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Spatiotemporal Fixes and Multispatial Metagovernance: The Territory, Place, Scale, Network Scheme Revisited

This chapter presents a strategic-relational approach to spatiotemporality and proposes a set of interrelated concepts relevant to the Leipzig project's three key organizing themes: spatialization, spatial formats, and spatial orders. The argument unfolds in six steps. First, it considers what is at stake in spatial (re-) turns in social analysis and calls for a rigorous ontological spatial turn. Second, it outlines four recent turns in geographical enquiry, their motivations, and some of their limits in grasping the complexities of sociospatial organization.

Third, it presents the territory, place, scale, and networks (TPSN) schema as a considered theoretical response to one-dimensional spatial turns. This highlights the structuring role of four corresponding spatialization practices as well as their relation to spatial imaginaries that guide the construction of socio-spatial relations and their articulation into larger spatial orders. Fourth, while a general spatial turn occurred in response to overemphasis on the temporality of social relations, a justified "bending of the stick in the other direction" should be tempered by recognition that sociospatial patterns also have temporal aspects. In this spirit, I introduce the concept of spatiotemporal fixes and explore some of their key strategic-relational aspects. This involves addressing their structural, discursive, governmental, and agential aspects. Fifth, building on the TPSN schema and its relation to spatiotemporal fixes, I discuss the government, governance, and metagovernance of sociospatial relations. On this basis, I then elaborate the notion of multispatial metagovernance and illustrate its role in the recent development of the European Union (EU). Sixth, and final, the chapter offers some general comments on what this approach implies for work on spatialization, spatial formats, and spatial orders.

What is at Stake in Making Spatial (Re)turns?

Actors are forced (usually unwittingly) to reduce the complexity of the natural and social world to "go on" within it by taking some aspects as more meaningful or important than others. A fortiori, this holds for the complexity of geo-physical and sociospatial relations. Hence actors approach them through

spatial imaginaries that frame their spatial understandings, projects, and experiences or, at least, through other kinds of social imaginary that have significant spatial presuppositions and implications.[1] This holds not only for active or passive participants in the social world but also for disinterested observers. All spatial imaginaries are selective, however. Those adopting a given imaginary cannot see what it cannot see without requisite sensitivity and self-reflection on the implications of adopting one or another spatial imaginary. This is one basis of spatial turns in the humanities and social and natural sciences as scholars reflect on the limits of prevailing approaches to sociospatiality and, perhaps, develop new research programmes. More generally, it follows that, while selective imaginaries are necessary to facilitate going on in the world, they also limit possibilities for action. If, and when, they prove inadequate, this may lead to revivals, revisions, renewals, or radically novel imaginaries and patterns of conduct.

Another dimension of complexity reduction is structuration. This sets limits to compossible combinations of relations among relations, so that not everything that is considered possible in isolation from its place in space-time is compossible in a specific historical context.[2] Compossibility is always relative to specific time-space structures and horizons of action, power geometries of time-space compression, and the constraints of specific time-space envelopes.[3] It is also a dynamic relation among relations rather than a static one. Its effects can be benign and/or pathological and are typically asymmetrical. Relations of imperial domination or economic dependency illustrate this and often generate resistance where these asymmetries are not accepted as legitimate. There can be many simultaneous attempts to limit what is compossible at different sites and scales and few attempts succeed at a macrolevel. Thus, if some structural coherence and a strategic line do emerge, even in a provisional, partial, and unstable way, this result cannot be attributed to a single master subject. It is a contingently necessary outcome of the asymmetrical interaction of competing

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1 Cf. on the dialectical relations among conceived, perceived, and lived space, see H. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 1991; on imagined places, see R. Shields, *Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity*, Abingdon: Routledge, 1991; and E. Soja, *Thirdspace Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real and Imagined Places*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1996.

2 On compossibility, see M.R. Jones and B. Jessop, "Thinking State/Space Incompossibly", *Antipode* 42 (2010), pp. 1119–1149.

3 On the latter two concepts, see D. Massey, "Power-Geometry and a Progressive Sense of Place", in: J. Bird et al. (eds), *Mapping the Futures*, Abingdon: Routledge, 1993, pp. 59–69; D. Massey, *Time, Place, and Gender*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.

structuration attempts and, even where there is a hegemonic or dominant sociospatial strategy, its results are partly due to blind co-evolution.[4]

Compossibility is inherently spatiotemporal because social relations, especially those that are sedimented or institutionalized, are themselves inherently spatiotemporal (see below on institutional and spatiotemporal fixes). Exploring this requires going beyond time and space as external parameters of action to explore how specific spatial arrangements and formats entail specific spatiotemporal selectivities. As Doreen Massey notes:

> All attempts to institute horizons, to establish boundaries, to secure the identity of places, can in this sense therefore be seen to be *attempts to stabilize the meaning of particular envelopes of space-time* [original emphasis]. They are attempts to get to grips with the unutterable mobility and contingency of space-time. Moreover, however common, and however understandable, they may be, it is important to recognize them as such. For such attempts at the stabilization of meaning are constantly the site of social contest, battles over the power to label space-time, to impose the meaning to be attributed to a space, for however long or short a span of time.[5]

Spatial arrangements or formats can be examined in several ways. (1) They can be considered in terms of embedded spatialities and temporalities as emergent, regularized results of social interaction and spatial and temporal imaginaries. (2) They can be seen as the structurally inscribed strategic spatiotemporal selectivities involved in these emergent spatial configurations – or formats – and, again, the kinds of spatiotemporally oriented strategic horizons of action and modes of calculations that may be oriented to maintaining, subverting, or overthrowing them. (3) They can be regarded as the sedimentation of reflexively reorganized spatiotemporal matrices or spatial orders as processes of variation, selection, and retention lead to the partial, temporary, and provisional consolidation of specific spatiotemporal arrangements and, concomitantly — but potentially discordantly or disjunctively, recursively selected strategies and tactics concerned with chronotopic governance, the use of history to make history (historicity), and capacities to relocate, jump or bend scales, rearticulate networks, and so on – or, indeed, to subvert, undermine, or overthrow these spatiotemporal constraints. And (4) they can be considered the recursive reproduction of spatiotemporal orders that results

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4 B. Jessop, *State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach*, Cambridge: Polity, 2007; cf. M. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population, Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*, Basingstoke: Picador, 2007; M. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979*, Basingstoke: Picador, 2008; see also the discussion in the section on "Spatial Formats and Spatiotemporal Fixes".

5 Massey, *Time, Place, and Gender*, p. 5.

from the interaction of these analytically distinct but empirically interacting levels of spatiotemporal organization. Figure 1 maps the strategic-relational dialectic that connects these levels of analysis. Note, however, that the first level of analysis – depicting a simple dichotomy between external, absolute time-space and an idealist, universal affirmation of time-space as Kantian a prioris – is ruled out by acceptance that space and time are socially produced and reproduced, including the metrics in and through which they are perceived. Thus, this row in Figure 1 serves merely as a *negative heuristic* (avoid such a prioris) before showing how increasingly interesting and *positive productive* concepts can be generated through the stepwise articulation of concepts from one column in a given row into those from its correlative column in the same row. In this way it is possible to overcome the limits of simple dualities by moving to dialectically interrelated dualities and, in a further step, introducing the greater or less capacity of all or some agents to reflect on and transform sociospatial relations along with the mechanisms of variation, selection, and retention that contribute to the selection of organic (and compossible) spatial orders.

