4 Corporate Citizenship and Concession-Making

> La foreuse continue de prospecter différents sites prometteurs. Claude note que de nouvelles zones aurifères ont été découvertes par les récents travaux des orpailleurs sur les sites que Vincent a déjà visités; aussi Vincent doit-il y retourner afin d'en tenir compte.
>
> [. . .] Les compagnies minières tolèrent le travail des orpailleurs sur leurs concessions, car à cause de leurs outils archaïques, ils ne peuvent extraire que très peu de minerai d'or de la saprolite. Cette politique de tolérance permet aux compagnies d'établir de bons rapports avec les habitants des localités avoisinantes.[1]

Concessions – broadly defined as spaces where sovereignty is partly or temporarily transferred to a party other than the state[2] – have been established throughout western Africa for centuries. However, as the previous chapters have shown, it is only since the 1990s that the setting up of mining concessions by foreign investors became a common practice on the national territory of Burkina Faso. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, these mining concessions have proliferated in parts of the country they had not existed in before. This period of accelerated (foreign) direct investment coincides with the aftermath of the credit crunch in 2007/2008, when the gold price reached a record of almost USD 2,000 per ounce. Together with the investor-friendly mining code of 2003, the rising price of gold has attracted a range of multinational mining corporations to (re)invest in the country, many of them already holding exploration permits in Burkina Faso. Within just a few years, from 2007 to 2014, eight industrial gold mines opened, and by 2009 Burkina Faso became the fourth largest gold producing nation on the continent with exploration concessions covering almost half of Burkina Faso's national territory in 2018 (see Chapter 2 and Figure 2.3). The present chapter on "corporate citizenship" looks at concession-making practices from near and at-a-distance, notably at investors conferences in Toronto (Canada) and in the mining areas of western Burkina Faso (Bagassi and Houndé). Under the global condition, actors engage

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1 "The drilling machine continues to explore various promising sites. Claude notes that new gold zones have been discovered by the recent work of the artisanal gold diggers on the sites Vincent has already visited and Vincent needs to return to these sites in order to take this into account.

[. . .] The mining companies tolerate the work of the gold diggers on their concessions since, due to their archaic tools, they can only extract very little gold ore from the saprolite. This policy of tolerance allows the companies to establish good relations with the inhabitants of the neighbouring localities." (Own translation. Delisle, *Alidou, l'orpailleur*, pp. 91–92).
2 See P. Nyíri, "The Renaissance of Concessions", *Political Geography* 31 (2012) 4, pp. 195–196; M. Weihe, "Concessions and Sovereignty: Emerging Forms of Shared Authority Around Chinese Investment Projects in in Northern Laos", Master Thesis, Free University of Berlin, 2012.

in dialectical processes of flows and control, or of opening and enclosure.[3] In so doing, they draw different lines on maps (for investors, shareholders, government officials, and local populations) and cadastral lines on the ground to illustrate their property claims on land and subsoil resources. "Drawing lines" is influenced by the texture of the ore body and the different techniques to get the minerals out of the ground. It represents a shared practice in the mining industry that is functional in nature in that it provides powerful instruments of socio-spatial transformation in local, national and global settings. Physical and imaginative lines do not only physically separate the mine concession from neighbouring communities, but they also become discursive criteria for targeting corporate social responsibility.[4]

While describing in more detail these processes of enclosing and opening space(s) for investors, government officials, local populations or artisanal miners, this chapter mainly addresses their relationship to "corporate citizenship" (CC). In recent years, the language of corporate citizenship appears to replace that of CSR.[5] Yet it remains to date analytically and empirically understudied how global regimes of CC distinguish themselves from CSR. Evolved as a "new orthodoxy" in mining capitalism,[6] the chapter discusses how actors in corporate offices in Ouagadougou and in extractive areas in western Burkina Faso strategically refer to this concept by designating the corporations they enact as a "responsible corporate citizen" (*entreprise citoyenne*). Through the concept of citizenship, as Alejo José G. Sison states, "politics also lends to business firms a sense of identity, by way of membership in the community, and a justification for their rights and responsibilities as artificial or legal persons, being a channel for participating in community life".[7] What does it mean if a multinational company operating in western Burkina Faso claims that it is a "citizen"? Do such claims go beyond the often synonymously used terms of CC and CSR in terms of philanthropic engagements?[8]

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3 See Marung and Middell, *The Re-Spatialization of the World*, p. 1.

4 G. Banks, "Activities of TNCs in Extractive Industries in Asia and the Pacific: Implications for Development", *Transnational Corporations* 18 (2010) 1, pp. 43–59, at 47; Ey and Sherval, *Exploring the Minescape*.

5 J. M. Logsdon and D. J. Wood, "Business Citizenship: From Domestic to Global Level of Analysis", *Business Ethics Quarterly* 12 (2002) 2, pp. 155–187, at 155.

6 Rajak, *In Good Company*, p. 29.

7 Sison, *From CSR to Corporate Citizenship*, p. 241.

8 J. Curbach, *Die Corporate-Social-Responsibility-Bewegung* [The Corporate Social Responsibility movement], Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009, pp. 20–24; A. B. Carroll, "The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders", *Business Horizons* 34 (1991) 4, pp. 39–48; A. B. Carroll, "Carroll's Pyramid

The present chapter will discuss how the concept of corporate citizenship entails complex claim-making practices and corporate enactments. In Burkina Faso, corporations usually aim to become both "good citizens" in the world of their business, and "good citizens" in the national and local neighbourhoods of their mining concessions. Paradoxically, they therefore simultaneously have to rely on strategic opening and enclosure in their concession-making practices. The large-scale extraction endeavour relies heavily on tangible resource deposits that are worth extracting, and thus investing in. In the eyes of a global investment audience, far-away places in the Global South have to become "investible" and "opened up" to the global mining economy.[9] Yet property claims in form of concessions have to be constantly (re)asserted and enclosed in order to ward off external threats. How do these claim-making practices coincide with recurrent practices of multinational corporations in Burkina Faso's mining regions to increasingly fashion themselves as "good corporate citizens" or at least cooperative "neighbours"? To which stage of company-community relations will multinational corporations, for instance, accept artisanal miners on their concessions who not only potentially engender their deposits, but also influence the company's reputation locally, national and globally?

Muriel Côte and Benedikt Korf have revealed how, instead of resulting in "enclaves of mineral production", concessions-making practices are produced through and reproduce "socially thick" socio-political environments.[10] Their argument is an important contribution to empirical investigations into hybrid regimes of securitizing mining assets through (selective) engagements with neighbouring communities in order to maintain "the social license to operate".[11] The "corporate security begins in the community" principle is anchored in multi-scalar policies of the industry.[12] These range from the Voluntary

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of CSR: Taking Another Look", *International Journal of Corporate Social Responsibility* 1, 3 (2016).

9 See G. Bridge, "Resource Triumphalism: Postindustrial Narratives of Primary Commodity Production", *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 33 (2001) 12, pp. 2149–2173; A. L. Tsing, "Natural Resources and Capitalist Frontiers", *Economic and Political Weekly* 38 (2003) 48, 5100–5106; T. M. Li, "What Is Land? Assembling a Resource for Global Investment", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 39 (2014) 4, pp. 589–602.

10 Côte and Korf, *Making Concessions*.

11 See, for example, J. Hönke, "Business and the Uses of 'Civil Society': Governing Congolese Mining Areas", in: C. Gabay, C. Death (eds.), *Critical Perspectives on African Politics*: *Liberal Interventions*, *State-Building and Civil Society*, London: Routledge, 2014, pp. 91–107; Hönke, *Transnational Companies and Security Governance*.

12 Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*, p. 157; Welker, *'Corporate Security Begins in the Community'*.

Principles on Security and Human Rights multi-stakeholder initiative to which companies adhere, to their concrete CSR programmes and projects that incorporate the "local community" for their self-interest.[13] As the previous chapter has shown, extractive areas do not only feature fenced-off corporate concessions, but important "community belts", which entail the presence and work of community relations departments of the corporations themselves, and of INGOs selectively collaborating with the former.[14]

Yet corporations do not always succeed in convincing populations and (local) governments of their citizenship campaigns. Efforts to become "best in class" in the Burkinabè mining world, as expressed by company executives in Ouagadougou and Bagassi, were not exempt from meeting popular resistance which threatened extractive activities (see Chapter 5). The first subchapter of *Corporate Citizenship and Concession-Making* will discuss how these ambiguous outcomes of citizenship campaigns have to do with processes of enclosing space at-a-distance through specific notions of corporate ownership and development. The latter imagine extractive spaces in the Global South more generally and Burkina Faso specifically as empty of social and political life, but full of assets and (potential) profits. They entitle industrial miners in the concessions (in contrast to artisanal miners) to moral and legal claims on land and resources. The second subchapter zooms into concrete corporate campaigns and identities by highlighting how mining companies engage in both politics of strategic opening and enclosure concerning their concession-making practices in western Burkina Faso. It will be discussed how different infrastructures do not represent "fortresses of production" or "privately secured enclaves" of mineral production in the classical sense of the term.[15] Their engendered processes of enclosing extractive activities from the outer world does, however, deeply affect "sociality" in mining areas and the enactment of the firm as a transparent citizen. The last subchapter explores how corporate citizenship becomes enacted by CSR agents who have the task of representing the company in negotiations with mining affected communities, and are often perceived in turn, as "the company" by local populations.[16] An ethnographic

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13 See Voluntary Principles Initiative Secretariat, "Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights", https://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-voluntary-principles (accessed 3 November 2019); Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*, pp. 158–159.

14 Hönke, *Transnational Companies and Security Governance*, p. 65.

15 Hönke, *Transnational Pockets of Territoriality*, pp. 20–21; Ferguson, *Seeing Like an Oil Company*, p. 378.

16 See Kemp and Owen, *Community Relations and Mining*; Kemp, *Community Relations in the Global Mining Industry*; Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*.

account of their daily work and their own subjectivities at play as local CSR agents or global mining professionals will illustrate how, even within corporate structures, areas of responsibility and degrees of engagement are subject to hierarchical bargaining.

Building up *Terra Nullius*: Notions of Ownership and Development

Mining professionals seem to deal with different notions of responsibility and sustainability while they seek to legitimize their right to access lands and resources in African countries and abroad. This section focuses on both imagined and materialized representations of Burkina Faso's industrial gold mining sector by corporate agents, mainly "global mining professionals" (such as directors and CEOs),[17] and executive staff working in the mining areas of western Burkina Faso. Yet, while narratives of "goodness", and "virtuous subjectivity" expressed in CSR or respect for cultural values and practices are playing a key role among global mining professionals, they usually do not result in obstructing the speed at which either exploration works or mining proceeds. Nor would they cede priority in access to minerals to local (artisanal) miners.[18] It will be discussed how the question of access to mineral resources is not only expressed in legal terms (e.g., "legal" industrial mining vs. "illegal" artisanal mining and notions of concessionary properties), but also makes reference to moral claims of opening up to date empty and "virgin" spaces and places to the global economy. In doing so, discourses and practices that refer to an imagined *terra nullius* (Latin for "land of no one") historically serve as a pretext to justify access to land and resources that usually comes along with an expropriation or forced relocation of land owners and land users in "peripheral" world regions.[19] A range of scholars described how "resource frontiers" emerge, when sites of extraction are imagined as "full" of resources but "empty" of histories, claims, livelihoods, ecologies and proper governance.[20] Mining executives in

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17 Butler, *Colonial Extractions*, p. 163; A. Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception*: *Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006.

18 See Butler, *Colonial Extractions*, 191–195.

19 See R. N. R. Brown, "Spitsbergen, Terra Nullius", *Geographical Review* 7 (1919) 5, pp. 311–321; U. Sen, "Developing Terra Nullius: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Indigeneity in the Andaman Islands", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 59 (2017) 4, pp. 944–973.

20 Côte and Korf, *Making Concessions*, p. 467; Bridge, *Resource Triumphalism*, p. 2154; T. M. Li, *Land's End*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014; Tsing, *Natural Resources and Capitalist Frontiers*.

western Burkina Faso often referred to such a state of "emptiness" when speaking about the time prior to corporate intervention in particular areas.

While these accounts of executives of foreign-based mining firms ascribe a status of non- or not-yet-regulated to these mining regions, frontiers are not necessarily "zones of unmapping".[21] Rather, relatively discrete extractive spaces can be mapped via geographical devices and can still represent imaginations of "underutilized" frontier zones. The "discovery" of supplies and resources at-a-distance actually requires some form of spatial representation for a global investment audience. In doing so, "Inscription devices, ways of seeing, counting, classifying and rendering some things visible while occluding others exceed the motives, interests and intentions of the actors that produce them." To classify land and its resourcefulness "as underutilized requires discounting current uses".[22] Ever since colonialism, this practice is reflected in and through devices such as maps, surveys and grids.[23] Like the central state (see Chapter 5), mining companies today use specific inscription devices for their spatial property claims such as satellite images, maps, and graphs. These are integral to assembling land as a resource to different actors.[24] Legal and moral claims to land and resources eventually become manifest in these everyday discourses, investor presentations, and technical reports of corporations. Some of them enable land and resources to be manipulated at-a-distance; others demand corporate presence on the ground. Therefore, this section illustrates how control and ownership of lands is managed in and across various sites: in the national offices of multinational corporations, the mining concessions of western Burkina Faso and at investor conferences in Toronto.

