1 Introduction: (Re)Spatializing Corporate Responsibility under the Global Condition

"Wir sind nicht diejenigen, die am Berg kratzen" (we're not those scratching the mountain). These were the words a marketing and sales manager used to point to the limits of incorporating concepts of "sustainability" and "corporate social responsibility" (CSR) into corporate culture. His company, with its headquarters in Leipzig, Eastern Germany, supplies heavy systems and equipment for mining, bulk material handling, minerals processing, and air environmental industries to mining projects operating worldwide. It claims it is "a leading solutions provider to the global mining industry".[1] The Germany-based supply company, which during the past 200 years has been involved in East-German lignite mining, can be seen as an integral part of extractive production chains on a global scale. In 2018, the main export market for the company's heavy machinery was Chili's copper industry. In the near future, as corporate executives highlighted, the company intends to supply Rio Tinto's Simandou project in Guinea that has the potential to become the biggest high-grade iron ore mine in the world.

Months after the visit with students of my Master's seminar to the corporate offices in Leipzig in mid-2018, I tried to make sense of the manager's statement and how it connects to my own research on industrial gold mining in Burkina Faso. Since 2008, the Simandou project in Guinea is not only famous for its resource abundance, but also for one of the hugest corruption scandals in global mining governance and an enduring dispute on questions of ownership and benefit-sharing. It exemplifies that corporate ethics are at stake even long before (if at all) someone "scratches the mountain".[2] The statement of the German manager, in turn, not only points to a negation of corporate responsibility more generally, but also to its spatial limitations. The manager stated that the degree to which corporate policies could adapt to ethical principles in a context of large-scale

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1 Takraf Tenova, "About Us: Company", https://www.takraf.tenova.com/about-us/company/ (accessed 28 September 2019).

2 In 2013, *The New Yorker* has published a detailed piece of investigative journalism on the dubious deals between the Israeli billionaire Benny Steinmetz and the Guinean government under Lansana Conté from 2008 onwards. In early 2021, the disputes are not over yet. See P. R. Keefe, "Buried Secrets: How an Israeli Billionaire Seized Control of Guinea's Greatest Treasure", *The New Yorker*, 1 July 2013; F. Urech, "Simandou: Chronologie des Kampfs um Afrikas 'Rohstoff-Mekka'" [Simandou: Chronology of the struggle for Africa's 'raw materials mecca'], *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 8 January 2021.

extraction would be limited to the company's business areas of innovation and development. This mostly meant for him to invest in machinery and infrastructures that potentially limit the ecological footprint of large-scale mining operations. One out of many examples he cited was the delivery of dust suppressing machines to multinational corporations[3] operating in the Global South. For him, to adapt to global regimes of sustainability and responsibility was thus first and foremost to be seen as a new market requirement due to the changing attitude of clients. The company's own social responsibility, on the other hand, would be primarily directed towards employees in Germany and the respective local or national socio-political context. Despite being part of a larger multinational corporate structure with subsidiaries around the globe, the Leipzig-based manager perceived the spatial extent of corporate responsibility as limited. Form his perspective, the commitment "to environmental and social sustainability in all our business interactions" eventually did not extend to the places that are the final destinations of the company's mining machinery.[4]

As a global medium-sized company with firm regional roots, corporate managers are, however, deeply involved in scalar dimensions of corporate practice. While the delivered machinery and the simple fact of digging holes in the ground may have huge implications for adjacent populations to large-scale mining projects in the Global South, corporate care and responsibility apparently first focuses on the people closest to the company's (or their subsidiaries') respective headquarters. It only extends gradually, if at all, to other geographical scales. The opening statement of the sales manager ("we're not those scratching the mountain") ultimately points to what Doreen Massey calls different "spatialities" or different "geographies of responsibility".[5] She describes the "Russian doll geography of care and responsibility" predominant in Western societies as a structuring and mapping model according to which we have our first responsibilities towards those nearest too us. In these accounts, "the local" is socially constructed as exclusively meaningful in

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3 I subsequently use the following working definition for "transnational" or "multinational corporations" in accordance with the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights. Those refer to economic entities "operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities operating in two or more countries – whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or country of activity, and whether taken individually or collectively". United Nations, "Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights" (2003), p. 7.

4 Takraf Tenova, *About Us*.

5 D. Massey, "Geographies of Responsibility", *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography* 86 (2004) 1, pp. 5–18, at 5.

contrast to an abstract outside "global".[6] The attempt of Massey's analysis is to think space as thoroughly relational, multiple, and in process, thus overcoming opposing perceptions about abstract spaces (of the global economy) and concrete places of the everyday (social life).[7] The present book aims to contribute to these debates in post-structuralist geography through an ethnographic study of emplacements of global capitalism.

5,000 kilometres south of Leipzig in the landlocked country of Burkina Faso, where most of empirical research for the present book has been conducted between October 2016 and November 2018, company officials certainly acknowledged that their large-scale mining activities may have huge impacts on neighbouring populations. The negative ones, in their view, have to be compensated by projects of social and ethical engagement, often summarized under the umbrella term of the "social license to operate" (SLO).[8] According to mining professionals in Bagassi in (south-)western Burkina Faso, the enactment of the corporation as a transparent and responsible citizen in areas of extraction would be one important means to achieve this goal. In doing so, mine managers emphasized their efforts in challenging popular perceptions about mining corporations as being "enclaves diplomatiques" (diplomatic enclaves). This, at least, was one of the statements they made during a mine tour for visitors in September 2017 as part of the company's public outreach and stakeholder dialogue efforts. Do such rhetorical claims and their enactments through CSR programmes eventually account for disentangling "enclaves of mineral-extractive investment" on the African continent that are "normally tightly integrated with the head offices of multinational corporations and metropolitan centres, but sharply walled off from their own national societies (often literally walled, with bricks and razor wire)"?[9]

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6 Ibid., p. 9.

7 See D. Massey, *For Space*, London: SAGE, 2005.

8 The industry term "social license to operate" (SLO) developed to ensure smooth business operations has met huge criticism in recent years, not only in terms of its internal risk-orientation but also for failing to promote sustainable development and actual stakeholder engagement. SLO suggests a discrete and binary outcome of seeking permission and fails to adequately address the complexity of social landscapes with diverse stakeholders and competing interests. See J. R. Owen and D. Kemp, "Social Licence and Mining: A Critical Perspective", *Resources Policy* 38 (2013) 1, pp. 29–35; M. Brueckner and M. Eabrasu, "Pinning down the Social License to Operate (SLO): The Problem of Normative Complexity", *Resources Policy* 59 (2018), pp. 217–226; J. A. Delborne, A. E. Kokotovich, and J. E. Lunshof, "Social License and Synthetic Biology: The Trouble with Mining Terms", *Journal of Responsible Innovation* 7 (2020) 3, pp. 280–297.

9 Ferguson, *Seeing Like an Oil Company*, p. 379.

During fieldwork in Burkina Faso, partly conducted from within and beyond the corporate fence (that literally exists), the picture revealed itself as more complex. I found myself constantly confronted with the multiple ways different company, state and community actors made sense of the perceived negative and positive correlations between natural resource endowment and socio-economic development. A sustainability manager of the before-mentioned Canadian-based multinational company in Bagassi, for instance, explained the firm's ethical commitments by referring to a "cupcake". As profit-maximizing actors, they have, in the first place, to monitor risks that could impede or slow down their extractive activities. Second, they are held accountable by not only their shareholders but also a public audience in and beyond Burkina Faso. Third, the company aims to leave a sustainable footprint after its departure in the host communities of mining projects. While companies are not legally required to do so, this would represent the "cherry" on the cupcake of their corporate engagement. However, as in the case of the Leipzig-based supplying company, their ethical commitments have moral, political, and legal limitations. It would ultimately be the government of Burkina Faso that decides whether large-scale mining projects will proceed or not. Where the national legislation provides no legal frameworks (such as for the displacement and resettlement of artisanal miners), companies are obliged to develop their own standards or to refer to transnational norms of "responsible mining" as provided by the World Bank Group (WGB).

In one form or another, the cupcake rhetoric has been a steady companion to my research. In corporate presentations to their investors and shareholders in Toronto, mining officials emphasized the range of expectations from multiple stakeholders on different scales they have to manage (shareholders, employees, governments, local communities, etc.). Here again, the cupcake figured as a symbol for a prioritization of concerns (see Figure 1.1).[10] That different areas and scales of responsibility exist, is not yet meaning that they are all equally valued and pursued by those who define them. The present book explores these processes of (de)valuation and the impacts they have on company-state-community relations by pointing the different and often competing spatialities of responsibility in a globalized mining industry.

Attempts to (re)spatialize corporate responsibility do not happen in a vacuum. In order to encounter its crisis tendencies, capitalism could and cannot survive without being geographically expansionary.[11] Under the global condition,

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10 Own compilation retrieved from different corporate presentations.
11 D. Harvey, "Globalization and the 'Spatial' Fix", *geographische revue* (2001) 2, pp. 23–30; D. Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Figure 1.1: "Understanding various concerns": The corporate cupcake.

extractive capital is thus on a constant outlook for a "spatial fix" and entangled in dialectical processes of de- and reterritorialization. Accelerated cross-border flows and a "space-time compression" take place in parallel with an apparently anachronistic reterritorialization of investment.[12] With growing demand for natural resources, resulting from the 2007/2008 international financial and debt crisis, flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) have increasingly reached "underdeveloped" regions in terms of large-scale mining. In recent years, Gavin Bridge has identified a "geographic shift" in global mining investment from mature targets toward selected deposits in the Global South.[13] Also owing to the liberalization of their mining legislations in the 1980s and 1990s, this has resulted in many African countries experiencing a particular surge of territorialized mining investment. The (apparent) abundance of mineral resources on the African continent led many

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12 Starting in the mid-eighteenth century, the global condition is characterized by accelerated cross-border flows, as well as the emergence of various actors seeking to control these flows, among them notably the territorial nation-state. See S. Marung and M. Middell, "The Re-Spatialization of the World as One of the Driving Dialectics Under the Global Condition", in: S. Marung, M. Middell (eds.), *Spatial Formats Under the Global Condition*, Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019, pp. 1–11, at 2; N. Brenner, "Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies", *Theory and Society* 28 (1999) 1, pp. 39–78; D. Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 2006 [1989]; M. Middell and K. Naumann, "Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization", *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010) 1, pp. 1–22; S. Sassen, "Introduction. Locating Cities on Global Circuits", in: S. Sassen (ed.), *Global Networks, Linked Cities*, New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 1–36.
13 G. Bridge, "Mapping the Bonanza: Geographies of Mining Investment in an Era of Neoliberal Reform", *The Professional Geographer* 3 (2004) 56, pp. 406–421.

investors and multinational corporations (MNCs) to see African countries as a "new frontier" for capital investment[14] or even the "last frontier of globalization".[15] Large-scale extractive activities span the globe and the history of large-scale mining often exceeds that of nation-states on the African continent. Yet space and time matter to a great extend for the processes and the governance of extraction. They are emplaced, "fixed" and context-specific insofar as they depend on the existence of specific subsoil mineral deposits.[16] At the national and local levels, the territorialization of mining investment is said to find expression in "uneven, variegated, and discontinuous spatial manifestations"; with tangible consequences for socio-economic developments.[17] Today forms of expansionary mining capitalism challenge former prevalent modes of production that in many areas of West Africa have been dominant for years or centuries, i.e., subsistence farming or artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM).[18]

To retrace Burkina Faso's recent evolvement as a destination of global mining investment allows us to uncover specific emplacements and embodiments of "global capitalism".[19] At the same time, an empirical study of this specific

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14 A. Ackah-Baidoo, "Enclave Development and 'Offshore Corporate Social Responsibility': Implications for Oil-Rich Sub-Saharan Africa", *Resources Policy* 37 (2012) 2, pp. 152–159, at 156; G. Hilson, "The Extractive Industries and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Introduction", *Resources Policy* 40 (2014), pp. 1–3, at 1.

15 N. R. Shrestha, W. I. Smith, and C. L. Evans, "Africa's Global Economic Integration and National Development: A Management Framework for Attracting FDI", *Journal of Management Policy and Practice* 11 (2010) 5, pp. 34–48, at 34.

16 Dicken, *Global Shift*, p. 396; K. Dietz, "Politics of Scale and Struggles over Mining in Colombia", in: B. Engels and K. Dietz (eds.), *Contested Extractivism, Society and the State: Struggles over Mining and Land*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 127–148; F. Martín, "Reimagining Extractivism: Insights from Spatial Theory", in: ibid., pp. 21–44; Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre, "Researching the Politics of Natural Resource Extraction: A New Conceptual and Methodological Approach", ESID Briefing Paper 9 (2014).

17 M. Himley, "Extractivist Geographies: Mining and Development in Late-Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth-Century Peru", *Latin American Perspectives* 46 (2019) 2, pp. 27–46, at 31; Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*.

18 See M. Bolay, "When Miners Become 'Foreigners': Competing Categorizations Within Gold Mining Spaces in Guinea", *Resources Policy* 40 (2014), pp. 117–127; S. Geenen, "Dispossession, Displacement and Resistance: Artisanal Miners in a Gold Concession in South-Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo", *Resources Policy* 40 (2014), pp. 90–99.

19 I use the term "global capitalism" as a working concept despite its controversial nature, normativity, and its emergence as a term of critique. The actor-centered approach of this book points to the existence of "varieties of capitalism" instead of one singular economic superstructure, organism, or system. However, beyond understanding its inherent contingency, it is equally important to critically investigate different sites, people, and processes that (re)produce capitalism as a powerful concept, project, and reality. The global mining economy is

mining boom during the past decade urges us to look beyond Burkina Faso in the conventional ethnographic sense.[20] The scalar organization of the global (mining) economy and its inherent power relations require that resources have to be made "investible" in order to make extraction feasible in countries of the Global South.[21] These processes involve a multiplicity of actors, places and scales. "Linking the upstream mineralisation with the downstream money"[22] entails local populations affected by mining-induced resettlement and displacement (MIDR) practices, as it involves national governments granting access to these deposits, and shareholders that invest their assets on stock markets in Toronto or Sydney. "The local" can thus not only be seen as a victim of globalization, nor does it always represent a place of resistance. Yet entrepreneurs of "the local" as a "scalar dimension of practices"[23] shape "the moments through which the global is constituted, invented, coordinated, produced".[24]

The spatial expansion of mining capitalism and the discovery of "Africa" or "Burkina Faso" as new destinations of investment also enlarge actual and potential geographies of corporate responsibility.[25] Reasons for this can generally

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emblematic for capitalism as a project (rather than a context in which things just happen). Under the header of globalized financial capitalism(s), actors enact the institutional economic underpinnings by emphasizing profit maintenance, expectation of higher future gains but also of speculation, credit, uncertainty, and risk. I therefore consider global mining capitalism as an ensemble and outcome of multiple socio-spatial practices of actors and groups of actors. See Appel, *The Licit Life of Capitalism*; H. James, "Finance Capitalism", in: J. Kocka and M. van der Linden (eds.), *Capitalism: The Reemergence of a Historical Concept*, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016, pp. 133–163; J. Kocka, *Capitalism: A Short History*, Jeremiah M. Riemer [trans.], Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016 [2013]; T. Welskopp, "Zukunft bewirtschaften: Überlegungen zu einer praxistheoretisch informierten Historisierung des Kapitalismus" [Managing the future: Reflections on a practice-theoretically informed historicization of capitalism], *Mittelweg* 1 (2017) 36, pp. 81–97.

