Ofira Gruweis-Kovalsky

Religious Radicalism, the Zionist Right, and the Establishment of the State of Israel

Introduction

On May 16 1951, newspapers throughout the State of Israel ran headlines proclaiming: "Extremist thugs plot Knesset bombing to sabotage debate on drafting women." The plot was reportedly headed off by the Israeli security services, thereby "thwarting an attack on the Knesset."[1] The perpetrators were identified as members of *Brit Qanaim* ("Covenant of Zealots"), a militant faction of the Charedi youth movement, Tze'iray Agudat Yisrael. Throughout the years, this dramatic episode has remained etched in Israeli collective consciousness and scholarship as the act of religious extremists who embraced terror in their battle to determine the country's Jewish character.[2]

Theoretically, the battle should have ended in 1948: here was a state whose very existence defined what it meant to be Jewish, as Jews poured into the country en masse, assumed full political responsibility, and instated Jewish hegemony in the public space. However, the Jewish identity of citizens in a Jewish nation-state had been debated in political, cultural, and literary circles since the rise of the Zionist movement in the late nineteenth century. During the pre-state period, when the Jews lived under foreign rule, the question of self-identity rumbled beneath the surface, but erupted from time to time, culminating in political infighting and public expressions of discontent, such as demonstrations against Shabbat desecration in places like Jerusalem where the Jews constituted a majority. Nevertheless, the power of the Yishuv leadership, headed by the Zionist Socialists, was not diminished, and it was able to exercise its authority over

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[1] The security services thwarted the attempt to sabotage the Knesset, *A'l HaMishmar, Davar, Ma'ariv*, May 16 1951.
[2] Avraham Deskal, "Non Parliamentary Oppositional Behavior in the 1950s: Brit-Kanaim and Malchut-Israel" (MA thesis, Bar-Ilan University, 1990); Shely Levin and Jonatan Erlich, *Background Document: Jewish Political Violence in Israel*, (Jerusalem: The Knesset research and information center, 2005); Ami Pedahzur, *The Triumph of Israel's Radical Right* (PlaceOxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2012); Ehud Shprinzak, *Brothers Against Brothers: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination* (New York, USA: New York Free Press, 1999); Ehud Shprinzak, "The Emergence of the Israeli Radical Right" *Comperative Politics* 21, no. 2 (1989): 92–171.

most of the parties and militias.[3] Jewish identity in the Yishuv was basically dictated by this administration, which stifled the voices of anyone who did not conform with its Zionist-Socialist line. In response, those who were rejected and pushed to the margins resorted to unconventional methods and even violence to convey their message, although the reality of British Mandate had a moderating influence and served to tone down and repress the political and social discord in some measure.[4] During this period, two dissenting groups in the Yishuv set themselves up as an ideological, political, and ideological alternative, splitting from the mainstream and refusing to accept the authority of the Yishuv leadership. The very existence of such groups became a radicalizing force in the Yishuv.

In the first camp were the underground organizations of the Revisionist right and large segments of the Revisionist party. While the Revisionists identified as Zionists, they clashed with the Zionist leadership on ideological issues and policy, which led to their formal resignation from the Zionist movement and pursuit of independent activity in the underground.[5] In the second camp were the Charedim, a community of many subgroups that openly declared war on Zionism and those at its helm. At the same time, some of the leading rabbis were moderates who found ways of cooperating with the Yishuv leadership and the Zionist movement. Within these two camps were pockets of extremists who held radical views on a variety of subjects, including the definition of Jewish identity. Their actions fueled the flames and deepened the Yishuv's mistrust of the two groups as a whole.[6]

After the establishment of the State of Israel, Etzel and Lechi, the radical underground organizations of the Revisionist right, agreed to disband and join the Israel Defense Forces. In Jerusalem, however, due to the unresolved international status of the city which left it outside the bounds of Israeli sovereignty, these organizations continued to operate autonomously. Suspicion and mistrust of the

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3 Itzhak Galnoor and Dana Blander, *The Political System of Israel, Formative Years; Institutional Structure; Political Behavior; Unsolved Problems; Democracy in Israel* (Tel Aviv: Am-O'ved, 2013), 42.

4 Moshe Lissak, *Studies in Israeli Social History* (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute Press, 2009), 217–341.

5 Colin Shindler, *The Triumph of Military Zionism, Nationalism and the Origins of the Israeli Right* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006); Eran Kaplan, *The Jewish Radical Right, Revisionist Zionism and its Ideological Legacy* (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 3–30.

6 Binyamin Braun, The Ultra-Orthodox Jewry and the State, Yedidia Z. Stern et al., eds., *When Judaism Meets the State* (Tel Aviv: MISKAL-Yedioth Ahronoth Books, 2015), 79–63; Yossef Pund, *Separation or Participation, Agudat Israel Confronting Zionism and the State of Israel* (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1991).

Revisionists and the Revisionist underground ran deep, hampering communication with the State of Israel leadership and ending in violent skirmishes such as the *Altalena affair*. It was hence not surprising that the political parties established by former members of Etzel and Lechi were seen as illegitimate by the Israeli politics.[7]

While the leaders of the Charedi and national-religious communities also signed an accord with the Ben-Gurion administration, known as the status quo agreements, the character of Israeli public sphere remained a bone of contention. The dispute revolved mainly around Shabbat observance, military service for women and education, specifically the education of immigrant children. In Jerusalem, the conflict was particularly bitter, triggering violent protests and demonstrations. The Charedim and national-religious communities, feeling that they were being pushed to the sidelines, joined forces. In the lead-up to the elections of the Constituent Assembly in January 1949, the two Charedi parties, Agudat Yisrael and Poaeli Agudat Yisrael, formed a political bloc with the two religious Zionist parties. This bloc became part of the legitimate political establishment of the State of Israel upon joining the coalition headed by Ben-Gurion. Among the Charedim were groups of extremists who opposed this move by the Charedi mainstream. Embracing fringe views, they broke away from the community and aligned themselves with the far right and Neturei Qarta.