Moreover, it will be discussed how the implementation of national modes of governance and regulatory frameworks of the Burkinabè mining sector are fundamentally shaping corporate behaviour, and vice-versa. Contrary to absolute notions of and imaginaries of opening up "virgin" spaces in the Global South, multinational corporations in Burkina Faso aim to enact themselves as "corporate citizens" with specific rights and duties in host states.[25] In so doing,

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21 Ibid., p. 5100.

22 Li, *What Is Land*, p. 592.

23 N. Blomley, "Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence: The Frontier, the Survey, and the Grid", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 93 (2003) 1, pp. 121–141.

24 Li, *What Is Land*, p. 589.

25 See Carroll, *The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility*; Carroll, *Carroll's Pyramid of CSR*; A. Habisch and R. Schmidpeter, *Corporate Citizenship*: *Gesellschaftliches Engagement von Unternehmen in Deutschland* [Corporate Citizenship: Societal engagement of companies in Germany], Berlin: Springer, 2003.

they recognize the state's custodianship role in resource governance. To a certain degree, they even strategically refer to national property rights to justify their own claims to resources (see Chapter 5). That many mining executives in western Burkina Faso perceive of themselves and their corporate structures as most appropriate and significant for the development of mining areas, can also be seen as a consequence of a dominant government policy of leasing land and concessions to private entrepreneurs. The latter are hence able to express entitlements to inclusion and claims of exclusion. Different actors and forms of livelihoods form part of the concessions they own, while others do not. This particularly applies for policies of (non)tolerance vis-à-vis artisanal and small-scale gold mining.

Presentations for Investors

As land, resources have to be rendered available for global investment. Investors, analysts, and mining executives are key actors in assembling land as a resource, and thus to make its value both visible and investible.[26] To begin with, this section focuses on devices of resource control that allow manipulation at-a-distance. Maps and graphs in presentations and reports for (potential) investors make frontier, marginal or "underutilized" land tangible for global finance. According to Tania Murray Li, this enables, "[. . .] the kind of action-at-a-distance that assembling land as national, colonial and global 'resource' requires. Land still cannot be removed from the place where it is located. But with these devices in place, it can be assembled in new forms, and differently disposed."[27] Inscription devices and those in the corporate world who use them are deeply involved in counting, classifying and rendering things (in)visible. Often, they exceed the motives, interests and intentions of the actors that produce them. Investor relations officers of large-scale mining firms, for instance, may be aware the feasibility of mining projects cannot simply be measured in terms of resource abundance of a given concessionary space. Still, they are deeply involved in assembling land, territories and subsoil in terms of commodities, in order to attract capital for their mining endeavours.

Due to their dependence on venture capital, it is especially junior companies that are heavily involved in convincing investors to buy stock, and thus pushing the share price at the TSX and TSVX.[28] Even more than senior producers and

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26 Côte and Korf, *Making Concessions*, p. 467; Li, *What Is Land*, p. 589.

27 Ibid., p. 593.

28 Junior mining companies, or exploration companies, have usually no mining operations under way and rely almost entirely on the capital market to finance their exploration activities.

mid-tiers, they rely on "conjuring the spectacle".[29] Creating a rush for resources demands, according to Tsing, a spectacle that grabs the investors' attention. Gold as a commodity is specific insofar as it continues to figure as a "top investment asset", and a historically "safe haven" especially – but not only – in times of global economic turbulences.[30] It comes as little surprise that on a global scale and particularly for the case of Burkina Faso, investments in gold extraction particularly gained momentum with the global financial crises and the market crash in 2008. Hedge funds and other large institutional investors were urged to search for "safe" places to look for money. Yet gold market investors still have to be convinced that investing in West Africa is eventually more promising than in places which are more familiar to them, such as Canada or Australia. For that, the economy of finances and – to a certain degree – even of actually functioning gold mines rely on an "economy of appearances".[31] Frontier investments not only entail global imaginations about the newly enhanced value of a resource but also about its abundance in far-away places, and the "emptiness" of the latter. One of the most emblematic examples of such frontier imaginations in the Canadian and global mining industry is certainly the "Bre-X" scandal of the 1990s. Anna Tsing explored the role of "spectacle" as a main driver for huge international investments in a claimed gold deposit in the forest of Busan in Indonesia, which then turned out to be simply non-existent. Conjuring the possibility of huge finding required stock promotors and company executives to engage with frontier narratives of landscapes of "wild jungle". A space at the same time full of resources,

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When deciding to apply for an exploitation permit and to start production they usually become mid-tier producers. In many cases, however, promising licenses are sold to senior production companies before the start of any extractive activities. This has been the case for the junior company True Gold Mining, acquired by Endeavour Mining in 2012. Yet in Burkina Faso, as elsewhere, distinctions between juniors, mid-tiers, and majors cannot always be drawn with precision. Many mid-tier companies incorporate subsidiaries that are specialized in exploration, construction or production. In late 2019, this applied to both studied companies, Roxgold Inc. and Endeavour Mining. (Luning, *Liberalisation of the Gold Mining Sector in Burkina Faso*, p. 390; Dougherty, *The Global Gold Mining Industry*; M. L. Dougherty, "Scarcity and Control: The New Extraction and Canada's Mineral Resource Protection Network", in: K. Deonandan, M. L. Dougherty [eds.], *Mining in Latin America: Critical Approaches to the New Extraction*, London: Routledge, 2016, pp. 83–99; Q. Mégret, "De l'inscription en bourse à l'exploration en brousse: La double vie d'une multinationale minière junior" [From stock market listing to bush exploration: The double life of a junior multinational mining company], *Carnets de géographes* [2011] 2).

29 Li, *What Is Land*, p. 595; Dougherty, *The Global Gold Mining Industry*.

30 See L. Gosling, "Is Gold a Safe Haven for Investors?", *whatinvestment.co.uk*, 14 May 2019; Richer La Flèche, *Preface*.

31 Tsing, *Inside the Economy of Appearances*; See Li, *What Is Land*, p. 595.

but empty of former usages and livelihoods such as artisanal mining.[32] In doing so, they ignored the "intrinsically social character of land" and resources, and that different users may have different attachments to their material emplacement.[33]

Such assumptions also become visible when industry representatives distinguish between "greenfield" and "brownfield" projects in order to calculate investment risks and opportunities. The term "brownfield projects" indicates that previous capital had been invested in development and an established resource base. They can range from the advanced development stage with a known resource to a proven producer. Greenfield exploration, by contrast, "carries the risk of operating in literal unchartered territory"[34] and suggests "untouched grass".[35] The mere ascription of "greenfield" areas for mining, as indicated on corporate maps during investor conferences, therefore (re)produces notions of frontier investment. Without the existence of an extensive database, technical reports, economic and feasibility studies, permits or even some form of already carried out development work, these areas are imagined as empty of governance.[36] According to investment imaginaries, such global frontiers of mining investment imply to a greater or lesser extent institutional vacuums.[37] Hence they can figure as potential sites of transformation of land into industrial use, or of (potential) resources into reserves. In order to become investible, *mineral resources*, to which only some geological evidence is sufficient for their existence, have to be converted into *mineral reserves* that attract global investors' attention. Contrary to mineral resources, reserves imply a higher level of knowledge of the resources and therefore, a high level of confidence for the potential investor. Mineral reserves are thus defined as "the economically mineable part of a measured and/or Indicated Mineral Resource", as puts the Canadian institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum.[38] Sabine Luning has analyzed how frontier discourses connect specific mining temporalities to place-

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32 Tsing, *Inside the Economy of Appearances*.

33 See Li, *What Is Land*, p. 600.

34 Investing News Network, "Brownfield Projects: Less Risk, Faster Returns", *INNspired Investing News*, 29 January 2021.

35 J. R. Owen and D. Kemp, "Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: A Critical Appraisal", *Journal of Cleaner Production* 87 (2015), pp. 478–488, at 479.

36 Bridge, *Resource Triumphalism*, p. 2154.

37 I. Kopytoff, *The African Frontier*: *The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987, pp. 25–33.

38 Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum, "CIM Definition Standards for Mineral Resources & Mineral Reserves: Prepared by the CIM Standing Committee on Reserve Definitions" (2014), p. 6.

making practices of the industry.[39] She emphasized the temporal processes and ideas about future outcomes of this industry jargon. The notion "reserve" indicates that is "legally, economically and technically feasible to extract value in the present". "Resources", conversely, point to potential value in the future and potentially rely on more risk-taking behaviour of investors. The term "project" actually invokes both imaginations of extraction sometime in the future ("to project"), and a discrete mining activity ("a project") that already carries out concrete outputs in terms of ounces mined.[40] The conversion of resources into reserves, and of exploration projects into actual sites of production, formally takes place through the publication of (pre)feasibility studies, according to standards of the global mining industry. After considering all relevant modifying factors, the estimated tonnage and grade of mineral reserves of a concession are usually publicly disclosed.

As managers of two mid-tier TSX-listed companies with a number of extraction and exploration concessions in West Africa, Endeavour Mining and Roxgold Inc. executives have been to different degrees involved in assembling resources at-a-distance. While the two companies were able to rely on significant cash flows due to their sites of production, their managers still needed to convince international investors and banks that their exploration assets and properties are worth investing in. The successful discovery of resources, and their conversion into exploitable reserves, usually extends the mine-life of already existing plants, sites and infrastructures of extraction. It therefore significantly contributes to the overall value of a corporate portfolio. While this in turn attracts global investors, exploration and exploitation must thus be seen as entangled endeavours, practices and projects of both companies. During investor events, company executives constantly referred to both their exploration and extraction projects. In doing so, they used manifold visual description devices to transform largely invisible mineral deposits into assets.[41] Investor days, quarterly investor telephone conferences, or other mayor events of both mining companies between October 2017 and July 2019 usually took place offline and online to reach their target communities and were registered on company websites and YouTube-channels.

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39 Luning, *Mining Temporalities*; Luning, *The Future of Artisanal Miners from a Large-Scale Perspective*.

40 Ibid., p. 68; T. M. Li, "Contested Commodifications: Struggles over Nature in a National Park", in: J. Nevins, N. L. Peluso (eds.), *Taking Southeast Asia to Market: Commodities, Nature, and People in the Neoliberal Age*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008, pp. 124–139.

41 See P. R. Gilbert, "Expropriating the Future: Turning Ore Deposits and Legitimate Expectations into Assets", in: K. Birch (ed.), *Assetization: Turning Things into Assets in Technoscientific Capitalism*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2020, pp. 173–201.

Web-based platforms actually function as an important communication and marketing tool in connecting sites of investment (of the Global North) with sites of prospection and extraction (in the Global South).[42] Besides numbers indicating production and cash flow results in ounces and dollars, as other productivity indicators such as Health and Safety (H&S) incidences in their operating mines (i.e., Lost Time Injury free hours, LTI), companies particularly highlighted the potential of "their assets" or "their portfolio". Notions as "property", "asset", "portfolio", and "target" suggest the availability of land for large-scale extraction and renders other or pre-existing forms of property regimes and land use in the concessions invisible. With such technical presentations for a global audience, as Paula Butler states, "the industry routinely treats metals and minerals as impersonal, technical, prehistorical entities". The technical nature of such discourses would cumulate in characterizing mining as a non-political and non-social activity. As a result, she concludes, "this renders mining professionals such as geologists unthinkable as political subjects engaged in racialized relations of power".[43]

However, such frontier investment cannot simply take place anywhere in the world. It requires specific imaginations about the availability of extractive spaces in specific localities. Risk profiles and rankings of the corporate world usually point to both "country risks" and "geological risks".[44] While other factors (such as political stability and security concerns) may also be key for investment choices (see Chapter 2), the investibility of natural resources is profoundly shaped by accounts of resource abundance and imagined "virgin" territories for investment. The socio-spatial ordering practices of mining companies through maps, graphs and photography (re)inscribe spaces in the image of the commodity. In doing so, they tend to (re)define whole regions and places as primary commodity-supply zones, not of socioecological histories.[45] Company managers, such as Endeavour Mining's CEO Sébastian de Montessus are required to explain why investors should be "keen" to invest in their West African mining assets, despite or just because of turbulences on the global gold market. On the company's 2018 Toronto investor day, he emphasized his awareness about the fact "that the market has not been great", and that he is "happy that there are still some believers in the gold space". Before having a closer look at the different mining projects of the company, he explained at length "why we believe West Africa is a promised land in terms of discovery and also a nice

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42 See Mégret, *De l'inscription en bourse à l'exploration en brousse.*

43 Butler, *Colonial Extractions*, pp. 188–189.

44 Luning, *The Future of Artisanal Miners from a Large-Scale Perspective*, p. 71; Godoy, *Mining.*

45 See Bridge, *Resource Triumphalism.*

environment to operate [in]". In 2017 alone, USD 385 million of global exploration budget was spent in West Africa, which became the third largest investment area for exploration after Canada and Australia. The CEO emphasized that West Africa "has been the number one discovery region globally for the last ten years" (with 79 Moz discovered). What also makes the region particularly interesting for investors would be its newness as a destination for global capital. That's "also why you're discovering much more high-quality ounces [over there]". In order to convince potential investors to redirect their money to West Africa and especially the company's assets in Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, the CEO's presentation featured a range of statistical and graphical devices.[46] Many of the presented slides target resource estimates, discoveries and locations. They also indicate the company's mining concessions as "properties" of the company, despite the state's legal ownership role in terms of sub-soil resources in both countries.[47] As the representation of Endeavour Mining's "assets" in Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast exemplifies, mining executives are actively involved in counting, classifying and rendering things (in)visible. Pointing to a status of "under-explored" regions and even countries for the global mining industry, obscures other usages of land and resources, and the accompanying socio-political entanglements.[48] While two-thirds of the extremely mineral-rich Birimian greenstone belt is located in Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast, Endeavour Mining's CEO emphasized that former global exploration waves rather focused on Ghana and Mali as (potential) investment destinations. This would be the main reason for Ivory Coast's and Burkina Faso's to date "under-explored" extractive potential. Until today, only one quarter of the total production of the Birimian greenstone belt takes place in both countries, which represents a huge "[. . .] discrepancy. [. . .] where you have the most opportunities, [. . .] this is where you had less discoveries in the past." Therefore, Endeavour Mining specifically targets these "promised" territories in their exploration strategy.

