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Modern Territoriality, the Nation-State, and Nationalism

Introduction

This chapter began life as a commentary on a paper that was to be given by Charles Maier at a workshop at the German Historical Institute London on "The Territorial State after 1989" in June 2013. Maier was unable to make the workshop, so my commentary became the keynote paper. I have reworked it to relate to the theme of the present volume, which is to do with the specific modern historical form assumed by such concepts as state, territory, boundaries, and sovereignty and how these have shaped nationalist ideology. However, this does remain more an extended critique of the arguments of Maier than the presentation of an alternative argument. In this critique, I consider not just Maier's unpublished paper of 2013 but also publications in which he sets out his arguments about modern territoriality at greater length and in a broader context.[1]

First, let me historicize what is at stake here. Territoriality has been a key aspect of organized coercive power – often what we might also call state power – at least since the era of sedentary agriculture. Furthermore, territoriality will continue to be central to such power for the foreseeable future. So the issue is not about territoriality as an aspect of state power generally but about a specifically modern form of territoriality and its associated modern state power. This in turn I will relate to arguments about the modernity of nationalist ideology.

Second, I agree with Maier about locating the origins of modern territoriality – both conceptual and institutional – in early modern Europe.[2] I also agree that the specific hallmarks of this territoriality are the idea of the state as unmediated sovereign power exercised over the subjects/citizens of a sharply bounded territory and that the inhabited land mass of the world is completely covered by

1 C.S. Maier, "Transformations of Territoriality: 1600–2000", in: G. Budde, S. Conrad, and O. Janz, *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005, pp. 32–55; C.S. Maier, "Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood", in: E. Rosenberg (ed.), *A World Connecting, 1870–1945*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012, pp. 29–282; C. S. Maier, *Once within borders. Territories of power, wealth, and belonging since 1500*, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2016.

2 I distinguish between the concept of territory and the practice of territoriality. On the former, which can be traced back at least to classical Greece and Rome, see S. Elden, *The Birth of Territory*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013.

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a number of such states. It is these attributes of unmediated sovereignty, sharp boundaries, and global political geography that are specifically modern.

Third, I agree with much of the way in which Maier characterizes typical phases in the development of territoriality since the sixteenth century. One can select three major transformations in sixteenth-century Europe that help explain the emergence of new forms of territoriality associated with the formulation of concepts such as sovereignty and frontiers.

First, there is the breakdown of the unity of Latin Christianity and the plunging of much of Europe into fierce religious conflict. This created a new form of what Maier calls "identity space", especially with the "confessionalization" of the state.[3] Second, the discovery and the early settlement and exploitation of the "New World" gave access to resources and encouraged new ideas and practices of imperial rule. Third, both these transformations were channelled through a few competing regimes occupying a small space on the Atlantic seaboard of Europe, framing their religious and imperial ambitions in universalist terms and innovating militarily to pursue those ambitions.

It is this dialectic between the small space of Europe and the apparently unbounded space of the world beyond that shapes the initial modern concepts of territoriality – combining in a specific way Maier's points about the bounded landmass and the unbounded high seas.[4] As boundaries are contested and enforced through war in Europe, so are they projected, often fantastically, on to the still unknown land masses abroad.

What makes early modern Europe distinct apart from these three transformations is that modern territoriality in Europe involved symmetry. Frontiers have always mattered (e.g. the Roman *limes*[5] or the Habsburg military borders), and control of space and the people within those frontiers has always been crucial. However, before the early modern period, the usual pattern is of one dominant imperial power confronting other and different kinds of polities: China and tributary kingdoms, Persia and assorted Greek city states, or Rome and the tribes of northern Europe.[6] The language of universal empire still matters in sixteenth-

3 Although recently various historians of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation have suggested that the "confessionalization" thesis of Heinz Schilling and others has been exaggerated.

4 Carl Schmitt, as Maier mentions, develops an argument along these lines in *Der Nomos der Erde*.

5 See P. Parker, *The Empire Stops Here: A Journey Along the Frontiers of the Roman World*, London: Pimlico, 2010,

6 These are never simple distinctions, culturally or spatially. The "barbarians" and the "civilized" mix and interpenetrate and, indeed, the contrasting stereotypes we inherit from writers

century Europe but increasingly, whether it is Charles V or Louis XIV, is deployed by a ruler who looks increasingly similar to other rulers. That is not to set aside the great differences between England/Britain, Castille/Spain, France, the United Provinces, etc., but it is possible to conceptualize them as similar units engaged in power struggles, especially when coalitions can be deployed to counter the power of any one unit threatening hegemony.

However, modern territoriality goes through further transformations, which Maier enumerates. One is the Enlightenment notion that societies under sovereign control are not fixed, unchanging units whereby state power can only be increased as a zero-sum game, either conquering other lands or seizing more resources from one's own subjects, but instead malleable arrangements that, by the forceful use of reason, can be made more productive. This was a project rather than an achievement in the eighteenth century, but it did produce changes in how territoriality and rule were understood.

For complex and much debated reasons, changes that increased productivity did start to transform societies. "Society" came to be regarded no longer as an object of old or new style, unenlightened or enlightened rulers, but as a dynamic and autonomous force, indeed one that might reshape the state rather than the other way round. It is no accident that the first historians to write of class struggle as the motor of history are not Marx and Engels but the "bourgeois" historians of the French Revolution, such as Guizot. That takes us to revolution, democracy, and the transformation of the concept of sovereignty as flowing from God, embodied in monarchy and hierarchy, to that of popular sovereignty, with its implications of equality and participation. At its most stark, the Jacobins outlined a unitary concept of France and the French, expressed not just in the proclamation of new arrangements of time and space but also in the abolition of corporations, privileges, and "intermediate powers".

There is therefore little to dispute over the major phases of the development of modern territoriality: from the centralizing monarchies with their project of confessional unity in the early modern period, through the processes of change associated with Enlightened reform, commercial society, and popular revolution in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; on to the revolutions in technologies of production, communication, and transportation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; through the global wars and

who identify as "civilized" (e.g. Tacitus writing about "Germans" or Walter Scott writing about Highland Scots) are ways of responding to that interpenetration.

the rise and decline of imperial blocs in the twentieth century to the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the survival of currently one world power (though by no means hegemonic), along with the most modern forms of globalization in communications, finance, transport, military, and other spheres. In this last phase, much of what might be regarded as the debate over territoriality has typically taken the form of debates over the future of the nation-state – whether relatively unchanged as the major "power container",[7] or disappearing in the face of supranational forms of power, or continuing but in some transformed way.

Maier brings a particular twist to this history. The title of his contribution to *A World Connecting* is "Leviathan 2.0", as contrasted with Leviathan 1.0, which belongs to what one might call the era of Thomas Hobbes: the age of absolutism in Europe and imperialism in the New World.[8] Maier then conceptualizes a Leviathan 2.0, focusing on the period c. 1850–1880 as a "moment" that witnessed a cluster of global political transformations, ushering in a new stage of territoriality and type of state. Maier also suggests that from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, we can discern a shift to a third stage that, amongst other things, deterritorializes state power.

A central idea concerning the Leviathan 2.0 is that events such as the Meiji Restoration, German and Italian unification, and the US Civil War led to the formation of a new kind of territoriality in which, to use two very useful terms deployed by Maier, there was a convergence between decision space and identity space. This convergence is implied in the very term "nation-state". Such states formed the core of the global imperial powers and their conflicts from the late nineteenth century through the two world wars. Following imperial collapse (in much of Europe after 1918, beyond Europe after 1945), this nation-state form was generalized to the colonial subjects of imperial rule. The collapse of the USSR largely completed the process whereby the inhabited land mass of the world was divided up in to a series of such nation-states.[9]

It is key elements of these arguments that Maier puts forward about territoriality that I want to critique.

