

3 Nietzsche's psychology and the tension between body and spirit

In this chapter, I lay out and justify the foundations of my approach to Nietzsche's psychology through a critique of what I take to be misguided attempts to construct a coherent theory of drives on the basis of his writings. Not only has the excessive focus on drives in recent scholarship led to an unproductive focus on technicalities, but the resulting "Nietzschean" theories tend to obscure rather than illuminate Nietzsche's greater philosophical and critical projects. Moving beyond the current debate is an essential task of this study, because the dominant perspectives on Nietzsche's psychology hardly provide the resources required to advance understanding of his thinking on religion. That notwithstanding I do not intend to deny that theoretical reconstructions can be useful tools in scholarship. Instead, I seek to ask again, from the beginning, what generalizations about Nietzsche's psychological views can be made. In this regard, the philosopher's thinking about feelings is of particular interest, since he is in his criticism of religion preoccupied with the topic of religious feelings and especially religious interpretations of extraordinary feelings. I will therefore start by taking a closer look at Nietzsche's terminology for feelings.

For someone who purportedly holds the view that unconscious drives govern the psyche (cf. Leiter 2002), Nietzsche pays very close attention to conscious mental states and employs a remarkably rich vocabulary for affective phenomena. Besides a wealth of words for specific feeling-states, Nietzsche also uses quite a few general concepts. Affect [*Affekt*], feeling [*Gefühl*], passion [*Leidenschaft*, *Passion*], attunement/mood [*Stimmung*], and "state" [*Zustand*] are Nietzsche's favoured concepts to describe felt experience. Very rarely, he also uses the term emotion [*Emotion*]. These are not technical terms in any rigid sense nor does Nietzsche draw rigorous distinctions between them. Though it could perhaps be argued that his terms affect and feeling correspond most closely to feelings in contemporary philosophy of emotion, in the sense that they seem to be bodily, mostly episodic states, there is not much that distinguishes passion, attunement/mood and state from the former terms. The only minor difference is that the last two terms are perhaps more often used by Nietzsche to describe a greater unity of distinct feelings, such as an enveloping background of feeling that is always there. In any case, there is a continuum between shorter episodes of feeling and more stable states. This view does not only remain implicit in the writings, although it is already quite evident as such. Nietzsche also explicitly affirms that the most commonly discussed emotions are only exceptional states that fit into a larger picture of affectivity: "Anger, hatred, love, pity, desire, knowledge, joy, pain all are names for *extreme* states: the milder, middle degrees, not to speak of the lower degrees which are continually in play, elude us, and yet it is they which weave the web of our character and our destiny." (Hollingdale transl. Clark and Leiter 1997, 71; D 115, KSA 3, 107) Importantly, this view of a constant background of feeling, of a continuum between evanescent and enduring

as well as intense and barely noticeable feelings, remains the same even as Nietzsche's vocabulary changes. A case in point would be Nietzsche's use of the German term *Stimmung*. This term might be thought to be of special interest to us, because it is the most direct and most commonly used translation of the English word "mood". However, the term *Stimmung* plays a rather insignificant role in Nietzsche's writings, which allows me to here reserve the use of the English term mood to primarily serve the technical function of referring to the continuum of feeling as a whole.¹

The importance of the term for mood [*Stimmung*] diminishes in Nietzsche's mature philosophy; so much so that he not even once uses the term in his published works after the *Gay Science* of 1882. The first scholar to draw attention to this fact was Stanley Corngold. In an article on Nietzsche's use of the term mood [*Stimmung*], he advanced the thesis that in Nietzsche's later writings "Affect displaces Mood as the feeling mode of disclosure" (Corngold 1990, 87). Furthermore, Corngold connects this change of vocabulary to a more significant turn away from residual romanticism and idealism towards a fully-fledged vision of the world as will to power. Although Corngold is certainly on the right track concerning the change in terminology, he simplifies the issue and only by this simplification can he make the exaggerated claim that specifically affect would displace mood. Corngold's thesis needs to be qualified. First of all, it should be noted that this is merely a change of vocabulary, and not a significant change in the way that Nietzsche thinks about the phenomena in question. The term affect [*Affekt*] takes over some of the meanings attached to the term mood [*Stimmung*], while feeling [*Gefühl*] and state [*Zustand*] take on other aspects. There is especially one aspect that the term affect can't easily assimilate. One of the things the term mood [*Stimmung*] accomplishes is to refer to a unity of feeling or a unifying background feeling. The term affect is if not totally unsuited then at least not the ideal candidate to take over this meaning,² whereas state [*Zustand*] serves this purpose well. Even feeling [*Gefühl*] can be used to refer to a synthesis of feelings. In this regard, the English speaker might want to remind him- or herself that the German language does not distinguish between feeling with a small f and the capitalized Feeling, so it is harder to distinguish whether one is dealing with a distinct feeling or generalized feeling. In any case, it should come as no surprise that before giving up on the term mood [*Stimmung*], Nietzsche at times uses the

1 For some reason unknown to me, the term affect has become the preferred term of scholars when discussing the topic. It is worth pointing out that this has nothing to do with the frequency that Nietzsche employs the term. The simple term feeling [*Gefühl*] is actually used far more often by Nietzsche. Throughout this study, I follow Nietzsche in not drawing rigid distinctions in this regard, and the scholarly justification for preferring the term mood is simply this: there is no other term in the English language that is as well suited to describe the kind of continuum in question. Furthermore, such use of the term mood is already established due to Heidegger (cf. Heidgger 2006).

2 This comment refers to Nietzsche's use of the term affect. I have nothing against the broader use of the term in contemporary scholarship, e.g. in "core affect theory" (Colombetti 2014), and I frequently employ the term affectivity in a way comparable to the use of the term mood throughout this study.

terms mood [*Stimmung*] and state [*Zustand*] interchangeably (HH I 134, KSA 2, 129; D 552, KSA 3, 322–333; cf. GS 288, KSA 3, 528). The same goes for mood [*Stimmung*] and feeling [*Gefühl*] (D 28, KSA 3, 38–39; cf. GS 288, KSA 3, 528). Obviously, this doesn't mean that the terms always refer to the same phenomena. In the end, only a contextual approach to the texts can avoid overgeneralization (and thus: misinterpretations). Nevertheless, it is safe to say that all of Nietzsche's terms for felt experience refer to a continuum; a continuum that is perhaps best captured by the term mood. Now, if he also thinks that all such states are generated in the body, more specifically through the operation of the drives or instincts,³ it would seem that the current scholarly preoccupation with drives is more than justified.

Throughout this chapter, I argue that Nietzsche certainly thinks that one cannot separate spirit from body, and also that drives play an important role in this picture, but that there nevertheless are major problems with the dominant interpretation of Nietzsche's thinking on drives. Since this specific way of interpreting Nietzsche's statements on drives as evidence of an underlying theory of action is a very recent development, I will begin by presenting a short history of research on Nietzsche's psychological thinking, with special attention paid to how it came to be that Anglophone scholarship ended up where it is today.

3.1 A short history of research on Nietzsche's psychological thinking

Nietzsche's philosophical psychology is nowadays seen as central to scholarship on Nietzsche.⁴ This was not always the case. Walter Kaufmann complained in the late 1970s that Nietzsche's psychological thinking had until then received scant attention, in spite of the philosopher's explicitly stated wish to be recognized as a psychologist (Kaufmann 1978, 261). This claim is often repeated almost verbatim (e.g. Parkes 1994, 2 and 383–384; cf. Brobjer 1995, 59), and accepted as such as a valid starting point for discussing Nietzsche as a psychologist. One should however ask, in what specific sense Nietzsche had until fairly recently not been recognized as a psychologist, because it is certainly not the case that the psychological aspects of his thinking had

³ It is generally recognized that Nietzsche uses the terms drive [*Trieb*] and instinct [*Instinkt*] interchangeably (Clark and Dudrick 2012, 169; cf. Katsafanas 2013), though it is worth noting that it has been argued that this is the case only until 1888, after which the final notes and writings perhaps distinguish the two (cf. Conway 1999, 58–59).

⁴ Not only has there been a number of special journal issues, conferences and edited volumes (cf. Dries and Kail 2015) dedicated to Nietzsche's psychological thinking during the last few years, but such scholarship has also become integrated into both general accounts of Nietzsche's philosophy (see Pippin 2010) and interpretations of specific works (see Clark and Dudrick 2012). The recent monograph of Paul Katsafanas also deserves mention as it exemplifies the trend (Katsafanas 2016).

been ignored altogether. If Nietzsche indeed had revolutionary psychological ideas, why then would they have been overlooked for such a long time?

A closer look at the history of the reception of Nietzsche's philosophy reveals that the psychological aspects of the philosopher's writings did not escape early commentators. Besides enthusiastic endorsements, many critical remarks can be found. Admittedly, the vast majority of early commentators made only cursory remarks if any on Nietzsche's psychological ideas; and not a few betray a superficial grasp of Nietzsche's thinking.⁵ However, there was also more focused scholarly commentary. Despite predating the emergence of historical-critical approaches in Nietzsche-scholarship, the literature in question is not entirely lacking in insight. Some contributions even prefigure contemporary debates, especially when it comes to the question whether Nietzsche's psychological views can be systematized and presented in the form of a coherent theory.

