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Israeli Holocaust Memory and the Cold War

On the 18th of May 1953, the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, debated a new law calling for the establishment of Yad Vashem – The National Holocaust and Martyrdom Remembrance Authority. What was supposed to be a celebratory event quickly turned into a discussion of Israeli policy vis-à-vis Germany and the alignment of Israel in the East-West divide of the Cold War – two discussions that were, as will be shown, closely connected in Israel.

But it is important to first set out the political makeup of the young Israeli state (established in 1948) and to introduce the main protagonists in the political scene. Most of the parties and movements involved existed in the pre-state years and the ideological disagreements and feuds went back for decades.¹ During the War of Independence, on January 25, 1949, the country held its first elections to the Knesset. The winning party was Mapai (Mifleget Poalei Eretz Israel, Workers' Party of the Land of Israel). It was guided by a Socialist Zionist ideology and was led by David Ben-Gurion, who became Israel's first prime minister. The party had the largest number of seats in the Knesset, 46 out of 120, but that was not enough to rule. It needed to establish a coalition. What were its options? If we see the party as standing in the center (and to the left) on the political spectrum, it will be easier to place the other parties. To Mapai's left was Mapam (Mifleget Poalim Meuchedet, United Workers Party), Socialist Zionist as well, but more radical. It was composed of two movements: 1) Hashomer Hatzair (Young Guard) and its Kibbutz movement Hakibbutz Hartzi (National Kibbutz) and 2) Achdut Ha'avoda (United Labor) and its kibbutz movement Hakkibbutz Hameuchad (United Kibbutz).² Staunchly Zionist and, with 19 out of 120 members of Knesset (MKs), the second largest party in the first Knesset. Left of Mapam lay its Left Faction, which broke away from it in 1953 and in 1954 joined Maki (the Israeli Communist Party), the non-Zionist extreme left on the Israeli political spectrum. To the right of Mapai stood the liberal middle-class parties and the United Religious Front

1 See: Yechiam Weitz, "1948 as a Turning Point on the Israeli Political Map," *Israel Studies* 24, no. 3 (2019): 157–179.

2 On Mapam and the Israeli labor movement, see: Tal Elmaliach, *Hakibbutz Ha'artzi, Mapam, and the Demise of the Israeli Labor Movement* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2020); Eli Tzur, *Landscapes of Illusion: Mapam 1948–1954* (Jerusalem, Ben Gurion University Press, 1998). [in Hebrew]

(which included both Religious Zionists and non-Zionist ultra-Orthodox parties). The Herut (Liberty), the Zionist right-wing party, led by Menachem Begin, was at the right tip of the political spectrum.³

In establishing his government, Ben-Gurion did not choose his “natural allies,” the left-wing Zionist parties, but chose rather to work with the religious and liberal middle-class ones. This inevitably led to much animosity between the left-wing Zionist parties and the government, with much of it centering on the East-West Cold War divide and the place of the state of Israel in it. Though in future years the left-wing Zionists would join the government, they would remain in disagreement with Ben-Gurion on issues related to the Cold War. As we shall see in this chapter, the issue of Holocaust memory and the Cold War was a major point of controversy. In the aforementioned Knesset debate on the establishment of Yad Vashem, the attack on the government came mainly from the parties to left of the government. Yaakov Hazan, MK for Mapam, claimed that commemorating the Holocaust would be a travesty as long as the Israeli government supported the West German government. This support was implicit in the reparations agreement signed between the two countries the previous year. Several issues stood out: West Germany, Hazan claimed, was a continuation of both pre-Nazi and Nazi Germany and, as such, would continue endangering the lives of Jews in the diaspora. “We must remember,” he said, “that whatever happened there can happen today and always. As long as the Jewish diaspora exists and the regime that gave birth to Nazism exists as well.”⁴ Hazan did not explain what that “regime that gave birth to Nazism” was, but the context makes it clear that he was talking about capitalism in general and German capitalism in particular. “Yad Vashem should remind us that for us, Jewish socialists, Nazism is the arch enemy, and we have a holy obligation to work towards vanquishing the regime that gave birth to this horror,” Hazan argued. Hinting at the reparations agreement that was seen by the Israeli left as legitimizing West Germany, he stated that “there is no bigger sin to our people than giving a helping hand to the whitewashing of Nazism in the eyes of the world and to its resurrection.” The planned Yad Vashem, he

³ On Israeli Politics of the time, see: Peter Y. Medding, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948–1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). On the liberal parties at the time, see: Amir Goldstein. “We Have a Rendezvous with Destiny” – The Rise and Fall of the Liberal Alternative,” *Israel Studies* 16, no. 1 (2011): 26–52.

⁴ For the entire discussion see: Knesset Plenary Records, Knesset session 229–230. The quotes from Yaakov Hazan, Adolf Berman, and Esther Wilenska in this and the following paragraphs are from pages 1331–1339. All plenary records of the Knesset can be found online, <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/Pages/Sessions.aspx>, accessed March 17, 2022. All translations from the Hebrew in the chapter are those of the author.

claimed, “should remind us that as Jews we should contribute to the unrelenting war against it.”

As in many debates of the period, the specter of a third world war “constantly threatening humanity” loomed over the discussion. “For our people it ominously bears the threat of destruction [. . .] the murder of millions of our brothers in the Diaspora [. . .] and the destruction of our land and our young state.” Hazan thus claimed that “we must stand in the forefront of the fighters for peace” (i.e., on the Soviet side; the phrase “fighters for peace” usually signaled the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, while those in the West depicted themselves as “fighters for freedom”).