Studies of Jewish radicalism in the 1950s generally portray the two groups – Charedi radicals and the radical right of the Lechi and Revisionist school – as not connected to one another.[8] In this paper, I argue that there were ties despite the fact that the Charedim bowed out of Israeli politics and did not join the political right. The Israeli government's use of its intelligence services to exert political pressure on the Charedi leadership turned out to be counterproductive. It led to the radicalization of Charedi leaders and the social and cultural rejection of both the far right and the Charedim, who became pariahs in the State of Israel. The liminal geographic space of Jerusalem and the political status of the city, which remained unclear after the establishment of the state, further contributed to the radicalization of these groups.

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7 Ofira Gruweis-Kovalsky, "Between Ideology and Reality: Menachem Begin and the Jerusalem Question, 1948–1949," *Israel Studies* 21, no. 3 (2016): 99–125.
8 Mudde Cas, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge USA: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Kaplan, *The Jewish Radical Right*; Pedahzur, *The Triumph*; Shlomo Shpiro, "The Intellectual Foundations of Jewish National Terrorism: Avraham Stern and the Lehi," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25, no. 4 (2013): 606–620; Shprinzak, *The Emergence*; Shprinzak, *Brothers against Brothers*.

The Right-Wing-Charedi Alliance

Ze'ev Jabotinsky (1880–1940) and the ideologues of the Revisionist movement were secular, non-practicing Jews. At the same time, they harbored an emotional attachment to Judaism and Jewish tradition that fluctuated between tolerance and nostalgia. Active primarily in Eastern Europe until World War II, the Revisionists' demographic and political support base was religious and Charedi. These communities saw Revisionist ideology and activism as a way of restoring Jewish dignity, while the Revisionists regarded this diverse sector as part of the Jewish plurality they sought to represent. Although monism was one of the principles of Revisionist thinking (using the Hebrew term *chad ness*, literally "a single banner"),[9] the Revisionists had no problem welcoming pious Jews into their ranks: religion was seen as a private affair, not a hostile alternative ideology that would sidetrack them from their primary goal. Religious observance and Revisionism were not *shatnez* (i.e., the biblical prohibition on weaving together linen and wool),[10] as Jabotinsky put it, using religious terminology himself.[11] This approach contrasted sharply with that of the Zionist workers' parties, which publicly proclaimed their opposition to religion. Agudat Yisrael emphasized this point later on to explain its affiliation with the Revisionists and their political successors.[12]

From an ideological, administrative, and political standpoint, the Charedi sector is a complex society spanning a whole spectrum of social groupings, organizations, and doctrines.[13] On the eve of Israeli statehood, the Charedim could be roughly divided into three main streams. For the purpose of this article, the difference between them was in their attitude toward the Jewish state. The moderate Charedi camp, largely represented by Poa'lei Agudat Yisrael, viewed the establishment of the state as a positive development, but one which did not change their Charedi ethos in any way. The centrist camp, represented by Agudat Yisrael, held diverse opinions and included splinter groups such as Histadrut Tze'iray Agudat Yisrael.[14] Israel's establishment was seen not as a reli-

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9 Kaplan, *The Jewish Radical Right*, 31–50.

10 Judith Tydor Baumel, "Strange Bedfellows: The Revisionist Movement and Agudath Yisrael during the Holocaust," *Iyunim Bitkumat Israel* 12 (2002): 465–492.

11 Svetlana Natkovich, *Among Radiant Clouds: The Literature of Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky in Its Social Context* (Jerusalem Magnes Press, 2015): 219.

12 M. K. Rabbi Menachem Porush, *Koll Israel*, 40 (1982).

13 Cahaner Lee, Nikola Yozgof-Orbach and Arnon Sofer, eds., *The Haredim in Israel – Space, Society, Community* (Haifa: Chaikin Chair In Geostrategy, University of Haifa, 2012), 8–33.

14 Pund, *Separation or Participation,* 242.

gious commandment but as a threat to Jewish tradition, although there was no call for a boycott. For the third stream, made up of the Satmar Chasidim, the E'da Charedit in Jerusalem and Neturei Qarta, the very existence of a state was illegitimate because it was a declaration of Jewish sovereignty before the coming of the Messiach. This group boycotted anything connected to the state and continues to do so until today.[15] It consciously seeks to build walls between itself and Israeli society, and lives as an enclave within an enclave. On the other hand, it is a tiny minority that constitutes only three percent of Israel's Charedi population.[16]

In the period leading up to the founding of the state, Agudat Yisrael rejected secular Zionism but strongly supported the settlement of the Land of Israel as a Torah commandment. It even endorsed the establishment of new colonies like *B'nai- Barak* by members of the community,[17] although its approach was more on the passive side.[18] Agudat Yisrael's problem with Zionism was the character of the Jewish center that the Zionists sought to build.[19] Nevertheless, political ties grew up between Agudat Yisrael and the Revisionist movement and they aided one another in their battle against the Zionist establishment. The rabbis of Agudat Yisrael were fully aware of the critical differences between the Zionist right and other political camps, and saw the Revisionists as neutral and even sympathetic toward the religious cause. The Aguda-Revisionist partnership in the late 1930s and 1940s stemmed from this image of religious tolerance, the readiness of both groups to employ unconventional tactics if necessary, and a sense of brotherhood between groups that perceived themselves as victims of discrimination.[20] This political collaboration influenced Charedi thinking, all the more so in view of its endorsement by the rabbis, and a mutual alliance grew up between the two camps. The Charedim were prepared to listen to and consider the ideological arguments of the Revisionists, and the Revisionists, unlike the Zionist labor parties, did not reject the Charedi community out of hand.

This special empathy for the Revisionists extended to its attitude toward the underground movements. For the centrist Charedi leadership, there was a direct connection between repudiating Zionism and repudiating clandestine activity

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15 Braun, *The Ultra-Orthodox Jewry*, 80 – 81.

16 Menachem Keren-Kratz, "Ha-E'dah Ha-Haredit in Jerusalem in 1948 – 1973," *Cathedra* 161 (2017): 139 – 174.

17 Pund, *Separation or Participation*.

18 Rabbi Yitzhak Meir, *On the Walls of B'nai- Barak – the first Decade of B'nai- Barak* (B'nai-Barak: The society for research the history of B'nai- Barak Press, 1989).

19 Gershon C. Bacon, *The Politics of Tradition: Agudat Yisrael in Poland, 1916 – 1939* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2005), 50.