A case in point is Max Riedmann's *Nietzsche als Psychologe* from 1911. Having summarized the most important elements of Nietzsche's psychological thinking fairly accurately, Riedmann concludes that Nietzsche's psychology will never become influential if understood as a whole (Riedmann 1911, 123).⁶ This judgement is best understood against the ideal of a systematic, experimental and scientific psychology, the emergence of which is in the German-speaking world indissociable from the name of Wilhelm Wundt and the institutionalization of which was advancing rapidly in the years that Riedmann wrote. According to Riedmann, Nietzsche crucially fails to develop and prove the scientific value of the idea that could serve as the foundation for a psychological theory; namely the principle of the will to power. Riedmann's main objection is that instead of carefully basing his analysis on experiential evidence, the later Nietzsche simply presupposes the operation of the will to power so that in effect the idea acts as a prejudice [*Vorurteil*] through which Nietzsche approaches psychological phenomena (Riedmann 1911, 118–123). A properly scientific approach would instead proceed inductively from simple elements to complex phenomena (Riedmann 1911, 134). Because Nietzsche's psychological thinking is not of a systematic nature, and is instead made up of fragmentary and often contradictory statements, Riedmann goes as far as to question whether it is at all meaningful to call Nietzsche a psychologist (Riedmann 1911, 123). Nevertheless, he finally asserts

5 In this latter category, a 1909 article by H. Aschkenasy deserves special mention, as it can be considered the first scholarly attempt to view Nietzsche's thinking on religion through the lens of his psychological thinking. The article is marred by inconsistency and a lack of textual evidence for support, but on a positive note, it did note Nietzsche's preoccupation with moods [*Stimmungen*] (cf. Aschkenasy 1909, 143). For early works explicitly focusing on Nietzsche's psychology consult the *Weimarer Nietzsche-Bibliographie*; specifically pages 998–1001 of volume three (WNB 2002a) as well as pages 244–245 of volume five (WNB 2002b). Cursory remarks on Nietzsche as psychologist can be found in many of the works discussed by Richard Frank Krummel in his works on the reception of Nietzsche's writings in the German-speaking world (cf. Krummel 1998a–c).

6 "Im Ganzen wird Nietzsches Psychologie nie eine Bedeutung gewinnen." (Riedmann 1911, 123)

that Nietzsche's psychological intuition was extraordinary and that therefore the psychological fragments that play no small role in Nietzsche's writings might yet serve science; they might even turn out to be a real treasure trove (Riedmann 1911, 135).⁷

Riedmann's work can usefully be compared to and contrasted with another contemporaneous study, namely Hans Schaffganz's doctoral dissertation *Nietzsches Gefühlslehre* from 1913. Just as Riedmann (cf. Riedmann 1911, 134), Schaffganz works under the impression that Nietzsche had only a weak grasp of late 19th century psychological thinking and instead relied on his own experience and intuition in his psychological thinking (Schaffganz 1913, 1, 34–35 and 59).⁸ However, instead of only criticizing Nietzsche's psychological thinking on scientific grounds, Schaffganz also seeks to prove that it is systematic in its own way by trying to show that Nietzsche's intuitive understanding of feeling guides his entire philosophizing (cf. Schaffganz 1913, 58). In this view, Nietzsche's philosophy is essentially the result of intuitive thinking through feeling, which is perhaps a bit too bold a thesis, although it rests on the solid observation that Nietzsche is preoccupied with the affective life throughout his writings. According to Schaffganz, Nietzsche's thinking through feeling culminates in and finally becomes fully systematic in the idea of will to power as a metaphysical principle (Schaffganz 1913, 59–60). It is however precisely here that the major problem of the dissertation comes to light, as Schaffganz inevitably fails to prove convincingly that one can reduce all of Nietzsche's late thinking to this systematic design. In this regard, the work is clearly influenced and distorted by the general consensus of the time that a work entitled *The Will to Power* [*Der Wille zur Macht*] was Nietzsche's main work,⁹ but it is worth adding that although Schaffganz is de-

7 To be precise, Riedmann writes that the fragments “*können zur Fundgrube für die Wissenschaft werden*” (Riedmann 1911, 135).

8 This assumption is only insofar mistaken that Nietzsche, besides reading psychological literature in the broad sense that would include literary authors, did read quite extensively about contemporary developments in psychology that eventually led to the differentiation of a new science from within philosophy. To mention but two broad works: 1) early, in 1866, he read Friedrich Albert Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus* (1866), in which the neo-Kantian philosopher also discussed recent physiological and psychological research and reflected on their relevance to philosophy (cf. Brobjer 2008, 32–36), and 2) late in 1887 he read and heavily annotated Harald Höffding's *Psychologie in Umrissen auf Grundlage der Erfahrung* (1887), which discusses both classical and contemporary psychology (cf. Brobjer 2008, 103–104). What arguably should concern us most about Nietzsche as psychologist, namely his revaluation of desire, his insight into the question about mood, simply cannot be said to be the logical consequence of such readings, wherefore the judgement that he relied most on his intuition is basically correct.

9 Nietzsche at most suggested the possibility of a systematic metaphysics of will to power and never himself carried out the project to write a major work on will to power, as Mazzino Montinari has pointed out (KSA 14, 383–400). Various efforts at the beginning of the 20th century to compile a work of that title from the *Nachlass*, most notably at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* controlled by Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, proved disastrous for the reception of Nietzsche's philosophy, and helped to create the unfortunate association between Nietzsche's thinking and National Socialism. In this regard, the work done at the archive has rightly been considered more than merely a scholarly failure.

terminated to present Nietzsche's metaphysics of the will to power as the most bold and radical psychological attempt of its kind ever undertaken (Schaffganz 1913, 130), he remains ambivalent as to the scientific and philosophical merits of the attempt and points to serious inconsistencies in Nietzsche's psychological thinking (e.g. Schaffganz 1913, 101). Indeed, all in all, both of these early works (of Riedmann and Schaffganz) are marked by a healthy scepticism.

So if we now look closer at Kaufmann's claim that Nietzsche's psychology had not received the attention it deserves, we can see that what really is at stake is more than taking account of Nietzsche's psychological ideas or even taking account of his desire to be recognized as a psychologist. In fact, the claim rests on the willingness of the interpreter to accept Nietzsche's claim of being a psychologist without equal (EH 5, KSA 6, 305). This self-aggrandizing hyperbole does of course not disqualify Nietzsche's psychological ideas from serious attention. However, taking an acceptance of his self-interpretation as a standard of judging whether a scholar has recognized Nietzsche as a psychologist can only result in a distorted picture of the history of scholarship. Just as I have argued that there is a heavy price to pay if one takes Nietzsche's own statements in *EH* at face value as a starting point for discussing Nietzsche's communication of mood, taking his mockery of a self-assessment as a starting point for discussing his philosophical psychology must necessarily lead to a neglect of valuable contributions that do not fit into the picture. This, however, is exactly what Kaufmann does. Against this background, it is no wonder then that the only work that Kaufmann mentions as a precursor to his own is one which is more about celebrating Nietzsche's psychological genius than seriously engaging with his ideas.

Apart from his own work *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, published in 1956, Kaufmann mentions Ludwig Klages' *Die psychologischen Errungenschaften Nietzsches*, from 1926, as the only significant contribution to the topic (Kaufmann 1978, 262). This judgement is problematic in more than one respect. First of all, Klages seems to be interested in Nietzsche only insofar as the philosopher's thinking can be absorbed into his own eccentric project of characterology [*Charakterologie/Charakterkunde*] (Klages 1926). As if that were not enough to disqualify his work, Klages' treatment of the subject matter is thoroughly irrationalist (cf. Parkes 1994, 383). Therefore, it is hard to view his book as a serious contribution to the understanding of Nietzsche's psychological thinking. Secondly, Kaufmann not only omits all works critical of Nietzsche's psychology but also one influential early work that is sympathetic to its subject matter. Unlike the less well-known works of Riedmann and Schaffganz that I have discussed, works that Kaufmann might be forgiven for not mentioning,¹⁰ this is a work of whose existence Kaufmann was well aware.

¹⁰ I definitely do not thereby mean to suggest that these works should be considered obscure curiosities. Considering that it was a doctoral dissertation, the work of Schaffganz was surprisingly widely reviewed. A striking example of the internationalism of early 20th century philosophy is a review by Ellen Talbot, who was one of the first female professors of philosophy in the USA, in *The Journal of*

This early work that definitely should be mentioned is Karl Jaspers' *Nietzsche. Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens*, from 1936, which despite lacking a mention of psychology in its title provides a more helpful introduction to Nietzsche's thinking on affects and moods than either Klages or Kaufmann. Kaufmann's failure to mention Jasper's work is perhaps best explained as being a result of personal animosity and/or intellectual rivalry,¹¹ but the omission also raises the question as to what we are talking about when we are talking about Nietzsche's psychological thinking. Jacob Golomb, for example, in his turn wonders about the word "psychologist" in the title of Kaufmann's famous work, because even as Kaufmann is "referring to Nietzsche's psychological leanings, he then proceeds largely to ignore them" (Golomb 1999, 16). This judgement is a bit too harsh, as Kaufmann clearly takes a broader view of psychology than Golomb's depth psychological perspective allows for.¹² Nevertheless, it points to a real problem: neither Kaufmann nor other early writers were all too clear about in what if any sense Nietzsche should be understood as a psychological thinker and what his most important contributions in this domain were. This question seems to have been settled in more recent years, in the sense that there is a consensus on the question, and next I will briefly outline how this came to be.

