Volker Munz, Klaus Puhl, Joseph Wang

Language and World. Part Two

Signs, Minds and Actions

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Preface

This is the second of two volumes containing the proceedings of the 32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg/Lower Austria, August 2009.

The first of these two volumes “Language and World” is solely dedicated to Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Although several of the contributions collected in the present volume do refer to Wittgenstein, the articles published here also tackle central issues that are not directly related to his work. The five sections of this book deal with the following topics: „Theories of the Linguistic Sign“, „Language and Action“, „Language and Consciousness“, „Language and Metaphysics“, „Reality and Construction“. An additional interdisciplinary workshop was dedicated to Wittgenstein and literature. Wittgenstein himself saw close similarities between poetry and philosophy and was not willing to draw a distinction between the two. Furthermore his influence on literature and the arts is still very strong.

The editors would like to express their gratitude to all the contributors and to those who took part in the many and lively discussions during the conference. Without them this volume would never have happened.

We would also like to thank the board of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society and our publisher Dr. Rafael Hüntelmann for supporting us all the way through.

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Volker A. Munz, Klaus Puhl, Joseph Wang

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The Coherence Theory of Truth: Russell's Worst Invention?

Stewart Candlish and *Nic Damnjanovic, Perth*

Ralph Walker once attributed to Wittgenstein a coherence theory of truth, according to which the truth of a proposition is a matter of its relations, not to an extra-propositional reality, but to other propositions (Walker 1989). Of course, Wittgenstein is not so easily pinned down. We believe, though, that *none* of the philosophers usually labelled 'coherence theorists' actually held the view just described (which is how the coherence theory is nowadays thought of, with coherence understood as something stronger than consistency but weaker than entailment). Here, however, we will argue for a more modest conclusion. Our goal is to show that the coherence theory was the invention of Bertrand Russell and that those he accused of holding the view, now normally thought of as paradigm coherence theorists—the British Idealists—held instead an identity theory of truth. But the fact that prime candidates for coherence theorists are no such thing is more than a mere historical curiosity. Instead, as we shall argue in the final section, it's a sign of something significant, namely, that the coherence theory, when thought through, inevitably emerges as but a subspecies of the identity theory of truth.

1. The British Idealists' Theory of Truth

Whenever the coherence theory is attributed to any real philosopher, this is typically to the British Monistic Idealists Bradley and Joachim, and their American follower Blanshard. Yet, as we will argue, none of these philosophers actually held this view. How, then, did they come to be referred to as coherence theorists, and what did they in fact say about truth?

The *label*, 'the coherence theory of truth', seems to have come from Russell. In 1907 he published a seminal article, 'On the Nature of Truth'[1] which criticized the views expressed in Harold Joachim's 1906 book, *The Nature of Truth*. In that book Joachim defended metaphysical monism, attacked the correspondence theory of truth and argued that the essence of truth is 'coherence'. He did not, however, use the label the 'coherence theory of truth'. In contrast, Russell, although he starts out by designating Joachim's account as the 'monistic theory' soon starts referring to it as a 'coherence-theory'. One year later G. F. Stout (1908) also used the term 'coherence' of monistic idealist views of truth and F. H. Bradley (1908), responding to Stout, then dropped his own vocabulary of 'system' and adopted the term 'coherence'. From that point on, the theory of truth held by the British Idealists came to be referred to as the coherence theory of truth. But it is very important to see that their real theory of truth is not at all what is these days thought of as the coherence theory. We can see this by retracing their arguments.[2]

Take Bradley as an example, since his views inspired those of the others. His thoughts on truth originate in his metaphysics: for him, reality itself is a coherent system. The label 'coherence' carries no special weight here; it is just a way of marking the refusal to give even everyday common-sense pluralism any metaphysical significance, while drawing back from a Parmenidean conception of the world as an undifferentiated whole. That is, in Bradley's view, both everyday thought and extreme pluralist ontologies like Hume's or Russell's involve the abstraction of objects and facts from the situations in which they are embedded. His hostility to this abstraction is far-reaching enough to ensure that, according to his philosophical logic, at most one judgment can be true—that which encapsulates

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[1] This article was first published in the 1906/07 volume of *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. In 1910 he re-published, under the title 'The Monistic Theory of Truth', and with only trivial variations, the first two of its original three sections in his much-reprinted collection, *Philosophical Essays*, with the last part dropped and a new essay (Russell 1910c) put in its place. He chose to reprint a large slab of this 1907 essay in his widely read book of 1959, *My Philosophical Development.*

[2] Ayer (1952) also argued that the British Idealists did not hold a coherence theory of truth. Instead, he claimed, the 'coherence' label was actually applied to them in virtue of their theory of meaning.

reality in its entirety. He can account for falsehood as a falling short of this vast judgment and hence as an abstraction of part of reality from the whole. That judgment is the least true which is the most distant from the whole of reality.

But the consequences of his ontology are more extreme even than this. The one comprehensive judgment, even if possible, would still fall short. All judgments, in Bradley's view, distort reality by cutting it up into illusory fragments, tearing apart in their expression that which in experience is a unified whole. Accordingly, even this one gigantic all-encompassing judgment, for the very reason that it involves description, will be infected by falsehood unless it ceases altogether to be a judgment, abandoning the predicative and relational machinery of thought. The only way in which it can be adequate in its expression is by taking on the very nature of the reality it is meant to be about; and the only way to do that is by *becoming* that reality. This apparently bizarre claim becomes intelligible if seen as both the most extreme expression of his hostility to abstraction and a reaction to the most fundamental of his objections to the correspondence theory, which is the same as Frege's (1918, 3): that for there to be correspondence rather than identity between judgment and reality, the judgment must differ from reality and to the extent that it differs must distort and so falsify it. In a thoroughgoing monism, thought itself can't stand outside the all-encompassing whole.

Primarily, then, the monistic idealists had a metaphysics that forced them to adopt an *identity theory of truth;* that a truth-bearer can be true only by being identical with reality. And it's important to see that their view is an identity theory, and incompatible with what's standardly understood as a coherence theory. For the latter, as now understood, maintains that truth is a certain sort of relation that holds between truth-bearers (instead of between truth-bearers and reality) and that a truth-bearer is true if and only if it belongs to some specifiably coherent set of truth-bearers. This whole apparatus of terms in relation was anathema to the idealists, so that even in the final coherent system we can't talk of individual truth-bearers making up the system and each bearer being true. Furthermore, since truth is identity with reality, and it is possible to hold this view even if one does not think that reality is a coherent whole (as some pluralists might by, e.g., refusing to draw a distinction between true propositions and facts), truth is only derivatively a matter of coherence. For the monistic idealists, coherence is part of the nature of truth because on their view truth is identity with reality and reality is coherent. It is this fact that explains why Joachim, and later Blanshard in *The Nature of Thought*, slip into saying that the nature of truth is coherence.

2. Russell and 'The Coherence Theory'

We have seen how the British Idealists' identity theory came to be labelled the 'coherence theory' of truth. But how did we come to identify their position with what we now think of as the coherence theory of truth? The answer, again, lies with Russell.

In Part I of his 1907 paper, Russell sets out the coherence theory and argues against it. The most influential aspect of Russell's attack has been his objection that "it may be perfectly possible to construct a coherent whole of *false* propositions in which 'Bishop Stubbs was hanged for murder' would find a place"[3]. Russell concludes that, from what the coherence theory tells us, this proposition would be true. In raising this as an objection to the 'coherence theory of truth', Russell implies that on this view the truth of a proposition consists in its being a member of some 'coherent' set of propositions. Thus, with this objection he, in effect, created the coherence theory as we now understand it. Moreover, since he held himself out to be criticizing the view of the British Idealists, he also implied that they were committed to this absurd view. The influence of his paper can be seen 20 years later in Ramsey's discussion of the coherence theory, in which he says of it that "it is very easy to reduce to absurdity and after Mr Russell's amusing essay on 'The Monistic Theory of Truth' it is difficult to see how anyone can still cling to it"[4].

Russell's 1907 paper is interesting in this context not only because it invents the coherence theory of truth and its now standard 'refutation', but also because it contains the first, tentative, version of Russell's famous multiple relation theory of judgment. (We may call this the 1907 version,

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[3] Russell 1907, 136. It would have been well known to Russell's audience that Bishop Stubbs was a highly respectable Anglican divine.

[4] Ramsey 1927, 25. Ramsey was referring to the 1910 version of Russell's original paper.

to distinguish it from the second and non-tentative version of 1910, and from Russell's 1912 and 1913 versions, both of them modifications of the 1910 theory in response to objections.) This co-incidence isn't mere coincidence, as we can see by looking at the dialectic of Russell's argument.

Having attacked the coherence theory in Part I, he argues in Part II against a certain view of relations, namely "that relations are always grounded in the nature of their terms" (28), and alleges that this view is "an axiom", "the axiom of internal relations", upon which is based the metaphysics in which the coherence theory is embedded. In Part III, he sketches "the kind of theory, as to the nature of truth, which results from rejection of the axiom" (loc. cit.).

The way in which he introduces this new theory is striking. His rejection of the view that "experiencing makes a difference to the facts" (44) is, he says, a consequence of the rejection of the axiom of internal relations. He goes on:

> But from the point of view of the theory of truth, it is a very important consequence, since it sets facts and our knowledge of them in two different spheres, and leaves the facts completely independent of our knowledge. (45)

He assumes that this new theory of truth is going to require a theory of judgment—indeed, his writings in this period typically treat the two topics side-by-side—and he begins with the account of judgment that he had embraced in *The Principles of Mathematics*: judgment is a binary relation between one object, a mind, and one other, a proposition, understood as a unified entity not dependent on any mind for its existence. And he adds to that theory of judgment a variant of the theory of truth from the same work, what is now often called 'primitivism'; this variant moves the primitive property of truth from facts, where it had resided in 1903, to beliefs: "Truth, then, we might suppose, is the quality of beliefs which have facts for their objects, and falsehood is the quality of other beliefs" (45).

This variant is an anticipation of Russell's 1912 defense of the multiple relation theory of judgment against an objection from Stout, moving the property of relations he called 'sense' from the judged relation to the relation of judging. Although we might think of this account of truth as a form of primitivism, Russell himself thought it "a form of the correspondence theory" (loc. cit.). But he is uneasy about it, as the phrase "we might suppose" indicates, because of a worry he had expressed as early as 1904 and which he immediately goes on to explain here (loc. cit.), that it is hard to confine falsehood merely to beliefs, so that the variant risks collapsing into the original account, which he now finds problematic:

> But this simple view is rather difficult to defend against objections of various kinds, tending to show that there are not only mistaken beliefs, but also non-facts, which are the objectively false objects of mistaken beliefs.

And in this context, as a provisional solution, he comes up with the initial version of the multiple relation theory of judgment, which he thinks may enable him to retain the correspondence theory of truth while evading the implausibility of objective falsehoods. But, he says: "As between the above two views of truth, I do not at present see how to decide" (49).

To sum up, then: what we see emerging here, all at once, are the following. 1) The coherence theory of truth, pinned on the British Idealists and presented as readily refutable. 2) The correspondence theory of truth, seemingly thought of as essential to the idea that "facts [are] completely independent of our knowledge" (45). 3) The multiple relation theory of judgment, whose role at this stage is to preserve the correspondence theory of truth from problems about falsehood.

3. From Coherence to Identity

We have seen that the 'coherence theory' label was first provided by Russell in attempting to respond to the position held by the British Idealists, and Russell's labelling and redescription of their position helped contribute to the construction of the coherence theory straw man which then took on a life of its own. But if Russell is to blame for creating the coherence theory of truth, his paper also contains the resources for removing that theory from its place of prominence. For if we follow through one of the more insightful criticisms he made of the theory he described, we can begin to see why the coherence theory leads inevitably to the identity theory of truth, and is in fact merely a subspecies of it.

However unfair it was to its intended targets, Joachim and Bradley, the following observation from Russell is acute:

> And the objection to the coherence-theory lies in this, that it presupposes a more usual meaning of truth and falsehood in constructing its coherent whole, and that this more usual meaning, though indispensable to the theory, cannot be explained by means of the theory. (Russell 1907, 33; 1910b, 136.)

The acuteness of this observation lies in the fact that behind much discussion of the coherence theory seems to be the thought that, for the coherentist, there is something beyond the realm of judgment that we should like to talk about, but (perhaps because of epistemic problems), we can't manage it, or at least can't get it to function in a truth-making role, so we'll ignore it and instead confine ourselves to the realm of what we judge. But this coherentist rhetoric betrays a double-mindedness, since it wants to both keep the world beyond the realm of judgment *and* ignore it as irrelevant to truth. That is, coherentists seem to want to adopt what Putnam has called the internalist perspective, and yet the images of confinement suggest that there is, after all, a world beyond the coherent set of propositions.

This double-mindedness is hardly surprising. For consider the following *correspondence intuition* (sometimes, the *correspondence platitude*).

> *Correspondence Intuition*: If something is true, it's true *because* of the way the world is.

Unlike the coherence theory, this thesis seems to survive a form of Moore's Open Question argument, which might be put like this: "I know that what you say corresponds to reality, but is it true?"—as opposed to, "I know that what you say belongs to the preferred set of judgments, but is it (or any of them) true?" What are would-be coherence theorists to say about this deeply embedded intuition? Should they accept or reject it? While it may seem odd to suppose that anyone opposed to the correspondence theory would accept the correspondence intuition, even as a surface platitude, historically it has been quite common. In fact, it is because they accepted the correspondence intuition that Bradley and Bosanquet have been mistaken for correspondence theorists—Bosanquet complained about this (1911, 263), as did Bradley.[5] But both acceptance and rejection pose awkward consequences for those inclined to coherentism but not idealism: ac-

[5] Deflationists, too, sometimes accept the correspondence intuition—see Horwich 1998, 104-5, for example.

cepting it seems to lead them directly to a form of idealism; rejecting it can look like a *reductio*.

The correspondence intuition displays a binary picture underlying much of the discussion of truth. If we put on one side complicating considerations arising from epistemological concerns, the picture involves a distinction between what we talk about, on the one hand, and what we say about it on the other. It appears time and again in different guises: the distinction between the realm of reference and the realm of sense; between facts and propositions; between truth-makers and truth-bearers; and so on. This picture sits very naturally with the correspondence theory of truth, but it's still influencing even those who have indulged in coherentist talk. Hence their double-mindedness.

And of course once one exposes this kind of double-mindedness, and instead takes the coherence theory completely seriously by insisting that our truth-makers belong in the realm of sense, then the other side of the binary divide really does drop out as irrelevant. All we are left with is the world of judgments: it is some preferred set in this world that we are *really* talking about, and which constitutes reality. Thus similarly acute, even though Russell himself underestimates its significance, is his observation from earlier in the same paper:

> The view that truth is one may be called "logical monism"; it is, of course, closely connected with ontological monism, *i.e.*, the doctrine that Reality is one. (Russell 1907, 28; 1910b, 131.)

And now it's clear that coherence is neither here nor there. For a judgment to be true is just for it to belong to the set. That is the minimal sense in which Reality is one. And that is an identity theory of truth, available (on different grounds) to monists and pluralists alike.

So, when thought through, the coherence theory is but one special case of the identity theory of truth: it is not, therefore, the main rival to the correspondence theory that it is usually taken to be.[6] But, as a species of identity theory, the coherence theory, with its idealist and monist metaphysics, is particularly hard even to comprehend. And it carries with it the

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[6] One can see this at work in McDowell 1994, who is sympathetic to the internalist perspective but wary of the double-mindedness we have spoken of. As a result, he too comes to rest with an identity theory of truth.

problem that led Russell to abandon his 1903 binary relation theory of judgment for the multiple relation theory. That problem is, giving a sensible account of falsehood. Such a view seems unlikely to have attracted many good philosophers in twentieth-century analytic philosophy. As we mentioned at the beginning, we think it in fact attracted none. But that is an argument for another paper.

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Names, Nonsubstitutivity and the Tanney Puzzle

Laurence Goldstein, Kent

I. Peter Hacker: the Name

Many propositions of the *Tractatus* are elusive; many are dubious. But one that seems so obvious as to be hardly worth expressing is 'A name refers to (bedeutet) an object. The object is its referent (Bedeutung)' (3.203). This claim about names is exactly the kind of philosophical 'theory' that, in later writings, Wittgenstein seeks to undermine by the simple expedient of looking closely at how words are actually used. How are names used – do they always serve to refer to their bearers?

Peter Hacker leaves the conference earlier than expected, on Wednesday, but, quite by chance, soon after he does so, another participant joins the conference and this person, though not the spitting image of Peter, resembles him quite strikingly. I am too lazy, so late in the day, to learn this new guy's name, but, just for a laugh, when speaking with friends, I refer to him as 'Peter Hacker' and my friends start adopting this usage too. I never get close enough to the new guy to read his name badge, but you can see, even at a distance, that it is quite a long name. So my friends and I are using the name 'Peter Hacker' to refer to someone whom we know not to be the bearer of that name. Consider some further uses of the name 'Hacker':

- I see Peter across a crowded room and joyfully cry out 'Hacker', choosing the surname because I know there to be many Peters in the room but only one Hacker.
- I confide to someone 'Hacker is so called because he breaks into other people's computers'.

- I hear that the astonishingly prolific Professor Hacker has several new volumes coming out in November and tell a colleague 'I shall have to clear more space for Hacker on my bookshelf'.
- I see James Conant emerging from a conference room in which he has just presented a paper defending the 'resolute' reading of the *Tractatus*. He is looking miserable, crestfallen, almost suicidal. Although I do not know who was in the evidently hostile audience, I can make an educated guess at the identity of one member most likely to have given the speaker a rough ride, and, nodding towards Unlucky Jim, I knowingly whisper to my companion 'Hacker'.

In all of these cases I am using the name 'Hacker' to do something other than to name or refer to Peter Hacker, and in not all of these cases could I properly substitute the name 'Peter' for 'Hacker'. My aim in this paper is to examine apparent cases of failure of substitutivity of co-referring expressions, with a view to showing how those that have proved tricky to understand can be understood quite easily once Wittgenstein's reflections on the uses of proper names are grasped. It is to their use that we should be looking: 'Every sign *by itself* seems dead. *What* gives it life? – In use it is *alive*. Is life breathed into it there? – Or is the use its breath?' (*PI* §432).[1]

II. The Fragility of Intuition

In his recent book *The Philosophy of Philosophy*, Timothy Williamson claims 'that much contemporary philosophy is vitiated by supposing that evidence in philosophy consists of intuitions which successful theory must explain' (Williamson 2007: 5). In an otherwise scathing (but witty) review of that book, Hacker writes 'This is one point in Williamson's book which

[1] Some may here see a contrast with the *Tractatus* which seems to suggest that names are stagnant signs that represent objects (3.21). But, according to the *Tractatus*, it is *in a proposition* (Satz) that a name is the representative of an object (3.22), and a proposition is a propositional sign *in use* (3.11, 3.12, 3.326). There *is* a genuine contrast, however, because, in the *Tractatus*, the use of a proposition is a matter of projecting a possible situation, presenting a possible state of affairs, whereas the later writings are an effort to explore the *multiplicity* of uses to which sentences can be put.

is dead right'.[2] The idea that the job of philosophy is to vindicate rather than to question commonsense intuitions is, indeed a repugnant one, and the eponymous school of philosophy that championed commonsense is rarely mentioned these days, even inside Scotland. However, in the case of *semantic* intuitions, matters are more problematic. Semantic intuition just is commonsense about what words mean, and what words mean is how they are commonly used. Except in the case of certain technical expressions for an authoritative verdict on the correct meaning of which we defer to experts, meaning just is common use. For an ordinary expression, it would be absurd to claim that how it is used on the street, especially when that use is recorded in reputable, up-to-date dictionaries, is not the (or, at least, a) meaning of that expression.[3] So one would be right to be wary of a philosophical theory that entails that the meaning that almost all of us attach to a particular word is incorrect. There have been such theories. Tarski argued that our ordinary use of 'true' is confused; Dennett, to the same conclusion about our ordinary use of the word 'pain'; Churchland has argued that our ordinary conception of beliefs as being part of the furniture of the mind is mistaken. One ought to be suspicious of such theories – which is not to say that they should be rejected without a hearing.

What about our semantic intuitions as they relate to the meanings and, consequently, the truth-values of whole sentences? In the case of single non-technical words, community use is constitutive of their meaning, but, in the case of many sentences, most members of a reputable community may be *wrong* about their truth value. This is obviously how it is with empirical claims that seemed, once upon a time, to be commonsensical but which subsequent science showed to be false. But it is also true of rather pedestrian sentences, where no science, but just a little interrogation of our semantic intuitions, may cause us to reverse our original, intuitive, assignments of meaning and of truth-value (Bach 2002). What happens, then, when a semantic theory entails that a sentence that most of us would say is true is false? Do we insist that to hold fast to the theory and abandon intuition is to allow the theoretical tail to wag the dog of good sense, or do we

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2 See also Hintikka 1999.

3 For an interesting discussion of our intuitions regarding the correct use of factive verbs, see Steven Pinker 2007, 7-8.

say that to hold fast to a semantic intuition that a plausible theory has revealed to be questionable is dogmatic and antithetical to the advancement of knowledge?

III. The Tanney Puzzle

We present here a 'case study' that takes as its starting point the fact that most people would accept as true

1) Lois kissed Superman before she kissed Clark Kent.

but would reject as false

2) Lois kissed Superman before she kissed Superman.[4]

We should note that even a linguistically competent individual who is well acquainted with the movie and who is fully aware that Superman just is Clark Kent would be willing to accept 1) as an accurate description of part of the action. Julia Tanney accepts this too, but is then struck by an apparent anomaly. She writes:

> Normally, I would be very sympathetic with the claim that there was a time, t1, at which Lois kissed Superman but not (yet) Clark Kent. I note however that the sense in which Lois (at t1) had not (yet) kissed Clark Kent would be the same as that in which Oedipus, although having slept with Jocasta, had not slept with his mother. But Jocasta hanged herself and Oedipus gouged out his eyes because there was no question for them of not accepting substitutivity.

Apart from the change of *dramatis personae*, the apparently only noteworthy difference between the kissing claim 1) and

3) Oedipus slept with Jocasta before he slept with his mother.

is that less clothes and more action are involved, yet somehow, intuitively, we take 1) to be true and 3) false. So this is the Tanney puzzle, and the challenge is to find a plausible rationale for this difference in truth-value assignment.

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[4] Examples can be multiplied *ad libitum*. Most people, for example, would say that 'Clark Kent entered the phone booth and, seconds later, Clark Kent flew out' is false.

IV. Reports of Propositional Attitudes

Some semantic theorists would reject this puzzle on the grounds that there is no puzzle. They would claim that there is no difference in truth-value between 1) and 3); both statements, they would say, are false and that, if we have an inclination to say that 1) is true, this is a mistake and one that is easily diagnosed: Lois kissed Superman; since Superman is Clark Kent, she *ipso facto* kissed Clark Kent – there is no question of her kissing Superman *before* She kissed Clark. But let us look at another type of case – reports of propositional attitudes – for which this type of reply looks much less persuasive.

In direct quotation, the reporter or rapporteur (R) lets the reportee (E) speak for him/herself and, after introducing them as E's, simply reproduces E's words and mimics the force with which they were uttered by preserving the tonal features characteristic of that force . Of course, E is not literally speaking for him/herself, since it's the reporter, R, who is doing the speaking, but R, as it were, steps back and does not tamper with E's words (though R may sometimes sneer at those words or convey, by a stress or by some grammatical element, his/her belief that E was exaggerating, prevaricating or lying). In *oratio obliqua*, by contrast, there are certain changes of words that are obligatory. If Mick says (non-theatrically, non-ironically etc.) to Jerry 'Will you marry me?' then I report this episode correctly by saying 'Mick asked Jerry whether she would marry him', and if I do not alter pronouns appropriately when reporting Mick's proposal – suppose, for example, that I say 'Mick asked Jerry whether you would marry me' – then my report is unfaithful and, indeed, false.

One of the conventions, then, for the indirect reporting in English of what someone said, is that the reporter must make appropriate pronominal substitutions on pain of speaking falsely. It is easy to conceive, however of a possible language in which reported speech requires much the same grammatical paraphernalia as English, but in which the pronouns that would be used in an *oratio recta* report are obligatorily retained unaltered.[5] What about the conventions for reporting, in English, what someone *believes* or *thinks*? In belief reports in English, the same pronoun-shift rules

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[5] Unfortunately, I have not, so far, discovered such a language, but I would not bet against finding one.

apply as apply for reported speech. The rationale is obvious enough. Suppose that Mick believes that Jerry is a better person than he is. For a belief that p of which a person is conscious of believing it and is capable of articulating it, having that belief is approximately having a settled disposition to say that p. Mick, roughly speaking, has a settled disposition to say ‘Jerry is a better person than I am’, so, in reporting his belief, we are reporting what he *would say*, and therefore make the same pronominal adjustments as for reporting a saying. This suggests that, generally speaking and *ceteribus paribus*, a true report reports how a reportee would express his or her beliefs. This principle for reporting – that I call the Perspectival Principle – is not a recommendation as to literary style; it is not a principle of rhetoric but a prescription (albeit a *ceteribus paribus* prescription) for *true* reporting. The use of quotation, in a direct report is, as we have seen, another means for the reporter to stand back and let the reportee, E, speak in his or her own voice.

Confirmation that correct reporting requires, other things being equal, saying things as the reportee sees them, can be had from examining reports where the perspectives of R and E sharply differ. Let me inform you that my son believes that Santa Claus comes down the chimney every Christmas Eve. You have now been informed, even though I have used a referring expression that I believe refers to nothing and which is therefore co-referential, so far as I am concerned, with ‘The Man in the Moon’. It would be foolhardy in the extreme for me to impose my perspective in reports of my son’s Yuletide beliefs. Were I to say to you ‘My son believes that the Man in the Moon comes down the chimney every Christmas Eve’, then I would not only have misled you, but would also have told you something *false*. (My son is not so stupid as to believe that the Man in the Moon could be at two places at once – in the moon and half way down someone’s chimney.) Likewise, were I reporting to you Lois’ beliefs at a time before she became aware that Clark Kent is Superman I would be lying if I said to you ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent flies’[6], or, better, only in unusual sur-

[6] Lois is sitting in the newspaper office snatching furtive glances at Clark Kent. There is something about him that she can’t quite put her finger on. Then it occurs to her that, whenever there’s a Superman-sighting, Clark is not around. She stares hard at Clark, her mind races back over events of the last few days, and suddenly it

roundings ('Umgebungen' and 'Umstände' are terms Wittgenstein uses pretty much interchangeably, e.g. *PI* §§155, 250, 412) could I use a token of that sentence to make a true statement. Surely only those besotted by a theory to the point of insanity would claim that Oedipus, about to set sail on his honeymoon, believed that he was going off to have sex with his mother.[7] In accurately reporting his beliefs, we have to say things as *he* sees them.

V. When Substitution Fails to Preserve Truth-Value

One object may have two or more names and many uniquely identifying descriptions. If we say something true about that object then, in making that statement, it should not matter which singular term (which name or definite description of the object) we use, in the sense that a true statement should not be transformed into a false one merely by substituting a different singular term for the one used in the original statement. This seems to follow, quite trivially, from the Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. Given that 'a' and 'b' are referring expressions (names or definite descriptions) that pick out the same object, then, for any predicate 'F' the truth-value of 'Fa' has to be the same as the truth-value of 'Fb'. Or so it would seem. Yet, as we have just observed, where for 'F' we have a predicate ascribing a propositional attitude of an agent towards some object, then the singular term chosen by the speaker to refer to that object may have an influence on the truth-value of the ascription. It will be useful to look at some other contexts in which failure of substitutivity occurs.

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dawns on her that Clark Kent is Superman. Here is another example of the Perspectival Principle. Although identity is commutative, it would have been wrong (misleading, false?) of me to conclude the above story '… and suddenly it dawns on her that Superman is Clark Kent'. In my report on the revealed identity, I give prominence to, by placing it first, the name that Lois would have used to refer to the person on whom she was focusing.

[7] Among the besotted are some 'Direct Reference' theorists who would claim that Oedipus believed that he was going off to have sex with his mother, and some Freudian theorists who claim that he not only believed it but, deep down, wanted it too. The Direct Reference theorist could, however, distance himself from the Freudian by adding '… not knowing, even subconsciously, that his mother was his mother'.

The most obvious example is *metonymy*. If a referring expression is being used in a statement to refer to something other than its normal referent, then it is no surprise that the truth value of that statement is unlikely to survive replacement of that term with another that denotes the normal referent. Two slices of bread with ham between them did not leave without paying the bill, though the ham sandwich (viz., the guy whom the waitress identified via a description of what he ordered) did. If one accepts that the intentions of its user may sometimes help fix the referent of an expression, then metonymy is only apparent failure of substitutivity of co-referentials because the terms switched are not really co-referential.

Consider next quotational contexts. Here is a clearly invalid argument:

> "Beijing" contains seven letters.
> <u>Beijing = 北京</u>
> "北京" contains seven letters.

On the sort of theory of quotation pioneered by Donald Davidson (1979), quotation marks help refer to a shape by pointing out something that has it; usually what is pointed out is an inscription, a physical token. That material is *displayed* (rather than being referred to).[8] Hence exchanging the material pointed to in the first premise with some quite different material (such as the Chinese inscription) will result in reference being made to a different shape, and will result in a sentence with a different truth-value – unless, of course, that latter material is another assemblage of seven letters. On a classical alternative theory due to Tarski (1933), the grammatical subject of the first premise is the name of a name. But, again, while what is true of Beijing is true of that city by any other name, what is true of the name 'Beijing' will not generally be true of alternative names for Beijing; substitutivity *salva veritate* is not to be expected.[9] But, again, this is not a case of failure of substitutivity of co-referring expressions, because, while 'Beijing' and '北京' are co-referring names, the quotations of those names

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[8] For discussion of this, see Zemach 1985, 194.

[9] There are several other competing theories of quotation. Failure of substitutivity in quotational contexts may be regarded as a datum against which to measure, in the manner of Cappelen and Lepore 2007, the adequacy of any such theory.

are not. So, in neither metonymous nor quotational contexts is there real failure of substitutivity because, in both cases, what may have seemed the referent of the singular terms involved is not the real referent.

As is well known, Frege thought this also to be the case with attitude-ascribing contexts; he said that, in such contexts the referent (Bedeutung) of a singular term is its normal *sense* (Sinn). We are not, however, taking the Frege route. In treating reports of propositional attitudes as reports of what a reportee would *say* when expressing his or her beliefs, hopes, fears, desires etc., we are assimilating an attitude report to a report of what a reportee would say if disclosing those attitudes to the reporter in the reporter's own language. The form of a report is 'E would say, Attingly, qu (p)', where 'qu' is the function that quotes and translates E's perhaps unvoiced utterances that disclose his or her attitude, e.g. 'Pierre would say, belief-ingly, qu (Londres est jolie)'.

There is a famous example, due to Quine, which, at first sight anyway, seems to be a case where co-referring expressions genuinely cannot be switched *salva veritate*:

> Giorgione was so called because of his size.
> Giorgione = Barbarelli.
> Barbarelli was so called because of his size.

Although this example has generated a lot of discussion in the literature, it simply turns on a trick. Here is a naked exposure of the trick:

> Richard the lionhearted was so described because of his exceptional bravery.
> They say that Cedric was chicken-livered, though why he was so described, I don't know.
> Ergo, Richard and Cedric have some property in common, viz., being so described!!

It is, I take it, obvious, what has happened here. There is no property of *being so described* that Richard and Cedric have in common.[10] In the first sentence, the property ascribed to Richard is that of being lion-hearted.

[10] Similar remarks apply to *being true of its own quotation*, which, equally, is not a property. There is, then, no well defined question as to whether 'heterological' has the property of being true of its own quotation.

Here, ‘so’ is operating as a proquoe – a word that stands in for the quotation of an expression – and, in the statement about Richard, that expression is ‘lionhearted’. The *Giorgione* argument exhibits a simple fallacy of equivocation – in the first premise, ‘was so called’ abbreviates ‘was called “Giorgione”’; in the conclusion, the same phrase abbreviates ‘was called “Barbarelli”’. The first statement can be rewritten as

> Giorgione was called “Giorgione” because of his size.

This is a true statement and its truth value survives substitution of the referring term; it is *true* that Barbarelli was called “Giorgione” because of his size. (As we saw previously, terms within quotation marks are not available for substitution.) So Leibniz Law that identical objects have all their properties in common is not threatened.

Modal contexts seem to resist substitution of co-referring terms. It is true that

> 9 is necessarily greater than 7

but we intuitively think it false that

> The number of the planets is necessarily greater than 7.

Following Kripke, we can interrogate this intuition. What planets is the speaker referring to? It is a human speaker, so he is referring to the planets in our solar system. Let us then make that explicit:

> The number of planets in our solar system is necessarily greater than 7.

Is that true? Someone might say it is not, on the grounds that there could have been 8 or 14 planets in our solar system. But is that correct? If there were 8 or 14 planets, that would be a *different* solar system. That would be the solar system of a possible world perhaps not too dissimilar to our own world. So long as we insist that reference be rigid (Kripke) we can substitute *salva veritate* ‘Dthat [the number of planets in the solar system of the actual world]’ for ‘9’ (Kaplan), and here we have genuine co-reference and substitutivity *salva veritate*.

VI. Return to the Tanney Puzzle

The Tanney Puzzle was why substitutivity fails in the Lois case but not in the Oedipus. An obvious answer would be that, according to the Perspectival Principle, we should report things as the reportee would say them. Oedipus would not say 'I slept with Jocasta before I slept with my mother', whereas Lois would say 'I kissed Superman before I kissed Clark Kent'. But would Lois be right to express herself that way? I think she would. Most writers on the subject seem to agree that Superman is identical to Clark Kent. Yet, if they were identical then, by Leibniz' law, all their properties would be shared. Superman is superhuman, his powers include the power of unassisted flight. Define

> x is supermanic as x is superhuman and possesses all Superman's other essential attributes.
>
> x is kentic as x is human and possesses all Clark Kent's other essential attributes.

Superman, though superhuman, cannot do the logically impossible; in particular, he cannot be human and superhuman at the same time. For simplicity, let us work with a fictionalized version of the movie in which there is only one Superman-to-Clark switch and that it occurs at time t_1 (and that Lois kissed the leading male character once before t_1, and once after). In the movie, then, there is an x such that

> x is supermanic before t_1, and x is kentic after t_1.

Consider, following Goodman (1955), a precious stone that, at t_2, changes from being an emerald to being a ruby. Then there is a y such that

> y is an emerald before t_2, and y is a ruby after t_2.

This precious stone is an emeruby and is clearly neither an emerald nor a ruby, though it possesses the essential attributes of each at different times. Likewise, the individual in our simplified movie is superkentic – he is not identical to either Superman or Clark Kent, though he possesses the essential attributes of each at different times. Lois kissed *Superkent* before and after t_1, but, in so doing, she kissed Superman before t_1, and a *different* individual, Clark Kent, after t_1. Unfortunately for Oedipus, Jocasta always was his mom; her essential properties never changed. Whereas Lois was merely promiscuous, Oedipus was incestuous and, in Greece of the 6th Century B.C., incest was regarded more dimly than it is today.