20 Tydor Baumel, *Strange Bedfellows*.

carried out in its name, by Etzel, Lechi, or the Haganah. These two components did not stand alone: if one was rejected, so was the other. On the other hand, the contention of Etzel and Lechi that organized resistance to an illegitimate regime and its illegitimate actions meshed with Jewish political tradition was an argument that the Charedi public could understand to some degree.[21] It was this rationale that enabled the Revisionists to make headway in Charedi circles. At the same time, the leaders of Agudat Yisrael openly opposed the terror tactics of Etzel and Lechi, and some claim that the party's stance was the impetus for Ben-Gurion's decision to launch "the Saison."[22]

A number of rabbis accepted by both the Charedi and national-religious public gave the stamp of approval to affiliation with the Revisionists. One was Aryeh Levin (1885–1969) of Jerusalem, known as the "rabbi of the prisoners." Reb Aryeh, a Gur chassid who had been in contact with Jabotinsky even before the Revisionist movement, was born as one of the rabbis who lobbied for Jabotinsky's release after his incarceration by the British in 1920.[23] Levin's ties with members of the underground who became active in Israeli political life continued after the establishment of the state.[24] Another rabbinical figure from the Charedi world who maintained ties with the Revisionist movement was Rabbi Yitzhak Yedidya Frenkel (1913–1986) of Tel Aviv's Florentin neighborhood, known as the "rabbi of the neighborhoods." Frenkel, also a Gur hassid, was a disciple of the Imrei Emet and close to Rabbi Kook and Rabbi U'ziel.

From the early twentieth century, the Charedim in Jerusalem began staging protests against Shabbat desecration. Holding soccer matches and operating public transportation on the Jewish day of rest were the core issues of the time.[25] During the British Mandate, groups of young Charedim inspired by Etzel and Lechi also organized in secret to enforce religious observance through violence. Two groups known to have taken part in this activity were *Irgun Lochamei Yahadut* (Fighters for Judaism), which planted bombs in cafes that opened on the Shabbat, and *Bnei Pinchas* (Sons of Pinchas), which targeted women in

21 Hilda Schatzberger, *Resistance and Tradition in Mandatory Palestine* (Bar-Ilan University, 1985), 84.

22 Pund, *Separation or Participation,* 184–185.

23 Rabbi Kook letter, 1920. *Meged Yerachim*, 16. 2001.P 3.

24 Letter from Noach Zevoluni to Aba Achimeir, May 8 1949, Aba Achimeir Archives, Ramat-Gan.

25 Menachem Friedman, *The Origin of the Haredi Society, Orientation and Process* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1991), 63.

relationships with non-Jews.[26] Aside from the fact that these groups hailed from the Charedi community, they were both in contact with the Revisionist underground and their operational base was mainly at Jerusalem.[27]

Jerusalem as a Liminal Sphere

Following the establishment of the state, Jerusalem became the operational hub of the far right and the assembly point for activists of Lechi and Etzel.[28] The underground took shape there, because the city had not been declared part of the state. Until August 1948, Israel did not proclaim any form of sovereignty over Jerusalem and thereafter proclaimed conditional sovereignty. The clandestine military organizations that operated during the British Mandate became militias charged with the defense of the Jewish population when the British withdrew and war broke out.[29] The uncertainty of the future Jerusalem led to the radicalization of the population, which was expressed in their support for the Revisionist organizations. Lechi and Etzel maintained several bases in Jerusalem and their presence impacted greatly on life there.[30] Isser Halperin-Harel (1912–2003), who was responsible for surveillance of Jewish political organizations in Jerusalem and later became head of Israel's security services, testified that "the insurgents, Etzel and Lechi, took over Jerusalem and asserted their control through sheer terror. Even the police were terrified of them. None of the inhabitants would act against them, not out of support but out of fear."[31]

To describe the cooperation of Jerusalemites with Etzel and Lechi as the product of fear not only attests to a partial understanding of what was going on in the city, but to the vested interests of someone who sought to vilify the rival political camp and win points for his own side. The people of Jerusalem were enthusiastic backers of these groups and worked with them willingly. The

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26 Menachem Friedman, "ELI: Jewish Religious Underground during the British Mandate," in *Milestones, Essays in Jewish History Dedicated to Zvi Yekutiel*, ed. Immanuel Etkes, David Assaf, and Yosef Kaplan (Jerusalem: The Zalman Shazar Press, 2016), 379–396.

27 Summary of the police activity against the members of Brit Qanaim, written by the Jerusalem Police commander, Israel State Archives, file 2/75/5/6.

28 Avraham Vered, *A Burning Bush on Fire – Epic of War and Conquest* (Tel Aviv, 1950), 16.

29 Mordechai Bar-On and Nir Mann, "An Interview with the Fifth President Yitzhak Navon," *Aley Zait Vacherev* (Olive Leaves and Sword) 13 (2013): 13–30.

30 Ofira Gruweis-Kovalsky, "The Attitude of the Revisionists Right Wing toward Jerusalem in the War of Independence," *Aley Zait Vacherev (Olive Leaves and Sword)* 13 (2013): 140–174.

31 The Swedish Attorney General Special Report on the murder of Count Bernadotte, ISA, file: A-7668/6, 37.

data bears this out: perhaps the most telling statistic of all with respect to the cultural and political inclinations of the locals is the fact that the majority of Jerusalem children attended religious schools,[32] even though secular schools were available and highly recommended by the Yishuv leadership. Analyzing the outcome of the municipal elections in 1950 confirms this view of the Jerusalem public and highlights the disparity between the attitude of the national leadership and the locals. The Jerusalemites were a conservative-minded bunch who voted in the Constituent Assembly and municipal elections as directed by their rabbis. Hence the Religious Front, a merger of Agudat Yisrael, Poa'lei Agudat Yisrael Hamizrachi, and Hapoe'l Hamizrachi, was very popular in Jerusalem and played an important role as a united front in the general elections and as individual parties in the municipal elections.[33] In the mayoral elections the local and national religious parties formed a coalition with the Herut movement, which again testifies to the solid backing enjoyed by religious organizations and the Revisionist right in Jerusalem.[34]

The radicalization of the Jerusalem public and its link to the far right is also attested to by the growth of Lechi in Jerusalem after UN Resolution 181. The underground was joined by people from every sector, from Charedi anti-Zionists to Communists.[35] The numbers of Ultra-Orthodox who sought membership was so large that Lechi opened a religious unit in Jerusalem. This unit operated under the aegis of the rabbis and served as an ideological bridge between religious and secular messianic doctrines. Most of those who joined the religious unit in Jerusalem, which had over fifty members,[36] do not appear on the official Lechi membership roster.[37]

Lechi in Jerusalem thus incorporated in its ranks a distinct, self-standing unit of non-Zionist Charedim, and there is evidence that this unit was in contact

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32 Twenty-five percent of the Jerusalem children were registered at the Worker Wing Schools, *A'l HaMishmar*, April 29 1951.