The current flourishing of research on Nietzsche's philosophical psychology is to a great extent the fruit of Anglophone scholarship.¹³ One might even say that Kaufmann's exhortation to take Nietzsche's psychology seriously and his call for more research in this area did not go unheard, even if it was initially met with silence. In any

Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods (Talbot 1915), which is nowadays known simply as *The Journal of Philosophy* and is still counted among the best American journals in the field.

11 Kaufmann and Jaspers were well acquainted with each other's works and had fundamental disagreements about the methods of Nietzsche-interpretation (cf. Pickus 2007). Put shortly: Kaufmann emphasized textual evidence more, whereas Jaspers emphasized the intuitive understanding of the interpreter. While the former is essential for scholarship, one can also not do without the latter. As I do not see why one would have to choose one approach over the other, I think it is best to refrain from judging, which of the two scholar-philosophers left a more lasting legacy.

12 Kaufmann, in my view correctly, pays most attention to Nietzsche's revaluations, e.g. his analysis of *ressentiment*.

13 Nietzsche's philosophical psychology has not received comparable attention during the last decades in continental scholarship, though there are always exceptions. Again, the *Weimarer Nietzsche-Bibliographie* is a good place to start, but it is in no way exhaustive. Besides useful studies on self-fashioning (e.g. Brusotti 1997 and Hödl 2009) that are relevant to the understanding of Nietzsche's psychological thinking, the most enlightening contributions can be found in historical scholarship, the paradigm of which would be studies on the relations between Nietzsche and Freud (e.g. Assoun 2002; Gasser 1997) and to a lesser extent Nietzsche and Jung (e.g. Liebscher 2012). Although these studies are excellent in their own right, they contribute little to the understanding of what I have already suggested is most relevant in the big picture of Nietzsche's psychological thinking: his psychological revaluations of desire and mood. While some continental scholars have also written on the topic of drives, they have not significantly contributed to the Anglophone discussion, wherefore I will not here engage their work.

case, it would still take quite a few years until the first attempt at a comprehensive, in-depth investigation of Nietzsche's psychology was published under the title *Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche's Psychology* (Parkes 1994).¹⁴ This pioneering work by Graham Parkes remains an invaluable contribution to the discussion. Parkes pays attention to the whole range of metaphors that Nietzsche employs to get grips of the psyche from the inorganic over the vegetal, animal and political realms to the landscapes that are composed out of these. His work is equally alert to the variety of Nietzsche's concepts. Affects, atmospheres and moods all find a place alongside drives and instincts in this multifaceted yet balanced tome that eschews undue systematization. Parkes' effort to provide a comprehensive account of the development and transformations of the many layers and aspects of Nietzsche's psychological thinking is all the more significant, precisely because the current discussion is almost exclusively focused on the notion of drives (cf. Katsafanas 2013).

When it comes to the prominence of drives in later scholarship one can observe a certain historical irony. To a great degree, Parkes' work is responsible for the attention given to drives in more recent years. According to Parkes, the notion of drives had been either underappreciated or misunderstood in previous scholarship (Parkes 1994, 273 and 444).¹⁵ In contrast to earlier accounts, he singles out the idea of the psyche as a multiplicity as the most "revolutionary" and "radical" feature of Nietzsche's psychology (Parkes 1994, 18 and 251). Since Parkes then goes on to discuss the psyche as composed of multiple drives, it is not entirely unjustified to conclude that Parkes considers Nietzsche's thinking on drives his most important contribution to psychology. After all, it is precisely this aspect of Nietzsche's psychological thinking that echoes forth in depth psychology (Parkes 1994; cf. Gasser 1997). So Parkes settled the question in what sense Nietzsche was a psychologist by describing his psychological thinking as culminating in a drive-psychology. What remained unclear was if this drive psychology relies on a systematical drive-theory that can be spelled out. This latter question is already present in the immediate reception of Parkes' book.

The main worry in the reviews was not so much to what extent it is enlightening to take account of Nietzsche's psychological thinking when approaching his philos-

¹⁴ Jacob Golomb's equally pioneering work *Nietzsche's Enticing Psychology of Power* (Golomb 1989), which was originally written as a dissertation and published in Hebrew in 1987, focused on the therapeutic dimensions of Nietzsche's psychological thinking and did not aim for a comprehensive view of Nietzsche's psychology. Perhaps because of Golomb's attempt to present Nietzsche as something of a psychoanalyst in his own right, this work did not become influential in the Anglophone discussion on Nietzsche's psychology. The work would however have deserved more attention than it received, because of its challenging discussion of the role of mood in Nietzsche's thinking and writing.

¹⁵ In the first footnote of chapter 8, "Dominions of Drives and Persons", Parkes mentions a few exceptions to "the general rule of ignoring the Nietzsche's ideas about the drives" (sic!) (Parkes 1994, 444).

ophy,¹⁶ but rather to what extent his psychology is systematic or could be systematized. So in a sense Parkes' work had put scholarship at a crossroads; one would now have to choose between taking a more systematic or a more contextual approach. Alexander Nehamas for one sought to emphasize that Nietzsche's psychological thinking cannot be dissociated from his project of self-fashioning, and that therefore any systematization must necessarily fail to take account of the broader context of his psychological statements (Nehamas 1996). This is indeed a valid concern, insofar as it points to the necessity of a certain kind of contextual interpretation, which always keeps Nietzsche's projects in mind. However, one should remember that Nietzsche pursued a great variety of interconnected projects, and that Nietzsche's texts do not present his self-fashioning as such, but what he considered significant enough about his self-fashioning to communicate to his readers. One might therefore question whether that which is essential about this communication cannot be systematized after all. I nevertheless take Nehamas' critical perspective on attempts to systematize Nietzsche's philosophical psychology as a useful warning, which is worth heeding carefully, not least because it was not the only one of its kind.

Already in the year preceding the publication of Parkes' study, Bernard Williams wrote bluntly that "Nietzsche is not a source of philosophical theories" (Williams 1994, 237).¹⁷ For Williams this is apparent when we carefully examine Nietzsche's writings: it is not only that he nowhere presents systematic psychological theories, but that his texts positively render such a pursuit futile (Williams 1994, 237–238). In other words, the very fact that Nietzsche himself never cared to present his psychological thinking as a systematic theory already speaks against efforts to do so on behalf of the philosopher. In Williams' view, Nietzsche's moral psychology is minimalist in the sense that he does not seek to apply a pre-given theoretical framework to specific human actions, but instead seeks to invite his readers to interpret experiences and actions through a variety of non-moral perspectives (Williams 1994, 240). Ergo, Nietzsche's psychologizing is strategic. This means that it is crucial to see what use Nietzsche makes of psychology in any given context and that his psychological statements should always be interpreted from within his projects.

Despite such strong-worded warnings, not a few Anglophone scholars have devoted their time to the task of providing a more systematic account of Nietzsche's

¹⁶ Though such a worry was expressed by Glenn Martin, who feared that a focus on psychology perhaps necessarily obscures the historical problem of nihilism, which Martin correctly identifies as being central to Nietzsche's philosophical concerns (Martin 1996). While it is certainly the case that Parkes (1994) does not have much to say about nihilism, I do not share Martin's fears. Quite to the contrary, I argue throughout this study that it is rather the case that in Nietzsche's thinking the historical and the psychological are intertwined, so that Nietzsche's thinking on nihilism and the death of God cannot be fully understood without taking account of his psychological thinking and vice versa.

¹⁷ Williams' article was first published in the *European Journal of Philosophy* in 1993 (see Williams 1993), but for reasons of convenience I here cite the later publication of it in an edited volume (Williams 1994).

psychological thinking. More specifically, much effort has been put into the attempt to turn Nietzsche's disparate, at times contradictory statements into a coherent drive theory. The desired result would be a Nietzschean psychological theory, which besides allowing scholars to interpret other aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy more authoritatively could perhaps even contribute to contemporary discussions in philosophical psychology. This approach has most forcefully been advanced by Brian Leiter, who in his influential *Nietzsche on Morality* (Leiter 2002) first constructs a naturalistic moral psychology centred on the notion of the drive, and then proceeds to interpret *GM* on the basis of this naturalistic psychology, in order to finally argue that Nietzsche's psychology is more in tune with contemporary research in psychology than the ideas of any other major philosopher. The implication for textual scholarship is that the same naturalistic psychology could be applied in a similar procedure to all of the mature works.