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7 I take the phrase from Michael Mann in his volumes on the "sources of social power".

8 This book consists of five book-length chapters that take different approaches to the "global history" of the world between 1870 and 1945. I reviewed this extensively: J. Breuilly, "Strategies for Writing Global History", *The Journal of Global History* 9 (2014), pp. 314–332.

9 There remain a few polities such as Singapore, the Sultanate of Brunei, and the Gulf oil kingdoms, where the term "nation-state" would not apply.

Critique

Introductory Points

My critique can be summarized in the following points:

1. The development of territoriality is a more general process than nation-state formation.
2. Territorialization is not a linear trend but alternates with phases of deterritorialization, both within and between different places.
3. It is necessary to distinguish between territoriality as coercive power and the largely non-territorial features of ideological and economic power and to consider how they can in some way be combined in the nation-state form.
4. It is necessary to distinguish between the progressive universalization of the *concept* of territoriality and the necessarily partial institutionalized realization of territoriality as organized coercive power.
5. The key condition of modern territoriality is the transformation from subject to citizen towards mass politics, which changes both the functions and symbolic meaning of territoriality.
6. These critiques have implications for current and near future territoriality.

Territoriality is Distinct From Nation-state Formation

Maier argues that new forms of territoriality developed in the early modern period before nation-state formation.[10] Some were associated with monarchical centralization and can be linked to the kinds of boundary claims made by a ruler such as Louis XIV. Even when national terminology appears in the justifications for these boundary claims, they are essentially monarchical, as with the so-called "reunion" arguments used to justify war to take over territory on France's northern and eastern frontiers. Following successful expansion, more effective fortifications were constructed and French laws and systems of

10 I assume that although we call monarchical France and England "national" states before the eighteenth century, this is not to be regarded as the same as the claims made about those states, especially after the French Revolution and the moves towards parliamentary government based on a widening franchise in what was now Britain after the late eighteenth century. It would appear Maier would accept this distinction as, in his own argument, the USA acquires some additional "nation-state" quality as a result of the Civil War, just as more obviously did the political arrangements in the German, Italian, and Japanese lands.

administration introduced. Military as well as dynastic ambitions gave substance to territoriality, for example in the special military border districts of the early modern Habsburg Empire.

In the New World, the European powers also made precise boundary claims, starting with the Papal "division" of territory between Portugal and Spain along an east-west line that basically granted Portugal Africa and Spain America. However, given the ignorance of global geography at the time, no one actually knew this, and such territorial divisions were expressions of European aspiration. The institutionalization of such boundaries arose only in a process of negotiation and conflict, both between the imperial powers and – something that is often neglected – indigenous elites.

Much depended not only on how balanced or one-sided were power relationships but also on what interests were at stake and what place territory had in the economy and culture of the contending groups. For example, there were specific problems when European societies, practising sedentary agriculture (whether large or small scale, farm or plantation), encountered pastoral societies, as one can see with the treaties the British and French concluded with Native American societies in North America, later the British with indigenous groups in Australia and New Zealand, as well as a whole range of European powers with sub-Saharan African polities. European claims were often justified on the grounds that a "civilized" society was one which cultivates clearly bounded portions of land and that by contrast pastoral and other kinds of nomadic societies cannot be said to "own" land.

The practices through which such attitudes were implemented can be linked back to the processes Maier describes in continental Europe of cadastral surveys and subsequently the individualization of property rights in land – whether described as "enclosure" in mainland Britain or "peasant emancipation" in continental Europe. The clear drawing of boundaries around "private" property matches the clear drawing of boundaries around the "public" territory of the state. We can see the close relationship between these two processes in the expansion of the USA as well as in the way Napoleon imposed definite state boundaries in conquered central Europe along with the introduction of a civil code named after him, which was centred on the idea of absolute, individual property rights in demarcated parcels of land.

However, there is a gap in Maier's account of the progress of territoriality in Europe for the period 1792 to 1815, a crucial period both for the nationalization of territorial claims and also in realizing various functional forms of territorial power.

The Girondins who led France into war with *ancien régime* Europe in 1792 made novel claims that overrode earlier conceptions of territoriality by insisting that there could be no overlaps or blurring of France's frontiers. The tangled

jurisdictions on the eastern frontier whereby inhabitants of a single territory owed different obligations to the French crown and to the Holy Roman Empire were rhetorically and then militarily swept aside by revolutionary France. Just as territory was clearly demarcated internally with the construction of a system of departments, so was it also clearly demarcated against "non-France".

Various of these new features of territoriality also came to operate in the expanding area conquered by French armies, sometimes with but more often without any national justification. Tangled and overlapping jurisdictions were swept aside, for example in the new republics, later princely states, set up in the Italian and German lands and elsewhere. These might be designated as parts of greater France (e.g. left bank of the Rhine territories formerly within the Holy Roman Empire), as "model" states under rulers chosen by Napoleon (usually relatives) or in the expanded states granted to existing native princes. In almost all cases, the governments of these territories removed, at least legally, the privileges and corporations associated with substate forms of territorial autonomy (e.g. urban guild powers or rural noble powers). There were admittedly limits to such territorialization, above all because they were dependent upon an external power: France. Thus an "archaic" practice that undermined territoriality, indeed often the viability, of some of these states was Napoleon's policy of making privileged land grants in order to endow a new imperial nobility.[11]

These advances in territoriality were maintained, even reinforced, after 1815. The Vienna Settlement may have been "restoration" so far as Prussia, Austria, and Russia were concerned but not in relation to the myriad overlapping jurisdictions of pre-revolutionary central and southern Europe. The territorial simplification of the German and Italian lands, in which a series of medium-sized states had been granted "internal" sovereignty by Napoleon was maintained.[12] That was qualified by the Metternichian policy of reserving the

11 This demonstrates the non-linear development of modern territoriality and the conflicts between different interests and values. These could even exist within the mind of a single person, most notably Napoleon who seemed undecided between self-images of a new Charlemagne, enlightened European despot, or architect of a pluralist system of states based on shared principles of reason and freedom.

12 In the case of the *Deutsche Bund*, set up in 1814/15, the ingenious solution, adopted from the Holy Roman Empire and in effect continued by Napoleon as "Protector" of the *Rheinbund*, was to state that members of the *Bund* could not engage in diplomatic or military action independently. As Prussia and Austria also had territory outside the *Bund*, they were exempt from this rule. There were some interesting intermediate cases such as Hannover until 1837 and Schleswig-Holstein until 1864 where a member state of the *Bund* was ruled by a prince with territories outside the *Bund* but the *Bund* territory was kept distinct from the non-*Bund* territory.

right to intervene in the internal affairs of these states, although usually this was legitimized by getting the ruler of the state to make an appeal for such intervention.

These medium states, as well as larger ones, including Bourbon France, built on the Napoleonic legacy of tougher, territorially sharply defined and bureaucratically centralized states. German and Italian unification finished this process. Bismarck did not pursue "German unification" so much as a clear territorial distinction between one zone controlled from Berlin and another from Vienna. Why his creation was then called "Germany" raises questions about the need to legitimize territorial sovereignty in national terms, which I consider later.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the major European powers projected a set of distinct boundaries upon low population zones, most notably in relation to much of Africa at the Berlin Conference (1884/85).[13] Even if one considers these boundaries both symbolically and functionally meaningless at the time (often the territory in question was unexplored and unmapped by Europeans), they still acquired meaning with the further penetration of imperial power in the twentieth century and then in the way in which post-colonial states sought, with the support of the major powers, to project their power to the state boundaries.[14]

Much of this territorialization was a projection of more powerful states upon less powerful regions, even if disguised in the form of treaties that presented the arrangement as negotiation between equals. Here, we must distinguish between conceptual and institutional territorialization. The power of the major European states (both within and then beyond Europe), and latterly the USA and the USSR, made it possible for them to project favoured concepts of territoriality across various parts of the world. However, only under certain conditions would these concepts be realized institutionally, and yet again only under other conditions would both these concepts and institutions be represented as those of nation-states. In the first instance, for example, many colonial territories with notionally clear boundaries were left to pre-colonial practices in which such boundaries were of little importance. Only when the

13 Though even this apparently "arbitrary" carve-up of African lands between European states has been questioned; see S. Katzenellenbogen, "'It Didn't Happen in Berlin': Politics, Economics and Ignorance in the Setting of Africa's Colonial Boundaries", in: P. Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju (eds.), *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities*, London: Pinter, 1997, pp. 21–31.

