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7 Islands in Turmoil: The Azores during the Atlantic Revolutionary Cycle

During the Age of Revolutions,¹ perhaps one of the most unexpected and visible consequences of the Napoleonic Wars was the dramatic respatialization of the Portuguese Atlantic world. Following the invasion of the Portuguese metropolitan territory by the French army in November 1807, the Portuguese court departed from Lisbon and moved to the city of Rio de Janeiro, the capital of the viceroyalty of Brazil. The transfer of the court to Rio de Janeiro was a unique experience in the context of European polities, reframing the spatial hierarchies of the Portuguese Atlantic world and with multiple implications of political, institutional, economic, social, and cultural nature within the framework of the Portuguese Empire. In this chapter, I will present some of the consequences that these changes had upon the Atlantic insular territories of the Portuguese Empire, considering the specific case of the Azores. I am going to argue that the rupture that took place in 1807–1808 enhanced the agency of the political and social actors in the Azores and contributed to the failure of the Portuguese crown's project to enhance control over the Azorean Atlantic periphery.

Enlightened Reforms, the Portuguese Empire, and the Azores

Recent scholarship on “the long eighteenth century” has offered illuminating discussions and an important reappraisal of the relationship between Enlightenment and absolutism, namely by placing Southern Europe and its Atlantic colonies in the debate on the impact of the so-called “enlightened reforms”. In this context, Portugal and its overseas dominions benefit from this reorientation and from a comparative framework. Although an important reform activity occurred before 1750, it was in the second half of the eighteenth

¹ W. Klooster, *Revolutions in the Atlantic World. A Comparative History*, New York: New York University Press, 2009; D. Armitage and S. Subrahmanyam (eds.), *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760–1840*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; M.A. McDonnell, “Rethinking the Age of Revolution”, *Atlantic Studies*, 13 (2016) 3, pp. 301–314.

century that the bulk of political and institutional reforms took place.² Under José I (1750–1777) and the first decades of Maria I's reign (1777–1816), the Portuguese crown attempted to “rationalize” the institutional framework and the many jurisdictional levels encompassing the relationship between the imperial centre and far-flung peripheries establishing a stronger political control over the empire. However, despite these efforts, by the early years of the nineteenth century the political culture of the Ancien Régime continued to operate within the Portuguese pluricontinental monarchy. In spite of late eighteenth-century imperial reforms, the projects of reordering the Portuguese imperial territories, the rhetoric of unity, and the debates about the crown prerogatives – like in most, if not all, empires – political and social interactions as well as legal order within the borders of the Portuguese Empire were rooted in the foundational principles of corporate government and legal pluralism, with many blurred and overlapping jurisdictions.³ The “constitutional order” of empires was highly unstable and Portugal was no exception. Although all the Portuguese possessions were conceived as a unified political system, in fact, and as A.R. Disney puts it, “the Portuguese empire was an extraordinarily widespread and dispersed entity, only loosely held together – a complex patchwork of disparate parts.”⁴ Thus, in the process of imposing political order and imperial authority negotiation and jurisdictional arrangements were a key element in the interaction between the political centres and the imperial peripheries.⁵

² In the historiography written in English about this period, the works of the British historian Kenneth Robert Maxwell are perhaps the most frequently quoted. On the secretary of King José I, Sebastião José de Carvalho and Melo, better known by the title of marquis of Pombal, see K.R. Maxwell, *Pombal, Paradox of the Enlightenment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. For criticism of Kenneth Maxwell's view, see Nuno Gonçalo Monteiro's review in *e-Journal of Portuguese History*, 11 (2013) 1, pp. 110–119. On the reforms in Southern European polities and their Atlantic colonies, see G. Paquette (ed.), *Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750–1830*, Farnham: Ashgate, 2009, and especially Nuno Gonçalo Monteiro's chapter for the Portuguese case, “Pombal's Government: Between Seventeenth-Century *Valido* and Enlightened Models”, pp. 321–338. See also N.G. Monteiro, “Reformas Pombalinas e Reformas Bourbônicas nas Américas: Esboço de uma Análise Comparada”, in: Â. Garrido, L.F. Costa and L. M. Duarte (eds.), *Estudos em Homenagem a Joaquim Romero Magalhães. Economia, Instituições e Império*, Coimbra: Almedina, 2012, pp. 373–390.

³ L. Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; L. Benton and R.J. Ross (eds.), *Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500–1850*, New York and London: New York University Press, 2013.

⁴ A.R. Disney, *A History of Portugal and the Portuguese Empire. From Beginnings to 1807*, vol. 2: *The Portuguese Empire*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. xix.

⁵ C. Daniels and M.V. Kennedy (eds.), *Negotiated Empires: Centres and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500–1820*, London: Routledge, 2002.

In the Portuguese imperial context, the political and jurisdictional status of the islands of the Azores remained somewhat indefinite throughout most of the early modern period. As I already developed elsewhere, two factors help to understand this situation.⁶ Firstly, the archipelago did not have a political-administrative unity for centuries. Indeed, although the islands of the present-day eastern and central groups had been donated to Prince Henry the Navigator at an unknown date and remained in possession of the ducal house of Viseu-Beja until 1497, when Manuel I, the last duke and king since 1495, combined them into the assets of the crown, the islands of Flores and Corvo had belonged to a lordship other than the king since 1452. In 1593, they passed to the lordship of Mascarenhas, the counts of Santa Cruz, and then to the sixth count, Martinho de Mascarenhas, also marquises of Gouveia.⁷ Only in 1759, after the execution of the eighth count of Santa Cruz and duke of Aveiro, José de Mascarenhas, and the consequent seizure of all his assets by the Portuguese crown, the islands of Flores and Corvo finally became a part of the crown's assets. Secondly, in addition to the geographical dimension – the fragmentation and, above all, the distance, which sometimes led to the cartographic representation of Flores and Corvo as the Floreiras Islands, that is to say a geographical unit distinct from the islands of Terceiras or of the Azores – the fact that two political-institutional realities coexisted, the royal islands and the lordship islands, prevented the Azorean insular space from being a single political-administrative unit.⁸

In 1766, the establishment of the Captaincy General of the Azores by the Decrees of 2 August, signed by José I but drafted by the Secretary of State Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo (count of Oeiras since 1759), undoubtedly

6 J.D. Rodrigues, "Um arquipélago de geometria variável: representações dos Açores no período moderno", *Revista de História Regional*, Ponta Grossa, 13 (2008) 1, pp. 7–22 [URL: <http://www.revistas.uepg.br/index.php?journal=rhr>], reprinted in J.D. Rodrigues, *Histórias Atlânticas: os Açores na primeira modernidade*, Ponta Delgada: CHAM, 2012, pp. 33–43.