The notion of the "drive" is certainly a key term in Nietzsche's psychology. Besides that the analytic approach, and more specifically the theory-building approach, has become dominant within Anglophone scholarship. Therefore, the following section is devoted to the drives and the question what role they play according to Nietzsche, i.e. how one should understand Nietzsche's drives. However, this examination is done with the question of mood in mind. What is the relation of drives to felt experience? Do drives explain mood? Are drives irrational forces of nature and if so does this also apply to mood? This approach makes it possible to question the dominance of drives, i.e. the exclusive focus on drives in contemporary scholarship, without denying that they do play an important role in Nietzsche's philosophy. This is a necessary first step towards an approach that recognizes the importance of Nietzsche's psychological thinking for any interpretation of his philosophy without succumbing to the temptation of constructing a systematic theory.

Surveying the history of scholarship on Nietzsche's psychology, it is hard to escape the impression of historical contingency. Which concepts are deemed to merit special attention depends much on the scholar's research interests as well as his or her understanding of what constitutes psychology. This applies to my treatment as well. I do not here claim to provide a representative overview of Nietzsche's philosophical psychology; indeed, I have suggested that there are reasons to be sceptical about the very possibility of such a presentation. Instead, I concentrate only on those aspects most relevant to the guiding question of my work; namely Nietzsche's thinking about reorienting feeling and creating new moods. While there have hitherto been a few exceptions (Jaspers 1936, Golomb 1989, Parkes 1994 and Solomon 2003), those aspects of Nietzsche's thinking most relevant to the "philosophy of emotion" have been neglected in the scholarly literature. While it is certainly the case that Nietzsche's psychological thinking has received more sustained attention in recent years than ever before, many central questions still remain unexplored; perhaps because they can only be asked after the dominant view on "Nietzsche's drive theory" has been thoroughly questioned.

3.2 Drives in Nietzsche's philosophical psychology

The first appearance of the concept “drive” [*Trieb*] in Nietzsche's oeuvre is to be found in a short essay entitled “On Moods” [*Über Stimmungen*], written in 1864 by the then 19-year old student (cf. Parkes 1994, 273). This youthful exercise, which remained unpublished during the lifetime of the philosopher, serves to prove that Nietzsche's interest in the affective dimension of life is not confined to his mature philosophical writings. In that early text the notion of the drive appears only as one term among others to make sense of the workings of the psyche, and the term mood [*Stimmung*] is at the centre of the picture. It is, however, when consulting the secondary literature, hard to escape the impression that in Nietzsche's mature thought the concept of the drive plays a more important role than any other term that relates to affectivity. Yet it would be misleading to claim that the concept “drive” gains in importance at the expense of other terms related to the life of feeling. It is true that the term mood [*Stimmung*] almost disappears (cf. Corngold 1990), but the later Nietzsche still talks about affects, feelings and states all the time; in other words, he merely replaces one term with others. So if there is a shift, and there is some textual evidence to suggest there is one, it does not have so much to do with the disappearance of any specific term nor with the frequency of the appearance of the term drive. It is rather about the possibility of a new interpretation of the relation between the terms in question. When did this shift take place and how is it to be understood?

The shift can be dated to the early 1880s. In *Daybreak*, there are passages that emphasize the primacy of drives and instincts (D 109, KSA 3, 96–99; D 119, KSA 3, 111–114). What these passages do is to open up the possibility of reinterpreting in terms of drives any passage that applies a more conventional vocabulary of thinking, feeling and willing. So even if Nietzsche continues to refer to conscious states throughout *D* and even explains actions with reference to such states, these passages suggest that all conscious states and actions are the result of the unconscious operation of drives and could perhaps in principle be explained by drives. So for example with regard to mood, Parkes notes about this stage “that moods may well be manifestations of drives” (Parkes 1994, 289). Quite tellingly, Parkes does not have much to say about moods in Nietzsche's thinking after this. From now on, it would instead seem, the drives become the undisputed driving forces within the psyche. Is then not the result a view of persons as driven to act by forces utterly beyond their control? It is precisely in this sense that *D*, according to Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, marks the arrival of Nietzsche's mature philosophy (Clark and Leiter 1997, viii). The key question here, however, is whether Nietzsche's emphasis on the drives, his granting them some kind of primacy, implies that he thinks drives determine human life in the sense that the operation of the drives cannot be influenced consciously. Before seeking to answer that question, an initial overview of Nietzsche's use of the concept “drive” is called for; not least because Nietzsche never in his published work defines

what he means by a drive or gives an unequivocal presentation of the role of drives in conscious life.

In recent years a number of Anglophone scholars have come to recognize that it is far from clear what exactly Nietzsche had in mind when talking about drives, and that he even seems to present contradictory statements regarding their role (e.g. Katsafanas 2013; cf. Stern 2015). This recognition might serve as an important step towards a sceptical view regarding the possibility to present Nietzsche's psychology as a drive theory, since it points toward very real problems with taking his statements out of context and generalizing them; especially if that is done without balancing the resulting view with possibly contradictory tendencies in the texts. In this regard, the greatest temptation has been and still is to equate drives with physiological occurrences. It certainly is the case that the philosopher's rhetoric occasionally seems to encourage such a reading. Nevertheless, it can easily be shown that Nietzsche's "drives" should not exclusively be identified with "very basic motivational states, such as urges or cravings" (see Katsafanas 2013, 727). In his writings, Nietzsche mentions a vast number of drives from the sex-drive (BGE 189, KSA 5, 111) over art-drives (BT 2, KSA 1, 30) all the way to the drive to truth (GS 110, KSA 3, 471).¹⁸ In other words, there are clearly different kinds of drives; e.g. in *D* Nietzsche distinguishes drives such as hunger which require material satisfaction from moral drives that are to a certain extent satisfied through illusory fulfilment (dreams etc., cf. *D* 119, KSA 3, 112). This does not mean that the basic drives would even all be based on the same physiological model; i.e. akin to hunger in the sense that they would motivate specific actions or require nourishment. After all, one of the most basic, fundamental drives is supposedly the drive to form metaphors [*Trieb zur Metaphernbildung*] (TL 2, KSA 1, 887), which simply operates without any special nourishment.

As the text *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense* might not be considered an admissible source to base any interpretation on, and can be blamed for rather fanciful interpretations of Nietzsche,¹⁹ it is important to note that the idea that all talk of psychic reality is metaphorical is not limited to this text but pervades Nietzsche's psychological thinking. In arguably the most important passage on drives in *D*, Nietzsche explicitly affirms that all talk of the operation of drives is metaphor-

¹⁸ The way that Nietzsche multiplies drives at will is perhaps itself a hint not to take his drive-talk too literally. A prime example is Nietzsche's talk of the philosopher's sceptical drive, his analytical drive and his drive to compare etc. (GM III 9, KSA 5, 357).

¹⁹ The text was not intended for publication and is often used as a justification for "postmodern" or "post-structuralist" approaches to Nietzsche's thinking that find in the text a denial of truth similar to their own (Leiter 2002, 14–15; cf. Hödl 1997, 13). Approaching Nietzsche's later writings through the perspective of this early text is indeed problematic, as Maudemarie Clark has argued, at least if one does not take into account of the facts that 1) the text is not a denial of the possibility of scientific knowledge 2) his views on truth evolved considerably over the years (Clark 1990, 63–95). This is the case whether or not Clark misrepresents the positions of the "postmodernists" and whether or not she approaches the question of truth in Nietzsche's philosophy from an analytic perspective unsuited to the task, as has been suggested (cf. Hödl 1997, 17–18).

ical [*es ist alles Bilderrede*] (D 119, KSA 3, 112) and that what is really going on is perhaps unknowable, although felt (D 119, KSA 3, 113). A notable example of Nietzsche's metaphorical approach to the drives is that Nietzsche repeatedly insists that drives interpret the world; that drives reflect or even philosophize (D 119, KSA 3, 111–114; cf. BGE 6, KSA 5, 19–20). In light of this, one could close the discussion with the banal and unhelpful claim that Nietzsche's physiological terminology is metaphorical and could altogether be reinterpreted in terms of mental states accessible to conscious control. Such a move, however, ignores that Nietzsche most certainly is creating an opposition between the drives and rational, reflective consciousness. Precisely how this opposition should be conceived of is the decisive question.

To begin with, I identify the opposition between the drives and conscious control as a tension, and do not seek to resolve it in one direction or the other. Put differently, my approach is based on the intuition that the tension in question plays a constructive role in Nietzsche's thinking and on the fact that Nietzsche nowhere suggests that the tension can be fully resolved. It is clear enough that for Nietzsche the origin of metaphorization is in the affective body. The physical and physiological connotations of the word drive are of utmost importance, even if they would serve only to emphasize the bodily nature of the phenomena in question. While it is therefore unhelpful to think that one could remove the drives as a central element of Nietzsche's psychological thinking, the question is whether there are any grounds to generalize in the other direction, as if only the drives would matter. Specifically, it can be questioned whether it is possible to turn Nietzsche's discussions about drives into a coherent drive theory, according to which the operation of drives is mechanical and there is no room for consciously influencing one's drives. This is however precisely what the dominant approach in Anglophone scholarship on Nietzsche looks like. Therefore, in order to establish the foundation of an alternative approach, I will in the following section critically examine and evaluate the strongest attempt to cast Nietzsche's psychological thinking into the mould of drive theory. This is the paradigmatic account of Brian Leiter, which is built on the foundation of those passages in Nietzsche's oeuvre that go the furthest in questioning the status of conscious states.