14 On the role of state boundaries in the new states of Africa, see J. Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000; P. Englebert, *Africa: Unity, Sovereignty and Sorrow*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009.

imperial powers sought to "develop" such territories or to defend them against other such powers were the boundaries institutionalized through such practices as border posts and patrols as well as documentation procedures, which defined which people "belonged" to one or another colonial territory. In the second instance, even if colonial territories or, in the case of the USSR, the non-Russian republics, were given a "national" designation, they clearly were not envisioned at the time as becoming nation-states. That was a concept later devised as one way of justifying the break-up of empires.

Phases and Zones of "Territorialization" Alternate and Combine With Those of "Deterritorialization"

Much of early modern overseas European imperial expansion did not take a territorial form. Portuguese and, following that, Dutch imperialism often took the form of trade whereby the Europeans were satisfied to establish coastal footholds, leaving control of the hinterland to indigenous rulers, provided only that they were willing and able to engage in the desired commerce.

Those indigenous rulers might well preside over a "deterritorialization" as part of this transaction, most notably with the impact of the Atlantic slave trade upon those African hinterlands from which the slaves were drawn. New forms of rule emerged but not necessarily as control of clearly demarcated territory, indeed often undermining such forms of territorial control that had previously existed.

One might expect such "deterritorialization" to decline globally with the abolition of the slave trade and the creation of "empires of settlement" in North America, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, or "administered empires" in tropical zones where plantations were established with a small and changeable European population, or in zones combining elements of these two features. Yet the greatest phase of "non-territorial imperialism" was still to come, namely with British extra-European hegemony after 1815.

Maier justifiably debunks the claim by the late nineteenth-century British historian Sir John Seeley that the British Empire was established in a "fit of absence of mind", but Seeley has a point, or rather two points.

First, the "informal" empire, about which Gallagher and Robinson wrote the seminal pioneering account, was not established in any deliberate, long-term way.[15] John Darwin, in his recent book on the British imperial project,

15 R. E. Robinson and J. Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961.

makes it clear that it was not in fact a single project but a patchwork assemblage of different modes of influence in which direct territorial rule was just one element.[16] Even as formal imperial rule was established, most notably in British-controlled India in 1858, at the same time British officials were retreating from some of the modes of direct rule practised by the East India Company, which, amongst other things, was held responsible for the revolution of 1857.[17]

Arguably, British imperial control was bound to become increasingly territorial. Henry Maine, who did so much to develop the historical justification and administrative models for "indirect rule", regarded the Raj as, to deploy his distinction, a "legislating" and not a "taxing" empire. "Traditional" law codified and enforced by British officials and soldiers was a contradiction in terms. Territoriality was institutionalized by the process of defining zones of control, drawing up cadastral surveys, and seeking to individualize property rights (even when villages were designated collective owners). This was even more the case in those Indian coastal cities and other zones where capitalist penetration was most rapidly advancing. Nevertheless, informal empire, linked to the doctrine of free trade – which proclaimed and, in practice, sought to institutionalize the separation of economic from coercive power – was significant through much of the nineteenth century, where the British had the greatest influence. Did the British need indigenous territorial sovereigns with whom to negotiate "informal" empire?

In high population zones with existing sophisticated systems of rule, most notably imperial China, there was no attempt even to challenge existing modes of coercive power but only to enforce trading from coastal enclaves such as the great eastern seaboard cities and Hong Kong. This did undermine the territorial power of the imperial state in various ways. First, the imperial powers insisted that their citizens be subject to their own, not Chinese, laws, a status tellingly named "extra-territoriality". Second, zones were created in cities, such as Shanghai, that were beyond *all* imperial control. Finally, more indirectly but also more significantly, imperial exactions and incursions undermined what pre-modern territorial imperial power existed. The Taiping Rebellion destroyed central control, and the regionally commanded forces raised to repress it laid the basis for widespread local coercive power (the so-called "warlords"), which

16 J. Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System 1830–1970*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

17 This is a central argument in K. Mantena, *Alibis of Empire: Social Theories and Ideologies of Late Imperialism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, focusing on the work and thought of Henry Maine.

characterized both the late imperial and much of the republican period from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century.

The second justification for Seeley's claim is that what compelled the British to move towards clearer forms of territorial rule ("formal empire") was not a clearer sense of an imperial project but short-term responses to new challenges. Gladstone, an ardent anti-imperialist and believer in informal influence and free trade, took Britain into a formal occupation of Egypt because of internal challenges that threatened existing commercial relations as well as the vital Suez Canal. Challenges from a recovering France, and the new powers of Germany, Japan, and the USA more generally, triggered the formal division of extra-European territories. The same process was at work in the territorialization of the Americas both as an outcome of inter-imperial conflict and conflict between imperial power and white settler–led insurgencies.

This phase of nineteenth-century informal British Empire – with one, albeit quite weak hegemonic power – resembles US global power since 1990. Just as the term "empire" is considered problematic for the USA and often rejected by Americans, so too one should be cautious about referring to the British "Empire" for much of the nineteenth century. The defeat of France in 1815 was in a way the equivalent of the collapse of the USSR in 1989–1991. It meant that the remaining hegemonic power did not need to clearly demarcate its zones of imperial power from those of competing powers. The major difference, of course, is that British imperialism did not confront a system of legally defined, territorial nation-states in the way that the USA did.

One should not think that there was any resumption of a long-term secular "rise of territoriality" once British imperial power was challenged. War shattered territoriality: in Central Europe and the Middle East between 1914 and 1923, in China from 1937 until 1949, in Southeast Asia after 1941, and in parts of Europe after 1939/1941. The fact that clear lines were drawn on maps after these wars – whether in terms of new imperial claims (e.g. the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France in the Middle East) or the designation of new nation-states in Central Europe in 1919 or in Asia immediately after 1945 or in much of sub-Saharan Africa between 1958 and 1970 – should not blind us to the fact that this was often no more than a conceptual, not an institutional, achievement.[18] What is more, such "territorialization" was only possible on the basis of a violent destruction of an earlier territorial order. It would be a while

18 For a cogent critique of the conventional view that Sykes-Picot was both definitive and arbitrary with respect to certain Middle East state boundaries, especially the one between Syria and Iraq, see S. Pursley, "'Lines Drawn on an Empty Map': Iraq's Borders and the Legend of the Artificial State", *Jadaliyya*, 2015, http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/32140

after such a process of "reterritorialization" that the new boundaries would acquire some institutional substance and ideological force, often becoming the basis on which colonial nationalist movements claimed independence.

Even in the more "settled" zones, which for a time were known as the First World or Second World, it is difficult to see how "territoriality" in national terms was advanced for states that willingly or unwillingly belonged to supra-state military alliances such as the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We are again confronted with a de facto if not de jure distinction between internal and external sovereignty of the kind Metternich enforced in the German and Italian lands and the East India Company and later the Raj in non-British India.[19] Later, Carl Schmitt would make a similar point about how the Monroe Doctrine, an early nineteenth-century US claim to hegemony in South America, was incorporated into the post–World War I agreement that established the League of Nations, thereby enshrining a contradiction between hegemony and sovereignty, a contradiction that for Schmitt was in turn an expression of the hypocrisy of that institution.