20 Appel, *The Licit Life of Capitalism*, p. 4.
21 M. Côte and B. Korf, "Making Concessions: Extractive Enclaves, Entangled Capitalism and Regulative Pluralism at the Gold Mining Frontier in Burkina Faso", *World Development* 101 (2018), pp. 466–476.
22 N. Miskelly, "The International Mining Industry – Linking the Upstream Mineralisation with the Downstream Money" (2004), www.jorc.org/docs/miskelly3.pdf.
23 B. Mansfield, "Beyond Rescaling: Reintegrating the 'National' as a Dimension of Scalar Relations", *Progress in Human Geography* 29 (2005) 4, pp. 458–473, at 468.
24 Massey, *Geographies of Responsibility*, p. 11.
25 Matthias Middell has recently criticized the proliferation of spatial metaphors in human geography (such as "geographies of . . . "). I borrow the term "geographies of responsibilities" from Doreen Massey in order to account for the fragmented yet entangled geographies of mining capitalism and how actors of the global mining sector engage in specific scalar practices in relation to these geographies. I, however, attempt to avoid assumptions of "geographies" as

be interpreted as twofold and interrelated. Under the global condition, the authority of traditional spatial formats of mining governance, such as the nation-state, became re-calibrated. The introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) under the auspices of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in many African countries, for instance, gave rise to a shift in authority in mining governance from state to private actors.[26] Yet the past decades saw an increased attempt of governments around the world to (re)gain authority in mining governance and the evolvement of concepts like "resource nationalism" and "neo-extractivism".[27] Second, new regimes of voluntary codes of conduct and responsibility emerged in the global mining industry. Some authors have described these developments as an (apparent) "ethical turn in corporate capitalism".[28]

Through an anti-essentialist yet critical analysis of global capitalism, this book maps company, state, and community interactions in the Burkinabè gold mining sector. This mapping, however, is not static in nature. It eventually demonstrates how topics and sites of responsibility are struggled over. I mainly investigate the role of relevant actors in mining governance in Burkina Faso, discuss their social and political relationships to multiple spaces of responsibility and their involvement in producing specific spatialities of extraction. I argue that processes of (dis)enclaving are set up through various social practices:

anything flat, horizontal, or container-like. The analytical focus will thus be on how different actors practice responsibility through "orders of spacing and placing [. . .] 'spatialisations'" rather than assuming geographically-inscribed capabilities of these actors to do so. (R. Shields, *Spatial Questions*: *Cultural Topologies and Social Spatialisation*, London: SAGE, 2013, p. 1; M. Middell, "Raumformate – Bausteine in Prozessen der Neuverräumlichung" [Spatial formats – building blocks in processes of re-spatialization], Leipzig, Working Paper Series des SFB 1199 an der Universität Leipzig 14 [2019], p. 4; J. Allen, *Topologies of Power*: *Beyond Territory and Networks*, London: Routledge, 2016, p. 39).

26 B. Campbell (ed.), *Mining in Africa*: *Regulation and Development*, London: Pluto Press, 2009; B. Campbell, "Revisiting the Reform Process of African Mining Regimes", *Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d'études du développement* 30 (2010) 1–2, pp. 197–217.

27 See, for example, E. Gudynas, "Neo-Extraktivismus und Ausgleichsmechanismen der progressiven südamerikanischen Regierungen" [Neo-extractivism and compensation mechanisms of progressive South American governments], *Kurswechsel* (2011) 3, pp. 69–80; T. Jacob and R. H. Pedersen, "New Resource Nationalism? Continuity and Change in Tanzania's Extractive Industries", *The Extractive Industries and Society* 5 (2018) 2, pp. 287–292; K. Roder, "'Bulldozer Politics', State-Making and (Neo-)Extractive Industries in Tanzania's Gold Mining Sector", *The Extractive Industries and Society* 6 (2019) 2, pp. 407–412.

28 C. Dolan and D. Rajak, "Introduction: Toward the Anthropology of Corporate Social Responsibility", in: C. Dolan and D. Rajak (eds.), *The Anthropology of Corporate Social Responsability*, New York: Berghahn, 2016, pp. 1–28, at 3.

actors do strategically engage in processes of (de)connection with and to multinational corporations, the state, and local populations. Analytically exploring these processes through a spatial lens ultimately reveals how global regimes of responsibility lead to a proliferation of multi-scalar spaces of negotiation and nodes of governance in Burkina Faso's industrial gold mining sector. Although recent capital investment in Africa has been and continues to be territorialized, this eventually challenges ideas of "enclaved" economic, social, and political spaces where resource extraction predominantly takes place or is supposed to take place. By investigating the different and entangled forms of negotiation in the context of large-scale gold extraction in Burkina Faso, this work provides an ethnographic account of both. It accounts for particular ordering practices in local and (inter)national resource governance, as it tells us somethings about how these ordering practices (re)produce dialectical processes of flows and control in the global mining economy. It does so against the backdrop of academic and popular perceptions about negative correlations between sub-soil abundance and socio-economic development on the African continent, emerging multi-scalar policy schemes for resource extraction and new ethical commitments of the global mining industry.

Extractive Industries, Enclaves, Ethics

Besides the "resource curse" and the "paradox of plenty", a perceived enclave status of large-scale mining in the Global South constitutes today one of the most popular tropes and powerful discourses among policy-makers and scholars when describing the resource-development nexus. Generally speaking, the "enclave theory" assumes that extractive activities are disarticulated from both local populations and national development projects, reinforcing a status of "social thinness" inherent to mining capitalism. This negative perception of large-scale extractive activities, especially in many African countries, corresponds to "three decades of scholarship examining the link between mineral wealth and negative outcomes".[29] Since the global oil crisis in the 1970s, numerous (mostly) Western development scholars have been involved in discussions whether the natural resource endowment constitutes a "curse" or a "blessing" for governments and populations in African countries, leading to socio-economic prosperity – or to

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29 A. Elbra, *Governing African Gold Mining*: *Private Governance and the Resource Curse*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 5.

poverty, plunder, and war.[30] In the economics and political science literature, it were notably minerals and oil that have been depicted as a particular driving force for the "resource curse" since they are geographically specific and thus more readily available for governmental rent-seeking practices.[31]

The new millennium, again, saw a "revival of interest" of policy makers and scholars in the resource curse debate.[32] While more empirically based literature has often resulted in a body of mixed evidence about correlations between mineral endowment and the resource curse,[33] economic anthropology questioned the very theories behind these concepts. In so doing, economic anthropologists increasingly explored "the dynamic interplay of social relations, economic interests and struggles over power at stake in the political economy of extraction".[34] Instead of studying the resource curse as a mere technical problem of revenue distribution, ethnographic studies highlighted the particularity of universal concepts and discourses and how people respond to these

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30 See, for example, R. Auty, *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies*: *The Resource Curse Thesis*, London: Routledge, 1993; P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War", *Oxford Economic Papers* 50 (1998) 4, pp. 563–573; A. Gelb, *Oil Windfalls*: *Blessing or Curse?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988; T. Karl, *The Paradox of Plenty*: *Oil Booms and Petro-States*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997; J. Oßenbrügge, "Ressourcenkonflikte in Afrika" [Resource conflicts in Africa], *Wissenschaft und Frieden* (2009) 2, https://www.wissenschaft-und-frieden.de/seite.php?artikelID=1534; A. Williams, "Shining a Light on the Resource Curse: An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between Natural Resources, Transparency, and Economic Growth", *World Development* 39 (2011) 4, pp. 490–505.
31 R. Auty, *Resource Abundance and Economic Development*: *Improving the Performance of Resource-Rich Countries*, Helsinki: UNU World Institut for Development Economics Research, 1998; J. Isham, "The Varieties of Resource Experience: Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth", *The World Bank Economic Review* 19 (2005) 2, pp. 141–174.
32 P. Stevens, "The Resource Curse Revisited: Appendix: A Literature Review" (2015), p. 6, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/20150804Resource CurseRevisitedStevensLahnKooroshyFinal.pdf.
33 See, for example, M. Basedau, "Context Matters – Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa", *Working Papers Global and Area Studies* 1 (2005), https://pure.giga-hamburg. de/ws/files/21260536/wp01_basedau.pdf; C. N. Brunnschweiler and E. H. Bulte, "The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of Paradoxes and Red Herrings", *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 55 (2008) 3, pp. 248–264; P. Stevens, G. Lahn, and J. Kooroshy, "The Resource Curse Revisited", *Energy, Environment and Resources* (2015), https://www.cha thamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/20150804ResourceCurseRevisitedSte vensLahnKooroshyFinal.pdf.
34 E. Gilberthorpe and D. Rajak, "The Anthropology of Extraction: Critical Perspectives on the Resource Curse", *The Journal of Development Studies* 53 (2017) 2, pp. 186–204.

concepts differently.[35] In the meantime, journalists and scholars also started to observe a new investment "scramble" taking place on the African continent.[36] These more critical voices challenged the "Africa rising" narrative dominant since the 2010s for its simplistic emphasis on growth in Gross Domestic Products (GDP) and greater political stability on the continent.[37] They pointed to the fact that the latter tells little or nothing about the sustainability of economic development or human welfare on various scales and that the most fast-growing African economies are heavily dependent on exports of commodities. The rising influence of so-called emerging economies and their need for energy and raw materials have led to "new" concession-making and "land grabbing" practices on African territory. These latter would reproduce export-oriented colonial models of land and subsoil extraction that entail no wider benefits for national economies or local populations, leaving them with the environmental and social harms inherent to every large-scale (mining) project.

The Multiple Dimensions of Enclaving: Burkina Faso's Mining Economy

Prima facie, the contemporary "mining boom" of Burkina Faso appears to be a typical example of the new surge in foreign investment on the African continent, its concentration in fixed spaces of mineral extraction and an exclusion of ordinary citizen from the gains and benefits generated through resource extraction. The term "boom" has been an expression national policy-makers and local populations both used to describe the wave of global capital reaching the country

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35 See, for example, A. Behrends, S. P. Reyna, and G. Schlee (eds.), *Crude Domination*: *An Anthropology of Oil*, New York: Berghahn, 2013; G. Weszkalnys, "Re-Conceiving the Resource Curse and the Role of Anthropology", *Suomen Anthropologi* 1 (2010), pp. 87–90.
36 L. Fioramonti, "Africa Rising? Think Again!", in: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (ed.), *Africa Rising*: *Who Benefits from the Continent's Economic Growth?*, Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2014, pp. 6–9, at 6–7; R. Southall, "The 'New Scramble' and Labour in Africa", *Labour, Capital and Society/Travail, capital et société* 41 (2008) 2, pp. 128–155; R. Southall and H. Melber (eds.), *A New Scramble for Africa?*: *Imperialism, Investment and Development*, Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009.
37 The changing perception of "Afropessimism" to "Afropositivism" or the "hopeless" to the "rising" continent was perhaps best captured by two *The Economist* covers, in 2000 ("the hopeless continent") and 2011 respectively ("Africa rising"). (E. Frankema and M. van Waijenburg, "Africa Rising? A Historical Perspective", *African Affairs* 117 [2018] 469, pp. 543–568, at 543; "The Hopeless Continent", *The Economist*, 13 May 2000; "Africa Rising", *The Economist*, 3 December 2011).

notably since 2008, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. With the international gold price reaching new heights in 2011 (USD 1,900 per ounce), a huge number of Toronto stock exchange-listed multinational companies started to invest into their mining assets in the country and transformed their exploration concessions into operating mines. According to information from the Burkinabè Ministry of Mines and Quarries (MMQ), ten new mining projects were opened between January 2016 and June 2020 alone.[38]

In Burkina Faso, this development raised great hopes for socio-economic change on national and local scales. However, ten years later and similar to other African contexts, industrial gold mining has the reputation of generating few if any benefits for the country's citizens. Macroeconomic effects such as an overall state income of XOF 158 billion (ca. USD 293 million) generated by the mining sector in 2018 seem to have had little trickledown effects for communities directly affected by large-scale mining.[39] On the contrary, authors have pointed to the multiple destructive effects large-scale mining endeavours engender locally.[40] Others have claimed that the Burkinabè state still misses important income opportunities due to its investment-friendly national mining code.[41] What their descriptions have in common are the different scales they are addressing in and for mining governance ("the global", "the national", or

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38 Ministère des Mines et des Carrières, "Mois de la redevabilité dans le secteur minier Burkinabè: Du 04 au 27 Septembre 2020" [Burkinabè mining sector accountability month: 04–27 September 2020].

39 Initiative pour la Transparence des Industries Extractives Burkina Faso, "Rapport ITIE 2018" [EITI Report 2018] (December 2020), p. 10.

40 See, for example, L. Chouli, *Le boom minier au Burkina Faso*: *Témoignages de victimes de l'exploitation minière* [The mining boom in Burkina Faso: Testimonies of victims of mining exploitation], Pantin: Fondation Gabriel Péri, 2014; J. W. Coefe, "Évaluation environnementale de la mine d'or de Youga" [Environmental assessment of the Youga Gold Mine], Master's Thesis, Institut International d'Ingénerie de l'Eau et de l'Environnement (2IE), 2011; F. Drechsel, B. Engels, and M. Schäfer, "'The Mines Make Us Poor': Large-Scale Mining in Burkina Faso", *GLOCON Country Report* 2 (2019), https://www.land-conflicts.fu-berlin.de/_media_design/country-reports/country_report_EN_BURKINA-FASO.pdf; M. Thune, "L'industrialisation de l'exploitation de l'or à Kalsaka, Burkina Faso: Une chance pour une population rurale pauvre ?" [The industrialisation of gold mining in Kalsaka, Burkina Faso: A chance for the rural poor?], *Echo-Géo* 17 (2011).

41 N. Hubert, "La nouvelle législation minière burkinabée: quels risques en matière de développement durable?" [Burkina Faso's new mining legislation: What are the risks for sustainable development?], *Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d'études du développement* 39 (2018) 4, pp. 500–514; see, for example, E. Kaboré, "Exploitation minière: Où va l'or du Burkina Faso ?" [Mining: Where is Burkina Faso's gold going?], *L'Economiste du Faso*, 23 September 2019.

"the local") but also an apparent increasing popularity of spatial tropes to describe the mining-development nexus. From local NGO leaders to national policy-makers or global mining professionals; references to the national mining sector as evolving as an "enclave" with no wider implications to national development projects or narratives of countering popular images of the local mining concession as a "diplomatic enclave" both have been common issues raised during interviews and panel discussions.

Similarly has a body of recent academic literature on the global mining economy increasingly used spatial tropes to describe the implications of extraction's "peculiar spatialities" for socioeconomic development in the Global South.[42] In one of his famous essays, *Critique of Black Reason*, Achille Mbembe identifies, "Foreign corporations, powerful nations, and local dominant classes [. . .] help themselves to the riches and raw materials of countries thrown into chaos through zoning practices."[43] The South-African scholar Devan Pillay describes in a similar way forms of economic extraction through enclosure on the African continent:

> The 'modernisation' paradigm based on incessant production and consumption can only meet the needs of an enclave within a sea of poverty, pollution and plunder. Africa is regarded by transnational corporations and their governments as the last piece of virgin territory left to exploit for maximum returns.[44]

"Frontiers" and "enclaves" seem to have evolved as particularly relevant (and often metaphorically used) spatial semantics to describe transformation processes in ordering extractivism.[45] Their proliferation seems to indicate that new spatializations for resource extraction are emerging[46] and that those seem to compete with the more "traditional" "resource-state-nexus" in mining governance.[47] What

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42 G. Bridge, "The Hole World: Scales and Spaces of Extraction", *Scenario Journal* (2015) 5; Himley, *Extractivist Geographies*, p. 31.

43 J.-A. Mbembe, *Critique of Black Reason* [Critique de la raison nègre], Laurent Dubois (trans.), Durham: Duke University Press, 2017 [2013], p. 5.

44 D. Pillay, "The Global Economic Crisis and the Africa Rising Narrative", *Africa Development* XL (2015) 3, pp. 59–75, at 59.

45 See, for example, Côte and Korf, *Making Concessions*; M. B. Rasmussen and C. Lund, "Reconfiguring Frontier Spaces: The Territorialization of Resource Control", *World Development* 101 (2018), pp. 388–399; M. J. Watts, "Frontiers: Authority, Precarity, and Insurgency at the Edge of the State", *World Development* 101 (2018), pp. 477–488; K. Werthmann, *Enklaven*, Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2020.

46 Marung and Middell, *The Re-Spatialization of the World*, p. 1; Middell, *Raumformate*, p. 9.

47 G. Bridge, "Resource Geographies II", *Progress in Human Geography* 38 (2014) 1, pp. 118–130; K. Werthmann and D. Ayeh, "Processes of Enclaving Under the Global Condition: The Case of Burkina Faso", Working Paper Series des SFB 1199 an der Universität Leipzig 4 (2017).

authors have described as the "unique *territorial embeddedness* of resources" certainly results in a continuous centrality of state involvement in the extractive industries.[48] The mining boom of Burkina Faso, however, does not simply happen in a spatial container (e.g., that of the territorial nation-state), but is made by and of encounters which transcend "the national" as a relation of social practices.