33 Pinhas Alpert and Dotan Goren, eds., *Diary of a Muchtar in Jerusalem – The History of the Beit Yisrael Neighborhood and its Surroundings in the Writings of Rabbi Moshe Yekutiel Alpert (1938–1952)* (Bar-Ilan University Press, 2013), 174.

34 Yechiam Weitz, The Jerusalem Municipality Elections, Arnon Golan, Amnon Ramon, eds., *Jerusalem* (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, forthcoming).

35 Joseph Heller, *Lehi-Ideology and Politics 1940–1949* (Jerusalem: Zalman Shzar Press, 1989), Vol. 2, 388; Nadel Baruch, *Bernadotte Murder* (Tel-Aviv, 1968), 96; Hadas Regev-Yarkoni and Ofer Regev, *Jerusalem's Liberation Fighter, the Memories of Yehoshua Zetler* (Tel-Aviv: Porat Press, 2007), 121; Yisrael Eldad, *The First Tithe – Memories Episodes and Moral* (Tel-Aviv, third edition, 1975), 367.

36 The estimated number of the Lechi members in 1948 was one thousand members.

37 Association for Lehi legacy Memorialization, http://lehi.org.il/?page_id=125.

with Rabbi Avraham Yesha'ya Qarlitz, known as the Chazon Ish.[38] These ties with the Chazon Ish are of considerable significance in view of his lofty status in Charedi circles and the State of Israel. Tze'iray Agudat Yisrael, and especially its Jerusalem members, looked up to the Chazon Ish as a spiritual leader of the first degree. However, it is hard to know exactly what he thought about the political parties in Israel and the Religious Front, as many conflicting statements were issued in his name.[39]

It was this combination of politically and culturally shunned groups operating behind the scenes, apocalyptic messianic doctrines and a tempestuous political situation, inside the Yishuv and on an international scale, that fueled extremism. Jerusalem, as a place where nationalist, messianic, and theological doctrines converged, became a hot spot of instability during the period in question, which only heightened the apocalyptic premonitions of far right fringe groups in the national-religious and Charedi sectors. The fact that Jerusalem was physically divided between the State of Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan, and the sites holiest to Jews were in non-Jewish hands and off-limits to Jewish worship, helped to strengthen messianic groups calling for action. On top of this was the sense of many right-wingers and religious groups that they were being pushed to the margins of society and excluded from politics in the newly-established state.[40]

Messianic Doctrine and Radicalism

Traditional Jewish messianism is bound up with the concept of redemption and the two are ultimately inseparable.[41] Redemption is linked in Judaism to the ingathering of the exiles in the Promised Land, reinstating the House of David, renewing the religious rituals of worship in the Temple in Jerusalem, and establishing a society governed by Jewish religious law. Religious Zionists took pains not to identify Zionism as a messianic movement, whereas the Charedi

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38 Rabbi Avraham Isaiah Karelitz, 1878–1953.

39 Zvi Wineman, *From Katovitz to He Be-Iyyar – Chapters in the History of Agudat Yisrael, and the Ultra-Orthodox Jews New Perspectives* (Jerusalem: Vatikin Press, 1995), 159–165.

40 Amir Goldstein, *Heroism and Exclusion: The Gallows Martyrs and the Israeli Collective Memory* (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 2011); Ofira Gruweis-Kovalsky, *The Vindicated and the Persecuted – The Mythology and the Symbols of the Herut Movement* (Sede-Boker: The Ben-Gurion Research Institute, 2015); Udi Lebel, *The Road to the Pantheon-Etzel, Lehi and the Borders of Israeli National Memory* (Jerusalem: Carmel Publisher, 2007).

41 Friedman, *The Origin of the Haredi Society*, 19

fear of Zionism was related in part to this very issue. However, of all the traditional values of Judaism, the messianic idea was the one that secular Zionists tried hardest to preserve. Prior to the establishment of the state, the goal of rebuilding the Land of Israel by secular Jews had distinct messianic overtones. All streams of Orthodox Judaism found themselves up in arms with Zionism over the interpretation of basic religious concepts in the context of messianism.[42] The secular character of the Zionist enterprise was clearly a source of theological discomfort in the Orthodox world, although religious Zionist leaders rationalized their partnership with non-religious groups on the grounds that Jews must unite in times of emergency. World War II and its consequences for the Jews led Agudat Yisrael to accept the reality of settlement in the Land of Israel and join the debate over the character of a future Jewish state.[43]

In the interim period between the two world wars, some Agudat Yisrael rabbis interpreted the chaos in the world as the "birth pangs of the Messiach" and a sign that redemption was on its way. This messianic frame of mind spread beyond Agudat Yisrael and permeated the thinking of other Haredi groups, such as Chabad under the leadership of the Lubavitcher Rebbe,[44] and the disciples of the Munkacs Rebbe, who were sworn enemies of Zionism (and also of Agudat Yisrael).[45]

The shock of World War II, together with the birth of a Jewish state, provided further impetus for the emergence of messianic thought that combined religious and secular elements. The messianic ideas that developed in the Chasidic courts were a complex ideological and theological brew. Traces of messianism were even perceptible in the Gur dynasty from which Agudat Yisrael sprang.[46] A year before the establishment of the state, the Gerrer Rebbe, Imrei Emet, spoke of the times as the "era of the footsteps of the Messiach," although these remarks were subsequently downplayed by his son and successor.[47]

Viewing the world through a theological lens forced the Charedi rabbis to delve deeper into the spiritual significance of redemption. Some Aguda leaders

42 Friedman, *The Origin of the Haredi Society*, 19.

43 Chaim Shalem, *A Time to Take Action to Rescue Jews, Agudat Yisrael in Eretz Israel Confronting the Holocaust 1942–1945* (Sede-Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2007), 286.

