during the online debates. One person complained about a “tuyalisation” (tuyization) of workforce, thus referring to the restricted access criteria applying only to residents of Tuy. This dangerous “regionalism”, he stated, is not based on competencies and will thus lead to bad business performance. Another discussant compared the principle of access to professional training based on regional criteria to the politics of “ivoirité”. The latter concept, which has been primarily employed by political leaders in Ivory Coast since the mid-1990s, uses nationalist discourse in order to define “citizenship” and thus access to natural resources and land.

Ethnographic evidence from western Burkina Faso points to multi-scalar negotiations of “politics of belonging” in mining governance. The mentioned discussions exemplify how inclusion into and exclusion from specific labour markets was not only discussed as a form of compensation for displacement-affected people (the PAP or “local-locals”) or for inhabitants of the municipality experiencing rising costs of living (the “locals”). National shares in the mining economy equally played a key role. Stakeholders may emphasize “the national” to justify that “the mines belong to Burkina as a whole”, as an NGO coordinator emphasized in May 2017. Local representatives, on the other hand, had their own imaginations about who should be included in and excluded from spaces of profit-sharing. Given that the negative consequences and impacts of industrial mining projects will primarily affect the communities hosting the mine, this tendency is anything but surprising. The question of “who is the beneficiary” is above all a place-driven discourse about which inhabitants of the locality can receive the bulk of benefits. This eventually leads to transformations of not only the national mining labour market as a whole, but more specifically of mining towns as social spaces of the emplacement of “the global”. The question of who belongs to the “mining community” and who does not, becomes institutionalized through multi-scalar mining governance schemes with local content policies engendering mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion.

New Job Markets for Nocturnal Labour

The discussions on changing livelihoods and lifestyles due to direct jobs in mining and adjacent procurement industries often tends to overlook the (unintended) spill over effects this has in host municipalities of extraction. As stressed in the previous sections of this chapter, inhabitants of mining municipalities – whether

they participate in the mining labour market or not – are usually confronted to new infrastructures and markets, but also to rising costs of living. In this respect, the feasibility study of the Houndé project lists a number of social and community impacts that will arise due to the industrial mining project including “increased levels of income” that “will advantage those in receipt of the payments but adversely affect those who have not had the advantage, directly or indirectly of those increases in income”. However, what the authors labelled as the “development of local enterprises servicing the mine” did certainly not comprise changing geographies of nightlife, which often develop in parallel with mining projects.⁷¹

The last section of *Livelihoods and Lifestyles* discusses how the emergent mining economy in Houndé increasingly comprised emerging entertainment and sex work industries as a “by-product”.⁷² This is by no means surprising, as historically, mining, mobility, and prostitution are tightly interwoven.⁷³ Looking at the past and present gold rushes around the world, the global history of mining has been described as one of female and male fortune seekers who migrate to mining settlements. Vendors of sexual goods and services in particular travelled to places of seasonal and occasional labour, such as mines, ports, and farms. Therefore, transactional or commercial sex has been identified as omnipresent in the vicinity of artisanal and industrial mine sites.⁷⁴ Due to the strong presence of relatively young male adventurers, mining camps (of the past) have been labelled as “Eldorados” or places par excellence for individual and collective expressions of raucous lifestyles. With regards to mining spaces in West Africa, various scholars have described the emergence of a (nocturnal)

71 Zammit, Warren, Cheyne, Morgan, and O'Bryan, *Feasibility Study NI 43–101 Technical Report*, p. 20.3.

72 Despite different normative connotations, “prostitution” and “sex work” are both defined as activities that involve a sexual exchange for money or other valuables. During the past 30 years, the term sex work has increasingly gained popularity among professionals and human rights defenders due to a supposed less stigmatizing connotation. Attempting to underline (limits of) agency among sex workers, I decided to use the terms sex work and prostitution nearly interchangeably throughout this chapter. This mainly owes the fact that the French concept of *travail du sexe* is almost not or very little used in Burkina Faso itself. Furthermore, this chapter partly draws on involuntary forms of sex work with organized transnational prostitution and trafficking networks playing a key role. In so doing, the present chapter aims to avoid conflating (migrant) prostitution and sex work with trafficking. (M. H. Ditmore [ed.], *Encyclopedia of Prostitution and Sex Work*, Westport: Greenwood, 2006, p. XXV; Agustín, *Migration and Mobility*, p. 312).