7 On the donataries (*donatários*) of Flores and Corvo and, in particular, the Mascarenhas, see *Arquivo dos Açores*, facsimile edition of the original edition, Ponta Delgada: University of the Azores, vol. 1, 1980, pp. 21–28, and vol. 5, 1981, pp. 275–276, 353–358 and 517–527.

8 Accordingly, by analysing the circuits and flows of people and goods as well as assessing the peculiar behaviour of São Miguel within the Azorean context, one can state that there was not a great degree of liaison between São Miguel and the remaining islands, in particular those of the central and western groups: "The relative economic independence of S. Miguel and the peripheral location of the eastern group within the archipelago hinder the appreciation of inter-island trade from the point of view of the people of S. Miguel, who were more interested in dealing with Lisbon, England and Overseas" (cf. Avelino de Freitas de Meneses, *Os Açores nas encruzilhadas de Setecentos (1740–1770)*, vol. 2: *Economia*, Ponta Delgada: University of the Azores, 1995, p. 165). In this context, the lack of political-institutional unity was reinforced by the non-existence of a full economic articulation between all islands.

marked a rupture in the political and institutional history of the archipelago.⁹ One must emphasize that the reforms that the count of Oeiras thought up for the Azores need to be framed within, on the one hand, within the national conjuncture – an economic and public finance crisis, which would demand the attention of the authorities, especially in the years 1764 to 1770 – and within the international conjuncture; and, on the other hand, within the context of the implementation of a new administrative paradigm, structured in the “police science” of a cameralistic matrix, which proposed a model of active administration that best met the urgencies of the state.¹⁰ Thus, as in the kingdom, in the Azorean case it was not in the matrix of an “enlightened despotism” that we should seek the eventual elements of the “modernity” of Pombalism, but in its active reformism of cameralistic inspiration¹¹ and in the attempt to break with a “passive” administrative model and the traditional balance of powers.¹²

Regarding the political status of the islands, they held equal status to the provinces of the Kingdom of Portugal. In the secret special instructions sent to the first captain-general of the Azores, Antão de Almada, there was concern for the need to investigate the reason for the suspension of the collection of certain taxes in the archipelago, the *décima*,¹³ being the islands of the Azores “adjacent

9 On the ambitious set of measures designed for the Azores and set forward in the diplomas of 2 August 1766, see J.G. Reis Leite, “Administração, sociedade e economia dos Açores, 1766–1793”, in: *Arquivo Açoriano. Enciclopédia das Ilhas dos Açores*, vol. 16, Part 2, Fascicles 14–23, 1971, pp. 267–368; vol. 16, Part 3, Fascicles 24–35, 1972, pp. 369–475; and A. de Freitas de Meneses, *Os Açores*, vol. 1: *Poderes e Instituições*, 1993.

10 J. Subtil, “Os poderes do centro. Governo e administração”, in: A.M. Hespanha (coord.) and J. Mattoso (ed.), *O Antigo Regime (1620–1807), História de Portugal IV*, Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 1993, pp. 157–193, esp. 159–163 for “police state”. On the concept of “police”, see P. Schiera, “The ‘police’ as a synthesis of order and welfare in the modern centralised State”, in: A.M. Hespanha (ed.), *Poderes e Instituições na Europa do Antigo Regime. Colectânea de textos*, Lisbon: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1984, pp. 307–319.

11 J.L. Cardoso considers that the Austrian-German cameralism must be included in the doctrinal and political inspirations that fostered an environment conducive to change in the context of the enlightened reformism that characterized the governance of Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo (cf. J.L. Cardoso, “Direito natural e despotismo legal: a ordem e o discurso fisiocrático em Portugal”, in: *Pensar a Economia em Portugal – Digressões Históricas*, Lisbon: Difel, 1997, pp. 119–135, esp. 127).

12 On this issue, see J.D. Rodrigues, “*Para o socego e tranquilidade publica das Ilhas*”: Fundamentos, ambição e limites das reformas pombalinas nos Açores”, *Tempo* 11 (2006) 21, pp. 157–183.

13 The *décima* was an income tax introduced in 1641 just after the coup d’état of 1 December 1640 (the Restoration) in order to help the effort of the coming war (the War of Independence [1641–1668]). On the war, see F.D. Costa, *A Guerra da Restauração (1641–1668)*, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 2004; on the taxation system in the Azores, see J.D. Rodrigues, “As

to this kingdom” and therefore being a part of it, “provinces, like the others of Beira, Minho, or Alentejo, without any kind of difference”.¹⁴ With this change in the status of the archipelago, justified by its adjacency to the kingdom, the Azores definitively abandoned their position as an overseas domain and a manorial administrative model that had been implemented when it was settled.

The new political and legal status of the Azorean islands would be reaffirmed in the text of the important Charter of 26 February 1771 regarding the freedom of trade in cereals. In that statute, the legislator declared that the *liberdades* (liberties) enjoyed by the farmers of the kingdom should also be observed in the Azores, “as regards the police and economy in the said islands, which because they are adjacent are considered as parts and real provinces of this kingdom”.¹⁵ However, this new condition would not immediately bring benefits to the archipelago, which maintained its island specificity and was still far from the court.¹⁶

The political-administrative map drawn up with the creation of the Captaincy General of the Azores remained in force until the early 1830s. However, the Azores did not escape the shock waves of the 1807–1808 rupture in the Portuguese Atlantic world. As such, one of the most visible effects of the moving of the court to Rio de Janeiro and the uncertainties regarding the hierarchical structure that would prevail in the Portuguese Atlantic world was the fact that the archipelago returned to an undefined status for years to come. In the following, I present some of the political and administrative results of the 1807/08

Finanças”, in: A.T. de Matos (coord.), *A Colonização Atlântica*, vol. 3 of *Nova História da Expansão Portuguesa*, Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 2005, pp. 428–445.