During the quarterly presentations of both companies' financial results, social programmes of the company and people of the locality only played an ancillary role, if mentioned at all. Roxgold, for instance, regularly featured a couple of slides about "People at Yaramoko" at the appendix of their presentations. In all of Endeavour Mining's quarterly results presentations, "Houndé" only appeared as a "property" or a "site". The maps of the site featured deposits, exploration

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46 See Endeavour Mining Corporation, *ENDEAVOUR MINING Investor Day 2018*.

47 See ibid., p. 7.

48 See ibid., p. 8.

targets and (mine) infrastructure (i.e., roads and electric power lines).[49] Yet the presented maps shielded that large parts of the "Houndé property" are covered with human settlement and farmland. The existence of a 150,000 inhabitant's town (of Houndé) that continues to grow bigger in surface and demography was simply not mentioned. This is even more evident when comparing the extent of Endeavour Mining's mining concession with that of the inhabited neighbourhoods of Houndé (see Figure 4.1). Corporate presentations of Houndé on maps, however, only featured what is considered as important information and access criteria for the mining industry. This is not surprising given that every map only represents a particular set of informations.[50] The corporate devices are particular

Figure 4.1: Houndé mining permit (exploitation) and Houndé town (February 2018).

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49 See Endeavour Mining Corporation, "Operational & Financial Results Q1" (2019), p. 28.
50 A. Bjørn and J. Michael, "Are All Maps Mental Maps?", *GeoJournal* 14 (1987) 4, pp., 447–464, at 447.

insofar as they engage with a specific "economy of appearances".[51] They suggest that huge mineral deposits, territories and concessions in Burkina Faso are "empty" and "under-developed", and thus available for large-scale extractive activities. When mining company executives claim that they still have "lots of tickets in the lottery" in terms of exploration and extraction, they assert that they are legally and morally entitled to access these deposits.

Legal and Moral Claims to Land and Resources

> In this interviewee's fantastical scenario, however, local "villagers" – the village being the standard infantilizing trope of "Africa" in the colonial imaginary – are like small children standing still, watching and wondering, while foreigners arrive as if from a superior planet and miraculously transform "bare land" into value and money. The frontier lands that the white man needs to possess and dominate are not quite empty: although they are "sovereign territory with nothing on it," a human presence is detected. But this presence is not deemed problematic; in the colonial imaginary, these persons have no status as political subjects. They pose no threat or contest; indeed, they form an admiring audience for the wondrous performance of the Canadian venture capital, whose magic – "you generate value from nothing, you pull it out of thin air" – is vastly superior to theirs.[52]

The mining frontier as a spatial imagination and a (potential) place of intervention for global capital becomes notably expressed through corporate professionals' images and subjectivities. Both of them are interdependent and reproduce each other. Access to and ownership in distant lands is claimed through frontier discourses, and illustrated through specific devices as maps and photographs. Legal and moral claims to mining assets are not only expressed at-a-distance, but also in the concessions and national head offices of corporations, as professionals' attitudes suggest. While sitting in Roxgold's Ouagadoudou office in August 2017, an expatriate mining executive proudly points to a large-format picture on the walls of his room. "When I got here, there was nothing." The picture apparently shows a landscape of Roxgold's mining concession before construction works started two years ago, in 2015. A representation of the Bagassi area which reminds me of that in one of Roxgold's technical reports: the picture with the caption "typical landscape in the project area" shows a rather "barren" landscape with some hills and trees and characterized by the typical Burkinabè savanna dryness. People or animals, landowners and land users, are absent.[53]

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51 Tsing, *Inside the Economy of Appearances*.

52 Butler, *Colonial Extractions*, p. 207.

53 See K. Reipas, R. Hairsine and A. Caitlyn, "Technical Report for the Yaramoko Gold Mine, Burkina Faso" (2017), 18.

This is certainly what many people keen to invest in large-scale mining deals in "Africa" imagine, but not the local reality of the company's 230 km^2 mining concession in the Balé province. Such images downplay the impact of industrial gold mining on other claimants such as residents, farmers or artisanal miners and negates the socio-political entanglements of extractive activities.

As a rule, descriptions of resource frontiers among mining executives in head offices in Toronto or London, as of those on mining sites in western Burkina Faso featured a number of important elements. As Anna Tsing has explored, they usually took the existence of resources for granted, and most descriptions labelled and counted the resources and their official owners (see previous section).[54] Furthermore, when speaking about their own activities and achievements, mining executives regularly referred to a situation of spatial "emptiness", and the absence of local appropriation of the (sub)soil. They also claimed that industrial mining would go along with a necessary social and infrastructural "development" of the locality, the region and even the country. According to the second element of frontier discourse, expatriate mining executives in Houndé and Bagassi referred to the initial mining concession as a site of emptiness. According to a French security manager, "there was nothing, only bush" on his first arrival in Yaramoko back in 2013. In a quite similar way an operations manager was convinced that "we've built up this place", because when he came to Bagassi, "it was bush allover". During my research in mining areas in western Burkina Faso, however, I barely came across radical notions of "untamed" and "wild" resource frontiers. In terms of flora and fauna, Burkina Faso does simply not seem to be very suited for descriptions of far-away places in the "jungle" or of "nature going wild".[55] A Canadian exploration worker in Bagassi told me, for instance, that despite his appreciation for Burkina Faso's culture and local people, he personally would have preferred to stay in a country with more "jungle", such as the DRC.

Looking at the discursive strategies industrial miners employed to justify their interventions, one is able to discern three main motives: first, as the statements about "emptiness" suggest, they perceived themselves in terms of first-comers and frontier entrepreneurs. Second, they also referred to legal claims when speaking about their entitlement to land and resources. The mineral rights granted to concessionary owners via the central state, authorized them, in turn, to represent themselves as the rightful "developers" of the mining

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54 Tsing, *Natural Resources and Capitalist Frontiers*, p. 5100.

55 For a critical postcolonial appraisal of terms as "bush" and "jungle" concerning landscape descriptions in the Global South and particularly on the African continent, see S. Arndt and L. Hornscheidt (eds.), *Afrika und die deutsche Sprache*: *Ein kritisches Nachschlagewerk* [Africa and the German language: A critical guide], 3rd edn, Münster: Unrast, 2018.

areas. Third, company representatives also reproduced discourses about licensing land to large-scale entrepreneurs as a strategy to save the land from the pollutions and social destruction of "wild", "illegal" miners.[56] Despite artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) existing in the Balé and Tuy provinces at least since the end of the 1990s, corporate agents denied the former their claims to land and resources due to the long-standing presence of industrial concessions. In the absence of transparent ownership requirements and, in large parts, non-existent demarcations of industrial exploration concessions in the mining regions, rights-based access relationships are said to have a historical background, as Souleymane, one of Houndé Gold's CSR managers put it in October 2018. In his view, it can thus be excluded that artisanal miners were present as "first-comers", even if the latter often claim the opposite:

> The first exploration permit of the area was granted to whom? Avion Gold came in 2010. But Avion Gold bought the first mining permit from Avocet which had bought it from Goldberg, and which had bought it from Barrick. This goes back to the time of the Poura mine. The exploration permits were [already] owned by mining corporations. But these did not invest enough, or had found no deposit. That's why the permits converted from one owner to the other.

Endeavour Mining's feasibility study that was published in 2013 examines the different ownership structures of the "Houndé property". The latter then comprised six individual exploration licenses, for a total surface of 1005.65 km^2 (covering "the totality" of the Houndé area, as Souleymane recognized). The exploration licenses were then held by Avion Gold (Burkina Faso) SARL, an exploration company incorporated in Burkina Faso and owned by Endeavour Mining Corporation.[57] The technical report mentions "widespread, small-scale artisanal mining" in the project area.[58] Yet it does not give any details on the historical, geographical or socio-economic scale of the phenomenon. The feasibility study thus draws on a discourse of emptiness that is very similar to that of the CSR manager Souleymane. The latter stated that in terms of mining activities "there was nothing [when we came here]", except for some industrial mining titles Endeavour Mining then acquired in 2012. Therefore, mining executives usually perceived of artisanal miners as intruders that take possession of already existing industrial concessions. Looking back at the concession's history in 2017, a Roxgold manager emphasized in a similar way that artisanal miners first appeared in

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56 See Tsing, *Natural Resources and Capitalist Frontiers*.
57 Zammit, Warren, Cheyne, Morgan and O'Bryan, *Feasibility Study NI 43–101 Technical Report*, p. 1.3.
58 Ibid., p. 6.8.

the area when the company started initial intensified drilling programmes back in 2006/2007. What mining executives barely mentioned, however, was that "legal" and "illegal" mining activities are temporally and spatially mostly "inseparable".[59] For the exploration and prospecting activities of multinational corporations, the presence of artisanal mining on that same territory also serves as an indicator for potential mineral reserves. In Burkina Faso (as elsewhere), the principle of "they go where we go" results in the various overlapping extractive spaces for artisanal and industrial mining in the country.[60]

Talking about different modes, materialities and effects of extraction, company executives engaged in strategic boundary-making concerning the artisanal and small-scale mining world. While they all recognized ASM's impact on local livelihoods in terms of revenues for whole families and communities, they also claimed that the benefits one could generate from industrial mining compared to artisanal would always lead to a predominance of the industrial sector. Apart from taxes and revenues that are supposed to give benefit through the state and decentralized government units to local populations, communities would benefit from local employment, procurement, and social benefits generated out of the corporate CSR projects. "*Orpaillage*",[61] as Souleymane claimed, "has never transformed a small shop owner into a billionaire. But Houndé [Gold] did it". His colleague and former mayor of Houndé pointed in a similar manner to the "problematic" nature of ASM. He described his time as mayor during the local mining boom as follows:

> For the municipality, there were rather [a lot of] problems. There is, for instance, the problem of landslides, of accidents on main roads, of conflicts. Of course, *l'orpaillage* is a source of income. But if you trade it off against what you win and what you pay [. . .] It is not sure that with artisanal mining you will win in the future. But the problems are also huge, the public health problem[s], the degradation of the soil and so forth.

In contrast to the regulated industrial mines (that are usually fenced off, securitized, and regulatory driven in their interior), ASM sites were prescribed as characterised by "l'utilisation anarchique des espaces" (the anarchic use of spaces), dysregulation, and risk.[62] In the Bagassi South feasibility study, the use of mercury for gold extraction by artisanal miners was described as an "environmental

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59 Tsing, *Natural Resources and Capitalist Frontiers*, p. 5101; Bolay, *When Miners Become 'Foreigners'*; Geenen, *Dispossession, Displacement and Resistance*.

60 See Côte, *What's in a Right*.

61 The French term *orpaillage* can be translated as alluvial gold panning. However, in Burkina Faso it is used for all forms of artisanal and small-scale mining.

62 Roxgold SANU, *Étude d'Impact Environnemental et Social*, p. 112.

liability" and the presence of artisanal miners more generally as a "social risk" to the large-scale extension project. "Roxgold is undertaking the necessary steps to manage this risk", as the report emphasized.[63] In interviews, CSR executives stated that they even felt the difference between both modes of extraction like "day" and "night", due to prevalent ASM practices such as the amalgamation of mercury "in the open air" and "with kids next to it". Cyanide, which is mostly utilized in industrial sites to separate minerals from the ore, was occasionally portrayed as less dangerous in terms of environmental and health impacts. By appraising ASM as "the real danger", mining executives thus tended to belittle other chemical substances used in LSM can also have far-reaching impacts on environment and human health such as through the potential contamination of surface and groundwater.[64] However, the responsibility to regulate artisanal mining was usually attributed to the central state: "It is not to us to interfere", as a manager of the Houndé gold project emphasized in December 2016. Therefore, mining executives generally welcomed latest political attempts of the Burkinabè government to regulate the ASM sector through its new agency ANEEMAS.