This escape from the Tanney puzzle may seem unsatisfactory because surely there are cases of apparent failure of substitutivity where the object to which reference is made does not undergo essential change. Consider, for example, the British glamour model Jordan who was born ‘Katie Price’, a name still used by friends and family and indeed by Katie herself when not in glamorous circumstances (Price 2004). Katie, except when stripped for professional action, looks rather unremarkable and unattractive. It is Ernest’s birthday, and his wife promises to buy him, as a birthday present, an inflateable doll that looks like Jordan. We should think Ernest’s wife wicked and deceitful if what she actually gives him on his birthday is an inflateable doll that looks like Katie Price. In these circumstances, truth is not preserved in substituting ‘Katie Price’ for ‘Jordan’ in the statement

Ernest wants an inflateable doll that looks like Jordan.

The Perspectival Principle suggests that we establish what Ernest would say if asked. What he would say is ‘I want an inflateable doll that looks like Jordan’ and, just so as to avoid all possibility of disappointment, might add ‘and I definitely do not want one that looks like Katie Price’. He doesn’t much like the look of Katie Price, but he loves the look of Katie Price when glamoured up – and Katie Price glamoured up is Jordan.

It may seem, at this point, that, having successfully identified the referents of the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’, we should now be looking for an answer to the question ‘What is the referent of “Jordan”?’. It may even seem as if we have found one, namely that ‘Jordan’ refers to the fusion of those time-slices of Katie when she is glamoured up, just as (to borrow an example of David Pitt’s) a stoat is called an ermine *when its fur turns white during the winter*. Pitt himself would take the view that ‘Jordan’ refers to an *alter ego* of the *primum ego* Katie Price, and he expends a lot of energy examining what kind of entity, metaphysically and legally, an *alter ego* is (Pitt 2001). The ease with which we were able to solve the Tanney puzzle has created a danger of thinking that, in all circumstances of use, a name must have a determinate referent, though not, perhaps, its standard one. But the very assumption that every name has to have a fixed referent needs to be questioned. The general philosophical claim that Wittgenstein wishes to challenge is that the senses of words are fixed unambiguously (*PI* §426). That they are so fixed is, he believes, a misguided belief, a mere prejudice. He writes, 'In the actual use of expressions we make detours, we go by side-roads. We see the straight highway before us, but of course we cannot use it, because it is permanently closed'. Permanently closed. Wittgenstein is here repudiating the view, so central to the *Tractatus* (3.23) and to his predecessor Frege, that words have a fixed sense or a (typically small) set of fixed senses.

The subset of expressions he considers at *PI* §79 is that of *names*. Following Wittgenstein, what we should be asking, as we did at the beginning of this paper, is how a name is *used*, and what we find is that a particular name may be used in a variety of ways. One of his own examples is the statement 'Moses did not exist' (*PI* §79). If the speaker is speaking the truth, then he cannot here be using 'Moses' to refer to any individual; he may be referring to no individual at all (though this does not entail that his remark means the same as 'Santa Claus did not exist'). This is reminiscent of our 'Giorgione' example, for one of the things the speaker may be meaning is 'There is no historical figure answering to the name 'Moses' – so this context is a disguised quotational one. The speaker might also be meaning that the Israelites did not have a *single* leader when they withdrew from Egypt, or might be meaning something else quite different (*PI* §79).

What this suggests is something anathema to logicians and formal semanticists – that names have a certain flexibility, that they are used in different ways, varying in their use with topic of conversation and with the mutual knowledge shared by particular conversational partners. Suppose that, by some freak of fortune, Ernest's wife runs into Katie Price at a polo match, takes a liking to her and, upon returning home, suggests to her husband that they invite Jordan to dinner. He is keen on the idea, even though he is not in the least expecting her to turn up dressed only in skimpy underwear. In the statement

Ernest wants Jordan to come to dinner

the name 'Jordan' is not being used to refer to glamorous Katie episodes, and substitution in that statement of the name 'Katie Price' for 'Jordan' is truth-preserving.

If I am speaking to someone who knows Katie as 'Katie', knows that she strips off for a living, is a glamour model and is best known to the public for this rôle, but does not know that she goes under the name 'Jordan', then I could inform that person by saying 'Ernest wants an inflateable doll that looks like Katie' and be speaking the *truth*. For in this case the Perspectival Principle is trumped by the imperative for speakers to attempt to make themselves intelligible to their particular hearers. That sentence has an interesting kind of ambiguity; it contains no indexicals, explicit or hidden, and is not amphibolous and is yet ambiguous in that it expresses a truth when a token is uttered in one conversation but a falsehood when a token of the same type is uttered in a different conversational setting[11].[*]

[11] For a more elaborate example, see *PI* §525.

[*] This paper supplements, but also corrects, a paper of mine (2002) presented in an earlier Wittgenstein symposium.

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Is there a Language ‘Behind’ Speaking? How to Look at 20th Century Language Theory in an Alternative Way

Sybille Krämer, Berlin

1. What is at stake?

There is a standard ‘picture’ of how to look at 20th century theory of language: Within this picture normally a pragmatic shift is identified from structure-oriented authors as Saussure and Chomsky to action-oriented concepts of language represented in Wittgenstein, Austin, Searle, or Habermas. Normally we judge this development as a kind of *progress*, pointing in the direction of a better kind of theory: a fruitful turn from structure to action, from competence-analysis to performance-analysis.

But this picture is much too simple. The aim of my talk is to suggest another way of looking at the ‘logical geography’ of 20th century language theory.[1] The guiding idea is to take the distinction between a universal schema and the particular use (or between type and token, rule and instantiation) as a criterion for sorting out those authors who plead for this methodological difference and those, who reject it. From *this* perspective, a new kind of division emerges and we find out family resemblances between language theorists, who normally were classified to belong to controversial methodological schools. On the one hand we can identify proponents of a ‘two worlds model’ of language. This model differentiates not only terminologically but even (so to say) ontologically between schema and use in the sense of logical-genealogical primacy; it is founded in the conviction that to explain linguistic behavior means to make the rules explicit we are implicitly following when speaking. To this ‘cluster’ belong structural thinkers such as Saussure and Chomsky as well as the speech act theorists Searle and Habermas. We want to call this positions the ‘*logosoriented*’ or

[1] See: Krämer 2001.

‘*intellectualizing approach*’. On the other hand, there are those philosophers who reject the separation between schema and use as a methodological strategy. To this category authors as Wittgenstein, as well as Austin, Davidson, and Derrida can be seen to belong. We want to call this position the ‘*embodied group*’ or the ‘*non-intellectualizing approach*’. This typology may seem surprising. My further reflections hope to make it plausible. And by going through our argument we will make a discovery: In the terms of the non-intellectualizing approach we can reinterpret – and even rehabilitate – the internal rationality of the separation between schema and us.

2. The logosoriented approach

Saussure and Chomsky on one hand, Searle and Habermas on the other—this quartet of thinkers marks a major twentieth-century controversy: the polarity of structure and action as representing two basic options for a theory of language. Either language appears as a definable system, in which case the interesting question is “what is language?”; or language is embedded in the context of human action, in which case the question would be “what do we use language for?” Notwithstanding the contrast in the objects of language-oriented and speech-act oriented positions, however, there is common ground between the two. This commonality can be found in their underlying understanding of language, and concerns the more or less tacit presuppositions guiding both Saussure and Chomsky’s theories of language as well as those of Searle and Habermas.

The physiognomy of the intellectualist view of language can be summed up as following:

(1) *Universality*. There are grammatical or pragmatic universals in which everything that can be referred to as “language” or “speech” takes part. Only phenomena exemplifying and representing these universal characteristics can count as speech or communication. Whatever in speech goes beyond its role as manifestation of a universal type is the result of non-linguistic circumstances and, measured against the standard of pure language and communication, belongs to the extra-linguistic sphere.

(2) *Invisibility*. The relationship between speech and language can be described using hierarchical, spatial metaphors, whether in terms of the relation between surface and deep structure or between inside and outside. As deep structure, language or communication are invisible entities. Language does not appear on its own but has to first be made accessible. It is the task of the theorist to penetrate the surface of the spatio-temporal speech event, to make explicit the structures no longer accessible to the senses but only to reason, and to introduce them to the "mind's eye."

(3) *Ideality*. Ideality is the vehicle that allows us to deduce from the surface to what lies behind it, to get from the empirically visible to the cognitively invisible, and to make it accessible through description. This strategy of idealization allows for language, speech, and communication to become significant objects of study not as they are, but as they should be. Of interest is not actual but possible language and communication.

(4) *Reference to rules*. To explain language and communication means to describe the rules we obey when we speak. The rules specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for linguistic and communicative creativity. These rules do not describe—from the perspective of an observer—the regularities of the use of language, but are rather required for us to be able to speak in the first place.

(5) *Ability as knowledge*. Our command of these rules is understood as a kind of knowledge: we know the grammatical or pragmatic rules, whether explicitly or implicitly. Language is not a practical skill like riding a bike or swimming, but rather a knowledge-based ability. This does not mean that the speakers are (or have to be) conscious of this knowledge, but rather that a theorist of language can reconstruct it in the form of objective knowledge. The ability to speak can thus not only be represented but also explained by a system of knowledge.

(6) *Focus on competence*. Although linguistic competence can only be ascertainable from performance, they nevertheless exist independently of performance as a separate factor. Competence is the "place" where the regulating system of language and communication can be located.

It is for this reason that competence is the genuine object of linguistic theory. The theory of language does not investigate speech, but the disposition to speak.

(7) *Focus on speakers and on dialogue*. The decisive figure in the study of language and communication is the speaker. The production of linguistic symbols, not their interpretation, is the crucial linguistic activity. Speakers are actors in the sense of accountable originators of their utterances. A dialogue between two people is the primal scene of language usage.

(8) *Indifference to media*. The universal grammatical and pragmatic features of language and communication are indifferent to media. Language is actualized under material conditions but is not itself material, and is for this very reason indifferent to media. Media belong exclusively to the side of execution and actualization, and come into play when the linguistic system of knowledge, itself indifferent to media, is used under specific spatio-temporal conditions. Media are phenomena of actualization. Even more significant is the fact that language itself is not a medium—at least not in a sense that would be important or revealing in any way for a theory of language.

(9) *Disembodiment*. Not only is language disembodied, but so are the speakers themselves. Just as the vocal, written, gestural, and technical embodiment of language in its individual usage is marginal for language itself, the bodies of the speakers are not taken into account as physical prerequisites for speech, as desiring entities, or gendered difference.

(10) *Discursivity*. Language and speech belong to the sphere of the symbolic. What matters is the *differentia specifica* of this symbolism. Language is what it is in distinction to the image; it is a discursive and not an iconic symbolic system. Unlike the image there are always "final" elements in the analysis of language and communication, whether they be phonemes, morphemes, words, sentences, or speech acts, and all have precisely defined boundaries.

(11) *Reality index*: Are pure language and communication discovered or invented? The answer for our quartet of authors is clear: while it is

> true that the logos-oriented concept of language is a theoretical reconstruction, they claim that this reconstruction only represents what actually exists as a system of rules and knowledge and speakers' competence, which is subsequently applied in individual speech. This is why theorists of language do not construct but rather re-construct, bringing to light what is hidden behind the heterogeneous phenomena of language. Pure language and communication are not noumenal—i.e. ideal—constructs; they are not merely fictitious but actually exist.

We are now prepared to define this intellectualist concept of language somewhat more precisely. The covert effect of the two-world model is to produce an understanding of language and communication that no longer distinguishes between the media and tools of description and what is described; tends to identify model and reality. We will call this the "intellectualist fallacy." Let us shortly explain this fallacy.

Austin uses the term "scholastic view"[2] to characterize an approach that does not understand a particular utterance according to its meaning in the actual speech situation, but rather mobilizes and discusses all of its *possible* meanings. Generalizing Austin's observation, Pierre Bourdieu refers to the "scholastic fallacy": when scholars examine social, cultural, and linguistic phenomena, they do so in a situation of leisure, *scholé*, which is defined by its exemption from those very conditions, purposes, and constraints that characterize the objects of study in their life-world embeddedness and facticity. Bourdieu sees an incompatibility here between object and method. Applied to linguistics this means that the *scholé* brings about a transition from the primary command of language as a means of communication to a secondary command of it as object of observation and analysis. Not to know language*s* but the know language *itself* is the goal of systematic linguistics. This means, however, that attributes deriving precisely from the fact that language is not used in practice but rather examined as an object are projected as real characteristics onto natural languages and speech. Following Bourdieu, Charles Taylor has also identified an intellectualist confusion in the philosophy of language between ideal and actuality and between model and reality. [3] But the situation is a little bit more com-

[2] Austin 1970.
[3] Taylor 1995.

plicate because the intellectualist strategy is more subtle than the mere confusion between ideal and real.

The division between actual, spatio-temporal, observable, particular, heterogeneous, everyday "speech events" and idealized, unobservable, scientifically reconstructable universal "language" is acknowledged and consolidated by ascribing ontologically different levels to each. The presupposition of the two-world model can in this sense be thought of as a strategy for *not* getting caught in the trap of the intellectualist fallacy. However, attributing a logico-geneological priority to language "itself" over actual speech metamorphizes speech, turning it into a—distorting—representation of the form of language or communication.

The "intellectualist fallacy" does not then consist in ascribing a reality index to this "noumenal construct", and, finally, regarding individual utterances as the reality of pure language itself. Model and reality are not simply confused; reality is rather transformed into a representation of the model—and always at the expense of reality. *The fallacy is that the reality of speech is regarded as a representation, or, to be precise, an instantiation of language*. This introduces the boundary between language/non-language into speech, which, in contrast to language "itself," has the peculiarity of mixing linguistic with extra-linguistic elements. By virtue of this mixture, speech in relation to pure language is, as a matter of principle, incomplete, lacking, deficient, and distorted—less form than deformation. It is the task of theory to employ the concept of language as an instrument of purification. This is the kernel of the 'intellectualist fallacy'.

3. The embodied approach

If we look for authors to whom the relationship between language and speech does not follow the distinction between pattern and actualization, we get a very mixed group, containing philosophers as Austin, Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Derrida.

The different concepts of language outlined by these thinkers will come together around a negative maxim. This can be formulated this way: It is not meaningful, for whatever reason, to categorically distinguish between pattern and usage in terms of differently ranked modalities of languages understood as levels of being.

Because of the variety of these different positions we want to characterize their positions not by mere description of some common essential thoughts – because in fact there will not be a lot of such 'common thoughts' but by asking our theorists two questions. Their answers will be brief and, rather than in the form of quotes, imaginary. Our questions are as follows:

(1) Why is the distinction between pattern (rule) and actualization (application) not a good model to explain the relationship between language and speech?

(2) Is there such a thing as "pure" language or communication?

Wittgenstein's answer

(1) We can distinguish between rules and their application in the same way we distinguish between language games: There is the linguistic language game that characterizes certain sentences as grammatically correct model sentences and there is the language game of everyday communication, in which hardly any correct sentences are spoken. Language games do not lie behind or on top of each other, but side by side. There are no universal patterns and forms upon which individual cases are based. However, spatio-temporal phenomena that have been characterized as exemplary or paradigmatic for our practice do exist; these can accordingly serve as standards or "forms." Which particular phenomena can be considered exemplary or as setting standards for others is determined by the given form of life, whose "such-and-suchness" brings to a standstill all questions asking "why" of a "how."

(2) There is no such thing as a pure language, for two reasons: (a) The categorical separation of language and image cannot be sustained in relation to language itself. Language always also functions as image; it has a non-discursive dimension. (b) Language is only ever given as a part of a form of life. This is why linguistic rules, like any other rules, are not self-explanatory but have to be embedded in practices with which we are already familiar, in which we have already been trained, in order that we may "follow" them.

Austin's answer

(1) In matters of action what is important is not the side of intentions, plans, and patterns, but the side of execution. Unlike ideal intentions, real executions can fail. An action is something that can fail. What is essential to language usage takes place on the side of actual speech and not on that of possible speech. This insight into the potential of failure can also be applied to theoretical speech about language: all conceptual systems that set up definite boundaries can—and usually do—fail in the face of the complexity of reality as soon as they performatively claim that the world corresponds to their concepts.

(2) The performative power of an utterance to not only describe the world but also to change it, is not a phenomenon internal to language. Whether speech acts actually put into effect what they denote is not revealed by looking at language but by looking at culture. Performative power has its roots in the conventions and structures of social practice. In the archetypal performatives, ritual and speech go hand in hand and can supplement or replace each other. The special case of archetypal performatives makes evident something that carries weight for all speech: the power of language is rooted in something that precisely is not (or no longer is) "pure" language. Language is not autonomous.

Davidson's answer

(1) The question of the relationship between pattern and realization is a version of the question about the relationship between conceptual scheme and its (empirical) content. There is however no such thing as *one* conceptual scheme shared by everyone speaking the same language, for the simple reason that it is also not plausible for there to be *different* conceptual schemes. There can thus be no meaningful distinction between a linguistic scheme and its individual application.

(2) The question as to whether there is a language beyond speech is of no importance for a theory of language. The arguments against a common language are implicit in the answer to (1). Regarding speech we can also say that it is not speaking but understanding and interpreting

that are the crucial activities and forms of linguistic creativity. Here the understanding of utterances is a case of the understanding of persons. When we understand, we produce theories of truth that can buttress our interpretations, but they are only valid for a single utterance, or, to be precise, for a single speaker. The competence of the listener to produce a theory with whose help he can not only understand an utterance but also the person speaking, is based not on a kind of rule-based knowledge but rather resembles the wit, spontaneity, and inventiveness of artistic production. Linguistic competence is not based on knowledge. It is rather an art—the art of life.

Derrida’s answer

(1) The traditional (metaphysical) relationship between form and actualization can also be found in the relationship between language and writing. However, as is always the case when there is a conceptual hierarchy, the relationship between the primary system of language and the secondary system of writing shows that the secondary term contains something that is both fundamental to the primary term as well as exceeding it, thus decentering the distinction between primary and secondary. Writing embodies the principle of iterability and the structure of delay (*Nachträglichkeit*), which are both necessary conditions for every signifying practice. The notion of iterability allows, for instance, a linguistic form to be interpreted as a universal that does not precede its particular execution in speech, but is rather constituted in the first place by repeated executions of the form. Given the structure of delay—the time interval upon which all repetition depends—iteration always also appears as a becoming-other and thus as a transformation of what was repeated.

(2) There is no “pure” signifying system because every actual signifying event is a *trace* of a past signifying event, which it both repeats as well as transforms. This is why the trace is the condition of the possibility of signs and at the same time the impossibility of pure signs. This is also true for language: writing is the condition of the possibility and the impossibility of “pure” language. There can be no “pure”

language because the form of language is only generated as the trace of repeating writing structures.

Is it possible now for us to sketch the outline of a non-intellectualist concept of language? Let us summarize some assumptions.

Language does not exist *as* form, but only *in* form of practices of linguistic usage. By "practice" we understand an action that is, in the broadest sense, tied to the body. It does not require a knowing-that, but only a knowing-how, i.e., an ability acquired through practice. Linguistic practices also include those that aim at *examining* language itself, that describe language as a form and develop linguistic theories. This practice is possible because language can be written down or fixed in other ways, thereby becoming an object of examination. All statements about *language* then always refer to the (written) *representation* of language, not to a language "per se." We do not have access to something like "pure" language. Language only exists as language-in-a-medium, as spoken, written, gestural, and technically mediated language. Neither do we have access to linguistic or communicative competence—except for in linguistic performance, where, however, language appears as embodied language. It is "embodied language" in a twofold sense: language itself has a material exteriority in form of the voice, writing, gesture, etc. This materiality of language is not marginal, but rather a basic fact. Furthermore, linguistic usage is—in varying degrees—tied to the corporeality of the language users, who express themselves not only as persons positioned in a symmetrical, formal-rational way, but also always as needy, asymmetrically positioned bodily beings. Here we have the outline of our sketch: we will call it, in reference to the "two-world model," the "performance model." But this is not the whole story.

Because the authors from the second group have more to tell us than these rather prosaic basics of a non-intellectualist concept of language. There is another insight that can be considered the "punch line" of our (less full-blown than slight) sketch: the new light in which the presupposition of the two-world ontology now appears.

In our diagnosis of the logos-oriented theorists, we interpreted the two-world ontology not simply as an intellectualist fallacy, but rather as the attempt to avoid the pitfall of this very fallacy. Let us recapitulate the conclusions we arrived at in chapter six: initially it seemed reasonable to join Bourdieu and Taylor in seeing the cognitivist view of language as relying on an intellectualist fallacy that confuses ideal and reality, model and actuality. It became clear, however, that the two-world ontology in fact means the *avoidance* of this kind of confusion. Indeed, the two-world model guarantees that everyday speech and communication need *not* be identified with an idealized structure of speech or speech situation. This dual concept of language instead allows for a moderate version of intellectualism, in which individual speech is made into the representative, the instantiation, or the actualization of intelligible speech and communication. Thus it becomes possible to distinguish between what belongs to the order of speech and what does not, and therefore adheres to extra-linguistic conditions. Herein consist the rationality and strategic meaning of the two-world ontology.

The "punch line" of our sketch of language and communication beyond intellectualism is that this "internal rationality" of the two-world ontology can be taken up and reinterpreted at the same time as it is maintained. We have now arrived at the crux of our talk, and hence also at its conclusion. The importance of the logos-critical thinkers lies less in their different explanations for this or that characteristic of language but in their revision of the connection between pattern and actualization. Let us assume that the intellectualist view of language itself yields a pattern. We are not interested in replacing this pattern with a better one. Yet we want to take up the distinction between language and speech as significant, but give it another interpretation. How so?

We have treated the non-intellectuallistic theorists as having dropped the assumption that there is such a thing as purified language and communication. Specifically, they "dropped" the notion that language has the capacity to operate as an order preceding speech. In this sense, "pure" language and communication is indeed a pure fiction. But only in *this* sense. If, however, we exchange the two-world ontology with a "flat ontology," the idea of a purified form of language takes on another, quite acceptable meaning. "Pure language" becomes separated from the universal plane of a "world behind the scenes," and placed where every other spatio-temporal language usage occurs. Examining and representing the "form of language" then becomes *a* particular linguistic practice. Everything that refers to this "form" is no longer a universal condition of speech, but a modality of speech next to other modalities: a practice of engaging with mostly written signifiers that differs "significantly" from other practices. This way, the idea of a language preceding speech can be understood as the result of a historically circumscribable linguistic practice: Habermas' suppositions of rationality are not fictional; we rather encounter them in the argumentative standards of successful communication in philosophy seminars or in the conventions of academic writing. Chomsky's grammatically correct sentence is a fact resulting from the calculated transformation of sentence patterns into complete sentences within grammar books.

These reflections are admittedly all too hurried and simplistic. But perhaps the program has come into sharper outline: the gist of the two-world model, which consists in understanding the relationship between language and speech as that between a pattern and its actualization, can be reframed, in the guise of a "flat ontology," as the distinction between historical and systematic uses of language. The explanation as to what is specific about these different kinds of linguistic usages does not, as Wittgenstein thought, come to a standstill with the "that's just the way it is" of a form of life, but must rather—and here we must agree with Luhmann—take into account language's constitution in media. For language only ever exists embodied in vocal, gestural, written, or technical media.

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Language
and
Action

Sprechen als vernünftiges Handeln: Grundlage einer rationalen Hermeneutik

Peter Janich, Marburg

1. Sprechen als Handeln

1) Wir machen uns *gegenseitig verantwortlich* für das, was wir sagen.

Das heißt, wir *geben und erwarten Antworten* auf Fragen nach Gründen, Zielen, Mitteln, (Sinn, Bedeutung usw.) unserer sprachlichen Äußerungen (und zwar im Alltag, in den Wissenschaften und in der Philosophie)

1,1) Sprachliche Äußerungen sind *Handlungen*, weil sie die definierende Bedingung eines askriptiven Handlungsbegriffs teilen: sie werden uns (von anderen Mitgliedern einer Sprech- und Handlungsgemeinschaft) *als Verdienst oder Verschulden zugerechnet (*synonym: *zugeschrieben, zugesprochen)*. Die wichtigste Unterscheidungsabsicht betrifft den Gegensatz Handeln/(bloßes, naturgesetzlich beschreibbares) Verhalten sowie Handeln/Widerfahren.

Damit werden auch andere handlungstheoretische Unterscheidungen auf sprachliche Äußerungen sinnvoll übertragbar. Thematisch die wichtigsten sind *Ge- und Misslingen* sowie *Erfolg und Misserfolg* von (v. a. sprachlichen) Handlungen.

1,2) Sprachliche Äußerungen von Personen zu Personen sind nach *Sprechhandlungstypen* zu unterscheiden: die thematisch wichtigsten:

(1) *Beziehung herstellen*: bitten, danken, loben, tadeln, beleidigen, ehren, kondolieren, gratulieren, versprechen, ernennen, Rache schwören, Liebe erklären, Vertrag schließen;

(2) *Befinden mitteilen*: Bekunden von Wohlbefinden, Übelkeit, Schmerz, Lust, Frust, Enttäuschung, Stolz, Glauben an ein (religiöses, politisches, wissenschaftliches) Programm;

(3) *Auffordern*: zum Handeln oder Unterlassen; zum Herbeiführen, Aufrechterhalten oder Vermeiden eines Sachverhalts;
(4) *Fragen:* besonderer Typ des Aufforderns zur Komplettierung eines unvollständigen Ausdrucks bzw. eines Satzes (Wort- bzw. Satzfragen);
(5) *Terminieren:* eigenen oder fremden Sprachgebrauch erläutern, festlegen, vorschreiben;
(6) *Suggerieren:* durch Wiederholungen (rituell, liturgisch, identitätsstiftend, schulbildend) bei sich oder Anderen eine Meinung erzeugen, verfestigen, schwächen;
(7) *Behaupten:* Sachverhalt darstellen, fingieren, als bestehend ausgeben;
(8) *Affirmieren:* eine sprachliche Äußerung bekräftigen, als bewiesen behaupten;
(9) *Exkludieren:* einen Teil oder eine ganze Äußerung ausschließen, negieren;

2) Handlungen heißen gelungen/misslungen, wenn sie (in den Grenzen sozialer Üblichkeiten oder Regeln) die *Handlungsabsicht* des Akteurs *aktualisieren/bzw. nicht aktualisieren*.

Gelingen/Misslingen stoßen dem Akteur am eigenen Handeln zu („Widerfahrnis“ als Erfahrung 1. Typs).

2,1) Gelingen und Misslingen einer Sprechhandlung (in den Grenzen üblicher Sprachgebräuche, grammatischer Regeln, sozialer Verhaltensformen usw.) wird anhand der Verständlichkeit der Sprechhandlung beurteilt.

Eine Sprechhandlung zeigt sich als misslungen (z.B. durch einen „Freudschen Versprecher“), wenn der Adressat anders reagiert als vom Sprecher erwartet, bezüglich

(1) Sprechakttyp
(2) Wortsinn
(3) Satzgehalt.

(Das Ge- oder Misslingen einer sprachlichen Äußerung ist also nicht dadurch definiert, dass der Adressat der Äußerung „zustimmt“ oder sie „ablehnt“, d. h. ihr die Anerkennung versagt.)

3) Eine Handlung heißt erfolgreich/erfolglos (synonym: hat Erfolg/Misserfolg), wenn ihre Zwecke *realisiert bzw. verfehlt* werden.

Erfolg und Misserfolg stoßen dem Akteur am eigenen Handeln zu („Widerfahrnis“ als Erfahrung 2. Typs).

3,1) Erfolg und Misserfolg einer Sprachhandlung (in den Grenzen üblicher Umgangsformen) wird durch den Sprecher *anhand der Reaktion des Adressaten* beurteilt. Der Adressat kann die Sprechhandlung eines Sprechers akzeptieren oder ablehnen.

Üblicherweise gilt eine Sprachhandlung je nach Typ als erfolgreich, wenn durch den Adressaten

(1) ein Gruß erwidert
(2) eine Bekundung geglaubt
(3) eine Aufforderung befolgt
(4) eine Frage beantwortet
(5) ein Sprachgebrauch übernommen
(6) eine Meinung geteilt
(7) einer Behauptung zugestimmt
(8) eine Begründung anerkannt
(9) ein Ausschließen übernommen

werden.

4) Die Paare Ge-/Misslingen und Erfolg/Misserfolg von (Sprech-)Handlungen müssen unterschieden werden, weil auch gelungene (Sprech-)Handlungen nicht zwangsläufig erfolgreich sind. (Ein regelgerechter Schachzug muss nicht zum Sieg führen.)

Dessen ungeachtet stoßen dem Akteur (Sprecher) Ge- und Misslingen bzw. Erfolg und Misserfolg seines Handelns zu: in Kooperationen und Kommunikationen seitens des Mithandelnden bzw. des Adressaten.

2. Sprechen als vernünftiges Handeln

5) Wo (Sprech-)Handeln parteilich, dogmatisch, täuschend, persuasiv, unaufrichtig, drohend, zwangsbewehrt usw. aktualisiert wird, gilt es als unvernünftig.

Da auch das Bestimmen von „vernünftig“ ein Handeln ist, kann es selbst nur wieder vernünftig erfolgen. Andernfalls würde vernünftiges Handeln per definitionem unvernünftig.

Deshalb ist das *Kriterium für „vernünftig“* (im Sinne von „nicht unvernünftig“) die *prinzipielle Symmetrie zwischen Akteuren* (Sprechern und Adressaten). Kooperationen und Kommunikationen heißen also vernünftig, wenn alle Beteiligten im Prinzip dieselben Rechte und Pflichten haben. Das Prinzip der Symmetrie kann auch stellvertretend/potenziell erfüllt werden, etwa bei Säuglingen, Bewusstlosen, Dementen.

Vernünftiges Sprechen ist an symmetrischen Rollenübernahmen von Sprecher und Hörer, an der Symmetrie von Diskursregeln, von Begründungs- und Rechtfertigungspflichten, usw., insbesondere an der Pflicht des verständlichen Sprechens beim Sprecher und der Verstehensbemühung beim Hörer ausgezeichnet.

3. Reden, Verstehen, Anerkennen

6) Unter Symmetriebedingungen sind Sprechen und Verstehen eine *gemeinsame Aufgabe* der an einer Kommunikation Beteiligten (und nicht etwa eine Aufgabe bloß des Hörers oder bloß des Sprechers – und schon gar nicht Aufgabe eines außen stehenden, archimedischen Beobachters, eines „Interpreten“ oder „Schiedsrichters“).

7) Nur in einem beständigen Wechsel der Rollen von Sprecher und Hörer können beide gemeinsam selbst entscheiden, ob sprachliche Äußerungen verstanden sind. Eine Kommunikation, die auf ein gegenseitiges Verständnis als (formales) Ziel gerichtet und in diesem Sinne „vernünftig“ ist, heiße *„Dialog“*.

8) Dialoge sind nicht auf Anerkennung der (materialen) Inhalte sprachlicher Äußerungen begrenzt. Sie sind auch bei verschiedenen Handlungszielen, Überzeugungen, usw. (als „vernünftige“, und damit als sprachlich „verständige“) möglich.

Verstehen und Anerkennen einer sprachlichen Äußerung sind also ebenso (d. h. analog) zu unterscheiden wie Ge-/Misslingen und Erfolg/Misserfolg.

4. Vermittelte Dialoge

9) Dialoge, die nicht in direkter Rede vis-à-vis (face to face), also in raumzeitlicher Anwesenheit beider Dialogpartner geführt werden können, sondern durch Raum und Zeit zwischen den Parteien getrennt sind, können sich eines *Transports von Botschaften* bedienen. Dieser Transport kann ohne technische Hilfsmittel durch einen menschlichen Boten erfolgen (Klassisches Beispiel: der Läufer von Marathon, der die Siegesbotschaft überbringt) oder durch technische Hilfsmittel (Klassisches Beispiel: Verschriftung von Rede zum „Text"; modernes Beispiel: Nachrichtentechnik, Telefon, Speicherung und Reproduktion von Schallereignissen) vermittelt werden. Dialoge, in denen Botschaften transportiert werden müssen, heißen *vermittelt*.

Bei vermittelten Dialogen kommen zusätzliche, über das Redeverstehen hinausgehende Probleme des „Verstehens" ins Spiel.

10) Ein *„idealer" Bote* ist ein solcher, der eine Botschaft relativ zum Gespräch in direkter Rede, also zum Boten-freien Dialog nicht verändert. Der ideale Bote ist also durch eine Invarianzforderung an die Botschaft relativ zum Überbringer bestimmt.

(Anschaulich und unterminologisch: der ideale Bote spricht und versteht in einem Dialog die Sprecher/Hörer jeweils genauso gut wie diese sich selbst. Ein idealer Bote kann technisch durch ein perfektes Video-System ersetzt werden. Er trägt weder etwas zum gegenseitigen Verständnis der Dialogparteien bei, noch behindert er es.)

Wenn zwei Parteien in einem Dialog ihre Äußerungen *verantworten* können, kann dies im selben Sinn auch der Bote. Dies ist diejenige Qualität eines „idealen Boten", die von realen Boten bestenfalls angenähert erfüllt wird. Diese Einschränkung hat ihren Grund darin, dass reale Boten selbst redende und handelnde Menschen sind, also ihrerseits erst einmal jede Äußerung der beiden Parteien verstehen müssen. Selbst bei idealer Unparteilichkeit des Boten (heute gern bei so genannten „Moderatoren" in öffentlichen Moderationsverfahren zu politischen Entscheidungen gesucht) bleibt eine prinzipielle Einschränkung durch die (biografische) Verschiedenheit der beteiligten Personen.

11) Ein idealer Bote ist ein *idealer Dolmetscher*, sofern die Dialogparteien verschiedene Sprachen sprechen.

Nach lateinisch „interpretari" und griechisch „hermeneuein" für (hin- und her-) „übersetzen" von einer in einer andere Sprache ist der ideale Dolmetscher auch ein „idealer Interpret" oder „idealer Hermeneut":

Er kann die Äußerungen beider Dialogpartner genauso verantworten wie diese selbst, und zwar in beiden Sprachen.

Mit „verschiedenen Sprachen" sind hier methodisch primär so genannte „natürliche" Sprachen gemeint. Metaphorisch können im methodisch zweiten Schritt dann auch verschiedene Fachsprachen oder verschiedene Parteilichkeiten von Sprachen gemeint sein.

12) Während der „ideale Dolmetscher" (im Unterschied zum realen) per definitionem keine zusätzlichen Verstehensprobleme erzeugt, ist es bei *Verschriftung der Botschaft* anders. (Entsprechendes gilt für den Einsatz nachrichtentechnischer Mittel, bei denen zwei Beschreibungsebenen der Botschaften als „Signal" und als „Information" benötigt werden. Nachrichtentechnik und die so genannte Informationstheorie betreffen nur das technische, nicht das Verstehensproblem der Botschaften.)

„Texte" (also die Schriftform sprachlicher Äußerungen) verlieren gegenüber der vis-à-vis Kommunikation in direkter Rede Kommunikationsaspekte wie Mimik, Gestik, Intonation usw., gewinnen aber Beständigkeit (wiederholte Lesbarkeit; graduelle Verbesserung der Interpretation in einer „hermeneutischen Spirale"). Analoges gilt für nachrichtentechnische Mittel.