14 J.G. Reis Leite (ed.), *O Códice 529-Açores do Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino. A Capitania-Geral dos Açores durante o consulado pombalino*, Ponta Delgada: Secretaria Regional de Educação e Cultura/Direcção Regional dos Assuntos Culturais-Universidade dos Açores/Centro de Estudos Gaspar Frutuoso, 1988, pp. 35–58, “Instrucção Secretissima, que Vossa Magestade Ha por bem mandar dar a Dom Antão de Almada [. . .]”, 2 August 1766, esp. 54.

15 A.D. da Silva, *Collecção da Legislação Portuguesa desde a ultima Compilação das Ordenações, redegida pelo Desembargador Antonio Delgado da Silva. Legislação de 1763 a 1774*, Lisbon: in Typografia Maigrense, 1829, pp. 534–536, esp. 535; *Arquivo dos Açores*, vol. 5, 1981, pp. 342–344, esp. 343.

16 On these issues, see F.F. Drummond, *Apontamentos Topográficos, Políticos, Civis e Ecclesiásticos para a História das nove Ilhas dos Açores servindo de suplemento aos Anais da Ilha Terceira*, with an introductory study, reading, text editing, and contents by J.G. Reis Leite, Angra do Heroísmo: Instituto Histórico da Ilha Terceira, 1990, pp. 45–46; F.A. Mendes, “Crédito, Moeda e Fiscalidade em Ponta Delgada (1766–1800)”, synthesis paper prepared within the scope of Educational Aptitude and Scientific Capacity Assessments, Ponta Delgada: University of the Azores, 1995, pp. 73–77.

rupture for the Azores, an issue that I believe is not very well known. I will focus my attention on the local power relations and, in particular, on the political communication between the captain-generals and the crown in the tropics and on the uncertainties and changes regarding the status of the islands, uncertainties that were put into use by the players involved.

The Azores and the 1807/08 Rupture in the Luso-Brazilian Empire

Two major events marked the international developments of the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the first two decades of the nineteenth century, which had direct implications for Portuguese diplomacy and political life: the American Revolution together with the War of Independence (1776–1783), and the French Revolution (1789) together with its political and military consequences, namely the Napoleonic Wars and the revolution in and independence of Haiti. The shock waves produced by the events in France during the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods had great repercussions.¹⁷ Within the Atlantic area, there were the slave uprisings – between 1789 and 1832, several uprisings were recorded and more than 20 were rooted in the rumour that the slaves had been freed; the independence of Haiti, declared in 1804 and a logical consequence of the slave uprising of 1791 and the proclamation of the abolition of slavery by Victor Hugues, whose decree was approved by the National Convention in France on 4 February 1794; the undeclared war, or quasi-war, between the United States of America and France in 1798–1800; the Napoleonic Wars; the transfer of the Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro in 1807/08, which introduced a radical change in the political and economic framework of the Luso-Brazilian empire; and the independence of the Spanish colonies of the Americas, a result of the French invasions.

The French invasion and occupation of the Kingdom of Portugal led to the transfer of the Portuguese royalty to Brazil and the settlement of Prince Regent João and the Portuguese royal family in the city of Rio de Janeiro in 1808. The respatialization of the Luso-Brazilian empire was a unique moment in the history of the Atlantic world and of the Portuguese monarchy. In fact, until that year never before had a European ruler set foot in the Americas.

¹⁷ Cf. J. Godechot, *France and the Atlantic Revolution of the Eighteenth Century, 1770–1799*, New York: The Free Press, 1965, p. 145.

Furthermore, as Rio de Janeiro became the new seat of the Portuguese monarchy, the political and economic core of the empire merged into just one. Even before reaching Rio de Janeiro, while in the city of Salvador da Bahia, by the Royal Letter of 28 January 1808, Prince Regent João authorized the opening of the Brazilian ports to foreign navigation, a measure that profoundly changed the conditions of Portuguese foreign trade.¹⁸ Between 1796 and 1811, Brazilian commodities accounted for 60 per cent of Portuguese trade with other European markets. Following the French invasion in 1807, during the years 1808–1813 Portuguese trade faced a severe commercial crisis. The radical shift in the long lasting relationship that existed between Portugal and Brazil broke the “colonial pact” and transformed “metropolitan” subjects into “colonial” subjects, with the Kingdom of Portugal now a colony of a colony, as Patrick Wilcken suggests¹⁹; this shift eventually led to the end of the Luso-Brazilian empire, with the independence of Brazil in 1822. Hence, even before the end of the Peninsular War (1807–1814), the Luso-Brazilian Atlantic world was already operating within a new political and economic framework.

In the Azores, the years 1807/08 were also a rupture. On the one hand, by decision of the governor and captain-general of the Azores, Miguel António de Melo, the opening of the ports of Brazil led to the end of the legal constraints of the Azorean trade in its relations with Portuguese America²⁰; on the other hand, and as in the past, the islands acquired significant importance in the geopolitical panorama of the Portuguese Empire. Faced with the Napoleonic threat, the captain-general sought the protection of the English fleet to police the Azorean seas, where there were no local means to oppose the French

18 J.M. Viana Pedreira, *Estrutura industrial e mercado colonial: Portugal e Brasil (1780–1830)*, Lisbon: Difel, 1994, pp. 317–340; V. Alexandre, *Os Sentidos do Império. Questão Nacional e Questão Colonial na Crise do Antigo Regime Português*, Porto: Afrontamento Editions, 1993, pp. 167–285 and 767–792; L. Valente de Oliveira and R. Ricupero (eds.), *A Abertura dos Portos*, São Paulo: Editora Senac São Paulo, 2007; R. de Mattos, “Versões e interpretações: revisitando a historiografia sobre a abertura dos portos brasileiros (1808)”, *HISTORELo. Revista de Historia Regional y Local*, 9 (2017) 17, pp. 473–505. For a synthesis of the period, see A. Slemian and J. P.G. Pimenta, *A corte e o mundo: uma história do ano em que a família real portuguesa chegou ao Brasil*, São Paulo: Alameda, 2008; G. Paquette, *Imperial Portugal in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions: the Luso-Brazilian World, c. 1770–1850*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 84–163.