This complex combination of territorial and non-territorial, national and non-national power can be found even within the same state. The Soviet Union insisted on national territoriality in the non-Russian republics and institutionalized national identity in a series of "affirmative action" policies.[20] Yet, at the same time, it institutionally combined coercive, economic, and ideological power at the level of the "imperial" state and enforced boundary control much more effectively at the border between communist and non-communist regimes than it did between the Soviet Union and its nominally sovereign communist neighbours. Meanwhile, in the two major communist powers, China and the USSR, state territoriality as free movement by citizens was undermined by the requirement for internal passports, the denial of rights to rural immigrants in urban areas (still current Chinese practice), the wholesale forced movements of populations and the designation of certain territories within the state as places of exile where normal rule of law did not apply. If we associate territoriality and the doctrine of popular sovereignty as entailing the right of free movement of citizens throughout state territory, clearly such practices undermine such aspects of modern territoriality.

I cannot therefore discern any linear trend towards greater "territoriality", whether in imperial or national form, but instead opposing trends in various

19 This was a point made by Partha Chatterjee in his contribution to the above mentioned GHIL conference.

20 T. Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.

places and periods. Territoriality is a useful concept but only in conjunction with its negation. I will return to this theme later when I argue that globalization – not itself a recent development even if associated with new features since 1990 – necessarily involves both "more" and "less" territoriality.

Distinguishing Between the Territoriality of Coercive Power and That of Ideological and Economic Power

Maier's key moment in the shift to a distinctively modern form of territoriality is 1850–1880, precisely the time when the conditions for a series of global challenges to British hegemony were being formed. This was most obviously the case with the "national unifications" of Germany, Italy, Japan, and the USA – all involving inter-state and/or civil war. It was also a time when other empires (Romanov, Ottoman, Qing, Persian), with a greater or lesser degree of success, sought to reform themselves by borrowing from the more successful cases (first Britain and France, and later increasingly Japan, Germany, and the USA).

Maier's "moment" has two key elements: it is seen as *national* and it is about the transformation of coercive power. However, following various political theorists (Max Weber, Ernest Gellner, and Gianfranco Poggi, with modifications Michael Mann) I distinguish three forms of power, ideological, and economic power in addition to coercive or military-political power, characterized by the typical sanctions that are used to enforce such power. The point about these forms of power is that they are not necessarily transformed at the same time or along the same lines as coercive power.

Ideological Power

Very broadly one can distinguish a range of ideologies that have the capacity to stimulate, channel, and focus human action. First, and most important, is religion. It is at the heart of many resistances to modern imperialism and the attempt to impose a particular kind of territorial order. At times, it threatens to destroy such an order, as in China in the late 1850s and early 1860s or in India in 1857. Even when animating imperial expansion, it often does so in transterritorial ways, as one sees in much Christian missionary effort, which was not circumscribed, let alone directed, by territorial states. The interaction between dominating and resisting religious movements can produce especially explosive results, such as the Boxer Uprising of 1900, which included the killing of many Christian missionaries and their families.

There are also secular ideologies with great influence that are not territorially circumscribed. Race ideology, for example, plays an increasingly strong role in animating and justifying imperialist projects. Its most powerful expression is that of white race superiority claims, in such forms as Seeley's arguments about global Anglo-Saxon imperial rule or in justifying immigration controls on Chinese labour. In turn, it elicits responses on behalf of non-white groups, most notably in the plethora of pan-nationalisms (pan-Asian, pan-African, pan-Islam, pan-Arab), which often accept the division of the world into separate races while challenging the particular hierarchy preached by white race apologists.[21] It is also entangled with the rather distinct category of ethnicity, which is used to distinguish allegedly inherited (biological or cultural) differences between groups of the same race – whether Sun Yat-sen's diatribes against the Manchu (and his claims about the "five races of China" argument) or radical anti-Semitism or the ethno-national claims made within the Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman empires.

Furthermore, there are the two secular progressive ideologies of liberalism and socialism. Arguably liberalism was the founding ideology of modernity, with its justifications for the removal of privileged distinctions, group hierarchy, and the view of the state as a servant of "society". What is interesting about both these broad ideologies is their neglect of territoriality and of state power as something distinct, derived either from relationships between individuals (e.g. the social contract as the basis of states) or classes. The main reason is that both ideologies, so far as inequalities of power were concerned, were fixated on the dramatic fortunes of capital as a restless, global force, and rather less on the other two components of classical political economy – land and labour – which are territorially less mobile and which require some kind of territorial control.[22]

There remains nationalism that appears to be the ideological expression of state as territoriality (national homeland) and as identity (the nation) par excellence. However, I think it is misleading to think of nationalism as an ideology in the same way as religion, race, ethnicity, liberalism, socialism, and conservatism. I also think it is wrong to tie the development of nationalism to national history or, at least initially, nation-state formation and development. However, these are matters I will

21 For an introduction to the burgeoning work on pan-nationalism, see C. Aydin, "Beyond Civilisation: Pan-Islam, Pan Asianism and the Revolt Against the West", *Journal of Modern European History* 4 (2006) 2, pp. 204–223.

22 I leave aside conservatism as a parasitic ideology, raised from implicit defence of custom to explicit advocacy of tradition through challenges to the status quo.

take up later in the section on the relationship between identity and decision space.[23]

For the moment, my provisional conclusion is that these forms of ideological power, although they can be harnessed to justify the coercive transformation we call nation-state formation, are not themselves territorially delimited forms of power and the moment of *formation* as coercive power is not to be equated with the *foundation* of the nation-state as a particular combination of coercive, ideological, and economic power.

Economic Power

The economic basis of modern imperialism is capitalism. Maier's moment of coercive nation-state formation is also the heyday of free trade. The principal German and Italian states, along with Britain and France and various smaller European states, were in the process of negotiating lower tariffs virtually at the same time as steps towards national unification were being taken. Even the moves to protectionism taken from the late 1870s have been exaggerated as they covered a small range of goods, and the tariffs were not especially high, certainly by later standards. Furthermore, internally within continental Europe (Britain and the USA were exceptional in this regard) – linked to the advance of the inner dimensions of territoriality – we find the sweeping away of guilds, privileged forms of landownership, separate legal codes for town and country, and restrictions on free movement and settlement, as well as the making of stricter distinctions between public and private sources of revenue (e.g. with regard to monarchies) along with distinguishing between the proper objects of public and private expenditure.

Most significant of all, and generally neglected in discussions of modern state-building, is peasant emancipation. This began with reforms on some royal properties (e.g. in the Prussia of Frederick the Great), was decreed in revolutionary fashion in France in August 1789, was extended by Napoleon beyond France, was haltingly continued after 1815, was virtually completed in much of central Europe during the 1848–1849 revolutions, and finally serfdom was

23 I consider the relationship between modern territoriality and nationalist ideology in more detail in an article devoted to the theme of modernization theory and historical writing: J. Breuilly, "Modernisation and Nationalist Ideology", *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 57 (2017) special issue, pp. 131–154.

legally abolished in Russia in 1863. On this basis, whether to the benefit of small holding farmers (as in France) or to formerly privileged landowners (as in much of Prussia) or some combination of these, land was increasingly defined as private property and agricultural labour as waged. To put it sweepingly, on this transformation was laid the basis of modern mass politics and the formation of peasant, elite conservative, and worker parties. This in turn disseminated a territorial political system through the electoral politics of a parliament that covered the state territory and broke down that territory into a series of constituencies.