This book follows central assumptions of the "spatial turn" in the social sciences and humanities, which conceive of space as transforming and being transformed by historical, economic, political, and cultural processes.[49] These processes are time and context specific and brought into play by particular actors. This theoretical understanding of the socially constructed nature of space makes it worth interrogating whether the nation-state ever was, still is, or more than ever will be a "preeminent actor for controlling global flows" in the global mining economy.[50] In twenty-first century mining capitalism, other spatializations in and of resource governance such as enclaves, transnational networks, global production chains, or municipalities seem to play an equally important role. However, they do not necessarily point to the establishment of a new or dominant spatial format in ordering extractivism. As an outcome of the spatial actions of different groups of actors, processes of spatialization have to be standardized to a certain degree in order to account as collective space-making projects with societal significance.[51] Studying

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48 Dicken, *Global Shift*, p. 408.

49 Martín, *Reimagining Extractivism*, p. 27; D. Harvey, *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001; H. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, Donald Nicholson-Smith (trans.), Malden: Blackwell, 1992 [1974]; E. W. Soja, *Seeking Spatial Justice*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010.

50 Marung and Middell, *The Re-Spatialization of the World*, p. 3.

51 As analytical categories, the terms "processes of spatialization", "spatial formats", and "spatial orders" refer to the main analytical categories of the Collaborative Research Centre (SFB 1199) "Processes of Spatialization under the Global Condition". Spatial formats are the result of and shaped by processes of spatialization and have certain characteristics in common. First, they are based on both different scales of territoriality (the "local", the "national", the "global") and the interconnection of far-reaching spaces (through networks, value chains, or "transnational spaces"). Second, they are characterized by a certain degree of long term repetition, standardization, performativity, institutionalization, and the collective imaginings of their stability. Third, they always exist in relation with other spatial formats (in parallel or in concurrence to) and eventually join them in a spatial order "whose scale is still to be determined". Due to the spatial complexity of mining capitalism, this book can only tentatively point to a "spatial order" of extractivism. Such an analysis would require further research on a variety of spatial formats and their role in spatial ordering practices going beyond processes of (dis)enclaving. (M. Middell, "Category of Spatial Formats: To What End?", in: S. Marung, M. Middell [eds.], *Spatial Formats Under the Global Condition*, Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019, pp. 15–45, at 27 and 19; Middell, *Raumformate*, p. 6).

these projects and practices in more detail, eventually makes actual historical-social processes of space-making tangible, thereby avoiding a reproduction of universalist and therefore Eurocentric ideas and ideal types.[52]

In this book, the enclave concept serves as a heuristic tool to investigate the multiple spatialities of "ethical" extraction and how they become enacted and counteracted across time. Generally speaking, debates about the enclave nature of economic spaces leading to uneven development in contexts of the Global South have a relatively long history. Discontinuous geographies of extraction that do not coincide well with notions of development can be traced back to early colonial times and forms of "accumulation by dispossession".[53] Some have identified private companies' (e.g., the British South Africa Company) strategies and policies of securing spaces of resource extraction by the means of their own private armies or security forces as forerunner models of contemporary territorial extractive enclaves.[54] The contemporary global mining economy, again, can be considered as a globalization project that is particularly shaped by dialectical cross-border flows and attempts to maintain and assert territorial control over these flows. Sidaway therefore perceives of the enclave debate as pointing to an "intensification and reworking of dependency in an era of globalization as well as reviving aspects of a colonial era pattern of extractive enclaves".[55]

The enclave literature simultaneously draws essential assumptions from the resource curse debate and extends it. The resource curse debate typically features cross-country comparisons of GDP and growth rates and usually limits itself to "the national" as a scalar dimension of the phenomenon. Evolved as "a derivation of the resource curse literature" in the late 1990s and early 2000s,[56] the discussions on national "enclave economies" emphasize in a very similar way the negative outcomes a resource and export-dependency has for national

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52 Middell, *Category of Spatial Formats*, pp. 21–22; Middell, *Raumformate*, p. 7; B. Jessop, N. Brenner, and M. Jones, "Theorizing Sociospatial Relations", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 26 (2008) 3, pp. 389–401.

53 Harvey, *The New Imperialism*; N. A. Phelps, M. Atienza, and M. Arias, "Encore for the Enclave: The Changing Nature of the Industry Enclave with Illustrations from the Mining Industry in Chile", *Economic Geography* 91 (2015) 2, pp. 119–146.

54 See D. Rajak, "'HIV/AIDS Is Our Business': The Moral Economy of Treatment in a Transnational Mining Company", *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 16 (2010) 3, pp. 551–571.

55 J. D. Sidaway, "Enclave Space: A New Metageography of Development?", *Area* 39 (2007) 3, pp. 331–339, at 333.

56 M. W. Hansen, "From Enclave to Linkage Economies? A Review of the Literature on Linkages Between Extractive Multinational Corporations and Local Industry in Africa", *DIIS Working Paper* 2 (2014), p. 435.

economies.[57] The Global South's mining sectors since the 1950s have repeatedly been described as disconnected and isolated from the rest of the economy, comprising lacking linkages and spill overs.[58] Thus, enclave economies do not so much refer to a localized space that can be delineated on a map, but to a national economy the main export product is "controlled" by "foreigners" instead of domestic citizens.[59] Today the term "enclave economy" is associated predominantly with a lack of backward linkages (input supplying economies) and forward linkages (output supplying economies) and figures as a spatial trope to delingate negative perceptions of industrial gold mining in West Africa with regard to local employment provision and procurement.[60]

This has in recent years been supplemented by accounts on the emergence of territorial mineral enclaves as enclosed spaces of extraction. The enclave literature thus integrates the spatial conditions and dimensions under which extractive practices are able to flourish, despite (or precisely because of) the political rent-seeking behaviour of political elites or even raging civil war.[61] It also draws

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57 Yet recently there have been attempts to empirically engage with the "subnational resource curse". This rescaling can also be observed in literature on enclave economies: Authors have been increasingly referring to the geographical concentration of resource extraction, a revenue generation which is physically confined to small areas, or to a particular space is more connected to globalization processes than to the territorial nation-state (O. Manzano and J. D. Gutiérrez, "The Subnational Resource Curse: Theory and Evidence", *The Extractive Industries and Society* 6 [2019] 2, pp. 261–266; E. Gudynas, "Der neue progressive Extraktivismus in Südamerika" [The new progressive extractivism in South America], in: T. Lambert (ed.), *Der Neue Extraktivismus: Eine Debatte über die Grenzen des Rohstoffmodells in Lateinamerika*, Berlin: FDCL-Verlag, 2012, pp. 46–62; D. K. Leonard and S. Straus, *Africa's Stalled Development. International Causes and Cures*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003; Phelps, Atienza, and Arias, *Encore for the Enclave*).
58 R. Auty, "Mining Enclave to Economic Catalyst: Large Mineral Projects in Developing Countries", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 13 (2006) 1, pp. 135–145; J. H. Conning and J. A. Robinson, "Enclaves and Development: An Empirical Assessment", *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44 (2009) 4, pp. 359–385; Hansen, *From Enclave to Linkage Economies*; H. W. Singer, "The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries", *The American Economic Review* 40 (1950) 2, pp. 473–485.
59 Conning and Robinson, *Enclaves and Development*, p. 361; Auty, *Mining Enclave to Economic Catalyst*.
60 R. Bloch and G. Owusu, "Linkages in Ghana's Gold Mining Industry: Challenging the Enclave Thesis", *Resources Policy* 37 (2012) 4, pp. 434–442.
61 It was perhaps most prominently Jean-François Bayart who used the term "extraversion" to describe the ways in which African actors have actively participated in the processes that have created and maintained the continent's dependent position within the global economy. See J.-F. Bayart, "Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion", *African Affairs* 99 [2000] 395, pp. 217–267).

on a specific materiality and geography of extraction that, as a commercial enterprise, "rests on monopolizing control over a few strategic spaces that provide access to mineral-rich portions of the underground".[62] Most prominently, James Ferguson has argued that large-scale mining endeavours in African countries in recent years have become "more 'oil-like'".[63] Technological sophistication of mining projects and their spatial location and isolation in remote areas increasingly resemble the enclaved nature of the Angolan oil industry where the global "hopping" mining capital only touches well-defined spaces of extraction while it bypasses surrounding societies, economies, and contexts.[64] His account points to the emergence of territorial mineral-rich enclaves as (dominant) spatial formats in extractivism which are simultaneously characterized by (dis)connection, control, and enclosure: geographically demarcated, "fenced-off", secured by private military companies (PMCs), and at the same time networked and integrated into a global mining economy. In doing so, Ferguson challenges notions about trickle down effects of global capital investments while evoking a spatial analysis of development outcomes. Mining investment is "global" in the sense that it connects discrete places of financing or of the head offices of multinational corporations in the Global North, with those of extraction in the Global South. Yet, "it does not encompass or cover contiguous geographic space".[65]

Ferguson's enclave narrative (leading to "social thinness" in and around mining concessions in African countries) contrasts the capital-intensive neoliberal mode of production with "socially thick" mining governance in the twentieth-century Zambian copper belt. In the late colonial and early independence era, mining investment potentially came along with "far-reaching social investment".[66] This entailed the employment of thousands of local and national workers who earned relatively high wages. It also implied the provision of social services and infrastructures; i.e., schooling and training for workers and their wives accommodated in company or mining towns.[67] Ferguson describes this "socially thick" organization of mining activities as "a thing of the past".[68]

62 Bridge, *The Hole World*.

63 Ferguson, *Global Shadows*, p. 201.

64 See ibid.; Ferguson, *Seeing Like an Oil Company*.

65 Ibid., p. 379.

66 Ibid., pp. 378–379.

67 B. Rubbers, *Le paternalisme en question*: *Les anciens ouvriers de la Gécamines face à la libéralisation du secteur minier katangais (RD Congo)* [Paternalism in question: Former Gécamines workers facing the liberalization of the Katangese mining sector (DR Congo)], Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013; B. Rubbers, "Mining Towns, Enclaves and Spaces: A Genealogy of Worker Camps in the Congolese Copperbelt", *Geoforum* 98 (2019), pp. 88–96.

68 Ferguson, *Global Shadows*, p. 205.

Highly mechanized and reliant on much smaller amounts of "highly skilled" – often foreign – workers, the spatial flexibility of isolated mining enclaves in the twenty-first century would engender a bypassing of both local and national development projects. This enables large-scale mineral extraction to take place in "downsized states", in which, besides the multinational companies, only a small rent-seeking political elite is able to profit from resource abundance.[69] This would ultimately allow economies of extraction to proceed in contexts of political instability and even moments of raging civil war. Put pointedly, he assumes the following: the weaker the nation-state and the more corrupt its political elite, the more attractive the territory is to private foreign capital investment.[70] Spatially demarcated and encapsulated, the extractive enclave requires no social investment within the frame of national societies and is able to hold up in an extremely violent environment. His argument is underscored by the prevalence of PMC-secured mineral enclaves of multinational companies in politically unstable contexts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, or Chad.

Several authors in recent years have questioned the historical newness of extractive enclaves,[71] or shifted the frame of analysis to the micro politics of concession-making and of enclosing space in the Global South.[72] Others have emphasized in more detail how the contemporary grid-making capacities of extractive industries shape regimes of political authority and control. In "enclave democracies", certain veto-holding powers such as multinational companies are said to undermine central forms of state authority.[73] A more localized description of this power relation identifies a "series of miniature corporate states" as representing "a modern mirror of feudal fiefdoms, with the corporate concession holder as sovereign".[74] This does not mean that extractive processes have completely failed to produce socio-economic development. Yet the latter does not

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69 Ferguson, *Seeing Like an Oil Company*, p. 378.

70 See Reno, *How Sovereignty Matters*.

71 See Rubbers, *Mining Towns, Enclaves and Spaces*; Phelps, Atienza, and Arias, *Encore for the Enclave*.

72 See, for example, Appel, *The Licit Life of Capitalism*; A. Bezuidenhout and S. Buhlungu, "Enclave Rustenburg: Platinum Mining and the Post-Apartheid Social Order", *Review of African Political Economy* 42 (2016) 146, pp. 526–544; Côte and Korf, *Making Concessions*.

73 A. Croissant and P. Thiery, "Von defekten und anderen Demokratien" [Of defective and other democracies], *WeltTrends* (2000) 29, pp. 9–32; J. Emel, M. T. Huber, and M. H. Makene, "Extracting Sovereignty: Capital, Territory, and Gold Mining in Tanzania", *Political Geography* 30 (2011) 2, pp. 70–79.

74 Bridge, *The Hole World*.

conform to an actual or "imagined" space of the nation.[75] Ferguson himself has admitted that his analysis represents a "highly simplified sketch" and "cannot stand in for the detailed ethnographic accounts that, one hopes, will soon help to give us a more fleshed-out picture of the social and political life of African mineral-extraction enclaves".[76] The following study on processes of (dis)enclaving in Burkina Faso's gold mining sector is an attempt to analytically and empirically fill some of these gaps.[77] As an expression of (re)spatializing the resource-development nexus, enclaves as (potential) spatial formats address and affect resource governance on multiple scales. Therefore, the analysis not only incorporates discussions on who is to be held responsible for the (non)access to gains and benefits on a local or subnational level, but also addresses questions of (inter)national responsibility for promoting and challenging the emergence of economic enclaves in the sense of economic underperformance, export dependency, and lacking linkage economies. It does so through a study of encounters, entanglements, and power relations: What is for instance the role of the state in the granting access to concessions in the Global South and how do different forms of mining governance shape each other?

Ethicizing Mining Capitalism

The "apparent ethical turn" in corporate capitalism through the emergence of a "CSR industry" can be traced back to the early 1990s,[78] when the corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement has "flowered" around the globe.[79] Yet this was preceded by much-longer standing debates in academia and the corporate world about the place of the corporation in society and its ethical engagements.[80]

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75 See M. J. Watts, "Antinomies of Community: Some Thoughts on Geography, Resources and Empire", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 29 (2004) 2, pp. 195–216.

76 Ferguson, *Seeing Like an Oil Company*, p. 381.

77 In doing so, it engages with more praxeological and procedural appoaches of "(dis)enclaving" as a process and "enclavity" as an outcome. See P. Bond, "Primitive Accumulation, Enclavity, Rural Marginalisation & Articulation", *Review of African Political Economy* 34 (2007) 111, pp. 29–37, at 31.

78 Dolan and Rajak, *Introduction*, p. 4.

79 A. B. Carroll, "Managing Ethically with Global Stakeholders: A Present and Future Challenge", *The Academy of Management Executive (1993–2005)* 18 (2004) 2, pp. 114–120, at 116; R. Jenkins, "Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty", *International Affairs* 81 (2005) 3, pp. 525–540, at 526.

80 This has evolved from earlier attempts to "moralize" capitalism chiefly through corporate philanthropy and paternalism. In the emergent factory system in the US and the UK in the late

Despite typically harsh working conditions in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, corporations operating in the Global North and South had an interest in "stabilizing" their workforce and containing opposition in factories or near production sites. This also applies to many large-scale plantation and mining projects in mostly isolated and sparsely populated African regions. European companies such as the Mining Union of Haut-Katanga (*Union Minière du Haut-Katanga*, UMKH) in the early twentieth century Congolese copper belt or Belgian Congo's largest oil palm concession *Huiléries du Congo Belge* (HCB) during the interwar period had to rely on a system of contract or migrant workers to assure their productivity. Beyond means of coercion, they were also forced to provide some form of social incentives such as housing to their workers to monitor their spatial mobility.[81]

In its attempt "to broker the uneasy relationship between market and social imperatives" under neoliberalism,[82] the history of CSR has been and continues to be reassessed and rewritten.[83] Since the early 1990s, worldwide operating (mining) corporations have come under growing pressure to assume responsibilities beyond those traditionally expected from the corporate world.[84] An increasing focus on the private sector as important actor in development is mainly owing to two factors: first, multinational companies attracted criticism from both mining-affected communities and "global scale coalition-building" (such as INGOs, lawyers, and media) for their environmental, human rights and labour practices around the

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eighteeth century, companies increasingly took responsibility for their workers that extended beyond normal business requirements. While the late nineteenth century saw the rise of large companies as "modern" corporations, first forms of business-led philanthropy and corporate reactions to the "anti-trust movements" gained in importance. For an overview, see A. B. Carroll, "A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Practices", in: A. Crane (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 19–46; Dolan and Rajak, *Introduction*, pp. 4–7; Jenkins, *Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty*, pp. 526–528.