Multinational mining companies occasionally tolerate artisanal miners on their exploration concessions. In Houndé and Bagassi, this did not happen because of regulatory requirements, but in particular because of the "good will" of the respective company. According to company executives, to tolerate artisanal mining or not depended on the nature and extent of the work the company is conducting in the concession, and above all on whether deposits are seriously "threatened" or not. A *cohabitation* (coexistence) is possible, for instance, if drilling works are not impeded by ASM activities. Endeavour Mining, for instance, tolerated ASM on their exploration concessions in Kari, Bouéré, and Dohoun as long as the resources of the concessions were not considered as "reserves" suitable for industrial extraction. After their exploitation permit for Bouéré and Dohoun was granted in December 2017, they successively "evicted" *orpailleurs* from their concessions. A security manager justified these decisions with the company's legal entitlement it received from the central state: "if you sign the permit, it becomes [your] property, but not as your own building, but as an apartment, which fells under private law."

Empirical evidence from the two mine sites demonstrates that industrial firms, in practice, do not necessarily (want to) feel responsible for spaces, which they are not fully able to govern. Existing cases of temporal "coexistence" with

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63 K. Reipas, R. Hairsine and A. Caitlyn, *Technical Report for the Yaramoko Gold Mine*, p. 12.

64 Drechsel, Engels, and Schäfer, *'The Mines Make Us Poor'*, pp. 1–2; M. Porgo and O. Gokyay, "Environmental Impacts of Gold Mining in Essakane Site of Burkina Faso", *Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal* 23 (2017) 3, pp. 641–654.

artisanal miners, for them, did not imply that the latter have the right to legitimately exploit on their concession. Industrial mining companies may hence make use of their legal right to evict artisanal miners at any stage of their concessionary regime if they require themselves their concessionary space or parts of it. According to the mining law that gives precedence to industrial entrepreneurs, "Artisanal miners can always be turned into disposable illegals", as Sabine Luning has stated.[65] Between 2015 and 2018, Roxgold employed for instance a rather untypical corporate ASM policy in accepting artisanal mining to proceed even on parts of their exploitation permit. Yet there was neither a formal agreement, nor an Authorization for Artisanal Mining (AAM) in place that would formalize the relationships between industrial and artisanal stakeholders, and the latter were evicted in early 2018 due to Roxgold's concessionary extension (see Chapter 5). On the one hand, the mining companies justified this "on demand" practice by referring to the moral and material superiority of industrial mining endeavours. As the statement of a CSR executive exemplifies, they also made reference to the national mining legislation that engages in a preferential system for foreign-owned industrial mining concessions:

> You take a foreign investor, for instance, who comes [. . .]. [. . .] he asks the question, "and the artisanal miners?" The state will tell him, "no, those who have no authorization, they have no right [to extract]. [. . .] for someone who does not know the affinities and the arrangements and the tolerance that we have in Burkina Faso, he will say, "no, you don't have the right, leave the site". But what are the consequences? It's the law which says it. [. . .] what are we referring to when we coexist with someone who is illegal?

The articulation of moral and legal claims in relation to the tolerance of ASM by mining executives was often supplemented by simple economic reasons for the necessity of evictions. If situated in an industrial concession and tolerated by its owner, artisanal extraction was still required to only take place on specific scales. Due to their rudimentary tools to extract potentially gold-bearing ore with pits of 20 to 50 meters and sometimes over 100 meters,[66] *orpailleurs* tend to scratch only on the surface of the deposit according to many executives. "Our underground extraction is not equivalent to artisanal surface extraction", as a CSR manager in Bagassi stated. However, from the moment small- and semi-scale extraction uncovers significant sub-soil resources, and extraction takes place on a higher technical level, the principle of "coexistence" usually came to a relatively abrupt end.

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65 Luning, *The Future of Artisanal Miners from a Large-Scale Perspective*, p. 69; Engels, *Not Normal, Not Just*, p. 7.

66 Drechsel, Engels, and Schäfer, *'The Mines Make Us Poor'*, p. 5; Werthmann, *Bitteres Gold*.

About Citizens and Neighbours

In his account on the emergence of mineral enclaves in Africa, James Ferguson has stated that it is solely the "hopping" global capital that shapes the spatial configurations of zones of extraction.[67] The mapping devices of corporations and investors point to such an ordering of extractive spaces that are "far away" according to a capital-investment-driven logic of extraction. Yet Ferguson's account does not provide explanations for why corporate agents in the national head offices of corporations and in the sites of extraction still have to reproduce these logics and discourses through expressed legal and moral claims to land and resources. This section will discuss how, beyond global investment decisions, the boundaries and interests of multinational corporations (MNCs) are simultaneously shaped by local contexts. MNCs are thus forced to interact with social actors. Concession-making in the age of the "ethical turn" in corporate capitalism not only entails dialectical processes of opening up spaces to the global economy and enclosing them through specific claim-making practices.[68] It also reproduces these processes locally through the territorializing logics of concessionary spaces, and through enactments of the corporation as a transparent and good corporate citizen or neighbour. This eventually points to the mutually constitutive relationships between firms and their social environment.[69]

The enactment of mining corporations as corporate citizens with not only economic and legal responsibilities but also social and ethical ones, has to incorporate various enactments of the corporation: notably that of a profit-maximizing actor that conjures up "morality" at the heart of capitalism. The expressions of what Rajak has termed a "perhaps [. . .] oxymoronic promise" are different, according to the various sites and settings in which they are displayed.[70] The emphasis on either morality or profit-making in corporate presentations highly depended on the target audience. This notably applies to the degree to which local and national contexts, political aspects, and previous land use were highlighted. Presentations during bigger international events for the minerals and mining industry, such as Mining Indaba in Cape Town or at the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada (PDAC) annual meeting in Toronto, tended to incorporate much more social and political aspects of

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67 Ferguson, *Seeing Like an Oil Company*.

68 See Dolan and Rajak, *Introduction*, p. 3.

69 See P. Dicken and A. Malmberg, "Firms in Territories: A Relational Perspective", *Economic Geography* 77 (2001) 4, pp. 345–363.

70 Rajak, *In Good Company*, pp. 9–16; P. Benson and S. Kirsch, "Corporate Oxymorons", *Dialectical Anthropology* 34 (2010) 1, pp. 45–48; Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*.

mining and therefore corresponded to the "global regime of CSR" in the industry.[71] The emphasis on morality rather than profit-making was also dominant on site within the concessions. Visitors of mine sites in Burkina Faso were particularly confronted with numbers about local content promotion, CSR and sustainable development of the respective corporation. Particularly within the CSR departments of multinational corporations, managers and consultancies developed specific graphic devices, such as maps, sustainability and stakeholder reports, and local development plans for the management of their programmes and projects.[72] Prior to the extension project of Bagassi South, the CSR Department of Roxgold for instance developed and worked with a map indicating all known landowners and the existence of artisanal miners on the Bagassi South concession. Yet these maps were not displayed in public and mainly served as a management tool for engineering mining-induced displacement and resettlement (MIDR) processes.

Actors are permanently involved in formulating priorities for their own world, which can be the world of profit-making and the world of ethical engagements. This "capacity to orient oneself within the world and to formulate priorities for one's own organization of relevant spaces" has recently been conceptualized as forms of "spatial literacy" of different actors and groups of actors.[73] According to their interests and daily practices of spatialization, actors strategically engage in decisions on how to define relevant spaces. While social and political "emptiness" and "resource abundance" serve as appropriate spatial imaginations to convince investors in Toronto to invest in frontier mining assets in Burkina Faso, the opposite may by displayed to convince people to redirect their investments to Australia. In order to rise global finance capital for the Novo discovery of the Karratha gold project in Northern Australia, which could potentially become "the lowest cost gold mine in the industry", an investor in Frankfurt am Main pointed to the following scenario:

> I can tell you that if this place where anywhere in Africa, Asia, or South America, there would be 100,000 plus artisanals on top of it using sledge hammers, pneumatic drills, or pluggers and dynamite to get at the nuggets. . .and bugger the grade numbers. It is there, it's going to be minded by someone, and the ultimate grade and origins for the time being are just White Noise.

71 Rajak, *In Good Company*, p. 7.

72 See Endeavour Mining Corporation, "2018 Sustainability Report", London (May 2019); Roxgold Inc., "2018 Sustainability Summary" (2019).

73 Marung and Middell, *The Re-Spatialization of the World*, p. 4.

Experts of Burkina Faso's mining sector know quite well that scenarios of "100,000 plus artisanals" on an industrial mining concession are not completely far-fetched. How do corporations, in practice, deal with these neighbours or competing claim-makers in an era of "corporate citizenship" (CC)? The present section highlights the dialectical processes of opening and enclosure in concession-making in western Burkina Faso. In doing so, it first stresses corporate citizenship discourses among executives of Roxgold, their implications and limitations. It secondly points to the every-day enactments of citizenship in the mining concessions that is greatly shaped by the infrastructural make-up of sites of extraction.

"Best in Class"

"Notre engagement, être une société citoyenne" (Our engagement, being a corporate citizen), figured as a recurrent slogan on much of Roxgold's advertising material in Burkina Faso.[74] According to the public relations brochures, the motto mainly reflects corporate engagements in terms of community relations. Since the exploration phase, the company reportedly has been working in close collaboration with its host municipality and especially with the neighbouring village of Bagassi. The "community relations aspect" was repeatedly described as "key" to the company's exploration and exploitation projects. It was notoriously emphasized by different employees of the company, from the national executive to the local CSR agent. In addition to this, the motto "best in class" echoed through the administrative office buildings during my research stays at the company compound. It was not only outplayed on posters and charts, but company employees also referred to it during their daily working tasks. They did so mostly in a positive manner, but sometimes also ironically concerning additional tasks they had to fulfil due to "best in class" standards. The executive staff of the CSR Department employed the "best in class" slogan almost as a mantra, especially during public presentations and regular mine tours they provided for an interested public and for important stakeholders. In contrast to the "corporate citizen" motto which was invented by one of the national executives, the former slogan was developed in Roxgold's corporate head office in Toronto and points to the "ultimate exploration company's goal – to turn a project into a 'best in class' producing mine". It does, on the one hand, refer to the "high-

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74 Own translation. (Roxgold SANU, "Une société minière citoyenne" [A citizen mining company], [2017]).

grade narrow gold vein" Roxgold is extracting underground, "capable of 100,000 oz's per year running up to 11 gram per tonne over its life of mine making it one of the highest grade gold mines in the world".[75] Beyond the "best in class" deposit, the company's success has been linked to its "ability to operate safely and responsibly [. . .] driven by the conviction that our presence in host communities must be a win-win", as Roxgold's CEO John Doward emphasized in the company's 2018 Sustainability Summary.[76]

The concept of corporate citizenship, derived from management theory and in recent years extensively used in the corporate world, shares with CSR its conceptual fuzziness. There can be at least three possible readings and scalar dimensions of corporate citizenship:[77] first, ethical engagements result out of a firm's membership in society of a state where it operates, which entails specific rights and duties.[78] Second, due to their multinational nature, corporations are increasingly seen as "global business citizens" that responsibly implement their duties to individuals and societies within and across national and cultural borders.[79] Third, in the corporate polity (analogous to the state) different stakeholder groups are themselves potential citizens of the corporation.[80] According to corporate agents in Roxgold's head offices in Ouagadougou and at the mine site in Bagassi, the corporate citizenship campaign "best in class" is mainly based on three pillars: proximity, transparency and (social) integration. The "proximity" and "transparency" principles of Roxgold's community engagements point to their efforts to enact their responsibilities on various scales: global, national and local. "As a good [national] corporate citizen", a corporate executive stated in August 2017, the company has for instance accepted to pay the one per cent FMDL contribution. In addition to other obligatory or non-obligatory payments to the national treasury or local claim-makers, the principles of proximity and transparency were notably enacted through (non-)institutionalized forms of communication and exchange between the company, government authorities and local communities. For a CSR executive of Roxgold, a "responsible corporate citizen" enacts "transparency" in the daily interactions

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75 Globe 24–7, "Case Study in Detail: Roxgold", https://globe24-7.com/case-study/detail/1 (accessed 5 November 2019).

76 Roxgold Inc., *2018 Sustainability Summary*, p. 3.

77 See Curbach, *Die Corporate-Social-Responsibility-Bewegung*, pp. 20–24.

78 See Carroll, *The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility*; Carroll, *Carroll's Pyramid of CSR*; Habisch and Schmidpeter, *Corporate Citizenship*.

79 See Logsdon and Wood, *Business Citizenship*; Logsdon and Wood, *Global Business Citizenship and Voluntary Codes of Ethical Conduct*; J. M. Logsdon, "Global Business Citizenship: Applications to Environmental Issues", *Business and Society Review* 109 (2004) 1, pp. 67–87.