3.3 Beyond Nietzsche's purported epiphenomenalism

It has now become necessary to engage the problem how to understand the tension between Nietzsche's emphasis on drives on the one hand and his equally strong concern with reorienting affective life on the other. This issue mirrors one of the most problematic questions in Nietzsche-scholarship, namely how to reconcile his fatalism with his emphasis on self-making. There is an extensive and fairly technical debate on this topic, further obscured by the tendency of interpreters not only to draw on contemporary philosophical positions to elucidate Nietzsche's statements through comparison but to claim that he in fact espouses one or another such posi-

tion.²⁰ Here I will limit the scope of the discussion by viewing it only from the perspective of philosophical psychology. Specifically, I aim to show what can be gained for a contextual account of Nietzsche's psychological thinking when one challenges the view that Nietzsche espoused epiphenomenalism. For the sake of clarity, I will primarily draw on *D* in the discussion, because this work has been identified as inaugurating the shift in emphasis toward the drives and because it contains the most illuminating passages on the topic. After introducing the problem and the currently dominant interpretation, I will develop a novel solution through a constructive critique of Robert Solomon's enlightening reading of Nietzsche's philosophy of emotions. Finally, I will reflect on the implications of adopting this new interpretation.

Nietzsche's works abound with vivid descriptions of mental states and exhortations to change the way we feel about things.²¹ These descriptions and exhortations coexist with statements that drives determine actions and with genealogical explanations of specific actions in terms of drives. The philosophical and interpretative problem concerns their relation, and has often been stated thus: Does Nietzsche think that consciousness is epiphenomenal?

The dominant interpretation in Anglophone scholarship has been that in Nietzsche's view consciousness is epiphenomenal (e. g. Leiter 2002). In what specific sense is this the case? How should one understand his purported epiphenomenalism? According to the influential account of Leiter, Nietzsche thinks that a person's unconscious drives, i.e. physiological facts about that person, causally determine the person's mental states. Such physiological facts, or what Leiter calls type-facts, are practically unchanging and determine what kind of person one is and what one can become. So a particular person's conscious states might play a role in causal explanation, in so far as they are part of a causal chain leading to an action. Nevertheless, "the real story of the genesis of an action begins with the type-facts, which explain both consciousness *and* a person's actions". That means that type-facts are both causally primary and explanatorily primary with regard to consciousness and action; consciousness is in itself not causally efficacious. (Cf. Leiter 2002, 91–92.)

One can certainly find passages in *D* that at least suggest the possibility of such an interpretation (D 116, KSA 3, 108–109; D 129, KSA 3, 118–120; D 130, KSA 3, 120–122).²² Still, this interpretation is best understood as a rationalization of Nietzsche's

20 So in this case one does not only encounter the usual "he says this – no he says that" kind of debate in the literature, but also a debate about fundamental philosophical commitments and theories. Needless to say, Nietzsche did not care to provide a clear answer himself. For an introduction to this debate, see Leiter (1998) and Solomon (2002).

21 A very clear example is the concluding sentence of aphorism 103 of *D*, "*Wir haben umzulernen, – um endlich, vielleicht sehr spät, noch mehr zu erreichen: umzufühlen*" (D 103, KSA 3, 92), which beyond any doubt suggests the possibility of changing one's affective constitution, at least over a long span of time.

22 In these passages Nietzsche vehemently criticizes traditional understandings of free will, but does not affirm any definite opposing view and importantly qualifies his discussion of necessity with many a perhaps [*vielleicht*].

statements in one particular direction. Even if one accepts the thesis that he expressed epiphenomenalist views, one can question whether he did this because he assumed that there are inflexible, rigid type-facts that determine actions, instead of for strategic reasons. Leiter rhetorically recognizes that his interpretation has to be qualified at least in one regard; the environment (which for Leiter includes values) plays a causal role in shaping a person's life and his actions (Leiter 2002, 97). Still he denies that a person could gain any kind of autonomy through interactions with his environment,²³ because it “simply does not square with the theory of action that underlies the basic fatalistic doctrine” (Leiter 2002, 98). While Leiter's emphasis on type-facts can and should be challenged, let us for now be content with examining what follows from his premise.

What are we to make of Nietzsche's talk about self-mastery? In this view, “self-mastery is merely an effect of the interplay of certain drives” (Leiter 2002, 100). Consequently, there is no real tension in Nietzsche's writings, but only in the confused mind of the interpreter. In practice, Leiter's interpretative framework resolves any apparent contradictions within a single text as well as between texts by referring to an underlying theory of action that has been arrived at through an interpretation and rationalization of a few chosen passages.²⁴ Still, it is of no use to deny that the conclusions that Leiter draws can be drawn from the textual evidence. One can however ask two critical questions: Firstly, and most importantly, one can ask if such an interpretation does not clarify Nietzsche's psychological thinking at the expense of obscuring much of Nietzsche's philosophical project, not to speak of casting doubt on its viability. Secondly, and more modestly, one can ask if there is no other way to understand his emphasis on psychic forces that resist rational control than to conclude that Nietzsche thinks physiological facts should always be considered explanatorily primary.

A number of scholars have sought to challenge Leiter's interpretation of the statements that he bases his epiphenomenalist thesis on, most often drawing on additional textual evidence (cf. Katsafanas 2013 and Dries 2013). The problem with these challenges is that Leiter's conclusions can certainly be drawn from the passages he cites. The competing interpretations of what Nietzsche says are hardly more plausible than Leiter's and thus end up with at least equally implausible “Nietz-

²³ Leiter thus rejects the view that “while type-facts may circumscribe the range of possible trajectories, it now seems that a person can ‘create’ his life – and thus be morally responsible for it – insofar as he can create those values that (causally) determine which of the possible trajectories is in fact realized” (Leiter 2002, 98).

²⁴ Leiter draws primarily on *D* when justifying his account, but this same work contains passages that can be used to resist such a reading. Besides the already cited aphorism 103, which suggests that one can in a genuine sense learn to feel differently, the most obvious evidence is to be found in aphorism 104, in which Nietzsche states that all actions derive from evaluative judgements, either one's own or someone else's (*D* 104, KSA 3,92). Even the most minimalistic interpretation of this passage must admit that Nietzsche thinks one can “own” one's actions. I examine other relevant passages in *D* in the final section of this chapter (3.5), before the conclusion.

schean" psychological theories (e.g. Katsafanas 2016).²⁵ Perhaps a more fruitful approach would be to pay more heed to context and to what Nietzsche in fact does, instead of merely interpreting single statements. In this regard, I fully subscribe to Tom Stern's criticism of the dominant approach to Nietzsche's psychology, and in particular I want to follow up on his suggestion that what Nietzsche was trying to do might contradict any effort to force his thinking into the mould of drive theory (cf. Stern 2015, 139).²⁶ It certainly seems that Nietzsche was not too concerned about the theoretical problem of epiphenomenalism. As Peter Poellner correctly notes, he "explicitly *uses* explanations" that rely on conscious states as causes "on almost every page of his writings" and that "there are a plethora of passages indicating that Nietzsche, even in the later phase of his creative career, regards consciousness as efficacious" (Poellner 2009, 297). The key question then becomes, why Nietzsche nevertheless opposes the drives to conscious mental states. What kind of project or projects does Nietzsche pursue when employing the vocabulary of drives to question inherited conceptions of mental life?

Poellner regrettably evades this crucial question by identifying Nietzsche as a proto-phenomenologist, specifically as a forerunner of Husserlian phenomenology, for whom the mental is always primary.²⁷ Nietzsche's philosophical project can indeed be described as an attempt to redirect attention to what he poetically calls the earth but to equate this concern with Husserl's preoccupation with the "life-world" is an anachronism that only sows confusion. That Nietzsche was not too concerned with the theoretical problem of epiphenomenalism, does not mean that he was not deeply concerned with the more practical question of what role consciousness can play in shaping action. Just as Nietzsche's expressions of scepticism concerning the power of consciousness should not be interpreted as a fundamental commitment to a rigid theory of action, one should also resist the temptation to undo the tension in the opposite direction. Against both extremes, I argue that Nietzsche was well aware of a tension between bodily nature and conscious thought and that the tension plays a productive role in his philosophical writings. There is a danger

25 Most problematically, Katsafanas presents his own theoretical construction as if it were nothing but an elucidation of Nietzsche's own theoretical commitments. I am willing to grant Katsafanas the use of the term Nietzschean, as he clearly builds his psychological theory on statements by Nietzsche, but only if one then distinguishes the "Nietzschean", as philosophy inspired by Nietzsche, from Nietzsche's actual intentions, which resist theorization.

26 Brian Leiter has sought to defend his interpretation against exactly this kind of criticism by asserting that there is no fundamental conflict between the "Humean Nietzsche" of drive theory and the "Therapeutic Nietzsche", who speaks of revaluation and who aims to influence select readers. However, this entire defence rests on the implausible premise that the "Therapeutic Nietzsche" works within the framework of drive theory, and not the other way around. (Cf. Leiter 2013, 582–584.)