73 S. Aderinto, “Mines”, in: M. H. Ditmore (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Prostitution and Sex Work*, Westport: Greenwood, 2006, pp. 315–317, at 315; J. A. Laite, “Historical Perspectives on Industrial Development, Mining and Prostitution”, *The Historical Journal* 52 (2009) 3, pp. 739–761.

74 Agustín, *Migration and Mobility*, pp. 312–313; Laite, *Historical Perspectives*.

entertainment and leisure industry that goes hand in hand with strong migration movements and the selling of commercial sex.⁷⁵ Katja Werthmann has argued that, in a Foucauldian sense, artisanal mining camps in Burkina Faso represent “heterotopias of deviation” where normal social behaviour is not only contradicted but sometimes becomes inverted.⁷⁶ Drawing on similar tropes, Bryceson, Jönsson, and Verbrugge identified specific “wifetypes” in Tanzanian artisanal gold mining settlements. The authors concluded that these localities are indeed places that have the reputation of persisting “sexual amorality”. This implies, for instance, that certain relational norms between men and women can become circumvented or reinscribed. Yet the practices they encountered did not always fit neatly into popular tropes on the role of prostitutes of primarily serving men’s sexual needs. Women’s economic activities, they emphasized, can range from “professional sex work” to transactional sex and “extra-prostitution related jobs” to other mine support services, such as gold panning. Especially for women in difficult economic or social situations mining camps may offer opportunities to gain an independent living and to escape from certain societal expectations and norms.⁷⁷

In her accounts on “gendered cities”, Doreen Massey has analyzed how more mobile women can appear as a threat to existing spatial orders of social control in masculine-dominated worlds. However, mobility is also associated with sex work because of the stigma attached to it.⁷⁸ On a very individual level, or the level of group agency of people who sell sex, mobility may mean the decision to make a living in a neighbourhood distant from home. Otherwise, mobility may also refer to the relative freedom of movement within a given neighbourhood where sex work takes place. Martina Löw and Renate Ruhne have studied “die (Re-)Produktion räumlicher (An-)Ordnungen der Prostitution” (the [re]production of spatial orders of prostitution) around the main station of Frankfurt am Main in Germany.⁷⁹ They have pointed to processes of spatializing “the other” through

⁷⁵ See, for example, T. Grätz, “Morality, Risk and Rules in West African Artisanal Gold Mining Communities: A Case Study of Northern Benin”, *Resources Policy* 34 (2009) 1–2, pp. 12–17; G. Hilson, “‘Once a Miner, Always a Miner’: Poverty and Livelihood Diversification in Akwatia, Ghana”, *Journal of Rural Studies* 26 (2010) 3, pp. 296–307.

⁷⁶ Werthmann, ‘*Following the Hills*’, p. 131.

⁷⁷ D. F. Bryceson, J. B. Jönsson and H. Verbrugge, “Prostitution or Partnership? Wifetypes in Tanzanian Artisanal Gold-Mining Settlements”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 51 (2013) 01, pp. 33–56, at 42; Aderinto, *MINES*, p. 316; Werthmann, ‘*Following the Hills*’, p. 118.

⁷⁸ D. Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994; Agustín, *MIGRATION and MOBILITY*.

⁷⁹ M. Löw and R. Ruhne, *Prostitution: Herstellungsweisen einer anderen Welt* [Prostitution: Modes of producing a different world], Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011, p. 10.

mechanism of exclusion and a discursive distancing of prostitution from what is perceived as “normal”. In a similar way, Phil Hubbard has analyzed that “geographies of Female prostitution” in Western societies feature various “spaces of Other” such as red-light districts. The latter would play a crucial symbolic role in the definition of moral and sexual (hetero-patriarchal) standards.⁸⁰ Yet Löw and Ruhne have also highlighted that spaces of prostitution are subject to constant forms of (re)negotiation, in which state authorities, owners of brothels, clients, and the sex workers themselves are involved.⁸¹

The present subchapter explores different sites of sex work in mining environments, the way they shape mobility strategies of sex workers and vice-versa. In an absence of legal law, people tend to abdicate responsibility for sex work and prostitution, which, however, is a significant “byproduct” of the local mining economy. It will be discussed how emerging geographies of sex work result from intersecting livelihoods and lifestyles of clients and providers, of “locals” and “strangers”, and vice-versa. The struggle over sites of prostitution is shaped by relatively abrupt processes of emerging and perishing sites of sex work in mining towns and the mobility strategies of actors involved. Yet it is argued that sex work geographies in Houndé point to both, extended mobilities of female fortune seekers, and to their containment. After a mapping of different sites and forms of sex work that emerged in parallel with the mining economy in Houndé, the second part of the subchapter points to an extreme case of containment and exclusion of Nigerian girls and women. It discusses how this site was struggled over, and how it eventually disappeared in November 2017. In so doing, *New Job Markets for Nocturnal Labour* highlights the diversity of segments and actors within the local mining labour market in general, and of those engaged in the mining-mobility-prostitution nexus in particular. It eventually points to currently understudied interregional dimensions of prostitution networks in West African mining areas.