44 Gershon C. Bacon, *The Politics of Tradition: Agudat Yisrael in Poland, 1916–1939* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2005), 58–59.

45 Motti Inbari, "Messianic Activism in the Work and Thought of Chaim Elazar Shapira (the Munkacser Rebbe) in the Interwar Period," *Cathedra* 149 (2014): 77–104.

46 Mendel Piekarz, "The Inner Point of the *Admorim* Gur and Alexander as a Reflection of their Ability to Adjust to Changing Times," in *Studies in Jewish Mysticism Philosophy and Ethical Literature*, ed. Joseph Dan and Joseph Hacker (Jerusalem: Magnes Press 1986): 569–592.

47 Braun, *The Ultra-Orthodox Jewry*, 96.

looked askance at the enthusiasm with which Israel's founding was greeted. They saw the state as a danger to Judaism and feared that it would become a rubber stamp for secularism. Other rabbis of the movement hailed the creation of a Jewish state as an act of divine providence that would actually strengthen Charedi/religious society. In the words of Rabbi Jacob Rosenheim, one of leading proponents of this view, "only a blind person could say that what is unfolding now… in the Holy Land is mere history or the result of human design or natural causes, and not see that the birth of the Jewish state is the metaphysical outcome of sweeping Jewish self-sacrifice!"[48] Some of the leading Charedi rabbis and yeshiva heads joined the religious Zionist leadership in signing a joint proclamation that portrayed the achievement of statehood as *atchalta degeula* (beginning of salvation).[49] Agudat Yisrael's official bulletin said much the same thing.[50] Directly or indirectly, reading such material drove the message home, even if some of the undersigned rabbis, and those who succeeded them, later changed their tune. Maybe it was even over-influence that led them to backtrack and wage war on those who rejoiced over Israeli statehood, like Rabbi Soloveitchik, the Brisqer Rebbe,[51] who bemoaned the fact that "so many good people are being swept up by the masses and infected by the virus of enthusiasm for autonomous Jewish rule in Eretz Israel."[52] Indeed, many Charedi leaders avoided contact with the Zionist movement after the establishment of the state, while others refused to voice an opinion on the subject.

The publications and public statements of Histadrut Tse'iray Agudat Yisrael attest to the theological confusion in Charedi circles on the subject of Israeli statehood: sometimes they took one approach and sometimes another. On the eve of the Constituent Assembly elections towards the end of 1948, members of the all the Charedi youth movements handed out flyers that portrayed Israel's establishment as a miracle: "The miracle of the victory of the few over the many has been reenacted before our eyes."[53] Two years later, with the elections for the Second Knesset around the corner and Agudat Yisrael wracked by infighting, the party's youth wing passed a resolution at its annual convention that veered in the opposite direction: "In view of the emotional turmoil and disagreement

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48 Pund, *Separation or Participation*, 214–215; Jacob Rosenheim, "Al Domi Lach," (Do not remain silent) *Hamevaser*, Elul 28 1949.

49 Braun, *The Ultra-Orthodox Jewry*, 96.

50 Pund, *Separation or Participation*, 223.

51 Shimeon Josef Meller, *The Rabbi of Brisk Book* (Jerusalem: Feldhaim Press, 2004), Vol. 2, 516–517.

52 Shimeon Josef Meller, *The Rabbi of Brisk Book* (Jerusalem: Feldhaim Press, 2004), Vol. 3, 325.

53 'United Religious Front' Pamphlet, Zionist Religious Archives, file 1 (in Hebrew).

over the issue of the establishment of the state, which has also affected the Charedi Jewish community, we hereby declare that Zionism in all its variations constitutes a grave spiritual and physical danger to the Jewish people."[54] The fact that the party leaders and rabbis needed to clarify that they were still opposed to Zionism shows that many were eager to become part of the state and acknowledged the miraculous nature of its birth.

The triple alliance of the far right, the religious Zionists, and the Charedim was thus another factor in the mounting radicalization in the 1950s, as political secular messianism joined up with theological religious messianism. Jerusalem was the hub in this context not only because of its theological significance but because the formation of many of these groups took place in the city. The Jerusalem branches of Poa'lei Agudat Yisrael and Histadrut Tse'irey Agudat Yisrael were of particular note.

Religious Zionist thinkers contributed indirectly to the radicalization process by portraying the military conflicts and apocalyptic world wars of the time as their own battle and as a confrontation of the Messiach and those on his side against the forces of evil. A handful of Jewish legal scholars tried to put together a system of laws for military engagement and soon after the state was founded, work began on a code of military ethics. The spirit of revolution permeated many factions of the Religious Zionist movement. In this context, there were a number of rabbinical figures from the heart of the religious establishment whose authority was accepted by both the Religious Zionists and Charedim. One was Rabbi Ben-Zion Meir Chai Uziel (1880–1953), who recognized the founding of the state as a sign of messianic times, as borne out by his correspondence. He believed that the existence of a state would lead to the demise of secularization, a view shared by Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook (1891–1982), Rabbi Ze'ev Gold (1889–1965), and Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik (1916–1981) Achieving statehood was perceived as a "revealed miracle." For Rabbi Chaim David HaLevy (1924–1998), the state was the first stage in the realization of the divine promise.[55] Israel's establishment in 1948 made the link between Jewish nationalism and messianism even clearer.[56] Religious Zionist thinkers were careful not to engage too deeply or openly in such apocalyptic thinking, but they tried hard to preserve the idea of the miraculousness of Israeli statehood as opposed to the modern day conception of coming into being naturally. After the Holocaust there was a grow-

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54 From the decisions of Tse'iray Agudat Yisrael, *Herut*, October 2 1950. "This Year's Slave," *Davar*, April 26 1950.