81 B. Henriet, "'Elusive Natives': Escaping Colonial Control in the Leverville Oil Palm Concession, Belgian Congo, 1923–1941", *Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue canadienne des études africaines* 49 (2015) 2, pp. 339–361; Rubbers, *Mining Towns*.

82 In the present book, "neoliberalism" is used as pointing to "a philosophy, policy orientation and technique of governmentality that promotes free markets as the organizing principle for economics, politics and society" (Mansfield, *Beyond Rescaling*, p. 462).

83 Dolan and Rajak, *Introduction*, p. 5.

84 Carroll, *Managing Ethically with Global Stakeholders*; K. Pistor, "Multinational Corporations as Regulators and Central Planners: Implications for Citizens' Voice", in: G. Urban (ed.), *Corporations and Citizenship*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014, pp. 232–248.

globe.[85] Second, the decline in confidence in the role of the state as an agent of development has had significant policy implications on a global level.

The growing attention corporate (mis)conduct received by an international public during the past three decades can mainly be attributed to global value chains becoming ever more important (in which northern buyers increasingly felt responsible for contexts in the Global South) and developments in communication. New technologies or satellite images displayed on accessible internet platforms and social media led to the emergence of transnational advocacy networks that were able to report in real time on corporate activities and abuses. What has been described as new forms of "global activism" therefore simultaneously contested modes of production and extraction under neoliberalism and profited from the architecture of globalization in order to challenge multinational corporations.[86] Global campaigns against extractivism mainly occurred in the aftermath of environmental disasters that were increasingly covered by international media and often resulted in court cases opposing local community representatives and multinational corporations. The latter were usually sued in their home countries due to a lack of international law sanctioning such corporate behaviour or because of weak law enforcement in the host countries of mining.[87] Evolving mining conflicts during the 1990s and 2000s such as in Papua New Guinea, various countries of Latin America, or the DRC demonstrate how mining projects became the target of contention on almost every continent.[88] Popular

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85 D. Sadler and S. Lloyd, "Neo-Liberalising Corporate Social Responsibility: A Political Economy of Corporate Citizenship", *Geoforum* 40 (2009) 4, pp. 613–622, at 613; A. Escobar, "Culture Sits in Places: Reflections on Globalism and Subaltern Strategies of Localization", *Political Geography* 20 (2001) 2, pp. 139–174; S. Kirsch, *Mining Capitalism*: *The Relationship Between Corporations and Their Critics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014.

86 The "newness" of these movements has also been challenged. See C. Calhoun, "'New Social Movements' of the Early Nineteenth Century", *Social Science History* 17 (1993) 3, pp. 385–427; K. H. Tucker, "How New Are the New Social Movements?", *Theory, Culture & Society* 8 (1991) 2, pp. 75–98; D. Della Porta and S. G. Tarrow, *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005; M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*: *Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

87 J. G. Frynas and S. Pegg (eds.), *Transnational Corporations and Human Rights*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; A. Golub, *Leviathans at the Gold Mine*: *Creating Indigenous and Corporate Actors in Papua New Guinea*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2014; Pistor, *Multinational Corporations as Regulators and Central Planners*.

88 See, for example, A. Bebbington (ed.), *Social Conflict, Economic Development and the Extractive Industry*: *Evidence from South America*, London: Routledge, 2013; J. Hönke and S. Geenen, "Land Grabbing by Mining Companies: Local Contentions & State Reconfiguration in South Kivu (DRC)", in: An Ansoms and T. Hilhorst (eds.), *Losing Your Land*: *Dispossession in the Great Lakes*, Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2014, pp. 58–81; S. Kirsch, "Anthropology and

protests such as the miners' strike at the Lonmin owned Marikana mine in South Africa in 2012 have been met with extreme repression by the military, police, and private security forces.[89] Since then, many other catastrophic events such as the Brumadinho dam disaster in 2019 in Brazil forced governments, companies, and contractors such as the worldwide operating service company TÜV Süd to investigate their own role in and responsibilities for managing and monitoring large-scale mining activities in the Global South.[90] Multinational corporations which rely on a whole range of subsidiaries, contractors, and consultancies to realize their extractive projects increasingly worried about their brands and corporate campaigns.[91]

The global rise of CSR must also be analyzed against the backdrop of failed attempts to produce legal codes and requirements for multinational corporations from the 1960s onwards.[92] Corporations and their subsidiaries increasingly spanned multiple legal jurisdictions. Thus they were difficult to control and to hold accountable for human rights abuses or environmental destruction.[93] Since the end of the Second World War, there have been numerous attempts (notably by governments of the Global South) to regulate corporate activities at a global scale and to establish legally binding codes of conduct for multinational companies within the United Nations (UN).[94] However, corporations and governments alike resisted attempts to create legal compliance or liability. This eventually resulted in an emphasis on normative agreements of corporate (self)regulation instead of state intervention.[95] In the era of the SAPs of the 1980 and 1990s, the

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Advocacy: A Case Study of the Campaign Against the Ok Tedi Mine", *Critique of Anthropology* 22 (2002) 2, pp. 175–200.

89 P. Alexander, "Marikana, Turning Point in South African History", *Review of African Political Economy* 40 (2013) 138, pp. 605–619.

90 C. Dohmen et al., "Deutsche Staatsanwälte ermitteln gegen den TÜV Süd" [German prosecutors investigate TÜV Süd], *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15 February 2020.

91 Dolan and Rajak, *Introduction*, p. 4; Jenkins, *Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty*, p. 527.

92 J. Barkan, *Corporate Sovereignty: Law and Government Under Capitalism*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013, p. 131; Jenkins, *Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty*, pp. 526–527.

93 Pistor, *Multinational Corporations as Regulators and Central Planners*; Barkan, *Corporate Sovereignty*, p. 122.

94 For an overview, see ibid.; Jenkins, *Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty*; D. Weissbrodt and M. Kruger, "Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights", *American Journal of International Law* 97 (2003), pp. 901–922.

95 Successfully adopted transnational frameworks include, in particular, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*

"Washington consensus" reflected the dominant belief that governments (in the Global South) are not able to bring about fundamental change. This led to a shift from official development assistance (ODA) to foreign direct investments (FDI) in global aid policy,[96] and has also manifested in a general shift in authority in African mining governance. Fuelled by the liberalization of national mining codes under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, African states gradually retreated from their role as the most central regulator of mining governance and transferred important authorities to private actors.[97]

    With the "ethical turn" in the 1990s, this trend towards corporate self-regulation and soft law promoted by the Global North continued.[98] What was new, however, was that these global CSR regimes not only became important for multinational corporations, but also states and their aid policies, or transnational institutions such as the UN and the World Bank.[99] CSR eventually became a global model in resolving ethical and social problems of corporate capitalism.[100] Being the sector where the debates on CSR as promoting "development" have been "arguable the most extensive",[101] the global mining industry has immediately become part of and launched itself a series of global initiatives. In addition to corporate initiatives initiated by individual companies or their

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(1976) and the International Labor Organization's (ILO) *Tripartite Declarations of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises* (1978), similar to the United Nations (UN), *Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights*. These initiatives were generally perceived as a "compromise" between the failed (legally-binding) UN Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) code and voluntary codes of conduct like the *Global Compact*. See Barkan, *Corporate Sovereignty*, p. 128; Weissbrodt and Kruger, *Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations*.

96 G. Banks et al., "Conceptualising Corporate Community Development", *Third World Quarterly* 37 (2015) 2, pp. 245–263, at 245; Jenkins, *Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty*, p. 527.

97 See J. Jacobs, "An Overview of Revenue Flows from the Mining Sector: Impacts, Debates and Policy Recomendations", in: B. Campbell (ed.), *Modes of Governance and Revenue Flows of African Mining*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 16–46; N. K. Poku and J. Whitman (eds.), *Africa Under Neoliberalism*, London: Routledge, 2018.

98 Jenkins, *Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty*, p. 528; Barkan, *Corporate Sovereignty*.

99 Carroll, *A History of Corporate Social Responsibility*, p. 20.

100 Dolan and Rajak, *Introduction*, p. 2.

101 K. Slack, "Mission Impossible?: Adopting a CSR-Based Business Model for Extractive Industries in Developing Countries", *Resources Policy* 37 (2012) 2, pp. 179–184, at 180; T. Frederiksen, "Corporate Social Responsibility, Risk and Development in the Mining Industry", *Resources Policy* 59 (2018), pp. 495–505, at 495.

managers,[102] global initiatives for more responsibility and accountability in the global mining industry increasingly relied on "multi-stakeholder partnerships" between corporations, UN agencies, governments, or INGOs.[103] Additionally to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights adopted in 2000, the UN launched the same year the Global Compact, which involved businesses, labour organizations, NGOs, and governments.[104] Another important multi-stakeholder partnership was the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) launched in 2003 to account for more "transparency" and "good governance" in oil, gas, and mineral revenue allocation between host governments and multinational companies.[105]

Because of the spatially bounded nature of resource deposits, as well as the pollution and waste production that are inherent to all mining, large-scale mining projects in the Global South will certainly continue to shape and (reproduce) particular power relations: forms of dispossession and displacement of local populations or artisanal miners, and environmental damages do not simply diminish with an (apparent) "ethical turn in corporate capitalism".[106] Many authors have therefore appraised the new voluntary engagements of the corporate world in relatively critical terms. Beyond simple rejections of CSR as politics of "green" and "whitewashing", or those unanimously advocating the "business

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102 One of the most important forums of such issues is the CEO-led Global Mining Initiative (GMI) (1998) which gave rise to the creation of the International Council on Mining & Metals (ICCM) in 2001 (International Council on Mining & Metals [ICMM], "Our History", https://www.icmm.com/en-gb/about-us/annual-reviews/our-history [accessed 10 January 2021]).

103 H. Jenkins, "Corporate Social Responsibility and the Mining Industry: Conflicts and Constructs", *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environment Management* (2004) 11, pp. 22–34, at 23; L. Fransen, "Embedding the Multinational Corporation in Transnational Sustainability Governance", in: G. Baars and A. Spicer (eds.), *The Corporation: A Critical, Multi-Disciplinary Handbook*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 257–267.

104 Jenkins, *Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty*, pp. 529–530.

105 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, "Who We Are", https://eiti.org/who-we-are (accessed 10 January 2020); G. Carbonnier, "Les négociations multi-parties prenantes: l'exemple de l'initiative de transparence des industries extractives" [Multi-stakeholder negotiations: the example of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)], *Relations Internationales* 4 (2008) 136, pp. 101–113.

106 Dolan and Rajak, *Introduction*, p. 3; Geenen, *Dispossession, Displacement and Resistance*; T. Niederberger and T. Haller, "PART I: 1. Introduction", in: T. Niederberger et al. (eds.), *Open Cut: Mining, Transnational Corporations and Local Populations*, Münster: Lit, 2013, pp. 15–34; M. Welker, *Enacting the Corporation: An American Mining Firm in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014, p. 65.

case",[107] CSR literature is rather ambivalent about CSR's effects on development outcomes.[108] Others have criticized CSR's potential in contributing to a depoliticization of mining governance, and the society at large.[109] A third body of literature critically engages with the gradual transfer of authority from governments to private companies, and thus a potential "re-drawing of the boundaries between corporate- and state-centred regulation".[110]

With their new role as agents in development, corporations increasingly had to extend their responsibilities towards governments and populations in the Global South. The "social license to operate" (SLO), "corporate social responsibility" (CSR) and "corporate citizenship" (CC) became important industry buzzwords through which companies (had to) legitimize(d) their presence and extractive activities. These "semi-formal, quasi-legal regulatory regimes" became increasingly mainstreamed into mining policies around the world.[111] They share the assumption that corporations are required to align their extractive activities with standards of ethic engagement and sustainable development.[112] Despite the normative complexity of these terms and the non-existence of a "homogenous, coherent concept" for

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107 See, for example, P. Schreck, *The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility*: *Understanding and Measuring Economic Impacts of Corporate Social Performance*, Heidelberg: Physica, 2009.

108 See, for example, G. Hilson, "Corporate Social Responsibility in the Extractive Industries: Experiences from Developing Countries", *Resources Policy* 37 (2012) 2, pp. 131–137; D. Rajak, *In Good Company*: *An Anatomy of Corporate Social Responsibility*, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011; C. McEwan et al., "Enrolling the Private Sector in Community Development: Magic Bullet or Sleight of Hand?", *Development and Change* 48 (2017) 1, pp. 28–53; J. Sharp, "Corporate Social Responsibility and Development: An Anthropological Perspective", *Development Southern Africa* 23 (2006) 2, pp. 213–222.

109 Barkan, *Corporate Sovereignty*, p. 112; Dolan and Rajak, *Introduction*; Rajak, *In Good Company*.

110 Sadler and Lloyd, *Neo-Liberalising Corporate Social Responsibility*, p. 613; B. Campbell, "Corporate Social Responsibility and Development in Africa: Redefining the Roles and Responsibilities of Public and Private Actors in the Mining Sector", *Resources Policy* 37 (2012) 2, pp. 138–143.

111 Barkan, *Corporate Sovereignty*, p. 111; J. M. Logsdon and D. J. Wood, "Global Business Citizenship and Voluntary Codes of Ethical Conduct", *Journal of Business Ethics* 59 (2005) 1–2, pp. 55–67; A. J. G. Sison, "From CSR to Corporate Citizenship: Anglo-American and Continental European Perspectives", *Journal of Business Ethics* 89 (2009), pp. 235–246.

112 Dolan and Rajak, *Introduction*, p. 5; S. Bice, *Responsible Mining*: *Key Principles for Industry Integrity*, London: Earthscan, 2016; J. G. Frynas, *Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility*: *Oil, Multinationals and Social Challenges*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

CSR,[113] Dolan and Rajak have recently provided a working definition within their volume *The Anthropology of Corporate Social Responsibility*. According to them, the CSR's architects' project of establishing a neutral "supra-cultural ethic to govern disparate spaces and actors" has to be analyzed in light of the effects this potentially has on various scales:

> CSR is thus best be seen as protean and multiply enacted – an evolving and flexible and overlapping set of practices and discourses (as opposed to a distinct set of initiatives or principles) through which business (re)makes and asserts itself as an ethical actor, claiming to elide the frictions between principles and profit by reframing (if not actually reinvigorating) the responsibilities, interests and priorities of the corporation.[114]

The authors also point to a major shift in recent years away from normative preoccupations in the academic debate. A number of scholars increasingly claim that we need to focus our analysis on the multi-scalar structure and impacts of CSR in terms of power relations. Similarly, James Ferguson's critique of the one-sided focus on the study of development as either a "good" or a "bad" thing,[115] anthropological approaches should not limit themselves to an analysis on what CSR fails to do in terms of development outcomes. Instead, they should investigate what the supposed "'win-win' marriage" of global values and local practice and of social and commercial objectives actually does.[116]

As in other sectors, regimes of responsibility in the global mining economy shifted from corporate philanthropy and paternalism towards an emphasis on promoting capacity building and self-empowerment of host communities of mining in the Global South.[117] There have been three other important developments that are notably relevant in global mining governance: first, by embracing a number of different topics such as human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption on various scales CSR spans from "the global" to "the local". It attempts to hold corporations accountable and responsible vis-à-vis a global public, national governments, and mining-affected populations alike. In doing so, it not only aims to

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113 J. G. Frynas and M. Blowfield, "Setting New Agendas: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility in the Developing World", *International Affairs* 81 (2005) 3, pp. 499–513, at 503.

114 Dolan and Rajak, *Introduction*, pp. 5–6.

115 See J. Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development,' Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.

116 Dolan and Rajak, *Introduction*, p. 19; T. Frederiksen, "Political Settlements, the Mining Industry and Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing Countries", *The Extractive Industries and Society* 6 (2019) 1, pp. 162–170; Sharp, *Corporate Social Responsibility and Development*.