Emerging Geographies of Sex Work in a Mining Town

“Nous sommes tous et toutes responsables” (We are all responsible). Concerning the (non)governance of prostitution and sex work in Burkina Faso, the subtitle of Lydia Rouamba’s book *La prostitution féminine au Burkina Faso* makes a

⁸⁰ P. Hubbard, *Sex and the City: Geographies of Prostitution in the Urban West*, London: Routledge, 2020 [1999].

⁸¹ Löw and Ruhne, *Prostitution*, p. 13.

clear moral point. As one of the few scholars who have empirically investigated these practices, she discusses questions of responsibility and its abdication. While considering sex work in Burkina Faso as a “*phénomène importé*” (an imported phenomenon), the author mainly reveals a tendency among national political authorities to remain dormant concerning emerging sex work environments across the country.⁸² Her statement correlates with experiences I made during fieldwork while studying the day- and the nightlife of mining areas. Interviewees generally not only pointed to weak legal frameworks in place but also spoke of an “it’s not my business” attitude of those who are supposed to enforce laws and regulate the entertainment and sex work industries. The criminal code of Burkina Faso does not criminalize prostitution per se, but prohibits the establishment and operation of brothels and forbids anyone from living on the earnings of prostitution. While prostitution as such is primarily subject to moral and social sanctioning practices, “procuration” is considered as “public order offence”, as Rouamba stated in March 2018.⁸³ In her book, she also engages with an increased transnationalization of “procuration” within the past years, with sex workers and victims of human trafficking mainly originating from the neighbouring countries Nigeria, Mali, and Benin.⁸⁴ During the research, official brothels were non-existent in Burkina Faso, and sex work generally took place in informal ways. Nevertheless, there were specific sites in place where (mostly) women offered sex for money.

The present section will discuss those sites of sex work entangled with mining economies. This responds to the need to examine how sex, which involves some form of commercial exchange, fits into broader cultural, social, and economic landscapes.⁸⁵ The mushrooming of places and spaces of commercial sex in Houndé has obviously been triggered by new economic activities and opportunities attached to the emerging mining economy. While the presence of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) dates back to the late 1990s, industrial extractive activities only gained momentum in 2016, when Endeavour Mining started constructing its Houndé mine. Mining activities not only engendered alternative income strategies to local populations, but also came along with new forms of lifestyles in mining towns and settlements. The mining boom in

82 P. I. Z. L. Rouamba, *La prostitution féminine au Burkina Faso: Nous sommes tous et toutes responsables* [Female prostitution in Burkina Faso: We are all responsible], Ouagadougou: SISTD/CNRST Burkina Faso, 2016, p. 23.

83 See *ibid.*, p. 27.

84 *Ibid.*, p. 52.

85 See J. Scoular and T. Sanders, “Introduction: The Changing Social and Legal Context of Sexual Commerce: Why Regulation Matters”, in: J. Scoular (ed.), *Regulating Sex/work: From Crime Control to Neo-Liberalism?*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 1–11.

Houndé had important spatial manifestations such as the emergence of the already mentioned supplying industries or of new buildings and infrastructures. Artisanal miners and (former) landowners (who were subject to important sums of compensation payments due to MIDR) were most significantly involved in these practices. One example among many was the landowner, who, in comparison to other people, had reportedly received the bulk of compensation payments from Endeavour Mining back in 2016.⁸⁶ He then reinvested parts of this money in building the largest new hotel in Houndé which opened in early 2018.

After almost doubling in size and population in the past decade from 2006 to 2017, the influx of migrant fortune seekers to Houndé has above all produced new nightlife infrastructures, such as bars, night clubs, and hostels (*auberges*).⁸⁷ Within the period of two years from my first research stay in October 2016 to the latest one in November 2018, the cityscape of Houndé was changing on an almost day-to-day basis. One of the most obvious changes were the shifting geographies of sex work. Since the construction of the industrial mine site in mid-2016, places that were directly or indirectly related to commercial sex work more than doubled from three known “operating” sites that had opened before 2015, to ten in 2017 and 2018.⁸⁸ Prior to the mining boom, bars, *maquis* (in Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast designating popular restaurant bars and dancing venues, often a combination of them), and hostels known for sex work had been concentrated along the main road *rue nationale n°1*. Since 2016, however, sex work geographies increasingly extended into more peripheral sectors of Houndé, especially those adjacent to the mine site. Some of these places eventually sustained and gained growing popularity among migrant and native populations. Others disappeared as fast as they had emerged.