55 Dov Schwartz, *Religious Zionism between Logic and Messianism* (Am-Oved Press Tel-Aviv, 1999), 31–37, 94–96.

56 Inbari, *Zionism in the Thought*.

ing sense that the return of secular Jews to their roots was close at hand, and this feeling strengthened as the Jewish homeland became a reality. Many drew a link between the birth of the state and the Holocaust, and regarded the two as part of a single divine plan.[57] The upshot was that members of the Yishuv were influenced by a medley of ideas and ideologies, and drew validation for their activism from a blend of Charedi and religious Zionist rabbinic sources as well as discussions of the dimensions of Eretz Yisrael and the State of Israel in secular sources.[58] Therein lay the roots of the concept of a secular "Kingdom of Israel" interwoven with aspects of religious messianism so fervently embraced by Lechi. The ideas of Israel Eldad)1910 – 1996) and Uri Tzvi Greenberg (1896 – 1981), which they shared in writing on the pages of *Sulam,* a monthly journal edited by Eldad, and at parlor meetings of the paper's readership, thus appealed to audiences across the religious and social spectrum – secular, religious, and Charedi.[59]

Political Strife and Extremism

The heated political battles over the character of the Jewish state that ensued after Israel declared its independence widened the gulf between the religious/Charedi sector and the secular public. The religious parties fought to instate laws that would enforce kashrut and Shabbat observance in Israel but they failed to win support for legal sanctions against those who violated the laws. As time went on, loopholes were found which enabled people to skirt the Shabbat and kashrut laws.[60] The protest demonstrations organized by the religious and Charedi camp culminated in violent clashes. Scholarship to date has studied Charedi violence in Jerusalem, but little has been written about acts of violence committed against this sector. The police used unreasonable force against this population as a matter of course and justified its actions on the grounds that the Char-

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57 Schwartz, *Religious Zionism*, 91.

58 Arye Naor, *Greater Israel Theology and Policy* (University of Haifa Press, 2001), 24.

59 Ofira Gruweis-Kovalsky, "A Tale of Love and Darkness: The Radical Right Wing and the Herut Movement, 1948 – 1957," *Kesher (Communication)* 50 (2017): 89 – 99.

60 Aviad Hacohen, "The State of Israel – This is a Holy Place!: Forming a 'Jewish Public Domain' in the State of Israel," in *On Both Side of the Bridge, Religion and State in the Early Years of Israel*, ed. Mordechai Bar-On and Zvi Zameret (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Press, 2002), 169 – 170.

edim were enemies of Israel who sought to destroy the state.[61] The Charedim were often the victims of retaliatory attacks by supporters of the political left. These attacks, mostly perpetrated by gangs of young people and soldiers from the socialist youth movements and kibbutzim, were reported in the newspapers and came up for discussion in the Knesset.[62]

Under these circumstances, the enthusiasm of the Charedi leaders and their flock over the birth of a Jewish state began to wane. Similar feelings arose in the national-religious sector. The cultural-theological excitement of statehood was tempered by reality. The fringe groups grew restless and agitated, especially in Jerusalem. For the city's religious and Charedi inhabitants, the battle loomed on two fronts: on the one hand, they were fighting for the character of the state, and on the other, for the character of the city. Jerusalem was a holy city with a special role in Jewish theology, but also a divided city in which the administrative system of the British Mandate no longer functioned. In addition, it was home to a population that was largely religious. A new municipal framework with a new set of bylaws was required, but because Jerusalem was not recognized as part of the state, even by Israel, the municipality that came into being would be operating outside the jurisdiction of the Israeli government.[63] The political tug of war in Jerusalem thus grew even stronger. Jerusalem became the arena for public protest – on issues of concern to the religious sector, mainly the character of public sphere, as well as issues related to the city's national and international standing. This served as the foundation for political cooperation between the Revisionist right and local religious and Charedi parties, which reached a peak with the establishment of a coalition led by Zalman Shragai of Hapoe'l Hamizrachi after the municipal elections in 1950. It was a political alliance that sprang at the core from collaborative efforts to organize protests against Shabbat desecration. The election results attested to the mounting strength of the religious right-wing and Charedi sector. This coalition, made up of parties which sat in the opposition in the national government, was greeted with suspicion and dismay by Israel's national leaders, who did all they could to cripple it. The Jerusalem city council thus became a political battleground

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61 Summary of the police activity against the members of Brit Qanaim, written by the Jerusalem Police commander, ISA, file 2/75/5/6 (in Hebrew).

62 *'Divrei Haknesset* (protocol of the Israeli Parliament), Session 61, July 27 1949. "Stones and Batons in the Shabbat Wars Between Religious and Mapam," *Ma'ariv*, August 27 1950.

63 Motti Golani, "Zionism without Zion: The Position of the Pre-state and National Leadership of Israel on the Jerusalem Question 1947–1949," in *Divided Jerusalem 1948–1967*, ed. Avi Bareli (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 1995), 30–52.

where the local parties fought between themselves and also with the government.[64]

This internal fighting in the city council paralyzed the work of the municipality, but it was also a catalyst for radicalism. The political battles moved into the streets, sparking demonstrations and displays of militancy. Charedi organizations were established to fight Shabbat desecration that joined forces with groups from outside the Charedi world. HaMoe'tza lema'an hashabbat (Council for the Sabbath), affiliated with the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Jerusalem, then headed by Rabbi Yehuda Leib Maimon, organized outreach in secular communities to promote religious observance throughout the country. Among the leaders of Brit Hashabbat (Shabbat Covenant), which masterminded the Shabbat demonstrations, were Israel's two chief rabbis. This organization drafted the "Shabbat law" which it sought to pass as a municipal bylaw in Jerusalem.

Outside movie theaters in Jerusalem, big posters hung by the Mapai-dominated Workers' Council declared: "Anyone who defies the laws of the state or its constitution will be met with forceful resistance... Down with the appalling propaganda of the forces of darkness in the Yishuv. The community of workers, Jerusalem's intelligent majority, will join the forces of modernity to stamp out this plot."[65] The militancy of the socialist youth movements was regarded by everyone, but especially the religious and Charedi public, as an "undeclared culture war on religious Judaism in Israel."[66] This struggle strengthened ties between the religious denominations, and led to an alliance between the religious moderates and extremist groups like Neturei Qarta that were driven by a desire to incite religious-secular friction and rebellion against the state. At the same time, religious radicals were brought together with right-wing radicals under the auspices of Eldad's newspaper *Sulam*.

Zealots and the Underground

As political tension between religious and secular Jews in Jerusalem ran high, rumors began to circulate about an anti-establishment Charedi underground. These rumors were set off by a series of arson attacks targeting vehicles and places of entertainment across the country that were open on Shabbat. While the

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64 Ofira Gruweis-Kovalsky, "Between National Politic to Local Politics," in *Jerusalem*, ed. Arnon Golan and Amnon Ramon (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, forthcoming).