Four Basic Kinds of Spatial Turn

Building on these preliminary remarks, I now comment on the four main kinds of spatial turns that are relevant in this contribution: thematic, methodological, ontological, and reflexive.[6] Regarding spatiality, they can be characterized as follows. First, a thematic turn occurs when previous research topics are downplayed in favour of (re)focusing on intrinsically or contingently spatial issues. These would include the simplest of the three Leipzig project concepts, namely, spatializations and their various dimensions, emphasizing the mobile (cf. Massey), processual, and variable nature of spatial arrangements. Second, a methodological turn privileges some aspects of sociospatiality as an initial entry point to – a spatial lens on – the study of complex phenomena and uses appropriate theoretical concepts and research methods to this end. The concept of spatial formats could well be located here: it suggests a set of spatial entry-points for the study of phenomena that are often studied without specific regard or, indeed, any regard to their spatial aspects and thereby aims to

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6 Cf. B. Jessop, "Institutional (Re)turns and the Strategic–Relational Approach", *Environment and Planning A* 33 (2001) 7, pp. 1213–1237; B. Jessop, "Critical Semiotic Analysis and Cultural Political Economy", *Critical Discourse Studies* 1 (2004) 2, pp. 159–174; B. Jessop, N. Brenner and M.R. Jones, "Theorizing Sociospatial Relations", *Environment and Planning D* 26 (2008) 3, pp. 381–401.

	Structure	**Agency**
Simple	Newtonian Space-Time	Kantian *a prioris*
Dichotomy	(external, absolute)	(ideal, universal)

Hetero-	Embedded spatialities and	"Social spaces" and
geneous	embedded temporalities	"social times"
Dualities	(emergent, regularized)	(constructed measures)

Genuine	Structurally inscribed	Spatiotemporally oriented
Dialectical	spatiotemporal selectivities	strategic calculations
Dualities	(differential constraints)	(differential horizons)

Reflexive-	Reflexively reorganized	Recursively selected
Recursive	spatiotemporal matrices	strategies and tactics
Relations	(differentially distantiated	(chronotopic governance,
	differentially compressed)	historicity, etc.)

Recursive Reproduction of
Spatio-Temporal Orders

Figure 1: A Strategic-Relational Approach to Spatiotemporality.
Modified version of Figure 1.2 in N.L. Sum and B. Jessop, *Towards a Cultural Political Economy: Putting Culture in its Place in Political Economy*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 63.

provide descriptive and explanatory value-added to the understanding of these phenomena. Whether spatial formats then operate in the manner of Marxian rational abstractions, Weberian ideal types, or some other kind of comparative lens would depend on how the investigator constructs the explanandum and the development of the overall spatial formats approach. Methodological turns are often more productive when the entry point differs from the exit point as other aspects of the social order are introduced into a more complex investigation. This would seem to hold when spatial formats are adopted as an entry-point into the relevant phenomena, enabling their spatial complexity to be discovered.

Third, an ontological turn occurs when spatiality is regarded as a fundamental aspect of the natural and social worlds, such that any attempt to describe or explain these worlds that neglects spatiality is bound to be defective. At stake in such a turn is the recognition that social relations are always already spatial and that their sociospatiality matters as much as their sociotemporal features. This said, it is crucial to avoid a radical ontologization of space (especially vis-à-vis time) because this easily leads to an empty spatial fetishism that abstracts from other salient features of social relations to focus on spatiality as such. Yet space in general does not exist – except as an abstract horizon of action waiting to be given concrete spatial content or as abstract geometrical or topological representations of points, lines, or three-dimensional spatial relations devoid of content. Without attention to specific spatial formats, imaginaries, and strategies, spatial fetishism assigns causal power to space per se as a determinant of human action. But even such causal powers are relational – relative to specific spatiotemporal horizons of action and technologies for conquering time-space; otherwise it amounts to no more than the claim that space matters. As Andrew Sayer argues, researchers must examine *how* space makes a difference and, we might add, bringing in the issue of agency, how it can be made to make a difference. This requires attention not only to the abstract moments of sociospatiality but also to their contingent articulation such that specific "spatial effects" are produced. The study of spatial orders, the most complex-concrete concept in the Leipzig trinity, implies strong ontological commitments to the inherent spatiality of the social and natural world and their interrelations once humankind began to walk the earth.[7]

7 A. Sayer, "The Difference that Space Makes", in: D. Gregory and J. Urry (eds.), *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1985, pp. 49–66.

Fourth, a reflexive turn focuses on the contingencies of spatial imaginaries and accounts of sociospatiality. It may compare and critically evaluate different imaginaries and their implications for action and research, identify their respective strengths and blind spots, seek to render them commensurable, or, at least, identify where and why they differ and remain contested. It may also explore specific spatial imaginaries, putting them into their historical context, explaining their uneven adoption or recontextualization in different fields, disciplines, or research programmes, how they get sedimented through normal scientific routines or are challenged and replaced in scientific revolutions, how they "travel" in space-time and with what effects, and so on. The history and sociology of geographical enquiry, the production of geographical knowledge, and its embedding in wider sets of social relations illustrate this turn.[8] Projects that provincialize hegemonic imaginaries, knowledges, and epistemologies are also relevant here. In short, a reflexive turn involves metatheoretical reflection on the development, reception, and effects of specific spatial imaginaries, spatial themes, spatial research methods, and ontological assumptions about sociospatiality.

The Social Production of Spatiality

The starting point for a concern with spatialization is the recognition, now widespread, of course, that space is socially produced through engagement with, refusal of, or resistance to situated social interaction.[9] Space comprises socially constructed grids and horizons of social action that divide and organize the natural, social, and imaginary world(s) and orient actions in the light of such divisions. These grids and horizons provide "spaces of interaction" that may lead to the emergence and consolidation of specific sociospatial arrangements (or spatial formats). These spaces of interaction can be approached from three perspectives: first, as *asymmetrical sites of social action* that factitiously privilege some kinds of spatial orientation and action over others; second, as *objects of sociospatial ordering strategies* deliberately oriented to fixing, manipulating, reordering, and relaxing material, social, and symbolic borders, boundaries, frontiers, and liminal spaces; and, third, as *governmental technologies used to steer action by sedimenting sites of action*

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8 See, e.g., M. Middell (ed.), *Self–Reflexive Area Studies*, Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2013; T. Loschke, *Area Studies Revisited: Die Geschichte der Latinamerikastudien in den USA, 1940 bis 1970*, Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2016.
9 Cf. D. Massey, *For Space*, London: Sage, 2005.

and establishing hegemonic or dominant spatial horizons of action and/or mobilizing resistance thereto.

An important theoretical precondition for exploring spatialization is to distinguish between its initial "raw material" and the sociospatial relations that result from its appropriation and transformation through diverse spatialization processes and practices. This distinction is most often made in relation to the terrestrial and the territorial. The former term refers, in everyday parlance, to the earth, water, and sky within and beyond human reach. More specifically, it comprises *terra*, or "land", in its broadest sense: land and its subterranean substratum, the sea, its depths and seabed, the air above, and, where relevant, outer space provide the geophysical and socially appropriated "raw materials" or general substratum for territorialization and other forms of spatialization. Before *Homo sapiens* emerged, these raw materials had already been transformed through geophysical processes and the interactions of flora and fauna. These legacies constitute the "first nature" that is transformed through human action as the basis for "second nature" as it becomes subject to different spatialization practices and transformed materially and in terms of its social significance. In this sense, the production of nature is an integral part of the production of space. As Neil Smith notes, "when this immediate appearance of nature is placed in a historical context, the development of the material landscape presents itself as a process of the production of nature".[10] How much and how far earth, water, and sky are so transformed depends on available spatialization and other technologies, past and present spatial imaginaries, and past and present social practices. Conversely, variations in first and second nature also constitute the grounds (pun intended) for ethnogenesis, as different terrains favour different corporeal and mental adaptations, leading to diverse human communities and cultures.[11] These variations also provide the basis for enduring divisions that can constitute the basis for conflict or cooperation, for example between hill peoples and plain dwellers or nomads and sedentary peoples.[12]

The occupation and transformation of the terrestrial is often studied in terms of place-making and/or territorialization. Even nomads usually have recognized

10 N. Smith, *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1984, pp. 34, 34–65.

11 For a brief survey, see K. van der Pijl, *Nomads, Empires and States: Modes of Foreign Relations and Political Economy*, vol. I, London: Pluto Press, 2007, pp. 25–44.