80 See Sison, *From CSR to Corporate Citizenship*.

with different local community stakeholders. In his opinion, "the more you hide, the more they will find out". That would be one of the main reasons why the management team would "never" refuse a visit at the mine site. "We at Roxgold, we want to transform a bit the image of a mining company as a diplomatic enclave", he summarized in September 2017. Officially, community consultations in the different villages of Bagassi were held once a month to collect data on topics of interest to local stakeholders. A detailed grievance mechanism has been in place for any issues or disputes occurring locally.[81]

As described by company executives, community engagement has been integral to the corporate policy from the initial start of the Yaramoko underground mining project for which construction commenced in 2015. Benoît, a corporate executive working in Roxgold's national headquarters in Ouagadougou explained to me in detail how, from the setup of the mining project, he personally assured that meetings with all important stakeholders had been organized even before the company applied for its extraction license. For this purpose he displayed different pictures of corporate-community meetings held in Bagassi, for which he had regularly left the corporate offices in Ouagadougou. The pictures showed him with different local authorities such as the *Conseil Villagois de Développement* (CVD) members, the prefect or village elders (*chef de terre*, *chef de village*) at stakeholder consultation meetings. Additionally, Benoît displayed a corporate chart showing pictures of different influential "village personalities" framed green, yellow or red. "Green" would symbolize an influential person favourable to the mining project, while a yellow frame would stand for "less supportive", or "neutral", and a red one for "opposition". Knowing "who is who" and "who is supportive and who is not" has eventually allowed the company to convince the more reluctant people of the mining project and to better communicate with them. The mining executive also pointed to one case where the company successfully "transformed" a red-framed person into green. This has been the case for the son of an influential landowner, who formerly made his living out of artisanal mining and who was known in the village as "hotheated". Benoît stated in March 2017:

> But today, we work with him. When we started the construction [of the mine site], we wanted to find a local supplier. And I personally campaigned that the transport service should be local. What we did is we sponsored him a bus, [and] we signed a two-year contract with him for the transport of our employees. When he started [the business], he bought an air-conditioned bus for the transport of our employees.

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81 See Roxgold Inc., "Mining High Grade Gold in Burkina Faso: TSX: ROXG" (2018), p. 69.

Benoît who, according to his own account, had invented the corporate motto *société minière citoyenne*, was convinced that specific actors are able to change the rather negative perception of world-wide operating mining corporations. "Les entreprises sont à l'image de ceux qui les dirigent" (companies are the image of those who run them), he proudly emphasized some months later, and individuals would be key to good corporate behaviour. This would be one of the main reasons for the many years of peaceful coexistence between Roxgold and the people of Bagassi. The "bad apples" among mining projects in Burkina Faso (and around the globe), in contrast, would be shaped by mismanagement and bad corporate communication. While explaining his argument of "corporate exceptionality", he raised the Karma case, a mine in northern Burkina Faso that became famous for community unrest during its construction phase in 2014 and 2015.[82] At the time, the project was operated by the Canadian junior company True Gold, and acquired by Endeavour Mining in April 2016.[83] "The decisions were made in Canada and here no one has interacted with the communities. No one has listened to the peoples' voices. And because of that, it all exploded."[84] Roxgold's mining executives repeatedly pointed to Endeavour Mining as a rather negative example of corporate community management. In doing so, they discursively reinforced the corporate "best in class" status of Roxgold, knowing that I was also investigating the Houndé project of Endeavour Mining.

Mining executives did not hide that in terms of hybrid security governance, their ethical engagements in "community relationship building" in and around host communities would be "crucial to the success of current and future mining projects".[85] Attaining and maintaining sustainable businesses and their social license to operate meant, in practice, impeding local people from becoming "frustrates" that cause potential problems to corporate operations, as Benoît

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82 See, for example, Werthmann and Ayeh, *Processes of Enclaving Under the Global Condition*, pp. 16–18.

83 True Gold Mining, "Endeavour Completes Acquisition of True Gold" (2016), http://www.truegoldmining.com/news/endeavour-completes-acquisition-true-gold (accessed 13 October 2016).

84 However, the Karma case seems far more complicated. An additional factor leading to social unrest has been an alleged potential damage to the Ramatoulaye mosque that figures as an import place of Muslim pilgrimage. Furthermore, a former CSR employee of True Gold stated in 2018 that the Burkinabè CSR director of the company has been involved in playing communities off against each other. (Werthmann and Ayeh, *Processes of Enclaving Under the Global Condition*, pp. 16–18; Engels, *Wann werden Konflikte manifest*; Engels, *Nothing Will Be as Before*).

85 Roxgold Inc., *2018 Sustainability Summary*, p. 8; Hönke, *Transnational Companies and Security Governance*; Welker, *'Corporate Security Begins in the Community'*.

stated. Representing the cherry on the cupcake (see Figure 1.1 in the introduction), the legacy aspect of corporate citizenship is thus described as exceeding the respective life-span of one specific mining operation: "To help communities grow and thrive, we must provide tools and support for ongoing prosperity beyond the life of our operations. Responsible corporate citizenship is not about simply checking boxes to demonstrate compliance on paper, but about building a lasting legacy of positive social impact and economic viability."[86]

Beyond "transparency" and "proximity", one of the means to achieve this would be to enact the third pillar of their corporate citizenship policy, which is "social integration". At the national mining fair SAMAO in September 2018 in Ouagadougou, a Roxgold CSR executive eloquently displayed the company's efforts in terms of social integration with neighbouring communities:

> For us, Roxgold, what is our vision of social integration? For us, it is the capacity of living together and growing together. Since 2014, we developed this approach. For us, social integration is when people host you. It is when people are eager to help you in case of problems. It is when people invite you for their festivities.

To illustrate the corporate "integration" efforts, he then showed a picture of the white administrative General Manager (the *directeur general*, "*le DG*") eating local food in Bagassi, which provoked a ripple of laughter running through the audience. Incidentally, this was not the first time I came across such discourses on the importance of putting oneself "on an equal level as locals". In conversions with executive staff in the mine site, a Canadian manager emphasized in September 2017: "As a citizen you [have to] participate at the *cité*" and "if we speak of citizenship, it is also a question of adapting oneself to the social context [. . .] we're in Burkina [Faso], Balé, Bagassi."

How far "social integration" allows non-corporate actors to participate in the corporate polity, however, remained a constant issue of debate. Beyond local content policies (see Chapter 6) and indirect forms of participating in decision-making processes through the state's ten per cent stake in the extraction project, there were few instances of concrete citizen participation in the corporate polity. An exceptional case was the way Roxgold provided and distributed funds for community development. The corporation received annually a significant number of project requests that were submitted by community representatives (e.g., by women's associations or other local organizations). After a first screening by the CSR Department, these projects were selected and approved by

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86 Roxgold Inc., *2018 Sustainability Summary*, p. 8.

the local and provincial project monitoring committees. To ensure that decision-making was widely representative of community stakeholders, these committees comprised of local authorities, government technical agencies, village authorities, landowners, youth groups and women's groups.[87] Since then, the corporate citizenship slogan has found expression in a variety of CSR projects realized in the municipality of Bagassi. These ranged from solar electrification in schools, women's health campaigns, to the equipment of the local municipal occupational training centre (in collaboration with WAGES and the municipality of Bagassi, see Chapter 3), or the implementation of livelihood restoration programmes for MIDR-affected populations. In total, in 2017 and 2018 Roxgold spent approximately USD 600,000 annually in "community development-related activities".[88] However, while company executives stated that "it's the community who decides" on the projects, they reserved the right to define a number of requirements for their financing, such as their "secular" nature and whether they are derived from "established" municipal associations.

The "Best in Class" motto was not only (re)produced by company employees. Several national mining sector experts, and occasionally local people, referred to the exceptional status the company has in Burkina Faso in terms of community relations. In 2016 and 2018 respectively, Roxgold received the "Best Corporate Social Responsibility Award" at the SAMAO in Burkina Faso. The CSR award obtained from the NGO *Réseau Afrique Jeunesse* (in partnership with the Swedish development organization Diakonia) was also prominently mentioned during the company's quarterly investor calls and in the company's sustainability report.[89] What remained disclosed during these publicity campaigns was that only two days after the 2018 awarding, on 30 September 2018, the company faced significant community unrest with a roadblock erected at the mine entrance in Bagassi. The unrest, during which the opinion leaders of the youth movement largely ignored the various formal grievance mechanisms set in place by the company, prevailed until mid-October 2018 (see Chapter 5). This example clearly points to limitations in enacting the corporation as a responsible citizen. While Roxgold strategically extended its responsibilities to neighbouring communities, the latter were not exempt from being excluded from sites and benefits of extraction, as the next section will discuss.

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87 See ibid., p. 9.
88 Ibid., p. 12.
89 Ibid., p. 3.

Access Regimes and the Inner Life of Mine Compounds

In terms of infrastructure and access regimes, the Yaramoko mine resembled other large-scale mining projects around the world. The discursive opening of the concession to adjacent communities through corporate citizenship campaigns was compromised by what Hannah Appel has termed "infrastructural violence".[90] The latter implies forms of exclusion and disconnection. Several access regimes and infrastructures established physical and discursive borders between the mine concession and the neighbouring village of Bagassi. An inner fence separated the "55 zone" as the proper site of extraction including the plant and some office buildings from other infrastructures such as the accommodation camp for workers or the tailings storage facility. Several outer fences served to protect all relevant mine infrastructures against external intruders. Due to the concessionary extension for the development of the Bagassi South deposit, 1.8 kilometres away from the "55 zone", the outer fence infrastructure has been encroaching significantly on the neighbouring villages since early 2018 (see Figure 4.2). The extension of the concession has led in particular to the extinction of *Bagassi Sud* (locally also known as *Bagassi Sanmatenga*),[91] which was a satellite village of Bagassi, built up by migrant Mossi artisanal miners in the late 1990s and early 2000s. After artisanal miners received compensation payments for their loss of infrastructure and an "aid of departure" between May 2017 and February 2018, they definitively left the concession site in July 2018 and engaged in ASM activities elsewhere.

Entering the mine compound through the inner and outer fence system implied a ritualized process of security clearances as comings and goings were strictly monitored. To access as a non-employee the perimeter fence usually required an invitation by the company or an official appointment. All non-employees, visitors, subcontractors and consultancies had to leave their passports or identity cards at the guardhouse in exchange for a badge visibly on display at all times while inside the compound. The badges were to be signed by different departments of the mine (Environment, CSR, Human Resources, Security, Operations, Health & Safety). The fence system, separating the mine

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90 See Appel, *Walls and White Elephants*; T. Hendriks, "A Darker Shade of White: Expat Self-Making in a Congolese Rainforest Enclave", *Africa* 87 (2017) 4, pp. 683–701.

91 Sanmatenga meaning "land of gold" in Mooré (*saan* = gold; *tenga* = land) is a recurrent name of artisanal mine sites in the Burkina Faso and also points to a major Mossi gold producing province in the region of Kaya. (See K. Reipas, R. Hairsine and A. Caitlyn, *Technical Report for the Yaramoko Gold Mine*, p. 172; Werthmann, *Bitteres Gold*, p. 24).

Figure 4.2: The new outer perimeter fence at the entrance to Bagassi after the concession extension in 2018.

compound from village life, entailed different sub-fence and surveillance systems:[92]

– The process plant and specific infrastructure were enclosed within a high security area protected by double security fencing 4 meters apart and 2.4 meters high. This high security area included electronic surveillance by closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras.

– General site infrastructure buildings situated outside the high security area were bounded by a single perimeter security fence. This security fence consisted of a 2.0-meter-high fence with razor wire at the top of the support posts. Entry to the main administration area was assured via the main access security building with access to the process plant high security area via an additional security building that incorporated turnstiles, a change room, and laundry. Entering this inner fence of the mine site resembled an airport security clearance system. Workers and drivers had to pass through a security gate where they were identified and checked individually. As the main administration building area, several infrastructures were located outside

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92 Own observations. (See K. Reipas, R. Hairsine and A. Caitlyn, *Technical Report for the Yara-moko Gold Mine*, pp. 154–155; Roxgold Inc., *Mining High Grade Gold in Burkina Faso*, p. 4).

the process plant security fence but contained within their own fences. An additional single security fence enclosed the area of the mining contractor African Underground Mining Services (AUMS), laboratory, camp, magazine, and tailings storage facility. A cattle fence was installed around the water storage dam. The magazine for explosive materials was separately fenced-off.

– Since 2018, a 2.0-meter-high security fence with razor wire at the top of the support posts enclosed and connected both mining areas (the "55" and the "Bagassi South" zone). It separated the site of extraction from the neighbouring village of Bagassi.