13) Auch *Texte* sind Produkte sprachlichen Handelns. Sie hängen – unabhängig von Erfolg und Misserfolg bei (potentiellen) Adressaten – zweifach (vom Unterschied) von Ge- und Misslingen der Sprechhandlung seitens des Sprechers ab:

(1) Der Sprecher äußert tatsächlich, was er (im Rahmen sprachlicher und sozialer Üblichkeiten) zu äußern beabsichtigt. Das heißt, ihm unterläuft kein Fehler;

(2) Der Sprecher „übersetzt" seine sprachliche Absicht adäquat in Schriftform.

(Ein Text kann nach Meinung seines Autors misslungen sein, obwohl er als gelungen intendiert war. Ein Autor kann aber per definitionem nicht das Misslingen eines Textes intendieren.)

14) *Texte dialogisch unverfügbarer (z.B. toter) Autoren* sind in ihrer Entstehung an die Absicht des Gelingens der Handlungen des Autors gebunden, können aber *nicht in einem vernünftigen Dialog verstanden/verstehbar gemacht* werden.

Dieses Problem löst auch ein „idealer" Bote oder Dolmetscher (Interpret, Hermeneut) nicht.

Insbesondere kann das Interpretieren von Texten toter Autoren nicht als Form einer besonderen Erfahrung (Einfühlung, Einrücken in eine Tradition, einen Kontext usw.) bestimmt sein. Denn Erfahrungen 1. wie 2. Typs (vgl. Thesen 2) und 3)) sind bei unverfügbaren Autoren und ihren Texten unmöglich. Tote Autoren „reagieren" nicht.

15) *„Das" Problem der Hermeneutik* ist also generell *nicht*, herauszufinden, was hat der Autor „wirklich", „in Wahrheit" oder „eigentlich" „gemeint" hat, „uns sagen wollte" usw.

Diese Fragen sind prinzipiell und generell unbeantwortbar. Sie sind semantisch sinnlos.

16) Eine „rationale Hermeneutik" als Verfahren, *für oder wider bestimmte Interpretationen* von Texten dialogisch unverfügbarer Autoren *zu argumentieren* und damit „wissenschaftliche" Textinterpretationen von anderen (gefühlten, kongenialen, aus ihrer Zeit heraus), nicht wissenschaftlichen zu unterscheiden, darf sich nur auf den Text selbst stützen.

(Auch wenn der Autor selbst diesen Text als misslungen verwerfen würde, hat der Interpret dafür prinzipiell und generell kein Kriterium. Alle traditionellen Hermeneutiken sind unwissenschaftlich.)

17) Der *Text* (eines dialogisch unverfügbaren) Autors heißt *„verstanden"*, wenn der verständige Sprecher (Leser) ihn selbst verantworten kann.

Dafür muss er ihm – vgl. 8) – nicht zustimmen; der Interpret muss die Äußerungen des Textautors (in den verschiedenen Sprachhandlungstypen) nicht akzeptieren.

Deshalb kann insbesondere eine inhaltliche Übereinstimmung zwischen Interpret und Autor kein Qualitätskriterium für die Interpretation sein.

18) Aus dem Qualitätskriterium „verstanden“ als „durch einen Sprecher verantwortbar“ folgt nicht, dass der Text eines dialogisch unverfügbaren Autors *nur eine* richtige Interpretation hat.

Interpretationen sind prinzipiell und generell durch Texte unterbestimmt.

Interpreten- oder Interpreten-Schul-Streitigkeiten um „die richtige Interpretation“ sind nicht wissenschaftlich.

5. Historische Verortung

19) Der hier vorgetragene systematische Versuch, die Grundlagen einer rationalen Hermeneutik sprachpragmatisch zu bestimmen, reagiert auf die Verfassung der Hermeneutik in der philosophischen Diskussion. Exemplarisch für die beiden hauptsächlichen Ansätze gegenwärtiger Hermeneutik sind die in phänomenologischer Tradition stehende *metaphorische Hermeneutik* von Hans Georg Gadamer und die in der Tradition der analytischen Sprachphilosophie stehende *Analytische Hermeneutik* von Oliver Scholz. Beide Ansätze können weder Verfahren noch Kriterien anbieten, wie man eine bessere von einer schlechteren Interpretation begründet unterscheiden kann. Es gibt bis heute keine wissenschaftliche Interpretationskunst.

19,1) Die Hermeneutik von H. G. Gadamer ist eine *metaphorische,* weil alle sie bestimmenden Begriffe wie „Freilegung“ einer „Wahrheit“ durch „hermeneutische Erfahrung“, „das Wunder des Verstehens“ durch das „Einrücken in das historische Bewusstsein“, ja die gesamte Darlegung des Autors über Sprache, Verstehen, Wahrheit und Welt metaphorisch sind. Ihnen fehlt, was nur in direkter, nichtmetaphorischer Rede zugänglich wäre, nämlich (gegenüber einem widerfahrnishaften, als Erlebnisqualität geschilderten, passivisch bleibenden Verstehenserlebnis) eine aktivische Komponente, die, etwa in Form von Regeln oder Anweisungen, angeben würde, was genau zu tun ist, um eine bessere von einer schlechteren Interpretation des Textes einen toten Autors zu unterscheiden. Das „Gespräch“ des Interpreten mit dem toten Autor eines Textes ist, als Grundlage von Gadamers Hermeneutik, per se eine Metapher.

19,2) Die analytische Hermeneutik von O. Scholz setzt dagegen bei den (der Rechtswissenschaft entnommenen) Präsumptionsregeln an, nach denen ein Interpret dem (toten) Autor eines Textes gewisse Qualitäten unterstellen muss, damit dann die analytischen Bedeutungs-, Zeichen- und Sprechakttheorien sinnvoll angewandt werden können. Da hierbei weder pragmatische noch gar methodische Aspekte der Sprachphilosophie berücksichtigt werden, gelingt es diesem Ansatz so wenig wie dem phänomenologischen, zu Verfahrensvorschlägen für die Textinterpretation oder zu Bewertungsmaßstäben für Interpretationsergebnisse zu kommen.

19,3) Der systematische Vorschlag, der hier unterbreitet wird, steht in der Tradition des methodischen Konstruktivismus der Erlanger Schule und seiner Marburger Weiterentwicklung im Methodischen Kulturalismus. Wichtig ist hier vor allem die methodische Hintergehbarkeit der Lebenswelt und ihrer sprachlichen und praktischen Leistungen, die im Konstruktivismus noch als unhinterfragtes Apriori der auf Wissenschaft beschränkten Sprachkritik galt. Methodisch kulturalistisch dagegen ist der Primat der Handlungstheorie gegenüber der Sprachphilosophie, der sprachpragmatisch die Kriterien gewinnt, die eine Interpretation (als Oberbegriff zu allen Verstehensbemühungen sprachlicher Äußerungen) neben wissenschaftlichen und philosophischen auch gegenüber alltagssprachlichen Texten einschließlich toter, nicht in einen Dialog einbeziehbaren Autoren eröffnet.

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On the Pragmatics of Unanswerable Questions

Peter Kügler, Innsbruck

1. Unanswerability Claims

Sometimes it is said that certain questions can never be answered. I will call such statements "unanswerability claims". At different times different questions were regarded as unanswerable, but at no time there was an agreement as to which questions are the unanswerable ones. An unanswerability claim usually does not imply that the question in focus has never been answered before. In most cases, the question has already been answered in one way or another. But those who claim unanswerability reject the known answers as inadequate. Thus, any unanswerability claim seems to presuppose a distinction between two kinds of answers: on the one hand, inadequate, inappropriate answers which, for some reason, need not to be taken into account, and on the other hand, proper, suitable answers, which also include the right answer to the particular question. Answers of the first kind are not only taken to be false, they are assumed to suffer from deficiencies which endanger their very status as answers. Answers of the second kind, however, are supposed to be out of reach, which is why the respective questions are claimed to be unanswerable as such.

Historic examples of unanswerability claims include the famous "world riddles" (*Welträtsel*) that were debated around the turn to the 20th century. In two lectures delivered in 1872 and 1880,[1] the German physiologist Emil du Bois-Reymond mentioned three problems which in his opinion would never be solved: the essence of force and matter, the origin of motion in the world, and the development of consciousness, in particular sense impression, from material conditions. A fourth problem he considered was the possibility of free will, but this would only be unsolvable if

[1] Emil du Bois-Reymond 1916.

free will did exist. So we can evade the riddle, du Bois-Reymond argued, by denying the existence of free will. He also indicated that the unanswerability of the world riddles is due to the fact that the human mind is limited to insufficient ways of thinking and knowing. He referred to our inability to imagine anything which is not an object of either the outer or the inner sense. But above all, he appealed to the assumption that the problems elude a *mechanical* solution. They should be unsolvable in the sense that the particular facts (the existence of consciousness, etc.) cannot be explained by combinations and movements of parts of matter.

Today, du Bois-Reymond's legacy is continued by Colin McGinn who also thinks that the question how consciousness arises from brain states cannot be answered. A question like this which "happens to fall outside a given creature's cognitive space"[2] he calls a *mystery*. The problem of consciousness is beyond our cognitive space, so it is a mystery for us human beings. Other mysteries in McGinn's view concern the self, the nature of meaning, the possibility of free will and of knowledge, especially knowledge a priori. Similarly to his 19th century predecessor, McGinn assumes that true explanations must follow a mode of thought he denotes as "combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings" (p. 18), which is a quasi-mechanical model of explanation, except that the atoms need not to be material and the combination needs not to be spatial.

A third, and notorious, unanswerability claim is associated with *verificationism*. A question is said to be unanswerable if no method is known to verify one of the statements that would answer the question. In his essay "Unanswerable questions?" from 1935, Moritz Schlick referred to this absence of a method of verification as *logical* impossibility, or impossibility *in principle*, and distinguished it from a merely *empirical* impossibility of answering a question.[3] In this second, weaker sense of impossibility, a question is unanswerable if a method of verification is known but not applicable. Popular examples of empirical unanswerability are questions about past events when sufficient evidence is missing. In this case we cannot verify an answer to the question, but we do know how a person could have verified an answer if he or she had been in a better epis-

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[2] McGinn 1993, 3.
[3] Cf. Schlick 1969, 372.

temic position, for instance, close enough to the event to observe what had happened at that particular time and place. When answering a question is logically impossible, however, there is no method at all that could be used even under ideal, counterfactual epistemic circumstances. Verificationists have ascribed this logical unanswerability to metaphysical questions and inferred that these questions are therefore meaningless.

This was just a short summary of three types of unanswerability claim. In the following I shall recapitulate in somewhat greater length Ludwig Wittgenstein's view of unanswerability. After that I will go into the logic (and pragmatics) of questions and answers before I conclude with some remarks on contextual conditions, above all, metaphysical and anti-metaphysical paradigms.

2. Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein's unanswerability claims belong to his early and middle periods. They are primarily based on his naturalism, which he announced in paragraph 4.11 of the *Tractatus*: "The totality of true propositions is the total natural science (or the totality of the natural sciences)."[4] The reference to the Darwinian theory of evolution in 4.1122 makes clear that for Wittgenstein the natural sciences encompass more than just the physical sciences. But metaphysics and ethics certainly do not fall within this broader range, which is why Wittgenstein takes metaphysical and ethical questions to be unanswerable. In comparison with straightforward naturalism, however, Wittgenstein creates a somewhat more spectacular philosophy by adding a few ideas, including an account of "the mystical" in the *Tractatus* and some remarks on *similes* in the *Lecture on Ethics*. Thus we read in paragraph 6.44: "Not *how* the world is, is the mystical, but *that* it is." As the Greek word "mystikós" means "hidden" and "secret", Wittgenstein's statement seems to imply that the old metaphysical question "Why does the world exist?" (or "Why is there something rather than nothing?") cannot be answered. The answer to this question is hidden to us. In the *Lecture on Ethics*, probably delivered in 1929 or 1930, Wittgenstein discusses the same metaphysical example when talking about the experience

[4] Wittgenstein 1933, 75.

of *wondering at the existence of the world*. When having this experience, he says, "I am then inclined to use such phrases as 'how extraordinary that anything should exist' or 'how extraordinary that the world should exist.'"[5]

Wittgenstein, of course, was aware of the existence of metaphysical, in particular theistic, answers to "Why does the world exist?" He actually maintained, again in the *Lecture*, that the experience of wondering at the existence of the world is "exactly what people were referring to when they said that God had created the world" (p. 10). But answers from religion and metaphysics are to be rejected, for according to Wittgenstein they seem to be similes, but when scrutinized more closely, they turn out to be nonsense. Instead of "simile" he also uses the words "analogy" and "allegory" without distinguishing the three expressions or defining one of them. Yet the crucial point for Wittgenstein is certainly *similarity*: the metaphysical usage of words is similar, but not identical, to ordinary usage. Speaking of God, for instance, resembles speaking of human beings; it is part of an "allegory which represents him as a human being of great power whose grace we try to win, etc., etc." (p. 9)

For Wittgenstein the problem with analogical, allegorical answers is that they are no proper answers if they cannot be replaced by answers without similes (analogies, allegories): "And if I can describe a fact by means of a simile I must also be able to drop the simile and to describe the facts without it. Now in our case as soon as we try to drop the simile and simply to state the facts which stand behind it, we find that there are no such facts. And so, what at first appeared to be a simile now seems to be mere nonsense." (p. 10) In summary, then, Wittgenstein's unanswerability claim in the *Lecture* is this: a question that can *only* be answered by analogy to ordinary or scientific facts cannot be answered at all. The notion of "ordinary life" is used twice in the *Lecture*, but Wittgenstein leaves no doubt that *science* is the measure of all things that make up ordinary life, or nature, or the world. He still holds the view that all facts are scientific facts, so the mystical, which goes beyond science, has nothing to do with facts.

A word of caution may be useful here, regarding the term "simile" in the *Lecture*, which in the German translation is rendered as "Gleichnis".[6]

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[5] Wittgenstein 1965, 8.
[6] Cf. Wittgenstein 1989.

This word also appears in the German version of the *Tractatus*, in paragraphs 4.012, 4.015, 4.063 and 5.5563. It is used there in different senses, which is probably the reason why the Ogden-Ramsey translation of the *Tractatus*, as well as that by Pears and McGuinness,[7] comes up with three different words for "Gleichnis" ("likeness", "simile" and "model" in Ogden-Ramsey, "likeness", "imagery" and "simile" in Pears-McGuinness). In the *Lecture*, as we have seen, the word "simile" refers to a deficient mode of speech that depends on non-allegorical speech. In the *Tractatus* the word "Gleichnis" is used in a similar way in 5.5563, where Wittgenstein compares a "Gleichnis" (model, likeness) of the truth with "truth itself". In paragraphs 4.012 and 4.015, however, the word appears in the context of Wittgenstein's picture theory of language. In this pictorial sense, any sign is said to be a "Gleichnis" (likeness) of the signified. A proposition picturing, or representing, a fact, is a "Gleichnis" of that fact. On balance, we need to distinguish at least two senses of "Gleichnis", of "simile", "likeness", or whatever translation we prefer. What Wittgenstein has in mind is similarity, but this similarity can either be *allegorical* or *pictorial*. The first is a similarity between two ways of representation, for instance ordinary language and religious-metaphysical language, the second kind of similarity exists between a representation and its object, for instance a proposition and a fact. Here we are only concerned with the first kind, with allegorical rather than pictorial similarity.

3. Logic and Pragmatics of Direct Answers

The difference between Wittgenstein and traditional metaphysics does not concern the availability of questions or answers, but the assessment of some types of answers, especially answers utilizing analogies that cannot be replaced by statements without analogies. To shed more light on this issue, we need to figure out what makes a statement an answer to a question. Here, yes-no questions cause considerably fewer problems than questions containing interrogative words like "why", "what", "how", "who" etc. A yes-no question such as "Does matter consist of atoms?" can be answered by "yes" or "no", or by the statements these two words stand for

[7] Cf. Wittgenstein 1961.

("matter consists of atoms", "matter does no consist of atoms"); yet it is not obvious what kind of answer is required by a question with an interrogative word. In the following I shall concentrate on this type of question, not the least because the two previous examples "How does the brain produce consciousness?" and "Why does the world exist?" belong into this category.

I will start with a non-philosophical example, though. We know that a question can elicit many different reactions. When being asked who wrote the song *Desolation Row*, you can say nothing at all and perhaps shrug your shoulders; you can, for whatever reason, insult the questioner, or give him or her a hug and a kiss; you can also answer "I don't know" or suggest to look it up in Wikipedia. Better responses would include the indefinite answer "some American singer-songwriter", the disjunctive answer "Neil Young or Bob Dylan", or the precise answer "Bob Dylan". Of all the reactions mentioned, only some are answers, and only one of these answers, the last one, gives the desired information.

A well-established concept in the logic of questions (interrogative logic, erotetic logic) is that of a *direct answer*. A direct answer to a question is one that answers the question without giving more information than necessary. The definition in the book *The Logic of Questions and Answers* by Belnap and Steel uses the term *completeness*: "A direct answer, then, is what counts as completely, but just completely, answering the question."[8] A direct answer contains just enough information to answer the question completely, not more and not less. Hence "Bob Dylan" is a direct answer to our example question. Another one would be "Neil Young", even though this answer is false – directness does not imply truth. A disjunction like "Neil Young or Bob Dylan", on the other hand, is no direct answer, whether being true or false. Though more informative than a shrug of the shoulders, the disjunction does not answer the question completely; whereas the following answer contains too much information and therefore is no direct answer, either: "Bob Dylan wrote *Desolation Row* in the back seat of a New York taxi." The additional information where the song was written might be welcome to the questioner, but it is not necessary for answering the question.

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[8] Belnap / Steel 1976, 13.

Thus, a direct answer must be neither incomplete nor overcomplete. Getting too much information, though, is generally less disturbing than getting too little. Overcompleteness includes completeness and the latter is what we are typically looking for. So it seems appropriate to confine the discussion to the property of completeness. What, then, does it mean that a statement answers a question completely? It is surprisingly difficult to answer this. When David Harrah introduced the concept of direct answer in a paper from 1961, he tried to give a formal characterization of direct answers for certain types of questions.[9] Yet the prospects of such a purely formal approach are rather poor, particularly when applied to questions like those we have considered so far. The answer "Donald Duck wrote *Desolation Row*" has the same shape as "Bob Dylan wrote *Desolation Row*". But given that all people involved know that Donald Duck is a Disney comic character, the first answer will hardly be rated as being complete. And an answer to "Why does the world exist?" will be of the form "The world exists because p". Incomplete answers, too, do have this form. Perhaps it is the form of the embedded sentence p that decides about completeness? No, because form alone does not determine which sentences must be inserted for p to make a good explanation. Suppose a theist who takes "The world exists because God created it" as a complete answer to the previous question. This answer has the same form as "The world exists because Michelangelo painted it", which seems to be far from being a complete answer if "world" means the real world. Note that we do not reject this answer for being wrong but for being irrelevant, or even absurd.

Obviously it is not form alone that makes the difference between complete and incomplete answers. It needs more than a purely formal characterization of completeness. In the logic of questions this requirement is usually met by adding some *pragmatics* to logical theory. Pragmatic concepts are used to explain what completeness or directness is. According to the meanwhile classical definition by Charles Morris, pragmatics is "the science of the relation of signs to their interpreters", dealing "with all the psychological, biological, and sociological phenomena which occur in the functioning of signs."[10] The "functioning of signs" we are interested in is

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[9] Cf. Harrah 1961.
[10] Morris 1938, 30.

the asking and answering of questions, and relevant psychological phenomena include intentions, interests and preferences of the persons involved in this process. What counts as a complete answer partly depends on such psychological factors. Thus, after having defined a direct answer as “what counts as completely, but just completely, answering the question”, Belnap and Steel go on explaining that a direct answer is just what the questioner wanted to get: “If we were to put the matter psychologically, we would say that a direct answer is precisely the kind of response the questioner *intends* to elicit with his question.” (p. 13)

What is remarkable about this statement is its “unofficial” character, as it were. In Belnap’s and Steel’s book on the *logic* of questions and answers this pragmatic or, as the quote says, psychological definition of direct answers is presented as a mere comment that apparently does not belong to logic itself. But in fact this supplement is indispensable for understanding the property of completeness. There is no way of determining which answer is a complete one without referring to the psychology of the questioner. We must know what the questioner wants to know. In the introduction of Belnap’s and Steel’s book, written primarily by Steel, we read that logic is concerned with grammar, semantics and proof theory (though the latter cannot be expected from erotetic logic). Logic in this sense should be free of pragmatics, dealing with syntactical operations, abstract contents and inferential relations between these contents. It follows that the notion of direct or complete answer is no logical concept at all, although it is located in the very heart of erotetic logic. Here, “pure” logic depends on non-logical assumptions.

Another example for a pragmatical amendment to the logic of questions can be found in approaches in which it is treated as a kind of epistemic logic. According to Lennart Åquvist, a question is used to express a *request* that is satisfied if the questioner gets to *know* the answer.[11] A person asking a question thereby requests to provide him or her with appropriate knowledge. To use a term by Jaakko Hintikka,[12] the *desideratum* of the question “Who wrote *Desolation Row*?”, when described from the questioner’s point of view, is “I know who wrote *Desolation Row*.” The desid-

[11] Cf. Åquvist 1975, 140.
[12] Cf. Hintikka 1976, chap. 2.

eratum is a state of knowledge in which the questioner wants to be brought. A complete answer, then, is one that succeeds in bringing about this epistemic state. This shows that whether a question is complete or incomplete depends, among other things, on what the questioner knows in advance. The answer “Robert Allen Zimmerman wrote *Desolation Row*”, for instance, would only be satisfactory for questioners who already know that the person of that name is identical to Bob Dylan (given that he or she knows who Bob Dylan is).

4. Contexts and Paradigms

Now back to the supposed unanswerability of metaphysical questions. In the terminology of the previous section we may say that Wittgenstein’s unanswerability goes back to his refusal to accept irreducible analogies as direct (or complete) answers. For Wittgenstein such answers can only be provided by natural science. Answers coming from other discourses, like religion, ethics or metaphysics, are rejected as meaningless. We know, however, that most philosophers of the past did disagree. Thomas Aquinas, to name but one, dealt at length with our main example, explaining the existence of the world by a divine cause. God, in turn, is a perfect being whose essence can only be grasped by way of analogy. When God is said to be good, wise etc., these predicates are not applied in the same sense as when applied to human beings. Rather, what they convey is that God possesses the properties ascribed to him in a higher or even infinite proportion. So, according to Thomas, there is not only analogy between God and his creatures but also infinite difference. Moreover, analogical speaking of God cannot be reduced to non-analogical speaking, as this would require that predicates can be univocally applied to God and creatures, and this is denied by Thomas.[13]

A few hundred years later, Immanuel Kant expressed a related but somewhat different view, referring to God as “the Unknown, which I do not hereby cognise as it is in itself, but as it is for me or in relation to the world, of which I am a part.”[14] This he called a “cognition of analogy”. In

[13] Cf. *Summa* Theologiae I q. 13 a. 5.
[14] Kant 1912, 129 (§ 57).

contrast to Thomas Aquinas, however, Kant rejected the idea that God's *essence* can be known by analogy. In Kant's view, the analogy only concerns the *relation* between God and the world. Yet this is not the place for discussing the parallels and differences between Thomas' and Kant's understanding of analogy. Suffice to say that both shared with Wittgenstein the idea that analogies are based on some kind of similarity and, most importantly, that they are *irreducible*. In metaphysics analogies cannot be replaced by non-analogical language. Yet in contrast to Wittgenstein, the other two did not worry about that, since they did not regard translatability as a meaning criterion, neither translatability into the language of natural science, nor in that of ordinary life. Even Kant, who strongly opposed speculative theology as meaningless, tried to establish a transcendental theology by using analogical descriptions of God.[15]

A very different and more recent example comes from Nicholas Rescher's book *The Limits of Science*. In chapter eight of this book, entitled "Against Insolubilia", Rescher deals with the existence of the world, admitting that it cannot be explained causally, by positing a thing as the cause of all being. A natural cause would itself belong to the things in the world and thus could not explain their existence. Assuming a supernatural cause, however, would amount to mixing two spheres that must be kept apart. Rescher opts "for leaving God to theology and refraining from drafting him into service in the project of scientific explanation."[16] His own explanation of the existence of the world is in terms of a "principle of value", which is not a thing or like a thing, hence no *cause* in a material, thing-like sense. The explanation, then, is a teleological one, employing the principle "that things exist because 'that's for the best.' Such a teleological approach would hold that *being* roots in value." (p. 121) In short, the world exists because its existence is good and valuable. To the obvious objection that this explanation is not a scientific one, Rescher replies by indicating that scientific standards have often changed in the past, and that they will do so in the future. In prior centuries, teleological explanations have been highly esteemed; today they are regarded as unscientific but this need not remain

[15] Cf. *the Critique of Pure Reason*, B 659 ff. and 723 ff.

[16] Rescher 1999, 120.

so. “The fashion of the present day could turn out to be […] wrong with respect to teleological explanation.” (p. 121)

In Wittgenstein’s view of science, there was no room for teleology or values. Science is committed to causality, and values belong to the realm of the mystical. Outside of science there is no meaning. On the background of Rescher’s account of the variability of scientific standards, a restrictive criterion of meaning, like Wittgenstein’s, may be seen as an arbitrary premise, a contingent invention made at some point of history. Yet it is only from a historical perspective that it can appear like this, since a meaning criterion may well present itself as an absolute truth to the members of a paradigm that is built upon this criterion or a similar assumption. Our previous examination of the logic of questions and answers may help to illuminate how these differences in opinion between members of different paradigms, between metaphysicians and sceptics, are possible. They are possible because logic has a pragmatic side. At least the central concept of a complete answer cannot be explained without mentioning pragmatics.

In studies of the pragmatics of questions it has become customary to use the terms “context” and “relevance” to cover the pragmatic factors on which questions and answers depend. A typical assumption is that only some answers to a given question are relevant, and that the context of asking determines which answers these are.[17] There is no doubt that an important part of this context is constituted by psychological factors. Belnap and Steel, as well as Åquvist and Hintikka, focus on *intentions*: a questioner intends to get some knowledge by eliciting the right answer. In a recent paper on the epistemology of questions, Christopher Hookway characterizes “the context of an utterance as an evolving body of presuppositions, of things that are taken for granted by the participants, and, perhaps, are known to function as a body of shared background knowledge.”[18] Those looking beyond epistemology would prefer to call this the “epistemic context” and distinguish it from physical, linguistic, and social context. Actually, psychology and epistemology cannot be separated from sociology.

[17] An influential example is Bas van Fraassen’s theory of why-questions; see Fraassen 1980, § 4.3.

[18] Hookway 2008, 13.

Which answers people expect when asking a question, and which they accept as completely answering that question, is what they have *learned* to expect and accept in interaction with others. This is particularly so in the case of philosophical or scientific questions, where people learn these things, for instance, when studying at a university. A great mind like Wittgenstein, of course, may also start a new tradition.

As Thomas Kuhn writes, the term "paradigm" in its "sociological" meaning "stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community."[19] Philosophical unanswerability claims represent philosophical paradigms. They are used to identify a paradigm, promote it and delineate it from others. In the case of Wittgenstein the relevant paradigm may be described as a kind of naturalism that emphasizes causal laws of nature. But since paradigms, just like discourses, language games, research programs etc., are no clear-cut entities and often overlap each other, we may also locate Wittgenstein in the narrower paradigm of logical atomism. The parallels between the *Tractatus* and Russell's "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", first published in 1918, are well-known, and so is Russell's confession that these lectures "are very largely concerned with explaining certain ideas which I learnt from my friend and former pupil Ludwig Wittgenstein."[20] In the last of this series of lectures (on metaphysics), Russell says "that the only difference between science and philosophy is, that science is what you more or less know and philosophy is what you do not know. […] Therefore every advance in knowledge robs philosophy of some problems which formerly it had, and if there is any truth, if there is any value in the kind of procedure of mathematical logic, it will follow that a number of problems which had belonged to philosophy will have ceased to belong to philosophy and will belong to science." (p. 243) This seems to imply that if a problem cannot be solved by science, thus turning from a philosophical problem to a scientific one, it cannot be solved at all.

So much for logical atomism, the naturalistic paradigm of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Non-naturalism, of course, has its own paradigms. Like most metaphysicians at all times, Thomas Aquinas deliberately employed

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[19] Kuhn 1970, 175 (Postscript).

[20] Russell 1986, 160.

analogies, metaphors, similes, symbols, etc., to answer questions like that about the origin of the world. As a rule, metaphysicians did not expect that these creative ways of speaking about things remote and mysterious could be replaced by more mundane ones. They often also agreed that these ways of speaking are insufficient, imperfect, and even "incomplete", in the sense that they are not able to reveal the whole truth about the matter (e.g. God). But nevertheless we must admit that they may be complete in the sense discussed in the previous section. Even an "incomplete" answer, a "mere" simile, can be *pragmatically* complete if it satisfies the request expressed by the metaphysical question, i.e., if the questioner accepts the simile as answering the question.

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Zur Performativität des Narrativen: Vorüberlegungen zu einer performativen Narratologie

Alexandra Strohmaier, Graz

Der vorliegende Beitrag präsentiert erste Überlegungen zu einer performativen Narratologie, wobei Austins Konzept des Performativs und dessen Profilierungen, wie sie in der zeitgenössischen sprachphilosophischen und kulturwissenschaftlichen Theoriebildung erfolgen, als Bezugspunkt für eine Neuausrichtung narratologischer Ansätze vorgeschlagen werden sollen. Im Unterschied zu pragmalinguistisch ausgerichteten Ansätzen der Narratologie, deren Prämissen sich im weitesten Sinn auf die von Austin – anhand seiner Trichotomie lokutionär/illokutionär/perlokutionär – begründete Sprechakttheorie und ihre vermeintliche Weiterentwicklung in der Sprachphilosophie Searle'scher und Grice'scher Prägung zurückführen lassen, soll im vorliegenden Beitrag also Austins initiale Performativ/konstativ-Distinktion als Grundlage für eine performativitätstheoretische Perspektivierung der Narratologie stark gemacht werden. Damit schließt der hier propagierte Zugang an jene sprachphilosophischen Ansätze (primär poststrukturalistischer Provenienz) an, die eine Rückwendung zu Austins ursprünglicher, später aber von ihm verworfener Unterscheidung vollziehen und dabei – wie etwa die Ansätze Jacques Derridas, Shoshana Felmans, Judith Butlers oder Sybille Krämers – Aspekte des Performativen herausstellen, die in der sprachanalytisch und universalpragmatisch orientierten Rezeption Austins weitgehend unbeachtet blieben, sich aber – so eine Hypothese des vorliegenden Beitrages – gerade für eine Theorie des literarischen Erzählens als produktiv erweisen könnten.

Der erste Abschnitt des vorliegenden Beitrages ist einem kursorischen Überblick über pragmalinguistische Grundlagen narratologischer Ansätze gewidmet. Während erste Versuche einer pragmalinguistischen Fundierung narratologischer Theorien bereits im Zuge des in den 1960er

Jahren einsetzenden *pragmatic turn* beobachtbar sind, kam es in den letzten beiden Dekaden zur Ausbildung erzähltheoretischer Ansätze, die in der gegenwärtigen narratologischen Forschung dezidiert als Manifestationen einer „pragmatischen Narratologie“ firmieren. In einer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit den diesen Ansätzen inhärenten sprachphilosophischen und kommunikationstheoretischen Prämissen wird dabei insbesondere das für die anglo-amerikanische und deutsche Erzähltheorie charakteristische Modell der narrativen Kommunikation kritisch reflektiert. Im zweiten Abschnitt wird eine Modifikation des klassischen narratologischen Kommunikationsmodells unter Rekurs auf Austins Theorem des Performativs vorgeschlagen, wie sie u.a. durch das narrative Verfahren der Metalepse (als Inszenierung von Narration als Performanz) nahe gelegt wird. Die folgenden Ausführungen suchen generell die Richtung anzudeuten, die eine Revision des klassischen Kommunikationsmodells unter performativitätstheoretischer Perspektive nehmen könnte, sie verstehen sich als Präliminarien zu einer performativen Narratologie.

Pragmalinguistisch fundierte Ansätze der Narratologie und ihre Prämissen

Die pragmatische Narratologie, die, wie Sven Strasen (2002, 185) in einem gleichnamigen Überblicksartikel darstellt, einen postklassischen Ansatz der Erzähltheorie präsentiert, geht aus den sprachphilosophischen Traditionen hervor, welche sich auch für die moderne (Literatur-)Pragmatik im Allgemeinen als grundlegend erweisen: John R. Searles Sprechakttheorie sowie die von H. Paul Grice etablierte Theorie intentionaler Bedeutung und rationaler Kommunikation. Bereits Mary Louise Pratts 1977 erschienene Studie *Toward a speech act theory of literary discourse*, die in ihrem Fokus auf Erzählliteratur als Wegbereiter der pragmatischen Narratologie gelten kann, kombiniert die von Searle installierte Konzeption von Kommunikation als regelgeleitetes Handeln mit dem von Grice formulierten Kooperationsprinzip und den von ihm aufgestellten Konversationsmaximen der Quantität, der Qualität, der Relevanz und Modalität sowie seiner Implikaturentheorie. Das aus der Systematisierung der Grice’schen Thesen auf kognitiver Grundlage hervorgegangene Relevanzprinzip von Sperber und Wilson bildet, so Strasen (2002, 187f.) in Anschluss an Meyer et al.

(2002, 140), gegenwärtig das dominante Paradigma der Literaturpragmatik und der pragmatischen Narratologie. Zu den entschiedensten Proponenten eines relevanztheoretischen Ansatzes in der Literaturpragmatik zählt etwa Adrian Pilkington, der in seiner Studie *Poetic Effects. A Relevance Theory Perspective* (2000) die Applikation der Relevanztheorie auf genuin ästhetische Phänomene vornimmt. In der narratologischen Theoriebildung kann Michael Kearns *Rhetorical Narratology* (1999), einer der elaboriertesten Ansätze der pragmatischen Narratologie, als Ergebnis eines relevanztheoretischen Zugangs zu Fragen der literarischen Kommunikation herausgestellt werden. Ohne auf diese Ansätze näher einzugehen, sollen im Folgenden die Prämissen der sie fundierenden sprachphilosophischen und kommunikationstheoretischen Modelle knapp umrissen werden.