12 See Ibid.; J.C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009; J.C. Scott, *Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.

porous regions within which they roam, setting up temporary homes and return-ing to central places for social purposes.[13] Territorialization in general involves settlement and boundary-drawing, that is the constitution of frontiers, borders, and lines that serve to demarcate, "contain", *and* connect social relations. There is also a rich history of interactions between nomads, empires, and states.[14] A more restricted meaning of territorialization concerns the demarcation of the exercise of political power. This can take the form of simple or complex chief-doms, the rise of city-states, and other forms of statehood.[15] The territorial na-tional (Westphalian) state is only *one* form of territorialization of political power and, as the reference to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) indicates, is historically very recent and, indeed, a long-time in the making even after that date.[16] Other state forms have existed and some still survive: city-states, small states, empire, suzerainty, satrapy, client states, trust territories, colonies, protectorate, man-dates, etc. Other forms of political power are only loosely related to distinct terri-tories or not directly territorial at all (e.g. stateless societies, nomadic and snowball states, virtual regions, networked governance, and so on).

Seen in terms of its juridico-political construction, the terrestrial may be *terra nullius* and/or divided among territorial powers ("extra-territoriality"). The geophysical character of land, sea, and sky conditions claims to sovereignty, underpins different kinds of territorial organization and political imaginaries and strategies, triggers different kinds of territorial disputes, influences the for-mation and development of land-based and maritime empires, and shapes in-ternational law. The main result of territorialization is to divide the landmass into delimited areas governed by a political authority (especially one or another kind of state) that makes binding decisions on residents and defends its

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13 M.J. Casimir and A. Rao (eds.), *Mobility and Territoriality: Social and Spatial Boundaries among Foragers, Fishers, Pastoralists and Peripatetics*, Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1992; van der Pijl, *Nomads, Empires and States*.

14 See, e.g., R. Amitai-Preiss and D.O. Morgan, *The Mongol Empire and Its Legacy*, Leiden: Brill, 2000; T J. Barfield, "The Shadow Empires: Imperial State Formation along the Chinese–Nomad Frontier", in: C.M. Sinopoli and T.N.D'Altroy (eds.), *Empires: Perspectives from Archaeology and History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 8–41; L. Kwanten, *Imperial Nomads: A History of Central Asia, 500–1500*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979; van der Pijl, *Nomads, Empires and States*; J. Rennstich, "Nomads of the Land and Sea: Stateless State-Challengers in World System Evolution", Presented paper, 58th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Baltimore, 22–25 February 2017.

15 See B. Jessop, *The State: Past, Present, Future*, Cambridge: Polity, 2015.

16 B. Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations*, London: Verso, 2003.

authority against internal and external threats. For different reasons, the "high seas" and some terrestrial areas (notably the Antarctic, currently legally defined as *terra nullius*, i.e. land without a sovereign) escape territorialization.

From the Taken-for-Grantedness of Territory to other Spatial Dimensions

If we consider the development of geography as the main discipline that takes spatiality – as opposed to other dimensions of the natural and social world – as its self-described core focus and, hence, as its *ontological* starting point, we can observe three recent *thematic* and/or *methodological* spatial turns in mainstream scholarship. Schematically, these are a concern with places (including regions) as opposed to territory, a scalar turn, and a network turn. This observation implies that territory was the taken-for-granted framework for geographical enquiry based on the transformation of the terrestrial into territory due to some kind of "territorial imperative" that implies that nomadism is savage, primitive, or primordial. Recent mass migrations have called this assumption into question even as they are seen to threaten the territorial integrity of states and prompt new political responses and new fields of study. This concern with territory was criticized on several grounds in the 1970s and 1980s. This was probably related to the growing concern with globalization in the post-war world as an allegedly new process.

There were two main criticisms of territorial analysis. First, there was the "territorial trap", that is the Westphalian temptation to assume that states are sovereign within their territory, that the "domestic-foreign" distinction is a fixed feature of the modern interstate system, and that states are static, timeless, territorial power containers.[17] Second, the charge of "methodological nationalism" criticized the view that *territorialization* is confined to the building of national boundaries by national states and thereby defines societies in national terms. These claims prompted productive debates on the changing territorialities – and, more generally, spatialities – of statehood[18] as well as a turn to other sociospatial themes. Different forms of territorialized political power coexist and are complemented/undermined by diverse forms of extra-territoriality in and

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17 J. Agnew, "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory", *International Political Economy* 1 (1994) 1, pp. 53–80; P.J. Taylor, "The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World-System", *Progress in Human Geography* 18 (1994) 2, pp. 151–162.

18 N. Brenner et al. (eds.), *State/Space: A Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003.

beyond states. We can call this a territorial turn insofar as it examined what was previously taken for granted and led to new ways to study the complexities of territorialization, its contradictions, and its crisis tendencies across space-time.

Another response to the territorial trap and methodological nationalism was growing concern with places, localities, and regions as non-territorial forms of spatial organization. This turn also had its internal critiques, which generated lively debates. Specifically, geographers began to reject the notion that *place* (or locale) was a fixed, areal, and self-contained building block of sociospatial organization. Initially, grounded in studies of spatial divisions of labour and local or regional economic restructuring in the 1980s as uneven development became more characteristic of advanced industrial economies, geographers rejected the taken-for-grantedness of place. They emphasized that its boundaries are contingent and relational and serve both to contain and to connect interactions across places and spaces at diverse scales. Moreover, the social significance of place is usually closely tied to everyday life, has layered and differential temporal depth, and is linked to collective memory and social identity. The naming, delimitation, and meaning of places are contested and changeable and the coordinates of any given physical space can be connected to multiple places with different identities, spatiotemporal boundaries, and social significance. In other words, places were seen as emerging from relationally constituted, polyvalent processes that were embedded in broader sets of social relations.[19]

A second turn occurred around scale in the 1990s. This was conventionally conceived as a nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing size and, in territorial terms, was related to different tiers of government. The scalar turn questioned such conceptions. It arose from efforts to discover how global, continental, national, regional, and local relations were being recalibrated through capitalist restructuring, state transformation, and changes in "civil society" and its mobilization. Scholars addressed the (potentially tangled and divergent) processes of scale-making, rescaling, and scale-jumping and how they affected hierarchical relations among various intertwined forms of sociospatial organization, such as market exchange, state institutions, urban forms, and citizenship regimes.[20] The

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19 T. Cresswell, *Place: A Short Introduction*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004; R. Hudson, *Producing Places*, New York: Guilford Press, 2002; Massey, "Power-Geometry and a Progressive Sense of Place"; Massey, *For Space*.

20 C. Collinge, "Self–Organization of Society by Scale: A Spatial Reworking of Regulation Theory", *Environment and Planning D: Society & Space* 17 (1999), pp. 557–574; R. Keil and R. Mahon (eds.), *Leviathan Undone? Towards a Political Economy of Scale*, Vancouver:

resulting rich analyses of scalar relations had two rather contradictory outcomes. One was a bandwagon effect in which ever more sociospatial themes were subsumed under a scalar rubric; the other was advocacy of a "flat ontology" that denied the relevance of territoriality as a hierarchical structuring principle and treated scale as somehow akin to horizontal networks. This ignored the complexity of the links among different scales of action, which could be linked vertically, horizontally, and transversally as well as centripetally and centrifugally.