As in many other parts of Burkina Faso, an official or well-known red-light district did not exist in Houndé. However, sex workers usually recruited their clients in particular venues such as bars and nightlife facilities. During my research, I encountered three such sites for sex work. My classification is based on the *modus operandi* and the place-bounded nature of these activities. The first one is the most difficult to grasp because women and girls practice prostitution on an individual basis. Private homes of college students and other segments of society may become “chambres de passe” (passing chambers) during

⁸⁶ See Houndé Gold Operation S.A., “Protocole de compensation” [Compensation protocol] (2016).

⁸⁷ See Commune urbaine de Houndé, *Plan Communal de Développement (PCD) 2017–2021 de Houndé*, p. 19.

⁸⁸ Since official statistics on prostitution were nonexistent, this information is based on hear-say knowledge of my interlocutors and my own observations.

nighttime, and people organize themselves concerning their working environment, schedules and methods of payment. The second and third dominant form of sex work in western Burkina Faso is more organized in nature and attached to specific localities. These are places, set up exclusively or secondarily for the purpose of recruiting clients for sex work. Sites are nightclubs (*boîtes de nuit*), dancing bars (*maquis*), or hostels (*auberges*) that are known for accommodating women who offer commercial sex to clients. In some places passing chambers form part of the venue, other sites are mere recruitment sites for sex workers. A particular site are hostels or bars that specifically recruit foreign sex workers, in particular English-speaking girls and women. These places are known for being run by a responsible and older “madame” (madam). These latter sites often have the reputation of involving cross-border trafficking of women originating from Nigeria which was confirmed in interview statements of sex workers about some of these places. During the research, however, it often remained vague to what extent levels and kinds of force, obligation, and coercion may have formed part of a woman’s migration project.⁸⁹ Yet, even in environments of absolute enclosure and containment, many women succeeded in resisting in one way or another the strategies of social and spatial control designed to regulate their livelihoods and working practices, as the case of the hostel 4 Seasons will indicate later.

“Where is gold, there is demoralization”, stated an executive of a Houndé-based construction company in early 2017. The moral judgments attached to sex work resulted in few if any local girls and women offering sexual services in renowned spots. My investigations into the sex labour market in Houndé (and its relation to the mining economy) point to several cases of (semi)organized sites of sex work and, in particular, to forms of transnational and -local mobility of women who were not always subject to direct coercion. In more than half of known sites for sex work in Houndé in 2017/18 worked migrant women originating mostly from Nigeria and Togo. The *VIP de Houndé* is one of the localities where commercial exchanges of sex and money were displayed most visibly. Situated in the heart of a relatively old area of Houndé town (*secteur 2*), it opened in December 2016 as the “first night club in town”. Contrary to already existing bars and *maquis* in Houndé, the VIP did not only feature a relatively large open-air area where “hôtesses” (hostesses) served drinks and food to clients, but also an air-conditioned nightclub inside the building. Although relatively tiny in size, the nightclub featured common characteristics of such infrastructures across West Africa: the UV-light exposed furniture was rather

⁸⁹ See Agustín, *Migration and Mobility*, p. 312.

“upper class”, drinks were expensive and people (including young hostesses dressed in revealing clothing) were dancing to sonorous and DJ-animated pop music in front of mirrors. In 2017, during the peak of construction work at the industrial mine site in Houndé, the VIP developed to a well-known place where men could meet women that offer sexual services in exchange for money. Owned and financed by a Burkinabè businessperson involved in the manganese Tambao mining project in the northern part of the country, the VIP’s internal labour organization was highly depended on migrant workers originating mostly from Togo, Ivory Coast, and some other parts of Burkina Faso. The Togolese “gérant” (manager) had been involved in the management of nightclubs in Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou beforehand and could therefore rely on an already existing business network for potential staff, especially barmaids. Many of the Togolese barmaids I have talked to in 2017 had already worked for him in Ouagadougou. In Houndé, they hoped to gain quick money since the emerging mining town was considered as “a new market” for nocturnal labour. According to their accounts, working in *maquis* in Burkina Faso was much more profitable to them than in similar spots in Togo.