Die von Sperber und Wilson aufgestellte Relevanztheorie gründet in der Annahme einer universalen Struktur menschlicher Informationsverarbeitung, die darauf hin ausgerichtet sei, möglichst starke kognitive Effekte bei möglichst geringem Prozessaufwand (Sperber et al. 1986, vii) zu erzielen. Der Grad der Relevanz einer Information wird definiert als das Verhältnis von kognitivem Effekt und Prozessaufwand (Sperber et al. 1986, 123f.). Die Effizienz der Kommunikation hängt von der erfolgreichen Identifikation der Senderintention durch den Empfänger ab, was durch das Relevanzprinzip gewährleistet wird. Dieses wird von Sperber und Wilson (1986, 158) als allgemeingültiges Prinzip bestimmt und folgendermaßen expliziert: „Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance.“ Die Relevanzgarantie eines (ostensiven) Stimulus initiiert und strukturiert die Rezeption – indem sie dem Empfänger kommuniziert, dass der zu verarbeitende Stimulus hohen kognitiven Gewinn in Relation zu dem zu investierenden Prozessaufwand verspricht, wird der Verarbeitungsprozess aufgenommen und (idealerweise) bis zu der erfolgreichen Ermittlung der informativen Absicht des Senders mittels systematischer Erschließung logischer Implikaturen aufrechterhalten. Sperber und Wilson schließen damit an Grices Konzeption von Kommunikation als zweckrationales Handeln an, das auf dem Prinzip der Kooperation und der damit verbundenen – von Sender und Empfänger wechselseitig unterstellten – Einhaltung der Konversationsmaximen beruht. Diese dienen auch als Grundlage für die (teleologische) Rekonstruktion der vom Sender intendierten Bedeutung. Die Erschließung des Sinns folgt dabei der konversationellen Logik der Implikatur, die nicht nur den Rezeptions-, sondern auch den Produktionsvorgang bestimmt, insofern sie vom Sender in der Kalkulation der Empfängerreaktionen bewusst zur Bedeutungsübermittlung eingesetzt wird.

In der Grice'schen Bedeutungstheorie kommt der kommunikativen Intention eine selbstreferentielle Dimension zu. Die Äußerungsbedeutung wird nach Grice durch die im Adressaten erzielte Wirkung bedingt, wobei der Adressat deren Intendiertheit erkennen muss, was folgendermaßen formalisiert wird: „‚[S] meant something by x' is (roughly) equivalent to ‚[S] intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention'" (Grice 1971, 58). Dieser Status der Intention und die damit verbundene Vernachlässigung der linguistischen Bedeutung zugunsten der (allgemein für das Inferenzmodell charakteristischen) kommunikativen (durch die Sprecherintention determinierten) Bedeutung in Grices Kommunikationstheorie erlauben nach Sperber und Wilson die Modellierung von Kommunikation als codeunabhängiges Handeln. Die Grice'sche Theorie lege, so Sperber und Wilson (1986, 25), nahe, dass Kommunikation möglich sei „even in the absence of a code".

Grices weitgehende Gleichsetzung von (Sprecher-)Intention und (Äußerungs-)Bedeutung, die in der Relevanztheorie eine Radikalisierung erfährt (vgl. Meyer et al. 2002, 140), wird von Searle in *Speech Acts* aufgegriffen und dahingehend abgeändert, dass die Bedeutung einer Äußerung nicht nur an der Intention des Sprechers, sondern auch an der Konvention (der Sprache) festgemacht wird: „Die Bedeutung übersteigt die Intention, sie ist zumindest manchmal auch eine Sache der Konvention" (Searle 1971, 71). In Searles Replik auf Derridas Austin-Lektüre (Searle 1977, 202) wird hingegen diese Modifikation ansatzweise wieder zurückgenommen. Das Verstehen einer Äußerung besteht nach Searle nunmehr primär in der Identifikation der Äußerungsabsicht. Die verbale Äußerung wird (auch in der schriftlichen Kommunikation) als ideale Realisierung der Sprecherintention begriffen: „In serious literal speech the sentences are precisely the realizations of the intention" (Searle 1977, 202).

Die hier konturierten sprechakttheoretischen Positionen mit ihrer Privilegierung der (Sprecher-)Intention als bedeutungskonstitutiven sowie produktions- und rezeptionsbestimmenden Faktor der Kommunikation scheinen nicht nur in der pragmatischen Narratologie, die dezidiert in der

Tradition der Sprechakttheorie Searles und Grices steht, sondern auch in allgemein narratologischen Modellen (vor allem der deutschen und angloamerikanischen Erzähltheorie) als Präsuppositionen der Theoriebildung zu fungieren. Insbesondere Varianten des in den 1970er Jahren entwickelten Kommunikationsmodells des Erzählens, das nicht nur in klassischen Ansätzen der Narratologie, sondern auch in postmodernen Versionen der Erzähltheorie (vgl. etwa O'Neill 1996) eine eminente Rolle spielt, scheinen auf die in der Pragmatik Searle'scher und Grice'scher Prägung vorherrschende Vorstellung von Kommunikation als kalkulierbare Übermittlung auktorialer Intention zu rekurrieren. Als paradigmatisch für eine derart kommunikationstheoretisch ausgerichtete Schematisierung des (literarischen) Erzählens kann das im deutschsprachigen Raum besonders einflussreiche „Kommunikationsmodell des Erzählwerks" in der Konzeption von Cordula Kahrmann, Gunter Reiß und Manfred Schluchter gelten.

Die Produktion und Rezeption des narrativen Textes wird von Kahrmann et al. anhand eines aus fünf hierarchisch angeordneten Kommunikationsniveaus (N) bestehenden Modells formalisiert, das für jede Ebene eine Sender- sowie eine Empfängerinstanz der Kommunikation annimmt. Die auf der Ebene N4 situierte (selbst in die als N5 bezeichnete, übergeordnete Ebene des historischen Kontexts eingebettete) reale Kommunikationssituation ist konstitutiv für den Erzähltext, der „als sprachlich fixierte Manifestation des Autorbewußtseins und seiner Kommunikationsabsicht" (Kahrmann et al. 1996, 49) definiert wird. Dabei wird nach Kahrmann et al. (1996, 50) die Intention des realen Autors über die fiktionalen Senderinstanzen der nächst höheren Ebenen (abstrakter Autor, fiktiver Erzähler, erzählte sendende Figur) sowie deren Empfängerkorrelate (abstrakter Adressat, fiktiver Adressat, erzählte empfangende Figur) zum Ausdruck gebracht. Während zwar der abstrakte Autor als „das theoretische Konstrukt der dem Text impliziten Intention des realen Autors" und der fiktive Erzähler als potentiell explizite Konkretisierung der Autorintention bestimmt werden, sind, wie Kahrmann et al. betonen, grundsätzlich die gesamte fiktionale Redesituation und ihre Kommunikationsniveaus (N1-N3) als vom Autorbewusstsein und seiner Kommunikationsabsicht abhängig zu denken. Das diesem Modell immanente Konzept von Kommunikation als Transmission auktorialer Intention erlaubt es, die Textproduktion als „den sukzessiven Vollzug eines Entscheidungsprozesses durch den realen Autor" (Kahrmann et al. 1996, 58) zu modellieren, als deren Konstanten die auf der Kommunikationsabsicht basierende Erzählkonzeption und der intendierte Leser verstanden werden (vgl. Kahrmann et al. 1996, 58). Die anhand des Modells konzipierte Textrezeption lässt sich als Rekonstruktion der im Text implizit manifesten Autorintention verstehen, wobei die ideale Rezeption mit der Intention des Autors konvergiert (vgl. Kahrmann et al. [4]1996, 59).

Die pragmalinguistische und kommunikationstheoretische Ausrichtung narratologischer Ansätze, wie sie hier andeutungsweise skizziert wurde, ist im wissenschaftshistorischen Kontext der primär werkimmanent oder strukturalistisch verfahrenden Literaturwissenschaft der 1950er und 1960er Jahre als Versuch einer Rehabilitierung der in dieser Tradition weitgehend ausgeblendeten Instanzen des Autors, des Rezipienten sowie des Kontextes literarischer Kommunikation zu bewerten. Pratts für die pragmatische Narratologie wegbereitende Studie etwa gründet in dem Bemühen, die von den Russischen Formalisten etablierte Dichotomie zwischen poetischer und nicht-poetischer Sprache unter Rückgriff auf Positionen der *Ordinary Language Philosophy* zu korrigieren. Im Gegensatz zu der von den Formalisten bzw. Strukturalisten vertretenen Konzeption einer durch intrinsische Merkmale von der Alltagssprache radikal verschiedenen Sprache der Literatur wird eine nicht-essentialistische Konzeption von Literatur propagiert, in der diese nicht länger in Abgrenzung zur Alltagssprache, sondern als eine ihrer Erscheinungsformen bestimmt wird (Pratt 1977, 3-37). Damit verbunden ist die Situierung des literarischen Textes in einem Handlungszusammenhang, der in Analogie zur narrativen Alltagspraxis (als persönliche Rede) modelliert wird – literarische Kommunikation funktioniert, so die nahezu allen (literatur-)pragmatischen Ansätzen gemeinsame Grundthese, nicht grundsätzlich anders als Alltagskommunikation, weshalb sie wie diese mit dem Analyseinstrumentarium der pragmatischen Linguistik beschrieben werden kann (dazu auch Strasen 2002, 187).

Die Präsuppositionen, die dem kommunikationsanalytischen Inventar der pragmatischen Narratologie inhärent sind, erscheinen allerdings vor dem Hintergrund literaturtheoretischer und sprachphilosophischer Reflexionen (nicht nur poststrukturalistischer Provenienz) als problematisch. In seiner zweckrationalen Grundlegung scheint sich das von Grice etablierte Kommunikationsmodell bereits a priori für die Analyse literarischer

Sprachhandlungen als unangemessen zu erweisen. Grices Konversationsmaxime der Modalität etwa impliziert Forderungen nach der Vermeidung von Polysemie und Opazität (in den Worten Grices: „Mehrdeutigkeit“ und „Dunkelheit des Ausdrucks“) (Grice 1993, 250). Zumal aber gerade „Komplexität“ oder „Verrätselung“, wie etwa in der Typologie axiologischer Werte von Heydebrand und Winko (1996, 114), als (wenn auch historisch spezifische) definitorische Merkmale von Literarizität zu verstehen sind, erscheint die Grice’sche Maxime eine (direkte oder indirekte) Applikation auf literarische Sprachhandlungen grundsätzlich auszuschließen.

Die (in einer Radikalisierung der dem Inferenzmodell immanenten Grundannahmen) von Sperber und Wilson anvisierte Möglichkeit einer Kommunikation „in Abwesenheit eines Codes“ erscheint nicht nur in der Perspektive zeichentheoretischer Ansätze als inkompatibel mit literatur- bzw. erzähltheoretischen Erkenntnisinteressen. Eine derartige Abstraktion von der sprachlichen Bedingtheit von Bedeutung, wie sie in der Grice’schen Konzeption einer zeichenunabhängigen Intention angelegt ist, scheint in letzter Konsequenz in der Annullierung des literaturwissenschaftlichen Untersuchungsgegenstandes selbst zu kulminieren.

Neben dem Kooperations- bzw. Relevanzprinzip, das darauf abzielt, im Dienste der Effizienz die Kontingenz und Ambiguität des Sprechhandelns systematisch auszuschließen, dieses zu regulieren und kalkulieren, ist es insbesondere die intentionalistische Konzeption von Bedeutung, wodurch die oben genannten Ansätze als problematisch gerade auch für die Analyse literarischer Kommunikation erscheinen. In seiner Austin-Lektüre sowie seiner Searle-Replik, in *Signatur Ereignis Kontext* und *Limited Inc a b c...*, zeigt Jacques Derrida bekanntlich die Abwesenheit der Intention als Bedingung von Sprechakten auf. Im Zusammenhang mit der Entfaltung seines Konzepts der Schrift vollzieht Derrida (1988, 299) den „Bruch mit dem Horizont der Kommunikation als Kommunikation von Bewußtsein oder von Anwesenheiten und als linguistische oder semantische Übermittlung des Meinens“. Eine ‚graphematische’ Konzeption von Kommunikation auf Grundlage des Derrida’schen Schriftbegriffs impliziert eine Absage an die der pragmatischen Sprachkonzeption immanente Vorstellung von Kommunikation als Vehikel eines durch die Intention eines selbstbewussten Sprechers verbürgten Sinns: „Als Schrift ist die Kommunikation, legt man Wert darauf, dieses Wort beizubehalten, nicht das Beförderungsmittel von Sinn, der Austausch von Intention und Meinen, der Diskurs und die ‚Kommunikation der Bewußtseine'" (1988, 313). Dabei ist es nach Derrida (2001, 96f.) in erster Linie die für das Zeichen (*marque*) konstitutive Struktur der Iterabilität – dessen irreduzible Differenz in der Wiederholung –, die „die Intention [...] spaltet oder in einen Abstand rückt, sie daran hindert, voll selbstpräsent zu sein, in der Aktualität ihrer Absicht oder eines Sagen-Wollens".

Die reduktionistischen Implikationen der Konzeption eines bedeutungskonstitutiven Meinens für eine Theorie der literarischen Kommunikation wurden indirekt bereits in Ansätzen der werkimmanenten Literaturtheorie kritisiert. Bereits 1946 haben Wimsatt und Beardsley die Annahme, dass die Intention des Autorsubjekts als Maßstab der Rezeption und der Bewertung von Literatur fungieren könne, als Fehlschluss ausgewiesen. Ohne die Bedeutung der Intention für die Anlage des literarischen Textes durch den empirischen Autor grundsätzlich zu verneinen, wird von ihnen die Möglichkeit, aber auch die Angemessenheit, auf die auktoriale Intention im literaturwissenschaftlichen Interpretationsprozess zurückzugreifen, in Abrede gestellt (Wimsatt et al. 2000, 85f.).

Wenn die (Literatur-)Pragmatik durch ihr Festhalten an einem radikalen bzw. starken Intentionalismus-Begriff in gewisser Weise hinter den Einsichten der werkimmanenten bzw. strukturalistischen Literaturtheorie zurückbleibt, dann erscheint ihre Tendenz zur Idealisierung, zur Formalisierung und Regulierung des Rezeptionsaktes gerade als eine Fortführung strukturalistischer Praktiken. Bereits ein flüchtiger Blick auf die heuristischen Modelle pragmalinguistisch ausgerichteter Literaturwissenschaft suggeriert, dass die Methoden, wie sie am Strukturalismus durch die Literaturpragmatik kritisiert wurden, von dieser selbst übernommen und lediglich auf ein anderes Untersuchungsobjekt übertragen wurden. Galten die wissenschaftlichen Bemühungen des Strukturalismus dem Text, so ist es in der pragmatischen Literaturtheorie nun dessen Rezeption, die es – mitunter auch durch Rückgriff auf Positionen der empirischen Literaturwissenschaft und der Kognitionswissenschaft – szientistisch zu organisieren gilt. Dadurch scheint ironischerweise gerade das Potential, das die Orientierung der pragmatischen Literaturtheorie an Positionen der *Ordinary Language Philosophy* implizieren könnte, verloren zu gehen. Die programmatische

Hinwendung zur Alltagssprache im Dienste der Wissenschaft bewirkte, so ließe sich konstatieren, realiter eine Verwissenschaftlichung der Alltagssprache und des durch sie bzw. mit ihr vollzogenen Handelns.

Zu einem performativitätstheoretisch erweiterten Modell narrativer Kommunikation

Nach dieser kursorischen Darstellung von Prämissen und Methoden der pragmatischen Narratologie soll dieser nun als mögliche Alternative eine performativitätstheoretisch perspektivierte Narratologie gegenübergestellt werden, indem auf Basis des von Austin eingeführten Theorems des Performativs und in Rekurs auf dessen Erweiterungen in der rezenten sprachphilosophischen und kulturwissenschaftlichen Theoriebildung eine spezifische Modifikation des klassischen Kommunikationsmodells – als mögliche Grundlage einer performativen Narratologie – vorgeschlagen werden soll.

In ihrem Versuch aufzuzeigen, dass – entgegen der Meinung Austins und seiner sprachanalytischen und universalpragmatischen Nachfolger – das Performative und das Illokutionäre nicht in einem Ersetzungsverhältnis zueinander stehen, präpariert Sybille Krämer (2001, 142ff.) spezifische Merkmale ursprünglicher Performativa – ritueller Sprechakte, wie etwa Vermählen, Vermachen, Verurteilen, Taufen – heraus. Dabei werden Eigenschaften und Wirkungsweisen des Performativs sichtbar, die der klassischen Konzeption von Kommunikation als eine auf Kooperation der Sender- und Empfängerinstanz beruhende (transparente) Übermittlung auktorialer Intentionen, wie sie auch dem oben konturierten Kommunikationsmodell immanent ist, weitgehend widersprechen. Die Berücksichtigung der von Krämer am ursprünglichen Performativ aufgezeigten spezifischen Merkmale im Kontext literarischen Erzählens kann, wie hier argumentiert werden soll, Ansatzpunkte für eine Rekonzeptualisierung des klassischen narratologischen Kommunikationsmodells bieten. Die Übertragung der sich am ursprünglichen Performativ abzeichnenden Kommunikationsstruktur auf das Handlungssystem der Literatur erscheint dabei auch insofern geboten, als literarische Äußerungen, wie unter anderen Jonathan Culler (2000, 506) hervorhebt, als Formen performativen Sprechens verstanden werden können. Wie für performative Äußerungen sind für literarische die logisch-semantischen Wahrheitsbedingungen ohne Relevanz –

performative bzw. literarische Äußerungen sind weder wahr noch falsch –, und für beide gilt, dass sie sich nicht auf gegebene Tatsachen beziehen, sondern diese (durch das/im Ausführen der Äußerung) erst herstellen.

Wie Austin (1975, 87) bereits in seinem 1946 erschienenen Aufsatz *Other Minds* argumentiert, bedeutet die „Äußerung offenkundig ritueller Ausdrücke […] nicht, daß man die vollzogene Handlung *beschreibt*, sondern dass man sie *ausführt*“. In *How to do Things with Words* definiert der Begriff des Performativen bekanntlich Sprechhandlungen, „in denen etwas *sagen* etwas *tun* heißt; in denen wir etwas tun, *dadurch daß* wir etwas sagen oder *indem* wir etwas sagen“ (Austin 2002, 35). Die ursprünglichen Performativa repräsentieren keine Tatsachen einer außersprachlichen Welt, sondern stellen diese sprachlich – in der/durch die Ausführung einer Äußerung – her. Die sprachlichen Zeichen einer performativen Äußerung haben weniger eine (hetero-)referentielle denn eine wirklichkeitskonstituierende Funktion. Das Performativ, so Derrida (1988, 305) in seiner Austin-Lektüre, „beschreibt nicht etwas, das außerhalb der Sprache oder vor ihr existiert. Es produziert oder verwandelt eine Situation, es wirkt.“

An den spezifischen Erscheinungs- und Wirkungsweisen ursprünglicher Performativa zeigt sich nach Krämer nun, dass sich diese weniger als dialogische denn als gleichsam dramatische Rede begreifen lassen: „Die ursprünglichen Performativa sind „weniger an der Urszene dialogischer Wechselrede orientiert als an einer Aufführung“ (Krämer 2001, 143). Durch die ursprünglichen Performativa wird keine Beziehung zwischen den Gesprächspartnern gestiftet, die eine reziproke Verpflichtung einschließen würde: „Im ursprünglichen Performativ dient die Sprache als Medium der Suspendierung von Dialog und Verständnis“ (Krämer 2001, 145). Als primärer Adressat der rituellen Äußerung erweist sich nach Krämer auch nicht das Individuum (wie es in der universalpragmatischen Konzeption von Kommunikation als Empfänger hypostasiert wird), sondern das gesellschaftliche Kollektiv, das – vertreten durch das Auditorium, vor dem eine rituelle Sprechhandlung vollzogen wird – im weitesten Sinn auch als Urheber der im zeremoniellen Akt verbalisierten Äußerungen verstanden werden kann. Denn die Wirkmächtigkeit der im institutionellen Sprachgebrauch artikulierten Formeln ist durch soziale Konventionen festgelegt, ihre performative Kraft beziehen sie aus der Tradition vorangegangener überpersönlicher (Sprach-)Praktiken. Deren Wiederholbarkeit und nicht die individuelle Intention des Sprechers determinieren deren Bedeutung. Der Sprechakt des Verheiratens etwa gelingt, wenn die entsprechende Formel (vor den zum Verfahren der Eheschließung zugelassenen Personen und von der zum Vollzug dieses Sprechakts autorisierten Instanz) artikuliert wird, unabhängig von den mentalen Dispositionen des Sprechers. Dessen Autorität konstituiert sich, wie Krämer (2002, 335) unter Referenz auf Judith Butler andeutet, durch das Zitieren der Norm, ist also Folge und nicht Voraussetzung seines Sprechens: „Die Kraft des Performativs speist sich nicht aus den Intentionen und dem Willen des sprechenden Individuums als dem originären und persönlichen Ursprung der Äußerung, sondern wurzelt in der ‚sedimentierten Wiederholbarkeit', die in jeder performativen Äußerung am Werk ist" (Krämer 2001, 144). Durch diese den individuellen Sprechakt ermöglichende und gleichzeitig über ihn hinausgehende Zitatförmigkeit sprachlicher Handlung (deren Iterabilität im Sinne Derridas) wird, wie Butler (2006, 30) aufzeigt, (je)der Sprechakt auf den ihn konstituierenden Nexus sprachlicher Äußerungen hin geöffnet.

Unter Berücksichtigung dieser Erscheinungs- und Wirkungsweisen des ursprünglichen Performativs in der Revision des klassischen Kommunikationsmodells wäre dessen Dynamik zunächst weniger nach dem Modell einer privaten „working cooperation" (Mey 2000, 12) zwischen personalem Autor und individuellem Leser denn nach dem Modell eines performativen, das heißt immer (auch) an eine Öffentlichkeit gerichteten, (Sprech-)Akts zu entwerfen. Die Konzeptualisierung des gesellschaftlichen Kollektivs als (empirischen) Adressaten literarischer Kommunikation würde es u.a. auch erlauben, die in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Narratologie tendenziell verdrängte Geschichte des literarischen Erzählens als ursprünglich orale, an eine Öffentlichkeit gerichtete Praxis in der narratologischen Theoriebildung (wieder) stärker zu profilieren. Das in Ansätzen der pragmatischen Narratologie vorausgesetzte Kooperationsprinzip bzw. dessen kognitionstheoretisches Komplement, das Relevanzprinzip, ließe sich im Zusammenhang mit der an der sprachanalytischen und universalpragmatischen Rezeption Austins erkennbaren Rationalisierung und Idealisierung, wie sie unter anderem Krämer aufzeigt, nicht nur als Ergebnis einer (kognitionswissenschaftlichen) Komplexitätsreduktion, sondern auch einer (womöglich unzulässigen) Abbildung der Kommunikationsbedingungen narrativer Alltagspraxis auf literarische Narration verstehen. Das auf zwei empirische Aktanten ausgerichtete Kommunikationsmodell als Grundannahme narratologischer Theoriebildung könnte unter dieser Perspektive zudem wissenschaftskritisch in seiner epistemologischen, kultur- und medienhistorischen Bedingtheit hinterfragt werden, mitunter als Produkt medientechnologisch induzierter Privatisierung literarischen Erzählens und seiner Rezeption.

Die performativitätstheoretische Rekonzeptualisierung der textinternen Instanzen narrativer Kommunikation (im Modell Kahrmanns et al. der fiktive Erzähler und der fiktive Adressat) und ihres Kommunikats (des Erzählten) kann sich, wie im Folgenden gezeigt werden soll, am Verfahren der narrativen Metalepse orientieren, die als „performatives Erzählen“ (Häsner 2001, 20) Narration als Performanz (selbstreferentiell) inszeniert und mithin die Implikationen einer Konzeption von Narrativität als Performativität paradigmatisch zu veranschaulichen imstande ist. Bei der Metalepse handelt es sich nach Genette (1998, 168f.) um eine (erzähllogisch als widerrechtlich verstandene) Überschreitung einer „Grenze zwischen zwei Welten: zwischen der, in der man erzählt, und der, von der erzählt wird“. Als charakteristisch für die Metalepse erweist sich also, dass sie die (sie bedingende) pragmatische Ebenenhierarchie, wie sie die Architektonik des klassischen Kommunikationsmodells vorsieht, im Akt der Narration gerade nicht respektiert, sondern performativ unterminiert. Eine besonders augenfällige Form der metaleptischen Transgression liegt etwa dann vor, wenn die Figuren einer Geschichte sich an ihren Erzähler wenden, wenn Konstituenten der erzählten Welt, des intradiegetischen Universums, in die sie konstituierende extradiegetische Dimension (des Erzählaktes) eingreifen. Als prominentes Beispiel für diese Form der Metalepse, das u.a. Wolf (1993, 360) anführt, kann etwa die Anrede Molly Blooms an ihren Erzähler bzw. Autor gelten. In ihrem Schlussmonolog findet sich folgende Apostrophe (Joyce 1961, 769): „O Jamesy let me up out of this“. Genette (1998, 168) verweist als Beispiel für Metalepsen unter anderen auch auf *Tristram Shandy*, dessen Erzähler den Leser etwa auffordert, doch bitte die Tür zu schließen oder Mister Shandy ins Bett zu bringen.

Der Vollzug dieser narrativen Sprachhandlungen beschreibt kein Geschehen, sondern stellt dieses her. Die dabei geäußerten Worte beziehen sich nicht primär auf das Erzählte, sondern auf das Erzählen, das mit diesem Akt des Erzählens auch als solches zur Aufführung gebracht, selbstreferentiell inszeniert wird und wirklichkeitskonstituierende Effekte entfaltet. In dem Zitat aus Joyces *Ulysses* wird der Erzähler gleichsam vor den Augen des Lesers ins Leben gerufen. Das Verfahren der Metalepse inauguriert den Erzähler, der in dem/durch den Akt des Erzählens als dessen Subjekt konstituiert wird. Auch als Appell des Erzählers an den Leser generiert die Metalepse das Objekt ihrer Referenz. Der Leser entsteht in der/durch die Anrede des Erzählers, der diesen – gleichsam appellatorisch – hervorbringt. Die mediale Bedingtheit von Kommunikat, Sender und Empfänger wird offenbar. Es gibt diese drei Konstituenten der Kommunikation (in ihrer spezifischen Form) nur aufgrund des Mediums der Sprache, in dem und durch das sie sich realisieren.

Eine an der Metalepse beobachtbare Eigenschaft besteht in den Worten Genettes (1998, 169) in der „inakzeptablen und doch so schwer abweisbaren Hypothese, wonach das Extradiegetische vielleicht immer schon diegetisch ist und der Erzähler und seine narrativen Adressaten, d.h. Sie und ich, vielleicht auch noch zu irgendeiner Erzählung gehören". Was sich ereignet, wenn die Metalepse wirkt, scheint so etwas zu sein wie ein Schwindel, vergleichbar dem, was Austin (2002, 46) bemerkt, wenn er in seiner Vorlesung von „schlüpfrige[n] Kufen" spricht, die die metaphysischen Füße zum Rutschen bringen. Wie Shoshana Felman (2003, 44) argumentiert, ist es dieser Verlust des Bodenkontakts, worin die „Performanz" des Performativen besteht: „[T]he very performance of the performative consists precisely in performing the loss of footing: it is the performing of the *loss of the ground*."

Die durch die Metalepse bzw. das Performativ evozierte Impression eines „Bodenverlusts" lässt sich sprachphilosophisch auf die Inszenierung des Zusammenbruchs der dem Konzept der Repräsentation immanenten Differenz von Zeichen und Bezeichnetem zurückführen. Wie Krämer aufzeigt, bringt das Austin'sche Theorem des Performativs das „Zwei-Welten-Modell der Sprachlichkeit" (Krämer 2001, 95), wonach „ein Satz das, was er *beschreibt*, nicht zugleich auch *ist*" (Krämer 2001, 138), zum Kollabieren. Anstelle der Nicht-Identität von Wort und Sache wird die „magische Ineinssetzung von Zeichen und Bezeichnetem" (Krämer 2002, 323) zur Aus- bzw. Aufführung gebracht. Die metaleptische Destabilisierung ontologischer Ordnungen, wie sie sich insbesondere durch jene Komplexionsformen der Metalepse konkretisiert, die mit Wolf (1993, 372) als paradoxe

„Möbiusband-Erzählungen“ bezeichnet werden können und in der bildenden Kunst eine Entsprechung etwa in M. C. Eschers berühmten Lithographien „Zeichnen“ (1948) oder „Bildgalerie“ (1956) finden, scheint ihre irritierenden Effekte ebenfalls aus der für sie kennzeichnenden Außer-Kraft-Setzung der Logik der Repräsentation zu beziehen. Damit tritt das Zeichen als Sache an sich, in seiner Materialität, in Erscheinung und verweist auf die unhintergehbare Kontingenz der Medialität von Kommunikation.

Die Berücksichtigung dieser an der Metalepse konturierten Performativität des Narrativen würde mithin ein Kommunikationsmodell implizieren, in dem das Erzählte nicht länger primär als Ergebnis intentionaler Bedeutungskonstitution gedacht wird, sondern als Resultat einer (medial spezifischen) narrativen Praxis, die das Erzählte sowie dessen (textimmanente) Produktions- und Rezeptionsinstanzen (durch den/in dem Akt des Erzählens) performativ hervorbringt. Ein derartiges Modell, wie es unter Rekurs auf die Erscheinungs- und Wirkungsweisen des ursprünglichen Performativs gewonnen werden kann, negiert die ideale Vorstellung von einem dem Erzählen vorgängigen oder von ihm unabhängigen Erzählten, das nicht vom Erzählen und dem Medium, in dem es erfolgt, affiziert wird – eine der zentralen Präsuppositionen der klassischen Narratologie und ihrer Modelle –, und eröffnet einen Zugang, der eine immer schon materialisierte, medial inkarnierte Geschichte als Gegenstand der Untersuchung voraussetzt. Durch die spezifische Modellierung dieser radikalen Abhängigkeit des Erzählten und seiner Instanzen vom Erzählen, wie sie oben ansatzweise vorgeschlagen wurde, scheinen die spezifische Performativität bzw. Medialität des Erzählens und seine Kontingenz narratologisch fassbar zu werden.

Resümee

Ausgangspunkt der hier formulierten Überlegungen zu einer performativen Narratologie bildeten die an Ansätzen der pragmalinguistisch fundierten Narratologie ausgemachten kommunikationstheoretischen Grundannahmen, in denen narrative Kommunikation als tendenziell zweckrationaler, intentional gesteuerter, regelgeleiteter Prozess mit kalkulierbaren Folgen verstanden und dementsprechend modelliert wird. Insbesondere die in der pragmatisch orientierten Literatur- und Erzählwissenschaft favorisierte Konzeption von Kommunikation als durch das Prinzip der Kooperation bzw. Relevanz strukturierte Transmission und teleologische Rekonstruktion intentionaler Bedeutung in den Theorien von Grice sowie von Sperber und Wilson wurde als partiell inkompatibel mit den Funktions- und Wirkungsweisen literarischer Sprachhandlungen herausgestellt. Demgegenüber wurde das von Austin implementierte Theorem des Performativs in seiner Weiterentwicklung durch Positionen der zeitgenössischen Performativitätstheorie als theoretische Grundlage für eine Revision erzähltheoretischer Ansätze vorgeschlagen. Die Berücksichtigung der sich am ursprünglichen Performativ abzeichnenden Merkmale des Sprechhandelns, wie sie unter anderen von Krämer akzentuiert wurden, ließ eine Rekonzeptualisierung des klassischen narratologischen Kommunikationsmodells geboten erscheinen, welche in Analogie zu den Erscheinungs- und Wirkungsweisen des Performativs vom gesellschaftlichen Kollektiv als (empirischen) Adressaten literarischer Kommunikation ausgeht. Die textinternen Instanzen literarischer Kommunikation wurden am Beispiel des narrativen Verfahrens der Metalepse rekonfiguriert. Die an der Metalepse als performativer Inszenierung des Erzählens beobachtbaren Bedingungen narrativer Kommunikation und ihrer Instanzen legten es nahe, das der klassischen Narratologie immanente Konzept einer prä- bzw. außerdiskursiven Sprecher- und Empfängerinstanz zu revidieren und die konstitutive Funktion des Erzählens für das Subjekt des Erzählens und seinen (fiktiven) Adressaten herauszustellen. Sender- und Empfängerinstanz wären demnach als heteronome Aussagesubjekte zu denken, die sich in dem/durch das Erzählen konstituieren, verändern und nicht unabhängig von diesem existieren. Die Konvergenz von Zeichen und Bezeichnetem, wie sie die Metalepse als selbstreferentielle Aufführung von Narration (als Performanz) präsentiert, motivierte außerdem dazu, (in Anschluss an Krämer) die Performativität des Narrativen als Medialität zu reflektieren und deren entsprechende Konzeptualisierung in einem revidierten Modell narrativer Kommunikation einzufordern. Eine derartige Modellierung narrativer Kommunikation, die als Grundlage einer performativen Narratologie das klassische narratologische Modell ansatzweise komplementieren könnte, scheint der spezifischen Performativität und Medialität des Narrativen Rechnung tragen zu können.

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Language and Consciousness

Sense-data and Senses*

Michael Dummett, Oxford

Sense-data are wrongly named: they are not at all what we are *given.* We are not given visual sense-data, for example: what we are given are scenes of a street, or a room, of fields, or a wood, of the sky with the sun and clouds, or with the moon and stars. Only with great intellectual effort can we break the scene down into visual sense-data; it is as difficult to do so as to hear one's own language spoken as one would hear it if it were a language of which one knew nothing, or to see it written as one sees an unfamiliar script. It is doubtful whether many philosophers who talk about sense-data ever make such an effort successfully, They speak of visual sense-data as if they were always purely two-dimensional, whereas the experience of looking at a terrestrial scene with both eyes undoubtedly differs from that of looking at it with only one, having covered the other eye. A scene, though not a mere conglomeration of sense-data, is *visual:* we see reflections, shadows and rainbows, and these are part of the scene we see.

When we try to identify the visual sense-data we are receiving as we look upon a scene, we attempt to strip away the interpretation we are putting on them in perceiving it as a scene of this or that kind. Very much of our interpretation of sense-data is automatic; but sometimes conscious enquiry is needed. We hear a sound and cannot identify it or tell where it is coming from; or we feel something with our fingers and cannot make out what sort of material we are touching. The interpretation that comes automatically we had to learn as infants: it cannot be thought that a man bom

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blind who suddenly received his sight, like the one in the Gospel, would immediately understand what scene was presented to his eyes. But once learned, it ceases to constitute thought applied to our experience: it becomes *part* of our experience. Sometimes, indeed, we misinterpret what we see; but it would be nonsense to ask for that reason whether there is in truth anything in external reality we are perceiving, misinterpreting or misperceiving. By our perceptions, as well as what is reported to us by others, we build up a map of the world around us. It is when subsequent perceptions fail to tally with this map that: we realise that we have misperceived or misinterpreted. The agreement of present perceptions with subsequent ones is the criterion for their delivering a correct report of external reality; doubts whether there is such a reality are simply senseless.

In the same way, when we are spoken to in our own language, or any other language that we know, we seldom need to make an effort to recall the senses of the words: they come to us laden with their senses. Though we indeed hear the words, and can repeat the words we have heard, we cannot hear them save as bearing the senses they carry. Sometimes we misunderstand what is said to us: the criterion for our having attached the correct sense to the words is that it fits with what the speaker goes on to say or do, and with what others who use those words say and do. It would be senseless to doubt whether the words really bear objective senses, on the score that we sometimes misunderstand them. No philosopher has committed this folly, setting an Argument from Misunderstanding alongside the Argument from Illusion; nor has any laboured to devise a refutation of it. But scepticism about the external world that appeals to our sometimes being mistaken about what we perceive is classically treated as requiring clever argumentation to refute it, although it is no less absurd than scepticism about whether words have senses, and for much the same reason. Perhaps the error has been to overlook the analogy between the two kinds of misbegotten doubt. In both cases we are interpreting what we see or hear, so unconsciously that we are not normally aware of doing so, the act of interpretation becoming a component of the experience of perception, hi both cases there is in fact a gap between the purely sensory impact and what we are conscious of seeing or hearing. In the case of hearing or reading a piece of language this gap is more glaring than in that of sensory perception, but this does not nullify the analogy. The gap is evident from there being many human languages, as we are all very well aware; even if there were only one, perhaps the gap would be less evident if learning language were not so prolonged a process, and one in which adults participate as teachers.