117 See Carroll, *A History of Corporate Social Responsibility*; Dolan and Rajak, *Introduction*.

break with the "resource curse" on national and international levels,[118] but also establishes a web of global norms, standards and certification schemes that address the direct vicinities of large-scale mining around the globe.[119] Thus, corporate engagements became increasingly formalized and targeted multiple scales, ranging from specific CSR strategies and policies in sites of extraction to multi-stakeholder partnerships on a global level.[120] Second, in promoting voluntary codes of conduct, foreign direct investment (FDI) as a vehicle for development and states as the primary duty-holders for guaranteeing human rights, the CSR regimes were "discrediting the drive to tame corporate behaviour through legally binding codes".[121] Third, this eventually redefined the roles and responsibilities of public and private actors in the global mining economy on various scales.[122] Therefore, the rise of the CSR movement during the past 30 years not only poses a range of challenges to corporate governance more generally but also offers a promising gateway for the study of multi-scalar mining governance: how are corporations morally (and legally) held accountable across a number of host and home countries and by whom? What do these projects and practices, in turn, tell us about agency, structure and power relations the global mining industry?

Actors, Sites, Scales

> How can ethnography be global? How can ethnography be anything but micro and ahistorical? How can the study of everyday life grasp lofty processes that transcend national boundaries?[123]

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118 C. C. Corrigan, "Breaking the Resource Curse: Transparency in the Natural Resource Sector and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative", *Resources Policy* 40 (2014), pp. 17–30.

119 Dolan and Rajak, *Introduction*; J. Sydow, "Global Concepts in Local Contexts: CSR as 'Anti-Politics Machine' in the Extractive Sector in Ghana and Peru", in: C. Dolan and D. Rajak (eds.), *The Anthropology of Corporate Social Responsability*, New York: Berghahn, 2016, pp. 217–242.

120 Hilson, *The Extractive Industries and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*; D. Rajak, "Ethnographies of Extraction: Anthropology, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Resource Curse", *Suomen Antropologi* (2010) 1, pp. 91–94.

121 S. Soederberg, "Taming Corporations or Buttressing Market-Led Development? A Critical Assessment of the Global Compact", *Globalizations* 4 (2007) 4, pp. 500–513, at 500; Barkan, *Corporate Sovereignty*, pp. 129–130.

122 See Campbell, *Corporate Social Responsibility and Development in Africa*.

123 M. Burawoy, "Introduction: Reaching for the Global", in: M. Burawoy (ed.), *Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and Imaginations in a Postmodern World*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, pp. 1–40, at 1.

Doreen Massey has summed up three propositions on which our contemporary spatial sensitivity rests, and which reveals particularly useful for considering the spatial complexity of the global mining economy: we have, first, to recognize that space is a product of interrelations and constituted through interactions from the immensity of the global to the intimately tiny. Second, she assumes that space is to be understood "as the sphere of the possibility of the existence of multiplicity" in the sense of co-existing trajectories and of heterogeneity. Third, we have to recognize that space is never a closed system and always under construction.[124] "Traditionally", anthropologists' occupation has been the "intimately tiny" in that they specifically addressed local communities as key players in negotiation practices over industrial mining. Together with other social scientists who focused their analysis on the "binary relationship between states and corporations",[125] they contributed to the identification of states, corporations and communities as key stakeholders with specific interests in mining governance. This, in turn, has led to the emergence of a "three legged" or "triad stakeholder model" dominant in social science research on mining.[126] More recent anthropological studies, however, not only break with ethnography's tradition of providing holistic representations of small and relatively clearly bounded groups,[127] they also account for a complexity of actors monolithically categorized as "the company", "the state" or "the community" and their multi-scalar relationships.[128] Authors such as Marina Welker or Alex Golub have highlighted how the latter are not always distinctly demarcated pairs and entities.[129] Those macro actors who are said to speak with a single voice and to have a clear object of action (as "leviathans") in reality are complex entities composed of multiple micro actors with diverse interests.[130] Their negotiation practices and planning behaviour deeply shape the governance of

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124 Massey, *For Space*, pp. 10–11.
125 C. Ballard and G. Banks, "Resource Wars: The Anthropology of Mining", *Annual Review of Anthropology* 32 (2003) 1, pp. 287–313, at 289.
126 Ibid.
127 See M.-A. Falzon, "Introduction: Multi-Sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis and Locality in Contemporary Research", in: M.-A. Falzon (ed.), *Multi-Sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis and Locality in Contemporary Research*, Farnham: Ashgate, 2009, pp. 1–23; E. Nadai and C. Maeder, "Fuzzy Fields. Multi-Sited Ethnography in Sociological Research", *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 6 (2005) 3.
128 Ballard and Banks, *Resource Wars*, p. 290.
129 Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*, p. 11; Golub, *Leviathans at the Gold Mine*.
130 See R. J. Pijpers and T. H. Eriksen (eds.), *Mining Encounters: Extractive Industries in an Overheated World*, London: Pluto, 2019.

the mining sector. Mining governance, on the other hand, folds back on changing state dynamics and the make-up of companies and (mining) communities.

An investigation into the make-up of multinational corporations, and how, according to popular perceptions, they evolved as the "most powerful non-state actors in the world",[131] requires a non-normative analysis of who these entities actually are.[132] I position my work within ethnographic studies stating that "no corporate actor exists independent of its ongoing enactments".[133] Instead, people enact corporations in multiple ways and these enactments constantly involve struggles and negotiations about responsibilities and boundaries of engagements. However, as those studies also argue, it does not make sense to simply overlook the existence of powerful entities so meaningful to "capitalism's seeming coherence".[134] Drawing on concepts of Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, Marina Welker described the corporation as both the "idea" of a powerful and unified actor and the corporation as a "system" of material relations and practices.[135] The corporation as a "macro-actor" thus represents "[. . .] a micro-actor seated on black boxes, a force capable of associating so many other forces that it acts like a 'single man'".[136] Social science enquiry is where "black boxes" open up: how can macro-actors do "as if" they were closed and dark, powerful and disentangled from national contexts, or responsible and integrated locally?[137] It urges us to understand how in everyday life, ordinary actors put these entities together and how multinational corporations enact themselves as collective subjects that actually exist and have rights, obligations and interests.[138] Corporate managers and employees as Hannah Appel has observed in Equatorial-Guineas' petroleum industry, were engaged in "labor-intensive processses [. . .] of spatial and socio-political distancing" to make corporate operations feasible.[139] In her study on a Newmont Mining subsidiary in Sumbawa (Indonesia), on the other hand, Welker explored how

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131 Barkan, *Corporate Sovereignty*, p. 128; United Nations, *Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations*.

132 M. Callon and B. Latour, "Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macro-Structure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to Do so", in: K. D. Knorr-Cetina and A. V. Cicourel (eds.), *Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro-Sociologies*, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981; Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*.

133 Ibid., p. 35; Golub, *Leviathans at the Gold Mine*.

134 Appel, *The Licit Life of Capitalism*, p. 28.

135 Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*, p. 4.

136 Callon and Latour, *Unscrewing the Big Leviathan*, p. 299.

137 See ibid.; Appel, *The Licit Life of Capitalism*.

138 Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*, p. 3.

139 Appel, *The Licit Life of Capitalism*, p. 22.

local populations perceived the multinational corporation sometimes as a profit-maximizing "Newmonster", and occasionally as a "patron" personified by the corporate CSR manager.[140]

In this book space as an analytical lens and "the enclave" as a heuristic tool serve to investigate spatialities of responsibility in Burkina Faso's gold mining sector. If we perceive of the global mining industry as an ensemble and outcome of multiple socio-spatial practices,[141] the relevance of particular forms and formats of spatialization "can be measured only from the perspective of the engaged actors".[142] Different actors practice and construct responsibility through "orders of spacing and placing [. . .] ('spatialisations')".[143] I assume that the classical *homo economicus* model of the corporation that explains multinational corporations as mere profit-maximizing actors, "leviathans" or "corporate monsters",[144] cannot account for the multiple ways corporations (as "states" and "communities") enact their responsibilities.[145] Further, this obscures what the emergence of ethics in mining governance actually *does* in terms of company-state-community relations: boundaries are constantly re-drawn – and this relates to the spheres of the public and the private, the interactions of macro- and micro-actors and the different scales actors address in their claim-making practices. The present book therefore emphasizes enactments of macro-actors ("the corporation", "the state", and "the community"), and the linkages with their powerful counterparts. It provides an analytical and empirical approach that neither downplays forms of corporative sovereignty and power, nor the role of the state as a central planner and regulator in mining governance, and that of mining-affected populations in concession-making practices. As a consequence, the present account of Burkina Faso's post 2008 mining economy aims to counter both forms of "methodological nationalism",[146] and the "territorial trap" (circumscribing resource sovereignty to

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140 See Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*.

141 See Welskopp, *Zukunft bewirtschaften*.

142 M. Mayer, "To What End Do We Theorize Sociospatial Relations?", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 26 (2008) 3, pp. 414–419, at 416.

143 Shields, *Spatial Questions*, p. 1.

144 Barkan, *Corporate Sovereignty*, p. 115.

145 See Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*.

146 See A. Amelina et al. (eds.), *Beyond Methodological Nationalism: Research Methodologies for Cross-Border Studies*, New York, NY: Routledge, 2012; N. Glick Schiller and A. Wimmer, "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences", *Global Networks* 2 (2002) 4, pp. 301–334.

the territorial nation-state alone),[147] without downplaying the role of "stateness" in mining governance.[148] To assume a simple "rescaling" of authority in mining governance from the national to supra- and subnational scales (embodied by the International Finance Corporation or the African Union) may also be misleading.[149] "The national" actually "articulates" with neoliberal approaches and becomes (re) constituted through the latter.[150] The various enactments of responsibility in mining governance, in turn, shape the legitimacy, capacity and authority of the nation-state.

To reveal whether specific spatial formats of mining governance (the global production chain, the state, the enclave, the municipality etc.) become dominant or not over time, "we require a set of theoretical tools to analyse multiple spatializations at the same time".[151] This book does this by investigating scalar configurations of resource governance in and beyond Burkina Faso. As a relation of social practices,[152] scale shares with the enclave as a (potential) spatial format that it can be employed as both a lens through which to observe its own significance in processes of spatialization and the relationality of other scales and formats.[153] Both are being done here to explore dominant ordering practices in mining capitalism. In extractive relations, people may refer to "the global", "the national" or "the local" in order to counter processes of enclaving. In doing so, they eventually promote or challenge specific spatial formats for resource governance such as the nation-state, the enclave or the global production chain that consequently become institutionalized, standardized and repetitive over time.

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147 Martín, *Reimagining Extractivism*, p. 30; J. Agnew, "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory", *Review of International Political Economy* 1 (1994) 1, pp. 53–80; Emel, Huber and Makene, *Extracting Sovereignty*.

148 See J. Schubert, U. Engel, and E. Macamo, "Introduction: Boom and Bust: Extractive Industries and African States in the Twenty-First Century", in: E. S. Macamo, J. Schubert, and U. Engel (eds.), *Extractive Industries and Changing State Dynamics in Africa*: *Beyond the Resource Curse*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2018, pp. 1–21.

149 See N. Brenner, "Between Fixity and Motion: Accumulation, Territorial Organization and the Historical Geography of Spatial Scales", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 16 (1998) 4, pp. 459–481; R. Hudson, *Producing Places*, New York: Guilford Press, 2001; B. Jessop, *The Future of the Capitalist State*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002; E. Swyngedouw, "Neither Global nor Local: 'Glocalization' and the Politics of Scale", in: K. R. Cox (ed.), *Spaces of Globalization*: *Reasserting the Power of the Local*, New York: Guilford, 1997, pp. 137–166.

150 See Mansfield, *Beyond Rescaling*.

151 Shields, *Spatial Questions*, p. 12.

152 Mansfield, *Beyond Rescaling*.

153 See Marung and Middell, *The Re-Spatialization of the World*, p. 7.

From the 1990s, Anglo-American poststructuralist geography perceived scale (as space) as socially produced and productive, not as objects.[154] "The global", "the national" and "the local" must thus be conceived as relational, not necessarily hierarchical. While actors apparently have different bargaining powers in global mining capitalism, these are not necessarily geographically-inscribed.[155] There are fragmented and entangled spatialities of responsibility in mining capitalism and actors engage in specific scalar practices in relation to these. In order to provide more detailed ethnographic accounts on the complex extractive relationships and spatializations that "link the upstream mineralisation with the downstream money",[156] we have to extend the conventional lines of ethnographic enquiry.[157] The twenty-first century organization of corporate mining capitalism spans from the capitals of financing in Toronto or Sydney to sites of extraction in western Burkina Faso, to sites of gold trading, processing and consumption in Switzerland. As another relation of social practices, "the global" has increasingly gained importance in the regulation of the global mining economy due to the growing influence of banks, hedge funds and financial agencies.[158] The introduction of new regimes of responsibility has led spatialities of extraction and mining governance becoming ever more complex. *Spaces of Responsibility* thus empirically investigates different but interrelated sites of the global mining sector in Burkina Faso, Canada and Germany in order to empirically trace what and who enables or constrains multinational corporations to operate "ethically" across multiple political systems.[159] The dialectical process of flows and control under the global condition lead to diverse and conflicting interactions, often characterized by "friction" between actors with different world views, agendas, and aims.[160] Exploring

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154 Dietz, *Politics of Scale and Struggles over Mining in Colombia*, p. 131; Mansfield, *Beyond Rescaling*; S. A. Marston, "The Social Construction of Scale", *Progress in Human Geography* 24 (2000) 2, pp. 219–242. The conceptual flourishing of "scale" in critical geography and its appliance to an expanding range of socio-spatial phenomena has been criticized by Neil Brenner. (N. Brenner, "The Limits to Scale? Methodological Reflections on Scalar Structuration", *Progress in Human Geography* 25 [2001] 4, pp. 591–614).

155 Allen, *Topologies of Power*, p. 39.

156 Miskelly, *The International Mining Industry*.

157 Ballard and Banks, *Resource Wars*, p. 289.

158 Dietz, *Politics of Scale and Struggles over Mining in Colombia*, p. 129; E. Ferry, "Gold Prices as Material-Social Actors: The Case of the London Gold Fix", *The Extractive Industries and Society* 3 (2016) 1, pp. 82–85; See Dicken, *Global Shift*.

159 Pistor, *Multinational Corporations as Regulators and Central Planners*, p. 234.

160 R. J. Pijpers and T. H. Eriksen, "Introduction: Negotiating the Multiple Edges of Mining Encounters", in: R. J. Pijpers, T. H. Eriksen (eds.), *Mining Encounters: Extractive Industries in an Overheated World*, London: Pluto, 2019, pp. 1–20, at 2; A. L. Tsing, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.

connections but also (potential) disruptions between the stock exchanges in Toronto and extractive spaces in the Global South enables us to discuss Ferguson's approach from an empirical lens: to investigate relating changes in the domain of African mining to structural changes in global capitalism.

A multi-scalar analysis of enactments of ethical capitalism not only explores the diverse and complex impacts mining may have in areas of extraction,[161] it also touches on questions of collective and individual responsibility, and those of legal personhood and sovereignty. This, however, reveals some challenges in terms of holding group agents, such as corporations, responsible – from near and at-a-distance.[162] In her famous analysis of totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt has drawn a clear distinction between moral and legal responsibility on the one hand, and political responsibility on the other. The former refers to the individual who should be held liable for any wrongdoing. For the latter case, responsibility is shared collectively. This makes us collectively responsible for things that we have not done, but in which we (at least indirectly) participate.[163] According to John Allen, actors engage in "spatial twists and turns [. . .] to transcend a landscape of fixed distances and well-defined proximities".[164] He and other authors have discussed how to construct responsibility "at-a-distance" and across different "geographies of responsibility".[165] Yet they did so in mostly theoretical ways.[166] Burkina Faso's mining boom illustrates how different macro- and micro-actors construct responsibilities from near and at-a-distance. At this point it is important to mention that proximity and distance constitute not necessarily topologically-inscribed features. A mining professional can live and work in western Burkina Faso, and still is he able to distance himself from the social-spatial context he interacts in and with. A local resident is not able to fulfil the "global" requirements to enter Burkina Faso's industrial mining labour market, even though a large-scale mining project has destroyed her

161 See Himley, *Extractivist Geographies*, p. 31.

162 See C. List and P. Pettit, *Group Agency*: *The Possibility, Design, Status of Corporate Agents*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

163 H. Arendt, *Responsibility and Judgement*, New York: Schocken, 2003.

164 Allen, *Topologies of Power*, pp. 126–127.

165 Ibid., pp. 110–112; Massey, *Geographies of Responsibility*.

166 Empirically, obligations of justice that arise from heightened global interdependence have been related to the transnational NGO world, constructing "collective" consumer responsibility in global supply chains and production networks. By referring to Arendt's concept of "collective responsibility", Iris Marion Young has demonstrated how NGOs and activists in the anti-sweatshop and Fairtrade movements have achieved the construction of responsibility at-a-distance. (I. M. Young, "Responsibility and Global Labor Justice", *Journal of Political Philosophy* 12 [2004] 4, pp. 365–388).

livelihoods. In corporate head offices and areas of extraction, however, the same firm granting or denying access to the industrial labour market displays itself as socially responsible and as a "corporate citizen".