27 Poellner goes as far as to assert that "Nietzsche not only pervasively uses and anticipates phenomenological modes of inquiry, but that, perhaps even more importantly his work contains the most powerful and perceptive statement of the implicit motivations of the 'phenomenological turn' in early twentieth-century continental philosophy" (Poellner 2009, 298).

that if one accepts either Poellner's or Leiter's view, one loses sight of this tension that influences Nietzsche's thinking far beyond his psychological speculations.

I already suggested that opposing drives and conscious thought might for Nietzsche at least in part be a strategic move. According to Bernard Williams, Nietzsche's statements suggesting epiphenomenalism are best read as parts of arguments against certain moral interpretations of psychology.²⁸ Robert Solomon also notes the polemical intent of such statements (Solomon 2003, 75). In order to pursue this thread, it is useful to turn from the abstract debate on epiphenomenalism to the question how the tension between drives and conscious states should be understood in the case of emotional experience. It is generally recognized in analytic scholarship that whatever other functions drives have in Nietzsche's psychological thinking, their primary function is to influence emotional experience. According to Katsafanas: "Drives manifest themselves by coloring our view of the world, by generating perceptual saliences, by influencing our emotions and other attitudes, by fostering desires." (Katsafanas 2013, 743; cf. D 119, KSA 3, 113–114) Though the metaphor of colouring is not unproblematic and Nietzsche only occasionally uses it,²⁹ Katsafanas is right to point out that for Nietzsche there is a close connection between the drives and other affective phenomena, at least in the sense that the drives have something to do with the all-enveloping background of feeling through which one encounters the world. How specific drives relate to specific emotions is a different question altogether, though it is worth noting that another influential scholar goes as far as to claim: "Drives and affects are undistinguishable, for an 'affect' is simply what it feels like to be driven by a drive" (Constâncio 2011, 16). Be that as it may, these examples from contemporary scholarship open the possibility to look beyond Nietzsche's terminology and to consider the concepts he employs attempts to approach certain phenomena, among them not least the nature of feelings and motivational states and their relation to rational and non-rational aspects of consciousness. In the following section, I follow this line of thought by engaging Robert Solomon's reading of Nietzsche's philosophy of emotion, which is particularly interesting precisely because he dares to think beyond the terminology provided by Nietzsche.

²⁸ "Nietzsche's doubts about action are more usefully understood, I suggest, as doubts not about the very idea of anyone's doing anything, but rather about a morally significant interpretation of action, in terms of the will." (Williams 1994, 242–242)

²⁹ It must be said that probably the most common description of the role of moods and feelings in contemporary analytic philosophy involves "colouring our view of the world". The metaphor of colouring has been criticized for reducing feelings and moods to mere aesthetic phenomena that serve no important function (cf. Ratcliffe 2008, 47), but this criticism does not hit the target in the case of Nietzsche, for whom aesthetics is never mere aesthetics. Nietzsche himself employs the metaphor of colour occasionally, e.g. when he in *GS* writes that we lack a history of all that has given colour to life (*GS* 7, KSA 3, 378–379) or that a cold grey sentiment associated with the historical sense is only one colour of the new feeling [*Farbe dieses neues Gefühls*] (*GS* 337, KSA 3, 564–565).

3.4 Robert Solomon on the tension in Nietzsche's understanding of the emotions

We have seen that the concept of the drive is intimately associated with the body in Nietzsche. On the other hand, we have noted that there is no gulf between the physiological and the phenomenological; that drives are intimately related to what we have called mood. Robert Solomon suggests that the interpreter could in most cases replace the term drive with other terms such as passion, emotion and desire. In Solomon's view, such an approach would recover a rich understanding of psychic life in Nietzsche sadly obscured by his reliance on the theory of drives that was popular in the late 19th century (cf. Solomon 2003, 78). So instead of trying to build some kind of Nietzschean psychological theory, (which, as a drive theory, could only be mistaken in his view),³⁰ Solomon suggests readers should learn to appreciate Nietzsche's observations about the motivating forces driving human actions as well as the philosopher's emphasis on the value of living passionately. In this view, Nietzsche was no great psychological theorist but he did have a keen psychological eye. For Solomon, it follows that one therefore need not pay too much attention to Nietzsche's preferred conceptual apparatus; one should rather seek to draw insights from what Nietzsche is trying to say. This approach is understandable against the background of Solomon's own philosophical project, which includes making Nietzsche relevant to contemporary philosophy of emotions, but I will seek to show that it also provides important clues for scholarship that seeks to understand Nietzsche's psychological thinking in its own right.

Solomon's suggested strategy of reading is worth interrogating closely. While developing his strategy of reading Nietzsche's writings, Solomon identifies an internal contradiction in the philosopher's statements on emotion that should not seem too surprising when one takes into account the debate over epiphenomenalism. Nietzsche at times treats emotions as if they were first and foremost strategies or ways of engaging with the world, talking about the importance of cultivating the emotions and the possibility of spiritualizing passions (Solomon 2003, 79–81 and 83). The understanding of emotions implied by such talk is quite at odds with the view of given and fixed forces of nature, torrents and streams rushing up to take hold of the mind, which Solomon suggests is also present in Nietzsche's writings (Solomon 2003, 82–83). The first understanding of emotions gives room for conscious control, while the second one puts constraints on choice. Solomon undoubtedly detects a real tension in Nietzsche, but it is precisely here that one should halt, instead

30 For Solomon's objections against psychological drive theories, see Solomon 2003, 76–78. I tend to agree with Solomon that trying to build some kind of comprehensive Nietzschean psychological theory is a futile effort, but I would add that trying to clarify his views to serve historical scholarship is a quite different and wholly legitimate endeavour. To what extent Nietzsche-scholarship and philosophers writing on Nietzsche have been engaged in the former effort, at the expense of the latter, is a question everyone involved in the discourse should ask himself.

of rushing onwards.³¹ Solomon's eagerness to reclaim Nietzsche for himself is problematic. In order to be able to replace Nietzsche's drive-talk with his own vocabulary, Solomon has to overlook the differences between his own conception of an irrationalist "hydraulic model" of emotions and a more fundamental yet subtle constraint on choice presumed by Nietzsche. Therefore, we cannot follow Solomon without first examining the premises of his project. This strategy also allows us to better appreciate Nietzsche's efforts by contrasting his thinking with what is one of or perhaps even the most influential perspective in the philosophy of emotions.

Only against the background of Solomon's understanding of choice can one make sense of his reading of Nietzsche and judge to what extent it hits the mark. While Solomon did revise important details over the years, those aspects of his theory of emotion that most concern us here remained virtually unchanged and are most clearly expressed in an early article. In his classic article on "Emotions and Choice", Solomon sets out to develop an alternative against what he takes to be a dominant perception of emotions as physiological occurrences that happen to us (Solomon 1973, 20). Here I want to focus only on his rejection of the idea that emotions resist our control and on the question in what sense he instead argues that one can choose one's emotions. According to Solomon, views that emphasize the uncontrollability of emotions overlook that emotions are in most if perhaps not all cases intentional, i.e. about something. To paraphrase Solomon's example, I am angry at John for stealing my car. If I learn that John did not steal my car, that he only bought a car that looks exactly like mine, I won't be angry at him anymore. (Solomon 1973, 21–23). This means that emotions are judgements, specifically normative judgements. Solomon adds that not only are emotions about something (i.e. emotions are intentional) they are also about something in a specific situation (i.e. emotions are situational), so he ends up with the view that "to have an emotion is to hold a normative judgement about one's situation" (Solomon 1973, 27). So if emotions are judgements that one can in some sense choose, why is it that emotions are commonly considered irrational and beyond our control?

Solomon argues that the apparent irrationality of emotions shouldn't be confused with uncontrollability. Instead, the best explanation for the widespread view that emotions can resist our control is that emotions are bound to situations. Emotions are responses to situations, which for one or another reason (e.g. on grounds of being unusual) demand a quick response. So emotions are hasty judgements that are appropriate and rational in the situations in which they arise (Solomon 1973, 34–35). Because emotions are linked to situations, one cannot simply choose to feel angry without any reason, without being in a situation where anger is a possibly appropriate response (Solomon 1973, 31 and 40). What one can do is to become more self-aware about one's judgements, to strive towards making correct judgements

31 The ambivalence Solomon detects in Nietzsche's philosophy of emotion is also reflected in Solomon's text with frequent exclamations of "and yet", "but despite" and so forth (cf. Solomon 2003).

about situations and (eventually) change what kind of judgements one tends to make in particular circumstances (Solomon 1973, 32).³² Consequently, emotional control does not involve fighting against some natural force, but in various ways challenging the normative judgements that constitute emotional responses, and thus eventually changing the way one tends to act in any given situation.