There are instances of universal illusions: cases in which, without special knowledge, every observer will misdescribe the objects that he sees. But, when we are suffering no such illusion and are interpreting what we see correctly, are we seeing it as it really is? Well, the hypothesis is surely that we are doing so; if our description of what we see did not tally with how it really is, we must be subject to illusion or misinterpretation. But are we seeing it, not just as it would be correct to describe it, but as it really is in itself? Those who say that physical objects are not really coloured do not mean that it will always be incorrect to call them yellow or green: they mean that so to describe them – and mean by doing so that they have this or that phenomenal colour, the colour as we see it – is not to say what they are like *in themselves,* but only how they appear to us. Now certainly our unaided senses can tell us a good deal about an object, but very far from everything. When we know how an object looks, feels, smells and tastes, we know a great deal about it, but there is much more to know. It may be conceded that to know what an object is like in itself must involve knowing *all* about it – possessing a full description of it as it presently is – and that to know so much may require a knowledge of physics and chemistry, and probably a good bit of mathematics; but this is not the point. The question was whether, when we correctly describe an object as we perceive it through our senses, our description will form part of a characterisation of it as it is in itself, or whether it must rank merely as an account of how the object affects us. Well, we see an object in a certain light, from a certain distance and in a certain direction. All these circumstances go to determine how it looks to us, but none is intrinsic to the object as it is in itself. But we can be asked to say what, from looking at it, we take the object to be like in itself, rather than how it looks to us at the moment. And when we do this, we shall certainly mention its colour.

We can see an object only as it appears to us. We may be able to determine a good deal of how it is in itself, but there could be no such thing as *seeing* it as it is in itself. Sense-perception is not the revelation of an object to a passive subject: it is an interaction, of the perceived object and the perceiver. A physical object interacts with other objects according to laws of nature. It can be characterised as it is in itself solely in mathematical terms. It manifests itself to sentient beings according to their particular sensory equipment. It is necessary that it should appear in different ways to different kinds of sentient being, because their perception of it is an interaction between it and them. We see it as it appears to human beings (in my own case, to slightly colour-blind human beings). It presses on us to wonder whether some object at which we are looking really is, in itself, as it appears to us; does it *really* look like that, feel like that, sound like that? In fact the question is nonsensical. It is nonsense because its appearance to us is an interaction between it and us: it can look a certain way only *to* a viewer. The object itself is not an interaction, but something that interacts with us and with others: it is nonsense to speak of its looking this way or that save to one who looks at it.

In *Thought and Reality* I argued that a description completely devoid of terms whose meaning is given partly by reference to our experience or position could present the object it so characterised only as an abstract mathematical model. I went on to say that it does not make sense to say that that is what an object in the world is really like in itself. It is true that it would not make sense to say that what was given in such a characterisation was all that there was to a material object. But we are under no pressure to say that. A material object has a complex potentiality to interact in a variety of ways with diverse other objects and with fields of force associated with them; mathematical objects do not interact with other mathematical objects. Material objects interact with one another in accordance with scientific laws that depend upon the constitutions of each. These constitutions may be characterisable in mathematical terms; but they are not all there is to the objects. What makes them actually existing physical objects is their having a position relative to other objects and their potentiality to interact with those objects. A material object has not been fully characterised when it has been described as we find it to be by examining it: this must be supplemented by an account of its potentiality to interact in diverse ways with other objects.

Material objects interact with other material objects, and interact differently with different kinds of material objects. They are characterised in large part by how they interact with different kinds of other material objects. But with which other material objects does a given material objects interact? With those that come in contact with them, or that emit radiation that impinges on them. This is why material objects of necessity inhabit a space within which they can move, or at least within which other material objects, capable of coming into contact with them or of broadcasting or reflecting radiation, are able to alter their position: material objects are of their nature spatio-temporal.

Unlike material objects, senses are properties. The senses of which we naturally think are senses *of* words or phrases in a language or dialect; they are properties of those words or phrases. Is everything that is 'of something else a property of that other thing? Clearly not: a portrait of a person, or a photograph of a person, is not a property of that person. It is not just that we could not grasp what a sense is without understanding that it is or may be the sense of some word or phrase: we could not grasp what a portrait is without understanding that it must be the portrait of some person. It is also that senses are not objects of some general kind, restricted by their relationship to some word or phrase whose sense they are. Portraits are works of art – paintings, busts, sculptures or photographs – which have a special relationship to their subject or subjects (for a portrait may portray more than one person). The subject must be an actual person (or small set of persons). The portrait must depict the face or faces of that person or those persons (perhaps, but not necessarily, exclusively). The intention of the work must be to show the appearance – and perhaps also the character – of the subject or subjects. The relationship that a work of art must have to one or more persons to be a portrait of him, her or them is fairly complex; but its complexity is irrelevant to the present distinction. A portrait is a work of art that has that relationship to its subject: but we cannot say that a sense is a whatnot that has a particular relationship to some word or phrase. There is no way in which the meaning of "whatnot" could be explained here. It is that fact that makes senses properties of the words or phrases of which they are the senses.

It does not follow that every sense is the sense of some actual word or phrase in an existing or dead language. There is a Chinese word (written with a single character) which applies both to playing cards and to dominoes, Ma-Jong tiles and the like. The concept is easily grasped, but we have in English no word or easily formed phrase that expresses it. Here we have a sense which is not the sense of any English word or phrase. Senses may be compared to directions. Any one specified place on the Earth's surface lies in a particular direction from any other specified place. But there can be directions in which no specifiable spot lies from any other specifiable spot. Likewise there may be many senses that are not the senses of any word or phrase in any language.

We speak of many different sorts of object – individual animals and people, species, stars, constellations, political parties, political theories and so on. Here we have considered two sorts – senses and sense-data. Sense-data are the results of our efforts to break down our sense-perceptions into elements corresponding to the elements of the purely sensory impact of those perceptions. Senses are the results of our attempts to analyse the contributions of particular words and phrases to the expression of our thoughts by sentences containing them. Together, they provide admirable examples of the conceptual mechanisms by means of which we seek to catalogue the components of the world which we inhabit.

Showing and Self-Presentation of Experiences – Some Philosophical Cases

Johann Christian Marek, Graz

Experiences

Experiences (*Erlebnisse* in German) are of *phenomenal character*. There is something it is like to be in a conscious mental state; there is something it feels like to be in pain, and there is something different it feels like to be glad. Some experiences are *purely phenomenal* – pains and moods, for instance –, and some are *intentional*, i.e. directed to something – for example, you are glad about your good company or you are glad to get home. Intentional states such as being glad about someone (or worshipping something) are *purely objectual*, whereas intentional states such as being glad to get somewhere (or believing that something is the case) are *propositional*.

You can distinguish between the *mode* and *content* of intentional experiences. When you entertain the belief that it is raining, believing is the mode and that it is raining is its content. When you hate that it is raining the content stays the same but the mode has changed into an emotional experience.

It is controversial which mental phenomena count as experiences, especially whether there is the experience of the mode on the one hand and the experience of the content on the other hand. Ludwig Wittgenstein, for example, was always skeptical about both of these accounts. He questioned the view that there is an experience of meaning as well as the view that willing, understanding and conviction respectively would be experiences. Although Wittgenstein objected to the idea of the experiential reality of mental acts and contents, he did not fully deny the existence of experiences.

It is also controversial whether experiences are genuine objects (things) or not. One non-object interpretation takes experiences as *occurrences*, "states" as Roderick Chisholm coins them. According to Chisholm we can define a state (occurrence) as the exemplifying (realization) of properties by something:

> For every x, x is F if and only if there is the state x-being-F. (Cf. Chisholm 1989, 162; 1996, 72.)

Thus, experiences are conscious occurrences, which can be defined as realizations of conscious properties. The conceptual chain from "consciousness" to "qualitativeness" looks like the following:

(1) A property F is *conscious* (a manifest mental property) iff F is an immediately qualitative property.
(2) A property F is *immediately qualitative* iff F is necessarily such that for every x that is F it is like to be F for x.

If someone is happy there is something it feels like to be happy for her, whereas being a woman and a beetle do not automatically involve that there is anything that it feels like to be a woman and a beetle, respectively. Being happy then is a conscious, a manifest mental property, whereas being a woman etc. is not.

Case I: Wittgenstein: Expressing Experiences as Showing and not Saying

In discussing characteristics of the psychological (understood as *experiences*) Ludwig Wittgenstein deals with themes like "Expressing Experiences *versus* Describing or Asserting Experiences" or "Expressing Experiences as Showing and not Saying".

Considering psychological verbs Wittgenstein says "that their third person but not their first person is stated on grounds of observation. That observation is observation of behaviour." (RPP I, Sect. 836)

A slightly different characterization can be found in his "Plan for the treatment of psychological concepts" (RPP II, Sect. 63) where he states:

> Psychological verbs characterized by the fact that the third person of the present is to be identified by observation, the first person not.
> Sentences in the third person of the present: information. In the first person present, expression. ((Not quite right.))

Wittgenstein says that "with 'I believe------' he expresses his belief in no way better than with the simple assertion" (MS 169, 10), and he even thinks that a person can't say of herself that she has the belief: "All that hangs together with this, that one can say 'I believe he believes...', 'I believe I believed...', but not 'I believe I believe...'." (RPP II, Sect. 282) Wittgenstein also stresses the point that the speaker's own relation to her words "is wholly different from other people's." (MS 169, 9; PI II, Sect. 192) "I do not relate to them as an observer. I *can* not observe myself as I do someone else, cannot ask myself 'What is this person likely to do now?' etc. Therefore the verb 'He believes', 'I believed' *can* not have the kind of continuation in the first person as the verb 'to eat'." (MS 169, 10)

Hence, Wittgenstein stresses the point that there is a different kind of continuation of the verb "believe" in the first person indicative; "I believe" can be seen as an expression of my own belief-state, but not as an expression of a kind of belief about my belief. (Cf. MS 169, 11f.; PI II, 191f.)

Expressing mental states by words is not reporting them, but it is a move in a language-game and as such intended although not by a meta-mental or meta-linguistic reflection. The expression "I believe it is raining" shows that I believe that it is raining, although it is not said by these words that I believe that it is raining; what I say is only that it is raining. The verbal expression is not a natural expression like a tremble or a semi-action/reaction as a cry is; it is a non-natural verbal expression.

Though Wittgenstein concedes that "[d]escribing my state of mind (of fear, say) is something I do in a particular context. (Just as it takes a particular context to make a certain action into an experiment.)" (PI II, 188), sometimes (more exactly: in a particular context, in certain circumstances) I express my experiences, and sometimes I tell someone my experiences. Moreover, Wittgenstein admits that he cannot always give a clear answer whether the utterance "I am afraid" is a cry of fear or a reflection on one's present state. (PI II, 187) Wittgenstein brings up a further reason for this complication: "A cry is not a description. But there are transitions. And the words 'I am afraid' may approximate more, or less, to being a cry. They may come quite close to this and also be far removed from it." (PI II, 189)

Wittgenstein remarks on experiences are confronted with the following problem: On the one hand, Wittgenstein states that a person can't say of herself that she is in a particular inner state (of believing, for example), and, one the other hand, he seems to state that a person may describe her inner states. Be that as it may, I think Wittgenstein could accept the following thesis about mental properties (experiences):

> Being-*F* is an experiential property iff Being-*F* is necessarily such that for every subject *s*, if *s* is *F* and *s* expresses verbally to be *F*, *s* does this without inference from other beliefs and from observation of her own words and behavior.

Case II: Meinong's Self-Presentation of Experiences

Alexius Meinong's so-called *self-presentation [Selbstpräsentation]* of experiences can be added as a further mark of consciousness, of the manifest mental. According to Meinong, experiences, i.e. conscious mental occurrences, are able to present themselves to a self, to a subject.

Usually, the objects of experiences are not constituted by their experiences: they are something mind independent and not immanent to consciousness. When you think that it is raining, for example, you have a mental representation, a kind of sign of the current rain (so-called "other-presentation" [*Fremdpräsentation*]). In contrast to this, it may happen that you think about your belief that it is raining, because you realize that in this situation your belief about rain is misplaced (as you should listen to your partner's speech), and you feel a bit embarrassed about it. In order to present your belief about rain as an object of your embarrassment (an inner reflective experience), you do not need a further, separate representation to which the rain-belief corresponds as an object. The rain-belief has the capacity to present itself to your mind. In general, the reference to one's own experiences does not require the intervention of an additional representation. That your mental experiences present themselves to you means you can refer to your instantaneous experiences without the intermediary of a further representation of them. You are able to reflect upon your momentary conviction without needing a kind of mental symbol of your belief. In thinking about the rain your mind is in some way *turned outwards*, whereas in directing your attention to your experiences, for instance, to your manifest belief about rain, your mind becomes *turned inwards*. (Cf. Meinong 1906, §11, §13; 1910, §20, §43; 1917, §1; Marek 2009, Sect. 3.2.)

In having the manifest conviction that it is raining the subject is not directed to her belief but only to the rain. The conscious belief about something does not require that the subject already has a consciousness about her consciousness. According to this interpretation of Meinong the following can be said:

Consciousness is *not* necessarily such that if a subject *s* has a conscious property *P*, *s* is also conscious of its* having the property *P*.

By the way, what is negated by this principle is a thesis of self-consciousness in a twofold manner: First, *s* is conscious of itself in a direct (de se) manner – therefore, the third person pronoun is used with a Castañeda asterisk as a sign of a "quasi-indicator", i.e. an emphatic reflexive expressing the reference of the subject to itself qua itself. Secondly, *s* is conscious of the conscious state it is in.

As far as I can see, Meinong does not interpret self-presentation as such a manifest self-consciousness of one's conscious states. Meinong's conception of self-presentation has rather a touch of potentiality or dispositionality.

SP1 Being *F* is a self-presenting property for a subject *s* =Df Being *F* is necessarily such that, if *s* is *F*, and if *s* thinks (in some way) about its* being *F*, then *s* does not need any particular, separate representation of its* being *F*.

SP2 Being *F* is self-presented to a subject *s* =Df (1) Being *F* is a self-presenting property for a subject *s*, (2) *s* is *F*, and (3) *s* thinks about its* being *F*.

SP3 Conscious properties are necessarily self-presenting properties. [See Marek 2003, 169; 2009, Sect. 3.2]

In connection with Meinong's conception of self-presentation a short note on his philosophy of language should be added:

When someone believes that it is raining, the person may utter "It is raining". In uttering these words she expresses and, in a way, means her belief that it is raining, but she does not thereby express a belief about her belief nor does she thereby say that she believes that it is raining. In having the belief that it is raining the person does not yet reflect on this belief by a further "meta-belief". Nevertheless, expressing beliefs by uttering sentences containing only the believed content is not a simple natural expression like tears for sorrow; it is a kind of a non-natural, intended expression. In uttering "It is raining" the person intends to express her belief-experience, but this intention should not be reconstructed as a conscious mental meta-experience like "I intend to express my belief that it is raining by uttering the words 'it is raining'". (Cf. Meinong 1910, §4.)

However, the person may explicitly refer to her experience when she turns inwards by a reflective thought. For example, she may have an emotion about her belief that it is raining, and she may express this by uttering "I find it embarrassing to believe that it is raining".

Meinong, I think, accepts the possibility that the utterance "I believe it is raining" is not an expression of a meta-belief, but just an explicit expression of the belief that it is raining. In a similar way, uttering "I find it embarrassing to believe that it is raining" is not a report about my embarrassment; rather it is an expression of the emotional state I am in.

It depends on the special (also inner) circumstances whether utterances like "I believe", "I am afraid", "I am glad" can be interpreted as utterances of a kind of meta-belief about the speakers experiences of belief, fear and gladness, respectively, or just as intended expressions of belief, fear and gladness, respectively.

Case III Moore's Paradox

Something like "It is raining, but I don't believe it" is an (Wittgensteinian) example of the so-called Moore's Paradox. Although the two asserted states of affairs *(it is raining* and *I do not believe it is raining*) may both obtain, the whole assertion sounds "perfectly absurd", said G. E. Moore (1942, 543).

That you believe that it is raining is not analytically implied by (does not follow from) the fact that it is raining, and the fact that you say it is raining does not analytically imply that you believe that it is raining. In introducing the distinction between *saying* (or asserting) and *implying* by saying, Moore presents an explanation of the apparently paradoxical situation and, therefore, a solution to the paradox. In asserting "It is raining" you imply (in this special Moorean sense) that you believe this, although you do not assert that you do. Moore's view is that in asserting that *p* the speaker implies that she believes that *p*, and the absurdity consists in the contradiction between what is implied and what is asserted. The nature of this kind of implication seems to be founded on knowledge by experience: "In the first case, that you do imply this proposition about your present attitude, although it is not implied by (i.e., does not follow from) *what* you assert, simply arises from the fact, which we all learn by experience, that in the immense majority of cases a man who makes such an assertion as this does believe or know what he asserts: lying, though common enough, is vastly exceptional." (Moore 1942, 542f.)

It is worth noticing that Moore takes the utterance "I do not believe ..." for an assertion and argues that you imply a proposition about your belief when you assert "It is raining".

Wittgenstein's answer is different: He suggests that there are a lot of scenarios where these words can be uttered. In certain circumstances – quite the usual ones – the utterance leads to the paradox. The explanation of the paradox is different to Moore's suggested solution in the following way: Wittgenstein denies that "I believe" or "I do not believe" is – in the usual context – an assertion of the speakers own mental state, because it is only the *expression* of the speakers belief and failing to believe, respectively.

According to this interpretation, Wittgenstein thinks that "It is raining" is a saying about the rain and *a showing (expressing) of the belief with this content*, whereas "I do not believe it" is *a showing (expressing) of the failing to believe this* (and not a saying about the failing to believe it).

Wittgenstein takes the utterance "I do not believe ..." for an *expressivum* and, consequently, he sees an inconsistency between the expressing of the belief and the expressing of the failing to believe this. Interpreted according to a pragmatic language-theory the hearer gets shown two incoherent expressive utterances: on the one hand the speaker expresses her belief that it is raining, and on the other hand the speaker expresses her failing to believe that it is raining. Moore's paradox is not a paradox of the logic of propositions [Logik des Satzes], it is a paradox of the logic of assertions [Logik der Behauptung], Wittgenstein says:

> „Das Mooresche Paradox legt eine falsche Deutung der Behauptung eines Satzes nahe. Man ist versucht zu fragen: Gibt es also eine Logik der Behauptung

> außer der Logik des Satzes selbst? Hier ist es, glaube ich, nützlich, sich an den Begriff des Sprachspiels zu halten. //nützlich, den Begriff des Sprachspiels festzuhalten.// (Ich schreibe manchmal wie ein alter Professor)“ (MS 132, 326) [Moore’s Paradox suggests a false interpretation of the assertion of a sentence. One is tempted to ask: Is there a logic of assertion besides the logic of proposition itself? It is useful, I think, to abide by the concept of the language-game. //useful to stick to the concept of the language-game.// (Sometimes I write like an old professor.)]

Logical structure, deducibility, and consistency cannot be reduced solely to propositions. Not just propositions but also assertions, questions, imperatives, wishes and even feelings are accessible to logic. In this sense, the distinction between showing and saying also helps us to understand how value judgments work according to emotivism. Emotivists claim that value judgments can be interpreted as expressions of a complex of beliefs and – in the final analysis – of (collective) emotions. As there is not only a logic of propositions, the emotivists’ claim does not preclude that value judgments can figure in valid arguments.

Post Scriptum

The following joke shows that there are situations that are not completely paradoxical, only a little absurd perhaps: “The son of a rich American Jewish lawyer starts studying at Trinity College. One day the son says to his father that he now knows exactly what “trinity” means, “it is the unity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as three persons”. This makes his father – a convinced atheist – furious, so that he replies in an angry voice: “There is only God our Father, but I do not believe in him.”

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Sind Eindrücke Informationsträger? Was wir aus PU §§354-356 lernen können.

Eike von Savigny, Bielefeld

Wir sind durch eine nun 2400 Jahre alte Tradition daran gewöhnt, die Sinneswahrnehmung nach dem Modell der Benachrichtigung aufzufassen; in diesem Modell spielen Sinneseindrücke die Rolle der Nachrichtenträger. Wir sind durch dieselbe Tradition daran gewöhnt, weitere kognitive Vorgänge nach dem Modell der Nachrichtenauswertung aufzufassen, also als Produktion von Vermerken, Akten, Auszügen, Kommentaren, Lückenergänzungen, Zusammenfassungen, Fragen, Vermutungen, Aufspüren von übergreifenden Mustern usw. Es gibt also Rohstoffe, Halbfertigwaren und Fertigprodukte. Hume hat die Rohstoffe als „impressions“ vom Rest als „ideas“ unterschieden. In diesem Aufsatz geht es um „impressions“ in seinem Sinne, Sinneseindrücke.

Und zwar will ich etwas hoffentlich Interessantes und sicherlich Strittiges in der Abschnittsfolge PU 354-356 finden, nämlich Wittgensteins Erläuterung für den Gebrauch des Wortes „Sinneseindruck“. Dem füge ich eine weiter nicht begründete Anforderung an den Begriff des Glaubens hinzu und kann so eine Rylesche Argumentation für den Versuch benutzen zu zeigen, warum es keinen philosophischen Grund für das Vorurteil gibt, dass Sinneseindrücke uns Umgebungswissen liefern.

Was könnte man mit dem Postulat erklären, wenn wir dank dem Gebrauch von Sinnesorganen etwas wahrnähmen, bekämen wir einen Sinneseindruck, der die gewonnene Information repräsentiere und so für die Verwertung verfügbar mache? Mir fallen auf diese Frage zwei Antworten ein: Wir erklären mit dem Postulat, dass wir auf Grund der fraglichen Sinneseindrücke eine Überzeugung bilden; oder wir erklären damit, dass wir uns in unserer Umgebung zurechtfinden.

Fangen wir mit der ersten Antwort an, mit der Bildung von Wahrnehmungsüberzeugungen. Sinneseindrücke können täuschend sein, können im Sinne der philosophischen Standardvorstellung also falsche Information speichern; in diesem Fall werden wir häufig eine irrige Überzeugung bilden. Erfreulich oft sind sie allerdings wahrheitsgetreu; dann bilden wir häufig eine auf anständigem Wege gewonnene zutreffende Überzeugung, also Wahrnehmungs*wissen* im Sinne einer gängigen Interpretation von „wissen".

Unsere Abschnittsfolge PU 354-356, in der ich eine hilfreiche Erläuterung für das Reden über Eindrücke finden will, gehört in Wittgensteins Überlegungen darüber, was es mit dem Denken auf sich hat, und hat an ihren Kontext zwei wichtige Anschlüsse: erstens das Schwanken zwischen Kriterien und Symptomen, mit dem das Denken sich in Wittgensteins Musterrezept für psychologische Begriffe einfügt. Den zweiten Anschluss an den Kontext liefert die Vorstellung, wenn man sich gezwungen sehe, einer Alternative die Zustimmung schlechthin zu verweigern, sei die andere Alternative notwendig wahr. (Diese Überlegung ergibt sich aus Fragesätzen wie „‚Kann man denken, ohne zu reden?'" in PU 327 und für das Ausdrücken einer Vermutung untauglichen Sätzen wie „‚Diese Taubstummen haben alle nur eine Gebärdensprache gelernt, Jeder aber spricht zu sich selbst im Innern eine Lautsprache'" in PU 348.) Das ist leider eine exegetisch nicht sehr übersichtliche Gemengelage:

> 354. Das Schwanken in der Grammatik zwischen Kriterien und Symptomen lässt den Schein entstehen, als gäbe es überhaupt nur Symptome. Wir sagen etwa: „Die Erfahrung lehrt, dass es regnet, wenn das Barometer fällt, aber sie lehrt auch, dass es regnet, wenn wir bestimmte Gefühle der Nässe und Kälte haben, oder den und den Gesichtseindruck." Als Argument gibt man dann an, dass diese Gesichtseindrücke uns täuschen können. Aber man bedenkt dabei nicht, dass die Tatsache, dass sie uns gerade den Regen vortäuschen, auf einer Definition beruht.
>
> 355. Nicht darum handelt es sich, dass unsre Sinneseindrücke uns belügen können, sondern, dass wir ihre Sprache verstehen. (Und diese Sprache beruht, wie jede andere, auf Übereinkunft.)
>
> 356. Man ist geneigt zu sagen: „Es regnet, oder es regnet nicht – wie ich das weiß, wie mich die Kunde davon erreicht hat, ist eine andere Sache." Aber stellen wir also die Frage so: Was nenne ich „eine Kunde davon, dass es regnet"? (Oder habe ich auch von dieser Kunde nur Kunde erhalten?) Und was kennzeichnet denn diese ‚Kunde' als Kunde von etwas? Leitet uns da nicht die

> Form unseres Ausdrucks irre? Ist das eben nicht eine irreführende Metapher: „Mein Auge gibt mir Kunde davon, dass dort ein Sessel stehe“?[1]

In PU 354 kommen Sinneseindrücke ins Spiel, deren täuschender Charakter „auf einer Definition beruht“. Um welche Definition geht es? Soweit ich die Literatur überblicke, ist sie ausnahmslos der Meinung, Wittgenstein habe es mit einem definitorischen Zusammenhang zwischen Gefühlen der Nässe, Gefühlen der Kälte und dem und dem Gesichtseindruck einerseits zu tun und anderseits dem Sachverhalt, dass es regne. Schreiben wir das einmal probeweise hin:

> Unter der Bedingung, dass x sich nicht unter der Dusche befindet, gilt: „es regnet in der Umgebung von x“ heißt: „x hat das Gefühl von Nässe und Kälte und den Gesichtseindruck von grauen, parallelen Strichen in einer generellen Abwärtsbewegung“

Da er das Beruhen auf einer Definition hier als Argument benutzt, sich also dazu bekennt, hätten wir es in Wittgenstein mit einem in der Wolle gefärbten Phänomenalisten zu tun. Von den Forschern, die sich das haben auffallen lassen, haben außer John W. Cook (dem man hier den einzigen gewichtigen PU-Beleg für die phänomenalistische Interpretation[2] zu konzedieren hat) alle anderen sich entweder gewundert wie Elizabeth Wolgast 1964[3] oder Wittgenstein dafür gescholten, dass er Falsches verteidige, und zwar unzureichend, wie Peter Hacker 1990[4]. Man weiß nicht, wo man auch nur damit anfangen kann, gegen eine Interpretation zu argumentieren, die dem Wittgenstein der PU so etwas als Erläuterung des Sprachgebrauchs unterstellt. Sagen wir einfach: Eine Alternative wäre willkommen. Hier ist sie:

> „x hat den Sinneseindruck, dass p“
> heißt:
> „x glaubt auf Grund des Gebrauchs seiner Sinnesorgane, dass p“
>
> „x hat den täuschenden Sinneseindruck, dass p“
> heißt:

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[1] PU, §§354-356, 906 f.
[2] Cook 1994, 81 f.
[3] Wolgast 1964, 353 f.
[4] Hacker 1990, 382.

> „x glaubt auf Grund des Gebrauchs seiner Sinnesorgane, dass p; p ist nicht der Fall"
>
> „seine Sinneseindrücke täuschen x vor, dass p"
> heißt:
> „x hat den täuschenden Sinneseindruck, dass p"

Und mit einer kleinen Erweiterung über die Textformulierungen hinaus:

> „x hat den wahrheitsgetreuen Sinneseindruck, dass p"
> heißt:
> „x glaubt auf Grund des Gebrauchs seiner Sinnesorgane, dass p; p ist der Fall"

Also keine Definition von „Regen", sondern eine Definition von „einen Sinneseindruck mit dem und dem Inhalt haben". Was spricht für die Interpretation? Zunächst und vor allem, dass die erste Definition das Alltagsdeutsche richtig beschreibt, soweit das Wort „Sinneseindruck" im Alltagsdeutschen überhaupt vorkommt. (Mit dem Wort „Eindruck" allein und ohne Erwähnung der Sinnesorgane wird das noch glaubhafter.) Zweitens hängen die vier Definitionen eng genug zusammen, damit man sie als *eine* Definition bezeichnen kann. Drittens besteht die Definition die unmittelbare Textprobe in PU 354: „Unsere Sinneseindrücke täuschen uns gerade den Regen vor", weil das kraft der Definition bloß heißt, dass wir auf Grund des Gebrauchs unserer Sinnesorgane irrig annehmen, dass es ausgerechnet regne. Auf der Definition beruht also, dass die Sinneseindrücke uns *das* vortäuschen, *was* sie uns vortäuschen, nämlich dass es regnet. Viertens wird der skurrile Text von PU 355 klar, wenn wir annehmen, dass die „Übereinkunft" die „Definition" aus PU 354 ist; dann ist die Sprache der Sinneseindrücke nämlich die Sprache, in der *wir* über Sinneseindrücke reden (nicht etwa die Sprache, in welcher miteinander oder mit uns zu reden die Sinneseindrücke übereinkommen).

Es ist wichtig, dass gängige philosophische Meinungen über Sinneseindrücke im Lichte der Definition *nicht sinnvoll* sind. Solche Meinungen sind z. B.:„Wir sind darauf angewiesen, dass unsere Sinneseindrücke uns die Wahrheit sagen." Oder: „Von der Außenwelt wissen wir nur, weil unsere Sinneseindrücke uns informieren." Oder: „Sinneseindrücke können zu falschen Meinungen verführen." Solche Formulierungen legen einen definitionstheoretischen Fehler an den Tag, den Fehler nämlich, die Definitionen so zu verstehen, als erläuterten sie Ausdrücke wie „y ist ein Sinneseindruck“, „y ist ein täuschender Sinneseindruck“, „y ist ein wahrheitsgetreuer Sinneseindruck“ und dergleichen. Der Fehler entsteht, wenn man z. B. die erste Definition so versteht, als hieße das Definiendum

> statt
> „x hat den Sinneseindruck, dass p“
> fehlerhafterweise
> „es gibt ein y, so dass gilt: y ist ein Sinneseindruck, dass p, und x hat y“

Dieses Definiendum wäre (verbotenerweise) logisch komplex und hätte damit die Eigenart, zur Formulierung von Texten zu führen, in denen es unerklärt vorkommt. Z. B. könnte man auf Grund dieser veränderten Definition daraus, dass a nicht auf Grund des Gebrauchs seiner Sinnesorgane glaubt, dass p, schließen, dass a von den Sinneseindrücken, dass p, keinen hat; aber was es heißen soll, dass y ein Sinneseindruck mit dem Inhalt p ist, wüsste man nicht. Ist es außerdem der Fall, dass a auf Grund des Gebrauchs seiner Sinnesorgane glaubt, dass q, dann verhilft einem die falsche Auffassung des Definiendums zu der Feststellung, es gebe einen Sinneseindruck, dass q, der kein Sinneseindruck, dass p, ist. Man spürt schon, wie ein Philosoph sich auf so etwas stürzen kann, um etwa zu fragen: Woran liegt dieser Unterschied der beiden Sinneseindrücke? Haben sie verschiedene Formen oder Farben? Dass er damit keine Frage stellt, deren Sinn er sich klar gemacht hätte, merkt er nicht.

Denn man glaubt nun einmal, alle Wörter, die man ausspricht oder hinschreibt, zu verstehen, und ersetzt sich den fehlenden Sinn, ohne das zu merken, glaubt also, über Sinneseindrücke gut genug Bescheid zu wissen, um fragen zu dürfen: In welcher Phase des Wahrnehmungsprozesses entstehen Sinneseindrücke? Hat man ein und denselben Sinneseindruck mehrmals, oder hat man mehrere nacheinander, wenn man mehrmals nacheinander den gleichen Sinneseindruck hat? Können zwei Menschen ein und denselben oder höchstens den gleichen Sinneseindruck haben? Könnte es Sinneseindrücke geben, die nicht Sinneseindrücke eines Subjekts sind? Haben wahrheitsgetreue Sinneseindrücke Eigenschaften mit den Originalen gemeinsam? *Haben* Sinneseindrücke Eigenschaften, oder sind sie welche? Sind visuelle Eindrücke mit dem Aussehen von Körperoberflächen identisch?

Gehen wir zur nüchternen Betrachtung unserer Definition zurück. Ich brauche nicht anzunehmen, dass es sich bei den Erläuterungen um ausgewachsene Äquivalenzen handelt. Für meine Zwecke genügt vielmehr[5], dass *auf Grund von Bedeutungsbeziehungen* die Folgerung gilt:

x hat den Sinneseindruck, dass p
also:
x glaubt auf Grund des Gebrauchs seiner Sinnesorgane, dass p

Professor Marek hat in mündlicher Diskussion dagegen den Einwand erhoben, man könne den Sinneseindruck haben, dass p, und trotzdem nicht glauben, dass p. Als Beispiel hat er die Müller-Lyer-Täuschung akzeptiert, insbesondere für den Fall, dass man das Entstehen der Zeichnung mitverfolgt hat. Ich halte das für eine Verwechslung der klassischen, philosophielastigen, subjektiven Sinneseindrücke damit, dass die bekannten beiden waagrechten Müller-Lyer-Striche unterschiedlich lang *aussehen*, und das ist überhaupt nicht subjektiv, sondern ganz objektiv so. Um es sehr philosophisch auszudrücken: Das Aussehen der Striche ist da, wo die Zeichnung ist, nicht etwa in meinem Bewusstsein.

Wenn die kritische semantische Folgerung gilt, dann ist der Schluss vom Eindruck auf die Überzeugung keine Erklärung des Zustandekommens der Überzeugung durch den Sinneseindruck. Denn die Konklusion wiederholt nur etwas, das schon in der Prämisse gesagt ist. Für das Gewinnen der Konklusion aus der Prämisse wird von keinem empirischen Zusammenhang Gebrauch gemacht, schon gar nicht von einem kausalen. Der gegenteilige Anschein stammt daher, dass in der Prämisse von anderen Entitäten die Rede zu sein scheint als in der Konklusion, nämlich von Eindrücken. Das ist aber, wie wir vorhin gesehen haben, eine Einbildung, die auf Sprachschlamperei beruht. Der Sinneseindruck, dass p, oder dass man ihn hat, ist nicht Ursache der Überzeugung, dass p.

[5] Glücklicherweise; denn Professor Stoecker hat in mündlicher Diskussion sogleich darauf hingewiesen, dass wir dank dem Gebrauch unserer Sinnesorgane oft eine Nachricht, dass p, lesen, aber nicht sinnlich mitbekommen, dass p.