"The expectations that firms will be good corporate citizens in the global sphere is one of the latest mandates of CSR."[167] The fashionable use of corporate citizenship by the corporate world, however, also poses moral, legal, and political challenges. While governments are (legally) accountable to their citizens or the society as a whole, corporations are not. Yet they are increasingly seen as responsible for administering citizenship across multiple jurisdictions.[168] Hence, how far are corporations, for instance, legally (made) responsible for social welfare (traditionally assumed by nation-states) in mining contexts of the Global South? In African countries, the CSR movement mainly evolved from the twenty-first century, and thus in parallel with governmental attempts to regain regulatory authority over their national economies. The Burkinabè mining sector is very typical in this regard, as it has been and continues to be subject to a both profound legislative reform since 2015 and to numerous regimes of voluntary commitments of the present multinational mining companies in the country. This account of Burkina Faso's recent mining history aims to add to a body of literature that focuses on CSR as an apparatus of governance that shapes and transcends scalar relations.[169] Today, "responsibility", "transparency", and "sustainability" serve as powerful tools and discourses not only invoked by the corporate world, but also by governments, NGOs and local populations.

While ethics appear to have significant effects for changing dynamics of power and authority in company-state-community relations, it is confronted to the finite nature of non-renewable resources. It thus remains questionable at best whether CSR is able to counter structural inequalities in resource governance, such as (non)access to these finite resources. Moral and legal accountability are not always easily to disentangle, especially not for local populations in the direct vicinity of industrial mining projects. The present work investigates these phenomena (i.e., the interplay between CSR and selected national and regional jurisdictions) by looking at the various negotiation practices around corporate responsibility. How do actors eventually deal with and challenge the territorializing effects of mining capitalism nationally and locally? How is the latter shaped by CSR as a "new [global] orthodoxy"[170]? It will be highlighted

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167 Carroll, *Managing Ethically with Global Stakeholders*, p. 116.

168 Pistor, *Multinational Corporations as Regulators and Central Planners*, pp. 172–176.

169 See S. Kirsch, *Mining Capitalism*; Rajak, *In Good Company*; Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*.

170 Rajak, *Ethnographies of Extraction*, p. 91.

how CSR has broadened the groups to whom the firm is held accountable. These are not anymore only shareholders but workers, customers, suppliers, competitors, local populations and national and local governments.[171] Through the specific institutionalization of ethics, the boundaries of the public and private spheres, as the roles of states, companies and communities become constantly re-negotiated.

A Minefield of Company-State-Community Relations

"So you're taking a stance on behalf of the communities?" This was the question posed to me by a French precious metals fund executive suddenly at an investors' conference in Frankfurt am Main in June 2018. At the two-days gathering focused on mining investment opportunities in Europe, I soon realized that my role as a social anthropologist working on mining in Africa was mostly equated with "community advocacy" by the corporate world. Although I mentioned from the beginning of the meeting that my research focus on corporate responsibility exceeds CSR questions, I had to fulfil the role of the "community relations expert" during the whole conference. This eventually resulted in a final statement I was asked for on how to advance company-community relations around the world, which later was launched online by an investor-dedicated media portal. Looking back, I remember this situation as one of the most awkward instances of my field research. More generally, it strongly reminded me about discussions on the "embedded anthropologist" label, but also perceptions of "activist research" in the field of economic anthropology. While the former mainly criticizes the problematic nature of industry-funded and -influenced research,[172] the latter unanimously advocates for the "community case" and focuses on harms brought about by mining.[173] "Traditionally", resource anthropology tended to engage more with the mining-affected communities than studying up on corporate or governmental structures, and was branded as "activist research" on behalf of "indigenous communities" in the Global South. In the past decade, however, scholars

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171 Sison, *From CSR to Corporate Citizenship*, p. 244.

172 Mainly owing to the recruitment of numerous social science researchers by multinational corporations for their community engagement programmes and projects since the 1990s. See C. Coumans, "Occupying Spaces Created by Conflict: Anthropologists, Development NGOs, Responsible Investment, and Mining", *Current Anthropology* 52 (2011) S3, pp. S29–S43; Kirsch, *Anthropology and Advocacy*.

173 See M. Welker, "No Ethnographic Playground: Mining Projects and Anthropological Politics. A Review Essay", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 58 (2016) 2, pp. 577–586.

increasingly started to argue that more research from "inside" mining corporations was needed, even advocating for an "internal turn" in social science research on mining capitalism.[174] Authors emphasized that the complex make-up of the global mining industry requires both research on the effects of corporations (mostly in the Global South) and research on the inner-workings of the corporate world.[175] Ethnographic research has therefore increasingly turned to studying up the agency of elites in mining governance.[176] Recent years have also seen a surge of anthropological research on particular materialities and temporalities of resource extraction, and how they shape and are shaped by social relations on various scales.[177]

In order to be able to investigate the changing and sometimes conflicting relationships between "the global", "the national" and "the local" in mining governance, my own research broke with several conventions of classical ethnographic field research. It did so mainly by transcending the epistemic company-community divide in social science mining research, and by applying multi-sidedness to trace the spatializing actions of actors. During my field research in Burkina Faso, Canada and Germany, I became convinced that looking into diverse sites of mining capitalism allows for a better understanding of company-state-community relations. This book also accounts for the need to empirically tackle multiple scales rather than centring on particular ones ("the global", "the national", or "the local"),[178] and to incorporate

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174 D. Kemp, "Community Relations in the Global Mining Industry: Exploring the Internal Dimensions of Externally Orientated Work", *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management* 17 (2010) 1, pp. 1–14, at 2; D. Kemp and J. R. Owen, "Community Relations and Mining: Core to Business but Not 'Core Business'", *Resources Policy* 38 (2013) 4, pp. 523–531, at 524.

175 Coumans, *Occupying Spaces Created by Conflict*; G. Urban and K.-N. Koh, "Ethnographic Research on Modern Business Corporations", *Annual Review of Anthropology* 42 (2013) 1, pp. 139–158; Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*.

176 See, for example, A. Golub and R. Mooweon, "Traction: The Role of Executives in Localizing Global Mining and Petroleum Industries in Papua New Guinea", *Paideuma* (2013) 59, pp. 215–236; Rajak, *Ethnographies of Extraction*; Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*.

177 See, for example, Ferry, *Gold Prices as Material-Social Actors*; S. Geenen, "Underground Dreams. Uncertainty, Risk and Anticipation in the Gold Production Network", *Geoforum* 91 (2018), pp. 30–38; S. Luning, "Mining Temporalities: Future Perspectives", *The Extractive Industries and Society* 5 (2018) 2, pp. 281–286; T. Richardson and G. Weszkalnys, "Introduction: Resource Materialities", *Anthropological Quarterly* 87 (2014) 1, pp. 5–30.

178 Himley, *Extractivist Geographies*.

the various dimensions of mining (economic, social, material and legal); on the ground and occasionally underground (see Figure 1.2).[179]

Figure 1.2: Multi-sited ethnography in practice: Author in the underground mine of Bagassi.

Even with a "regional" focus on Burkina Faso, this book is strictly speaking not *about* Burkina Faso.[180] The extractive relations constituting the country's recent industrial gold mining boom do by far represent a field of investigation constituted by a geographically located space with clearly demarcated boundaries. This counters the more "traditional" ethnographic approaches aiming to provide holistic representations of small and relatively clearly bounded groups in a given field site.[181] "Thick" interactions with and descriptions of what was conceived as the life world of "natives", could only be established during a relatively long-term

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179 M. Ey and M. Sherval, "Exploring the Minescape: Engaging with the Complexity of the Extractive Sector", *Area* 48 (2016) 2, pp. 176–182; R. Godoy, "Mining: Anthropological Perspectives", *Annual Review of Anthropology* 14 (1985) 1, pp. 199–217.
180 See Appel, *The Licit Life of Capitalism*, p. 4.
181 Falzon, *Introduction*; Nadai and Maeder, *Fuzzy Fields*.

journey of field research.[182] The ethnographic site of research was usually "understood as the container of a particular set of social relations which could be studied and possibly compared with the contents of other containers elsewhere".[183] Due to its own "crisis of representation" since the 1980s[184] and an increasing prominence of the "spatial turn" in social anthropology, the mid-1990s saw the rise of "mobile" or "multi-sited" ethnography. The latter challenged a number of conventions in the field, among them the container-like nature of space, as Falzon stated. "In sum, contemporary research has to come to terms with the idea that, logically, if space is produced, there is no reason why the space of ethnography should be exempt. Which puts the processes of this production, and the possibility of alternatives, on the agenda."[185]

Famously introduced by George E. Marcus in his *The Annual Review of Anthropology* essay, multi-sited ethnography attempts to tackle "multiple sites of observation and participation that cross-cut dichotomies such as the 'local' and the 'global', the 'lifeworld' and the 'system'".[186] Previously, "the global" (or in Marcus' words, the "world system") was seen as a framework within which the local was contextualized or compared, or "as a container within which social interaction just happens".[187] With the rise of multi-sited ethnography, however, it became an integral part of multi-sited objects of study. Instead of focusing on a single site of observation, multi-sited ethnographers follow people, connections, associations, and relationships across space. It has in common with central assumptions derived from critical geography that "the global" is not something abstract, monolithic and "external", but an integral part of social relations.[188] It is notably through ethnography that we come the closest to multifaceted and

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182 Falzon, *Introduction*, p. 1; C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, New-York: Basic Books, 1973.

183 Ibid., p. 1.

184 The discussions under the header of "crisis of representation" addressed a number of challenges including questions of writing, power, ethics and the embedding of small-scale "traditional" communities in larger systems (Nadai and Maeder, *Fuzzy Fields*; See P. Atkinson, *Understanding Ethnographic Texts*, Newbury Park, CA: SAGE, 1992; J. Clifford and G. E. Marcus [eds.], *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*, Berkeley: Univiversity of California Press, 1986).

185 Falzon, *Introduction*, p. 4; K. F. Olwig and K. Hastrup, *Siting Culture: The Shifting Anthropological Object*, 1st edn, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 1.

186 G. E. Marcus, "ETHNOGRAPHY IN/OF the WORLD SYSTEM: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography", *Annual Review of Anthropology* 25 (1995), pp. 95–117, at 95.

187 Marung and Middell, *The Re-Spatialization of the World*, p. 4.

188 Falzon, *Introduction*, pp. 1–2; Mansfield *Beyond Rescaling*; Massey, *For Space*; Massey, *Geographies of Responsibility*.

fleeting actions of spatialization by individual and collective actors under the global condition.[189] As the ethnographer's occupation is to study others "in their space and time", he or she "has therefore, a privileged insight into the lived experience of globalization".[190] However, in order to analytically capture and contextualize a "huge variety of more or less consequential observations", ethnographic methods ideally have to account for scalar dimensions and the societal relevance of the phenomena overserved.[191]

In their review article on *The Anthropology of Mining*, Chris Ballard and Glenn Banks have advocated for "multi-sited ethnography" as the most appropriate methodological lens through which "the full spectrum of activities which contribute to and contextualize mining as a site for research must be addressed, if only at the level of the multi-sited 'imaginary'".[192] Since the "the multinational corporation" or "the global mining economy" does not represent a clearly bounded object of study such investigations allow us to appropriately map inherently fragmented yet connected spatial and social spheres. Research on both the effects of corporations (on workers, host communities etc.) and the innerworkings of corporations (e.g., the space-making practices of mining professionals), I am convinced, can contribute to epistemologically "disenclave" what is often thought to be two monolithic entities, namely the "company" and the "community" in global mining capitalism.[193] It further enables us to investigate the role of other macro- and micro-actors (such as the state and its various representatives) within these relationships.

However, the spatially dispersed field through which the ethnographer moves also poses several important methodological challenges. As Ballard and Banks emphasized, the pursuit of a multi-sited ethnography of mining "appears to lie beyond the competence of any individual researcher".[194] In pursuing a multi-sited research programme, the researcher potentially faces various constraints, notably in terms of funding and time. How can we still adapt to "thick description" as "one of ethnography's richest offerings" while being mobile and multi-sited?[195] A second and related methodological challenge is that the practices of "following"

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189 Middell, *Category of Spatial Formats*, p. 18.

190 Burawoy, *Introduction*, p. 4.

191 Middell, *Category of Spatial Formats*, p. 4.

192 Ballard and Banks, *Resource Wars*, p. 307.

193 Kemp and Owen, *Community Relations and Mining*, p. 524; Urban and Koh, *Ethnographic Research on Modern Business Corporations*.

194 Ballard and Banks, *Resource Wars*, p. 307.

195 Falzon, *Introduction*, p. 7; Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*; Cf. M. Candea, "Arbitrary Locations: In Defence of the Bounded Field-Site", in: M.-A. Falzon (ed.), *Multi-Sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis and Locality in Contemporary Research*, Farnham: Ashgate, 2009, pp. 25–46;

has tangible consequences for the production of researchers' field sites. Studying a multinational corporation, for instance, must necessarily imply the choice of a limited number of locations chosen by the researcher. Emphasizing the role of Canada as a home country of multinational corporations active in Burkina Faso potentially contributes to downplaying the role of Australia and vice-versa. For one of the corporations I studied – incorporated on the Cayman Islands with corporate offices in London, and listed on the Toronto stock exchange – there was neither an identifiable "nationality" nor "corporate citizenship" (see Chapters 3 and 4). In how far we incorporate ourselves an imagined "given" space or a set of trajectories that we are able to follow during research and that eventually contradict our own assumptions that space is socially produced?[196]

A third important methodological challenge was the above-mentioned "conflicted nature of mining as a site for research", which in terms of ethnographic engagements all too often tends to become a conflictive "playground" for both researchers and researched.[197] Reflexivity and positionality are being advocated in social science research as a strategy for situating their subjectivities and knowledge, and how these may shape the research process. Yet in practice, this poses a range of challenges.[198] While positionality has often been considered as referring to social characteristics and identifications of the researcher (notably in terms of class, "race", gender and age as social categories), it also incorporates questions of the researcher's positionalities within academic disciplines.[199] Ballard and Banks depicted ethnographic engagements in mining research as generally characterized by dilemma shifting between an "illusionary neutrality" and research projects committed on behalf of communities.[200] While a simple binary distinction between pro- and anti-industry stances may appear methodologically overdrawn, the choice of and access to interlocutors, interview partners and infrastructures continues to be constitutive for the overall direction of research and its outcomes.

G. Hage, "A Not so Multi-Sited Ethnography of a Not so Imagined Community", *Anthropological Theory* 5 (2005) 4, 463–475.

196 Falzon, *Introduction*, p. 10.

197 Ballard and Banks, *Resource Wars*, p. 307; Niederberger and Haller, *PART I*, pp. 21–22; Welker, *No Ethnographic Playground*.

198 See G. Rose, "Situating Knowledges: Positionality, Reflexivities and Other Tactics", *Progress in Human Geography* 21 (1997) 3, pp. 305–320; A. Herod, "Reflections on Interviewing Foreign Elites: Praxis, Positionality, Validity, and the Cult of the Insider", *Geoforum* 30 (1999) 4, pp. 313–327.