The emergent system of territorial states also empowered international forms of cooperation, which can be regarded as essential conditions for interactions between states, such as agreements on the measurement of time, the use of gold as the basis of currency exchanges, and standardized forms of communication (e.g. postal and telegraphic). There was a school of "national economy" – especially important in the USA and Germany – but it was of far less importance than classical political economy or marginal utility economics, which superseded classical political economy. Economic transactions were more important across imperial blocs than within them; for example, patterns of capital investment and government borrowing do not largely fit within the zones of formal imperial control (Britain invested more heavily in independent Latin American states than in its African colonies, with the possible exception of South Africa). Even some aggressive German imperialists, confronted with the inability to make headway against Britain in terms of naval power, began to see the merits of a *Pax Britannica* as creating an integrated economic zone where capital from all over the world can easily move. Challenged by popular and regime resistance to imperialism in China, six imperial powers allied to crush the Boxer Uprising in 1900. There was no simple congruency between the patterns of state coercive power and of economic power.

So as with ideological power, there is a great deal that is non-territorial about trends in economic power. Nation-state formation is a very particular kind of territorially focused coercive power, which defined the internal order of the core of the major imperial powers increasingly but which cannot be projected beyond those territories before 1918.

The Conceptual and the Institutional Diffusion of Territoriality

One can trace a series of institutional changes that amounted to an increasingly distinct projection of state sovereignty over those occupying a demarcated territory. For example, the sovereign removed significant forms of coercive power

from "overmighty" subjects such as fortresses, stockpiles of weapons, and followings of armed men and sought to insulate its frontiers from armed incursions from outside, whether by states or other entities. In this way, the classic Weberian state with a monopoly of large-scale coercive power is formed. However, it is not clear how widely this was diffused beyond the cores of the major imperial powers by the end of the nineteenth century.

Such a *concept* of sovereign power over a demarcated territory was increasingly projected on to many parts of the world, but the requisite institutional changes to realize this concept did not take place. China from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century is a good example. On the one hand, China was diplomatically recognized by the major powers, even if they also recognized territorial losses as in the form of Japanese annexations and conceding special zones of control to all the major imperial powers. After 1919, China was a recognized sovereign state in the League of Nations. Nevertheless, the central state lacked coercive power over its whole territory. Conversely, certain forms of territoriality were achieved by non-state means. The Imperial (from 1912 Chinese) Maritime Customs Service, which operated from 1854 until 1949, treated China as a single economic territory so far as the control of trade across its borders was concerned. However, this was a "private" institution run largely by Europeans and some Americans who nevertheless displayed a good deal of loyalty towards "China".

Yet there were also strict limits to its institutional achievements, as the Customs Service operated in areas where it was difficult, if not impossible, to carry out its designated functions. The Taiping Rebellion undermined central imperial control and was crushed with the use of armed forces raised under local officials, which in turn formed the basis for regional "warlord" power in the late imperial period and throughout the life of the republic (1912–1949). The nationalists were busy reconstituting sovereign territorial power between 1926 and 1937, but this project was abruptly reversed with the Japanese invasion and then the civil war from 1945 until 1949. Chinese groups, in particular the nationalists and the communists, had the modern concept of territoriality as a goal, and various events, such as the popularization of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and the idea of "national self-determination", probably made the concept an increasingly important one to a growing number of people. Nevertheless, China, if anything, saw a "deterritorializing" trend from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century.[24]

24 On the impact of Wilson's doctrine of national self-determination, see E. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anti-Colonial Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; F. Dikötter, *The Age of Openness: China before Mao*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008.

In other areas more directly under the control of imperialist nation-states, there were also conceptual projections of territoriality but again not given much in the way of institutional form. This had begun piecemeal in certain European zones with the recognition of new states such as Serbia and Greece in the early nineteenth century. Later other Balkan regions broke away from Ottoman control. As a procedure of international agreement and recognition, the conceptual requisites for a "modern" state were elaborated: a constitution, a princely ruler (usually drawn from a cadet branch of an established European royal family), a commitment to rule of law and respect for various individual and/or group rights, and a clearly demarcated boundary. This trend was generalized through much of Central Europe after 1918, mightily assisted by the US doctrine of national self-determination backed by elaborate data built up by teams of academics. In the form of colonial rather than sovereign territories, this was also projected on to much of sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, for example with the establishment of League of Nation "mandates".

Furthermore, political elites in the states in question took the issue of territoriality very seriously, often by insisting that the state did not control all the territory it should – as embodied, for example, in a series of conflicting claims to Greater Serbia, Greater Bulgaria, and Greater Greece. In colonial territories, pan-nationalism declined as nationalist elites concluded that the best prospect of gaining independence was to focus on that self-contradictory concept: the "colonial state". The main difference between the form taken by "self-determination" in European nineteenth-century and post-1918 small state formations and post-1945 extra-European colonies was that generally it had been ethno-nationality (based on some combination of language and religion) that defined the territory of the nation-state in the first set of cases, while it was the colonial territory that defined the "nationality" of the state in the second set. The third great wave of small nation-state formation following the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia combined elements of the two earlier phases, in that the new states were largely based on the territory of the constituent republics of the former states, but these had already been defined in ethno-national terms.

In part, the formation of small nation-states out of larger imperial states was linked to the emergence of nationalist movements with territorial forms matching that of the new state. However, often they were as much, if not more, an international solution dictated by the major external powers who wished to liquidate one formal imperial power (sometimes even including their own) but not by transferring the territory and its inhabitants to the formal rule of another imperial power.

Undoubtedly in some cases, especially where a territorial-wide nationalism played a major role in achieving independence, there was a substantial

institutional and political base for the new state.[25] Roeder argues that the non-Russian republics had become sufficiently real so that those in charge of its institutions had a greater capacity to achieve independence and wield power in the new situation than any other elites. It is also argued that the "ethnic affirmative action" policy of the USSR had created a national identity space that could match republican decision space. However, clearly this varies regionally: broadly speaking, the fates of the West, South, and Central Asian republican zones have taken very different forms based on the degree to which national identity and republican institutions had developed before the Soviet collapse.

Elsewhere, little of this had happened. The Soviet ethno-national programme was exceptional, going against the usual trend for the core – as state power, economic interest, and national identity – to discriminate in favour of itself, often at the expense of inhibiting any genuinely territorial power or identity forming in the peripheries. The modern concepts were often little more than rhetoric – even if important rhetoric because the major powers subscribed to this and insisted that periphery elites do so too – superimposed upon distinctly non-territorial forms of power and identity. In such cases, "territorial nationalism" too was just an elite response to an "outer" form rather than representing anything more popular or deeply believed.[26]

This combination of conceptual without institutional territoriality continues to this day, for example in the patronizing language of "failed states" and "neo-patrimonialism" applied to various regions of Africa and Asia. In some cases, the conceptual project arguably produces the opposite of institutional territoriality. Arnold Toynbee argues that the projection of the nation-state model on to parts of Central Europe and the Balkans after 1918 was a disaster for the region, breaking up natural economic unities (e.g. along the Danube), forming weak and non-viable states whose elites engaged in petty and vicious conflicts with one another. The Austro-Marxist Karl Renner, who had argued, along with Otto Bauer, for combining genuine national cultural autonomy with a multiethnic state, also canvassed the idea of a Danubian Federation.

25 However, in the most impressive case of organized mass nationalism – India – the fact that there were two competing movements caused the failure of the "territorial" solution and led to the massive violence associated with partition.

26 Partha Chatterjee has consistently distinguished adaptive "outer" from more distinctive and authentic "inner" nationalism, and many nationalist writers have made distinctions such as that between "civilization" and "culture" to try to capture the way nationalism both adapted to the universally projected concept of the nation-state and the claim to uniqueness for the particular nation.

Broadly speaking, the nationalist programme, as it had taken shape in the nineteenth century, had projected national independence as a process of creating larger and more progressive state forms such as Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Poland. There often was recognition of "small nations" but not taking the form of sovereign territorial states. The identification of the territorial state with the nation-state and of the nation-state with post-imperial constructions – whether ethno-national (as in Central Europe after 1918) or territorial (as in extra-European empire after 1945) or as a combination (as with the non-Russian republics of the USSR) – in many ways undermined the move towards a genuine territorialization of the world where the separate states each wielded effective power internally and in their relations with each other. It also tended to divide internal coercive from ideological and economic power more sharply, which in turn rendered that coercive power increasingly incoherent and weak.