19 P. Wilcken, “‘A Colony of a Colony’. The Portuguese Royal Court in Brazil”, *Common Knowledge* 11 (2005) 2, pp. 249–263.

20 R.M. Madruga da Costa, *Os Açores em finais do regime de Capitania-Geral (1800–1820)*, Horta: Núcleo Cultural da Horta, 2005, vol. 1, pp. 301–307.

corsairs preying on those waters.²¹ Nevertheless, considering the situation in the Kingdom of Portugal and the blockade of the Tagus and Douro rivers by the English navy,²² the governor instructed that no merchant ship would be allowed to set sail to the Portuguese coast from any Azorean port. In a context of greater isolation, Miguel António de Melo also took the initiative to suspend the royal legislation in force in order to cut ties with the kingdom, turning the Azores into a space where the Bragança dynasty was sovereign. The governor chose to favour maintaining a communication channel with the court in Rio de Janeiro, with the defensive support of Great Britain while taking advantage of the stopovers of English ships at the port of Horta.²³

Thus, as a result of the changes affecting the political and spatial hierarchies within the Portuguese Atlantic, the Azores became a transatlantic border, a contact zone that guaranteed the mobility of Portuguese and English forces.²⁴ And, within this critical scenario, we must also remember the Azorean participation efforts to pay off the national debt. Although the archipelago was “an accidental taxpayer against the terms of a convention to which, of course, it did not wish to be associated”, the islands contributed to this end with several remittances between 1809 and 1819 and also with the sending of shipments of *roccella tinctoria* (a fungus used for making dyes), whose value came to nearly 12 *contos de réis*.²⁵

In the Azores, one of the most immediate and visible consequences of the departure of the Portuguese court and the superior courts of the monarchy to Brazil was the interruption of the arrival of the lists of the Desembargo do Paço (Royal High Court), which contained the names of new local officials, allowing several officials to stay in power. On another point, and in general, the figure of the captain-general became more present and active at a time when the Azorean

21 R.M. Madruga da Costa, “As Invasões Francesas e a transferência da Coroa Portuguesa para o Brasil: algumas repercussões nos Açores”, *Arquipélago-história*, 2nd Series, 3 (1999), pp. 275–324.

22 J.-A. Junot, *Diário da I Invasão Francesa*, introduction by A. Ventura, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 2008, pp. 116, 120, 121, 125, 128, 133, 148, 149, 161, 175 and 182 (from December 1807 to June 1808).

23 R.M. Madruga da Costa, “Guerra Peninsular, Conjuntura Transatlântica e seu impacto nos Açores”, in *O Papel das Ilhas do Atlântico na Criação do Contemporâneo*, Proceedings of the 5th International Colloquium on the History of the Atlantic Islands, Angra do Heroísmo: Historical Institute of Island of Terceira, 2000, pp. 97–104; A. Canas, “Governar Portugal na Guerra peninsular: um desafio atlântico”, *Ler História* 54 (2008), pp. 75–93, esp. 77.

24 R.M. Madruga da Costa, “Faial, 1808–1810; Um tempo memorável”, *Boletim do Núcleo Cultural da Horta* 11 (1996), pp. 135–284.

25 Madruga da Costa, *Os Açores em finais do regime de Capitania-Geral*, vol. 1, pp. 430–438.

islands were again called to play a central role. In fact, the years that followed 1807/08 witnessed a change in the power relations between the municipalities and the captain-general²⁶ and also between the captain-general and other agents of power present in the archipelago, especially the crown magistrates, giving rise to a frequent and negative conflict in the relations between institutions.

Upon the settlement of the Portuguese court in Rio de Janeiro in 1808, Azorean politics was marked by “some anarchy in the organic connection of dependence of the captaincy-general on the central power”.²⁷ Of course, this is not a surprising scenario, as the change of the political centre of the Portuguese Empire from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro marked the beginning of a vast process of reform and administrative reorganization, beginning with Portuguese America and, in particular, the city of Rio de Janeiro itself, “which was thus transformed into the place of power by excellence”.²⁸ Adding to the distance – which also meant time – and the lack of communication, the transformation of the capital of the State of Brazil into the capital of the Portuguese Empire temporarily placed the Azores in a temporal and spatial horizon even further away from the centre of power.

In this scenario, Miguel António de Melo soon understood that the transfer of the Portuguese court, the cabinet, and the royal courts to Brazil represented a transformation of the institutional and economic frameworks within which he had operated until then. In a letter dated 14 January 1808, he wrote to Domingos de Sousa Coutinho, the Portuguese envoy to London, informing him of the manner in which he had learned of the departure of the court – he had received the news while on São Miguel – and expressing his surprise regarding the establishment of a Board of Governors in Lisbon and doubts as to whether the jurisdiction

²⁶ The institutional and administrative changes would continue and, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, the hierarchies between municipalities would also change, with an impact on the local official structure: the Charter of 9 October 1817 annexed the villages of Lagoa and Água de Pau to the jurisdiction of the outside judge of Vila Franca do Campo, with the position of common judges being extinguished in both villages. Cf. Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo [National Archives of Torre do Tombo] (ANTT), *Desembargo do Paço*, Repartição da Corte, Estremadura e Ilhas [Office of the Court, Estremadura and Islands], file 1671, no. 1 (Água de Pau) and 2 (Lagoa).

²⁷ Madruga da Costa, *Os Açores em finais do regime de Capitania-Geral*, vol. 1, pp. 93–94.