A third turn focused on networking as a structuring principle and pattern of conduct. It examined *flat, decentred* sets of social relations that are organized on functional or flow lines and characterized by "symmetrical connectivity".[21] Scholars explored networks, stressing transversal, "rhizomatic" forms of interspatial interconnectivity, and studied network geographies in such fields as commodity chains, interfirm interdependencies, cross-border governance systems, interurban relations, and social movements.[22] This fed broader interest in networks and their relation to old and/or new territorial, place-based, and scalar formations.[23] Nonetheless, such "flat ontologies" risk neglecting the hierarchical relations that often exist within and among networks. For, even if power relations within all networks were egalitarian and symmetrical, inequality and asymmetry could still occur in network-network relations, as expressed in the uneven capacities of networked agents to pursue their own interests and strategies. Such asymmetries and inequalities can (and do) arise from the place-based grounding of networks (global cities or marginal places), the scales at and across which they operate (e.g. dominant, nodal, or marginal), and their territorial (dis)embedding (e.g. colonies, empires, or strong vs. weak states).

University of British Columbia Press, 2009; E. Sheppard and R. McMaster (eds.), *Scale and Geographic Inquiry: Nature, Society, and Method*, Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004; N. Smith, "Remaking Scale: Competition and Cooperation in Prenational and Postnational Europe", in: H. Eskelinen and F. Snickars (eds.), *Competitive European Peripheries*, Berlin: Springer, 1995, pp. 59–74; E.A. Swyngedouw, "Neither Global nor Local: 'Glocalization' and the Politics of Scale", in: K. Cox (ed.), *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*, New York: Guilford, 1997, pp. 137–166.

21 M. Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1996.

22 G. Grabher, "Trading Routes, Bypasses and Risky Intersections: Mapping the Travels of 'Networks' between Economic Sociology and Economic Geography", *Progress in Human Geography* 30 (2006), pp. 1–27.

23 A. Amin, "Regions Unbound: Towards a New Politics of Place", *Geografiska Annaler: Series B* 86 (2004) 1, pp. 33–44; S.A. Marston, J.P. Jones III and K. Woodward, "Human Geography without Scale", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 30 (2005), pp. 416–432.

These turns were sometimes pushed too far and interpreted in one-dimensional terms. Some scholars fell into the metonymic trap of conflating a part (territory, place, scale, or networks) with the whole (the totality of sociospatial organization), whether this was due to conceptual imprecision, an overly narrow analytical focus, or ontological (quasi-)reductionism. Examples include (1) *methodological territorialism*, which, as noted, subsumes all aspects of sociospatial relations under the rubric of (politicized) territoriality; (2) *place-centrism*, which treats places as discrete, largely self-contained, socioecological assemblages and/or relies excessively on the lexicon of place to interpret sociospatial relations; (3) s*cale-centrism* treats scale as the primary axis around which other sociospatial dimensions are organized, or alternatively, subsumes more and more sociospatial relations under an increasingly sophisticated scalar rubric[24]; and (4) a one-sided, *network-centric* focus on the horizontal, rhizomatic, topological, and transversal interconnections of networks located in frictionless spaces of flows and marked by accelerating mobility.[25]

The TPSN Framework

Jessop, Brenner, and Jones offer a distinctive response to these often one-dimensional ontological and methodological turns.[26] Rather than making a similar turn to highlight another sociospatial moment, they proposed a heuristic framework that, due to its focus on territory (T), place (P), scale (S), and networks (N), was termed the TPSN framework. It was concerned with revealing the complex, multidimensional nature of sociospatial configurations. This framework is an abstract taxonomic tool that can be populated by actual spatial imaginaries, representations, objects of strategic intervention, and (un)intended outcomes. In this way, it can also provide a bridge between actors' perspectives and observers' interpretations. It is also useful for discussing different sociospatial priorities of different accumulation regimes and modes of regulation. In addition to their general spatial awareness, participants and observers deploy more specific grids and horizons of action. While other principles certainly exist, these four were the most salient in the 1980s–2000s. How they

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24 See, e.g., S.A. Marston, "The Social Construction of Scale", *Progress in Human Geography* 24 (2000) 2, pp. 219–242.

25 M. Sheller and J. Urry, "The New Mobilities Paradigm", *Environment and Planning A* 38 (2006), 207–226.

26 Jessop, Brenner and Jones, "Theorizing Sociospatial Relations".

might apply to cyberspace, virtual space, or digital space remains to be explored by the original proponents of the TPSN scheme.

Table 1 cross-tabulates all four sociospatial dimensions regarded, first, as *structuring principles* and, second, as fields open to *structuration* through one or other principle. It shows that structuring principles do not just apply to themselves – a route to mutually isolated forms of one-dimensionalism – but to other sociospatial fields too. The concepts presented in each cell were (and remain) illustrative, intended to spur research strategies on sociospatial polymorphy. Serious research must also overcome the two-dimensionalism of this table to give a richer account of specific TPSN landscapes, spatial formats, and spatial orders.

Table 1: Towards a Multidimensional Analysis of Sociospatiality.

Structuring practices	Fields of Operation			
	TERRITORY	**PLACE**	**SCALE**	**NETWORKS**
TERRITORI-ALIZATION	States as "power containers" defined by their frontiers or boundaries	Integrating places into a territory, managing uneven growth in a state	Intergovernmental arrangements for coordinating different scales	State alliances, consociational democracies, multiarea government
PLACE-MAKING	Core-periphery relations, land-based empires, borderlands	Locales, milieux, cities, regions, localities, globalities	Glocalization, glurbanization (global-local and urban-global ties)	Local, urban, regional governance or partnerships
RESCALING	Scaled political authority (multilevel government, federal states)	Local↔global articulations, areal (spatial) division of labour	Nested or tangled scalar hierarchies, scale-jumping, re and descaling	Parallel power networks, private international regimes
NETWORK-ING	Cross-border region, virtual regions, nomadic shadow empires	Global city networks, poly-nucleated cities, overseas trading companies	"Soft spaces", networks of differently scaled places	Networks of networks, spaces of flows, maritime empires

Greatly modified version of Table 3.2 in Jessop, Brenner and Jones, "Theorizing Sociospatial Relations".

Taking territory to illustrate these points, this matrix shows that each socio-spatial concept can be deployed in three ways:

– *in itself* as a product of (re)bordering strategies that operated on the existing territorial landscape (this read the matrix diagonally, hence territorialization ⟷ territory);

– as a *structuring practice* (or causal process) that impacts other already structured fields of sociospatial relations that may be undergoing restructuring in other respects too (this reads the matrix horizontally, hence: territorialization → place; territorialization → scale; territorialization → network);

– as a *structured field*, produced in part through the impact of other sociospatial structuring principles on territorial dynamics (here the matrix is read vertically to consider: place → territorialization; scale → territorialization; and network → territorialization).

The same points hold for the three other moments in this schema. It thereby suggests that sociospatial configurations can be interpreted as contingent expressions of efforts at strategic coordination and structural coupling in specific spatiotemporal contexts. This highlights the heuristic value of adopting a strategic-relational approach.

First, these configurations can be the *site* for elaborating spatiotemporal strategies and fixes, that is sites where strategies and fixes are elaborated and pursued. In this regard, they provide reference points for diverse spatial identities, imaginaries, interests, and associated strategies. These could privilege one axis of spatial organization or involve two or more axes (e.g. states, land-based empires, global city networks, and virtual regions such as the Brazil, Russia, India, and China economic quartet known as BRIC and later, with the addition of South Africa, the BRICS).

Second, they can be the *object* of spatiotemporal strategies and fixes, that is, become the object of recalibration, reorganization, collibration, and so on either in their current form (e.g. by rebalancing the different structuring principles) or as future objects yet to be formed (e.g. the One Belt, One Road project, now officially known as the Belt and Road Initiative, promoted by China to reconnect the Eurasian heartland).

Third, they can have different roles *as means* in securing, modifying, or disrupting the coherence of spatiotemporal relations in social formations in different stages of development, historical contexts, and specific conjunctures. For example, guerrilla networks could be deployed to create conditions in which the countryside surrounds towns as fixed places in a revolutionary struggle, or dense institutional networks can be established to strengthen the competitiveness of polycentric urban regions considered as an interconnected set of places.