Yet, so long as the concept of the sovereign, territorial nation-state was defended by the most powerful states, it acquired a life of its own. Englebert argues that, despite their weakness and failure to make a reality of sovereign power in a demarcated territory, African states have rarely been subject to significant secessionist or irredentist challenges. He attributes this to the way in which external forces (more powerful states but also powerful non-state entities such as business corporations and international charities) continue to buttress the "idea of the state" such that even those who contest the power of the existing government claim to do so in the name of the state.

In all these ways, the universalization of the concept of the territorial state is not only not accompanied by its institutional generalization but in fact the conceptual projection actually helps maintain and even create the lack of real territoriality. Indeed, one might go further and argue that the simultaneous existence of territorialization and deterritorialization are necessary to one another, in a dialectic in which one produces the other, indeed where territoriality is advanced in some states precisely through inhibiting or even reversing it in other states.

Territoriality and Democracy

Territoriality acquires a special significance when the subjects of the state identify themselves with that state and this usually, although not always, is associated with the development of citizenship, both in terms of the proportion of the population who become citizens and the range of rights and obligations of that citizenship.

I begin with a neglected aspect of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). This, of course, is deployed as a founding myth for the study of international relations, with the claims that in the agreement was embodied the idea of the sovereign, clearly demarcated territorial state subject to no higher form of authority and each juridically equal to all the others.[27] Empirically one might question some of these points. How territorial was the Holy Roman Empire? How could equality be squared with making three of the signatory states guarantors for the agreement as a whole? However, I want to draw attention to another feature of the treaty. It identified three legitimate confessional forms of Christianity: Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed (we often use the term Calvinism). It established the territorial distribution of the adherents of the three confessions at a particular date. It declared that, in the event of boundary changes between states, the existing territorial distribution of faiths be observed. Whereas the Peace of Augsburg (1555) had declared that the religion of the prince was the religion of the people, this provision in the Treaty of Westphalia reversed that principle. The reason was clear: it appeared that the constant attempt to force people to change their religion had led to the bloody conflicts of the last century or so. By separating the confessional identity of subjects from that of their rulers, it was hoped to avoid one major reason for conflict. It was intended to mean that if the ruler changed his faith, he could not impose it on his subjects (a great relief to Protestant Saxons, whose hereditary king was constantly taking the elective kingship Poland and converting to Catholicism!). It also meant that any territorial changes following a war should not be accompanied by efforts at mass conversion. Interestingly, the most important single instance of conversion was that of the prince falling in line with the majority of his subjects, not the other way round. Henry IV of France recognized that, out of necessity, "Paris is worth a mass".

Admittedly, this limited principle of toleration was not always observed, as when Louis XIV revoked Henry's Edict of Nantes, but it was established. So already, even before modern citizenship and democracy was granted, some princes were compelled to recognize that the identity space, which would reinforce the authority of the territorial monarchy, in an age when confessional identity counted for more than national identity, had in part to come "from below".

Still, what counts most for securing a subject/state link in the modern territorial state is citizenship. This is a complex term and one needs to distinguish between particular functions (rights and obligations) and their practical

27 For a critique of this "myth", see B. Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of International Relations*, New York: Verso, 2003.

realization, on the one hand, and the role of citizenship in establishing identity, usually called nationality, in the modern state, on the other.

The most dramatic changes in citizenship were associated with the American and French revolutions. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen stipulated that power proceeded from the people; the US Declaration of Independence insisted that governments must rest upon the "consent of the governed". Of course, the rhetoric alone does not suffice, and until citizenship is institutionalized into a range of rights and obligations, it can mask many kinds of undemocratic rule.

T.H. Marshall usefully distinguishes between legal, political, and social citizenship.[28] The first was associated with equality before the law and involved the removal of privilege. The second was associated with the right to vote in and stand for election to a sovereign parliament. The third was associated with the right to welfare of various kinds, such as medical care or income support in unemployment or old age. Marshall tends to focus on rights rather than obligations (such as jury and military service, or the making of tax and other public payments) and to see the three forms of citizenship coming in successive phases – arguably a generalization from the English/British experience, but the functional distinctions are valuable nonetheless.

Interestingly, Marshall does not consider the essential condition for all these and any other forms of citizenship, namely *state membership*. Yet, without this concept taking a territorial form, it is difficult to see how any modern citizenship can exist. Let me take one well-documented example of how this might come about. On one day in October 1842, the Prussian state for the first time defined who was a Prussian subject.[29] On that same day, other laws were passed that modified the current system of poor relief. Hitherto, a subject was only eligible for poor relief in the parish of his or her birth. With a state-wide labour market developing along with cyclical unemployment typical of capitalism, this was becoming an impractical provision. Under the new law, residence in a place for three years qualified someone for poor relief. However, that meant one could no longer depend upon the parish to make the decision as to who was entitled to relief; it had become a matter for the state. Until then, Prussia, so far as claims to poor relief were concerned, could be treated as the sum of its parishes, and the boundary that mattered was the parish boundary. Now, in order to avoid free riders from outside Prussia claiming such relief, one

28 T.H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*, New York: Doubleday, 1964.

29 *Staatsangehöriger*, literally member of the state, as opposed to the German term for citizen, which is *Staatsbürger*. On the link of territory to citizenship, see A. Fahrmeir, *Citizenship: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Concept*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008.

had to define who was a Prussian. State membership mattered for many poor people. In a way, it was what Marshall would call a form of social citizenship, which triggered the state definition of subject membership in the Prussian case.

The history of citizenship as a bundle of rights and obligations enforced by the state, and the different stages and forms it takes in different places, is yet to be written, but I would argue that it is at the heart of modern territoriality and is key to the foundation as opposed to the formation of the nation-state. Many of the surveillance techniques we associate with the "growth of the modern state" are not so much impositions upon a passive population but necessary, often popular instruments for the enforcement of citizenship. Universal conscription requires a register of eligible males of the appropriate age groups – to this end, Napoleonic France was the first to establish the necessary bureaucracy that enabled Napoleon to raise mass armies year after year. Prevention of benefit claims by foreigners requires not just a clear distinction between citizen and foreigner but also that this be documented for each individual.[30] Not only that, if only particular categories of citizens had certain rights or obligations (old-age benefits, military service, and level of income for taxation), then mass data on the relevant information had to be gathered, maintained, and retrieved by specialist agencies of the state. Inevitably, the bounded state and those defined as its subjects/citizens increased its salience both as institutional reality and social experience.

The modern "iron cage" (Max Weber) was being constructed, not as a top-down process but a broader social process. To return to my distinction between "forming" and "founding" a nation-state, it may be that Italy was formed as a nation-state between 1861 and 1871 as part of the coercive "moment" Maier describes, but arguably France was "founded" as a nation-state during the peacetime period of the Third Republic from 1871 to 1914, when, in Eugen Weber's famous formulation, peasants were made into Frenchmen. Again, Weber's book arguably does not describe so much a deliberate top-down project (though there were such elements involved) but the complex outcome of internal migration (national labour market, railway travel, and growth of urban-industrial centres), mass literacy in a standardized French vernacular, and adult manhood suffrage for elections to a sovereign parliament. All these changes had a clear territorial focus.