Hazan’s words were just the opening salvo in a fervent attack on government policies by the parties further to the left. Adolf Berman of the Left Faction⁵ used current Soviet terminology to link the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943 directly to the East-West politics of the time. Berman had been active in rescuing Jews from the ghetto and had been involved in the revolt, although he had not fought in it. He claimed that the ghetto uprising had been led by young socialist Jews who “saw their struggle for the national honor as a link in the general anti-fascist struggle of humanity.” They had not taken up “the flag of the revolt, to have the Israeli government sign an agreement with the neo-Nazis [. . .] we have an obligation to fight, together with all the forces of peace in the world against the resurrection of the German-Nazi army by American imperialism.”⁶ Regarding Israel’s place in the East-West alignment, he stated that “while many of the Ghetto fighters died while dreaming of Eretz Israel they did not dream of an Israel linked to imperialism, to the black forces of international reaction, to war mongers and to Foster Dulleses [in the plural].”⁷ Instead, they saw their struggle for national honor as a link in the general anti-fascist struggle and dreamt of Israel as a “bas-tion of progress, social justice, national revival, and peace and friendship with all nations.” There was no question as to which side the Jews and Israel should pick, the answer lay in the lessons of the Holocaust. The Western governments “deserted and left the Jews to their fate,” claimed Berman, “but no fury of hate or the

5 The Left Faction broke off from Mapam due to the latter’s stronger identification with the USSR.

6 While the new German army, the *Bundeswehr*, was only established in 1955, the early 1950s were a period of open discussion on the establishment of such a force within Germany and between West Germany and the Allies. See: Thomas C. Schwartz, “The ‘Skeleton Key.’ American Foreign Policy, European Unity, and German Rearmament, 1949–54,” *Central European History* 19, no. 4. (December 1986): 369–385.

7 John Foster Dulles, 1888–1959, US Secretary of State (1953–1959) under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, architect of major US policies during the Cold War, including the re-armament of Germany and attempts to establish a pro-Western Middle East pact.

cracking whip of reactionary propaganda will make the Jewish masses forget that if any Jews survived the Holocaust it was thanks to the Soviet Union, to the Red Army, the Army of Stalingrad!”

Further on the Israeli left was the Israeli Communist Party (Maki). Its representative, MK Esther Wilenska, followed up on several of the issues raised by Hazan and Berman, but with even more vehemence and with direct reference to Cold War policies and disputes. “Israel should fight against the re-awakening of the Nazi beast, against the establishment of the fascist military force of West Germany that is to be the striking force of the Third World War.” Wilenska also claimed that Jewish survivors, deserted by the West, owed their lives to the Red Army. She juxtaposed East and West in this context: “Our experience has shown that the flag of Anti-Semitism, anti-Communism, and Fascism is the flag of Hitler and Mussolini, murderers of millions of our people.” She further maintained that the war experience also revealed that the Jewish people’s fate is intertwined with that of the Soviet Union and the anti-fascist camp, and that today therefore “the place of the Jewish people is with the Soviet Union and the international peace camp against the Imperialist warmongers, Hitler’s present-day heirs.” She asked how Jews could take seriously the government’s statements on the commemoration of Holocaust victims when it refused to protest the release of captive Nazi war criminals by the Americans and British, thus aiding US preparations for a Third World War. “Against our people’s interest, against the legacy of the victims, this government supports the preparation of an [anti-Soviet] block in the Middle East by Foster Dulles and the interests of American billionaires.” Wilenska called to establish “a Yad Vashem against the reestablishment of the Nazi Army, against preparations for a Third World War, against a Middle Eastern anti-Soviet block [. . .] for Peace in the world and the Middle East.”⁸

The reactions in the Knesset to these attacks were quite low-key since, as will be shown, this was far from the first time that pro-Soviet and anti-Western sentiments had been aired in the Knesset during Holocaust-related debates. Responses from speakers of the government coalition block and of the right ranged from mentions of antisemitism in Soviet partisan units during the war to references to current manifestations of it, such as the “Doctors’ plot.” Generally, they attempted to wrest the discussion away from political or sectarian lines and back to a focus on Holocaust commemoration. Yet, this debate shows how, for some Israelis, especially those who could relate to the socialist-Zionist and communist parties to the left of the (Zionist-socialist) government, the memory of the Holocaust and its lessons were intertwined with the current Cold War debates.

⁸ Knesset Plenary Records, 1344–1345.

Indeed, as this chapter shows, Holocaust-related discussions in the young Israeli state were permeated with Cold War concerns and cannot be fully understood without taking them into consideration. The Holocaust was a national and personal catastrophe on a massive scale. Most Israeli families of European origins (and they constituted the majority, certainly of the leadership and elites at the time) experienced Holocaust-related losses. The destruction of most European Jews was a searing trauma, and the debates it engendered were forceful and divisive even without bringing in the Cold War. Yet in the postwar years, debates on the Holocaust took place with the alignment of the world along an East-West axis and with apprehensions of an impending Third World War. Questions of reparations from Germany, diplomatic relations, arms sales and purchases to and from West Germany interconnected the Holocaust and its memory, on the one hand, and Cold War issues, on the other. While there is extensive literature on Israel and the Cold War, most works on Israeli Holocaust memory do not address this issue. The aim of this chapter is to bring together these two strands of research and to provide a fuller understanding of Israeli Holocaust memory in its Cold War context. In order to understand the interconnection of Holocaust memory and Cold War politics in Israel, two core issues need first be explored: 1) Israeli state policies vis-à-vis the evolving Cold War and an emerging West Germany and 2) the complicated relationship between the Israeli Zionist left and the Soviet Union.

Where to in the East-West Divide?

The question of Israel's position on the East-West divide and the Cold War was debated by Zionist institutions from 1945 onward. The UN resolution of November 29, 1947, which called for the establishment of a Jewish and an Arab state in Palestine, supported by the US and the USSR, gave hope that the new Jewish state would be spared the need to take sides and would be able to commit to a policy of non-alignment.⁹ There were reasons to believe that the new state could garner support from both blocks. The Soviet Union, for example, allowed Czechoslovakia to sell weapons to Israel during the 1948 war at a time when Western powers officially adhered to a weapons embargo. Some Jews in the Eastern Bloc countries were al-

⁹ See Uri Bialer, *Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948–1956* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

lowed to immigrate to Israel, though Soviet Jews were not.¹⁰ The Western bloc housed the vibrant Jewish communities that supported and donated money to Israel, and these communities could offer the young state a viable future either on their own or by lobbying their respective governments. The goodwill of the two blocs gave rise to the hope that in the future Israel would be able to gain the support of both sides. “International support requires non-alignment,” claimed Israel’s Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett in 1950; “We can’t forgo the support of either bloc.” This was not only for the sake of the state of Israel’s future, but also for the wellbeing, future, and identity of the large communities of diaspora Jews. Choosing a side would endanger the future of Jews on the other side and harm their chances of immigrating to Israel. Since Jewish communities tend to identify with their states, claimed Sharret, it was obvious that if Israel chose to fully identify with the West against the Soviet Union, “they (Soviet Jews) will feel that we’ve forsaken them.”¹¹