The general security system of the Yaramoko mine consisted of a combination of various access control points (including mine, plant and camp), read in and read out access control, and a radio system used for site communications, with separate channels for mining, process plant and security. The underground mine workers used a leaky feeder communications system. This was coupled with intruder detection devices, supported by surveillance cameras located at several key locations across the site, which monitored comings and goings. Other physical and visual barriers (such as lightening of the concession site during the night) accompanied fencing. The inner and outer fences were further secured by company-hired security guards and a *gendarmerie* station inside the compound.[93] In addition to the transportation system connecting the centre of Bagassi to the project site to facilitate the movement of employees hired locally, Roxgold's has set up vehicular travel from and to the site for expatriate and national employees that was accompanied by gendarme escort. During the research period, the transportation of national employees, contractors and suppliers in military-escorted convoys was a shared practice for multinational mining companies in Burkina Faso. It responded particularly to the worsening security situation in many of the mining regions in the east and the north of the country where corporate infrastructures and staff have been repeatedly a target for terrorist incidents. Such a convoy, escorted by *gendarmerie* personnel, was attacked on 6 November 2019 on the road between Fada and SEMAFO's

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93 Endeavour Mining additionally used drones, perimeter surveillance sensors and tracking systems on their concessionary sites. The gendarmes, police and military forces who reinforce security on private mine sites remain accountable to their national chain of command and usually operate closely with the corporate security personnel through a mechanism of Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) signed with the national authorities. (See Endeavour Mining Corporation, *2018 Sustainability Report*, p. 24).

Boungou Mine site in the East region of Burkina Faso. The company and international media reported that at least 37 persons were found dead.[94]

While the concession site was located only some kilometres away from the village of Bagassi, entering the mining compound implied access to a range of privileged infrastructures that the surrounding areas were deprived of. This particularly applied to the sporadic and uneven water, electricity and health care infrastructure outside the corporate fence. The various security rituals one had to fulfil to enter the concessionary site produced spatial distance and "disentanglement" from the outer world. Furthermore, it was the very different make-up of infrastructures that separated "regimes of the global, the standard, the compliant, the objective, to be differentiated from the arbitrary, the personalistic, the incomprehensibly local [. . .] outside".[95] During my stays on site, I had access to air-conditioned office buildings, restaurants, a bar, a soccer field, fully furnished rooms with English-only TV channels, hot and cold water, constant electricity, and a relatively good mobile phone coverage. While these infrastructures and the behaviours of many (expatriate) mine workers certainly reminded me of what Hannah Appel has described as "spatial and phenomenological distance in which the enclaves are at once in and not in Equatorial Guinea" or of the expat quarters in DRC's logging concessions,[96] the Yaramoko compound was not a luxury offshore resort either. Compound life was functional in nature and racial boundaries were rather porous. The compound corresponded to the relatively harsh working conditions of mineworkers (expatriate, national and local) with several weeks of eight to ten hours working day shifts without weekends or even additional free time. The latter was constrained to official "breaks" which the non-local workers usually spent abroad, in the capital Ouagadougou, their home countries or elsewhere (e.g., Thailand for tax avoidance reasons). In order to assure the necessary "work discipline", the restaurant and the bar at the campsite closed exactly at 10 p.m. and there was either a pool, a golf course, a movie theatre or other luxury infrastructures in place to motivate workers to spend their holidays in the compound. While the camp was equipped with its own sewage and septic systems, information signs reminded workers about the limited access to drinking water people had outside the compound and that they should reflect on their own behaviour concerning water consumption and

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94 SEMAFO, "Attack on the Road Between Fada and Boungou in Est Region", https://www.sem afo.com/English/news-and-media/news-releases/news-releases-details/2019/SEMAFO-Attack-on-the-Road-Between-Fada-and-Boungou-in-Est-Region/default.aspx (accessed 7 November 2019); van Praet and York, *Dozens Dead*.

95 Appel, *Walls and White Elephants*, p. 451.

96 Ibid., p. 442; Hendriks, *A Darker Shade of White*, p. 688.

waste production. However, on request and on special occasions, champagne was also served in the bar (see Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3: After work conversations in the air-conditioned compound bar.

In terms of accommodation and restoration, Roxgold provided relatively equal conditions for national and expatriate mine workers. The main restaurant premises were used by all categories of workers, except local daily labourers. Workers from outside Bagassi were hosted in an accommodation camp with a capacity to house 300 staff ranging from "manager style self-contained units" to double room units with central ablutions.[97] Yet language and socio-cultural barriers often hindered interactions between different categories of staff (expatriate, national, and local). Except for some Ghanaian and Tanzanian workers, few staff members spoke English fluently, and Australian or Canadian workers often relied on rudimentary French skills to communicate with their Burkinabè colleagues or local populations. In the evenings, the main compound bar was filled with mostly (white) Anglophone workers drinking beer, watching hockey games (rather than soccer) and playing pool. Francophone Canadian,

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97 K. Reipas, R. Hairsine and A. Caitlyn, *Technical Report for the Yaramoko Gold Mine*, p. 155.

Belgian and French executives, however, often exchanged with Burkinabè colleagues outside their working hours and had drinks together. According to Burkinabè employees, white workers in the past complained that Blacks often did not join them in the premises of the bar. One of the main reasons for that was that the air-conditioning in the bar was set too high so that nationals preferred to drink their beer or soft drinks outside. The temperature was set at 16 degrees Celsius, which was conceived by the latter as "not normal" for a Sahel country. "When you come here [as an expatriate worker], you have to assimilate", a national worker affirmed during a conversation in the bar back in 2017. Since this is not the case, he would usually just buy his beer and then go out.

Roxgold's managers and employees were constantly striving to ensure that the company's exceptional status as a "corporate citizen" was also reflected in its security policy. In doing so, they at least rhetorically designed the mine site's infrastructures and access regimes as (relatively) open to "the public" and adjacent populations. Besides local content and procurement policies that found expression in hundreds of local employees passing through the mine gates every day,[98] company officials emphasized how granting access to local people to the non-fenced concession zone would be part of their corporate principles of transparency and community engagement. In fact, the perimeter fence (Figure 4.2) of the concessionary site did not correspond to the total surface of the initial 15.84 km^2 and extended 23.5km^2 extraction license. A security manager therefore described Roxgold's security infrastructures as a "unique" and "modern" form of socio-spatial proximity to adjacent communities. In the long term, this would impede social conflicts and protests from emerging in the first place. In practice, this implied a (temporal) tolerance of artisanal miners on the extraction concession (see Chapter 5). On the other hand, it meant that Peul pastoralists and their cattle could freely circulate in the concession, but outside the fenced "zone of interest". However, this tolerance of corporate "outsiders" on concessionary territory also had significant consequences in terms of being and becoming responsible for what happens outside the corporate fence. Both corporate agents and villagers reported cases of cattle and sheep being found dead on concessionary territory. While local populations and the mayor of Bagassi assumed that the animals died because they drank contaminated water of the corporate storage facilities, corporate agents hold artisanal miners responsible for mercury contaminations occurring in the concession. The Security Department of the mine also invoked the "Peul problem" when its agents identified

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98 See Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*, p. 11.

pastoralists making a fire for cooking just next to the corporate fence in September 2017, which could pose a serious security risk to the company.

Forms of corporate social integration into the village life also comprised of interactions and exchanges which took place outside the concession site. This was a unique feature in the sense that many large-scale mining projects in Burkina Faso were reported to have excessive security regimes and access restrictions in place, especially for their expatriate employees. For the case of the Essakane mine in the far north of the country, the latter were reported to come and go by aircrafts and had no right to leave the concessionary site, even if they were employed in the company's CSR Department. While in case of the Houndé gold mine, the doors of the fenced concession site were closed at 6 p.m., the employees of Roxgold SANU and the exploration companies were free to leave and enter the compound at any time after work. Many Canadian and Australian workers made use of this opportunity and went to village bars after work or to the local nightclub on Saturdays after the camp's bar had closed at 10 p.m. A Canadian diamond driller who had previously worked in Canada, the US and Mexico told me in March 2017 how "amazing" he finds Bagassi and the local people. Among himself and his Canadian colleagues circulated vivid accounts of instances of local encounters, such as that of a cockerel drinking their ordered beer during their sojourn in a local bar. It was an open secret that many Burkinabè and expatriate miners had (sexual) relationships with women from Bagassi (notably female workers of the subcontractor All Terrain Services, ATS), and often foreign sex workers originally from other Burkinabè regions, Togo and Nigeria (see Chapter 6). In August 2017, Benoît told me in Ouagadougou how he had experienced a particularly embarrassing moment when the Canadian board of directors visited the Yaramoko site and the various realized CSR projects of the company. To their surprise, two women at the local health centre (*Centre de Santé et de Promotion Social*, CSPS), to which Roxgold had contributed a second maternity ward, gave birth to a "white" child. In October 2018, an Australian worker was fired because he had reportedly "disappeared" for several days and was later found in the courtyard of a woman in Bagassi. This instance illustrates how the free movement of workers and specific labour relations at the Yaramoko mine, however, were shaped by safety instructions and strict rules for disciplinary misconduct. Compliance with these rules was monitored on a regular basis, for instance by alcohol testing during working hours.[99]

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[99] See Roxgold SANU, "Employee Handbook" (2016); Roxgold Inc., *Mining High Grade Gold in Burkina Faso*, p. 7.

However, beyond corporate policy restrictions and internal corporate hierarchies, "the participation of citizens at the life of the *cité*" (as a mining executive put it) also depended on staff's personal motivation for leaving the compound. Others, such as a Burkinabè women who has been working for Roxgold for a year, complained in 2017 that "we're in the bush here" and that the rural context of Bagassi would be "annoying" and not interesting in terms of a social life. The various infrastructures provided at the mine site eventually would not challenge the "prison like" everyday work life comprising of the same routines, the same food and the same people for (often) six continuous weeks without a break. A Senegalese executive of the Health and Safety Department told me once that during the three years he has been working at the mine site, he has visited the adjacent village only three or four times. This was mainly due to the fact that he simply didn't know "anyone out there". He visited Bagassi a handful of time and only at the company's CSR manager's invitation. Many corporate agents preferred to leave the enclosed concessionary space only during leave, even though the company allowed for the relative mobility of its staff. "Social thickness" or "thinness" of mining projects must thus be seen as compromised by several factors including corporate access policies and infrastructures, the individual (distancing) behaviour of workers, and specific work assignments as those of CSR agents whose task is to represent companies in communities and vice-versa.

CSR Departments as Interfaces between Company and Community Interests

The emergence of physically demarcated "fortresses of production" in western Burkina Faso in the last couple of years does not simply imply a limitation of extractive relations to the concessionary sites alone.[100] While mining infrastructures are equipped with fences and monitored by strict access regimes, the question of how to include the local population into mining life has been a pivotal concern of corporate enactments across hierarchies. Within corporations, CSR departments are certainly the institutional arenas where "corporate citizenship" becomes most vividly negotiated. CSR agents are permanently acting within, between and upon different sites – mainly "the mine" and "the community". By the very nature of their work assignment that requires decisions made inside and outside the corporate fence, CSR agents are seen as the "main

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100 See Hönke, *Transnational Pockets of Territoriality*, pp. 20–21.

interface" between company and community concerns and interests.[101] They are entitled and required to leave the enclosed spaces of the concession sites in order to enact the corporation. In western Burkina Faso, these "personizations" and "enactments" of corporations entailed different concepts of community engagement.[102] It notably comprised the enactment of "corporate citizenship" in the case of Roxgold, and of "building strong relationships and proactively engaging in dialogue with local communities and institutions, as well as the government at a local, regional, and national level" for Endeavour Mining.[103] In doing so, CSR agents had to fulfil ambivalent tasks of engagement. While they had to explain to local populations that "the mine cannot be responsible for everything", they simultaneously were seen as the intermediaries for all forms of advocating the "community case" within the corporation.[104]

CSR agents are required to translate corporate responsibility and citizenship paradigms into concrete CSR policies. In so doing, they have to "draw" functional lines concerning corporate areas of responsibility. The present subchapter sheds light on how these lines become contested internally between CSR agents and the mine management, and within the CSR departments. It specifically engages with CSR agents' specific spatial subjectivities as being at once "insiders" and "outsiders" of both, corporations and communities.[105] As they have to enact at once connection and disconnection to local communities and authorities, they become specifically involved in corporate boundary- and responsibility-making. The mere fact that (at least some) offices of the community relations (CSR) departments at both mine sites were located outside the perimeter fence, already hints to a distinctive physical and social location of CSR agents within modern business corporations. In practice, however, interactions between CSR agents and local populations were often limited to well-defined and scheduled instances of company-community interaction. The CSR Department of Endeavour Mining was not located in the urban centre of Houndé but adjacent to the mine site. To reach the department premises usually required at least a car or motorbike, and using the road leading to the CSR Department (and the concession site) required the wearing of a helmet, which at the time of research was an uncommon practice in western Burkina Faso. In Bagassi, the company occasionally pointed to the existence of a CSR office in the village of Bagassi. Yet the office was rarely open during my own research stays and community

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101 Kemp and Owen, *Community Relations and Mining*, p. 524.