Fourth, different structuring principles may be conducive to different kinds of sociospatial governance. Territorialization is closely associated with a hierarchical state logic, in which sovereign states govern their respective territories – considered as power containers that are not subject to external authority – and seek to manage interstate relations by using state resources and capacities. Place-based governance could become the basis of local democracy based on community and solidarity and act as a counterweight to centralized territorial power, or, where mobility is limited, it could be a means of subordinating marginal groups. Interscalar articulation is associated with multilevel government or governance. A scalar and/or reticular logic is appropriate to balancing spatial fixity and motion within a space of flows across continuous space-time with a greater emphasis on negotiation and decentred steering. These strategies are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, because different forms of spatialization can be combined to produce different spatial formats, more complex spatial governance strategies exist, with or without internal tensions. Two-dimensional examples include multilevel governance arrangements that combine territory and scale; core-periphery relations based on asymmetrical relations among places in a territory; polynucleated cities based on networked places; and networked territories such as cross-border regions. An interesting case found at different scales is the balancing of a state-centred logic oriented to territorial governance and a capitalist logic oriented to managing the space of flows.[27] Free trade zones, gateway cities, transregional economic corridors, customs unions, and global trade regimes organized in the shadow of a hegemonic state provide examples of such arrangements. These forms of governance can be combined in more complex forms of multispatial metagovernance targeted at specific spatial sites or their differential articulation in pursuit of larger sociospatial projects (see below the section on "Multispatial Metagovernance").

Fifth, relatedly but more generally, we might explore whether the relative weight of the four "pure" TPSN moments of spatialization is associated with the relative stability of different spatial formats and/or emergent spatial orders. For

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[27] See G. Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times*, London: Verso, 1994; D. Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Indeed, Harvey suggests that each logic generates contradictions that must be contained by the other. If the territorial logic blocks the logic of capital, there is a risk of economic crisis; if capitalist logic undermines territorial logic, there is a risk of political crisis. Overall, this generates a spiral movement of uneven geographical development as contradictions are displaced from one logic to the other in a process of mutual adjustment and reaction (Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, p. 140).

example, the Atlantic Fordist accumulation regime, its mode of regulation, and its societal paradigm tended to prioritize territory and place as core organizing principles. This regime resulted from relatively successful efforts to construct and steer the development of a national economy, national territorial state, and national society, and it involved consistent efforts to reduce uneven local and regional development and core-periphery relations that were generated by Fordist growth dynamics through mechanisms that Neil Brenner described as spatial Keynesianism.[28] In turn, the crisis of Atlantic Fordism was strongly related to growing economic internationalization, which undermined the structured coherence of economic spaces organized within national borders and weakened the state's ability to secure full employment and manage uneven development through Keynesian welfare techniques. Two economic imaginaries came to hegemonize post-Fordist scenarios and strategies. First, an economic regime dominated by the transition to a "knowledge-based economy" would prioritize networks and scale over securing territorial integrity and governing specific places. The focus would be building knowledge-intensive value chains and inserting networks into a scalar as well as spatial division of labour by reducing the frictions of national borders. Second, a neo-liberal, finance-dominated accumulation regime would prioritize the telematic space of flows over territory and promote scalar networks of financial hubs.

Sixth, each sociospatial organizing principle has its own forms of inclusion/exclusion and entails differential capacities to exercise state powers. This opens a strategic field in which social forces seek to privilege different modes of sociospatial organization to privilege their ideal and material interests. Regarding the state in its narrow, juridico-political sense, examples include gerrymandering constituency boundaries, voter suppression, promoting or weakening place-based uneven development and centre-periphery inequalities, reordering scalar hierarchies and scale-jumping, and organizing parallel power networks that cut across formal vertical and horizontal divisions of power within and beyond the state. Some social forces are marginalized, excluded, or subject to coercion, leading to social and political blowback against the forms of marginalization, exclusion, and inequality associated with given spatial formats.

Seventh, as two of its proponents have argue, the TPSN approach also offers a research method that is sensitive to the "*geographies of compossibility* [original emphasis]".[29] These exist because not every sociospatial arrangement that seems

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28 N. Brenner, *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
29 Jessop and Jones, "Thinking State/Space Incompossibly".

possible when judged in isolation can be combined with all other individually feasible arrangements when seen in terms of their articulation in specific spatio-temporal envelopes. In short, not everything that is *possible* is *compossible*. Which arrangements are eventually combined depends on discursive-material in-teractions among co-evolving sociospatial configurations in specific contexts. Some strange combinations do survive – witness long-lasting interactions be-tween nomads and empires, which sometimes have mutually beneficial and sometimes pathological effects. This is linked to diverse contradictions, conflicts, dilemmas, marginalization, exclusion, and volatility, both within and among these sociospatial forms. These arrangements must be analysed in space-time be-cause (in)compossibility does not have fixed and absolute properties of spatial orders (see below the section on "Spatial Formats and Spatiotemporal Fixes").

Eighth, the transition between different spatial formats is rarely smooth be-cause it involves uneven development, institution-building, and the promotion and consolidation of new geoeconomic or geopolitical spatial imaginaries. Crises and attempts at crisis resolution may both reorder the relative weight of the four principles and their institutional expressions and, hence, modify their respective roles in displacing or deferring crisis tendencies and contradictions in one or another spatiotemporal fix. They may also alter the prospects of sub- or counter-hegemonic projects (e.g. the social economy or Occupy movements). Moreover, as such transitions also create winners and losers, they can lead to resistance and other challenges.

Ninth, the TPSN schema can be used to categorize the spatial dimensions and dynamics of resistance. Table 2 presents a thought experiment to illustrate how this might be explored.

Spatiotemporal Fixes and Spatial Formats

Building on the taxonomy presented above, this section draws on my previous strategic-relational work on conjunctural analysis, cultural political economy, and institutional analyses to reflect on how spatial formats characterized by the articulation of different sociospatial moments come to be stabilized, even if only in a provisional, partial, and relative way. This poses the question of semi-otic fixes, institutional fixes, and spatiotemporal fixes.

A semiotic fix involves the sedimentation of a specific spatial, spatialized, or spatially relevant imaginary so that it becomes the taken-for-granted refer-ence point for social action, institution-building, and spatialization strategies. Sedimentation is a process that occurs through variation in and the subsequent selection and retention of rival spatial imaginaries, such that one imaginary

Table 2: A TPSN Matrix of Resistance.

The TSPN of Resistance				
	TERRITORY	PLACE	SCALE	NETWORKS
TERRITORY	NOMADISM	Secession, separatism, irredentism	Dual power, anti-imperialism	Wars of position
PLACE	Peasant wars, migration, asylum	RED BASES, SURVIVALISM	Council communism, soviets, communes	Militant particularism
SCALE	Subsidiarity	Countryside surrounds towns, siege warfare	SCALE-JUMPING	World Social Forum International Solidarity Movement
NETWORKS	Mobile tactics	Movements of homeless and dispossessed	Localism, factory egoism, anarchism	MULTITUDE

becomes the naturalized or hegemonic framework of spatial identities, interests, and strategies. As such, it defines appropriate objects of spatial observation, calculation, management, governance, or guidance, and thereby frames the competition, rivalries, and struggles that occur around spatialization within its parameters. Such fixes are never fully closed or sedimented, of course: even hegemonic spatial imaginaries are contested. They often depend on complementary sub-hegemonic spatial imaginaries with different sociospatial bases of support or sites of spatialization; and they are all vulnerable to counter-hegemonic spatial imaginaries. Semiotic fixes are most effective when they connect different spheres, scales, and sites of social action and have in-built sources of redundancy and flexibility that can be mobilized in the face of instability or crisis. They can be studied in terms of historical semantics, pragmatic conceptual history, critical discourse analysis, and other forms of semiotic enquiry, on condition that extra-semiotic factors as well as internal semiotic factors are brought into the explanation of the development, reception, and effects of competing imaginaries.[30]

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30 For a more detailed account of the theoretical and methodological foundations for exploring the variation, selection, and sedimented retention of semiotic fixes, see Sum and Jessop, *Towards a Cultural Political Economy*.