The issue of Soviet Jews and their future made courting the goodwill of the Soviet Union a priority. Zionist leaders, themselves mostly from Eastern Europe, saw Soviet Jews, with a population of about two million, as the last great reservoir of likely immigrants to the Jewish state. The immigration of Soviet Jews was critical to the future of the Jewish state as no one expected large-scale Aliyah from Western countries. There was also a feeling of responsibility for the future of these Jews. It was obvious that decades of communist education and oppression in the USSR would cause a loss of Jewish identity through assimilation and extinction. The escalating anti-Jewish policies of the Stalinist regime led to anxiety over the physical future of Soviet Jewry. Historian Joseph Heller claims that such sensibilities, albeit naïve, informed the Israeli foreign policy of non-alignment. Israeli representatives repeatedly raised the issue of the free immigration of Soviet Jewry in talks with their Soviet counterparts, all to no avail.¹² The USSR was willing, at times, to allow for an exodus of Jews from the countries in its sphere of

10 G. Gorodetsky, J. Freundlich, D. Yaroshevky, Y. Ro’I, Stegny et.al., *Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941–1953*, 2 vols. (London: Cass, 2000).

11 Moshe Sharett, “The State of Israel between East and West. Seminar lecture delivered on April 22, 1950,” in *Speaking Out: The Collected Speeches of Israel’s First Foreign Minister 1950*, ed. Yaakov and Rina Sharett (Tel Aviv: Moshe Sharett Heritage Society, 2016[in Hebrew]), 349–395, 363.

12 Joseph Heller, *The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–67: Superpower Rivalry* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 33–46. On Israeli naiveté, he writes: “From a historical perspective, Israel was naive to believe it could separate the question of immigration of Eastern bloc Jews from that of Israel’s joining a regional defense organization. It can be argued that, even without the issue of immigration, the Kremlin would not have regarded Israel as a friendly country. In effect, Israel’s unavoidable economic and military dependence on the West placed it squarely in the bloc hostile to the Soviet Union” (17).

influence, but feared that an Israel-oriented Zionist approach might spark a Jewish nationalist awakening in the Soviet Union. It therefore refused to engage in any discussion on the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. The escalating Cold War, the competition among superpowers for influence in the Middle East, the pro-Western choices made by the Israeli government, Soviet anti-Zionism and antisemitism borne out by anti-Jewish policies, the Slánský Trials (or Prague Trials, as they were called in Israel), and the “Doctors’ plot,” all made for a growing rift between the USSR and Israel – a rift that was being played out in the Holocaust discourse in Israel. Moreover, since Zionism was banned in the Eastern bloc, the Zionist movement became seen as “a Western organization.”¹³ While this helped raise Western support for Israel, it also drew fire from the Eastern bloc.

Israel’s ruling party, Mapai, led by Ben-Gurion, was a Socialist party committed to the Zionist idea of establishing a Jewish state. It balanced the two ideals under the motto “*Mi’mamnad Le’am*” (from a class to a nation). Like many Western Social Democratic parties, it had a clear non-communist, even anti-communist stance. In the Israeli case, therefore, non-alignment was actually pro-Western: financial support came from the US, where very active Jewish communities were based, and the country identified with the ideals of freedom and democracy as they were understood in the West.¹⁴ Yet it was the Korean War that served as the tipping point that forced Israel to choose sides openly.¹⁵ Israel supported the UN, and Ben-Gurion even wanted to send a contingent of Israeli troops to participate in the war as a part of the UN Forces. It was important to the US that the war was seen not as an American imperialist venture but rather as an international effort against aggression. By sending troops, Israel could thus gain credit from the US administration and public. Foreign Minister Sharett objected fiercely because this marked a total break with the Soviet Union and would provoke a “fire” in the IDF. It would have been very hard to explain to the Israeli public, predominantly socialist, and just beginning to recuperate after the Holocaust and the War of Independence why its conscripted youth are sent to fight in Korea.¹⁶ He suggested sending a group of

13 Moshe Sharett, “The State of Israel between Left and Right,” seminar lecture delivered on April 22, 1950, in *Speaking Out: The Collected Speeches of Israel’s First Foreign Minister 1950*, ed. Yaakov and Rina Sharett (Tel Aviv: Moshe Sharett Heritage Society, 2016), 349–395. [in Hebrew]

14 In 1949, a loan of one million dollars was granted by the US to Israel. Bialer, *Between East and West*, 208.

15 Gangzheng She, “Ben-Gurion, the Korean War, and the Change in Israeli Foreign Policy,” *Israelis* 7 (2015): 205–214.

16 Yoseph Heller, *Israel and the Cold War*, 49.

medical personnel instead.¹⁷ This idea was accepted by the government, but Ben-Gurion kept sending unofficial messages to the US and other Western countries stating Israel's support of the West: "Although in times of peace we try to maintain political independence [non-alignment], in the event of a world war we stand one hundred percent with the West."¹⁸

By early 1952, the government was more outspoken on the issue, which was becoming a clear dividing line between Mapai and the parties on its left. On January 3, 1952, in the middle of a Knesset session on the reparations agreement, Sharett addressed an ideological forum of the Ahdut Ha'avoda Movement, one of the parties comprising Mapam. Israel had to make a choice, he said, and it had chosen the West: "As a result of the universal ideological struggle, which also affects us and which is a battle for the soul of our youth and the mind of the nation itself, neutrality has become impossible; non-alignment is out of the question."¹⁹ Considering American financial aid that was crucial to Israel (and the lack of such aid from the USSR), he claimed that "our attachment to the USA is literally a question of life and death for the state of Israel and for its population."