65 Deskal, *Non Parliamentary*, 27.

66 "From Stumbling to Stumbling," *HaModia*', January 5 1951.

rabbis emphatically denied the existence of an underground, such claims suggested a possible link between the far right and Charedi groups in the context of Lechi terror in Jerusalem. Police reports regularly stated that the electoral success of the religious parties in the 1950 municipal elections was credited in some Charedi circles to the Shabbat demonstrations, which were accompanied by physical force.[67] Mapai's newspaper *HaDor* lay the blame for the tense atmosphere in Jerusalem on the Charedim due to their "conspiracies to win the municipal leadership."[68] The Charedim saw this as incitement against their community, which was reflected in the responses of their rabbis and newspapers.[69] Despite this talk of an underground, internal memos of the security services ruled this out and attributed the terror supposedly carried out by the religious underground in November 1950, in this case arson, to the "unpremeditated act of random individuals."[70]

That same month as the arson attacks spread to Jerusalem, the newspapers reported an attempt to set fire to the central bus station in Jerusalem. The incident, which took place early Friday morning, was said to be the work of an unknown group by the name of Brit Qana'im.

Up until this point, the young people of Tse'iray Agudat Yisrael had mainly devoted themselves to educational work with the children of Yemenite immigrants living in transit camps. A political battle was raging over what schools they would be sent to, and the Yemenites as a whole were being belittled by the establishment. According to the Jewish Agency, the Charedi activists, students from *B'nai- Barak*s Ponevetz yeshiva, were guilty of "incitement, distributing flyers, convincing the Yemenites that they were being brainwashed and religiously manipulated, and warning them against the 'eaters of carrion and non-kosher food' in whose midst they lived". At a Jewish Agency Executive meeting, it was reported that "these young people were acting on their own, without party authorization."[71] Some members of the executive demanded that they be barred from entering the camps. Despite the grave suspicions against them and the decision to track their movements and keep them under surveillance, intelligence agents discovered no evidence of an underground. None of the reported vio-

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67 Summary of the police activity against the members of Brit Qanaim, written by the Jerusalem Police commander, ISA, file 2/75/5/6 (in Hebrew).

68 "Set Fire in Jerusalem," *Hador*, January 21 1951.

69 "HaDor falsely libel Agudat Yisrael," *HaModia*', March 20 1951.

70 Summary of the police activity against the members of Brit Qanaim, written by the Jerusalem Police commander, ISA, file 2/75/5/6 (in Hebrew).

71 Protocol of the Jewish Agency Executive, Central Zionist Archive, February 20 1950, 17 (in Hebrew).

lence, including arson, was deemed the work of a clandestine organization. The security services worried that the radicalization of the young people might lead in this direction, but in the neighborhoods of Jerusalem the acts of arson and talk of an underground were portrayed as a government conspiracy to marginalize the religious sector. According to the police, religious groups were spreading the word that the cases of arson were "a provocation by the workers parties and especially the secretary of the Jerusalem Workers Council, Moshe Bara'm" (1911– 1986).[72]

In response to the tempest over religious observance in the State of Israel, groups of young Charedim across the country began to work behind the scenes in several cities at once, lobbying for change in Charedi politics and, above all, challenging the community's traditional leadership.[73] The most visible of them was the Jerusalem group, which refused to accept the authority of Agudat Yisrael. These groups were monitored by the security services, but surveillance failed to produce incriminating evidence. Intelligence reports began to note a growing flurry of activity in Jerusalem: "From time to time we receive reports, admittedly insufficiently verified, of large quantities of weapons in the possession of various bands of religious extremists in Jerusalem."[74] In January 1951, after another attempt to set buses on fire in Jerusalem, nine suspects were rounded up. According to the charge sheet, all belonged to Neturei Qarta.[75] Despite his ideological differences with this sect, Moshe Porush (1893–1983) of Agudat Yisrael, the Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, interceded on their behalf and negotiated their release.[76] The national-religious camp was convinced that the vandalism was the work of "some group seeking to blacken the reputation of the religious public in Jerusalem."[77]

At this stage, political pressure began to be exerted on the police and security forces to stop the wave of arson attacks. The issue was brought up the Knesset when MK Reuven Shari (1903–1989) of Mapai[78] addressed a parliamentary query

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72 Top Secret Letter from the Head of the Police General Department to the Head of the Police Investigation Department, Jannuary 21 1951. ISA, file 2/75/5/6 (in Hebrew).

73 Friedman, *The Origin of the Haredi Society*, 64; "Open crisis in Agudat Yisrael, *Ma'ariv*," December 31 1950; "Putsch against Y. M Levin Inside Agudat Yisrael," *A'l HaMishmar*, January 1 1951; *HaTzofeh*, January 1 1951; *Davar*, January 2, 1951.

74 Summary of the police activity against the members of Brit Qanaim, written by the Jerusalem Police commander, ISA, file 2/75/5/6 (in Hebrew).

75 "Shabbat Zealot set Fire Cars in Jerusalem," *Davar*, January 21 1951.

76 "7 cars were set on Fire by Shabbat Zealot," *Herut*, January 21 1951.

77 "Sin Drags Another Sin," *HaTzofeh*, January 22 1951.

78 1903–1989, Jerusalem resident, Secretary of the Jerusalem Workers Council before Moshe Baram and Deputy of the Jerusalem Mayor Daniel Auster 1948–1950.

to the Minister of Police on the subject of car-torchings.[79] The police reiterated its claim that the violence in Jerusalem was a product of the municipal elections, and the press in Israel and around the world picked it up. *The New York Times* ran a story that "Election of religious mayor stokes extremist violence."[80] The Charedi newspaper *HaModia'* stressed that the chief rabbis and the Council of Torah Sages also condemned the arsonists."[81] *HaTzofeh*, the organ of the Mizrachi movement, noted that Brit Qanaim and its actions were not part of Neturei Qarta but rather a band of "leftovers from the defunct religious wing of Lechi."[82] *A'l HaMishmar*, affiliated with Mapam, described the culprits as a "well-organized gang of thugs who probably learned their trade as insurgents back in the days of the underground."[83] Intelligence officers accused the mayor, Zalman Shragai (1899 – 1995), of collaboration with the Charedi underground and providing it with political backing.[84]