²⁸ Â. Domingues, “Dom João, príncipe esclarecido e pai dos povos, e a fundação das colónias sueca de Sorocaba e suíça de Nova Friburgo”, in: Valente de Oliveira and Ricupero (eds.), *A Abertura dos Portos*, pp. 120–147, esp. 126.

of governors was extended to the Azores.²⁹ Three days later, in another letter, this time addressed to the viscount of Anadia,³⁰ the secretary of state for the navy and overseas, the captain-general presented his doubts concerning the possible obedience he owed to the governors of the kingdom and even sought to contribute to a clarification of the terminology of the administrative geography with regard to the concepts of “Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves”, “Adjacent Islands” – which would be the Azores, Madeira and Porto Santo – and “Overseas Domains”, comprising colonies south of Cape Bojador. In the same letter, the captain-general also raised the question of whether or not he could encourage, under the current conditions, the establishment of salt farms for local consumption and a rabbit hide hat factory for export and whether vessels that from then on would leave the islands to Brazil could transport foreign goods.³¹

The captain-general of the Azores showed to have a clear and correct understanding of the process that was underway, while at the same time he placed himself in a position of refusing to be subordinated to the jurisdiction of the governors of the kingdom. In a later letter to the viscount of Anadia, dated 1 March 1808, he wrote, in a more alarmed tone, that the current situation of calamity prevented “on these islands the ordinary course of Civil Procedures that are handled by the Court, as it is unknown to where the appeals filed should be forwarded to [. . .]. This uncertainty vexes the peoples, and distresses them.” Mentioning that he already knew, when he went to the Azores in 1806, that forensic affairs had been in a state of disarray for years and that crimes were not being punished, he asked to be given competencies such as the ones practiced in other captaincies – for example, the courts of Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, and the State of India – while also giving suggestions to standardize forensic, civil, and criminal matters in the name of the proper course of justice.³² In a letter dated 12 July of the same year, the viscount of Anadia informed the captain-general that the prince regent had established several higher courts in Rio de Janeiro and that the jurisdiction of the courts of Lisbon had been transferred

²⁹ Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Regional de Angra do Heroísmo [Public Library and Regional Archives of Angra do Heroísmo] (BPARAH), Capitania Geral dos Açores [Captaincy General of the Azores] (CGA), Book 5 of the registry of orders of the General Government of the Azores (1806–1808), fls. 232 v-235.

³⁰ João Rodrigues de Sá e Mello de Menezes e Sottomayor (Aveiro, 1755–Rio de Janeiro, 1809), first viscount of Anadia (1786) and first count of Anadia (1808).

³¹ BPARAH, CGA, Book 3 of the accounts register of the General Government of the Azores for the State Secretariats (1806–1808), fls. 234–235.

³² BPARAH, CGA, Book 3 of the accounts register of the General Government of the Azores for the State Secretariats (1806–1808), fls. 246 v-250 v.

to the newly created courts “and the same applied to the forensic affairs”.³³ Thus, the bases were laid so that, despite their “adjacency” to the kingdom, the islands communicated preferentially with Brazil.

The leading role of the captain-general was also reflected in the insular military government. Following the invasion of Portugal by the French, Miguel Pereira Forjaz, the minister of war, foreigner affairs and the navy, carried out the reform of the Portuguese army, putting into practice decisions and regulations that had been decided since 1803. The reform finally materialized in 1808, mainly by means of the Public Notice of 30 September, of the Decree of 11 December, which determined a mass population survey, and the Charter of 20 December, which re-established the militia regiments.³⁴ However, in the Azores, the captain-general understood that the Charter of 20 December could not be applied to the archipelago without a royal order, as it was only meant for the territory of the Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves and the “European continent”.³⁵ He also suggested that 19 adaptations of administrative nature should be introduced in order to take into account the insular specificity.

In Rio de Janeiro, the court had already recognized that the situation in the Azores posed problems in relation to regular communication between the various levels of power and that it required a proper framework, particularly in relation to the military government of the islands. In this respect, the letter dated 22 July 1808 could not have been clearer. In response to the abuses committed by Miguel António de Melo’s predecessors in connection with appointments of assistants to the militia, the captain-general was ordered to obey the provisions of 12 December 1749 and 30 April 1785, “which will regulate similar provisions in the continent of Brazil”. Furthermore, in relation to the individuals presented by the insular municipalities to the offices of the local ordinance companies, “because of the great distance of those islands to the capital that I chose for my residence”, which prevented the complete observance of the Charter of 18 October 1709, the prince regent determined that the governor and captain-general of the Azores would thereafter draft the respective letters of nomination of the ordinance officers, whose approval would be

33 Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Regional de Ponta Delgada [Public Library and Regional Archives of Ponta Delgada] (BPARPD), Arquivo da Câmara de Ponta Delgada [Archive of the Municipality of Ponta Delgada] (ACPD), Book 121, *Livro 7º do Registo (1799–1816)*, fls. 204–206.

34 A.P. Nunes, “A segunda invasão francesa”, in: M.T. Barata and N.S. Teixeira (eds.), *Nova História Militar de Portugal*, vol. 3, Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2004, pp. 73–89, esp. 75–76.

35 Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino [Overseas Historical Archive] (AHU), Conselho Ultramarino [Overseas Council] (CU), *Açores*, box 66, doc. 66.

later submitted to the confirmation of the Supreme Military Council, based in Rio de Janeiro.³⁶ As greater autonomy was granted to the captain-general, his connection with Rio de Janeiro, and not with Lisbon, was confirmed, which in fact met the strategy of Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, who, from the new court, intended to avoid maintaining or creating a centre of power in the Kingdom of Portugal. It is therefore not surprising that the Regency Council in Lisbon complained in subsequent years that it had no “authority whatsoever” over the Azores and Madeira.³⁷

In sum, if the disturbances arising from the transfer of the Portuguese royal court affected the normal functioning of the institutions while the peoples felt vexed in matters of justice, it is also true that Miguel António de Melo was able to collect dividends from the new Luso-Brazilian Atlantic world political map. Supported by the decisions of the prince regent and his ministers, he extended his jurisdiction despite being aware of the accusations that could be made against him, as he stated when addressing the viscount of Anadia:

I do not wish to remind you of these and other affairs because I hope that the Prince Regent Our Lord will extend the jurisdiction he entrusted on me, but because His Royal Service greatly matters, that those affairs are not halted on these islands, being so slow as it is the one that R.H. finds on the same islands.³⁸

With greater autonomy than that of the governors of the kingdom in Lisbon, Miguel António de Melo decided to implement several interim measures of provisional nature, which, benefiting from the state of affairs and the displacement of the political centre to Brazil, apparently contributed to a “greater governmental expression of the captaincy”.³⁹ Thus, in 1809, following orders from the court or on his own initiative, the captain-general published some diplomas that contributed to removing the Azores from the jurisdiction of the governors of the kingdom. In a letter dated 28 February, Miguel António de Melo, in reaction to a warning from the count of Anadia, ordered that the royal courts established in Rio de Janeiro govern all matters

³⁶ BPARPD, ACPD, Book 121, *Livro 7º do Registo (1799–1816)*, fls. 206–207 v. For a description of the captain-general in the jurisdiction of the municipalities after 1807, see M.L.L. Ananias, *(Es)paços do Concelho em Tempos de Mudança. Ponta Delgada: 1800–1834*, Master thesis in Insular and Atlantic History (15th–20th Centuries), Ponta Delgada: University of the Azores, 2000, pp. 66–67, 175–178 and 329–333.