It is important to note that as far as security and diplomacy were concerned, Israel's support of the Western bloc was a story of unrequited love. The Western powers were not forthcoming to Israeli requests to join NATO and certainly not any Middle Eastern equivalent, such as SACME (Supreme Allied Command, Middle East) or other initiatives.²⁰ Israel was a liability in attempts to gain the support of the Arab states for a pro-Western alliance. The US State Department saw Israeli intransigence regarding the return of Palestinian refugees as an unwanted impediment to its Middle East policies. Offers by Israel to enable the US to use Israel for stockpiling strategic supplies were rejected, as were requests to purchase arms from both the US and Britain.²¹ The Western powers wanted Israel to publicly commit itself to the Western camp, something that Israel was reluctant to do due to its aforementioned policies towards the USSR. Even West Germany, with whom Israel signed the reparations agreement, refused Israel's request for diplomatic ties until 1964, as it saw it as detrimental to its efforts to get the backing and recognition of Arab states.

17 Gabriel Sheffer, *Moshe Sharett: Biography of a Political Moderate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 549.

18 Sheffer, *Moshe Sharett*, 557.

19 Bialer, *Between East and West*, 47.

20 Bialer, *Between East and West*, 226.

21 For Israeli attempts to navigate the Cold War in the Middle East, see: Howard A. Patten, *Israel and the Cold War: Diplomacy, Strategy and the Policy of the Periphery at the United Nations* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013).

“Mother Russia”

For decades, the USSR was viewed with admiration by left-leaning Israelis. Trepidation caused by the Soviet Union’s anti-Zionist stance and, later on, anti-Jewish policies was offset by the major role accorded to the Red Army in the victory over Nazi Germany and subsequently the USSR’s vote for the establishment of a Jewish state in the UN. While it was obvious that Maki’s policies would be pro-USSR, Mapam’s policies are of special interest here. The latter was looking for a policy that would reconcile its Zionist ideology with support and admiration of the Soviet Union and a commitment to Holocaust memory.

The Ahdut Ha’avoda/Hakkibutz Hameuchad (United Labor/United Kibbutz) and Hakibbutz Haartzi/Hashomer Hatzair (National Kibbutz/Young Guard) movements that established Mapam had their roots in the revolutionary leftist movements of Tsarist Russia. After the October Revolution of 1917 and its opposition to Jewish nationalism and Zionism, their focus moved to other Eastern European countries and to the building of the Jewish national home in *Eretz Israel*. These were radical activist Zionist-socialist movements, leading the way to the establishment of kibbutzim and the formation of Jewish defense organizations.

Both movements strongly identified with the USSR and its ideals. The latter was, in the words of Yaakov Hazan, their “Second Homeland, the Socialist one.”²² They saw it as a “worker’s paradise” and the Eastern bloc as the “Peace Camp.” They shared the USSR’s commitment to socialism and distributive justice, and even outdid its commitment to a communal lifestyle in the kibbutzim that they established. But they also remembered the repression of both their movements and their members in the USSR and the areas it occupied. The 1952 Prague show trials, which accused the leaders of the Czech Communist Party of espionage for the West and of a Zionist conspiracy, challenged the basic pro-Soviet stance of Mapam. The antisemitic/anti-Zionist sentiment that infused the trial and the indictment of a senior Mapam party member, Mordechai Oren, as a Western spy, further distanced the party from the Soviet Union, though not from its ideals. The trials caused an ideological and political earthquake in the party with the leaders of the party standing by its left Zionist agenda (while not disavowing the USSR) and the pro-USSR Left Faction splitting from the party, as mentioned above.

22 The Knesset Plenary Records, vol. 1 (1949), Knesset session 12, March 10, 1949.

Everyone Has His “Other Germany”

At the nexus of Holocaust memory and the early Cold War lay the question of Germany. Of all the causes and problems explaining the Cold War, “[n]one was more central or pervasive than the German problem. It was central to the outbreak of the Cold War, central to its continuation and central to its decline,” wrote Avi Shlaim.²³ Germany (or Germanies) and relations with it were naturally central to the interplay between Israeli and Jewish Holocaust memory as well as Israeli diplomacy and politics. As shall be seen here, generally, Ben-Gurion and Mapai were willing to accept West Germany, while the parties to their left rejected it and saw a future in relations with East Germany.

In 1959, following a government crisis and breakup caused by opposition to Israeli arms sales to Germany, Ben-Gurion described West Germany as “the other Germany,” one that was different from Nazi Germany.²⁴ After his first summit in 1960 and meeting with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer he reiterated his position: “I said in the Knesset, the parliament of Israel, last summer, that the Germany of today is not the Germany of yesterday. After having met the chancellor, I am sure that my judgment was correct.”²⁵ Some years of reparations and normalization in Israeli-German relations had to pass for such a statement to be heard, wrote Yehiam Weitz: “In 1952 [the time of the reparations debate], no one would have dared describe Germany this way.”²⁶

Actually, the term had been used much earlier. In 1950, a Communist Israeli paper announced to its reader that “the other Germany has risen.”²⁷ Following the elections in East Germany, the paper called for “joy and satisfaction” that should be felt “by every progressive, anti-fascist, and peace lover, and especially every Jew who remembers what is the significance of an imperialist war-mongering Germany to the Jewish people.” East Germany, it claimed, stood in sharp contrast to “the Nazi state” established in West Germany by “Wall Street supporters.” Of course, the paper explained to its readers, thanks were due to the Soviet Union, which brought about the transformation of East Germany into a peace-loving state that no longer

23 Avi Shlaim, “The Partition of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War,” *Review of International Studies* 11, no. 2 (1985): 123–137.

24 Roni Stauber, “Realpolitik and the Burden of the Past: Israeli Diplomacy and the ‘Other Germany,’” *Israel Studies* 8, no. 3 (2003): 100–122.

25 *Davar*, March 14, 1960.

26 Yehiam Weitz, “A Review of Idith Zartal, *Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood*, Hebrew edition 2002,” *Iunim B’itkumat Israel* 13 (2003): 443–448.

27 Yaakov Zilber, “The Other Germany Has Risen,” *Kol Haam* (The People’s Voice) no. 4, October 4, 1950.

threatened the Jews. The transformation of Germany had been a victory for the “Peace Camp that is the camp of life to our people.” It is obvious that in internal Israeli discussions, both camps had a “Germany of today.” This “other Germany,” however, was either the East or the West one, based on one’s politics.