Among the local population, the VIP had the reputation of being a place of “illicit” activities and lifestyles. In 2017, it actually evolved as a popular recreational spot for construction workers hired by the mine or subcontractors who dropped by in the evening to watch soccer on the terrace, to drink (non)alcoholic drinks, or to get in touch with the barmaids. In contrast to other informal sites of sex work, the VIP manager did not occupy any explicit intermediary function in arranging businesses for clients and sex workers. While the barmaids’ official task was to serve drinks, many of them engaged in additional income strategies. They expanded their monthly salary of XOF 30.000 to 40.000 (~ USD 50–67) through payments gained after the official working hours in the homes of men or in hostels. Interviewees stated that they often sent significant parts of their salaries back to their families in Togo, who, as a rule, were not aware about their relatives’ professional life in Burkina Faso. “There are things you cannot do if you are close to your family”, a Togolese sex worker in Bagassi stated. She came to Burkina Faso in 2009, but since then has returned regularly to her hometown in northern Togo to see her two kids who stayed with her siblings. She perceived her professional activity in the Bagassi-based version of the *VIP de Houndé* as limited in time. Yet making money abroad would allow her to set up her own business and to build a house in her home country. She also spoke openly about the downsides of her profession and experiences of violence she had to make with clients, such as expat miners. Despite all this, she stressed a certain degree of livelihood and lifestyle agency that she would otherwise not

have. “Adventure feels good. [. . .] I take my life into my own hands”, she stated in October 2018.

The changing geographies of sex work in Houndé during the early industrial mining boom had important spatial and temporal dimensions. These corresponded to the boom and bust phases inherent to all mining, different scales of extraction and the respective employees involved. In mid-2017, at the height of the construction phase, a new site for sex work opened “at the entrance of the mine site”, as a CSR executive put it. The hostel complex comprised ten rooms (*chambres de passe*). In early 2018, six women worked and lived in the rooms of the courtyard, paying XOF 2,000 (~ USD 3) of their daily salary to the hostel managers. One of them, Angèle, was a 24 year-old women from Bobo-Dioulasso. Although she was not a “native” of Houndé, she was one of the few Burkinabè national sex workers I came across. As her colleague in Bagassi, she emphasized the temporal limitation of her income strategy: “If you gain a husband, you will abandon this work”, she concluded in March 2018. Still, she reported that she was sometimes able to gain up to XOF 25,000 (~ USD 42) per day. Before coming to Houndé, Angèle had worked for another manger as a hostess in Dano, which has been a hot spot for artisanal mining. At that time, spending a whole day with clients occasionally allowed for a daily income of up to XOF 65,000 (~ USD 109). Her testimony is in line with those of other interviewed sex workers who perceived ASM activities as more income-generating than the industrial ones. Moreover, the construction phase of an industrial mine site with huge amounts of relatively free-circulating construction workers had the reputation of being more profitable than the context of mines already in production. Since the Houndé mine’s first gold pour in October 2017, many nightlife spots had effectively disappeared from the cityscape. Most of VIP barmaids I met again in the beginning of 2018 had moved to other places or had returned to the capital Ouagadougou. With the dismantlement of the hostel *4 Seasons*, the most well-known and most violent site of sex work suddenly disappeared in November 2017.

The Four Seasons of a Prostitution Enclave

The open display of activities and lifestyles around sites of sex work was judged “illicit” and in part “amoral” by large parts of Houndé’s population. However, these places were met with “silent tolerance” by political authorities. An exception was the “Auberge 4 Saisons” (Hostel 4 Seasons), which opened in October 2016 at the outskirts of Houndé town. Officially managed by Michael, a Nigerian businessperson formerly involved in Ouagadougou’s sex work industry, the venue resembled a typical *maquis* with walls, rooms, chairs, and tables in green and white,

representing the colours of the Nigerian flag. Situated around seven kilometres from the city centre of Houndé town, the spot comprised typical *maquis* infrastructures such as flat screens for the transmission of soccer matches and video clips, and a small dancefloor in the interior. The bar was further surrounded by rooms, which were officially rented to overnight guests. Another wall comprising a single entry gate separated the rooms from the outside world. During daytime, the brothel infrastructure was hardly recognizable as such. After sunset this changed immediately as the *maquis* and the surrounding rooms were provided with light and music sound by generator installations. In contrast, the neighbourhood had no access to electricity (except for some electrification via solar cells) and thus remained completely dark and relatively silent. While sitting in a bar in the city centre during one of the occasionally occurring power breakdowns, people frequently joked that they were now going to “Nigeria” or “la Mecque” (Mecca). The latter spatial trope was used to describe the busy motorcycle movements between Houndé town and the venue during night-time. A certain degree of spatial distance, however, made the “amoral” character of service provision socially and politically feasible, as a police officer confirmed in December 2016.

