16. Propositional attitudes
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Eric Swanson
Abstract
Verbs like ‘believes,’ ‘knows,’ ‘suspects,’ ‘hopes,’ and ‘worries’- verbs that, at the level of logical form, can take clauses as their complements- are generally taken to denote intentional attitudes borne to a proposition. For this reason they are known as propositional attitude verbs. It is difficult to construct a semantics and pragmatics adequate to the features of these verbs. Any successful theory must explain why, within the scope of an attitude ascription, substitution of coreferring terms sometimes seems to change the truth value of the ascription. This feature of attitude ascriptions seems to entail that coreferring terms can have different semantic values; other compelling arguments seem to show that coreferring terms must have the same semantic value. After surveying other important features of propositional attitude verbs, and presenting several coreference puzzles, this article discusses conceptions of mental content intended to help resolve such puzzles. It then explores the importance of subjective uncertainty to attitude ascriptions and to formal semantics in general. It concludes by sketching an approach to the semantics of attitude ascriptions that coheres with the standard ways of representing subjective uncertainty. This approach also unifies the treatment of coreference puzzles and the treatment of presupposition carrying expressions in attitude ascriptions.
Abstract
Verbs like ‘believes,’ ‘knows,’ ‘suspects,’ ‘hopes,’ and ‘worries’- verbs that, at the level of logical form, can take clauses as their complements- are generally taken to denote intentional attitudes borne to a proposition. For this reason they are known as propositional attitude verbs. It is difficult to construct a semantics and pragmatics adequate to the features of these verbs. Any successful theory must explain why, within the scope of an attitude ascription, substitution of coreferring terms sometimes seems to change the truth value of the ascription. This feature of attitude ascriptions seems to entail that coreferring terms can have different semantic values; other compelling arguments seem to show that coreferring terms must have the same semantic value. After surveying other important features of propositional attitude verbs, and presenting several coreference puzzles, this article discusses conceptions of mental content intended to help resolve such puzzles. It then explores the importance of subjective uncertainty to attitude ascriptions and to formal semantics in general. It concludes by sketching an approach to the semantics of attitude ascriptions that coheres with the standard ways of representing subjective uncertainty. This approach also unifies the treatment of coreference puzzles and the treatment of presupposition carrying expressions in attitude ascriptions.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Contents V
- 1. Pronouns 1
- 2. Definiteness and indefiniteness 33
- 3. Specificity 70
- 4. Quantifiers 112
- 5. Bare noun phrases 149
- 6. Possessives and relational nouns 177
- 7. Mass nouns and plurals 204
- 8. Genericity 232
- 9. Aspectual class and Aktionsart 274
- 10. Perfect and progressive 313
- 11. Verbal mood 369
- 12. Deverbal nominalization 407
- 13. Tense 436
- 14. Modality 463
- 15. Conditionals 503
- 16. Propositional attitudes 532
- 17. Indexicality and De Se reports 562
- Index 619
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Contents V
- 1. Pronouns 1
- 2. Definiteness and indefiniteness 33
- 3. Specificity 70
- 4. Quantifiers 112
- 5. Bare noun phrases 149
- 6. Possessives and relational nouns 177
- 7. Mass nouns and plurals 204
- 8. Genericity 232
- 9. Aspectual class and Aktionsart 274
- 10. Perfect and progressive 313
- 11. Verbal mood 369
- 12. Deverbal nominalization 407
- 13. Tense 436
- 14. Modality 463
- 15. Conditionals 503
- 16. Propositional attitudes 532
- 17. Indexicality and De Se reports 562
- Index 619