Mapam held a staunch, uncompromising position on any rapprochement with Germany, but that meant only West Germany. Its delegates, in fact, attended socialist international events in East Germany. In 1952, for example, its central committee debated the participation of the Israeli Peace Committee – of which it was a founding body – in the World Peace Council Congress.²⁸ This happened right after Mapam was notified that the Congress had been moved from Helsinki to Berlin. It was obvious that the organization would attend this event, but there was some unease about attending an event in Germany, which led to the suggestion that only its secretary and not members of its leadership be sent “because of our attitude towards Germany.” There was a brief discussion, and the consensus reached was that members of the presidium should attend. “I welcome the decision to hold the peace congress in Berlin,” said Yaacov Riftin, “Berlin is a symbol of opposition to world war; the historical front of the Jewish people is that of preventing war.”²⁹

The issue of East Germany was further debated at the following meeting.³⁰ According to Mapam, thanks to Soviet policy there was no danger of East German rearmament since that policy aimed at “an independent, democratic, united and peace-loving Germany.” Unlike West Germany, East Germany “should be given credit” for going in that direction. From the discussion within the Mapam leadership, we learn that there was also a functional internal political reason for attending the Berlin conference: the power play between the Israeli left and the Soviet Union and its international organizations. Who really represented the Israeli “progressive,” pro-USSR public – the anti-Zionist communist party or the Zionist

28 The World Peace Movement was organized by Moscow as an international movement calling for disarmament and world peace and was one of the propaganda tools used by the Soviets during the Cold War. The general nature of the organization (and its downplaying of Soviet leadership) made it acceptable to many public figures and organizations in the West. See R. F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffmann, *Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (New York: Aldine, 1986); J.A.V. Vermaat, “Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement,” *Problems of Communism* 31, no. 6 (1982): 43–56. On the Israeli case, see Tamar Herman, “The Rise and Decline of the Israeli Peace Committee – 1950–1956,” *Zionism* 17 (Winter 1993). [in Hebrew]

29 Meeting of the Mapam Executive Committee, June 9, 1952, Yad Yaari Archives, 64.90, p. 51.

30 The various proposals for a party “declaration on Germany” are not given in the protocol, which includes only the discussions about them.

Mapam? “We can’t have someone else (the communists) representing Israel there.”³¹

It must be said that the pro-East German policies of the Hashomer Hatzair faction of Mapam were not acceptable to their party partners in Ahdut Ha’avoda and its leader, Yitzhak Tabenkin, who refused to compromise with either Germany. Tabenkin was against any alignment with one of the big blocs, claiming that it would cause mistrust of Israel among emerging countries. Ahdut Ha’avoda fiercely opposed any participation in the Berlin event and publicly condemned it. The issue led to rising tensions within the party and contributed to its eventual breakup.³²

The ability of the Israeli left to maintain an active, positive approach to and relations with East Germany, while attacking West Germany with Holocaust-related rhetoric, naturally drew fire from the government coalition. “We just heard that a delegation of *Mapam* is going to Berlin to attend the Communist International. And they will go to Berlin and not to Bonn – to the city in which sat Hitler, Himmler and the other murderers, the city from which emanated the extermination decree against the Jewish people,” argued MK Yohanan Kese of Mapai during the Knesset reparations debate.

Is it permissible to visit the Germans in the East? Are their hands not full of Jewish blood? Is it because Stalin authorized this [made it “kosher,” in the original Hebrew] that these Germans are better?

For us [the government camp] there is no difference between the Germans of the west and the east – but you gentlemen, I very much suspect – because you attack us so much and claim we’re willing to compromise with Nazis – that you will run to compromise with the German people if they are in the Soviet sphere of influence.³³

The question of the “other Germany” was indicative of the Cold War divide within the Israeli public and Israeli politics. More than a question of the reality in Germany, it was one of political expediency of Cold War politics and the survival of the Israeli state in a world divided along its lines.³⁴ The issue was also played out in the reparations debate.

31 Meeting of the Mapam Executive Committee, June 9, 1952, Yad Yaari Archives, 64.90, p. 55.

32 The issue was debated during an emergency meeting called by Ahdut Ha’avoda, see “The Inner Strife in Mapam,” *Shearim*, December 10, 1951.

33 The Knesset Plenary Records, Knesset sessions 14–15, November 4, 1951, 951.

34 For the way the Cold War influenced discourse of the Holocaust in the two Germanies, see: Kobi (Yaakov) Kabalek, “The Rescue of Jews and the Memory of Nazism in Germany, from the Third Reich to the Present” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2013).

The Reparations Debate

In a way, the Knesset debate over Yad Vashem with which this paper opened was a replay of several such vehement discussions of the preceding years, most notably that over the reparations agreement with Germany.³⁵ On March 12, 1951, Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett notified the Knesset of Israel's demands from West Germany and that talks on a reparations agreement were being conducted between the two governments. The resulting agreement was debated and accepted by the Knesset in January 1952. The debates were fierce and spilled over into the streets through demonstrations, mass rallies, and a riot outside the Knesset during the actual vote.

Opposition to both the reparations agreement and relations with Germany cut across party lines and communities and was not necessarily Cold War-related. Opposition in the Knesset came also from the center and the right and not only from the pro-USSR left. Menachem Begin, head of the Herut Party that lay on the right of the Israeli political spectrum, led an active campaign against the reparations agreement, which culminated in his followers rioting outside the Knesset building during the debate. Even Mapai, the ruling party, allowed a group of Holocaust survivors to voice their opposition to the agreement during the party leadership's debate on the issue. While they found some support in the party's leadership, Ben-Gurion was adamant that the survival of Israel entailed accepting reparations that were rightly due. The public debates over the agreement are well-documented and researched. Our interest here lies in the Cold War angle.

The government was frank about the Cold War context of the reparations agreement and explained to the Knesset that Germany was on its way to political and military rehabilitation that would not be contingent on compensation of the Jewish people. "Both the Russians and the West are courting Germany like a young bride," said MK Meir Argov, head of the Foreign Affairs and Security Knesset Committee. "They are offering her everything [. . .] weapons, an army, unification, you think that if we would not agree to reparations there would be no rehabilitation of Germany? [. . .] this is a childish claim," he continued.³⁶

For the parties on the Israeli left, the Cold War implications of the agreement were apparent. Yaakov Riftin of Mapam criticized all those people who refused to

35 On the negotiations, see Nana Sagi, *German Reparations: A History of the Negotiations* (New York: St. Martin's Press; Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1986). For documents on the Israeli deliberations of the reparations agreement, see: Yaakov Sharett, ed., *The Reparations Controversy: The Jewish State and German Money in the Shadow of the Holocaust 1951–1952* (Göttingen: De Gruyter, 2011).