The combination of working and living spaces in hostels (*auberges*) can be seen as a recurrent feature of sex work environments in Burkina Faso. *4 Seasons*, nevertheless, comprised particular forms of enclosure and sequestration for the venue’s “workforce”. Hosting at periods up to 30 Nigerian women and girls, the provision of a sexual service was fixed at a lump sum of XOF 2,000 (~ USD 3).⁹⁰ Even for Burkina Faso standards, this amount was far below the average price for sexual services. According to rumours, half of the money went back to the owners of the venue due to a debt the employees had to return to them for travel expenses. As a system of control, the price for sexual services had to be paid in advance and, after receiving the money, the women passed through to a specific place in the *maquis* to receive condoms in exchange for money.⁹¹ “4 Seasons”, one of the women working there explained to me, meant that there were no closing hours for the business in place. However, (potential) clients primarily reached the venue after nightfall when the normal bar became a nightclub with colourful spotlights and lightly dressed women on the elevated dancefloor. In its interior, the venue comprised some shielded spaces where one could get in contact with the women relatively incognito (see Figure 6.2). One or two persons observing the scenery and controlling

⁹⁰ See Mouvement des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, “Objet: Information” [Subject: Information] (2017).

⁹¹ Ibid. and own observations.




Figure 6.2: Hostel 4 Seasons in 2017.

comings and goings were usually placed at the entrance. Michael had reportedly engaged *Dozos* as security guards who were members of a co-fraternity of “traditional hunters”. During several visits and some gentle conversions with several women, it became evident to my local interlocutors and me that the Nigerian sex workers experienced a severe form of sequestration. They were not allowed to leave or enter the building by their own, had been deprived of telephones and their real identity papers, and were required to reimburse their “debts” via prostitution to Michael and his wife (the madam).

In the last 30 years, Nigeria has acquired the reputation of being one of the leading African home countries of human cross-border trafficking. A bunch of policy papers and scholarly work has been concerned with Edo State and especially its capital Benin City becoming a hub for international sex trade in Nigeria.⁹² As an important feature of Nigerian crime “going global”, Nigerian

⁹² United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “Human Trafficking in Nigeria: Root Causes and Recommendations”, UNESCO Policy Paper 14.2 (E) (2006), p. 11; O. Adesina, “Between Culture and Poverty: The Queen Mother Phenomenon and the Edo International Sex Trade”, *Jenda. A Journal of Culture and African Women Studies* (2006) 8; International Organization for Migration, “Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking from Nigeria to Europe”, IOM Migration Research Series 23 (2006); A. Terfa Ahon, “Adolescents’ Prostitution and the Educational Prospects of the Girl-Child in Nigeria”, in: R. L. Dalla (ed.), *Africa, Asia, Middle East, and Oceania*, 1st edn, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013, pp. 17–30.

traffickers abroad have reportedly established mafia-like organizations or cartels and networks of control.⁹³ In most destination countries of trafficking this has led to severe systems of control concerning the mobility and economic activities of the “victims”.⁹⁴ These “African sex networks” would feature two key principles, namely the “debt system” and references to “voodoo” or “juju” practices.⁹⁵ Upon arrival at their destinations, women are deprived of their travel documents and have to sign agreements to pay back their “madams”. While the huge body of academic and popular literature has far largely focused on Europe and more specifically Italy as a destination for Nigerian sex trafficking, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other institutions increasingly started to consider the interregional character of sex trafficking in West Africa. According to these accounts, most of trafficked persons find themselves deceived into believing their destination is Europe.⁹⁶ Apart from some media reports on Nigerian prostitution in the vicinity of West African mining areas, there has been little research on this topic.⁹⁷

4 Seasons in Houndé must be seen as an emplacement of global organized Nigerian crime, which featured many characteristics of territorialized enclaves to make “extractive” endeavours feasible. Within walled-off, enclosed spaces, coming and goings were strictly monitored and Nigerian women were deprived of any connections to the “the local” outside, if not in form of client relationships inside the walls. Unlike the territorial mining enclaves, however, seclusion and “disentanglement” was not usually based on the free will of those working there.⁹⁸ Within the enclave of 4 Seasons in Houndé, women were mostly afraid to speak about their situation and the immobility to which they were constrained made any meetings outside 4 Seasons impossible. While some of them confirmed that they were not able to leave the venue, others openly asked for help since they would be “not free”. “Whitney Houston”,

⁹³ S. Ellis, *This Present Darkness: A History of Nigerian Organised Crime*, London: Hurst & Company, 2016, pp. 119–125.