Das zweite Erklärungsversprechen, das wir mit dem Postulat von Sinneseindrücken einlösen wollten, war: Dass wir Sinneseindrücke bekommen, sollte erklären, wie wir uns in unserer Umgebung zurechtfinden können. Um es zu prüfen, mache ich einen Umweg, indem ich mich zunächst auf die Verwertung *wahrheitsgetreuer* Sinneseindrücke beschränke (von denen in unserer Abschnittsfolge PU 354-356 nicht ausdrücklich die Rede ist), und zwar auf ihre Verwertung für kognitive Leistungen.

Ich habe jeden Sommer die Gelegenheit, Himbeeren zu pflücken, und deshalb glaube ich mich zu der auf Erfahrung beruhenden Feststellung berechtigt, dass es sich dabei um eine ungemein intelligente Tätigkeit handelt, um das Ausüben von angeborenen oder erlernten Fähigkeiten, deren Ausübung aufs Zierlichste koordiniert sein muss. Es handelt sich bei dieser gekonnten Tätigkeit nicht etwa bloß um ein Unterscheiden – oder, um dem bei Philosophen beliebten „Verfügen über Begriffe" näher zu kommen, um ein Klassifizieren. Natürlich unterscheide ich im Zuge des Pflückens immer wieder mancherlei – rote und weniger rote Umgebungen von roten Beeren, locker sitzende und fest sitzende Beeren, Links und Rechts, Vorn und Hinten, Oben und Unten, Festhalten und Loslassen usw. Dieses Unterscheiden ist eingebettet in gekonntes Verhalten, und das ist weitaus anspruchsvoller als bloßes Klassifizieren. Sollte also bloßes Klassifizieren nach einem kurzfristig mental repräsentierten Wissen (einem Sinneseindruck) schreien, dann um so mehr das gekonnte Himbeerpflücken. Dann muss – muss! – es eine mentale Repräsentation geben, die das Wissen ums Himbeerpflücken ausmacht, und es muss ständig viele, viele kurzlebige mentale Repräsentationen geben, Sinneseindrücke eben, über die derjenige verfügt, der gerade dabei ist, gekonnt Himbeeren zu pflücken.

Gibt es eine mentale Repräsentation der Fähigkeit, dank der wir von anderen mentalen Repräsentationen, nämlich Sinneseindrücken, Gebrauch machen?

Natürlich nicht. Freilich könnte ich das Himbeerpflücken lang und breit beschreiben. Aber meine berufsspezifische Fähigkeit zum Verbalisieren ist strikt irrelevant dafür, ob ich gekonnt Himbeeren pflücke. „Der eine weiß, wie's geht, der andere kann's." Der philosophische Hammer in diesem Zusammenhang ist das Rylesche Regressargument[6]: Wer eine Ge-

[6] Ryle 1949, Kap. 2.

brauchsanweisung verwerten will, muss die Fähigkeit ausüben, Gebrauchsanweisungen zu verwerten. Braucht man fürs Himbeerpflücken *deshalb*, weil es eine kognitive Leistung ist, eine Gebrauchsanweisung, dann braucht man auch eine Gebrauchsanweisung für das Verwerten der Gebrauchsanweisung; denn auch das ist eine kognitive Leistung, usw. ad inf. Und braucht man, um die Farben zweier *Himbeeren* zu unterscheiden, Repräsentationen ihrer Farben, nämlich Farbeindrücke, dann braucht man auch Repräsentationen dieser Farbeindrücke, um *sie* voneinander zu unterscheiden, usw. ad. inf. „(Oder habe ich auch von dieser Kunde nur Kunde erhalten?)“[7] Man kann nicht für jede kognitive Leistung verlangen, dass sie als Verwertung von Gebrauchsanweisungen erklärbar ist; also kann man nicht a priori vom Vorliegen einer kognitiven Leistung auf die Benutzung mental repräsentierter Information schließen.[8] Freilich ist das Verwerten von Gebrauchsanweisungen gelegentlich ein taugliches Modell für das Erklären von kognitiven Leistungen. Dann spielen aber außerdem kognitive Leistungen eine Rolle, die nicht auf dieselbe Weise erklärbar sind, nämlich das Verwerten der fraglichen Gebrauchsanweisungen.

Ende des Umwegs; es war von Wahrnehmungs*wissen* die Rede, mit dem kognitive Leistungen erklärt werden sollen. Beim alltäglichen Reden von Eindrücken geht es aber primär gerade nicht um Wissen und um das mit dem Wissen zusammenhängende gekonnte Handeln, also nicht um *wahrheitsgetreue* Sinneseindrücke, sondern um solche Sinneseindrücke, von denen man redet, um sich die Skepsis gegenüber der fraglichen Überzeugung gerade offen zu halten. Solange wir selbst sehen, dass es regnet, sagen wir von einem anderen, der äußert, es regne, gewöhnlich nicht, er habe diesen *Eindruck*, sondern wir sagen, er *wisse*, dass es regnet. Sagen wir dagegen, er habe den Eindruck, es regne, dann drücken wir im allgemeinen aus, dass wir die Behauptung, es regne, hier und jetzt nicht selbst

[7] Es gibt keinen philosophischen Grund für die Annahme, man finde sich in der Umgebung schwerer zurecht, wenn man sie selbst als wenn man ein Bild von ihr betrachte. Der Alltag lehrt das Gegenteil.

[8] Von der Übersetzung von „x verfügt über die für seine Leistung notwendige Information“ durch „x verfügt über eine mentale Repräsentation der für seine Leistung notwendigen Information“ oder gar durch „das Gehirn von x enthält eine mentale Repräsentation der für seine Leistung notwendigen Information“ ist dringend abzuraten.

unterschreiben. Muss wenigstens der bloße Eindruck, es regne – also der Eindruck, egal ob wahrheitsgetreu oder täuschend – als Repräsentation von Information postuliert werden, die dem Subjekt zugänglich ist und die von ihm verwertet werden muss, wenn sein Verhalten erklärbar sein soll? Das zu erklärende Verhalten wäre in diesem Fall nicht das *richtige* Verhalten, sondern das dem bloßen Eindruck *angemessene* Verhalten. Beispiel: Savigny hat den Eindruck, die Beere sei dunkelrot. (Ob er wohl Recht hat?) Deshalb greift er darnach. (Ob das richtig ist, lassen wir mal dahingestellt, solange dahingestellt bleibt, ob die Beere wirklich dunkelrot ist.) Ich schlage vor, hier kurzen Prozess zu machen und die folgende Tafel als Repräsentation gleicher Verhältnisse anzunehmen; dabei entspricht jedes waagrechte Paar den beiden anderen waagrechten Paaren und jedes senkrechte Paar den beiden senkrechten Paaren auf gleicher Höhe:

x hat den wahrheitsgetreuen Eindruck, dass p	x hat den Eindruck, dass p
x weiß, dass p	x glaubt, dass p
x tut, was angesichts von p richtig ist	x tut, was bei Vorliegen von p richtig wäre

Dass x den Eindruck hat, es regne, dass x also glaubt, es regne, macht sein gekonntes Nasswerde-Vermeide-Verhalten verständlich, welches richtig wäre, wenn es regnete. Dieses gekonnte Verhalten ist, das wird nicht überraschen, eine kognitive Leistung, mag auch offen bleiben, ob sie gerade am Platze ist (ob es also regnet). Wird die Leistung damit erklärt, dass der Eindruck, es regne, Information (mag sein auch falsche Information) enthalten müsse, die fürs Erbringen der kognitiven Leistung verwertet werde, dann wird in dieser Erklärung eine weitere kognitive Leistung postuliert, nämlich die Leistung, die Informationen, die fürs Nasswerde-Vermeide-Verhalten relevant sind, korrekt zu verwerten. Usw. ad inf. Nicht alle vorzuschaltenden Erklärungen können das Verwerten von mental zugänglicher Information postulieren (es wären dann zu viele Erklärungen vorzuschalten); also kann nicht allein aus dem Vorliegen einer kognitiven Leistung auf die Verwertung von mental zugänglicher Information geschlossen werden. Daraus, dass x sich seinem Eindruck entsprechend verhält, kann man daher nicht schließen, der Eindruck enthalte Information, deren Verwertung das dem Eindruck angemessene Verhalten erkläre.

Ich sehe also keinen philosophischen Grund für die Annahme, dass Sinneseindrücke Informationen zur Verfügung stellen, die die Überzeugungsbildung steuern oder die für das Erbringen von Leistungen relevant sind; und dass jemand als Inhalt von Sinneseindrücken Informationen erwarten könnte, die weder die Überzeugungsbildung steuern noch fürs Erbringen von Leistungen relevant sind, wäre mir neu. Damit sehe ich keinen Grund für die Annahme, dass es die Sinneseindrücke der philosophischen Tradition überhaupt gäbe.

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The Harmony Chapter

Joachim Schulte, Zürich

When Georg Henrik von Wright, in his pioneering article on the origin and composition of the *Philosophical Investigations*, raised the question of the unity of the work he asked whether the two so-called parts of the book were really meant to go together.[1] Nowadays, it seems, most people see the answer to this question more or less as von Wright himself put it at the time: what was called Part Two of the book tends to be regarded as a separate and fragmentary attempt at composing a work on the philosophy of psychology.[2]

The question of the unity of the book, however, retains a certain urgency, but now it tends to be asked about the formerly so-called Part I, in particular about its third third, the remarks following §421.[3] When studying this material, one is inclined to wonder whether Wittgenstein had a clear idea of what he was up to or, to mention a question raised in an essay by Brian McGuinness, whether he really knew what his project was.[4] This is a question I don't want to try to answer here. But my impression is that we have not yet found truly satisfactory ways of dealing with this material. The following observations are an attempt at suggesting a way of looking at one particular section of this material, viz. what, following Peter Hacker, I call the chapter on the harmony between language and reality, which

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[1] See von Wright 1982, 135-6.

[2] Accordingly, the division into two parts has been given up in the new, 4th edition of *Philosophical Investigations* by P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Oxford: Blackwell, 2009. What used to be Part II is now called *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*. In this paper, quotations are taken from the new edition of the *Investigations*.

[3] §421 was the last remark of the so-called *Zwischenfassung* (intermediate version) of the *Investigations*, cf. Wittgenstein 2001, 563-738.

[4] Cf. 'Manuscripts and Works in the 1930s', in McGuinness 2002, 270-286.

comprises §§428-465.[5] Most of these remarks belong to the earliest in the whole book, and one question which needs to be answered is why Wittgenstein made this specific selection. Again, this is a question I shan't try to answer. All I shall do is suggest a certain way of looking at the beginning of the harmony chapter, and I shall do so because I feel that this approach may be helpful in trying to arrive at a coherent reading of the rest of the chapter.

1.

My suggestion is that a useful approach to the harmony chapter is by way of tracing and keeping in mind three images. I shall now try to describe these images and to point out in which way they can serve to give this chapter a certain structure. Our three images are introduced in the first three remarks of the harmony chapter, and I feel that *this* way of looking at §§428 to 430 marks a change from previous readings of this material. I want to render plausible the view that these three remarks are a little like vague sketches that are filled in with much more precision in the sequel. That is, taken together the following remarks amplify with more detail and clearer outline what the first three remarks hint at in a more allusive way. This is remark number one:

> 428. "A thought – what a strange thing!" – but it does not strike us as strange when we are thinking. A thought does not strike us as mysterious while we are thinking, but only when we say, as it were retrospectively, "How was that possible?" How was it possible for a thought to deal with *this very* object? It seems to us as if we had captured reality with the thought.

The quoted words at the beginning are meant to introduce the theme of this remark, and perhaps the theme of the following remarks as well. The speaker of these words expresses surprise or wonder by saying that a thought is something 'strange'. What he finds strange is not a particular thought, but thought as a type. The speaker quoted by Wittgenstein calls thought a 'strange object' – a *seltsames Wesen*, and this word 'Wesen' is significant. Unfortunately, I see no way of rendering the peculiar quality of

[5] Hacker 2000, Chapter 1, "Intentionality: the harmony between language and reality (§§428-65)".

the German expression which, in this context, does not make one think of the essence or nature of a kind of thing. The natural association here is with a mysterious creature, a ghost or a spectre. So, the implicit idea is that a thought, like a ghost, is an unusual creature which accomplishes what cannot easily be explained. That's why it is called strange. But the strange or ghost-like aspect does not strike us *while* this *Wesen* – this creature or object – is performing its task, while it is as it were active. It is active while we are doing something, namely, while we are thinking. But what is found strange is evidently not something *we* do in thinking a thought. Rather, what one marvels at is a strange something that does what it does without its being noticed while the process is taking place. It is only retrospectively that it is felt to be the engine driving a remarkable process. Hence, the kind of thought we are interested in must, at least to a certain degree, be independent of the process of thinking. And the aspect which concerns us is one that does not seem strange while one is thinking the thought in question. This means that the specific content of the thought is irrelevant to our considerations. After all, the specific content of a thought is something that one does quite frequently wonder about. Even WHILE I am thinking a particular thought I may ask myself why I hit on this odd idea. For example: if, while looking at a flower, I think of fried eggs and wonder whether I'd like them a little more crisp, I may well find this thought at the same time I am thinking it strange. But that is clearly not the kind of strangeness that worries the speaker quoted by Wittgenstein.

This strangeness can only emerge if we abstract, not only from the specific content of a thought, but also from the specific attitude which the thinker of that thought assumes towards it. The strangeness we are looking for is connected with the possibility of establishing a relation between thought and object – between thought and reality. But most kinds of relation that one may think of in this context can be assigned to certain categories regarding which it is not possible to talk of a relation between thought and object without supplying additional information. If I desire an ice cream, I don't establish a relation between my thought and a particular cup of ice cream, but this or that cup containing ice cream will satisfy my desire. If I doubt that world peace is at risk, I do not normally thereby establish a relation between a thought and certain people and institutions and events; but whether my thought is or is not correct will depend on the behaviour of certain institutions or people. If I hope that the new director of the municipal clinic will improve medical care in our town, it may look as if I had succeeded in establishing a certain relation between a thought and a specific person; but if it turns out that the clinic has been shut down, that relation apparently vanishes into thin air. Of course, all these ways of speaking can easily give rise to philosophical problems, but the decisive point is that all the information required to bring out what may be strange in this type of case plays no role as regards the strangeness intended by the speaker quoted by Wittgenstein. Evidently, the relevant relation between thought and reality belongs to a different, and perhaps more abstract, level than the attitudes of desiring, doubting or hoping just mentioned.

The achievement regarded as strange, even mysterious, by our speaker is rooted in the capacity of thought to capture the relevant part of reality. This way of putting it involves an image, but at least at first glance the image is not a particularly clear one. The reason is that "to capture" may mean different things. There is nothing unusual in saying of a photograph that it has captured a certain situation; nor in saying of a poem that it captures a certain mood; nor in saying of a novel that it captures a certain time. Presumably, what matters in such cases is that one has managed to grasp and reproduce certain typical features: the photographer has focussed on characteristic details; the poet has found words that resonate with his readers and are likely to evoke specific images in their minds; the novelist has told a tale that seems emblematic of the events and changes distinctive of a certain era. But that is not the point of this passage from *Philosophical Investigations*, for (1) the word "capture" as applied to photographers, poets, etc. and their products emphasizes the abilities of these people (and not particular features of the photograph, the poem etc.); and (2) the capturing effected by photographers or poets is not a strange or mysterious quality. I think that the image intended by Wittgenstein is indicated by Miss Anscombe's English translation which, purely as a translation, does not seem to offer the best solution but, as an interpretation of our passage, goes in the right direction. She translates: "We feel as if by means of [thought] we had caught reality in our net." This, I take it, is the image, Wittgenstein has in mind: A thought contains a net, a certain pattern or stencil, which helps the thinker of the thought to capture reality. The remarkable feature is this: that it is possible to capture reality by such a ghostly means, viz. by means of a net contained in, or supplied by, thought. That this is the feature regarded as strange is confirmed by the fact that in the question "How was it possible for a thought to deal with *this very* object?" what is emphasized is "*this very* object" – *dieser Gegenstand selbst*. What is entrapped by the net is not a mere substitute but the object itself. Isn't that strange – considering that the net consists of such delicate fabric?

2.

I think we need not try to squeeze more than that out of the first remark quoted from *Philosophical Investigations*. What we have got suffices to give us a clearer idea of the intended image and the level of abstraction on which it can exercise its evocative power. The following remark, which according to my reading contains the second image, confirms that we have found the right level. This remark runs as follows:

> 429. The agreement, the harmony, between thought and reality consists in this: that if I say falsely that something is *red*, then all the same, it is *red* that it isn't. And in this: that if I want to explain the word "red" to someone, in the sentence "That is not red", I do so by pointing to something that *is* red.

Of course, the relevant kind of agreement is not what one has in mind when talking about truth as agreement between a proposition and the reality corresponding to it, or when claiming that a proposition is true if it is in agreement with reality. This latter sort of agreement is (if one accepts this use of the word "agreement" at all) something that can be either given or lacking. Similarly with normal cases of the use of the word 'harmony': whether or not two voices, or parts, are in harmony depends on their mutual relations. If these relations do not satisfy certain rules of the theory of harmony, we shall claim that these voices are not in harmony. That is, a harmonious relation is given only if certain conditions are satisfied. If this is not the case, we do not speak of a relation of harmony.

In the quoted passage, on the other hand, we are dealing with a kind of harmony or agreement that always exists provided thought and reality stand in any sort of relation at all. And that is practically always the case if a thought is being thought or a proposition is being expressed. The kind of harmony that concerns us exists independently of whether the relevant thought is true or false. If we employ an analogy which Wittgenstein relies on in his early writings when he conceives of truth and falsity as the two poles of a proposition determining its sense, we could say that the harmony in question exists even if the poles of the proposition are not orientated, that is, it exists even if the direction in which the proposition points is completely undetermined. In other words, the agreement or harmony between a thought *p* and reality is given no matter whether *p* is affirmed or denied. This sort of harmony obtains between elements or configurations of elements of the thought, on the one hand, and elements or configurations of elements of reality, on the other, but it attaches to a level which is prior to the level of affirmation and denial.

Thus there is a structural similarity between the images mentioned so far. The net of our first image captures reality no matter what attitude is assumed by the thinking subject towards objects of reality. The harmonious agreement of the second image obtains no matter whether the relevant thought is affirmed or denied. Both images rely on one and the same basic notion, viz. the Fregean idea of analysing a sentence into its propositional content, on the one hand, and the force with which this content is expressed, on the other. Wittgenstein famously elucidates this idea by means of a chemical analogy when he describes the propositional content as a "Satzradikal" – a sentence-radical. In the context of the first of our two images, the content does the job of a net capturing reality and functioning independently of the attitude assumed by the subject towards this content, that is, independently of whether his attitude is one of desire or hope, doubt or assertion. In the context of the second image, the thought or propositional content stands in a relation of harmonious agreement with reality no matter whether it is affirmed or denied, that is, no matter whether the content or the negation of this content is asserted.

3.

The third remark of our sequence continues the series of images reminiscent of Wittgenstein's earlier writings. This remark contains two such images that are connected with each other. Wittgenstein writes:

> 430. "Put a ruler against this object; it does not say that the object is so-and-so long. Rather, it is in itself – I am tempted to say – dead, and achieves nothing of what a thought can achieve." – It is as if we had imagined that the essential

> thing about a living human being was the outward form. Then we made a lump of wood into that form and were abashed to see the lifeless block, lacking any similarity to a living creature.

The ruler mentioned in this passage stands for the thought or the propositional content of a sentence – what Wittgenstein calls a sentence-radical. Its gradations fit the image of a net as well as the image of harmonious agreement. In the first context, they indicate the mesh of the net; in the second context, they allude to the overlapping marks regarding which there is agreement between measure and object measured. Of course, in the *Tractatus* too the measure, or ruler – the *Maßstab*, plays an important role. There Wittgenstein compares a picture, and hence a proposition – a *Satz* – to a measure and says that a proposition is laid against reality in the same way in which a ruler is laid against an object.[6] But now here there is an additional image that comes to the fore in our remark, namely the image of death and life.[7] The quoted speaker says that without external help a ruler is as it were speechless and to that extent lifeless. Taken by itself, the ruler cannot specify how long objects adjacent to it are. One may even want to say that, taken by itself, it does not measure anything but merely sits there as one object among many.

What is the quoted speaker driving at? One answer that may suggest itself would take its start from the parallel with the *Tractatus* and observe that a ruler whose gradations are not correlated with determinate points in reality fails to measure anything. That is, the gradations need to be made alive, as it were, by certain correlations which turn these marks into feelers that can, and do, make contact with reality.[8] These correlations may then be conceived as variously interpretable intentional acts that serve to breathe life into the gradation marks to enable them to accomplish what a thought (which is a live creature anyway) can pull off without such assistance. If you read the first – that is, the quoted – part of our remark this way, you may want to construe the second part as a comment by Wittgenstein, who explains to his interlocutor the kind of error he (the interlocutor) has com-

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6 TLP, 2.1512.

7 Cf. Schulte 2004.

8 Cf. TLP, 2.1515: 'These correlations are, as it were, the feelers of the picture's elements, with which the picture touches reality.'

mitted. This explanation would amount to saying that he has made the mistake of taking the external form of an object for its essential part and is now attempting to capture the essential part by way of copying the object's outward form. This attempt, however, the explanation continues, will inevitably result in total failure for the reason that what is alive cannot find a satisfactory representation in what is dead.

But if you look at the matter more closely, you will find that this is all wrong. What at first blush looks like a comment by Wittgenstein is (without further qualification) complete nonsense. Whether or not a wooden artefact can get across the essential features of a human being does not depend on the artist's beliefs and theories but on his talent, his capacity to deal with this particular subject and other facts of that kind. It is obvious that dead objects can portray live creatures. These objects may even seem very much alive. One prerequisite, however, is the obtaining of pictorial conventions – conventions that people can come to master. The aliveness of certain portraits by Titian may put into the shade the aliveness of his sitters. Here, however, the word "alive" is used, not in a purely biological sense, but in a sense which is appropriate to works of art, and this sense has a lot to do with the *expressiveness* of certain forms. As a matter of fact, a lifeless block can be a splendid likeness of a living creature; it is only in the biological sense that it cannot be alive. On the other hand, in the sense in which a great work of art can be alive, a living being may look, perhaps not dead, but fairly inanimate.

Once you see what is confused about the second part of our remark, you will see more clearly what is wrong about the first – that is, the quoted – bit. Of course, in a sense the speaker is quite right in claiming that in itself a ruler does not say anything about the length of objects that are to be measured. But that is trivial. It is just as trivial as claiming that a block of wood is biologically dead. But just as a block of wood can be very much alive, as far as its expressiveness is concerned, a ruler *can* say something: it can say something whenever it is used in accordance with its intended purpose. What is interesting about the quoted speaker's statement is that he ascribes to the thought what the ruler has been denied. The thought, he says, is not dead but can off its own bat manage what the ruler cannot accomplish without assistance. But this idea is totally wrong. Here, an achievement is attributed to a thought which can only be ascribed to members of a speech community. A thought in itself (whatever that may be) is just as dead as a ruler in itself. It is given life through being used, that is, through the role it plays in the thought of a language-using creature. If, on the other hand, by "thought" you mean mental or neural processes, they are simply irrelevant as far as 'saying something' is concerned. Mental or neural processes aren't signs that can be used. For this reason, even in a metaphorical sense they are incapable of saying anything.

Still, the quoted speaker is right in saying that, taken by itself – that is, without its proper context, a ruler is dead. Life requires more than that. In our case, life presupposes the existence of a speech-community whose members have a use for such rulers; and that is a community where the employment of such rulers has been given a point by means of certain practices and conventions. Thus the third image which plays a structuring role as regards the following remarks of the harmony chapter is the contrast between dead and alive. It is, as we have seen, an image that tends to confuse readers. But if you look at our sequence from a certain perspective, you will see that the third image is closely connected with the first two. The perspective I mean is determined by a shifting and, as I should like to stress, dangerous concept – the concept of *content*.

4.

So, my claim is that the notion of content is the leitmotif of §§428ff. It sets the tone of these remarks in a way which is from the very beginning informed by the three images I have described. Here I merely wish to indicate a few aspects of the game Wittgenstein plays with his leading concept and these images. The content we are dealing with is that of statements and thoughts, expectations and desires. This content may be what is stated or thought, expected or desired, and in a sense this sort of content is a *matter of fact* or a *state of affairs* that is talked or thought about, expected or desired. But as we all know, problems arise from the fact that not everything that is asserted or thought is true, and that not all expectations and desires are fulfilled. Does that mean that in these latter kinds of case our thoughts and statements have no content? Or was it illegitimate from the start – that is, also in the case of true statements or thoughts – to ascribe content to them?

In another sense, the content of a statement or a thought is what is said or thought in contrast to the *force* with which it is stated or thought. In this sense, one and the same content can be asserted or doubted, desired or scoffed at. That this idea is not without its problems is an insight which Wittgenstein tries to express in more than one place of his writings. One problem is this: that this conception doesn't really do justice to our actual ways of thinking and talking in that the theoretical division into content and force suggests the occurrence of two different acts to which, however, nothing corresponds in reality. Another problem is that the theoretical division runs the risk of connecting the two sides – content and force – with different kinds of mental processes whose supposed existence explains nothing and which in their turn are not amenable to a satisfactory explanation.

Talk about such kinds of content becomes even more complicated if we bring in negation. If we use a sign of negation, what is negated is supposed to be the same as what is asserted by the corresponding positive proposition. There is nothing wrong about this and similar ways of putting the point, but nonetheless the basic model may be misleading, as Wittgenstein says (§447), because "the feeling is as if the negation of a proposition had first, in a certain sense, to make it true, in order to be able to negate it". One tends to fall into this error because it is easy to overlook that "the assertions of the negating proposition contains the proposition which is negated, but not the assertion of it".

There are two aspects of the basic idea of content which are elaborated in the harmony chapter of *Philosophical Investigations*. The first aspect concerns the *identification* of content, the second concerns its *power*. The first two images are relevant to the first aspect, the third image is connected with the second aspect. The question "How do our thoughts acquire substance?" is one whose likely answers are directed by the images of the net and of harmonious agreement to move in a certain direction. Both images suggest that it is a certain potential inherent in the conceptual scheme informing our ideas and utterances which supplies the substance enshrined in our thoughts. This conceptual scheme is supposed to see to it that thoughts and statements formed in accordance with its rules capture all the reality that does not slip through the net. In addition, the conceptual scheme is supposed to ensure that every statement and every thought formed in accordance with its rules stands in harmonious agreement with reality. But in spite of these remarkable resources the conceptual scheme is not able to establish a connection between thought or proposition, on the one hand, and reality, on the other – a connection which suffices to restrict the domain of alternatives and to pick out or exclude exactly one or at least one among the countless chords that can count as harmonious. This kind of specification is something the conceptual scheme cannot bring about all by itself. That is why the sentence-radicals looked at in isolation seem to be lifeless, dead. Here, something needs to be added, and this additional element will surely be something mental which breathes life into the content of our thoughts and statements.

At this point, I suppose, the story begins to ring very familiar. So I stop.

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Wittgenstein on the Inverted Spectrum

David Stern, Iowa City

1. Introduction

This paper looks at some of the connections between what Wittgenstein had to say about imaginary inverted spectrum scenarios and current discussion of qualia inversion thought experiments. Wittgenstein never uses the terms “quale” or “qualia,” the current term of art for the qualitative aspect of experience, “what it’s like” to have that experience. However, in *Philosophical Investigations* 272, he touches on these concerns when he raises the possibility that different groups of people might have different visual impressions of red:

> The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own specimen, but that nobody knows whether other people also have *this* or something else. The assumption would thus be possible – though unverifiable – that one section of mankind had one visual impression of red and another section another.

Some readers have taken Wittgenstein to be affirming that the “assumption” in question is a possible though unverifiable hypothesis. However, it is clear from the overall context that this passage is only setting out one consequence of the view that experience is private, not endorsing it. Indeed, Wittgenstein is neither affirming nor denying the “assumption” that different sections of mankind have different visual impressions of red. As Philippa Foot puts it in a paper written in 1982, “according to him we merely think we understand the words we use when we try to formulate the hypothesis” (Foot 1982, 1). In a similar vein, Sydney Shoemaker, in his paper on “The Inverted Spectrum” observes that Wittgenstein “thinks that this ‘assumption’ is in fact senseless or conceptually incoherent and takes it to be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the notion of ‘private experience’ he is attacking that it implies that this ‘assumption’ might be true” (Shoemaker 1982, 328). Indeed, as we shall see later, Wittgenstein raises questions about the coherence of the use of the idea of spectrum inversion in philosophical thought experiments in his writing from the 1930s.

Much recent writing on spectrum inversion, on the other hand, makes use of thought experiments about spectrum inversion in order to argue for the existence of qualia. The current literature is extensive and varied. The PhilPapers website listed 87 papers under the heading of inverted qualia as of September 2009. The topic merits its own lengthy entry in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. It begins as follows:

> Qualia inversion thought experiments are ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy of mind (largely due to the influence of Shoemaker 1982 and Block 1990). The most popular kind is one or another variant of Locke's hypothetical case of spectrum inversion, in which strawberries and ripe tomatoes produce visual experiences of the sort that are actually produced by grass and cucumbers, grass and cucumbers produce experiences of the sort that are actually produced by strawberries and ripe tomatoes, and so on. (Byrne 2008)

The first sentence indirectly indicates a crucial connection between Wittgenstein's writing on spectrum inversion and the current debate: Sydney Shoemaker begins his much discussed article on the topic, cited in that first sentence, with a critical discussion of Wittgenstein's writing on spectrum inversion in the "Notes for Lectures on 'Sense Data' and 'Private Experience". Consequently, Wittgenstein's views on the topic are frequently referred to in the subsequent literature, even if only in passing. That discussion has recently circled back on the question of what position Wittgenstein might have taken about the subsequent debate. In "Wittgenstein and Qualia," Block (2007) provides a much more detailed defence of the reply to Wittgenstein on the inverted spectrum sketched in Shoemaker's paper. That paper has already inspired a response by Canfield (2009), who argues that Block begs the question under debate by presupposing the very claims about qualia he purports to defend.

2. Shoemaker on Wittgenstein on the Inverted Spectrum

I should make it clear at the outset that I think Foot and Shoemaker are on the right track in taking Wittgenstein to hold that the inverted spectrum "hypothesis" is not a hypothesis at all. Although I cannot pursue the point here, the strategy of attributing a *reductio* argument about private language to Wittgenstein, along the lines Shoemaker proposes, already concedes too much, in implying that we *do* understand the "assumption" in question (see Stern 2004, ch. 7, and 2007). If, as I believe, the classical philosophical conception of the inverted spectrum is more like a fantasy than a false theory, if we merely think we understand the words we use when we try to formulate it, as Foot puts it, then it is a mistake to treat it as something we do grasp well enough to reason to a contradiction.

> It is much more difficult to say precisely *why* Wittgenstein takes this position, and what it amounts to. It is, after all, very easy to think that the hypothesis of the inverted spectrum is intelligible, and that it *must* make sense. It is easy to explain to a small child. Indeed, when Ned Block's seven-year old daughter first heard about it, she replied that it explained why some people don't have purple as their favorite colour. (Block 2007, 86)

In 1982, Foot wrote that it struck her as very strange that Wittgenstein's views about the inverted spectrum hypothesis were very rarely discussed: "It must, I think, be assumed by the very many philosophers who talk about the hypothesis of the inverted spectrum as if it were something we all understand that Wittgenstein could easily be shown to be wrong but the odd thing is that they never give the slightest idea of how this is to be done" (Foot 1982, 1-2). As it happens, Shoemaker's "The Inverted Spectrum," published that year, radically changed the terms of debate by arguing that Wittgenstein himself provided the raw materials from which such a reply could be constructed. Shoemaker based his argument on a striking passage in Wittgenstein's "Notes for Lectures on 'Sense Data' and 'Private Experience'":

> Consider this case: someone says "it's queer/I can't understand it/, I see everything red blue today and vice versa." We answer "it must look queer!'" He says it does and, e.g., goes on to say how cold the glowing coal looks and how warm the clear (blue) sky. I think we should under these or similar circumst[ances] be incl[ined] to say that he saw red what we saw [blue]. And again we should say that we know that he means by the words 'blue' and 'red' what we do as he has always used them as we do."[1]

[1] Wittgenstein 1993, 231; quoted by Shoemaker 1982, 327-8 (using Rhees' 1968 edition), and by Block 2007, 75.

This appears to have been the first discussion of *intra*subjective spectrum inversion – one that occurs to a single subject. Up to this point, authors had concentrated on *inter*subjective inversion – the Lockean case in which different people have different color sensations of the same thing. The point, presumably, of introducing the case of an isolated instance of intrasubjective inversion is that such a modest change is not only conceivable but also potentially easily verifiable, and so provides a convenient point of departure in considering the more widespread change involved in the traditional intersubjective thought experiments.

Shoemaker argued that "there is a natural line of argument from what Wittgenstein seems to admit – the logical possibility of intrasubjective spectrum inversion – to what he apparently denies the meaningfulness of asserting – namely the possibility that intersubjective spectrum inversion actually exists" (1984, 328.) For if someone, call him Fred, undergoes inversion at time t, and others do not, then Fred's color experience will be different from theirs either before or after t (or both). So Fred's intrasubjective inversion leads to intersubjective inversion; and if one person's color experience can differ from another's at one time, why not permanently? "Why then" Shoemaker asks, "is Wittgenstein not committed to the very thing he seems to deny?" (1984, 329-330.)

In other words, there seems to be a slippery slope that leads from the initial story of intrasubjective inversion, the "innocuous" scenario, to use Block's (2007, 75-76) terminology, and the "dangerous" scenario of widespread intersubjective inversion. Indeed, as Shoemaker noted, Wittgenstein did discuss this very possibility, at least in outline, later on in the same "Notes for lectures":

> We said that there were cases in which we should say that the person sees green what I see red. Now the question suggests itself: if this can be so at all, why should it [not] be always the case? It seems, if once we have admitted that it can happen under peculiar circumstances, that it may always happen. But then it is clear that the very idea of seeing red loses its use if we can never know if the other does not see something utterly different. So what are we to

> do: Are we to say that this can only happen in a limited number of cases? This is a very serious situation. – [2]

Shoemaker does not give much attention to this problem, but he does propose a broadly verificationist reading of why Wittgenstein might have differentiated between the innocuous and the dangerous scenarios – the former is behaviorally detectable, because the subject of the change reports dramatic changes in his experience, while the latter is not detectable in this way. However, there is no good reason to equate Wittgenstein's talk of "use" here with the idea that there must be a procedure that would verify the claim in question.

Shoemaker describes Wittgenstein as though he were attracted to rejecting the very idea of intersubjective inversion, or at the very most, that Wittgenstein holds that we could only make sense of it if it happened to a very limited number of people. It is true that some philosophers, notably Frege and Schlick, have maintained a quasi-solipsistic view on which intrasubjective comparison of colour experience is meaningless. On this view, the very idea of someone else's experiencing spectrum inversion is empty, or at best, just a manner of speaking by analogy. Wittgenstein was certainly acquainted with this approach, but it should be clear from his discussion of the original scenario of intra-subjective spectrum inversion in the third person – he asks us to imagine it happening to someone else – that he does not endorse such a position. Nor, I think, should we take his proposal that perhaps we should say that it could only happen in a limited number of cases too seriously. I see no reason why Wittgenstein is committed to ruling out a priori the possibility of widespread spectrum variation, or systematic changes in color perception, due either to genetic variability in the physiology of the eye, or changes in eyesight associated with aging (see Block 2007, section 7, & 1999). However, such hypotheses are at best a diversion from the real issue, which is the proposal that someone with normal eyesight and brain might have different "visual qualia." This proposal is motivated by the idea of private experience, and the conception of the mind as a separate realm.