36 The Knesset Plenary Records, Knesset session 77, May 6, 1952.

understand “that the inclusion of West Germany in a European army and NATO is a danger to world peace, to humanity and to the Jewish people.” The other option, of course, was the Soviet stance that called for “a united Germany that will not join any military alliance.”

The communists were, as always, the most radical and blunt. MK Shmuel Mikonis suggested that the Knesset reject “any negotiation with the Neo-Nazi Bonn government that is rebuilding the Nazi Army with the Hitlerite Generals and frees war criminals [. . .] in order to prepare a new act of aggression that will endanger Jews and others [. . .]. The Jewish people will never be in the same camp with the Nazis.” It was obvious to him that signing such an agreement would seal Israel’s (and West Germany’s) place in the Western bloc:

Since the Ben-Gurion government is willing to bring the State of Israel, its strategic positions, and its economic and military potential to the service of the Atlantic pact in order to prepare a new world war against the peace-loving nations headed by the Soviet Union, since it agrees to bring Israel into an aggressive Middle East pact, since [. . .] it accepts the establishment of the Nazi army by the aggressor Atlantic pact [. . .] putting it in the same camp as the Nazis, we suggest a vote of no confidence.³⁷

The reparations debate challenged the pro-East German position of the left opposition. West Germany accepted its responsibility for Nazi crimes and, in the reparations agreement, showed its commitment to the survivors/victims of Nazi Germany. The East German regime, on the other hand, refused to discuss reparations since it denied any continuity between itself and the Nazi regime. This, of course, led to much criticism in Israel and abroad.³⁸ Mapam leaders debated whether they should call on it to pay reparations. Some Mapam leaders thought so, even if only to mollify opposition at home. Others objected, saying this would fuel Ben-Gurion’s criticism of East Germany and their contact with it. They did, however, suggest working on the issue with the East Germans behind the scenes. The question of reparations thus became ancillary to the Cold War debate.³⁹

³⁷ The Knesset Plenary Records, Knesset session 14–15, November 4–5, 1951.

³⁸ See: Angelika Timm, *Jewish Claims against East Germany: Moral Obligations and Pragmatic Policy* (Budapest: CEU Press, 1997).

³⁹ See: Lorena De Vita, “Overlapping Rivalries: The Two Germanys, Israel and the Cold War,” *Cold War History* 17, no. 4 (2017): 351–366. As De Vita shows, for the two Germanies, the reparations agreement was a Cold War issue as they were both vying for recognition from the Arab world. East Germany used the reparations agreement in its propaganda to the Arab world to show that West Germany was pro-Israeli and the large number of ex-Nazis in the West German administration in its propaganda to the Israeli public.

Weapons Sales and Purchases – the German Connection

The issue of German military aid to Israel and Israeli arms sales to Germany was a political “hot potato” in early Israeli politics that twice brought about the fall of the Israeli government. At the time, Israel was facing a security predicament. Western countries, except France, were not willing to sell weapons to Israel as they perceived that this might turn the Arab countries of the Middle East towards the Soviet bloc and engender Soviet involvement in the region. Moreover, since Middle Eastern oil was crucial to the Western economy, Western powers did not want to antagonize Arab countries against the West. Israeli retaliation raids across the border and the Suez War of 1956 further alienated the United States government to Israeli requests for military aid. Since Soviet bloc countries were providing weapons to Egypt and other Arab states, Ben-Gurion decided to approach the West German government on the matter.

The West Germans, in turn, were rebuilding their army and were interested in buying Israeli-produced weapons. The Germans were also interested in information about the tactics used by Israel during the Suez Crisis, especially in terms of tank force and air cooperation, as well as the Soviet weapons captured by the Israeli army.⁴⁰ It is apparent that “besides continuing to feel some responsibility towards the Jewish state, [the German government] also had a political interest in its survival and was prepared to aid it” beyond the reparations agreement.⁴¹ The first talks on the matter were held clandestinely in 1954. Although at the time Germany was not yet allowed to produce armaments, it built two patrol boats for Israel in 1955.⁴² In 1959, the Germans started providing Israel with military equipment, which, by 1961, amounted to 20 million DM.⁴³

A major scandal over weapons sales erupted in June 1959, when the West German daily, *Der Spiegel*, published an exposé claiming that Israel was selling weapons to Germany – specifically mortar shells and Uzi submachine guns.⁴⁴ The Knesset had previously declared its stance on German rearmament in a resolu-

⁴⁰ George Lavy, *Germany and Israel: Moral Debt and National Interest* (London: Frank Cass, 1996).

⁴¹ Lavy, *Germany and Israel*, 50.

⁴² For more on this issue, see Peter F. Müller and Michael Mueller, *Gegen Freund und Feind. Der BND: Geheime Politik und schmutzige Geschäfte* (Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 2002), 485–504.

⁴³ Inge Deutschkron, *Israel und die Deutschen: Das schwierige Verhältnis* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1983).