102 See Golub, *Leviathans at the Gold Mine*; Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*.

103 Endeavour Mining Corporation, *2018 Sustainability Report*, p. 17.

104 See Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*.

105 See ibid., pp. 39–40.

affairs were usually managed in the CSR office within the perimeter fence. When the vice-mayor of Bagassi aimed to address the CSR Department with an "urgent" demand in September 2017, he was stopped at the access control point at the perimeter fence. Since he had no appointment with any of the CSR personal, the latter did not receive him in their premises. Spatial proximity, transparency, and the "personization" of the mine as a "corporate citizen" must thus be seen as compromised by the very infrastructures and access regimes of the compound, and by well-defined and formalized arenas of interaction prescribing company-community interactions.

Nevertheless, in contrast to other corporate agents, CSR personnel of both mine sites physically transgressed corporate-community boundaries on a daily basis. Different CSR agents left the concessionary site at least once a day to meet community representatives, measure and collect environmental data, or to observe the advancement of CSR projects and programmes in the nearby villages and towns. Their activities were documented and monitored through specific stakeholder engagements plans, newsletter and notice boards distributed locally, corporate-wide sustainability reports, or through online activities.[106] Houndé Gold Operation (HGO) started to run a proper Facebook page in February 2017 where the CSR staff regularly made their visits and activities to, within and for the local community available to a local, national and global public. These forms of "rhetorical citizenship", however, became enacted differently between those who Paula Butler has called "global mining professionals" and their local and "local-local" colleagues in CSR departments.[107] The two studied CSR departments in Houndé and Bagassi comprised between five and ten people ranging from expatriate and national executives, to a number of local employees with different ties to the adjacent communities. Generally speaking, CSR sections at the two mine sites only included a small number of actual residents of the locality. Whilst having extended family ties in Bagassi and Houndé, CSR agents often returned from Ouagadougou or Bobo-Dioulasso to their native villages and towns due to their recruitment at the mine site. This was particularly the case for the Yaramoko mine in the municipality of Bagassi, where the primary education enrolment rate was estimated at only 49.4 per cent in 2017 and few secondary

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106 See Endeavour Mining Corporation, *2018 Sustainability Report*, p. 19; Roxgold Inc., *Mining High Grade Gold in Burkina Faso*, p. 69.

107 Butler, *Colonial Extractions*, p. 163; E. Hoff-Clausen and Ø. Ihlen, "The Rhetorical Citizenship of Corporations in the Digital Age", in: A. Adi, D. Crowther, G. Grigore (eds.), *Corporate Social Responsibility in the Digital Age*, Bingley: Emerald, 2015, pp. 17–37; Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception*.

education institutions existed.[108] The low level of skills and education to be found locally has been one of the main reasons for corporate managers to recruit even most of the "local-local" CSR staff outside of Bagassi (see Chapter 6).

For the executive CSR positions, corporations preferentially relied on expatriate staff or national employees with a certain experience in CSR work. Expatriate CSR agents often had a "development" and "social science" background and there were significant overlaps and social mobilities in place between the "global NGO world" and that of CSR practitioners.[109] The European or American CSR or Sustainability executives of HGO and Roxgold I have encountered during my research either had a background in NGO, consultancy, or government work. National CSR workers had often already gained experiences in CSR tasks during the exploration phase of the same projects or in similar positions in other mining corporations. According to the accounts of corporate agents and personal observations in the field, French speaking expatriate CSR employees were preferably and strategically engaged during the exploration and construction phase of mine sites. This is mainly due to the large presence of Anglophone company staff in this period. Having few socio-cultural ties to their working environments, they would otherwise not be able to communicate with local stakeholders, as a CSR executive stated in February 2018. This (partially) explains why Houndé Gold's CSR Department was directed by a European women (Sylvie) during the construction phase of the mine, and taken over by a national (Souleymane) as soon as the company entered its exploitation phase.

Managing Expectations from Within and from Without

Unlike other corporate agents, CSR practitioners are engaged in negotiations and struggles that constantly involve corporate and community interests. The task of both reforming corporate capitalism and "apologizing" for capitalism is inscribed in the everyday practice of company-community relations.[110] As illustrated in previous sections, they strive to overcome popular perceptions of mining corporations operating as "diplomatic enclaves". Thus, CSR agents occupy particular positions in the dialectical processes of opening and enclosure in concession-making. In their daily actions of spatializing corporate responsibility, they are confronted by expectations from "within" (their executive management)

108 K. Reipas, R. Hairsine and A. Caitlyn, *Technical Report for the Yaramoko Gold Mine*, p. 171.

109 See Kemp, *Community Relations in the Global Mining Industry*, p. 3.

110 Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*, p. 66.

and "without" (the communities they are interacting with). Are they ultimately able to "disenclave" what is often thought and prescribed as two distinct pairs, "the mine" and "the community"?[111]

While all interviewed CSR practitioners confirmed that their corporate management is committed to principles of CSR, local content promotion and sustainable development, some of them described their own tasks within the corporation as "binary" endeavours. During more personal conversations outside the Houndé concession site, Stephanie, a white female CSR agent, emphasized in March 2017 that all mining-related problems and complaints are directed to the CSR Department and that people are never fully satisfied with the compromises they attempt to generate between company and community interests: "it is impossible to please all interested parties". The great majority of expatriate employees of the mine, she stated, would not care about socio-political conditions and conflicts. When referring to the adjacent town of 150,000 inhabitants, they would often speak of "the village". With a few exceptions, the goal of construction workers would be simply to finish the construction of the mine site on time. Generally, they would simply not intervene in the affairs of the CSR Department, especially when the design of CSR programmes and projects is at stake. However, the CSR Department is highly dependent on a range of company executives who are responsible for the allocation of an appropriate budget line for community development programmes.

Investigating how CSR, CC and sustainability as "corporate oxymorons" are enacted in the concessions eventually reveals how global mining capitalism as a project is made up spatially and temporally by a range of different actors with divergent interests.[112] The parent companies of Burkinabè subsidiaries usually adhere to a number of global voluntary initiatives or guiding frameworks, including the UN Sustainable Development Goals, the ISO 45001 best industry practices or the IFC Social and Environmental Performance Standards.[113] As long as the resources are not extracted, however, the site management is reluctant to put money into community affairs since they are themselves highly dependent on the money of investors and creditors. The investment community, on the other hand, would often have "no idea what happens on the ground", as Stephanie stated on another occasion in October 2018. Therefore, CSR agents struggle to receive an appropriate CSR budget during the exploration and construction phase by their executive management. If not for the sake of the abovementioned frameworks, the technical staff of a mine reportedly rarely understands

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111 See Golub, *Leviathans at the Gold Mine*.
112 See Benson and Kirsch, *Corporate Oxymorons*.
113 Endeavour Mining Corporation, *2018 Sustainability Report*, p. 10; Roxgold Inc., *2018 Sustainability Summary*, p. 4.

the sense of measures such as the realization of basic surveys (*enquêtes de base*) at the beginning of a project. Often, they consider such procedures as wasted money since it does not correspond to their understanding of "highest impact, highest visibility". Generally, there is little will to invest in the social license to operate at the beginning of projects, or if all goes well, as Stephanie stated.[114]

Due to the temporal nature of mining projects, ranging from exploration and construction, to extraction and (post)closure, the enactment of corporate citizenship is shaped by a multiplicity of negotiations and their disruption. The processes of transferring knowledge about community affairs must be seen as deeply influenced by "promises" that have been made by locals, nationals and expatriate corporate agents during the different phases of a mining project. Local populations and mining professionals alike struggle with different corporate forms (junior companies, consultancies and contractors, mid-tiers and majors) engaged in the project cycle and their different enactments of corporate responsibility. At the beginning of every mining project and in order to better understand the local context, corporate managers usually hire NGOs or consultancies to do community surveys.[115] Several interviewees stated that usually few things are written down during this phase, and statements are later often interpreted as promises made by "the mine". In Toronto a former CSR manager described this process as the following:

> When I started at [big globally operating mining company], one of the big things was to get a social obligations register at every site and a grievance mechanism at every site. [. . .] if you think back [. . .] [for] a site that's like five years into operations let's say, and you have to go back and figure out the things that everybody has ever promised to the community from the beginning of exploration. It was intense!

The CSR agents' binary bargaining position is further reinforced by the fact that they occupy a position of weakness rather than strength within company hierarchies.[116] Marina Welker claimed, for instance, that there is a tendency of corporate executives to identify more closely with their own domain of expertise or their discipline (e.g., geology, metallurgy, investor relations, security, and human resources) than "community affairs". As with other "ameliorative disciplines" such as Health, Safety and Environment, CSR and their practitioners are under constant

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114 See Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*, p. 41.

115 L. Zandvliet and M. B. Anderson, *Getting It Right*: *Making Corporate-Community Relations Work*, Sheffield, U.K: Greenleaf, 2009, p. 5; M. L. Dougherty, "Boom Times for Technocrats? How Environmental Consulting Companies Shape Mining Governance", *The Extractive Industries and Society* 6 (2019) 2, pp. 443–453.

116 Dougherty, *The Global Gold Mining Industry*, p. 344; Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*, pp. 39–42.

pressure to justify their activities. While CSR agents are constantly reframing and reforming company boundaries and interests, their main task is to "responsibi-lize" the corporation. In doing so, they are in a constant struggle to acquire authority, resources and legitimacy. Because of their contingent identification as and practice of working both for and against the corporation, Welker stated, they partly see themselves as "outsiders" within the corporate structures.[117] In Burkina Faso and Canada, interviewees confirmed the persistence of different professional cultures within corporations, and therefore, diverging degrees of engagement with non-technical fields of intervention. Some spoke of a "clash of different worldviews" within the corporate form, others of an "engineer mentality" among mining executives. Confronted by a situation of local employees demanding higher salaries in the Yaramoko mine, a General Manager strategically distanced himself from these "social" affairs and struggles. An interviewee cited him stating that he prefers working with rocks because they are predictable, while peoples' behaviour is not. His unwillingness to more profoundly invest into community affairs was later depicted as one of the main reasons for the occurrence of community unrest in September and October 2018 (see Chapter 5). Nevertheless, interviewees also discerned a new generation of technical managers of the mine sites who are now trained in such issues as community affairs, more willing to learn than their predecessors, and occasionally specifically engaged in local content promotion.

On the other side of the corporate fence, CSR agents were simultaneously confronted by numerous expectations of local populations and authorities. "It is always and every time", stated Sylvie, another white female CSR executive in Houndé, while she described how she was handling an ever increasing number of requests. Many of these requests, as CSR agents emphasized, would actually not fall into the legal areas of responsibility of corporations. Such was the case for the financing of multi-stakeholder partnerships supposed to control corporate behaviour (see Chapter 3), or the construction and maintenance of public infrastructures such as roads. Yet CSR agents in Bagassi and Houndé highlighted that the corporation's enactment as a "responsible neighbour" or "corporate citizen" also comprises areas of responsibility for which no legal requirement exist. Through leveraging specific requests – giving importance to some while abdicating other – CSR agents eventually (re)negotiated spatial responsibilities within concessionary regimes and beyond. While engaging with and responding to ever demanding requests of local authorities in Houndé, they also (re)made the boundaries of public and private spheres of responsibility. Concerning

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117 Ibid., p. 42.

these sorts of public requests to private entities, the CSR executive Sylvie reported in September 2017 on a landslide that happened one month before in a small-scale granite quarry, causing the death of a young boy. The granite quarry was located on one of Endeavour Mining's exploration concessions and not far from the actual mine site in Houndé. Yet it did not target Houndé Gold Operation's extraction zone. "And we were the first ones to be called to send a machine in order to rescue [the body]. That is only one example. Because we are here, we are at their disposal." She went on to explain how the CSR Department had at first refused to send a machine because it did not target their (spatial) responsibilities. Afterwards, the management received a requisition from the provincial authority to send a machine, which they finally accepted.

What CSR agents often perceived as forms of extortion but necessary to gain and maintain a social license to operate, also points to a bunch of moral and legal responsibilities of mining corporations. Concerning the same landslide instance, local political and juridical authorities perceived it as "normal" that the multinational mining company in their region, province or municipality should be held accountable in such instances. A prosecutor in Boromo explained in February 2018 that after the incident happened, a first request was directed towards the local *gendarmerie*. Yet the fire department had no appropriate techniques at their disposal to save the dead body from the quarry. In this case, Burkinabè law would stipulate that a private company could be requested for technical help. According to the prosecutor, the corporate intervention would further reflect "the responsibility a company has to society at large". This example clearly shows that the boundaries of what the corporation is and what this corporation is held responsible for are not fixed. In specific local settings, CSR agents have to constantly (re)negotiate these questions. By the very nature of their job, at least, they cannot be fully disconnected from the local contexts they are working in, and the social actors they are working with. Or as a CSR practitioner put it, "If you do community relations [work], you have to know the *six mètres* (six metres) of the village."[118]

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[118] In Burkina Faso, the expression *six mètres* refers to small laterite roads that, theoretically, are six meters wide.