Two other key concepts that highlight the role of agency and strategy in resolving contradictions and dilemmas are "institutional fix" and "spatiotemporal fix". Like semiotic fixes, these also emerge, to the extent that they do, in a contested, trial-and-error process, involving different social forces and diverse strategies and projects. In addition, they typically rest on an institutionalized, unstable equilibrium of compromise.

An institutional fix is a complementary set of institutions that – via institutional design, imitation, imposition, or chance evolution – offer (within given parametric limits) a temporary, partial, and relatively stable solution to the coordination problems involved in securing economic, political, or social order. Nonetheless, it is not purely technical and, rather than providing a post hoc solution to pre-given coordination problems, it is partly constitutive of this order. It rests on an institutionalized, unstable equilibrium of compromise or, in extremis, an open use of force. As noted regarding the more general notion of compossibility, institutional fixes (as with semiotic and spatiotemporal fixes) can have benign or pathological effects and are typically asymmetrical in their strategically selective impact on the capacities and vulnerabilities of different social forces.

An institutional fix can also be examined as a spatiotemporal fix (or STF), and vice versa.[31] This is because institutions are inherently spatiotemporal. They emerge in specific places and at specific times, operate on one or more scales of action and specific temporal horizons, and develop their own specific capacities to stretch social relations and to compress events in space and time, and, hence, they have their own specific spatial and temporal rhythms. These spatiotemporal features are not accidental or secondary features of institutions but constitutive properties that help to distinguish one organization, institution, or institutional order from another.[32] In turn, a spatiotemporal fix consists in a specific configuration of the material, social, and spatiotemporal aspects of a given set of social relations in a specific "time-space envelope". STFs establish the TPSN spatial formats and temporal boundaries within which the always relative, incomplete, and provisional structural coherence (and hence the institutional complementarities) of a given social order are secured – to the extent that this is ever the case. Such fixes delimit the main spatial and temporal

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31 The following definition differs from that offered by D. Harvey, *The Limits to Capital*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1982; for an explanation, see B. Jessop, "Spatial Fixes, Temporal Fixes, and Spatio-Temporal Fixes", in: N. Castree and D. Gregory (eds.), *David Harvey: A Critical Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006, pp. 142–166.
32 Cf. P. Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

boundaries within which the relative structural coherence of sociospatial rela-
tions is secured and displace certain costs of securing this coherence beyond
these boundaries. A key contribution of STFs is externalizing the material and
social costs of securing such coherence beyond the spatial, temporal, and social
boundaries of the institutional fix by *displacing* and/or *deferring* them. These
fixes externalize the material and social costs of securing coherence beyond
specific spatial, temporal, and social boundaries, such that zones of relative
stability depend on instability elsewhere.

Two corollaries are that c*urrent* zones of *stability* imply *future* zones of *in-
stability* and that zones of stability *in this place* imply zones of instability *in
other places* – including within a given zone of stability that is internally differ-
entiated and stratified. Even within the "internal" boundaries of a given STF,
some classes, class fractions, social categories, or other social forces located
within these spatiotemporal boundaries are marginalized, excluded, or subject
to coercion. STFs thereby only *appear* to harmonize contradictions, which per-
sist in one or another form. Such regimes are partial, provisional, and unstable
and attempts to impose them can lead to "blowback" at home as well as
abroad. The primary sociospatial moments and temporal horizons around
which fixes are built and their coherence vary widely over time. This is reflected
in the variable coincidence of different boundaries, borders or frontiers of ac-
tion and the changing primacy of different scales in complex configurations of
territory-place-scale-network relations.

This is a contested process, involving different economic, political, and so-
cial forces and diverse strategies and projects and this, in turn, is one source of
the instability of institutional and spatiotemporal fixes that are consolidated, if
at all, only provisionally and partially and that are always the product of
a temporary unstable equilibrium of compromise. It is also fractal. That is, at
whatever scale of analysis we adopt, we find competing, contrary, and contra-
dictory attempts to establish organizational, institutional, and spatiotemporal
fixes on many sites, with alternative targets of government and/or governance,
using different kinds and combinations of sociospatial organizing principles
and strategies, intended to serve different kinds of ideal and material interests,
and reflecting different sets of social forces.

Regions and Territories

Regions can be located through the TPSN scheme in various ways. Interestingly,
Ansi Paasi and Jacob Metzger found this puzzling in a recent article on regions,
noting that the ambiguity of regions meant that my colleagues and I could not

locate it in the TPSN matrix. [33] My reply would be that regions can be located in the matrix – but in several ways rather than one unambiguous way. Specifically, they can be defined in terms of territory, that is, as divisions within politically organized terrestrial space. Referring to Table 1, such regions would be located in the vertical territory column. They would comprise a kind of territory that has been shaped by effects of place-making, scalar articulation, and networking. Regions can also be explored in terms of the organization of spaces in terms of place, that is based on lived experience, collective memory, regional identity, and so on. Issues of scale can also arise. Thus, regions can vary in size of scale from micro-regions through urban or metropolitan regions to the Europe of regions or macroregions (often networked) and also include virtual regions (an example is the Four Motors for Europe region) or virtual macroregions (an example is the collaboration and partial integration of the four BRIC economic-political spaces). These remarks indicate the complex relational geography of regions in which different regional imaginaries and different principles of regional organization are in play and in which, moreover, regions operate not only as containers but also as connectors through a range of cross-regional networks. In this sense, regions exist in a space characterized by the tension between containment and connection, fixity and flow, imagined identity and actual connectedness.

The emergence, consolidation, and subsequent disarray of the virtual region comprising the BRIC economies suggest the complex and tangled hierarchy of regions in world society. This hierarchy should not be understood politically, as a hierarchy of power, in terms of a more-or-less significant fields of geoeconomic and geopolitical contestation.

The twin peaks of this hierarchy comprise two broad geostrategic realms: first, a maritime realm formed by Western Europe, North America, maritime East Asia, Australia, and the Mediterranean littoral, and, second, the Eurasian continental realm, including the former Soviet Union and China. [34] Next come subordinate geopolitical regions (e.g. Europe, Japan, and North America) and independent geopolitical regions outside the two main geostrategic realms (e.g. South Asia). And below these are individual national states followed by subnational and cross-border regions. [35] Among these types of region, we find different and changing degrees of hegemony and hierarchy, overlapping spheres of

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33 See A. Paasi and J. Metzger, (2016): "Foregrounding the Region", *Regional Studies*, 51 (2016) 1, pp. 19–30.

34 Mackinder describes this grouping as the Eurasian heartland (H. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History", *The Geographical Journal* 170 (1904) 4, pp. 421–444).

35 S.B. Cohen, *Geopolitics of the World System*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

influence, national components and transnational influences, interdependencies, pockets of self-containment, embryonic and dying regions, marginal spheres, and areas of confrontation. This is reflected not only in shifts in national economic fortunes but also in the rise and fall of regions, new "North-South" divides, and so on. There are continuing complex rearticulations of global-regional -national-local economies, with uneven effects. Thus, in addition to the heterogeneous ensemble of regional spaces, we find mosaics of cross-border alliances organized within and across regions and continents, sometimes based on intergovernmental cooperation, sometimes on pooled sovereignty, or sometimes on hidden forms of (neo-)imperial domination. This complicates regional dynamics and the prospects of regional economic strategies. Indeed, it would be more apt, if convoluted, to discuss pluri-spatial, multitemporal, and poly-contextual modes of imagining, constituting, and governing regional economies and their always relative, provisional, and unstable integration into more encompassing economic spaces, right up to the world market.