⁴⁴ For a description of these two scandals, see Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2000), 302–305, 311–320.

tion, passed on November 16, 1954, opposing the rearmament of both Germanies, and now, when the arms sales became public, there was wide opposition in the Knesset itself and in the press.⁴⁵ Ahdut Ha'avoda, which was now in the government coalition, led the opposition to the sale of arms to Germany, which led to Ben-Gurion's dissolution of the government. Ahdut Ha'avoda was joined by the other opposition parties during the Knesset discussion.⁴⁶ The uproar occurred over the sale of weapons to Germany – an exchange with greater visibility and symbolic potency – and not over Israel's reception of German weapons. The latter was a guarded state secret, and probably one of which Knesset members and some of the government ministers remained unaware. Several of the Knesset members saw the selling of weapons by the Jewish state to West Germany as a moral travesty. MK Yigal Alon, for example, one of the leading commanders in the War of Independence, voiced his opposition to the deal tying together the Holocaust and present-day politics:

Arming German soldiers with Israeli weapons is an abomination to our national honor, to our Jewish sensitivities. It harms us politically and is adventurous security wise. It is too early to differentiate between the Germany of the past and that of today. Did the generation of murderers pass away? [. . .] the same officers, all too real, with their ranks and titles, who fought in the Nazi army in World War II, are the ones building the German army of today. [. . .] The murderers will be armed with weapons created by Jews!⁴⁷

Others saw it as an act of legitimization for Germany. Israeli submachineguns and grenades would not make the new German army invincible and the Germans knew it too, but the fact that the Jews who were the target of the "Final Solution" were now selling arms to the Germans would give West Germany a legitimization that it did not deserve. "The West German followers of Hitler want this deal," claimed MK Samuel Mikonis of the Communist party, "because these are weapons made by Jews in a Jewish state. It gives them political legitimization."⁴⁸

⁴⁵ "The Knesset declares its deep anxiety of the rearmament of West and East Germany [. . .]. The Knesset decides that Israeli arms sales to Germany will stop and no more Israeli arms will be sold to Germany." See: The Knesset Plenary Records, Knesset session 16, November, 1954.

⁴⁶ It is said that their staunch opposition was due to their leader Tabenkin's admiration and sense of responsibility to the Ghetto fighters Antek Zuckerman and Zivia Luvatin. Tabenkin saw them as exemplary heroes and even tried to bring them in as political figures and members of Knesset. Therefore, he felt obligated to follow their uncompromising stand against any contact with Germany and the Germans. Uri Izhar, *Between Vision and Power: The History of Ahdut-Ha'avoda Poalei-Zion Party* (Tel Aviv: Yad Tabenkin, 2002), 262. [in Hebrew]

⁴⁷ Knesset Plenary session 661, June 30, 1959.

⁴⁸ Knesset Plenary session 660, June 29, 1959.

The Cold War in Holocaust Commemoration

The Cold War was also very apparent in Holocaust commemorations. In the early 1950s, these ceremonies served as “memory sites” that articulated the very fresh memory of the Holocaust and its legacy as it was seen at the time. Since Yad Vashem was not yet established and there were no state organized ceremonies, the focus was on the memorial ceremonies organized by the Zionist left. Among these, the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising was at the forefront. It is meaningful that the two main ceremonies were held in kibbutzim – one at the Yad Mordechai Kibbutz (named after Mordechai Anielewicz, commander of the Jewish Fighting Organization during the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising) and the other at a kibbutz whose name spoke for itself: the Ghetto Fighters Kibbutz. Politically, these kibbutzim were affiliated with the two movements – now in the opposition – that comprised the Mapam party.

The major Holocaust commemoration event since 1951 took place at the Ghetto Fighters House, established by the members of the Ghetto Fighters Kibbutz. This group of young survivors led by Ghetto Uprising leaders Zvi “Antek” Zuckerman and Zivia Lubetkin committed itself to Holocaust commemoration and established a small museum and venue for holding its events. The kibbutz was affiliated with the Kibbutz Hameuchad – the United Kibbutz and its political party Ahdut Ha’avoda. The Holocaust memorial events in the kibbutz were an opportunity to lay down the party’s agenda on the East-West divide and the Israeli-German relationship.

“Nazism did not come down from the misty clouds, it was born out of an exploitative system,” claimed MK Israel Galili, one of the leaders of Ahdut Ha’avoda. “We can’t trust bourgeoisie humanism and democracy in a society of oppression,” he added. Galili started off with the Holocaust and the Second World War: “We will always remember the mighty army of the Soviet Union that saw Nazism as the enemy of its homeland,” he said, but then moved on to current affairs: “We must understand that somewhere, Nazism is brought back to life and it might, once again, attack the world [. . .]. If we will not destroy the satanic proponents and arms of Fascism they might destroy humanity.”⁴⁹

Other speakers attacked West Germany directly. Stefan Grajek, who fought in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, claimed that “we will not forget or forgive Nazi and barbaric Germany. Today, six years after World War Two, Hitlerism appears in its new form.” A full overview of the Cold War agenda and its relation to the Holocaust was provided by Dr. Olgierd Górka, the Polish Consul in Jerusalem. “We

49 All quotes from this event are from the Ghetto Fighters House Archive (GFHA), 2276.

can't honor the eighth anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising without underscoring that on the ghetto's side stood all the progressive elements of the Polish people [. . .] we can sadly say that the reactionary elements of the Anglo-Saxon world did not want to show the real faces of those reactionary Nazis whom they saw, already during the war, as potential allies," he stated. Górka juxtaposed the lenience shown to the Nazis in West Germany with East Germany's far harsher attitude towards them: "It is symbolic that on the same day that twenty Nazis were freed from (West) German jails, six Nazis were hanged by East Germany." As he explained, "[w]e did not hesitate to reach an agreement with the Democratic Germany of Wilhelm Pieck (East Germany's first president) that did not espouse the Nazi (West German) system of no justice and no responsibility." Górka also raised the issue of (West) German rearmament and spoke against "attempts to conceal the aspirations for the remilitarization of Germany and the reestablishment of its army." He saw this issue as directly connected to the Ghetto Fighters Kibbutz of today: "Out of the hearts of Poles and Jews, one cry is coming out: we don't want a new Nazi army [. . .]. There is no better time or place for a protest against the reestablishment of the Nazi army than this day of memorial and respect for the heroes of the ghetto!"

The commemoration ceremonies at the Ghetto Fighters House remained a site of constant attack on the Israeli government's alignment with both the West and West Germany during the Cold War, which resulted in the absence of government ministers from the ceremonies. In an op-ed protesting this after a ceremony at the Ghetto Fighters' House in 1953, Tuvia Buzikowski, one of the Warsaw Ghetto fighters, took the government and those of its ministers who had ignored the ceremony as well as other memorial events to task.⁵⁰ It seems that he was quite blind to the discomfort from which they had saved themselves by not participating.