Even those who came to question identifying nationality with membership of the existing territorial state were forced to adopt some of its territorial

30 For a long time, the available technology did not allow one to check this documentation at the state boundary, but the requirement that everyone have such documentation available for inspection by state officials could serve the same purpose by enabling deportation.

features. An interesting attempt to resist this was made by Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, the Austrian Marxist theorists and socialist politicians, with their idea of nationality as a personal rather than territorial attribute. But nationality politics in the Habsburg Empire expressed itself in territorial terms as nationalists claimed a majority in one place or another, which in turn meant the election of a deputy or the confirmation of claims to a school. Not only that, the Habsburg state itself went through various stages of projecting nationality upon its subjects – usually giving this territorial form, such as in regional parliaments – as one way of making closer connections between citizens and their state. When Lenin and Stalin turned their attention to the nationality question in the Romanov Empire, they explicitly rejected Bauer and opted for a territorial definition of nationality, even though Stalin's definition of ethno-nationality focused on "personal" attributes. The approach would eventually justify the formation of non-Russian republics, territorial entities but each designated with a "titular" nationality and associated name.

Which brings me back to nationalism. Like most political ideas, this starts off as an affair of intellectual minorities, usually taking the form of a radical, even utopian idea pitted against existing political forms of mainly sprawling dynastic empires and petty princedoms. What is more, it is a transnational movement often developed by exiles who have more to do with similar figures from other "nations" than with most of their fellow nationals.

I suggest that it is not so much the growing influence of these small groups that pushes politics in a national direction but rather the growing importance of territoriality combined with the advance of citizenship that makes the national idea seem so persuasive. Once peasants were made into Frenchmen (French women have to wait longer!), a process in which explicit nationalism was just one element (especially at those moments of war), then a political idea that turned Frenchness from an identity into a value and a programme acquired increasing appeal. By the time we get to a mass electorate and society within such a state, we find that all political groupings are stressing their national qualities as well as that their particular constituents constitute the heart of the nation and their policies are best suited to serve the national interest. One can perhaps continue to identify a specific political position that might be called nationalist as one that focuses on purging the nation of impure or alien elements (such as the Jew, or ethnic or racial minorities) or extending state territory to include places and peoples that are part of the "nation", but in fact such political positions rarely attract much popular support. That goes to parties that focus on either economic power (class and occupational and economic sector interests, such as unionization or tariff protection) or non-national ideological questions (e.g. secular as opposed to religious education). Nationalism is not so much a particular

value position then but rather the claim by all such parties to be focused on control of the existing territorial state, a state that is now credited with a national character and a national history that backs that up.[31]

The same arguments apply to citizenship law in terms of who automatically acquires citizenship, which, in the modern world, is usually equated with national citizenship. Again, it is important to distinguish between identity and function. An influential distinction in modern nationalism studies is between civic and ethnic. Brubaker associates this distinction with that between the two basic principles of automatic citizenship: place of birth or parentage (ius solis/the law of the soil and jus sanguinis/law of the blood).[32] The first characterized citizenship law in the French Third Republic and the second in the German Second Empire. Civic nationality could be seen as open to outsiders and ethnic nationality as closed. Many other contrasting attributes could be added.

Once again, however, we must make the distinction between decision and identity space and look at the range of functions that link citizenship to territoriality.[33] The first thing to note is that the distinction is of no significance for that part of the population born on the national territory of the parents (father in most cases; mother when an illegitimate child) who hold national citizenship. The second is to note that people are no freer in their choice of birthplace as in their parents, so there is no distinction in terms of freedom. A third point to note is that seeing the law of the soil as stimulating immigration and the law of the blood as discouraging it might be getting the causality the wrong way round.

The French government after 1871 was haunted by the threat that low demographic growth would condemn France to declining power, including the capacity

31 I have elaborated this argument in various publications, such as J. Breuilly "On the Principle of Nationality", in: G.S. Jones and G. Claeys (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 77–109; J. Breuilly, "What Does It mean to Say that Nationalism is Popular?" in: M. van Ginderachter and M. Beyen (eds.), *Nationhood from Below: Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 23–43. Mark Hewitson has recently argued that the preparedness of Germans to fight in the wars of unification has more to do with citizenship and acceptance of the legitimacy of the state demand to participate in wars against other states than with enthusiasm for nationalist ideology. M.Hewitson, *The People's Wars: Histories of Violence in the German Lands, 1820-1888*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

32 R. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1992.

33 This argument is closely related to the distinction Oliver Zimmer makes between national symbols and their uses. For example, language can symbolize nationality but can be used either to exclude or assimilate immigrants. See O. Zimmer, "Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: Towards a Process Oriented Approach to National Identity". *Nations and Nationalism* 9 (2003) 2, pp. 173–193.

to take revenge for defeat in the Franco-Prussian war and to recover Alsace-Lorraine. A law of the soil would encourage immigration and boost demographic growth and in addition would mean the male children of immigrants would be liable to military service. By contrast, Germany was a country of fast population growth and had a particular concern to discourage permanent immigration from Russia. Its legal tradition, emanating from a number of often small states where there was a greater likelihood than in a larger state that a child would be born outside the state of its parents, was naturally inclined to the law of the blood. However, that "blood" was parental, not race or ethnic "blood". Ethnic or race homogeneity would only be secured if the stock of parents was already homogenous; otherwise, it would perpetuate whatever ethnic or racial diversity already existed.

Finally, citizenship law is always liable to modification if powerful interests demand that. Once Muslim immigration from Algeria increased, the French government took steps to ensure that these racially and religiously distinct immigrants could not automatically acquire citizenship for children born to them in France. Conversely, the German government became very concerned that male colonists in German African colonies would automatically confer German citizenship upon the children they had from marriages to black African women. Two different principles led to unintended consequences that triggered the same prejudice. The result was the same abandonment of the original principle. What we see here is how the national territory is becoming associated with various identities that cannot be coded as either civic or ethnic but which rather combine pre-political claims (a nation existed here before there was a nation-state and indeed it is that prior existence that justifies this state) with political claims (this state should be a republic or a monarchy, liberal or illiberal, secular or religious, etc.). These then become crystallized, usually in contested ways, into different notions as to what is "truly national". Increasingly, competitions for power associated with such conflicting claims are focused on the national territory and key institutions such as parliament. In this sense, identity space becomes national space, not so much through the power of nationalism as through the power of the increasing link between territoriality and citizenship as well as the multiple national claims, all of which are territorially focused.[34]

34 Citizenship becomes contentious when there are specific pressures such as a particular flow of immigration. It also becomes contentious when boundaries rather than people move, for example in India after 1947 or when there is a move to mass expulsion or even worse of designated minorities. In each case it is the sudden disjuncture between decision and identity space that creates the problem.

There are two further steps in this process, although they are not inevitable or irreversible or final.

The first is that the modern territorial state fuses the range of different functional boundaries. The abolition of internal tariff barriers (between town and country, or between provinces), coupled with the raising of effective tariff controls at the state boundary, creates a common economic space. Indeed, it has been argued that the vision of achieving this – as in the work of Friedrich List, himself deeply influenced by the US "economic nationalist" Alexander Hamilton – helps one imagine the nation as an economic unit.[35] Welfare benefits extend beyond poor relief and are no longer the responsibility of parishes but are managed by state agencies. For a period in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a number of modern states obliged all young male citizens to military service, another national responsibility and nationalizing experience. That, of course, is one step that has been reversed with the shift to professional armed forces and often long-distance, "indirect" modes of warfare, which, in a different way, threaten to undermine accepted notions of state territoriality. Freedom of movement within the state territory might be said to embody a particularly liberal concept of territoriality, one that was never achieved in the USSR and which is heavily qualified in contemporary China. But even liberal state territoriality imposes restrictions on such movement beyond state territory. Even in cases where movement is unimpeded (e.g. under the Schengen Agreement for certain EU countries) both in law and practice, people are required to carry documentation proving their national citizenship and the destination state can insist on its production – the EU queue in airports might appear privileged compared to the non-EU queue but it is a queue nevertheless.