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[2] Wittgenstein 1993, 285; quoted in part by Shoemaker 1982, 327-8 (using Rhees' 1968 edition), and by Block 2007, 75-76.

3. Block and Canfield on Wittgenstein on the Inverted Spectrum

Shoemaker's discussion is taken up and developed in much greater detail in a recent paper by Block (2007), who repeats the verificationist construal of Wittgenstein's proposal that "the very idea of seeing red loses its use if we can never know if the other does not see something utterly different" (citation above). The equation of "use" and verification leads Block to propose an elaborate science fiction thought experiment, a development of the story about Fred designed to show that there could be inversion in a subject with normal responses to colors, inversion that would therefore be behaviorally un-detectable. We are asked to imagine that you are a normal person who undergoes inversion at age 18, perhaps by "crossing the wires in the visual system." As time goes by, your vision does not change, but you gradually get used to using the standard color vocabulary for stoplights and tomatoes, and even come to think in those terms. Nevertheless, you clearly remember what things looked like before the changeover, and the nature of the change. However, as you get older, amnesia strikes, and by the age of 60, you no longer remember anything that occurred before your 50^{th} birthday: at this point, you are behaviorally indistinguishable from those with normal color vision, yet your vision is inverted – your qualia are quite different from those of a normal perceiver. This is only the briefest summary of a 15-page argument, replete with multiple colored diagrams, and elaborate responses to a number of subtle and complex objections. Still, the overall direction of Block's argument is clear: he aims to show that an inverted spectrum is possible by describing, in great detail, a theoretically possible sequence of events that leads us from the "innocuous" scenario to the "dangerous" one.

Canfield's reply to Block turns on the point that Block and Wittgenstein have very different understandings of just what is going on in the "innocuous" scenario that each begins with (and also of the "dangerous" scenario that Block ends with.) Wittgenstein is concerned to bring out the preconceptions that we may bring to such a story – our "picture" as he calls it – of the relation between mind and experience.

> For if the red and blue that I see are pictured as mental entities of some sort – things I have or am aware of – then it is easy to think it possible that the mental thing I have when I see red is (qualitatively) the one you have when you

> see blue. In short we are inclined to the 'always' extension of the innocuous case because we philosophize under the influence of the picture of the inner. For Wittgenstein that extension is something to be examined critically, whereas for Block it serves as the basis for a proof of inverted spectra and qualia. His premisses rest ultimately on intuitions – for example those concerning certain supposed conclusions drawn from the physiology of sight. Wittgenstein on the other hand takes intuition not as something like evidence, but as reporting on what we are strongly inclined to say. (Canfield 2009, 3)

Wittgenstein's purpose in introducing the "innocuous" story, then, is precisely to illustrate how we can go wrong, how we can move from sense to nonsense without realizing that we are doing so. Canfield sums up the difference between Block and Wittgenstein with a simple diagram, deliberately much cruder than Block's elaborate schemata. Block conceives of the "innocuous" scenario as involving not just two subjects and their different reports on the colour of the object they look at, but also two different subjective sensations, two "thought bubbles", one attached to each person's head.

4. Hacker on Wittgenstein on the Inverted Spectrum

In a manuscript written in 1937, Wittgenstein approaches the hypothesis of the inverted spectrum from a very different perspective. He writes:

> Imagine each person had from birth a board with rows of attached color samples. Now, if he learns the names of the colors in the course of his childhood - as the adults point to a thing and say a name of a color – then he writes this name by *one* of the colors on his board. I want to assume that nobody sees which sample he writes the name by. - He is then got to make use of the names of the colors in the most diverse ways and I assume he is a 'normal person', nobody ever says he is color blind, does not know the colors, mixes them up etc. etc. Business with these words takes place smoothly. He says, like anyone else, the leaves look green in the summer, and become yellow and red in the autumn - etc., etc. Now, I want to assume, if he has to judge a color, he always looks alternately at the object and at his board - as if comparing the colors - and furthermore: if one tests his color sense by asking: "Which color is called 'red'?" then he first of all looks at a sample on his board (which we, however, do not see) and then points to a red object for the questioner. Likewise if one asks him: "What is this color called?" (pointing to some such thing) he checks his board first, then says the *correct* name. And now imagine that we somehow found out that he had the word "red" written by a green sample on his

> board, by a red one, "blue," etc.! "So then it would all be a misunderstanding!" – Why? - "Well, he still meant green the whole time, even if he 'said red'!" - But why do you say that? Is that the criterion, then, for what he "means" by a word? Do you have to take *that* as a criterion for it? *Have* you taken it as the criterion for his meaning in the practical use of language? Why shouldn't you just as well say: it is completely irrelevant for what he "means", where he points on his board? Or you could say: "There are two different uses of the expression 'the color, which he meant'"; but there can be no talk of *misunderstanding*! (MS 119, 87-91; 1937, my translation)

Hacker quite correctly describes this as an "effort to shake the grip of the private object that apparently functions as a private sample for the use of a word" (1990, 55). However, he also calls it a *reductio ad absurdum*, which concedes too much, I believe, to the position Wittgenstein opposes, in implying that it is a position that implies a contradiction. The passage certainly does aim to convince us that the idea of a private inner experience of colour, of qualia that float free of our intersubjective use of words for colour, is absurd. But I see no contradiction here, only an attempt to set out the views of the defender of the hypothesis of the inverted spectrum that make it look manifestly bizarre, a redescription that aims to get the reader to see it as an obsessive tic unconnected with the rest of what we do and say. The story Wittgenstein tells in this passage is very similar to the discussion of the grocer at the end of the opening section of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Asked for five red apples, he consults a colour chart in order to select apples of the right kind before counting them out one by one. The aim of both exercises is to get us to take a postulated process that seems somehow intelligible as long as it goes on in the mental realm, and show us how strange it is by imagining a language game, a practical activity, in which those ghostly processes are transposed into the domain of everyday action (see Stern 2004, 83-86).

5. Conclusion

The moral that I would like to draw from our consideration of these varying responses to Wittgenstein on the inverted spectrum is that we should be very wary of the idea that there is any one such thing as "the inverted spectrum." Rather, we face a wide variety of different stories about spectrum inversion, each of which must be assessed on its merits. The point of Wittgenstein's story about the possibility of someone's waking up and seeing everything red blue and vice versa is to emphasize that we can conceive of spectrum inversion in a quite specific and limited set of circumstances. In such a case, we would have good reason to say the person saw red what we saw blue. He contrasts this with a quite general case of spectrum inversion, the kind usually discussed in the literature up to that point, in which we are supposed to imagine that for all we know other people have always had quite different experiences from myself when looking at red and blue objects. In such a case, we might well ask how we know what those others mean by the words "red" and "blue." Wittgenstein's reasoning is closely analogous to Descartes' discussion of sensory illusion at the beginning of the *Meditations*. That the senses mislead us on occasion gives us good reason to doubt some of our judgments based on the evidence of our senses, but it gives us no reason to doubt all of those judgments, for we have to appeal to some of them in order to have grounds to doubt those that we put into question. Descartes, of course, goes on to consider the possibility that I might be dreaming, or deceived by an evil demon; Shoemaker and Block go on to consider their own elaborate hypotheses about spectrum inversion. But each of these futher scenarios imports additional questionable assumptions in the guise of a supposedly plausible story.

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Language and Metaphysics

The 'Language and World' of Religion*

Anat Biletzki, Tel Aviv

Language-games and forms of life are not the same.

Both these constructs carry astounding philosophical capital, and, in the way of all holders of capital, can be dear or cheap. Having become popular currency, they are used, especially the former, in multifarious contexts, not necessarily, or not even, Wittgensteinian contexts. So it is one thing to engage in the interpretative enterprise of asking "what is a language-game?" and what does it do for Wittgenstein, or "what is a form of life?" and how does it do anything for Wittgenstein; it is quite another to conscript these two expressions for the purpose of analyzing or investigating issues exempt from Wittgensteinian interests.[1] In the case of religion, however, the two agendas come peculiarly close. There is great fascination in unearthing what it is exactly that Wittgenstein said and thought about religion, mostly because his – not gargantuan – mention of the practices and beliefs of religion is relatively sparse and appears to be inscrutably vague. Not unlike other Wittgensteinian topics, there are several competing *interpretations* of his words; in the case of religion, however, his discussion of religion is so minimal[2] that the door is open for flights of under-

* Many thanks are due the participants of the 32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium (2009), especially James Klagge, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, and Alois Pichler, who asked challenging questions, the answers to which I have tried to work out in this article. Hans Sluga's query, concerning the relation between Wittgenstein's own religiosity and his thoughts on religion, deserves another investigation.

[1] I have, in the past, alluded to this as the interpretation-use distinction, cf. Biletzki (2003).

[2] In chronological order we usually point to passages in the *Notebooks 1914-1916*, very few sections in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921), some thoughts in "A Lecture on Ethics" (ca. 1929), the remarks in "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough" (1931), three lectures in "Lectures on Religious Belief" (ca. 1938), scant comments in *Philosophical Investigations* (ca. 1945), and some others in *On Cer-*

standing. In parallel, we come across a so-called Wittgensteinian explanation of religion – what it is, what religious practices mean, what religious beliefs consist of – that is sometimes divorced from questions of Wittgensteinian interpretation and rather *uses* Wittgensteinian tools in asking about and explaining religion itself. These are cases of justified opportunism, so to speak – the utilization of Wittgensteinian insights and terminology in the service of theology and religious studies.

I venture to categorize the readings of Wittgenstein that purport to establish his views on religion. These include: a) the attribution of the "mystical" to religion, placing religion in the realm of the ineffable and, accordingly, being placed mostly in readings of the early Wittgenstein; b) religion as an attitude; c) religion as the expression of emotion, sometimes termed "expressivism" or "emotivism"; d) religion as a personal experience of faith, wherein we find the Kierkedaardian association with Wittgenstein; and e) religion as a language-game or form of life. This list is, perhaps, not completely comprehensive; neither do its members mutually exclude one another. Still, it gives a general lay of the land and evinces the types of interpretation that have become common ground in understanding Wittgenstein in the context of religion. Without engaging in quantitative estimation, I also venture that it is the last of these groupings – religion as a language-game or form of life – that has been most vocal and provocative even while seeming to some the most natural reading while to others the most vulnerable to critique.[3] Furthermore, it has travelled most fruitfully beyond the arena of Wittgenstein interpretation into the domain of theology and religion *per se*, providing theology with a novel means of analysis.

The idea of religion as a language-game or as form of life acquired, early on, the label of "Wittgensteinian fideism." Coined by Kai Nielsen in

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tainty (ca. 1950); out of chronological order there are a few remarks in the editions of later work such as *Zettel* or *Remarks on Color*, and the several allusions to religion in *Culture and Value*.

[3] I may be referring here to the interpretative community's proclivity (concerning Wittgenstein on religion) of a decade ago. The recent upsurge in writings on this subject seems to exhibit greater nuance and, specifically, a newfound interest in the Kierkegaard-Wittgenstein connection. Also of note is that the Kierkegaardian connection has, on occasion, be seen itself as a version of the religion-as-a-form-of-life reading (See Hustwit 1978).

Nielsen 1967, this reading is noteworthy, to my mind, for two substantial reasons. First, and somewhat oddly, it uses Wittgenstein's own conceptual inventions ("language-game" and "form of life") in reading him on an apparently unrelated matter. Nowhere does Wittgenstein himself say that religion is a language-game or a form of life (although he does draw near with "… it is after all a way of living…", *Culture and Value*, 64). This is rather an interpretative tactic of his readers, who find that the force of these constructs (with their attendant complexities and complications) is of good explanatory value in understanding Wittgenstein's thoughts on religion and also, as intimated above, in understanding the phenomenon of religion itself unrelated to textual interpretation. Secondly, more significant than this methodological interpretative ploy is, indeed, the deciphering of content that one encounters when viewing Wittgenstein on religion via language-games or forms of life. The highlights of these readings have to do with the instinctive, primitive quality of language-games and forms of life; with their construal as practices; with their self-regulation; with their insularity; with their inscrutability from outside vantage points; and with their provision of internal standards and criteria of meaning (and rationality). Such common characterizations of both language-games and forms of life make it facile to use them interchangeably. Subsequently, D.Z. Phillips, the acknowledged leader of Wittgensteinian fideism, called religious beliefs "distinctive language-games," (Phillips 1970) and James Cook in critical mode went even further, showing how language-games are utilized (wrongly, to his mind) in the analysis of religion.[4] Nielsen, however, began his diatribe by targeting forms of life, quite haphazardly talking about "forms of language," "forms of life," "modes of discourse," "way of life," and even saying that "way of life" and "mode of discourse" come to the same thing (Nielsen 1967, 193).

One can argue with Wittgensteinian fideism, *grosso modo*, on two counts. One can, firstly, deny it as a satisfactory interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of religion and thence move on to one of the other interpretations that we have adumbrated. This interpretative feud leads to dissecting

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[4] Cook 1988. The misunderstood elements of language-games grafted on to religion, according to Cook, are behavior, primitive behavior, instinctive reaction, in-house explanation and internal justification.

Wittgenstein's enigmatic thoughts on religion in a more detailed fashion. It can and should take into consideration the option that reading Wittgenstein might enable several simultaneous insights: religion as being beyond meaningful language, religion as an attitude, religion as an expression of personal experience, and so on. But secondly, assuming that Wittgenstein would acquiesce to talk of religion as a language-game and as a form of life, one can then also argue *with* Wittgenstein: if language-games and forms of life are insular, inscrutable, self-regulating, and self-providing for norms of meaning and if, consequently, Wittgensteinian religion is thuswise disconnected from other ingredients of human life, then Wittgenstein must be wrong in his depiction of the religious arena.[5]

My specific current argument grows from different roots. Proceeding with affinity towards the fideistic tradition – I find it the most promising of strategies in understanding Wittgenstein, able to countenance the contributions of other readings within its own complexities – I would like to make some internal distinctions that can reinforce fideism while still permitting it to take additional Wittgensteinian steps. First and foremost, I make note again of the fact that, as just mentioned, especially in the case of religion, but rampantly all the same, language-games and forms of life are perceived as serving identical purposes and are, indeed, used by commentators as utterly exchangeable. Now, it is clearly beyond the space of this article to interrogate separately the Wittgensteinian icons of "language-game" and "form of life" and the attendant, sometimes strident and always vast, roster of their interpretation. Nor do I dispute their undoubted closeness: "Here the term 'language-*game*' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (*PI* 23). Still, there is great explanatory value, or, being Wittgensteinian we should perhaps prefer to say great philosophical descriptive worth, in speaking of religion as a form of life; far less so, it emerges, in putting forth an offering of the language-game of religion.

[5] Cook's main disagreements with this type of Wittgensteinian religion deal with a) the unnecessary amalgamation of primitive reactions and the meaning of religious terms, b) the unconvincing placement of practice before belief, c) the wrong view of religious persons impervious to rational reflection. Nielsen weighs in strongly against the thought that the autonomy of the religious form of life (or language-game) precludes (philosophical) argument with it.

Language-games are a rule-governed human activity. In Wittgenstein we see them being used to help us understand the learning of language; to illustrate basic functional traits of language (see primitive language-games like the builders); to emphasize the multiplicity of language uses (see the famous list in *PI* 23); and sometimes, rare-times, to speak of language, on the whole, as one interconnected game. Paradoxically, there is something both natural and artificial in the Wittgensteinian presentation of language-games. On the one hand, the term is exploited in Wittgenstein's turn from the formal, ideal language posited in *TLP* to ordinary language and its ordinary uses, trumpeted by the later Wittgenstein.[6] On the other hand, there is a somewhat synthetic, simulated, even fictive aura to the sometimes contrived examples which are brought forth as emblematic language-games. Whichever the case, the clichés of "language-game of religion" or "religious language-games," though seemingly intuitive, need to be investigated further before we can accept them as a fitting terminology or as an appropriate framework for what it is that we, or the faithful, do in religious contexts.

This investigation goes two ways. First, it must be ascertained whether the aspects of language-games that function in Wittgenstein's thought, for his purposes in discussing the workings of language in general, are relevant for *his* views on religion. Most instructive – and touching – are D.Z. Phillips' own "misgivings," as he calls them, concerning his original use of the cliché (possibly before it became a cliché) (cf. Phillips 1970, 24). With perceptive acuity, Phillips realizes that the very dealings in language-games, which are characteristic of the interpretative enterprise, go far beyond what Wittgenstein would have meant by the nomenclature, definitely beyond what he meant about religion. Whether ultimately natural (as a part of ordinary language) or inherently formalistic (because rule-governed), language-games could not and should not, in a legitimate Wittgensteinian reading, be utilized in the organized, theoreticized manner in which Witt-

[6] I'm clearly making short shrift here of two enormous interpretative issues: a) the question of whether it is really a formal (and ideal) language which is the object of *TLP* or actually ordinary language itself. (See *TLP* 5.5563: "In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order.") b) the ultimate question about the (dis-)continuity between early and later Wittgenstein, specifically concerning his move from formal to ordinary language.

gensteinians who adhere to religion-as-a-language-game treat them. Specifically, their application to religion suffers when they are thus manipulated, most importantly because religion and language-games cannot be seen though such convoluted and manufactured prisms. And this leads immediately to our second pursuit, regarding religion itself, not religion in or for Wittgenstein. Of the critiques mounted against fideism in its classical rendition, very telling is the view which quarrels especially with the idea that a language-game – and religion is here posited as an independent language-game – is necessarily autonomous, independent of and disconnected from other language-games. In other words, the rules which are self-constituted in and by a language-game control the meanings, beliefs, and practices concerning the concepts that function in that language-game *irrespective* of other language-games. That is, in a sense, the principal facet of religion as a language-game that is touted by fideism; and it is tasked as plainly wrong since the religious components of a religious life are not detached from other parts of that same life. On the contrary, religion has everything to do with the other ingredients of a human life and therefore its depiction as a sovereign language-game misses the point of a life lived religiously.

Things are different when we talk about forms of life and religion as a form of life. Famously, Wittgenstein only called on "form of life" five or six times in the *Investigations*. And although this construct, too, has become a ubiquitous coin of the Wittgensteinian and philosophical empire, it has, nevertheless, a more amorphous air about it. True, it has given rise to readings of Wittgenstein that place him in an anti-realist, relativistic, even postmodern camp. But that is not, for me, the strength of the term or the trajectory I want to travel with it. Rather, following Hanfling, I want to emphasize its meanderings between the pluralistic (rather than relativistic) recognition of diverse forms of life and the Wittgensteinian insight that these are all human forms of life.[7] This acknowledgment of both difference

[7] See Hanfling 2002. Hanfling makes it clear that Wittgenstein nowhere says "*human* form of life." These are, literally, Hanfling's words, which are based, however, on (Hanfling's understanding of) Wittgenstein's ascription of "human" to "form of life."

(similar to parochialism[8]) and (a certain) universalism makes room, then, for the existence of distinct forms of life – whether in different cultures, for different persons, or even, I dare say, in one individual's life – but also for communication, i.e., human communication between them. As opposed to the strict reading of different language-games as being incommensurable and therefore of there being no possibility for religious and secular language-games to interact in any way, this acceptance of a human form of life underlying particular forms of life – and let us not forget that Wittgenstein insists that if lions could speak we would not understand them (*PI* p. 223), whereas we do understand one another while speaking different languages because we all speak a human language – offers a stage upon which the religious form of life and the secular one can perform together. Wittgenstein did not speak about religion as a language-game *or* a form of life; but he did, we have seen, invoke the latter with "it is after all a way of living…".

What advantages might this bifurcation between language-games and forms of life have for our understanding of Wittgenstein on religion and perhaps, by way of his insights, of religion and the religious way of life? Here we must tread more gingerly since working out some of the following suggestions may point us back in the way of conjoining forms of life and language-games. This re-attachment, however, is meant to illuminate religion differently than the automatic, synonymous identification of the two constructs did.

The readings of Wittgenstein that find parallelisms between his thought of religion and the Kierkegaardian view are strikingly powerful. The highlight of those readings is the emphasis put on religion as a personal (perhaps even ineffable[9]) experience of faith. But where can we go from there? What explanation and interpretation of religious belief and religious practice can follow upon that very astute identification of the religious person as having a special, personal, private, religious (transcendental?) experience through revelation or similar mystical experiences? It is

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[8] See Travis 2004.

[9] This use of "ineffable" is at a distance from the more usual "ineffability" that is encountered in readings of religion in Wittgenstein that harp on the Tractarian posit of the mystical (and therefore the religious) as beyond the limits of language.

here that language must appear, for only through the medium of language – call it even religious language, credit it even with the label "religious *language-game*" – can any part of that experience be made explicit. Yet that language, which might report about a sublime awakening or vision, which can enumerate in supposed propositional form the contents of religious beliefs (such as "god exists," "the waters parted," "Jesus walked on water," etc.), or which functions to facilitate religious rituals and ceremonies (such as confession or prayer[10]), is populated by several religious language-games, regulated by their own rules that confer meaning upon their concepts and provide for consistent and coherent use of linguistic tools. An interesting insight about this move from the personal experience of faith to language can be obtained through Hintikka's articulation that language-games are the mediator between world and language.[11] The straightforward uptake of Hintikka's thought here would be that the "world" of religious experience is mediated to a meaningful language by the language-games that are prescribed by religious practice. It is our further ability to describe those same language-games, that is to say, to make explicit, as far as possible, the rules and goings on of those games, that affords us an understanding of religion and even of the religious person's experience. Clearly, the "world" spoken of here is not some preternatural reality, a divine being, miraculous events, or any of the transcendent elements usually supposed to inhabit the world which is supposedly represented in statements of religious belief. Rather, the experiential world of the believer is brought forth, into human language, using religious language-games. The philosopher's perspicuous representation of these language-games is merely her description of this religious grammar, her exposition of the use we put our language-games to when using language in religious contexts. This is, however, not "religion as a language-game" but rather the use of language-games that display specific peculiarities (having to do, e.g., with the use of terms like "god" and institutions like prayer) in a religious form of life.[12]

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[10] Wittgenstein does call prayer a language-game in *PI* 23.

[11] Hintikka's clear pronouncement of this can be found, among other places, in Hintikka 1979: "…language-games [are] the mediators between language and reality" (8).

[12] Insisting on fastidiousness, we might distinguish between the maligned "religion as a language-game" and the more appropriate "religious language-games" or even

One additional step can now be taken. Speaking about the experiential world of the believer as being mediated by language-games to the language we all understand, we can now find added value in the shift from language-games to form of life, more clearly moving us from the private (i.e., religious experience) to the public (i.e., religious practices, religious institutions). In keeping with, or actually in parallel to, the private-language argument as regards personal sensations, we may just as forcefully say that there is no foothold to a private language of religious experience. This is, in fact, the unacknowledged strength of the fideistic reading of Wittgenstein's religion. Not only does it divorce religious belief and practice from any transcendence, it furthermore calls our attention to the societal, communitarian essence of religion and of the religious form of life – and to Wittgenstein's awareness and embrace of this essence (an admittedly un-Wittgensteinian term). Although private, perhaps ineffable, religious occurrences might be a part of human experience (and then again, they might just be pathological hallucinations, or psychotic mental activities), only by being manifested in language as a part of a public, religious form of life can they be admitted into meaningful contexts. Put differently yet again – the "world" of religion is not the world depicted by the Bible, propounded by stories of faith, inhabited by mythological gods, fairies and what not. It is, rather, an easily recognizable social world, full of hierarchies and institutions and regulations and rituals that give meanings to the notions which function constitutively in them: a veritable form of life. And the language-games that serve this form of life are necessarily communal *because* our human forms of life – especially religious forms of life – are those of a human community. If the very personal, very private, very exclusive, perhaps sublime, perhaps divine aspects of religious faith seem to be belied by this admission of a more mundane and societal world of religion, then that is, to my mind, all to the good.

"language-games of religion," on condition that the latter two do not exhibit the extremes of insularity, autonomy, and self-regulation that were inappropriately (for religion) identified in language-games in general.

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Realismus, Ontologie und Sprachabhängigkeit

Volker Gadenne, Linz

1. Realismus und Antirealismus

Der erkenntnistheoretische Realismus wird meist durch zwei Annahmen charakterisiert, die etwa so formuliert werden können:

R_1 Existenz und Beschaffenheit der Welt (Realität, Wirklichkeit) sind unabhängig vom menschlichen Wahrnehmen und Denken (und auch von Sprache und Theorie).

R_2 Wir können diese unabhängige Welt in Ausschnitten erkennen.

Manche Philosophen (z.B. Searle 1997) verstehen unter Realismus nur die erste Annahme. Wenn man aber betrachtet, worum es in den Kontroversen zwischen Realisten und ihren Kritikern vor allem geht, dann zeigt sich, dass gerade die Frage der *Erkennbarkeit* der Welt eine zentrale Rolle spielt.

Als *Antirealismus* soll im Folgenden jede Position bezeichnet werden, die R_1 oder R_2 in Frage stellt. Heutige antirealistische Auffassungen betonen zum einen, dass die Welt nicht schlicht vorhanden sei, sondern in einem gewissen Sinne durch unsere Sprache sowie durch fundamentale Theorien erst *konstituiert* oder *konstruiert* werde. Man denke etwa an Goodmans (1978) bekannte Formulierung, dass Welten durch uns „gemacht“ seien, und zwar mit Worten. Zur Begründung dieser Konstruktionsannahme berufen sich ihre Vertreter vor allem auf Kant, den Pragmatismus und die Spätphilosophie Wittgensteins, teils auch auf Erkenntnisse der Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaften (z.B. Glasersfeld 1997).

Weiterhin lehnen Antirealisten R_2 ab und argumentieren, dass eine Erkenntnis der Welt, wie sie an sich ist, nicht möglich sei. Zwar gebe es Erkenntnis in dem Sinne, dass sich manche unserer Konstruktionen bewähren, doch dürfe dies nicht als ein erfolgreiches Erfassen oder Darstellen einer unabhängigen Realität verstanden werden.

Um den Realismus zu verteidigen, müssen seine Anhänger also erstens zu zeigen versuchen, dass es berechtigt ist, eine Welt anzunehmen, die unabhängig vom menschlichen Geist existiert und in diesem Sinne keine bloße Konstruktion ist. Zweitens müssen sie glaubwürdige Argumente für die Erkennbarkeit dieser unabhängigen Welt vorbringen bzw. die antirealistischen Einwände widerlegen. Zur Rechtfertigung von R_2 benötigt der Realismus eine Menge an Voraussetzungen, die meines Erachtens bisher nicht ausreichend geklärt worden sind. Im Folgenden soll es vor allem darum gehen, diese Voraussetzungen zu erarbeiten und zu prüfen, inwieweit sie erfüllbar sind.

2. Gründe für die Annahme einer unabhängigen Wirklichkeit

Das Hauptargument für den Realismus kann folgendermaßen zusammengefasst werden: Unsere Versuche, die Dinge zu beschreiben und zu gestalten, sind manchmal erfolgreich und stoßen manchmal auf Widerstand. Ich kann wiederholt und in Übereinstimmung mit anderen die Erfahrung machen, dass ich durch eine offene Tür gehen kann, jedoch nicht durch die Wand. Diese Erfahrung der *Widerständigkeit* der Welt lässt sich kaum anders deuten als so, dass wir einer von unserem Wahrnehmen und Denken unabhängigen Realität gegenüber stehen. Auch lässt sich der empirische Erfolg gut bestätigter wissenschaftlicher Theorien schwerlich ohne die Annahme verstehen, dass diese Theorien die Wirklichkeit zutreffend erfasst haben, zumindest in gewissen Zügen. – Wie wir wissen, ist dies kein Beweis für den Realismus. Aber es ist meines Erachtens ein Grund dafür, R_1 für plausibler zu halten als die Gegenannahme.

Nun bestreiten heutige Antirealisten in der Regel gar nicht, dass es etwas von unserem Denken Unabhängiges gibt. Doch widersprechen sie R_1 insofern, als durch R_1 dieses unabhängige „Etwas“ als eine „fertige Welt“ aufgefasst wird, als eine in bestimmter Weise beschaffene oder strukturierte Welt, in der also z.B. feststeht, welche Dinge und Eigenschaften es gibt und welche Tatsachen bestehen. Aus antirealistischer Sicht hängt es von unseren Begriffen ab, wie sich die Welt in Dinge, Eigenschaften und Tatsachen (oder, je nach Ontologie, auf noch andere Weise) gliedert.

Das gerade angeführte Argument von der Widerständigkeit stützt allerdings nicht nur die Annahme, dass überhaupt etwas von unserem Denken Unabhängiges existieren muss, sondern auch die darüber hinaus gehende These, dass dieses unabhängige „Etwas" eine bestimmte Beschaffenheit oder Struktur besitzt: Eine völlig homogene, strukturlose Welt könnte unmöglich der Grund dafür sein, dass wir eine Vielfalt von Dingen und Ereignissen erfahren, die bestimmten Gesetzen zu unterliegen scheinen, sie könnte also auch nicht verständlich machen, dass manche Beschreibungs- und Handlungsversuche misslingen. Ohne R_1 müssten wir annehmen, dass die Vielfalt in unserer Erfahrung mit all ihren Gesetzmäßigkeiten allein vom Subjekt hervorgebracht wird.

In diesem Zusammenhang ist die These von Interesse, dass es von der Sprache abhängen würde, wie die Menschen die Welt in Einzeldinge und Tatsachen gliedern. Im Anschluss an Sapir und Whorf gab es zahlreiche Untersuchungen darüber, ob die Welt von den Angehörigen verschiedener Kulturen tatsächlich verschieden gesehen wird (Whorf 1984). Die Resultate sind nicht einheitlich. Aber gestehen wir einmal zu, dass es in dieser Hinsicht bemerkenswerte kulturelle Unterschiede gibt und dass dies mit der Sprache zusammenhängt, dergestalt, dass die Verfügbarkeit über Begriffe und grammatische Formen beeinflusst, wie wir die Welt sehen und auffassen, z.B., welche Aspekte der Welt bereits in der Wahrnehmung ausgewählt werden. Würde dies gegen R_1 sprechen? Ich meine, dass das Gegenteil der Fall ist (Gadenne 2001). Eine solche selektive Funktion der Sprache lässt sich nämlich nur durch die Annahme einer schon irgendwie beschaffenen Realität verständlich machen. Um Begriffe entwickeln und auf die Welt anwenden zu können, muss diese schon bestimmte, für uns erfassbare Eigenschaften, Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede aufweisen. Es hängt z.B. mit menschlichen Interessen zusammen, dass wir Berge und Täler unterscheiden und benennen. Aber wir könnten Begriffe wie die genannten gar nicht erlernen und anwenden, wenn die Dinge nicht schon reale Eigenschaften und Unterschiede aufweisen würden, zu denen unsere versuchsweise gebildeten Begriffe passen oder nicht passen. Die Idee, Begriffe könnten den Dingen ihre Eigenschaften und Unterschiede erst verleihen, ist eine sehr seltsame Annahme, die überhaupt keine Wurzeln in unserer praktischen Erfahrung mit der Welt hat. Wir gestalten, verändern und strukturieren immer nur Sachen, die schon in bestimmter Weise beschaffen sind, z.B. hart oder weich, rund oder eckig. – Aus diesen Überlegungen folgt meines Erachtens, dass R_1 eine plausible Annahme ist.

3. Der Einfluss des Subjekts auf die Erkenntnis

Antirealistische Positionen stellen R_2 in Frage. Der Kern aller Einwände gegen R_2 besteht in der Annahme, dass bei jedem Erkenntnisversuch, den ein Subjekt unternimmt, das Ergebnis *auch* von Bedingungen abhängt, die vom Subjekt beigesteuert werden und die es grundsätzlich unmöglich machen, zu ergründen, wie die Wirklichkeit an sich beschaffen ist. Anders als Kant betrachten heutige Antirealisten die subjektiven Einflüsse meist als kulturabhängig und verweisen dementsprechend auf Sprachspiele und Weltbilder. Aus dieser Sicht ist uns also die Wirklichkeit niemals so gegeben, wie sie an sich ist, sondern immer nur vermittelt durch die verfügbaren begrifflichen Kategorien, vermittelt durch Formen, die der Grammatik unserer Sprache entstammen usw. Es kann keinen Erkenntniszugang zu einer reinen, unvermittelten Wirklichkeit geben.

Gegen diesen Einwand hat der Realismus die Möglichkeit, einen Beitrag des Subjekts zur Erkenntnis schlicht zu bestreiten und zu behaupten, dass wir sehr wohl die Fähigkeit besitzen, durch geistige Akte Teile der Wirklichkeit direkt (unvermittelt) zu erfassen (vgl. dazu Tegtmeier 2005). Oder er kann einen gewissen Beitrag des Subjekts zum Erkenntnisvorgang einräumen, jedoch argumentieren, dass dieser korrigierbar und somit kein grundsätzliches Hindernis für Erkenntnis ist. Die zweite Strategie ist meines Erachtens die aussichtsreichere. So ist es z.B. kein grundsätzliches Problem für den Realismus, dass manche Beobachtungen täuschen, *sofern* sich überzeugend argumentieren lässt, dass diese Täuschungen durch andere Beobachtungen sowie theoretische Überlegungen korrigiert werden können und unsere Beobachtungen im Ganzen dazu beitragen, unser Wissen über die Welt nach und nach zu erweitern. Es ist auch kein Problem, dass Erkenntnisresultate von *Werten* abhängen. Nur wenn von einem Einfluss gezeigt werden könnte, dass er unüberwindlich ist und somit eine unüberschreitbare Grenze für jede Erkenntnis markiert, müsste R_2 aufgegeben werden.

Natürlich muss der Realismus die *Fehlbarkeit* der Erkenntnis zugestehen. Dies ist kein Problem, wenn es trotz der Fehlbarkeit möglich ist, die Akzeptanz bzw. Präferenz bestimmter Aussagen über die Wirklichkeit zu rechtfertigen. Dazu ist der Realismus auf *methodologische Prinzipien* angewiesen, von denen die grundlegenden im Folgenden angeführt werden sollen.

4. Wahrnehmung und Hypothesenbestätigung als Erkenntnisquellen

Wir können davon ausgehen, dass die meisten heutigen Realisten die *Erfahrung* als notwendige Erkenntnisquelle ansehen und nicht annehmen, dass Realitätserkenntnis rein a priori möglich ist. Selbst wenn es auch möglich sein sollte, einige reale Tatsachen a priori zu erkennen, ist es doch ziemlich unumstritten, dass der weitaus größte Teil des Alltags- und auch des wissenschaftlichen Wissens auf Erfahrung beruht.