199 Ibid., pp. 320–321.

200 Ballard and Banks, *Resource Wars*, p. 306.

During my fieldwork, I certainly experienced forms of "infrastructural violence" that entail exclusion and disconnection, such as (electric) security fences separating the mine concession and surrounding villages or towns.[201] Not all mining professionals I came across were eager to expose themselves to ethnographic scrutiny. Yet despite a prevailing reluctance which is profoundly shaped by the "activist" label ethnography has in the corporate world, I did not perceive the former as "notorious", as stated by Ballard and Banks.[202] Many interlocutors of the corporate world were willing to make their perceptions of company-state-community relations accessible since they perceived popular images of the mining industry as too negative or monolithic. My own position as a white woman and emerging scholar doing research in a Global South context has had huge impacts on access relationships. Many of my interviewees and especially other white expatriates[203] working in Burkina Faso accepted and saw me as a "peer" with whom to share personal issues. This occasionally revealed the challenge or risk of becoming too involved with the lifeworlds of the people I studied and unanimously implied ethical questions about appropriate means of gathering material.

My status as a white female researcher from the Global North mostly entailed advantages in terms of access relationships in the field. I never had to hide that I was talking to the respective "other side" of the corporate fence, even though it was not always an easy task to navigate my research through a political and methodological "minefield of company-community relations".[204] I occasionally found myself seeking to manipulate my own positionalities depending upon the situation, place and the interlocutors (e.g., elites or non-elites) with which I was confronted. "Emphasizing commonalities" also helped

201 See H. Appel, "Walls and White Elephants: Oil Extraction, Responsibility, and Infrastructural Violence in Equatorial Guinea", *Ethnography* 13 (2012) 4, pp. 439–465; H. Appel, "Offshore Work: Oil, Modularity, and the How of Capitalism in Equatorial Guinea", *American Ethnologist* 39 (2012) 4, pp. 692–709.

202 Ballard and Banks, *Resource Wars*, p. 290.

203 I subsequently use the term "expatriate" as referring to someone who does not live in his or her birth country. Yet I also recognize that the term as a "category of practice" by those who actually use it (including my own) mostly refers to white people living or working in the Global South in contrast to "(im)migrants" from the South living and working in the Global North. The terms "Black", "white" and "race" will in the following not be used as pointing to biological or genetic facts, but to socially constructed and constantly reproduced categories. (R. Brubaker, "Migration, Membership, and the Modern Nation-State: Internal and External Dimensions of the Politics of Belonging", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 41 [2010] 1, pp. 61–78; Appel, *The Licit Life of Capitalism*, p. 286; Mbembe, *Critique of Black Reason*, p. 11).

204 S. Luning, "Processing Promises of Gold: A Minefield of Company–Community Relations in Burkina Faso", *Africa Today* 58 (2012) 3, pp. 23–39.

me in getting access to many anti-mining activist perspectives in Burkina Faso and Canada.[205] I was not willing to completely hide my own, rather critical stance towards large-scale mining. Due to the overall research focus (to investigate whether and how the various spatial configurations re-enforce social hierarchies and inequalities), and being aware about the danger of constructing "African worlds" as Western knowledge realities,[206] I have never perceived my work as "politically neutral". Producing knowledge about my ethnos (which is mining capitalism in and around Burkina Faso) at least does not immediately resolve some of the dilemmas associated with extractivism (such as the inherent environmental harms and the destruction of livelihoods) at local, national or global levels.[207] That mining-impacted populations expressed both hopes that I would report their concerns to the respective mining company, and a certain "tiredness" concerning surveys and assessments came as no surprise. The latter figure as important and necessary tools of mining companies needed to acquire an extraction license from the state (see Chapter 5). Reluctance of interviewees can be explained with a certain fear that interviews eventually lead to mining-induced displacement and resettlement (MIDR) practices. The biggest ethical dilemma I was confronted with during my field research, however, was a case of human trafficking in Houndé – one of the extractive areas I was studying in western Burkina Faso. In the aftermath of the closure of a brothel by state security forces in November 2017 and the imprisonment of the management, I provided a voluntary testimony to the public prosecutors' offices in Boromo.[208] Yet this was only one extreme case in which the simple dichotomy of "insider"/ "outsider" in field research has been obsolete.[209]

Instead of "going native", I often rather felt that I was "going expatriate" when conducting research on either side of the corporate fence. During research stays in the urban and semi-urban settings of industrial mine sites, I often had to think about what James Ferguson in his ethnography on the economic decline of the copper belt in Zambia described as the "unintelligibility of fieldwork".[210] Doing research among people of diverse backgrounds, such as Bulgarian construction workers, Canadian diamond drillers, Gabonese camp managers, or

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205 See Herod, *Reflections on Interviewing Foreign Elites*, p. 323.

206 See V. Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa*: *Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge*, Bloomington, London: Indiana University Press; James Currey, 1988, p. xi.

207 See Appel, *The Licit Life of Capitalism*, p. 5; Kirsch, *Mining Capitalism*, p. 3.

208 Chapter 6 describes the case in more detail.

209 See Herod, *Reflections on Interviewing Foreign Elites*, p. 323.

210 J. Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity*: *Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, pp. 208–209.

Nigerian sex workers, I was obviously not dealing with an ethnos or "cultural whole" in the classical ethnographic sense. Although some inhabitants of villages and towns clearly considered themselves as "more local than others", industrial mining sites and their neighbourhoods are usually "cosmopolitan spaces". I encountered, just as Ferguson did in the urban Zambian mining context of the late 1980s, many "natives" who were out of place themselves – just as the ethnographer.[211] As locations of research were often not fixed but meaning and time-related, my ethnographic engagements can best be captured by the concept of "translocational positionality".[212] Emphasizing "actors' perspectives" which means to perceive of actors as the designers of their own realities involved necessary shifts and contradictions for both me as a researcher and my interlocutors.[213] Beyond the methodological challenges multi-sidedness posed, however, it offered the most appropriate ways of studying mining capitalism. Most significantly it allowed exploring the emplacement of "the global" across sites, and therefore to integrate the relational thinking of space into research practice.[214]

Spaces of Responsibility

The rather "fuzzy field" of the Burkinabè mining sector spans an indefinite number of social worlds since it is simultaneously anchored in the global mining economy as in national and local extractive relations and practices.[215] Similar to "petro capitalism", host states of large-scale mining projects stand in relation to a particular sort of capitalism with a key resource (gold for the case of Burkina Faso) and a logic of extraction shaping company-state-community relations.[216] The emergence of physically demarcated "fortresses of production" with security clearance systems and access restrictions does not simply imply that extractive relations are limited to the concessionary site alone.[217] Negotiations

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211 Ibid., p. 229.

212 F. Anthias, "Thinking Through the Lens of Translocational Positionality: An Intersectionality Frame for Understanding Identity and Belonging", *Translocations: Migration and Social Change* 1 (2008) 4, pp. 5–20.

213 N. Long, *Development Sociology*: *Actor Perspectives*, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 49.

214 See Massey, *Geographies of Responsibility*, p. 5.

215 See Nadai and Maeder, *Fuzzy Fields*.

216 See Kirsch, *Mining Capitalism*; Watts, *Antinomies of Community*.

217 J. Hönke, "Transnational Pockets of Territoriality.: Governing the Security of Extraction in Katanga (DRC)", Leipzig, Working Paper Series of the Graduate Centre Humanities and Social Sciences of the Research Academy Leipzig 2 (2009), pp. 20–21; J. R. Owen and D. Kemp, *Extractive Relations*: *Countervailing Power and the Global Mining Industry*, London: Routledge,

over responsibility and accountability in mining governance exceed the actual sites of extraction and the boundaries of nation-states where resources are located.[218] Profit-making and responsibilizing the sector as two sometimes competing, sometimes complementary globalization projects constitute central ideas of and for twenty-first century mining capitalism. Their relationships become discussed by a number of actors in various places, among them most importantly the sites where extraction actually takes place.

Although ethnographically focusing on two sites of industrial gold production in (south-)western Burkina Faso, the research has not been comparative. The findings from different fields have been perceived instead as elements of a puzzle that are put together to form a more complete picture of spatialities of responsibility and extraction. The depth of focus and field research varied from site to site due to the nature of the field itself, and constraints in access or time. The "different but complexly connected sites" have been identified by tracing relevant topics across space, and the specific actors that enact these topics in multiple ways.[219] "Following the people" meant, in my case, mapping a variety of relevant arenas where negotiations on company-state-community relations take place. These range from investment conferences, community gatherings, demonstrations, political events, mining compounds and city council meetings. The geographical sites of ethnographic investigation therefore span from Burkina Faso (Ouagadougou, Houndé, Bagassi), Germany (Frankfurt am Main, Leipzig, Berlin), to Canada (Ottawa, Toronto). While the bulk of one year of multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork has been conducted in Burkina Faso, the research in Canada and Germany is based on a couple of weeks and a few days respectively. Between October 2016 and November 2018 I gathered my empirical material through ethnographic methods, i.e., interviews and participant observation during four research stays in Burkina Faso, one in Canada, and the occasional assistance of "mining events" in Germany. In order to form a more encompassing picture (notably on the "downstream money" of mining capitalism) and to encounter some of the challenges multi-sited fieldwork poses, I additionally integrated a range of conferences I attended "virtually" into my research portfolio. These comprised notably of webcasts, quarterly investor calls and presentations of the two studied companies, and events covered by social media accounts such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. This was supplemented by document analysis I

2017; M. Welker, "'Corporate Security Begins in the Community': Mining, the Corporate Social Responsibility Industry, and Environmental Advocacy in Indonesia", *Cultural Anthropology* 24 (2009) 1, pp. 142–179.

218 See Martín, *Reimagining Extractivism*, p. 35.

219 Nadai and Maeder, *Fuzzy Fields*.

started in early 2016 that mainly comprised national, regional and local policy papers, maps and websites and reports of multinational mining corporations.

The 273 interviews with company state and community representatives on which this book is mainly based range from informal conversations during which I jotted notes into my notebook, to recorded and transcribed interviews based on semi-standardized guidelines.[220] Due to the sensitive nature of huge parts of the material I gathered during interviews and participant observation, I made sure to leave identities of interlocutors vague. I therefore decided to only specify on the individual status of the persons interviewed (as "mining executive", "CSR agent", "civil society activist", "government official" or "farmer"). In some cases, I have applied pseudonyms in the text when referring to the specific biographies and life-worlds of individual actors. To people that are familiar with the topic and the region these can be by no doubt identifiable. Yet I assume that these latter actors may also be familiar with the different perspectives and ongoing conflicts I elaborate on.[221] Real names are only used for public figures involved in public events. This is also the case for company executives that expressed public statements during investor calls and presentations accessible online.

Mine Sites in Burkina Faso

In Burkina Faso, my research portfolio had been compromised for several reasons. Three of the most import ones had been security reasons,[222] infrastructural access, and the willingness of one of the studied corporations to accept me as an "intern" to shadow their CSR activities on several occasions between 2017 and 2018. I was reflecting for a while on whether I should anonymize the

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220 For that reason, many of the quotations provided in this book often refer to my efforts to capture as best as possible the actual words of interviewees. Longer quotes, however, are usually based on transcribed and coded recordings. Translations, especially from French to English, are usually my own. During my fieldwork, I occasionally worked with different research assistants in the two mining areas who translated from Dyula, Mooré or Bwamu and whom I considered as important "gatekeepers" for the research process. (See R. Edwards, "Power and Trust: An Academic Researcher's Perspective on Working with Interpreters as Gatekeepers", *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 16 [2013] 6, pp. 503–514).

221 In doing so, I am guided by Welker's empirical approach (Welker, *Enacting the Corporation*, pp. xvii–xviii).

222 The overall security situation in the country did not allow ethnographic field research to be conducted in the northern parts of the country, where many large-scale mining projects are located.

mines I was studying during my fieldwork. I eventually decided not to do so because my analytical argument that "context matters" for extractive processes, and that it exceeds the actual sites or "enclaves" of mineral extraction would otherwise be rendered ineffective. Bagassi and Houndé are indeed very specific sites of extraction that differ in size, infrastructural "connection" to the rest of the country, forms of socio-political organization and participation, and even by the very materiality of their gold deposits. The latter are extracted through very different means and techniques, "open pit" and "underground".

Although not part of the same administrative units, the surroundings of Bagassi (*Province des Balé, Région du Boucle du Mouhoun*) and Houndé (*Province du Tuy, Région des Hauts-Bassins*) share important similarities. They are located only 50 kilometers (km) away from each other (flight distance), and could be reached by motorbike in three hours' time. Both mining municipalities are situated between the capital city of Ouagadougou in the centre and Burkina Faso's economic capital Bobo-Dioulassou in the (south-)west (see Figure 1.3).[223]

A common language many "autochthones" speak is Bwamu.[224] Since precolonial times, the Bwaba region is known as one of the country's most significant cotton producing regions.[225] It also saw multiple immigration movements due to which Mossé and Peulh populations settled in the area.[226] The Houndé

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223 See B. Engels et al., "Mining Conflicts in Burkina Faso", http://www.mining-conflicts-burkina.net/ (accessed 29 October 2019).

224 Subsequently I will refer to "autochthony" as a "category of practice" that my interlocutors used. In a broader sense, the idea of "autochthony" means "first arrival" or "emerging from the soil" and serves as a mechanism through which processes of inclusion and exclusion to a given community take place. "Autochthones" ("sons of the earth") are opposed to "Allogènes" ("new comers"/"strangers"), which introduces a distinction of "soil" and "territory" (See A. Appadurai, "Souvereignty Without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography", in: S. M. Low, D. Lawrence-Zúñiga (eds.), *The Anthropology of Space and Place: Locating Culture*, Malden MA: Blackwell, 2003, pp. 337–349; M. Bøås, "'New' Nationalism and Autochthony –Tales of Origin as Political Cleavage", *Africa Spectrum* 44 (2009) 1, pp. 19–38; C. Lund, "Property and Citizenship: Conceptually Connecting Land Rights and Belonging in Africa", *Africa Spectrum* 46 (2011) 3, pp. 71–75).

225 Phliponeau Marie and Guibert Hervé, "Système lignager, moteur de l'expansion de la culture cotonnière ? Le cas des Bwa du Burkina Faso" [Lignage system, the driving force behind the expansion of cotton cultivation? The case of the Bwa of Burkina Faso], *Biotechnology, Agronomy, Society and Environment* 15 (2010) 3, pp. 367–378, at 368.

226 Other ethnicities of the region are for instance Gourounssi, Bissa, Samo, Kôh and Nounouma. (Commune urbaine de Houndé, "Plan Communal de Développement (PCD) 2017–2021 de Houndé" [Communal Development Plan [PCD] 2017–2021 of Houndé], Houndé [2017], p. 19; Roxgold SANU, "Étude d'Impact Environnemental et Social [EIES] du projet d'extension et de modification du plan d'exploitation de la mine de Yaramoko dans la commune de Bagassi, province des Balé: Rapport final" [Environmental and Social Impact Assessment [ESIA] for the

Figure 1.3: Multinational mining corporations in Burkina Faso (October 2019): Houndé and Bagassi.

and Bagassi gold deposits are both part of the Houndé greenstone belt which extends from the Ivory Coast border to the north of Houndé and Bagassi.[227] As the artisanal gold mining frontier spread from the northern parts of the country to the southern ones from the late 1980s, artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) evolved as an important livelihood strategy in the region.[228] Due to the influx of artisanal miners to the rich deposits of the Birimian Greenstone belt in the late 1990s and early 2000s, young people of Houndé and Bagassi (in contrast to their elders) soon got involved in ASM activities. A little later, from the early 2000s, both municipalities additionally became "hubs" for industrial mining activities.

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extension and modification of the Yaramoko mine exploitation plan in the municipality of Bagassi, Bale Province: Final Report], [2017], p. 130).

227 See K. A. Hein, "The Bagassi Gold Deposits on the Eastern Margin of the Houndé Greenstone Belt, Burkina Faso", *Ore Geology Reviews* 78 (2016), pp. 660–666.

228 See K. Werthmann, "Gold Mining in Burkina Faso Since the 1980s", in: K. Werthmann, T. Grätz (eds.), *Mining Frontiers in Africa: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives*, Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2012, pp. 119–132.