Professional Subjectivities and Mobilities

The inner workings of CSR offices were, likewise other corporate structures, highly demarcated by social and racial hierarchies. Given the presence of expatriate, national and local workers in these departments, the daily negotiations of north-south and national-local relations were key to the different enactments of the mine. CSR agents were not only permanently acting within, between and upon "the community" and "the mine" but often dealing with different degrees of local involvement due to their subjectivities as expatriate, national or local employees of the company. As Marina Welker has shown in detail, around mine sites, a single "local" individual might not be able to follow the same principles as "global" CSR executives in the corporate headquarters.[119] Due to their "heavier" involvement, this individual might be subject much more often to social expectations at a mine site. In this regard, Welker uses the concept of Peter Redfield who described the "light" engagement of expatriate *Médecins sans Frontières* (MSF) volunteers as opposed to the "heavy" involvement of national and local employees of MSF.[120] Given the unequal mobility and other social hierarchies between CSR executives in head offices and CSR practitioners in the field, the former could far more easily maintain a certain social distance from the consequences of their actions. In doing so, CSR executives often criticized patronage models of CSR where the company is seen as "a pot of money". Instead, they engaged with discourses of sustainable development, which comply with their notions of long-term development and which target a post-closure era of the mine site. As Welker illustrated, such sustainability metrics are nevertheless not always at odds with local obligations and commitments. "The interests of the corporation and its stakeholders look different depending on whether one is 'light' and invested in producing universal, humanitarian benefits (e.g., improved human development indicators) or 'heavy,', more directly invested in social relations with, and subject to the claims of those who stand to suffer or benefit from a mining project."[121]

Looking at negotiation processes in and around CSR departments in western Burkina Faso, I simultaneously rely on Welker's argument while also extending it. The different enactments and forms of "personizing" and "enacting" the mine, I argue, also shape the inner workings of CSR departments. Beyond questions of different salaries within the departments, the issue of potential kin

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119 Ibid., pp. 63–64.
120 P. Redfield, "The Unbearable Lightness of Ex-Pats: Double Binds of Humanitarian Mobility", *Cultural Anthropology* 27 (2012) 2, pp. 358–382.
121 Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*, p. 64.

obligations was obviously at stake, even though the Houndé and Bagassi-based CSR agents were rather reluctant to discuss these issues in public. A local CSR agent in Bagassi stated, for instance, how receiving phone calls and requests for employment at the mine site is an integral part of his daily work. Another relatively newly employed CSR agent in Houndé expressed anxieties with his own positionality of functioning as an "intermediary" between the executive management and local populations. He had the impression of occasionally becoming "a liar", faced with the needs of communities he himself is part of.

"Never ending demands" seem to represent a common feature CSR practitioners face and have to deal with during their daily work. These "demands", and the resulting frustration, are also mentioned in Zandvliet and Andersons' book *Getting it Right: Making Corporate-Community Relations Work*, which one of my interviewees in November 2017 described as sort of a "bible" in the CSR community and for CSR practitioners.[122] Within corporations, however, exist different abilities to disentangle oneself from these demands: "Materially heavy and socially light, the ex-patriate appears ever contingent, swept away by distant concerns. Materially light and socially heavy, the national staff member remains stolidly set, a repetitive actor in local history." While stating this, Redfield himself admits that this claim "may remain to ephemerally neat to anchor analysis, but it provides a suggestive set of metaphors to illustrate different conditions of mobility".[123] The already mentioned temporal dimension of mining projects not only involves different "promises" made along the project cycle. The latter become reinforced through "loyalty conflicts" due to the local embeddedness of corporate agents and their "socially thick" involvement in community affairs. Local consultancy workers and CSR agents work for a corporation while being simultaneously confronted with a range of expectations and obligations from their communities. According to an Ouagadougou-based consultant, this would result in "permanent conflicts" and micro-promises of which (expatriate) corporate executives are seldom aware. Thus, local agents often have to fulfil a double role: "intermediaries" acting out corporate interests and "mediators" who might play an independent and causal role in village conflicts as they are themselves members of the community.[124]

In fact, local populations often perceived Burkinabè CSR practitioners (in contrast to their expatriate colleagues) as the "ambassadors of the mine". These prescriptions had ambivalent outcomes for CSR agents' positionalities. On the

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122 Zandvliet and Anderson, *Getting It Right*.
123 Redfield, *The Unbearable Lightness of Ex-Pats*, p. 360.
124 Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*, p. 23.

one hand, they were often able to expand their power positions within a given society due to their corporate position.[125] On the other hand, they struggled with the common equalization of themselves with the decision-makers of a mining project, because in reality they were not. The phenomenological distancing of their superiors from "community affairs" or socio-political questions more generally reinforced their own CEO-like ascriptions among local populations. During stakeholder consultations, CSR agents were sent to represent the mine and therefore often functioned as a "filter" for company-community interaction of all kinds. In turn, the "ambassadors of the mine" were often responsibilized for any company-community interaction. Local candidates for security posts, for example, were said to name the CSR director in job interviews when asked about the head of the mine. The "ambassadors" also became one of the main targets of community unrest, even though their decision-making power tended to be limited within corporate structures. Other claimants, however, refused to negotiate with the relatively "powerless" CSR departments and claimed negotiations with the site or national management of the company (see Chapter 5).

According to her own experience in CSR work, Stephanie argued that expatriate employees are sometimes "better placed" to occupy positions in CSR departments. They would usually be less entangled with the different interests and claims of local people. This statement not only points to structural differences in terms of (potential) kin relations in a given locality, but also to different degrees of entanglement in socio-political contexts and conflicts more generally. While expatriate CSR practitioners obviously also dealt with many frustrations and moral difficulties, they were able to mobilize simultaneous feelings of belonging and distancing for their white self-making.[126] This does not mean that expatriate CSR agents were not able to develop social ties and a sense of solidarity to the host communities of industrial mining projects. However, they did not face the same problems as locals who were "operating locally" since their involvement in socio-political affairs was relatively low. Beyond ethnicity affiliations at play, attachment to place and history differed for national and expatriate workers mainly due to different conditions of mobility.[127] According to Peter Redfield, mobility also matters for the flow of knowledge within an organization and a "state of disconnection that allows ex-pats to stand strategically outside local alliances".[128] National and local CSR agents in Bagassi particularly emphasized the importance of good relationships with local political authorities

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125 See ibid., p. 23.
126 See Hendriks, *A Darker Shade of White*.
127 Redfield, *The Unbearable Lightness of Ex-Pats*, p. 363.
128 Ibid., p. 370.

without which, a local CSR agent stated, "mining projects cannot work". In their daily interactions, they cautiously navigated between the different interests at stake, especially the conflictive relationships between municipal and provincial authorities (see Chapter 3). Expatriate CSR employees did so as well, but to different degrees. They were simultaneously engaged in strategic disentanglements by claiming a label of (political) "neutrality" of their CSR policies. As her colleague Stephanie, Sylvie suspected her Burkinabè colleague Souleymane of acting as a "patron" in company-community relations, and in so doing, of bringing socio-political affairs into the CSR Department. As a white European employee of a multinational corporation, however, Sylvie was able to distance herself to a certain extent from the context in which she interacts. A state of disconnection, which she framed as "neutrality": "Me I am neutral, I don't have any interest in political affairs." Yet, according to her own accounts, it was notably the political "heavy" environment of the mining project in Houndé that provoked her decision to leave HGO after the construction phase of the mine was completed. In September 2017, she stated:

> After all I will go for another project, which is still a project of Endeavour Mining, but it is part of a zone with less inhabitants [. . .] it is not an urban municipality like that, not a capital city of a province. It is just a town, which is kind of lost in the middle of the country. I don't think that it will always be easy, but here, this urban setting, capital city of a province and big city I find this just heavy. And I don't know if I could continue [to work] here for several years.

In October 2017, Sylvie started working for another Endeavour mining project in Mali. In the meantime, Stephanie had also left Houndé for a new regional CSR coordination position in Endeavour Mining's Abidjan operations office. Souleymane, who has been involved in the mining project since the beginning of the firm's exploration works back in 2003, was the only executive employee of the CSR Department who accompanied the company's transition from exploration and development to the early mining phase. The next chapter will discuss in more detail, how his layoff eventually figured as a main claim of protestors in early 2018.

Conclusion

Constructing citizenship (and citizens' responsibilities) from near and at-a-distance is a complex and ever-ambivalent endeavour. Various actors, such as investors, company executives and CSR agents are involved in enacting logics of opening and enclosure, of entanglement and disentanglement and of (de)territorialization.

In the introductory chapter of their book dedicated to "corporate managers who are responsible for company operations in societies that are poor and politically unstable", the CSR practitioners Luc Zandvliet and Mary Andersons emphasized that a spatial "enclavement" of mining operations today does not prevent the latter from having societal and environmental impacts: "Even where corporate operations are separated from conflict by fences and guards, and even where operations are isolated, offshore, or located in remote areas, they have impacts on people's lives."[129] Looking at different enactments of corporate citizenship in Burkina Faso and beyond, this dogma seems to have emerged as a prominent feature of mining capitalism and becomes enacted in multi-scalar processes of concession-making. Yet these same concession-making practices continue to imply different practices of disentangling "the production of profit from the place in which it happens to find itself".[130]

Several authors have emphasized in recent years how materiality shapes the social practices through which resource extraction and regulation is achieved.[131] Looking at the interplay of materiality and discourse within the extractive sector reveals how extractive spaces are co-produced through "processes of extraction, and the nature of the mineral itself".[132] The logics of opening and enclosing space for extraction, as discussed in the chapter, rely on the spatial fixity of mineral resources in the ground that require specific techniques and infrastructures of extraction. Simultaneously, the enactment of corporate citizenship implies "concessions" in that it determines the degree to which enclosing space disentangles large-scale extraction from local and national development projects.[133] Through a (corporate) actor-centred lens, the chapter eventually revealed multi-scalar practices of drawing "lines for corporate responsibility".[134]

The practices of making resources "investible" illustrate how natural resources become "valued" and appropriated.[135] In so doing, international investors continue to imagine extractive spaces in the Global South as "empty but

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129 Zandvliet and Anderson, *Getting It Right*, p. 6.

130 Appel, *Offshore Work*, p. 442.

131 See, for example, K. Bakker and G. Bridge, "Material Worlds? Resource Geographies and the 'Matter of Nature'", *Progress in Human Geography* 30 (2006) 1, pp. 5–27; G. Bridge, "Material Worlds: Natural Resources, Resource Geography and the Material Economy", *Geography Compass* 3 (2009) 3, pp. 1217–1244.

132 E. Gilberthorpe and E. Papyrakis, "The Extractive Industries and Development: The Resource Curse at the Micro, Meso and Macro Levels", *The Extractive Industries and Society* 2 (2015) 2, pp. 381–390, at 381; Ey and Sherval, *Exploring the Minescape*.

133 See Appel, *Offshore Work*; Ferguson, *Seeing Like an Oil Company*.

134 Banks, *Activities of TNCs in Extractive Industries in Asia and the Pacific*, p. 48.

135 See Bridge, *Material Worlds*; Côte and Korf, *Making Concessions*.

full", thus (re)inscribing those spaces in the image of the commodity.[136] Their investment practices particularly draw on different notions of risk. In doing so, "risks run by capital" concerning their geological assets largely precede risks local people may encounter due to large-scale mining in investment decisions.[137] However, in addition to external factors (such as global commodity prices, shareholder expectations and project financing requirements), global investment decisions are also deeply shaped by the legal and regulatory requirements of host states.[138] While the spatial imaginations of corporate executives in the mining concessions tend to perpetuate their own moral claims to extractive spaces in the Global South, they are confronted to the presence of national and local claims to land and resources.

The second and third sections of the chapter have discussed how "corporate citizenship" becomes enacted in the dialectical processes of opening and enclosure in concession-making. The example of Roxgold, a Canadian mid-tier producer operating an underground mine in western Burkina Faso, has illustrated how constructing a corporate status of "exceptionality" in terms of company-community relations is entangled with the different infrastructures of mine compounds. In practice, the "socially thick" interactions with neighbouring communities and engagements to enact the corporations as a "good citizen" are compromised by logics of enclosure and securitization of assets and infrastructures. Essential elements of the corporate enclave, as Hannah Appel has highlighted, are not only physical demarcations via walls and systems of security clearance. Through discursive and phenomenological distancing, specific mining professionals remove themselves from "local social, legal, political, and environmental entanglements".[139] The prevailing aspirations of white CSR practitioners to stay out of politics and social issues in given contexts eventually resemble the discursive distancing practices of engineers and technical staff who only want to "dig a hole in the ground" and leave to another place for another hole. Yet the example of the role of CSR agents (and of global investors) in concession-making points to the fact that logics of opening and enclosure are not only shaped from within enclaved mine infrastructures. Transcending corporate-community boundaries on a daily basis, the inner bargaining processes in CSR departments point to extended forms of responsibility and its abdication depending on degrees of "global" or "local" positionalities.

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136 Bridge, *Resource Triumphalism*.

137 Luning, *The Future of Artisanal Miners from a Large-Scale Perspective*, p. 70.

138 Owen and Kemp, *Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement*, p. 481.

139 Appel, *Offshore Work*, p. 693.