Solomon's early view certainly captures something important about the role of emotions in everyday life even if it does not provide a full picture.³³ If one discounts fundamental objections to his approach,³⁴ I think there is only one issue that is of concern to us here. After initially opposing his view against theories that consider emotions to be occurrences beyond our control, Solomon ends up with a view in which the possibility to choose one's emotions is constrained to a great extent by the nature of the situation in which one finds oneself. For any given situation only a limited number of emotional responses are appropriate, after all. One can then ask if Solomon does not go too far in externalizing the reasons for the experience that emotions might resist conscious control. Even as Solomon would later revise and tone down some aspects of his theory of choice, he never recanted this externalization of the constraints on choice.³⁵ Nietzsche certainly emphasizes constraints on choosing one's emotions that have more to do with the individual facing a specific situation than with the situation itself, as I will soon show in more detail. Solomon is vaguely aware of this and it is for this reason that he brings the idea of hydraulic models of emotions into his discussion about the understanding of emotions that finds expression in Nietzsche's philosophical texts.

Solomon's talk of a hydraulic model refers to (mis-)understandings of emotion, in which emotions are thought of as fixed natural forces. Hydraulic metaphors of raging torrents and subterranean streams are a common identifier of such understandings. The key problem with such metaphors is that torrents are wholly mindless even if they flow in specific directions. As natural forces, torrents of emotion have to be dealt with. One can perhaps resist a torrent, redirect it or try to cope with it, but

32 "I can take any number of positive steps to change what I believe and what judgments I hold and tend to make. By forcing myself to be scrupulous in the search for evidence and knowledge of circumstance, and by training myself in self-understanding regarding my prejudices and influences, and by placing myself in appropriate circumstances, I can determine the kinds of judgments I will tend to make. I can do the same for my emotions." (Solomon 1973, 32)

33 Solomon is well aware of this as he himself remarks that the entire problem of "unconscious emotions" falls beyond the scope of his article (Solomon 1973, 26).

34 One implication of tying emotions to a certain kind of situations is that a large part of affective life falls outside the scope of the discussion on emotions. This could be contrasted with a more holistic account of all human experience as shaped by mood as we find in Heidegger, to name but one prominent example (cf. Heidegger 2006, 134–140).

35 Or as Paul Griffiths puts it: "While Solomon emphasized the cultivation of appropriate emotion through enculturation, his existentialist emphasis on personal responsibility would have made him uneasy with any theory in which the emotions – or at least the normative standards governing them – are inscribed into the psychology of the individual by the cultural milieu." (Griffiths 2010)

one cannot be rid of it. One cannot choose not to have torrents of emotion raging through one's body. (Cf. Solomon 2003, 73–74.) Does Nietzsche's talk of drives commit him to such a hydraulic model?

Nietzsche certainly thinks of emotions as natural forces, but does he think of them as being of a fixed, unchanging nature? Despite occasionally employing hydraulic metaphors, it is my contention that Nietzsche's understanding of the "nature" of emotion differs from Solomon's hydraulic model. Unless one thinks of nature as inherently inflexible, there is no reason to see the bodily nature of emotion as necessarily constricting choice, if one takes the choice to involve choosing among alternative emotions that are appropriate responses in a given situation. If one look closer at what Nietzsche has to say about the relation of affective phenomena to conscious thought and compare it to Solomon's views, one will see that while Nietzsche complicates the question of choice in a different way, the consequences are strikingly similar to Solomon's.

As we have seen, Nietzsche suggests that drives primarily operate on a sub-conscious level, in and through our bodies. They become manifest as emotions and attitudes. That means that drives are accessible to consciousness at least insofar as they are felt; and thus to a certain extent open to conscious reflection. In fact, Nietzsche only means to say that we cannot with certainty know reflectively all of the drives which constitute our affect and thus guide our action in any specific situation. In other words, we cannot be aware of all of the factors influencing our emotional experiences, reactions and actions (D 119, KSA 3, 111). Nietzsche writes that "However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his image of the totality of drives which constitute his being." (Hollingdale transl./Clark and Leiter 1997, 74; cf. D 119, KSA 3, 111) That would simply be too much for the conscious mind.³⁶ While such an understanding raises some initial doubts about the power of conscious reflection, the rather banal fact that we are not aware of the origin of all the content of our consciousness in itself renders neither choice impossible nor consciousness illusory. One does not have to draw on any advanced existentialist theory of freedom to account for that. One merely has to expand the notion of choice from a narrow conception of reflective deliberation to allow the felt body to play a more important role in choices. Such a view is fully compatible with Solomon's original understanding of emotion and choice, which emphasized that one has to go through a process of learning in order to be able to choose differently in any given situation. This is the case as long as Nietzsche allows for ways to consciously influence one's drives. There certainly are no philosophical reasons to rule out that possibility *a priori*. In this regard, it is worth noting that Solomon started emphasizing the bodily nature of emotion in his late work, in much the same way as

³⁶ This brings up the thorny issue of self-knowledge in Nietzsche. Suffice it to say that there is no consensus about what kind of self-knowledge Nietzsche considers possible. A strict reading of the passage in question would suggest that Nietzsche thinks only complete self-knowledge is impossible.

Nietzsche, but did not consider it an objection to his earlier views.³⁷ This strengthens our suspicion that the problem, which is at the basis of the tension apparent in Nietzsche's statements on the affective life, does not derive from Nietzsche accepting a hydraulic model of emotion or any strictly deterministic drive theory for that matter.

Solomon concedes that the hydraulic model does not fit Nietzsche too well. His "metaphors are not all so hydraulic" (Solomon 2003, 75).³⁸ Solomon also admits that Nietzschean drives can be acquired (Solomon 2003, 76). Indeed, Nietzsche talks a lot about the incorporation of ideas and their becoming sub-conscious instinct: this is one of the main themes of the *Gay Science* (GS 21, KSA 3, 391–393; cf. Franco 2011, 102). Recognition of these facts leads Solomon to resolve the tension he has described by correcting Nietzsche with existentialist terminology. There is, however, an important sense in which this move can only be considered an attempt to get rid of Nietzsche's recognition of certain constraints on choosing one's emotions that can only be understood as deriving from within us. Although I think it can be shown that Nietzsche's conception of natural forces does not imply rigidity, there is still an unresolved tension between the bodily nature of emotions and the possibility to choose one's emotions. This tension resides on a more fundamental level than the dichotomy of hydraulic and existentialist models of emotion allows for. Next, I will examine some particularly illuminating statements on the tension between consciously choosing one's emotions and forces constraining choice in *Daybreak*.

3.5 The history of emotions and the tension in question

Nietzsche's *Daybreak* is the work that is most often cited by scholars arguing for an epiphenomenalist interpretation (cf. Leiter 2002, 95 and 99–101). As I already noted, the text also contains statements that can be used to question that interpretation. Now I will examine three aphorisms that in my view indicate that Nietzsche is aware of a tension between choosing one's emotions and forces constraining choice. These aphorisms are unsystematic, and in this sense they do not differ from the evidence that the competing interpretations draw upon, but they do form a suggestive chain of thought and suffice to give an alternative picture that is more in tune with Nietzsche's critical projects. I want to pay particular attention to aphorisms 34, 35 and 38.

In aphorism 34, Nietzsche writes that moral feelings are apparently transmitted from parents to children when children notice strong sentiments for or against cer-

³⁷ A striking example of this Nietzschean emphasis on the body is Solomon's clarification that "the judgments that I claim are constitutive of emotion may be non-propositional and bodily as well as propositional and articulate. They manifest themselves as feelings." (Solomon 2004, 88)

³⁸ One could add that even when Nietzsche is at his most hydraulic, he allows for ways of manipulating the nature of the torrents and leaves room for the intellect to choose between competing drives (e.g. D 109, KSA 3, 96–99).

tain actions in their parents and copy their reactions.³⁹ Eventually practice makes specific feelings habitual and one learns to provide reasons for one's emotions. Nietzsche critically suggests that these reasons all too often only serve to justify emotional reactions after they take place, so in many cases habitual feelings are prior to any rational judgements. (D 34, KSA 3, 43) This, however, does not mean that feelings are not judgements, which becomes clear in the following aphorism that develops the theme:

35. *Feelings and their origination in judgments.* – 'Trust your feelings!' – But feelings are nothing final or original; behind feelings there stand judgments and evaluations which we inherit in the form of feelings (inclinations, aversions). The inspiration born of a feeling is the grandchild of a judgment – and often of a false judgment! – and in any event not a child of your own! To trust one's feelings – means to give more obedience to one's grandfather and grandmother and their grandparents than to the gods which are in us: our reason and our experience. (Hollingdale transl./Clark and Leiter 1997, 36; D 35, KSA 3, 43–44)

If there is one aphorism above others in Nietzsche that could be said to reflect Solomon's view of emotions as judgements then this would be it. The aphorism clearly states that feelings are judgements, but there is something that is even more important here. Firstly, Nietzsche claims that feelings are inherited. The relation between feelings and judgements is also familial; the inspiration that derives from feelings is a grandchild of a judgement [*Enkelkind eines Urtheils*]. The addition that the judgement that "one's" feeling depends on is not one's own, but of one's grandfather, grandmother and their grandparents, hammers the point home. While I think that it is reasonably clear that Nietzsche here primarily means to point to the historical dimension of feelings, to the cultural transmission described in the previous aphorism, the metaphor of inheritance is potentially misleading. The problem is that as Nietzsche does not specify the manner of inheritance, it cannot be ruled out that he also considers a biological transmission of acquired characteristics to be possible.⁴⁰ The second important point that merits commentary is the final suggestion that trusting one's feelings means obeying the human past instead of obeying one's own reason and experience. If the use of reason, which I take to entail conscious deliberation, had no power over the affects and no power to guide action,

39 "Ersichtlich werden moralische Gefühle so übertragen, dass die Kinder bei den Erwachsenen starke Neigungen und Abneigungen gegen bestimmte Handlungen wahrnehmen und dass sie als geborene Affen diese Neigungen und Abneigungen nachmachen" (D 34, KSA 3, 43).