Despite the spatial and socio-economic proximity of both municipalities, conditions for large-scale mining have been quite different. This has to do with a number of socio-political conditions, the specificity of subsoil deposits and different corporate cultures and enactments, as the following chapters of this book will reveal in more detail. While Houndé evolved as one of Burkina Faso's urban centres during the past few decades, the municipality of Bagassi kept a more "rural" character. It comprised an estimated population of 41,193 inhabitants in 2017, of whom around 3,000 people lived in the direct vicinity of the Yaramoko mine.[229] Large-scale gold exploration in the Bagassi region was being conducted since the mid-1970s by the Geological Survey of Burkina Faso (later known as the *Bureau des Mines et de la Géologie du Burkina*, BUMIGEB). In 2011, Roxgold Inc., a Canadian-based gold mining company, acquired the Bagassi exploration permit. The company subsequently engaged in extensive diamond drilling programmes that revealed an average gold grade of 21.26 gram per ton (g/t) mined ore in specific areas.[230] It is mainly owing to proven and probable ore reserves to a depth of 980 metres that the Yaramoko gold mine has been the first and to date only underground mine in the country. It started commercial production in October 2016.[231] Since then, the Burkina Faso subsidiary Roxgold Sanu SA (90 per cent owned by Roxgold Inc. and 10 per cent owned by the government of Burkina Faso) and its Australian subcontractor Africa Underground Services (AUMS) have extracted and developed two gold deposits: the "55 Zone", a fully underground mine and "Bagassi South" which achieved commercial production by the end of December 2018. After the approval of the extension project by the Burkinabè council of ministers in June 2018, the concession was extended from the initial 15.84 square kilometres (km^2) to 23.54 km^2 in total. In 2018, the concessionary size significantly outnumbered the adjacent village of Bagassi.

Houndé, on the other hand, has the status of an "urban municipality" (*commune urbaine de Houndé*) and capital city (*chef-lieu*) of the province of Tuy. At the moment of research, the urban municipality of Houndé comprised a total area of 1,244 km^2 with 15 villages and Houndé town.[232] Half of all population of the urban municipality was concentrated in five sectors of the latter. The occasionally indicated area of 2.18 km^2 is based on the last national census from

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229 Roxgold SANU, *Étude d'Impact Environnemental et Social*, pp. 127–128.

230 See Hein, *The Bagassi Gold Deposits*.

231 Roxgold Inc., "Operations & Projects – Yaramoko", https://www.roxgold.com/operations-and-projects/yaramoko/default.aspx (accessed 2 January 2021).

232 Commune urbaine de Houndé, *Plan Communal de Développement (PCD) 2017–2021 de Houndé*, p. 12.

2006 (*Recensement Général de la Population*). Estimates and maps indicate that the town since must have at least doubled in surface and population numbers, hosting an estimated population of more than 150,000 in 2017.[233] As in Bagassi, around 80 per cent of Houndé's inhabitants made their living out of subsistence agriculture, farming and herding.[234] Yet the town was further host to two production sites of the parastatal cotton company *Société Burkinabè des Fibres Textiles* (SOFITEX). As in Bagassi, large-scale exploration projects have a longer but interrupted tradition. Until the 1980s, the BUMIGEB was involved in exploration works for minerals and metals in Houndé.[235] However, multinational mining firms only applied for industrial permits in the early 2000s. In October 2012, the Cayman Islands registered company Endeavour Mining acquired the "Houndé property" from the Canadian junior company Avion Gold, comprising a land package of more than 1,000 km^2 and eight individual exploration concessions.[236] In February 2015, the Burkinabè state awarded Endeavour Mining the extraction license for its Houndé mine which exceeds a total surface area of 23.19 km^2. In December 2016, the Houndé permit was complemented by two extracting licenses for the satellite deposits Bouéré and Dohoun, also located in the same municipality.[237] Houndé Gold Operations SA (HGO), in which Endeavour Mining has a 90 per cent and the state of Burkina Faso a 10 per cent share, operates the mine in Houndé. Since the project only started commercial production in October 2017, research has been partly conducted during the construction phase of the industrial mine site. What could already be noted, however, was that the concession extended over large parts of the urban municipality of Houndé (see Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4).

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233 Ibid., p. 19.

234 Comité de Résistance de Houndé, "Putsch Fachiste au Burkina Faso en Septembre 2015: Rapport de la résistance face au coup d'État manqué de Septembre 2015" [Fascist coup in Burkina Faso in September 2015: Report of the resistance in the face of the coup d'état failure of September 2015] (2016), p. 11.

235 See M. Zammit et al., "Feasibility Study NI 43–101 Technical Report: Houndé Gold Projet, Burkina Faso", Perth (2013), 1.5.

236 Ibid., 6.3–6.5.

237 Agence de Presse Africaine, "Burkina: Trois nouveaux permis miniers pour plus 200 milliards f cfa et 2000 emplois" [Burkina: Three new mining permits for more than 200 billion f cfa and 2,000 jobs], *aOuaga.com*, 23 December 2016.

Multi-Scalar Negotiation Practices

The global CSR movement has led to a widening in scope of a firm's responsibility and obligations from the mere economic and legal spheres to social and ethical ones and has broadened the groups to whom the firm is held accountable.[238] The present book cannot necessarily contribute to a reduction of spatial complexity in describing and analysing "the ethical turn" in global mining capitalism. Rather it explores dominant modes of resource governance and their spatial organization through a specific case study, this being negotiations of "corporate responsibility" in the Burkinabè gold mining sector after the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. The latter serves as a vantage point to discuss the meanings of "ethical capitalism" from the angle of the multiple places, spaces and scales involved in mining governance. "Letting the research guide the data collection" meant in my case to discover ideas and concepts that were specifically relevant to actors involved in (the ethics of) concession-making.[239] Negotiations around issues and actors held responsible for "ethical mining" have been identified as a key theme across different sites of research.

A mapping of relevant topics, actors and relationships eventually uncovers what holds mining capitalism socio-spatially together. However, the mapping in this book is not static in nature. An "anti-essentialist" analysis of multi-scalar mining governance enables us to also study how boundaries are blurred and mutually shape each other: this relates on the one hand to scale as a social relation (not as an object of study), and on the other to corporations, states and communities seen as multiple and enacted. The present work empirically tackles how their interests, responsibilities, and boundaries become (re)negotiated, and how such negotiations make reference to linkages between resource extraction and socio-economic development. The multiple angles from which topics of responsibility have been addressed in recent years, I argue, indicate a proliferation of multi-scalar spaces of negotiation and nodes of governance in Burkina Faso's industrial gold mining sector. Actors strategically engage in processes of connection with and de-connection to "the global", "the national" and "the local", and consequently address companies, states or communities for their concerns. In doing so, they establish relationships to and with multiple spatialities of responsibility. This indicates, in turn, whether specific formats of governance become dominant or not in ordering extractivism.

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238 Sison, *From CSR to Corporate Citizenship*, p. 244.

239 See J. M. Corbin and A. L. Strauss, *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*, 3rd edn, Los Angeles: SAGE, 2008, p. 157.

Against the backdrop of mining capitalism's territorializing logics, this book asks what it actually "does" when multinational corporations increasingly fashion themselves as "ethically" engaged actors, promoting sustainable and responsible business practices. Has corporate behaviour changed only rhetorically or on paper? If we explore how global regimes of responsibility are enacted across sites and space – from (trans)national multi-stakeholder partnerships to local CSR programmes – then it turns out that corporate managers are far from being the only ones negotiating these issues. The new circulating norms about corporate responsibilities are not just "global" and standardized in nature. Accelerated by new flows of information and technologies, they are reinforced and contested nationally and locally. Therefore, I assume that multinational corporations today cannot completely distance and isolate themselves from the political, economic and social contexts they are interacting in and with. Perceiving mining capitalism as a project (rather than a context in which things just happen),[240] instead urges us to ask *what* multinational corporations are actually (not) responsible for and how extractive relations lead to specific spaces of (non)responsibility. To answer this question this book explores what are they *made* responsible for by various governmental and civil society actors, and by local populations. Analysing and investigating regimes of responsibility through an empirical study of Burkina Faso's gold mining boom therefore not only tells us something about capitalism's particular spatialities in areas of extraction. It also delivers more general insights into the role of "ethics" in (re)ordering extractive relations under the global condition.

What *Spaces of Responsibility* cannot provide, is a straightforward account of how these changing spatialities of responsibility for large-scale resource extraction lead to the establishment or failure of dominant spatial formats for resource governance such as the nation-state or economic enclaves. Nor does the multi-scalar complexity of global mining capitalism point to an overall equal distribution of gains and benefits to all actors involved in mining governance. An empirical focus on contemporary micro politics of concession-making, however, is able to account for specific processes of socio-spatial ordering. The latter challenges or reinforces enclaved resource governance by (re)producing forms of social thinness and thickness in and around localized mining concessions. Social thinness and thickness prescribe the degree to which mining activities are entangled with and disentangled from local and national developmental projects of mining governance. The "around" of concessions, however, is not limited to

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240 See Appel, *The Licit Life of Capitalism*.

geographical proximity. It rather points to complex and often conflicting interactions of actors and scales involved in concessionary practices.

Areas of corporate responsibility, as will be discussed throughout this book, become negotiated in different sites and on multiple scales. These range from stakeholder meetings in Burkinabè municipalities, corporate boardrooms in Toronto, national mining fares in Ouagadougou, investor conferences in Frankfurt am Main, African Union summits in Addis Ababa to the courtyards of people living in exploration concessions in western Burkina Faso. The theoretical vantage point of transgressing but interrelated scales in mining governance is therefore also mirrored in the empirical make-up of the chapters. They discuss emerging topics, trends and policies in multi-scalar mining governance, which most significantly (try to) challenge enclaved models of resource extraction in Burkina Faso. Among these trending topics, "resource decentralization", "corporate citizenship", "transparency", and "local content" figure most prominently. These topics become mainly enacted through first, emerging ethical commitments of the global mining industry, second, the occurrence of contestations and protests in the vicinity of mining endeavours, and third, the (re)emergence of the (local) state as a central planner and regulator of extractive activities.

The Mining Boom (Chapter 2) addresses "the national" as a dimension of social practices, and discusses how Burkina Faso evolved as an important destination for global mining investment over the past decade. The chapter describes how different "modes of mining governance" became dominant over time through specific ordering practices of and in the national mining economy.[241] What will also be explored is how the enclave trope continues to figure among scholars and policy makers as a spatial reference to overcome former dominant modes of rent-seeking mining governance under the Compaoré regime. At the same time, they point to a yet unachieved goal of transforming the national mining sector into an "engine" of "sustainable development". This chapter tells the story of how Burkina Faso has become increasingly attractive as a mining destination for international investors since colonial times and how the government has recently tried to (re)gain authority in mining governance. Changing modes of mining governance, however, did also stem from claims made on supra- and subnational levels. Corporate executives for instance perceived the profound mining reform introduced in 2015 as a major threat to their investments. Chapter 2 discusses how a respatialization of agency over mining revenues and specifically the decentralization of resource governance has been one of the main goals of reform promoted by donors

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241 See B. Campbell (ed.), *Modes of Governance and Revenue Flows of African Mining*.

and regional policy bodies and was perceived as an instrument of "justice" by local populations.

Chapter 3 (*Mining Revenue and "The Local"*) narrates the story of the contested implementation of the Mining Fund for Local Development (*Fonds Minier de Développement Local*, FMDL) which was one of the main goals of reform. Since July 2015, multinational corporations are legally required to contribute one per cent of their national turnover (before tax) to this fund. The new mining law provides the transfer of huge parts of the allocated money to mining-impacted municipalities. While a successful implementation of the fund would entail an important rescaling of authority in mineral revenue allocation from the national to the local level, multinational corporations mainly fear losing their "social license to operate". Yet they are not the only transnational actors involved in these negotiations. The presence of Canadian development aid projects in the two studied mining areas of Burkina Faso that aim to promote "resource decentralization" (and the successful implementation of the FMDL) through trainings for municipal actors rather points to multi-scalar practices of negotiation over these topics. Also, political and economic entanglements between the Burkinabè and Canadian mining economy are even more far-reaching. The chapter critically engages with the Canada-Burkina Faso relationships as a "win-win partnership" and analyses how such policies eventually (re)shape authority and responsibility among local policy-makers in the mining areas.

Corporate Citizenship and Concession-Making (Chapter 4) takes different corporate identities as a vantage point and explores how mining companies engage in both the politics of strategic opening and enclosure in western Burkina Faso. In doing so, they draw different (cadastral) lines on maps (for investors, shareholders, government officials, and local populations) and lines on the ground to illustrate their property claims on land and subsoil resources. On the other hand, they rely on functional lines concerning their areas of responsibility, which are influenced by the texture of gold deposits and the different techniques to get the minerals out of the ground. Lines do not only physically separate the mine concession from neighbouring communities, they also become discursive criteria for targeting CSR.[242] Since multinational corporations in Burkina Faso's mining regions increasingly fashion themselves as "good corporate citizens" or "neighbours", the chapter asks how different infrastructures and regimes of access affect "sociality" and the enactment of the firm as a transparent citizen. While mining infrastructures are equipped with fences and monitored by strict access regimes, the question of how to include the local population into the

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242 See Ey and Sherval, *Exploring the Minescape*.

mine life is today pivotal.[243] As an important part of hybrid security techniques that incorporate "the local", CSR departments figure as spatial interfaces between company and community interests. It will be discussed, however, how even within the corporate form areas of responsibility and degrees of engagement are subject to hierarchical bargaining.

Chapter 5 (*Access Relationships*) focuses on the role of the state in defining and attributing mining rights as "the sole owner" of subsoil resources, and the consequences this has for "the national" as an important relation of scalar mining practices. Although the central state claims in its constitution of 1991 that "all natural resources belong to the people" [of Burkina Faso] (Article 14, own translation),[244] the property of land where subsoil resources are located almost exclusively becomes negotiated between the central state and mining corporations according to the mining code. The chapter retraces empirically how the awarding of mining titles in a largely non-transparent manner in the past, increasingly met resistance of national civil society stakeholders and local populations. However, the reform process, here again, was reinforced through donor agencies and international good governance initiatives to which Burkina Faso adheres. Instead of perceiving "transparency" as a mere technical issue, its deep political entanglements will be analyzed. Access to mineral wealth is not only produced through the legal domains of law, but also through moral claims to land and resources in Burkina Faso and beyond. The entitlements of international investors and corporate agents managers regarding supposedly "virgin" and "underdeveloped" territories are supplemented and challenged by those of people living in the concessions who claim their rights to livelihoods and the land of their ancestors. The chapter provides empirical accounts on how "stateness" (defined as the changing legitimacy, capacity and authority of governments in mining governance)[245] eventually becomes reinforced through various negotiations over and claims to access.

Livelihoods and Lifestyles (Chapter 6) discusses another dominant narrative of the global mining industry, which is the promotion of linkage economies and "local content" in order to counter the enclave nature of the extractive industries. The chapter analyses who is (made) responsible for the economic rise and decline of specific mining towns and how local sites of extraction of the global

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243 See, for example, J. Hönke, *Transnational Companies and Security Governance: Hybrid Practices in a Postcolonial World*, London: Routledge, 2014; Welker, *'Corporate Security Begins in the Community'*.

244 " Les richesses et les ressources naturelles appartiennent au peuple." (Government of Burkina Faso, "La constitution du Burkina Faso" [Constitution of Burkina Faso], [January 1997], p. 3).

245 See J. Schubert, U. Engel, and E. Macamo, *Introduction*, p. 7.

mining economy potentially (re)produce categories of "locals" and "strangers". In doing so, the chapter discusses different notions of "the local community" among mining executives, local populations and political authorities. It will be argued that categories of "locals" and "non-locals" intersect with categories of "skilled" and "unskilled" labour, and therefore have very tangible consequences in terms of access to formal employment at mine sites. However, since linkage economies are also supposed to stimulate various procurement industries and other local economies, the chapter further provides insights into (un)intended spill over effects within the local labour market. Due to the boom and bust phases of extractivism, changing lifestyles and livelihoods have led to a mushrooming of a sex work industry in the two studied mining regions. While hardly anyone felt responsible for such developments, they (periodically) transformed the landscape of mining towns in significant ways.