Holocaust commemoration ceremonies organized by the other branch of Mapam, Hashomer Hatzair, also served as a platform for Cold War politics. "The Ghetto fighters commanded us not to forgive and not to forget [. . .]. Our people's tragedy came from the hands of the opponents of humanity, progress and socialism," declared Yaakov Amit in 1952 during the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising commemoration ceremony at Kibbutz Yad Mordechai: "There can be no reconciliation with the keepers of the flame of Fascism [. . .] as long as there exists that regime, sharpening its sword and training the Nazi beast for a new attack – we are in danger."⁵¹

⁵⁰ Tuvia Buzikowski, "Holocaust Memory and the Israeli Government," *Mishmar*, April 27, 1953.

⁵¹ Yaakov Amit, "No Compromise and No Reconciliation with the Heirs of the Murderers," *Mishmar*, April 23, 1952.

While commemoration events in Israel stressed the specific nature of the Holocaust and resistance, they were not unique in using commemorations as a platform for Cold War politics. As shown by Pieter Lagrou, the commemoration of Nazi crimes became a major battleground between Eastern and Western blocs as well as in internal left-right politics in Western European countries. Initiatives to compare the Soviet Gulag system to the Nazi concentration camp system were countered by others stressing the fascist nature of the West German government and the nascent NATO. Commemoration events in Buchenwald, Auschwitz, and other camps served as a platform for attacking the West to the detriment of non-communist delegations. Likewise, rival survivor organizations such as the Warsaw-based International Federation of Resistance Fighters (*Fédération Internationale des Résistants*, FIR) and the National Union of Associations for Deportees, Internees and Families of the Disappeared (*Union Nationale des Associations de Déportés, Internés et Familles de Disparus*, UNADIF) aligned themselves according to the East-West divide.⁵² The debates in Israel and the acrimonious Holocaust commemoration ceremonies should also be seen in this context.

Conclusion: Discord and Memory

What was the reason behind the interconnectedness of the agendas of Holocaust memory and the Cold War? The answer, it seems, lay in the existential realities of Israelis and their young state. The Israelis of the 1950s were living through monumental times. They had won the 1948 war, established a state, and more than doubled their number through the immigration of Holocaust survivors from Europe and Jews coming in from Muslim countries. But they had not yet reached peace and quiet. The country was regularly threatened with a “second round” by its neighbors, a war that this time around would be won by the Arabs. In addition, Egypt and Jordan enabled terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians from their borders, resulting in hundreds of Israeli casualties, mostly civilian, in these years.⁵³ The massive immigration strained the young state both financially and socially. Looming over all this was the Holocaust. Its scars were raw and ran deep, manifesting themselves in personal and public consciousness. As we have shown, they also permeated public discourse and decision making.

⁵² Pieter Lagrou, *The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe, 1945–1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

⁵³ See the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “1948–1967: Major Terror Attacks.” <https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/1948-1967-major-terror-attacks>, accessed March 30, 2024.

Simultaneously, Israelis, like most citizens of the globe, also lived through the tensions and tribulation of the early Cold War and the threat, as it was then seen, of a Third World War. Today it is hard to understand the stress of those years, but it was palpable to those living during that time. Choices had to be made and, at times, they clashed with emotions and long-held beliefs. Reality brought together discussions on Holocaust memory and the Cold War, not those on theoretical issues, but rather those on very tangible ones. Ideological and political leaders and the public had to reconcile the two, and it was not easy. At the heart of the discussion was the question: what is in Israel's best interest?

The reparations debate is a good example. Both supporters and opponents of the reparations agreement knew that it would enable West Germany to show that it had made up for past crimes and would open its way into the United Nations, the Western bloc, and eventually NATO. Yet for Ben-Gurion and his government, it was obvious that the Western powers would rehabilitate West Germany anyway and then Israel would have no leverage at all. It was imperative for it to act now to receive reparations that were crucial to the state's survival. Receiving military material from the Germans at a time when Israel was threatened on all fronts was no less crucial, especially since the major Western powers were reluctant to sell weapons to Israel. The discussion was couched in terms of honor and dignity within the context of the Holocaust on the side of the opponents across the political spectrum, but it was also about the identity of the young state and its best interests in a Cold War world.⁵⁴ Accepting reparations would cement Israel's affiliation with the Western bloc, as already conveyed by its stand on the Korean War. This was ideologically abhorrent to the left, since it could not envisage Israel as a part of a capitalist and "war-mongering" bloc. Moreover, they saw the government's attraction to the Western bloc as endangering the future of the young state, since it was obvious to them that in a confrontation between the blocs, the "peace camp" and the USSR would win and the Red Army would arrive in the Middle East.

These tensions were more vehemently debated, as I have shown, on the Israeli left, which intuitively saw itself as belonging to the socialist/communist camp, as it had long held a staunch pro-USSR position. This inherent affiliation with the communist camp explains its representatives' overt weaponization of the Holocaust in the political arena. By using the Holocaust, they brought to the debate the most potent argument possible and pushed through their arguments. Evoking martyrdom and resistance, they aimed to score points for the movements

⁵⁴ Neima Barzel, "Dignity, Hatred and Memory: Reparations from Germany: The Debates in the 1950s," *Yad Vashem Studies* 24 (1994): 247–280.

that saw past resistance to the Nazis as proof of the rightness of their cause. Those on the far left were losing the political debate as Israel leaned more and more to the West, on the one hand, and the USSR adopted an active anti-Israeli policy, on the other. This is not to say that it was manipulative propaganda on their side. They were certainly sincere in making the connection between resistance to the Nazis, Holocaust memory, reparations from Germany and its rearmament, and other Cold War issues, but the Israeli public and most political leaders were much less enthusiastic about such statements. By continuously using the Holocaust and resistance card in the political debate they alienated the government and alienated themselves from most Israelis, who supported the government policies on the issues discussed here and who wanted to connect to a Holocaust commemoration free of partisan appropriation.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ I teach a course on Israeli Holocaust memory and have discussed these issues for many years with young Israeli students. Together, we read the Knesset protocols mentioned in this paper and the students simply cannot understand what “all this politics” is doing in a Holocaust-related debate. The Holocaust remains potent in the 2020s, but the Cold War is so distant that even adults no longer see any connection. It is for this reason that I have written this chapter.