40 The view that acquired characteristics could be passed on from one generation to the next, associated with the name of Lamarck, remained widespread even after Darwin's theory gained ground. Nietzsche seems at times to have taken this idea very seriously as scientific fact (see Schacht 2013; for an opposite view see Clark 2013). This is not much of a problem for philosophical work that draws on Nietzsche, since passages that invite a Lamarckian interpretation can fairly easily be reread in terms of cultural transmission. It does however pose problems for a reading of Nietzsche's thinking that aims for historical accuracy.

it would be strange for Nietzsche to raise such a criticism. All in all, the aphorism fits Solomon's view that one is in some sense responsible for one's judgements, but it also complicates the picture by opening up a historical dimension.

In aphorism 38, Nietzsche seeks to draw attention to the way in which moral judgements transform drives. He opens the aphorism by claiming that the same drive, which in one cultural context expresses itself as a feeling of cowardice, can in a culture shaped by Christian morality become a pleasant feeling of humility. In themselves drives are immoral and only through moral judgements do they really become the feelings and emotions that we speak of. So moral judgements shape drives and give them a second nature [*zweite Natur*]. After making this initial point, Nietzsche devotes the remainder of the aphorism to historical examples. These examples are cursory and amount to little more than mere claims (to the effect) that the ancient Greeks felt both jealousy and hope differently than we do and that the Jews of the time of the prophets felt wrath as something divine.⁴¹ (D 38, KSA 3, 45–46)

What is important is that Nietzsche speaks of drives as malleable. This foreshadows his discussion of the drives in his following work, *The Gay Science*. There Nietzsche explicitly states that consciousness is a fairly recent development within organic lifeforms and that therefore it is still weak (GS 11, KSA 3, 382). Consciousness itself, he thus presumes, springs forth from the operation of the organism and its drives. Nevertheless, he suggests that conscious experience and thought can alter the nature of the drives and perhaps even give birth to new drives under the right circumstances. Far from intending to deny the reality of consciousness, Nietzsche's criticism of the overvaluation of consciousness, his criticism of the idea that we already fully have consciousness, is meant to spur us to become more conscious (GS 11, KSA 3, 383). What follows for Nietzsche is a grand task to "incorporate knowledge" and to review all normative judgements, in order to open up new ways of affirming life (cf. Franco 2011, 101–103). That, however, is a story beyond the scope of our discussion here (see chapter 5), so let us try to return to the question concerning the role of choice in emotional experience.

Not only does Nietzsche acknowledge that under specific circumstances "emotions" might resist conscious control, appear to us as torrents and thereby restrict choice. He also implies that there is a more fundamental irrationality constraining what affective response one can choose. Nietzsche never systematically elaborates the implications of his historical perspective on the issue that today is put in terms of emotions and choice, but some implications are clear enough to be summar-

⁴¹ In the Heidelberg-commentary on *D*, Jochen Schmidt helpfully points out that Nietzsche's examples about the Greeks rely on extreme overgeneralization; in fact, he presents Hesiod's rather personal view as the collective view of the Greeks. Nietzsche's example about the Israelites is similarly misleading (Schmidt and Kaufmann 2015, 128–132). This of course need not impact the philosophical point Nietzsche is trying to make, as there are very good reasons to think that the experience of emotions is shaped by historical forces; indeed, this is a trivial starting point for any history of emotions (cf. Plamper 2015).

ized thus: One cannot invent new feelings for any given situation and choose to feel whatever one wants. Most of our everyday affects are the results of untold years of natural and cultural history. One can choose not to let a “torrent” rage, but one cannot choose not to have affects at all. Choosing against one affect means choosing or giving into another affect. Being human means being affective, being in a mood. Besides disruptive or strong episodes of feeling, there is also always a background affectivity or mood structuring our perceptions and influencing choice even beyond the choice of emotions. Both the affects in the strict sense and background affectivity are mutable and the conscious cultivation of mood is possible. One should still not overestimate the power of consciousness, especially not that of the individual, for it is rare indeed in history that entirely new forms or directions of the emotions appear and leave a lasting legacy.

3.6 Conclusion

Returning to Solomon, one can conclude that he detects a real tension in Nietzsche’s understanding of affective life, which has went unnoticed by scholars of Nietzsche’s philosophy who tend to accept some form of drive theory without question (cf. Dries and Kail 2015).⁴² The desire to resolve the tension is understandable. Still, Solomon goes too far by imposing a foreign framework onto Nietzsche; thereby correcting him with a more “existentialist” theory of emotions. This is insofar unproblematic, as Solomon is mostly concerned with reclaiming Nietzsche as an advocate of the passionate life (Solomon 2003, 3–5). For a contextual interpretation of Nietzsche’s psychological thinking the tension presents a major challenge. Must one conclude that Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology is just hopelessly confused and contradictory?

One can and must of course concede that Nietzsche’s statements are confusing. This need not mean that his psychological thought is hopelessly confused. There is a real philosophical and existential problem at the basis of this confusion; it is a confusion that concerns the relation between nature, history and consciousness. The tension in Nietzsche’s thinking about feeling is best not conceived of as one between a hydraulic and an existentialist model but rather as a tension between historical forces and the power of consciousness. Therefore, one should be careful not to reject an inquiry into Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology as fruitless outright on account of his contradictory statements, and instead inquire into the problem. So let us ask one final time: does Nietzsche think that consciousness is epiphenomenal? I have suggested that for Nietzsche, the decisive issue is rather one of the relative strength

⁴² Perhaps it would be more diplomatic if not more accurate to say that this tension in Nietzsche’s understanding of affectivity has been overshadowed by an overtly abstract debate on Nietzsche’s fatalism in general and his epiphenomenalism in philosophical psychology. That scholars and philosophers writing on Nietzsche tend to disregard all criticism of drive theories is nevertheless the main issue, and this justifies the polemical statement here.

of consciousness and of conscious thought compared to that of the drives and the power of history that they represent. That this solution to the problem of Nietzsche's purported epiphenomenalism goes some way towards explaining the prevalence of discussions about feeling in Nietzsche's philosophical writings is evident, for it follows that the life of feeling is a privileged domain between more or less unconscious drives and more or less conscious thought; a sign of the tension between body and embodied spirit. Nietzsche's position is one that might or might not be attractive to contemporary philosophers. What matters here is that Nietzsche can plausibly be thought to have held such a view, and that this assumption is a good starting place for a contextual interpretation of his writings. Further evidence that Nietzsche in fact espoused such a view will be presented in the following chapters, along with discussions of the reasons that led him in the direction of developing such a view. Now it here only remains to outline the approach taken in the following chapters.

I would suggest that the tension in question is best explored on two levels; by taking account both of 1) Nietzsche's explicit psychological statements on the life of feeling and especially those statements dealing with the historical dimensions of feelings as well as the possibility of new configurations of feeling, and 2) his use of style, and of a variety of artistic means, in his writings in order to communicate mood and thereby open up new possibilities for philosophical thinking. In the following chapters, I limit my discussion by focusing primarily on Nietzsche's criticism of religion in the light of his communication of mood. This strategy is justified firstly because of the outstanding place that religion has in Nietzsche's writings both as inspiration and as target of critique and secondly because it allows to solve central problems in the scholarly literature on Nietzsche (as presented in the introduction of the study). To conclude: If Nietzsche's psychological thinking has played a marginal role in continental scholarship, Anglophone scholarship has been one-sided and obsessed with those aspects of his psychological thinking that are close to concerns in contemporary philosophy of mind and action. This focus has not resulted in a total neglect of mood, but it has subordinated the discussion about felt experience to the discussion about Nietzsche's assumed theory of drives. My question, the question of the historical dimension of affective phenomena and the possibilities of shaping the future of emotional experience, has been almost altogether neglected, although it is arguably of utmost importance to understanding Nietzsche's critical project concerning morality and religion. As I noted, Nietzsche never defines the concept of drive in his published work. Given the results of the investigation thus far, it is nevertheless worth noting, that when Nietzsche does define the closely related term instinct in a note from 1881, he speaks of instinct as a judgement that has become embodied.⁴³ This is of no small importance, for the evidence certainly points in the direction that Nietzsche thinks one can learn to judge differently.

⁴³ "Ich rede von Instinkt, wenn irgend ein Urtheil (Geschmack in seiner untersten Stufe) einverleibt ist" (NL 1881, 11[164], KSA 9, 505).