As the different functional boundaries all come to converge on the national frontier, so does that frontier come to figure more prominently in the experiences of the citizenry. Michael Billig's seminal work *Banal Nationalism* shows how the nation-state is distinguished from the world beyond, through such devices as the distinction in newspapers between "home" and "foreign" news. For example, one can also note how "local" news is relegated to a lower position; when the BBC TV's "national and international news" broadcast, which lasts about 30 minutes, is finished, the announcer declares that "we" will now be going to the news "where you are", and then there are 10-minute local news broadcasts. Weather forecasts popularize maps of the nation-state; British

35 For List's influence beyond Germany, see M. Metzler, "The Cosmopolitanism of National Economics: Friedrich List in a Japanese Mirror", in: A.G. Hopkins (ed.), *Global History: Interactions Between the Universal and the Local*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 98–130.

weather forecasts even manage very often to block out most of the territory of the Republic of Ireland. There is a common set of everyday signs and symbols that constantly and subconsciously transmit "nation-stateness", such as a particular style of road signs, railway timetables, or flags. Sometimes state and national signs and symbols get separated, as in Wales or Catalonia, which can have important consequences for a sense of popular national identity.

Such national projections are not just neutral or "banal". Boundaries can be invested with sacred qualities. After the German Second Empire annexed Alsace-Lorraine, there was mass publicity in France about the humiliation involved and the need to revenge and reverse this act. For a long time, I was sceptical about the popular impact of this. However, research by Martyn Lyons, based on the letters written home between 1914 and 1918 by French soldiers in that small part of Alsace that France militarily occupied for part of the war, not only confirms but also qualifies that impact.[36] These were men with low levels of literacy drawn from all over France and often in their letters more preoccupied with how their farms and families were faring than with the war. Yet again and again, it turns out that they were very conscious of the loss of Alsace. Many had read or knew of the mass-selling story of two boys cycling round France, *Le Tour de France par deux enfants: Devoir et Patrie* (1877). What was interesting here was the puzzlement many expressed that, when they finally found themselves in this place that essentially was part of France, the inhabitants, when they spoke to them, were foreigners, indeed Germans! However, most national citizens only perceive national boundaries as imagined, not as real in this way.

One can find numerous ways in which such sacralization takes place: geography and history and other lessons in the mass schools that the modern nation-state sets up, popular atlases, later in radio and television broadcasts, or the speeches of democratically elected politicians. In this way, the mythical stories nationalism tells about a sacred land and a special people become felt experiences. That in turn feeds back to the functional boundaries. Immigration controls, for example, cease to be just about calculations of costs and benefits but are framed in terms of the invasion of national space.[37] Sometimes the "rational" part of a government knows that certain immigration streams are

36 The army command, as also those in Britain, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, used a random sample of such correspondence as a way of gauging popular opinion amongst the rank and file, and this invaluable source survives. See his essay M. Lyons, "France: National Identity from Below, 1914–1919", in: M. Lyons, *The Writing Culture of Ordinary People in Europe, c. 1860–1920*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 91–112.

37 Only thus can one in part explain the British vote to leave the European Union in the referendum of 2016.

positively beneficial, indeed virtually essential, for the national economy but another, "emotional" part has to brandish controls and restrictions in order to prove that it is rebuffing the "invasion".

For these reasons, I would focus on nation-state foundation rather than formation, and I would stress that it is the functional expansion of the size of the citizenry and their range of rights and obligations that is most important in that foundational process, along with a set of modernizing changes, more so initially than wars and the symbolic declarations of national independence. However, once the process of sacralizing boundaries gathers momentum that becomes a force in its own right – a key component of certain kinds of populist nationalism and sometimes even a threat to the functional adjustment of boundaries and their controls for particular ends.

Implications for the Present and Future of Territoriality

The powerful nation-state of the modern era has managed to bring together decision space, in the sense of sovereign power able to monopolize coercive power within its own clearly demarcated boundaries, with identity space, in the sense of infusing the majority of citizens with the sense that this is "their" nation-state. At the same time, it has fused together a range of functionally defined spaces and boundaries and managed to impose some state restraints upon transnational economic and ideological power, in part by directly incorporating these as forms of national power (e.g. giving a national twist to liberal or socialist or conservative or religious ideologies). The powerful modern nation-state embodies institutionally distinctive forms of territoriality of the kind Maier analyses. However, the stress here is on *powerful* and *institutional*. The story is very different for regions where the state is not powerful, either in its external relations and/or in its capacity institutionally to enforce modern forms of sovereignty and territoriality. Here modern territoriality may well have been projected as a concept but not as an institutionalized set of practices.

There are three issues I want to consider in relation to the probable future of modern territoriality.

The first is the argument that new forms of power are likely to erode territoriality, even of the most powerful and institutionally realized nation-states. I will not repeat a set of arguments that one constantly encounters about the power of multinational corporations, international banks and hedge funds, the Internet, etc. I would only note in passing that very often the powerful nation-state appears able to bend some of these global developments to its control. The most recent revelations about how US and UK security agencies monitor Internet traffic, especially

when it crosses into territorial space, or the ways in which the Chinese and other governments monitor and close down websites, suggest that the powerful nation-state still is perhaps the major player in the exercise of these forms of power.

The second is that territoriality is not a linear process that "rises" and then "declines" but rather a partial and multiple set of processes. Partial in the sense that the advance of modern territoriality in one place might well be associated with its regression in another, and indeed there may well be a close relationship between the two processes. Multiple in the sense that functional territoriality might grow stronger in one dimension (say, immigration control) but weaker in another (say, control of financial flows).

The third, and the main point I want to make, is that the creation of identity space in the sense of mass citizen identification with the nation-state, which in turn is associated with institutionalizing various functional forms of territoriality as well as infusing the boundary and sovereignty with sacral qualities, imposes strict limits on future possibilities. We see that even quite weak states where such identity space has been formed put up significant resistance to threats to existing state sovereignty, as the mass indignation in small Southern European member states of EU policies demonstrates.

Once this has crystallized in a particular form, it can appear very difficult to restructure. Making peasants into Frenchmen was one thing; making Frenchmen into Europeans, let alone cosmopolitans, is something completely different. Peasant identity is a different kind of identity from national identity. One can combine them without difficulty. However, where national identity means state identity, and the state is seen as a sovereign space in which one either does or does not belong, it is difficult to see how it can be combined with a European identity that makes some of the same claims. Some analysts think there can be a gradual undermining of this identity space, first by stressing that people can see themselves in multiple identities, which can reinforce rather than conflict with one another, and second by arguing that the different functional identities can once more become disentangled from each other and we can enter some "neo-medieval" world where the "parcellized sovereignty" of the feudal era is reproduced.

I am sceptical of this. First, that earlier world was a non-democratic world, a world of distinct privileges and levels of power, which could therefore tolerate degrees of separate (collective) identities that even the most ardent advocate of multiculturalism today could not imagine.[38] Second, especially at times of crisis

38 See J. Breuilly, "The Historical Conditions for Multiculturalism", in: J. Eade et al. (eds.), *Advancing Multiculturalism*, Post 7/7, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008, pp. 7–28.

the theoretically available repertoire of identities available to the modern citizen do become zero-sum games. Is "my" currency to be controlled by the territorial state or some transnational central bank? "My" tax rates or welfare benefits? The command structure over "my" armed forces. Democratic identity space means that that notion of "my" has a particular form and force.

Of course, things do change. But if they do so, I think it will be in a crisis, with violence, undermining existing forms of territoriality before any alternative might, if ever, become clear. This, of course, has been the "normal" experience of much of the world, which has not had the good fortune to live as a secure citizen in a powerful modern nation-state, in part because precisely those states have imposed such conditions upon other parts of the world. Modern territoriality is not so much an inexorable and universal process, which is now under threat, as it is the good fortune of some parts of the world, which proceeds in a partial, multiple, and discontinuous manner.