Russell and Wittgenstein on Proposition, Judgement, and Truth

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents v
3. Philosophy of Language and Linguistics: The Legacy of Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. Preface 1
4. Mapping the Ancient City: Historical Linguistics and Conceptual Clarification 11
5. Russell and Wittgenstein on Proposition, Judgement, and Truth 29
6. How to Talk (Precisely) about Visual Perception? The Case of the Duck / Rabbit 53
7. Priority of Thought or Priority of Language 71
8. On the Ambiguity in Definite Descriptions 99
9. Proceduralism and Ontologico- Historical Understanding in the Philosophy of Language 115
10. Quine’s Criticisms of Semantics 139
11. Who Wants to Be a Russellian about Names? 161
12. Bradley, Russell, and the Structure of Thought 181
13. Logic and the Pursuit of Meaning 193
14. Objects, Concepts, Unity 213
15. The Legacy of Frege and the Linguistic Theory of Predication 225
16. Russell, Wittgenstein, and the Notion of False Propositions 255
17. Categorial Grammar and the Foundations of the Philosophy of Language 269
18. Index 295