The choice of spatial scale at which regional economic development should be pursued is inherently strategic. It depends on various political, economic, and social specificities of an urban and regional context at a given conjuncture. The temporal and spatial are closely connected here. The choice of time horizon will influence the appropriate spatial scale for development strategies. Likewise, the chosen spatial scale will influence the time horizon for pursuing these strategies. This is quite explicit in many regional economic strategy documents – with powerful players seeking to shape both the spatial and temporal horizons to which economic and political decisions are oriented so that the economic and political benefits are "optimized". When space and time horizons complement each other, it is possible for economic development to occur in relatively stable "time-space envelopes".[36]

In this context, considering the relativization of scale that followed the loss of primacy of the national scale when no new primary scale has yet been consolidated, new kinds of regional strategy have become possible. These can be understood in TPSN terms. For example:

– Seeking to locate a given place or region within a vertical hierarchy to maximize the advantages accruing from its relations to each point in the scale;

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36 Cf. Massey, *Time, Place, and Gender*; N.L. Sum, "'Time-space Embeddedness' and 'Geo-governance' of Cross-border Regional Modes of Growth: Their Nature and Dynamics in East Asian Cases", in: A. Amin and J. Hausner (eds.), *Beyond Market and Hierarchy*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997, pp. 159–195.

- Developing horizontal linkages among places or regions of similar type, ignoring the vertical dimension in favour of network building (global city networks are one example, cross-border regions another);
- Building "transversal" linkages, that is to say bypassing one or more immediately neighbouring scale(s) to engage with processes on other scales. Examples are growth triangles, export processing zones, free ports, and regional gateways;
- Trying to escape from scalar or place-bound constraints by locating one's activities in a borderless space of flows or moving into "cyberspace".

These options may be combined in more complex strategies, which can be explored from three viewpoints. (1) The first is the nature of the interscalar articulation involved – vertical (up and/or down), lateral (extraversion or introversion), transversal, etc. (2) The second is their primary carriers – private economic agents (e.g. firms, banks, chambers of commerce, or private equity funds), public bodies (e.g. different tiers of government, local or regional associations, or quangos), or social movements of various kinds (e.g. diasporas, civic associations, ethnic communities, nationalist movements, movements mobilized behind the right to the city or assertion of cultural identity, etc.). (3) The third is the relative primacy of the logics of the de- and reterritorialization of political power, usually associated with state actors or forces dependent on the state, and the rescaling and reorganization of the space of flows, usually associated with economic actors seeking to optimize profits without regard to territorial boundaries

Seen in these terms, regional imaginaries could aim to strengthen regional political institutions and capacities to govern regional economic space and/or to find ways to capture flows through specific spatial fixes (e.g. infrastructure provision) or reducing frictions (e.g. deregulation, liberalization, or flexibilization). This raises an interesting question about how the logics of territorialization and flows are combined in specific cases of regionalization and how, if at all, these sometimes complementary, sometimes antagonistic, logics can be governed.

Multispatial Metagovernance

Viewed in TPSN terms, the European Union has been described and approached strategically in various ways: territorially, as the *Europe des patries* (or nation-states); in place terms, as a Europe of cities or regions (including cross-border regions); in scalar terms, as a space of multilevel government or

governance; and, finally, as a space of network governance oriented to a space of flows. Here I focus on the last two mappings.

Multilevel government denotes a political regime characterized by imperative coordination through a territorial state – with a multilevel but unified hierarchy of command – that claims responsibility for managing relations among bounded areas under its exclusive control. This state can be a single territorial state – with at least two tiers of government – or a confederation of such states that has delegated at least some competences to one or more supranational political instances. The former arrangement is typically analysed in terms of public administration and federalism. The latter has re-emerged as an analytical or strategic problem in two contexts: (1) the decomposition of the Soviet Union – *a multi-state imperial regime dominated by Russia* – and its reorganization into a commonwealth of independent states that is seeking a new equilibrium of powers and competencies across economic spaces and states that were previously poorly integrated under central command; and (2) the expansion of the European Union as a *multi-tiered federal state in the process of formation*, in which the relationship among its political tiers (cities, regions, national states, and European institutions) is not yet settled and has evolved hitherto through a mix of incremental innovation in stable periods and crisis-induced radical integration in turbulent periods. Thus, whereas the Europe of Cities and the Europe of Regions are more incremental developments, recent proposals for tighter fisco-financial integration and centralized budgetary oversight are responses to the Eurozone crisis. The overall process of integration is a complex, hybrid process with different forms of government and governance in different policy fields and in different periods.

Theoretical and policy debates about multilevel government (hereafter MLG) range between two poles. At one pole, we find arguments for multilevel government based on a commitment to subsidiarity, that is to say maximum possible devolution of powers and competences to the lowest tier of government, with higher tiers responsible for policy problems that cannot be settled at lower levels. At the other pole, we find calls for a United States of Europe with power concentrated in European-level institutions and lower tiers acting as relays for decisions made at the European level. Situated between these poles are many other proposals and, more importantly, competing tendencies or developmental trends. Interestingly, the MLG concept occupies just two cells in Table 1: those concerned with territorial ordering along scalar lines and the (re)scaling of territorial relations. Likewise, the narrow descriptive and explanatory power of the alternative concept of multiscalar metagovernance compared with the potential range of multidimensional sociospatial governance arrangements also shows the limits of this alternative concept. For, while it transcends

government and governance, it merely substitutes scale for level as the site of metagovernance practices.

Network governance relies on a mix of well-ordered market relations (economic exchange), commitment to negotiation (consensus-oriented deliberation), and solidarity (credible commitments to cooperation). It can emerge spontaneously, in response to initiatives by key stakeholders, or from state initiatives to reduce the burdens of government by pooling sovereignty and/or sharing responsibilities for governing complex problems with diverse public, private, and third-sector partners. Network governance aims to secure the conditions for the flow of goods, services, technologies, capital, and people across different territories, for connecting different places in new divisions of labour (e.g. networks of cities, interdependent centres of production, or different forms of centre-periphery relation), over different scales of social organization (that may not coincide with territorial boundaries), and different sets of social bonds based on mutual trust. This pattern is less concerned with the integration of government in an emerging supranational or federal state system than with creating the conditions for integrated markets with agreed upon governance arrangements but no overall coordination. It is closer to the open regionalism model that has been suggested for East Asia and the Pacific region more generally. In the European Union, this governance pattern is seen in, inter alia, the open method of coordination.

Multilevel government and network governance are prone to the tensions and crisis tendencies in the more general oscillation between territorial government and the governance of flows. Thus, the hybrid character of government-cum-governance in the European Union combines elements of both forms plus other transversal arrangements – further complicated in the last few years by the development of a new political axis based on Franco-German interest in keeping the Eurozone intact, with decisions being imposed on weaker member states, notably Greece but also with Portugal and Italy being subject to Franco-German dictates. In this sense, the EU is a major and, indeed, increasingly important, supranational instance of *multispatial metagovernance* in relation to a wide range of complex and interrelated problems. Indeed, because the sources and reach of these problems go well beyond the territorial space occupied by its member states, the EU is an important, if complex, point of intersection in the emerging, hypercomplex, and chaotic system of global governance (or, better, global metagovernance). As such, it cannot be fully understood without taking account of its complex relations with other nodes above, below, and transversal to the European Union. Indeed, while one might hypothesize that the European scale is becoming increasingly dominant within the EU's multispatial metagovernance regime, it is merely nodal in the emerging global

multiscalar metagovernance regimes that are developing under the (increasingly crisis-prone) dominance of the United States.