In May 1951, the Jerusalem police chief appeared before the top commanders of the police force to report an alleged plot by this underground: "On the evening of May 14, 1951, our informant exposed a plan to toss an incendiary device into the Knesset plenum which would ignite and fill the hall with smoke while the MKs were debating the conscription of women."[85] The police chief claimed this was part of a special operation code-named "Operation Bride" which the group envisaged as the pinnacle of its achievements.[86] From testimony gathered after the arrests, the group was to enter the visitors' gallery with the bomb and those who remained outside would shut off the electricity at the appointed time. When the hall went dark, the lit bomb would be thrown from the balcony.[87] These details were repeated by all the detainees who were interrogated. Yehuda Reider, identified as the ringleader and sentenced to prison for his part in the

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79 'Divrei Haknesset' (protocol of the Israeli Parliament), Session 220, January 30 1951, 913.
80 Sydney Gruson, "Zealots in Israel Reviving Struggle; Religious Group Burns Cars in Jerusalem in its Fight for Sabbath Observance," *New York Times*, January 23 1951.
81 "The Minister of Police Informed that the Cars Lighters were Bunch of Fanatics," *HaModia'*, January 21 1951.
82 "The Religious Organizations will be Activated against Cars Lighters," *HaTzofeh,* March 7 1951.
83 "Cars were set on fire again in Jerusalem," *A'l HaMishmar*, March 15 1951.
84 Summary of the police activity against the members of Brit Qanaim, written by the Jerusalem Police commander, ISA, file 2/75/5/6 (in Hebrew).
85 Summary of the police activity against the members of Brit Qanaim, written by the Jerusalem Police commander, ISA, file 2/75/5/6 (in Hebrew).
86 "The Dangerous Underground Waked up," *Ma'ariv,* March 26 1952.
87 Summary of the police activity against the members of Brit Qanaim, written by the Jerusalem Police commander, ISA, file 2/75/5/6. (in Hebrew).

affair, shed light on some of the actions leading up to it: "The next day we met again. We discussed the matter of entry tickets and turning off the lights. I was the one who wrote up the minutes of this meeting." While he outlined all stages of the operation as intended, he pointed out that the original plan was dropped a day before they went into action.[88] Other group members who stood trial confirmed the cancellation of the plan in its original form, and the report of the chief of police supports this:[89]

> As luck would have it, the bomb was found in the possession of the Shin Bet informer, who was trying to pass it on to another group member, without knowing that this member was also an informer. So these two informers were trying as best they could to get one another to take the bomb (and get the other person arrested). The district commander took both of them into custody on the spot, as they clutched the bomb, along with the other fellows in the gallery and around the Knesset, followed by a sweeping round of arrests.[90]

So, the Jerusalem police chief claimed that the bomb was smuggled into the Knesset by a Shin Bet operative who was instructed to hand it to another person in order to implicate the group as a whole and wipe it out once and for all. It is hard not to reach the conclusion that the security establishment was manufacturing evidence on the assumption that this community was behind the torching of the cars. In the wake of this episode, some fifty Haredi Jews were rounded up and deported to Camp Jallame in the north of the country on charges of membership in an underground. The basis for these arrests was Regulation 111 of the 1945 Palestine Defense Emergency Regulations. All the detainees were Charedi men affiliated with Agudat Yisrael. The police were severely reprimanded for their rough treatment of the suspects, leading to the first parliamentary commission of inquiry in the history of the State of Israel.[91] The commission found that the allegations of severe police brutality were true: "The brutality in Jallame was planned, not coincidental or the impulsive, random behavior of an individual police officer or sergeant."[92] Four suspects were brought to trial for treason but the proceedings ended in a whisper. In spite of the gravity of the charges, none of the accused was sentenced to more than a few months in jail, and all were pardoned before serving time.

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88 "Testimony of the Police Inspectors," *HaTzofeh*, June 1 1951; *Herut*, June 1 1951.
89 "New discoveries on "Operation Bride," *Davar*, June 1 1951.
90 Summary of the police activity against the members of Brit Qanaim, written by the Jerusalem Police commander, ISA, file 2/75/5/6 (in Hebrew).
91 'Divrei Haknesset', (protocol of the Israeli Parliament), Session: 256–259, May 28–30 1951.
92 'Divrei Haknesset', (protocol of the Israeli Parliament), Report of the parliamentary committee of inquiry on the issue of the detainees in the Jallame camp. August 3 1951, 2209.

Conclusion

The radicalization of the right-wing and the Charedi sector can be traced back to the unending battle over the character of Jewish public sphere in the newly-founded state. For political reasons, two groups were pushed to the sidelines: the Revisionist right and the ultra-Orthodox community. Jerusalem was home to a large concentration of Charedim and supporters of the right. The city's unresolved international status added fuel to the flames of the debate and played a part in the radicalization of these two groups. In contrast to the image projected by these groups and the perceived ties between them, they followed different directions. For the right and left-wing extremists who belonged to Lechi before the establishment of the state, terrorism was seen as a legitimate tool for achieving political goals. Thus, as the situation grew more chaotic, they leaned even more towards radicalism. The Charedi radicals cut themselves off from Israeli politics. This was true not only for Neturei Qarta, but also for the ultra-Orthodox mainstream, Agudat Yisrael, which ran in the Knesset elections. It was a total walkout from the political system and the state: They refused to join the coalition at any price, the young people declined to serve in the army, and the Charedi community became a "society of learners".

The results of the Jerusalem municipal elections strengthened the Charedi/religious right and the right wing in Jerusalem. The coalition that was formed, which was on the opposite side of the political divide, was seen as a threat by the national government, which did everything possible to strew obstacles in its path. The Jerusalem city council became a political battlefront plagued not only by fighting between coalition partners but between the municipality and the government. In addition to bringing the work of the municipality to a standstill, the discord was a catalyst for radicalism: the political disputes moved into the streets, sparking demonstrations and acts of violence. As the concerns specific to Jerusalem merged with matters of national import, the local aspect of the battle took a step back, whereas the core issue, with its explosive power for the country as a whole, intensified. The round of events that followed the news of a Charedi underground operating in Jerusalem only increased Charedi hostility toward the state, encouraged insularity, and stoked religious fanaticism. At the same time, the acts of terror continued, largely because it was not this community that was behind them. In retrospect, one might even say that the events of this period solidified the alliance of outcasts that took shape in earnest after the political upheaval of 1977.

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