³⁷ Canas, “Governar Portugal”, p. 83.

³⁸ BPARAH, CGA, Book 3 of the accounts register of the General Government of the Azores for the State Secretariats (1806–1808), fls. 255 v-256, letter dated 4 March 1808.

³⁹ Ananias, *(Es)paços do Concelho*, pp. 346.

relating to administrative matters.⁴⁰ Months later, in a long letter dated 23 June and addressed to the judge appointed by the king in São Jorge, regarding his rejection of a pardon for prisoners granted by the governors of the kingdom by the Decree of 7 October 1807, the captain-general affirmed his agreement with the position of the magistrate and rejected the jurisdiction of the governors over the islands, at least in matters of justice.⁴¹ Less than a month later, in a letter dated 18 July addressed to the bishop of the Azores, Miguel António de Melo stated that to date the prince regent had not authorized that the jurisdiction of governors was exercised on the islands and that he understood the contrary.⁴² As this matter was not clarified, during the next decade the captain-general would several times deny the jurisdiction of Lisbon over the islands.⁴³

Miguel António de Melo remained in office until he was replaced in September 1810. Allegedly, according to news circulated by an English newspaper, he would have fallen out of favour with the regency in Rio de Janeiro for having joined the pro-French party. It was argued that his assets had not been confiscated when the city of Lisbon was occupied in 1808, but the accusation proved to be false. The substitution of the captain-general was due to the fact that Miguel António de Melo was an advocate of a liberal ideology. And contrary to his predecessors, the governor did not return to Lisbon, opting to stay in Angra, owing to fear of being a victim of persecution on his return to the kingdom.⁴⁴

The new captain-general, Aires Pinto de Sousa Coutinho, was appointed on 15 December 1809, but he only arrived in the Azores in September of the following year, almost at the same time as the arrival of the *Amazona*, the frigate that, on 26 September 1810, docked in Angra carrying on board the regency

⁴⁰ In May 1808, the Court of Appeals of Rio de Janeiro became the Supreme Court and “all appeals and legal proceedings from the islands of Azores and Madeira, Bahia and northern Portuguese America should, as of now, be sent to Rio de Janeiro, which in terms of justice acquired complete autonomy from Portugal” (cf. Slemian and Pimenta, *A corte e o mundo*, p. 67).

⁴¹ BPARAH, CGA, Book 6 of the registry of orders of the General Government of the Azores (1808–1810), fls. 195–197; F.F. Drummond, *Anais da Ilha Terceira*, facsimile reprint of the edition of 1850–1864, Angra do Heroísmo: Secretaria Regional de Educação e Cultura, 1981, vol. 3, pp. 196–197.

⁴² BPARAH, CGA, Book 6 of the registry of orders of the General Government of the Azores (1808–1810), fls. 203–203 v.

⁴³ Madruga da Costa, *Os Açores em finais do regime de Capitania-Geral*, vol. 1, p. 95.

⁴⁴ F. d’Athaíde Machado de Faria e Maia, *Subsídios para a história de São Miguel e Terceira: Capitães-Generais, 1766–1831*, Ponta Delgada: Gráfica Regional, 1944, pp. 105–140.

deportees – the “setembrizados” – accused of having liberal ideas.⁴⁵ The governor, as well as his successor, Brigadier Francisco António de Araújo Azevedo, took several decisions that suggest that he was committed to the socioeconomic development of the islands. However, the captain-general still lacked the means to implement the original project of the Captaincy General of the Azores, and the failure of the “new” Board of the Royal Treasury contributed to the system’s “financial collapse”.⁴⁶

It should be recalled that the political and social structure of the Ancien Régime contributed to blocking some of the governors’ initiatives. It was not only the numerous conflicts of jurisdiction – which, arising from a regulatory vacuum, involved the military, extending a scenario that came from previous years – but also, despite the initiatives of the *regalismo josefino* (Josephine regalism),⁴⁷ the fact that local island elites remained influential, especially the nobles of the main Azorean senates (Angra and Ponta Delgada), controlling the political power at the local level and zealously defending their jurisdictional autonomy. Thus, contrary to some of the more confident statements of a couple of the captain-generals, the framework of the relationship between the Azorean political centre in Angra and the other island calls for a more “negotiated” vision of how the political authority was exercised.⁴⁸

In this context, it must be pointed out that for the Azores, one of the main consequences of the establishment of the court in Rio de Janeiro and of the hesitations regarding the hierarchical structure that would be in force in the Portuguese Atlantic was the lack of a defined status for the islands, which was observable in the following years, changes and hesitations that were used by the political players involved. Thus, in a letter dated 12 December 1814, the internal affairs officer of the district of Angra referred to the Charter of 26 February 1771, which defined the islands “as parts, and real provinces of the Kingdom of Portugal”, claiming it to be null and void by the provisions of the Charter of 7 January 1811, according to which “they must now be considered

45 R.M. Madruga da Costa, *Um deportado do “Amazonas”: monografia histórica, época liberal nos Açores, 1810–1834*, 2nd ed., Ponta Delgada: Tip. Fernando de Alcântara, 1930; J.D. Rodrigues (ed.), *O Atlântico Revolucionário: circulação de ideias e de elites no final do Antigo Regime*, Ponta Delgada: CHAM, 2012.

46 Madruga da Costa, *Os Açores em finais do regime de Capitania-Geral*, vol. 1, pp. 439–445.

47 N.G. Monteiro, *D. José*, 2nd ed., Lisbon: Temas e Debates, 2008; Paquette, *Imperial Portugal*, pp. 17–66; J.D. Rodrigues, “Um Tempo de Ruptura? (1750–1778)”, in: J.P. Oliveira e Costa, J.D. Rodrigues and P.A. Oliveira (eds.), *História da Expansão e do Império Português*, Lisbon: A Esfera dos Livros, 2014, pp. 264–295.