⁹⁴ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *Human Trafficking in Nigeria*, p. 22–25.

⁹⁵ European Asylum Support Office, “Nigeria: Sex Trafficking of Women”, EASO Country of Origin Information Report (October 2015), pp. 24–26; Rouamba, *La prostitution féminine au Burkina Faso*, p. 52; Ellis, *This Present Darkness*, p. 186.

⁹⁶ Ibid.; Terfa Ahon, *Adolescents’ Prostitution*, p. 23; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *Human Trafficking in Nigeria*, p. 22.

⁹⁷ See S. Plasse, “Mali’s Prostitution Gold Mines a Transit Point to Europe?: Sex Workers in Search of Their New Eldorado”, *Afrik News*, 18 December 2009.

⁹⁸ See Appel, *Walls and White Elephants*.

who was relatively new to the venue in August 2017, explained that recruitment agents in Nigeria promised to bring her to Italy in exchange for a payment of XOF 2 million (~ USD 3,300). For her and many others, the imagined “Eldorado” Europe where she could pay off their debts by working in bars and restaurants eventually turned out as a nightmare in the periphery of Houndé. According to her accounts, Michael managed a second venue of this kind “somewhere in the bush” which is called W7. It later leaked out that the women were regularly sent to an artisanal mine site near Houndé to do the same kind of work, as some of the women testified.⁹⁹ The institutionalization of this exploitation project (through the “debt system” of the Nigerian sex work industry) must therefore be seen as relying on two interrelated forms of extraction. This was the mining economy as a driver for accelerating demand for sexual services on the one hand, and the “availability” of “bodies of extraction” of young women and girls on the other.¹⁰⁰

While a number of local authorities in Houndé were aware about the existence of such a venue since the beginning of 2017, hardly anyone felt responsible for it. According to a police officer in December 2016, early investigations against the owner and manager Michael had not been successful. In September 2017, the mayor of Houndé stated that Michael’s record was still under examination by the national police and that he was normally not allowed to officially open his venue before a positive note would be delivered by the latter. However, no official authority actively intervened in ongoing activities of 4 Seasons. It was only after three Nigerian women had successfully fled the venue in mid-2017, that the case was juridical prosecuted. In early October 2017, the Houndé branch of the human rights organization MBDHP informed the department of public prosecution in Boromo about severe human rights violations and forms of human trafficking in 4 Seasons.¹⁰¹ After one of the Nigerian women who had fled agreed on an official testimony at the *gendarmérie*, the venue was eventually swept and closed down by police forces and public authorities in November 2017. Roughly one year after the (official) opening of 4 Seasons, Michael and later his wife (who first escaped and hid herself near the border of Ivory Coast) were arrested. According to witnesses, the Nigerian woman was the driving force behind the trafficking business and in charge of surveilling and punishing the girls if they refused to work (enough), or for cases of pregnancy. An essential testimony that helped to localize Michael’s wife came from a Nigerian woman who

⁹⁹ See Mouvement des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, *Objet: Information*.

¹⁰⁰ See Mbembe, *Critique of Black Reason*.

¹⁰¹ Mouvement des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, *Objet: Information*.

was herself a former sex worker and in 2017 and 2018 ran her own *maquis* as a “madam”. As a professional in the business and at the time one of the first migrant sex workers in Houndé, she accused Michael and his wife of exceptional abusive behaviour and violence.

After the dismantlement of 4 Seasons in November 2017, the liberated women chose different paths. A small number of them decided to stay in Houndé where they often worked as servers in bars and occasionally returned to sex work activities. In 2018, the above mentioned “madam” hosted at least one of the former 4 Seasons workers in her own *maquis*. Some of them went back to Nigeria, others tried to make a living in other Burkinabè towns such as Bobo-Dioulasso, Ouagadougou, or Diébougou. While Michael and his wife were imprisoned in Boromo for having committed human trafficking, many details of the Nigerian sex work network remained obscure. During the research, rumours circulated among the population, MBDHP representatives, and juridical authorities about the involvement of an evangelist religious network and representatives of the Nigerian Embassy in Burkina Faso who had attended the official opening ceremony of 4 Seasons in September 2017. What remained as a silent testimony was the old 4 Seasons complex, where numerous traces of the organized surveillance and sequestration system could still be found in February 2018. 4 Seasons is not only an illustrative example of the different boom and bust phases that make up the temporal dynamics of mining economies. As fast as sites of prostitution may appear, they can fade again overnight. It also describes four seasons of spatialisation in a mining town for which different actors felt responsible or not.