This suggests that multilevel government and/or multiscalar governance should be put in their place in a broader multispatial metagovernance approach and that its agents should be sought not only in a multilevel or multiscalar division of labour but also in relation to their positioning in territorial, place-based, and network-mediated forms and modes of agency. Admittedly, in practice, much work presented under the rubric of MLG (whether the third letter in the acronym is interpreted as government or governance) does consider some of these complexities, usually in presenting findings rather than in any prior theoretical analysis. In this sense, terminologically, MLG is a misleading and oversimplified self-designation of work in this field. Unsurprisingly, this has triggered many attempts to clarify different meanings and dimensions of MLG.

One alternative, drawing on the TPSN schema, is *multispatial metagovernance*.[37] This is relevant not only to the MLG literature but also to other issues of governing complex social relations that exist in and across several spatiotemporal social fields. Multispatial metagovernance has four advantages over multilevel government, network governance, multilevel governance, and other widely used concepts.

First, it affirms the irreducible plurality of territorial areas, social scales, networks, and places to be addressed in attempts at governance. It notes the complex interrelations between territorial organization, multiple scalar divisions of labour (and other practices), networked forms of social interaction, and the importance of place as a meeting point of functional operations and the conduct of personal life. Second, it recognizes the complex, tangled, and interwoven nature of the relevant political relations, which include important horizontal and transversal linkages – indicated in notions such as "network state" or "network polity" – as well as the vertical linkages implied in multilevel government and/or governance.

Third, in contrast to a one-sided emphasis on heterarchic coordination, it introduces metagovernance considered as the reflexive art of balancing government and other forms of governance to create requisite variety, flexibility, and adaptability in coordinated policy-formulation, policy-making, and implementation. Fourth, it stresses the plurality and heterogeneity of actors involved in such institutions and practices, which stretch well beyond tiers of government and the limits of any given administrative, political, or economic space.

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37 B. Jessop, "Territory, Politics, Governance and Multispatial Metagovernance", *Territory, Politics, Governance* 4 (2016) 1, pp. 8–32.

Conclusions

This chapter has covered a large spatial field at breakneck speed. Its aim was to clarify theoretically what is at stake in studying spatialization thematically, methodologically, and ontologically as a contingent, multi-dimensional, and unevenly developing process. It also aimed to provide means for a reflexive turn in the study of spatialization by indicating some of the complexities of spatialization. By introducing the TPSN schema and showing how it can be deployed to think through the differential articulation of different kinds of spatial structuring principles and their role in (re)ordering different spatial "raw materials", I hope to have shown the limitations of one-sided, one-dimensional analyses and to have shown how structure and agency can be explored in and through the same basic theoretical framework. I want to emphasize here that the heuristic potential of the TPSN schema has been exemplified to render it plausible rather than fully demonstrated. For, not only were the cells in Tables 1 and 2 occupied by illustrative concepts rather than the full set of extant possibilities in the relevant literatures – such that other concepts could have been used; but, in addition, the two tables were only two-dimensional when spatializations, spatial formats, and spatial orders in the "real world" are multi-dimensional. This is one reason why I emphasized above that, while one must choose an entry-point (and, it might be added, perhaps a standpoint too) when embarking on research into spatializations, the exit point is likely to be different. Further research in this area, perhaps in the framework of the Leipzig project, would certainly benefit from adopting three-dimensional analyses.

For example, in commenting on the first draft of this chapter, Matthias Middell suggested that it is important not to take contemporary networks as the model for studying networks in earlier periods or, again, the relation among places in contemporary transregional frameworks as a paradigm for the relations among, say, city-states in Mesopotamia. This caution is very germane to the productive use of the TPSN scheme. Table 1 includes seven cells in which different kinds of network appear – either in terms of the effects of networking as a structuring principle and/or in terms of networks as the spatial field on which territorialization, place-making, or (re)scaling operate. Thus, nomadic empires that existed sometimes in the shadow of, or were even parasitic upon, sedentary empires[38] are in one cell; maritime empires are in another; the Eurasian Mongol Empire, together with its vassal states, would belong in

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38 See, for example, T.J. Barfield, "The Shadow Empires". In: Sinopoli and D'Altroy (eds.) *Empires*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 8–41.

a third, namely, the place-territory cell illustrated – but not exhausted – by the cases of land-based empires, centre-periphery relations, and borderlands.[39] Similarly, regarding place, there are seven place-related two-dimensional cells, with global city networks located in a different cell from inter-(city-)state relations and alliances. How one might locate relations among Mesopotamian city-states in this grid will depend on the changing outcomes of cycles of territorial expansion and retreat among early statelets and the first rival pristine states, efforts to expand control over the respective peripheries of city-states, the effects of the first (Akkadian) and subsequent attempts to build empires, and so forth.[40] This cannot be prejudged by a conceptual schema such as the TPSN paradigm – but the latter can help to interpret the results of theoretically-informed historical research. More generally, these questions point to the potential of the TPSN scheme to open space to study varieties of colonialism or imperialism, world history, and variegated colonialism and/or imperialism as structurally coupled, co-evolving forms of spatial organization. There are interesting developments in this area with the increasing attention being paid not just to varieties of colonialism and imperialism but also to their mutual imbrication and, for certain periods, compossibility rather than conflict.[41]

Middell also posed a further set of questions, concerning how subaltern groups, territories, places, and networks can be located in this schema.[42] A first response might be to invoke Michel de Certeau's remark that the powerful use space to exercise control, the powerless use time to express their resistance.[43]

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39 For a long-run perspective on the conflicts between land-based and maritime empires, see C. Schmitt, *Land and Sea: A World Historical Meditation*, Candor, NY: Telos Press, 2015 <originally 1942>. This text could easily be mined for many other two- and three-dimensional spatial orders.

40 For a magisterial survey of Mesopotamian city-state formation and inter-state relations, see J.C. Scott, *Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017. See also N. Yoffee, *Myths of the Archaic State: Evolution of the Earliest Cities, States, and Civilizations,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

41 For some interesting preliminary observations on this issue, see S.J. Potter and J. Saha, "Global history, imperial history and connected histories", *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, 16 (2015) 1, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_colonialism_and_colonial_his tory/v016/16.1.potter.html

42 In fact, he referred, loosely, to the Global South; I have expanded his question to include other kinds of relatively powerless social forces. For a critique of the concept of Global South from a strategic-relational perspective, see B. Jessop, "'The world market, North-South relations, neoliberalism", *Alternate Routes: A Journal of Critical Social Research*, 29, 2018, pp. 207–28.

43 See M. de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, pp. 35–37 and *passim*.

A second response would be to refer to Table 2, which locates different kinds of resistance within the TPSN matrix. A more satisfactory response, able to integrate the other two, would involve developing the strategic-relational approach (SRA)[44] that informs the TPSN schema. The SRA posits that sociospatial configurations can be construed not only as contingent expressions of competing efforts at strategic coordination and structural coupling in specific spatiotemporal contexts but also that every such configuration differentially privileges some forces, some interests, some spatio-temporal horizons of action, some strategies and tactics, and so forth, over others. They are inherently asymmetrical, and this poses crucial questions about the conditions in which these asymmetries are reproduced, contested, and transformed. The interrelated concepts of semantic fix, institutional fix, and spatio-temporal fix are relevant here – but, as also noted above, more work is required on the forms, modalities, and conditions for success of sub-hegemonic and counter-hegemonic resistance.

In short, the schema presented above is intended both as a negative heuristic, identifying approaches to avoid in the study of spatializations, spatial formats, and spatial orders, and as a positive heuristic, indicating fruitful lines of inquiry into the complexities of these phenomena. The TPSN schema does not offer a theory but a useful conceptual framework that can be linked to other concepts and be employed in historical research. And, like any other intervention into scientific discussion, it is fallible and open to revision. The Leipzig project could provide a fertile ground for evaluating its utility in comparison with other approaches.

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44 On this approach, see B. Jessop, *State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach,* Cambridge, Polity, 2007.