48 Daniels and Kennedy (eds.), *Negotiated Empires*.

adjacent to the State of Brazil rather than to the kingdom”, so that the ministers of the islands should receive the taxes meant for the settlements along the shores and in the hinterlands of South America.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, other players, at the same time, continued to defend the islands’ adjacency to Portugal.⁵⁰ In 1819, on the eve of the liberal revolution, Judge Alberto Carlos de Meneses, in his work *Pratica dos Tombos* (Practice of Registry), recorded the archipelago of the Azores, next to that of Madeira, both as “Adjacent Islands”.⁵¹

During the years of the French invasions, successive changes in the definition of the jurisdiction of crown-appointed officials, on the one hand, and in the establishment of hierarchies involving the judicial authorities based in the Azores and the royal courts, on the other, contributed to maximize problems that were rooted in the particularistic structure and the jurisdictional culture of the Ancien Régime. An example of this is the lack of definition of the justice affairs in mid-1810, which led the governor to write to the secretary of state, “requesting the necessary statements regarding the subjection of the Azores to courts of Portugal, for having not yet received any instructions in this respect”.⁵² The reply obtained by the Public Notice of 12 July 1810 stated that, except for forensic affairs, which should be channelled to the Supreme Court of Lisbon, all other matters fell within the jurisdiction of the courts of Rio de Janeiro.⁵³

However, not all the assertions were that clear. In this regard, Aires Pinto de Sousa Coutinho, writing on 9 October 1811 to the count de Galveias about the *Amazona* deportees, expressed the existing misunderstandings regarding the instructions he had received from Rio de Janeiro and Lisbon.⁵⁴ The misunderstanding also included conflicts concerning jurisdiction and the existence of different rulings from the courts established in Lisbon and in Rio de

49 BPARAH, CGA, Island of São Miguel, Nº. 16, Crown Magistrates– Correspondence (1814–1817), letter dated 12 December 1814.

50 BPARAH, CGA, Island of Terceira, Nº. 11, Crown Magistrates – Correspondence (1766–1818), representation of Fernando de Sá Viana, attorney of the tenant of the mills on Terceira, undated.

51 A.C. de Meneses, *Pratica dos Tombos, e Medições, marcações dos bens da Corôa, Fazenda Real, bens das Ordens Militares, ou Commendas, Morgados, Capellas, bens de Concelhos, Corporações Ecclesiasticas, Confrarias, Hospitaes, e de Casas particulares; até ao Proprietario, e Lavrador do menor Terreno; com a agrimensura, processo judicial, e formulario dos Livros do Tombo.*, Lisbon: In Impressão Regia, 1819, p. 280.

52 F.F. Drummond, *Anais da Ilha Terceira*, vol. 3, p. 199.

53 Ibid.

54 BPARAH, CGA, Book 5 of the accounts register of the General Government of the Azores for the State Secretariats (1811–1816), fls. 19 v-23 v.

Janeiro, which led the captain-general in 1815 to propose the creation of a Court of Appeals in the Azores, an initiative that had the support of several authorities.⁵⁵

Conflicts of jurisdiction were not limited to the opposition between the captain-generals, the governors of the kingdom, and the courts of Lisbon. There was also tension with military governors, especially those of the islands of São Miguel, Faial, and Pico, which were subject to the jurisdiction of the captain-general but which occasionally tried to assert their autonomy. An example is the case of the governor of São Miguel, who, in 1804, requested to have direct correspondence with the crown and to which the captain-general refused, presenting himself as the “only and first delegate of his royal highness”.⁵⁶ In a letter from the captain-general, the count of São Lourenço, addressed to the viscount of Anadia and dated 28 February 1805, the governor of São Miguel was accused of disobeying him and, appealing to the jurisdiction of the captain-general, was denounced as “indolent the intention of the governor when he requests to receive direct orders without going through the island of Terceira; which seems to have the purpose of shaking off the dependence owed to this government by other subordinates and all territorial parts of their district”.⁵⁷

If part of the friction was due to a regulatory gap,⁵⁸ by the middle of the second decade of the nineteenth century, Aires Pinto de Sousa Coutinho sought to solve this loophole by drafting, in 1814, “an instrument of regulatory nature” that would govern the actions of those that had been defined as “first public authorities” for the respective islands and their relationship with the Captaincy General.⁵⁹ However, his effort would come to nothing.

The Azores on the Eve of the Liberal Revolution of 1820

At the Congress of Vienna (1814/15), one of the main concerns of the European delegates was to control imperial disintegration and to restore the status quo that existed before the Napoleonic Wars. In the Portuguese court in Rio de

⁵⁵ Drummond, *Anais da Ilha Terceira*, vol. 3, p. 237; Madrugada da Costa, *Os Açores em finais do regime de Capitania-Geral*, vol. 1, p. 91.

⁵⁶ Madrugada da Costa, *Os Açores em finais do regime de Capitania-Geral*, vol. 1, p. 162.

⁵⁷ *Arquivo dos Açores*, vol. 10, 1982, pp. 385–387, esp. 386.

⁵⁸ Madrugada da Costa, *Os Açores em finais do regime de Capitania-Geral*, vol. 1, pp. 153–157.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 154, 156–157.

Janeiro, the general European peace was seen by some of the crown magistrates as an opportunity for the royal family and the court to return to Lisbon. This, of course, would represent a second respatialization within the Luso-Brazilian Atlantic world and a major setback for the elite groups in Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Pernambuco, which had benefited from the presence of the court in Brazil. Despite the pressure, the prince regent showed little interest in returning to Lisbon.⁶⁰ The creation of the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves at the end of 1815, by Decree of 16 December, reinforced the argument of those who claimed in those years that “it was not for the prince regent’s purposes to return to Portugal and to transfer again the seat of the monarchy to Lisbon”.⁶¹

Amidst the political turmoil in Europe and the Americas and the uncertainty of the Portuguese authorities regarding the decision to stay in Brazil or return to Portugal, the Azores seemed to have escaped this instability. In the Azores, local particularisms were combined with the withdrawal of the political centre and the geographical discontinuity. So, despite the “re-establishment” of the captaincy-general in 1798/99, the problems that had hindered the success of the attempted reform with the creation of the captaincy-general in 1766 kept on being a daily reality.⁶² After the establishment of the Portuguese court in Rio de Janeiro in 1808, the indecisions and silences of the political centre regarding matters of political, administrative, and judicial nature were felt strongly in the Azores, which continued to be “embedded in the webs of a biased system of relations that would in no point help the positive progress of the administration’s affairs”.⁶³ In the final years of the second decade of the nineteenth century, the death of Maria I (on 20 March 1816), the second military campaign in the Banda Oriental⁶⁴ and the critical events during 1817 in Brazil – the Pernambuco

60 J.D. Rodrigues, “Um Europeu nos trópicos: sociedade e política no Rio joanino na correspondência de Pedro José Caupers”, in: Rodrigues (ed.), *O Atlântico Revolucionário*, pp. 193–213.