Conclusion

The study of labour relationships in Burkina Faso’s mining areas reveals the various spatial and temporal dimensions of extractivism. As a whole, it only becomes feasible through different types of spaces that succeed the actual terrains where minerals are located.¹⁰² In the vicinity of industrial mines, as highlighted in the chapter, this involves a whole series of related activities. Some represent desirable parts of integrating “the local” into global mining economies. Others (such as human trafficking), however, are officially labelled as undesired outcomes of global phenomena. These Phenomena manifest themselves spatially: whether these are the described geographies of entertainment and sex work in

¹⁰² See Martín, *Reimagining Extractivism*, p. 35.

Houndé, procurement industries specialized in mining services in Ouagadougou, or local workers entering the Bagassi concession site on a daily basis. The temporal dimensions of labour relationships in mining economies are specific insofar, as the limited lifespan of Burkinabè mining projects of 10 to 20 years has severe consequences for the distribution modes of benefit sharing. Since natural resources are finite and the extraction projects limited in time, potential benefits due to large-scale mining have thus to be struggled over in the here and now. While this naturally attracts large numbers of (external) fortune-seekers, it also implies tightened competition over mining rents.

The various temporal dimensions of mining capitalism are similarly entangled with multi-scalar mining governance. While local content and procurement promotion is generally seen as a means to connect “the global” with “the local”, negotiations around “localness” and “content” in mining towns point to persisting processes of enclaving within the framework of linkage economies. In his study on labour fragmentation in the DRC, Ben Radley has emphasized how corporate outsourcing impedes broader industrialization processes and outcomes in mining areas. Instead, corporations continue to rely on foreign-owned supplying companies that, contrary to local suppliers, comply with the global standards of the mining industry.¹⁰³ My empirical study of local content and procurement promotion in two mining areas of Burkina Faso confirms assumptions that linkages with local suppliers are generally difficult to establish due to company requirements for quality or their preferences for imported goods. Companies emphasize that local purchasing does not meet the global quality criteria of the industry and that it often makes no “commercial sense in comparison to international supply alternatives”.¹⁰⁴ In the Burkinabè mining economy, therefore, many services such as security, catering, and construction tasks continue to be outsourced to “globalized” supplier companies. While these companies are all matriculated in the country according to Burkinabè business law, they are not necessarily locally owned. Out of the many “national” supplying companies, only few have a Burkinabè management and are committed to the transformation of products originating from Burkina Faso, as a Chamber of Mines representative stated in September 2018. The site management of companies such as Endeavour Mining, on the other hand, increasingly undertook investigations on not only the geographical location of their suppliers,

¹⁰³ Radley, *The End of the African Mining Enclave*.

¹⁰⁴ Endeavour Mining Corporation, *2018 Sustainability Report*, p. 29; Geenen, *Hybrid Governance*, p. 24.

but “also started classifying suppliers by ownership according to International Finance Corporation (IFC) categories”.¹⁰⁵

In terms of improved livelihoods and lifestyles, access to direct labour in the mines is one of the most important and competitive ways to benefit from industrial mining. In the course of the chapter, both aspects were presented: On the one hand, it became clear how the new “Eldorado” mining town attracted many people from all parts of the country and beyond through new income opportunities. On the other hand, this was linked to mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that determined who should benefit from the local mining boom and who should not. As a consequence, private, state, and community actors developed and institutionalized specific requirements for the “localness” of workforce. The chapter has shown how mining professionals, political authorities, and the local populations in Houndé and Bagassi themselves were deeply involved in setting up categories for “localness” and “content” and thus in spatializing mining governance. Categories of “PAP”, “unskilled labour”, and residency certificates not only (re)defined criteria for access to the mining labour market, but they also transformed mining towns as social spaces of belonging more broadly. However, the motives and capacities to promote and institutionalize local content diverged among actors and across scales. Therefore, the general attempt to “disenclave” the sector has by no means always translated into non-hierarchical employment structures or inclusive labour markets. While, in theory, access to some forms of labour was provided for all, mobility within the labour market remained reserved for some.

105 Endeavour Mining Corporation, *2018 Sustainability Report*, p. 29.