61 M.B. Nizza da Silva, *D. João. Príncipe e Rei no Brasil*, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 2008, pp. 71–73; J. Pedreira and F. Dores Costa, *D. João VI*, Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2006, pp. 237–239, 262–263.

62 J.D. Rodrigues, “*para o socego e tranqüilidade publica das Ilhas*”.

63 Madrugada da Costa, *Os Açores em finais do regime de Capitania-Geral*, vol. 1, p. 95.

64 The Banda Oriental or Banda Oriental del Uruguay was the name given to the territories on the eastern bank of the Uruguay River and north of the Río de la Plata. These territories comprise present-day Uruguay, the State of Rio Grande do Sul, and some parts of the State of Santa Catarina, in Brazil, and were for a long time at the heart of disputes between Lisbon and Madrid, settled in several treaties. Prince Regent João took the opportunity to regain those territories following the imprisonment of the Spanish royal family. See C. Bessa, “O Brasil e as

uprising – and in Portugal – the failed attempt by General Gomes Freire de Andrade to overthrow the British government and the execution of Portuguese military officers – contributed to keeping the Azores out of the crown's sight.⁶⁵ In general, the main crown-appointed magistrates serving in the archipelago sought to use the new political and spatial circumstances in favour of an extension of their power. Local political and social actors, however, also sought the same and therefore clashed with the captain-generals and the military governors.

The status of the Azores, lying between the two shores of the Atlantic, between the kingdom and the empire, experienced oscillations, but these did not end in any effective proposal for reorganizing the political-administrative map. Such events would occur only after the liberal revolution of 1820. And, in a political conjuncture of change, the letter that one of the setembrizados, Judge Vicente José Ferreira Cardoso da Costa, wrote to a friend on 23 October 1820 is still significant.⁶⁶ In some of the Azorean islands, news was circulating that the Junta of Porto wanted to “extend the national insurrection to the Azores Islands”.⁶⁷ Now what was the judge's opinion on this? In a clear manner, he stated:

The Azores form a captaincy, and a political government entirely separate from Portugal. Our relations with the kingdom are friendly, commercial, and judicial: and in these aspects there has been no change at all; because ships bring here as before, sentences and papers of the same sort in the name of the king; and therefore we must understand, as it seems to me, that Portugal seems itself in relation to the Azores as before.

Invasões Francesas. Corte no Rio, Reino Unido e Independência.”, in: M.T. Barata and N.S. Teixeira (eds.), *Nova História Militar de Portugal*, vol. 3, Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2004, pp. 232–252, esp. pp. 242–245; Paquette, *Imperial Portugal*, pp. 55–56.

⁶⁵ Paquette, *Imperial Portugal*, pp. 105–107.

⁶⁶ Vicente José Ferreira Cardoso da Costa was born in Bahia, Brazil, in 1765. He studied law in Coimbra and he held offices in the Portuguese administration. In 1810, following the third French invasion of Portugal, he was deported to the Azores along with several military officers, clergymen, and lawyers, all of them accused of being pro-French. Vicente José Ferreira Cardoso da Costa stayed in the island of São Miguel, where he married a lady from one of the main local households. On these events and on some of the setembrizados, see: Rodrigues (ed.), *O Atlântico Revolucionário*.

⁶⁷ Following the military uprisings of 1820 in Porto (24 August) and in Lisbon (15 September) juntas were formed in Porto and in Lisbon. The Junta of Porto's purpose was the restoration or regeneration of Portugal and the establishment of constitutionalism. In late September, a political agreement led to the creation of a unified junta in Lisbon. On the juntas, see Paquette, *Imperial Portugal*, pp. 108–109 and N.G. Monteiro, “A Vida Política”, in: J.M. Pedreira and N.G. Monteiro (eds.), *O Colapso do Império e a Revolução Liberal, 1808–1834*, Madrid and Carnaxide: Mapfre-Objectiva, 2013, pp. 37–74, esp. 56–58.

And he concluded that

it would be prudent that Portugal did not try to involve the Azores in its political affairs nor the Azores to be judges of the same, risking to complicate even more His Majesty in the resolutions to make, which already give Him a lot to do. Therefore, to lead with the mercantile, friendly, and judiciary as if we knew nothing of what is going on in Portugal.⁶⁸

Claiming to facilitate the decision-making process of the monarch, the judge argued that the Azores should not be involved in the ongoing events of the kingdom, especially because it was “a captaincy, and a political government entirely separate from Portugal”. This was, after all, a further assertion of autonomy from the local elites of São Miguel, who had co-opted the old *setembrizado*, which had anticipated the political divisions that would happen in the following years and that, after the definitive liberal triumph, would materialise in the administrative fragmentation that continued up until almost the end of the twentieth century.

In the following years, the Azores, just like in the Kingdom of Portugal, would be the stage for political and social conflict between constitutionalists and the supporters of the old political order. Peace would come only after the civil war of 1832–1834. It was, after all, a consequence of the unexpected and dramatic respatialization of the Portuguese Atlantic world that took place after 1807/08. Although being a small territory, the Azorean case provides a good example of the profound changes that took place during the decades of the Age of Revolutions and of how amidst the political turmoil actors tried to cope with new ideas and to adapt themselves to new political languages and models.

⁶⁸ A.J. Correia, “Historia Documental da Revolução de 1821 Na Ilha de San Miguel para a Separação do Governo da Capitania Geral da Ilha Terceira”, *Revista Michaelense* 3 (1920) 2, pp. 705–729, esp. pp. 711, 712 and 728.