Beobachtungen geben Anlass zur Bildung von Hypothesen, die dann anhand neuer Beobachtungen bestätigt oder korrigiert werden. Der Realismus muss also erstens voraussetzen, dass es rational gerechtfertigt ist, Beobachtungsaussagen als zutreffende Darstellungen der Wirklichkeit zu akzeptieren, so lange es keine speziellen Hinweise darauf gibt, dass eine Täuschung vorliegt. Zweitens muss er es als gerechtfertigt ansehen, eine Hypothese vorläufig als zutreffende Beschreibung der Wirklichkeit zu akzeptieren, wenn sie gründlich geprüft wurde und sich bewährt hat bzw. sie einer konkurrierenden Hypothese als zutreffende Beschreibung vorzuziehen, wenn sie sich deutlich besser bewährt hat als diese (vgl. dazu Musgrave 1999, Kap. 16).

5. Die rationale Wahl unter konkurrierenden wissenschaftlichen Theorien

In den Wissenschaften haben sich einige große Theorien (Paradigmen, Forschungsprogramme) gegen andere durchgesetzt. Aus realistischer Sicht hat sich in diesen Fällen jeweils herausgestellt, dass die neue Theorie T_2 der älteren Theorie T_1 überlegen ist, weil sie die Gesamtheit der Beobachtungen besser erklärt oder weil sie insgesamt mehr Probleme löst. Für den Realismus ist dies ein Grund für die Annahme, dass in diesen Fällen jeweils T_2 die Wirklichkeit zutreffender darstellt als T_1.

Nun haben Kuhn (1967), Feyerabend (1976) und andere diese Sicht angezweifelt und eine *Inkommensurabilität* großer Theorien behauptet: Bei solchen Theorien gebe es keine gemeinsame Basis von akzeptierten Beobachtungen. Die jeweilige Theorie bestimme, was die relevanten Beobachtungen sind. Unter diesen Umständen könnten nicht dieselben Beobachtungen T_1 widersprechen und T_2 bestätigen. Die Präferenz von T_2 gegenüber T_1 müsste dann also auf Gesichtspunkten beruhen, die nichts zu tun haben mit der Wahrheit dieser Theorien bzw. mit der Frage, ob die eine die Realität zutreffender darstellt als die andere. Unter diesen Umständen hätte es keinen Sinn, eine einzelne Theorie überhaupt als Versuch aufzufassen, Realität darzustellen. Und nach dieser Auffassung sind auch Beobachtungsaussagen keine unmittelbaren Beschreibungen objektiver Tatsachen, da ihre Interpretation und auch ihre Akzeptanz oder Ablehnung von Theorien abhängig ist.

Ein solcher *Theorien-Relativismus* ist mit R_2 unvereinbar. Denn R_2 benötigt die erkenntnistheoretische Voraussetzung, dass es möglich ist, mit rationalen Mitteln unter konkurrierenden (großen) Theorien eine Wahl zu treffen. Wenn dies nicht möglich ist, dann gibt es einen subjektiven und nicht korrigierbaren Einfluss auf die Erkenntnis: Die Resultate von Erkenntnisversuchen sind dann durch etwas geprägt, nämlich durch das jeweils vorherrschende Paradigma, das selbst nicht auf seine Übereinstimmung mit der Wirklichkeit hin prüfbar ist.

Nun ist das Inkommensurabilitäts-Argument wissenschaftstheoretisch und wissenschaftshistorisch eingehend geprüft worden und hat sich, in seiner ursprünglichen Fassung, als eher nicht haltbar erwiesen (Andersson 1988). Kuhn selbst hat die Inkommensurabilitätsidee im Laufe der Zeit modifiziert und abgeschwächt. Aus heutiger Sicht kann man meines Erachtens feststellen: Die bedeutenden konkurrierenden Theorien sind durchaus nicht inkommensurabel in einem Sinne, der zum Relativismus führen müsste. Anders ausgedrückt, es scheint in den Wissenschaften doch möglich zu sein, mit Verweis auf Beobachtungen zu argumentieren: Theorie T_2 wird durch die derzeit vorliegenden Beobachtungsergebnisse sehr gut bestätigt, T_1 wird durch dieselben Beobachtungen stark in Frage gestellt. Und dies ist es, was für R_2 auf der Ebene der (großen) Theorien nötig ist.

6. Ontologische Erkenntnis oder ontologischer Relativismus

Realisten sind oft der Auffassung, dass der Realismus nicht an eine bestimmte Ontologie gebunden ist, und dies ist grundsätzlich richtig (wenn man einmal von der Auffassung absieht, dass nur Geistiges existiert). Dennoch ist der Realismus nicht völlig unabhängig von ontologischen Fragen. Genauer, er benötigt die erkenntnistheoretische Voraussetzung, dass Ontologie als rationale Disziplin möglich ist, als eine Disziplin, die Erkenntnisse über die kategoriale Struktur der Welt zu gewinnen vermag. Anders ausgedrückt, R_2 benötigt die Annahme, dass es möglich ist, unter konkurrierenden ontologischen Theorien eine rationale Wahl zu treffen. Wenn dies nicht möglich sein sollte, dann könnte zwar R_1 verteidigt werden, doch müsste der Realismus dann in Bezug auf R_2 zugestehen, dass es in der Erkenntnis eine *Sprach-* oder *Theorieabhängigkeit* gibt, so wie dies die antirealistische Position behauptet.

Wenn wir im Alltag oder in der Wissenschaft die Welt bzw. Ausschnitte der Welt beschreiben, dann geschieht dies durch darstellende Aussagen, unter denen sich häufig die folgenden Formen finden: Fa, aRb, (x)Px. Solche Aussagen werden gewöhnlich nicht ausdrücklich mit einer bestimmten ontologischen Interpretation versehen. Die natürlichen Sprachen legen zwar bestimmte ontologische Annahmen nahe, z.B., dass es Einzeldinge und Eigenschaften gibt. Doch sind sie in dieser Hinsicht offen für nähere ontologische Interpretationen und lassen daher Fragen wie etwa die folgenden zu: Sind F und P als Universalien zu verstehen, als abstrakte Entitäten? Bilden Relationen wie R eine eigenständige ontologische Kategorie, oder sind sie auf Eigenschaften zurückführbar? Gehören Tatsachen, wie sie durch die genannten Aussagen behauptet werden, zu den Entitäten der Welt? Wie sollen allgemeine Aussagen ontologisch interpretiert werden?

Für den folgenden Gang der Argumentation möchte ich nun mit Nachdruck betonen, dass eine beschreibende Aussage wie „Fa“ je nach ontologischer Interpretation etwas anderes über die Wirklichkeit aussagt. Sie sagt zwar auch ohne nähere ontologische Interpretation etwas über die Wirklichkeit aus, eben dass a die Eigenschaft F besitzt. Aber sie lässt dann auch etwas über die Wirklichkeit offen, nämlich was die Natur eines individuellen Gegenstandes und die einer Eigenschaft ist. Und eine Welt, in der z.B. Eigenschaften Universalien sind, ist von einer Welt, in der nur existiert, was einen Ort in Raum und Zeit hat, vollkommen verschieden, so wie eine heliozentrische von einer geozentrischen Welt verschieden ist. Was darstellende Aussagen über die Wirklichkeit sagen, hängt also (auch) davon ab, wie man sie ontologisch deutet.

Nun gibt es die Auffassung, dass ontologische Fragen gar nicht beantwortet werden können, weil es keine Möglichkeit gibt, entsprechende Theorien mit rationalen Mitteln zu bewerten. Nehmen wir z.B. das angesprochene Universalienproblem. Ist es möglich, mit guten Argumenten zu zeigen, dass der Universalienrealismus dem Nominalismus überlegen ist? Armstrong (1989) hat entsprechende Argumente vorgebracht und zu demonstrieren versucht, dass der Universalienrealismus mehr Probleme zu lösen vermag, als die mit ihm konkurrierenden Theorien. Doch nicht alle teilen diese Auffassung, und es kann hier auch nicht weiter untersucht werden, wer in dieser Frage die besten Argumente hat. Was aber ergibt sich für den Realismus, wenn man die Position einnimmt, dass zwischen konkurrierenden ontologischen Behauptungen überhaupt nicht mit Argumenten entschieden werden kann und diese Behauptungen somit einer rationalen Diskussion nicht zugänglich sind?

Ein derartiger *ontologischer Relativismus* impliziert, dass Realitätserkenntnis eine Grenze hat und dass jenseits dieser Grenze nach nichtepistemischen Kriterien gewählt werden muss. Angenommen, wir akzeptieren aufgrund von Beobachtungen die Aussage „Fa“ und haben damit ein Stück Erkenntnis über die Wirklichkeit gewonnen. „Fa“ sagt uns, dass a die Eigenschaft F hat. Aber „Fa“ kann uns nicht sagen, ob a mit dem Universale F verbunden ist. Wir können zwar diese zusätzliche ontologische Interpretation vornehmen, können jedoch, falls der ontologische Relativismus Recht hat, nicht mit rationalen Mitteln herauszufinden, ob diese Interpretation der Wirklichkeit entspricht. Entsprechendes gilt für alle ontologischen Fragen. Die natürlichen Sprachen und auch die Sprachen der Wissenschaften legen gewisse ontologische Annahmen nahe, und man kann diese durch explizite ontologische Annahmen ergänzen. Deren Wahl muss dann aber nach anderen als epistemischen Kriterien getroffen werden, z.B. nach ästhetischen oder ökonomischen.

Wenn dies alles richtig sein sollte, dann wäre Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit tatsächlich *sprach*- oder *theorieabhängig*: Die Resultate der Erkenntnisbemühungen sind dann in einer Sprache abgefasst, die mit gewissen impliziten oder expliziten ontologischen Annahmen verbunden ist, deren Akzeptanz jedoch keine Frage der Erkenntnis, sondern einer Wahl nach nichtepistemischen Kriterien ist. So können wir etwa bei einer Sprache bleiben, die suggeriert, dass es in der Welt Einzeldinge, Eigenschaften und Tatsachen gibt, und wir bleiben deshalb bei dieser Deutung, weil es ohnehin keine ausreichenden Gründe für eine andere ontologische Theorie gibt und es im Übrigen sehr mühsam wäre, sich an neue ontologische Sichtweisen zu gewöhnen, nach denen es z.B. keine festen Dinge, sondern nur Ereignisse und Prozesse gibt.

Ein ontologischer Relativismus hätte für den Realismus noch eine andere unangenehme Konsequenz. Aus realistischer Sicht können darstellende Aussagen auf die Wirklichkeit zutreffen bzw. ihr *korrespondieren*. Aber was bedeutet dies genau? *Was* in den Aussagen „Fa“ oder „aRb“ korrespondiert welchem Bestandteil der Wirklichkeit? Unter gewissen idealen Voraussetzungen lässt sich die Idee der Korrespondenz klären, etwa so, wie es Russell getan hat und Wittgenstein im Tractatus aufgegriffen und weiterentwickelt (jedoch später wieder verworfen) hat. Nehmen wir an, dass die Realität eine bestimmte kategoriale Struktur besitzt und unsere Sprache diese exakt widerspiegelt. Sagen wir vereinfacht, dass die Realität aus vielen Einzeldingen besteht, denen Eigenschaften zukommen und zwischen denen Relationen bestehen. Wenn wir dann eine Sprache benutzen, in der es Namen zur Bezeichnung von Einzeldingen sowie Wörter für Eigenschaften und Relationen gibt, dann ist klar, unter welcher Bedingung deskriptive Aussagen wie „Fa“ oder „aRb“ der Realität korrespondieren, nämlich wenn der durch a bezeichnete Gegenstand tatsächlich die Eigenschaft F besitzt bzw. wenn zwischen a und b tatsächlich die Relation R besteht.

Aber angenommen, wir kennen die kategoriale Struktur der unabhängigen Wirklichkeit nicht und müssen sie daher offen lassen (obgleich wir mit R_1 annehmen, dass es irgendeine gibt). Wie soll man sich dann Korrespondenz vorstellen? Sie wird zu einer unklaren Angelegenheit. Sind z.B. nur die Ausdrücke „a“ und „b“ jeweils einer Entität zugeordnet, oder sind es auch „F“ und „R“? Gibt es Entitäten, denen die ganzen Aussagen „Fa“ oder „aRb“ zugeordnet sind? Ohne Antworten auf diese Fragen ist nicht klar, was Korrespondenz in diesem Zusammenhang bedeutet. Aus der Sicht eines ontologischen Relativismus ist die Frage, welcher Entität eine akzeptierte darstellende Aussage korrespondiert, prinzipiell nicht zu klären, da die kategoriale Struktur der Welt nicht erkennbar ist.

Was folgt daraus für den Realismus? Es ergibt sich eine Alternative. Entweder ist es möglich, ontologische Fragen so zu beantworten, dass bestimmte Antworten als rational gerechtfertigt gelten können. In der Regel wird die Rechtfertigung in dem Nachweis bestehen, dass von konkurrierenden Theorien eine bestimmte durch die verfügbaren Argumente am besten gestützt wird. Eine solche Argumentation kann auf rein philosophischer Analyse beruhen. Es ist auch denkbar, dass ontologische Theorien in Verbindung mit wissenschaftlichen Theorien geprüft und beurteilt werden. Wenn dies möglich sein sollte, dann stehen die Aussichten gut, R_2 verteidigen zu können.

Sollte sich dagegen auf längere Sicht der ontologische Relativismus als die plausiblere Position erweisen, dann sieht die Situation für den Realismus anders aus. In diesem Fall kann zwar weiterhin an R_1 festgehalten werden. Für R_2 ergibt sich dagegen eine schwierige Situation. Auf der einen Seite erscheint es plausibel, dass Aussagen über die Welt, die sich empirisch in hohem Maß bewährt haben, zu gewissen Ausschnitten dieser Welt in einem Verhältnis der „Entsprechung" oder „Übereinstimmung" stehen. Sobald man jedoch versucht, das Verhältnis der Entsprechung oder Übereinstimmung exakt zu fassen, stellen sich die ontologischen Fragen, die aus relativistischer Sicht keine Angelegenheit der Erkenntnis sein können.

Nun bin ich in dieser Hinsicht optimistisch und meine, dass ontologische Forschung, wie sie von vielen betrieben wird, wirklich Fortschritte auf dem Weg erzielt, bestimmte Lösungsvorschläge mit Argumenten zu rechtfertigen (vgl. z.B. Grossmann 1983, Armstrong 1989, Tegtmeier 1992. Dies im Einzelnen zu belegen, kann freilich hier nicht geleistet werden. Zielsetzung dieses Artikels war es, eine Menge an erkenntnistheoretischen bzw. methodologischen Voraussetzungen zu erarbeiten, die der Realismus benötigt, um nicht nur die bloße Annahme einer geistunabhängigen Wirklichkeit, sondern darüber hinaus den Anspruch auf ihre Erkennbarkeit zu begründen.

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Und Gott war das Wort: Wittgensteins niedrige Absichten

Esther Ramharter, Wien

0) Aufriss des Problems

Wittgenstein insistiert auf einer niedrigen Verwendung von Wörtern:

> Während doch die Worte ‚Sprache', ‚Erfahrung', ‚Welt', wenn sie eine Verwendung haben, eine so niedrige Verwendung haben, wie die Worte ‚Tisch', ‚Lampe', ‚Tür'. (PU § 97)

Dieser egalisierenden Wendung scheint jedoch folgende Stelle entgegenzustehen:

> Das Leben kann zum Glauben an Gott erziehen […] – das Leben kann uns diesen Begriff aufzwingen. Er ist dann etwa ähnlich dem Begriff ‚Gegenstand'. (VB, S. 571)

Es würde uns verwundern, wenn hier statt „Gegenstand" etwa „Lampe" stünde (etwas weniger vielleicht „Licht"). Nimmt Wittgenstein also doch eine in irgendeinem Sinn höhere Verwendung eines Begriffs in Anspruch? Man könnte diesem Problem mit dem Hinweis zu entgehen versuchen, dass sich auch das erste Zitat nicht gegen „höhere Wörter", sondern nur gegen „höhere Verwendungen" richtet. Was kennzeichnet aber ein „höheres Wort", wenn nicht die Verwendung?

Der Begriff „Wort", den Wittgenstein in Zusammenhängen wie PU § 97 öfters gebraucht, wäre auch hier, als Alternative zu „Gegenstand", ein naheliegender Kandidat – hat es eine Bedeutung, dass Wittgenstein stattdessen „Gegenstand" wählt?[1]

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[1] Weinberg (1994, 74) bezieht sich auch auf diese Stelle, stellt aber – für seine Zwecke gerechtfertigt –„Gegenstand" unterschiedslos in eine Reihe mit Wörtern wie „thoughts" und „sensations".

1) Der Kontext der zweiten Stelle (VB, S. 571)

Die Notiz aus dem Jahr 1950, aus der die Stelle stammt, lautet vollständig wiedergegeben:

> Ein Gottesbeweis sollte eigentlich etwas sein, wodurch man sich von der Existenz Gottes überzeugen kann. Aber ich denke mir, daß die *Gläubigen* die solche Beweise lieferten, ihren ‚Glauben' mit ihrem Verstand analysieren und begründen wollten, obgleich sie selbst durch solche Beweise nie zum Glauben gekommen wären.[2] Einen von der ‚Existenz Gottes überzeugen' könnte man vielleicht durch eine Art Erziehung, dadurch, daß man sein Leben so und so gestaltet.
> Das Leben kann zum ‚Glauben an Gott' erziehen. Und es sind auch *Erfahrungen*, die dies tun; aber nicht Visionen, oder sonstige Sinneserfahrungen, die uns die ‚Existenz dieses Wesens' zeigen, sondern z.B. Leiden verschiedener Art. Und sie zeigen uns Gott nicht wie ein Sinneseindruck einen Gegenstand, noch lassen sie ihn *vermuten*. Erfahrungen, Gedanken, – das Leben kann uns diesen Begriff aufzwingen.
> Er ist dann etwa ähnlich dem Begriff „Gegenstand". (VB, S. 571)

Ein Hinweis aus demselben Jahr auf Karl Barth (VB, S. 571) macht deutlich, dass Wittgenstein sich zu dieser Zeit zumindest ein wenig mit Gottesbeweisen beschäftigt hat (auch in den Jahren davor gibt es einige Notizen dazu). Ich behaupte keineswegs, dass Wittgenstein sich eingehender mit einem der „Klassiker" unter den Gottesbeweisen auseinandergesetzt hat, dennoch möchte ich etwas weiter ausholen und einige Bemerkungen zu Anselms Gottesbeweis machen, die, so scheint mir, Wittgensteins Überlegung in ein interessantes Licht rücken. Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass es Motivlagen gibt, die Wittgenstein in der Wahl des Wortes „Gegenstand" bestimmt haben könnten[3] und die jenen, die Anselm von Canterbury „id quo maius cogitari non potest" konzipieren haben lassen, sehr ähnlich sind.

Anselms Ontologisches Argument ist jenen von Descartes, Leibniz, etc. vom logischen Standpunkt[4] überlegen, weil „id quo maius cogitari non

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[2] Wittgenstein scheint sich hier Karl Barth in einem eher kontroversen Punkt (vgl. Flasch 1989, 23) anzuschließen, nämlich darin, dass die Erfinder von Gottesbeweisen mit ihren Beweisen nicht überzeugen wollten.

[3] Ein Motiv, das man für etwas hat, muss natürlich keineswegs eine Grundlage einer bewussten Entscheidung sein.

[4] Das bedeutet nicht: hinsichtlich der Überzeugungskraft.

potest“ – wegen der Neutralität des „maius“ – diejenigen Zuschreibungen, die größer machen, im Unterschied zu den „perfectiones“ nicht inhaltlich einschränkt. Größer wird ein Ding für Anselm dadurch, dass ihm eine Eigenschaft mehr zukommt.[5] „Eigenschaft“ ist ein logischer Begriff, „Perfektion“ nicht (sondern ein metaphysischer). Die folgende formale Darstellung kann sowohl als eine Formalisierung eines Arguments im Sinne Descartes’ oder Leibniz’ angesehen werden als auch als eine inadäquate Rekonstruktion des Anselmschen Beweises selbst. Die Relevanz der Unterscheidung zwischen rein logischen und metaphysisch-inhaltlichen Begriffen lässt sich daran jedenfalls gut verdeutlichen. Zunächst in Anselmscher Terminologie:

Es soll gezeigt werden:

Rg	Gott existiert in Wirklichkeit.[6]

Rekonstruktion mittels Prädikatenlogik 1. Stufe

Die Prämissen lauten:

$\neg\exists xGxg$	Es gibt nichts, das größer als Gott ist.
$\forall x(\neg Rx \rightarrow \exists yGyx)$	Zu allem, was nicht wirklich ist, gibt es etwas Größeres.

Dieses Argument überzeugt nicht, weil (die Variable) G eine inhaltlich (beliebig) bestimmbare Eigenschaft wie R auch ist. Es gibt daher keinen *logischen* Zusammenhang zwischen „größer sein“ und „real existieren“. In dieser Formulierung muss also (in der zweiten Prämisse) das implizit vorausgesetzt werden, woraus eigentlich die Überzeugungskraft des Beweises kommen sollte. Wenn Descartes sagt, „[E]s steht mir nicht frei, Gott ohne Dasein – d.h. das vollkommenste Wesen ohne höchste Vollkommenheit – zu denken.“ (Descartes Meditationen, 5. Meditation, S. 60), dann kann man

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[5] Er verwendet „Existenz in Realität“ als Eigenschaft, und er gibt keine weitere Einschränkung für das, was größer macht, an.

[6] Die Debatte über „Existenz“ und „notwendige Existenz“ werde ich hier nicht behandeln. Den Standpunkt von Phillips 1963 und Phillips 1990 finde ich sich sehr berücksichtigenswert. Dort werden auch die Beiträge von Malcolm, Findlay, etc. miteinbezogen.

dafür (wenn man das Argument als indirekten Beweis führt), die obige Formalisierung übernehmen, wobei G für „vollkommener“ steht. Dass aber „Existenz“ eine „Vollkommenheit“ ausmacht (daher aus Nicht-Existenz Nicht-Vollkommenheit folgt), ist eben eine inhaltliche Aussage, und keine logische Konsequenz; wenn man dagegen „Existenz“ als Prädikat auffasst, dann ist das Zutreffen dieses Prädikats auf ein Wesen „über das nichts Größeres“ gedacht werden kann, eine logische Folge, das zeigt die folgende Rekonstruktion:

Rekonstruktion mittels Prädikatenlogik 2. Stufe

$Mx{:=}\ \neg\exists F(\neg Fx)$ „worüber nichts Größeres gedacht werden kann“ wird definiert

Mg Diese Eigenschaft (2.Stufe) wird Gott zugesprochen. (Es gibt nichts/keine Eigenschaft, das/die Gott fehlt.)

Daraus Rg zu folgern, ist trivial, aber funktioniert.[7]

Der Beweis funktioniert gerade deswegen, weil einerseits zunächst keine verschieden „hohen“ Begriffe verwendet werden – wir sprechen über Dinge und über Gott, ob sie existieren, ebenso wie, ob sie blau sind oder wohlschmeckend –, andererseits aber das „maius“ einen besonderen Stellenwert – eine spezielle Art eines „hohen“ Gebrauchs – dadurch erhält, dass es als etwas Übergeordnetes Besonderes leistet, nämlich Existenz als logische Konsequenz liefert.

„Worüber es nichts Größeres gibt“ ist (1) nicht selbst eine Eigenschaft wie ein Sinneseindruck, aber (2) durch solche Eigenschaften, die wir sonst zur Charakterisierung von (wahrnehmbaren) Dingen verwenden, *definierbar* und verwendet (3) alle diese Eigenschaften unterschiedslos, wählt also keine inhaltlich aus (im Unterschied zur zweiten Prämisse in der ersten Rekonstruktion). Schon vor einem eingehenden Vergleich beginnt man hier eine Verwandtschaft mit Wittgensteins „Gegenstand“ zu ahnen.

[7] Und es ist die *einzige* Weise, wie man „maius“ und „Existenz in Wirklichkeit“ im Rahmen einer der üblichen Logiken so fassen kann, dass die gewünschte Folgerung aus *rein logischen* Gründen – ohne zusätzliches Postulat – gelingt.

2) Der Kontext der ersten Stelle (PU § 97)

In Bezug auf die erste Stelle gilt es einige begriffliche Klarstellungen zu dem Wortfeld um „niedrig", „tief", „hoch", etc. vorzunehmen.[8]

> Wittgenstein mokiert sich über die Neigung der Philosophen, für die Wörter, die sie gebrauchen, eine außerordentliche, reine und erhabene Bedeutung in Anspruch zu nehmen. Aber ist es, auf der anderen Seite, selbstverständlich, dass das Wort „Tisch" ausschließlich eine niedrige Verwendung hat? Gewiß hat es nicht nur eine einzige Verwendung, denn so mancher geht zum Tisch des Herrn, um das Heilige Abendmahl stehend einzunehmen – weil kein Tisch da ist. Und an einem sonnigen September haben zwei Kontrahenten in einer schwierigen Verhandlung ihre Karten ganz offen auf den Tisch gelegt, während sie im Stadtpark umherschlenderten. Wird in diesen Fällen das Wort „Tisch" nicht auf eine überhöhte Weise verwendet? Sind das schon erste Anzeichen philosophischer Infektion? (Heinrich 2003, S. 114)

Natürlich gibt es Wörter mit verschieden „hoher" Bedeutung (wobei dieses „hoch" auch in einem höheren Sinn verwendet wird, also nicht im Sinne einer Längenangabe): Es gibt Wörter einerseits für Heiliges, Profanes, Vulgäres, Erhabenes, Niederträchtiges und Edles. Ein Tisch etwa wird geweiht und erhält dadurch eine „höhere" Bedeutung.

> Nun ist aber der Vorgang, in dem sich solch eine Redeweise einbürgert, von außen gesehen ein ziemlich gewöhnlicher Vorgang, nicht grundsätzlich verschieden von jenem, in dem sich irgendeine gewöhnliche, (im überhöhten Sinn) niedrige Verwendung des Wortes „Tisch" eingebürgert hat […]. (Heinrich 2003, S.114f)

Egal, wie „hoch" Begriffe in ihrer Bedeutung oder Verwendung sind, wie wir sie gebrauchen, lernen wir immer auf die gleiche „niedrige" Weise.[9]

Werfen wir jetzt einen Blick auf die Stelle, um die es bei meinem Vergleich geht:

> Das Denken ist mit einem Nimbus umgeben. – Sein Wesen, die Logik, stellt eine Ordnung dar, und zwar die Ordnung a priori der Welt, d.i. die Ordnung der *Möglichkeiten*, die Welt und Denken gemeinsam sein muß. Diese Ordnung aber, scheint es, muß *höchst einfach* sein. Sie ist vor aller Erfahrung; muß sich durch die ganze Erfahrung hindurchziehen; ihr selbst darf keine erfahrungs-

[8] Zum „Höheren" im *Tractatus* siehe Donatelli 2005.

[9] Insbesondere lernen wir auch das „maius", das Prädikat zweiter Stufe im Gottesbeweis, wie jedes andere Zeichen zu verwenden.

> mäßige Trübe oder Unsicherheit anhaften. – Sie muß vielmehr vom reinsten Kristall sein. Dieser Kristall aber erscheint nicht als eine Abstraktion, sondern als etwas Konkretes, ja als das Konkreteste, *gleichsam Härteste*. (Log. Phil. Abh. No. 5.5563.)
> Wir sind in der Täuschung, das Besondere, Tiefe, das uns Wesentliche unserer Untersuchung liege darin, daß sie das unvergleichliche Wesen der Sprache zu begreifen trachtet. D.i., die Ordnung, die zwischen den Begriffen des Satzes, Wortes, Schließens, der Wahrheit, der Erfahrung, u.s.w. besteht. Diese Ordnung ist eine *Über*-Ordnung zwischen – sozusagen – *Über*-Begriffen. Während doch die Worte „Sprache", „Erfahrung", „Welt", wenn sie eine Verwendung haben, eine so niedrige haben müssen, wie die Worte „Tisch", „Lampe", „Tür". (PU §97)

Wenn wir etwas Tiefe oder Höhe zusprechen, besagt das schlicht, dass wir es wichtig nehmen.[10] „Nimbus" besagt, dass wir es *zu* wichtig nehmen. Diese Feststellung ändert aber nichts daran, dass es diesen Stellenwert eben *hat*. Zum Feuer etwa merkt Wittgenstein an:

> Nichts spricht dafür, warum das Feuer mit solchem Nimbus umgeben sein sollte. Und, wie seltsam, was heißt es eigentlich „es schien vom Himmel gekommen zu sein"? von welchem Himmel. Nein, es ist gar nicht selbstverständlich, daß das Feuer so betrachtet wird; aber es wird eben so betrachtet. (BEE, Item 143, S. 10)

Wittgenstein spricht im darauf folgenden Absatz auch von Tiefe, und meint, dass man etwa im Fall von Siegfried und Brunhilde im neueren Nibelungenlied sieht, dass diese vom Zusammenhang mit dem Verbrennen eines Menschen herrührt.

3) Die niedrige Ebene und der gehandhabte Nimbus

Wittgensteins „Gegenstand" bezieht ebenso wie Anselms „quo maius cogitari non potest" seine Bedeutung aus Eigenschaften (zur Erklärung, was „Gegenstand" heißt, müssten wir Beschreibungen heranziehen, es würde nichts fruchten, auf Dinge zu zeigen), und zwar aus als unterschiedslos behandelten Eigenschaften (Gegenstand zu sein schließt a priori keine Eigenschaft – eines Erfahrungsdinges – aus), findet aber auf Individuen Anwen-

[10] Missdeutungen unserer Sprachformen sind so tief, wie uns unsere Sprache wichtig ist, ebenso Witze (PU §111).

dung[11] – im Unterschied zu „Wort“ etwa. Das ist die Basis dafür, dass Anselms Argument logisch funktioniert. Dafür, dass auch Wittgenstein in diese Richtung gedacht haben könnte, lassen sich freilich nur Indizien nennen.

> Das Wesen Gottes verbürge seine Existenz d.h. eigentlich, daß es sich hier um eine Existenz nicht handelt.
>
> Könnte man denn nicht auch sagen, das Wesen der Farbe verbürge ihre Existenz? Im Gegensatz etwa zum weißen Elephanten. Denn es heißt ja nur: Ich kann nicht erklären, was ‚Farbe’ ist, was das Wort „Farbe“ bedeutet, außer an Hand der Farbmuster. Es gibt also hier nicht ein Erklären, ‚wie es wäre, wenn es Farben gäbe’.
>
> Und man könnte nun sagen: Es läßt sich beschreiben, wie es wäre, wenn es Götter auf dem Olymp gäbe aber nicht: ‚wie es wäre, wenn es Gott gäbe’. Und damit wird der Begriff ‚Gott’ näher bestimmt. (VB, S. 566)

Dieses Beispiel zeigt,[12] dass Wittgenstein auch damit ringt, was aus einem Begriff Gottes folgen kann. Die Stelle aus den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*, in der er das Wort „Gegenstand“ wählt, formuliert er wenig später.

Neben dieser Motivation von der Funktion(sweise) her, lassen sich aber auch noch andere Vorzüge des Begriffs „Gegenstand“ gegenüber den nahe liegenden Alternativen angeben: „Gegenstand“ ist

(1) kein religiöser Begriff, in diesem Sinn kein „höherer“ Begriff und nicht mit einem Nimbus umgeben[13]
(2) ein Metabegriff (nicht nur in formaler Hinsicht, sondern auch als Entsprechung der Idee, dass Gott mit den Dingen etwas zu tun haben muss, aber doch ohne eines von ihnen zu sein[14])

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[11] Wittgenstein verwendet, insbesondere zu der Zeit, in der diese Bemerkungen entstanden sind, bis auf wenige Ausnahmen „Gegenstand“ im Sinn von „Erfahrungsgegenstand“, nicht in irgendeiner weiteren Bedeutung wie „Thema“ etwa.

[12] Interessant wäre hier auch eine Untersuchung der Rolle des monotheistischen Gottesbilds für derlei Überlegungen. Offenkundig funktioniert der Terminus „Gott“ nicht nur in politisch-praktischen Kontexten (vgl. die Arbeiten von Jan Assmann), sondern auch im Zusammenhang mit Gottesbeweisen im Monotheismus grundsätzlich anders als bezogen auf viele Götter. Man kann sich etwa kaum vorstellen, dass es für jeden Gott einen spezifischen Gottesbeweis gibt.

[13] Jedenfalls nicht in diesem Kontext – beim Nachdenken über Sprache wäre das möglicherweise anders.

(3) kein rein sprachlicher Begriff (wie etwa „Wort“) – in dieser Hinsicht nimmt Wittgenstein die Religion ernst: Im Anfang war nicht das Wort, sondern – für uns – die Dinge des Lebens/das Leben.
(4) ein Begriff, dessen Gebrauch wir in diesem Zusammenhang als nicht metaphorisch bezeichnen würden, als nicht „höher“ in dem Sinn[15], der in der Darstellung von Heinrich thematisiert ist. Wittgenstein verwendet z.B. nicht Licht oder Leuchte; er hätte eine der viel konkreteren Metaphern der Bibel verwenden können (für eine sprachanalytische Studie dieser Metaphern siehe Hartl 2008).

Diese Punkte treffen sämtlich auch auf Anselms Konzeption „id quo maius cogitari non potest“ zu. Auch Anselm hält (1) durch die Verwendung des neutralen „maius“ mit einem Nimbus oder Tiefe versehene Begriffe wie Güte, Allmacht, etc. in seinem Gottesbeweis noch fern. Anselms „quo maius cogitari non potest“ kommt (2) wie „Gegenstand“ nicht durch (konkrete) sinnlich wahrnehmbare Dinge zu seiner Bedeutung, sondern durch sämtliche irgendwelche Dinge bestimmenden Eigenschaften. Es ist sinnlos, jemand einen Gegenstand hin zu halten und – in der Absicht ihm über diesen Gegenstand etwas mitzuteilen – zu sagen: „Das ist ein Gegenstand“ (in der Hinsicht, in der es auch sinnlos ist zu sagen, „dieser Stab hat eine Länge“ (vgl. PU §251)). Ob etwas ein Gegenstand ist, stellen wir nicht fest, indem wir hingreifen oder ihn anschauen, aber dennoch ist „Gegenstand“ auf (Sinnen-)Dinge anwendbar, also kein auf Sprache allein bezogener Begriff – genau wie „quo maius cogitari potest“[16] (3). Mit einem metaphorischen Begriff schließlich hat man es (4) bei Anselm auch nicht zu tun.

Wittgensteins Beschäftigung mit Ontologischen Argumenten ist, wenn auch in ihrem Ausmaß unklar, als Tatsache doch unumstritten. Dass

[14] Vergleiche dazu Phillips 1990, 12.

[15] Auch dem metaphorischen Gebrauch stellt Wittgenstein den niedrigen Gebrauch eines „Damit-Leben“ gegenüber: „Wenn Faust sagt ‚Wer darf ihn nennen, wer ihn bekennen, etc.‘, so könnte man ihn fragen: Gebrauchst Du hier nur ein poetisches Gleichnis, oder drängt sich Dir dieser Begriff auf, und lebst Du mit ihm?“ (BEE, Item 174, 1v)

[16] Ein Unterschied besteht allerdings darin, dass Gegenstand zu sein auf alle Dinge zutrifft, „quo maius cogitari non potest“ allerdings – in Anselms Vorstellung – nur auf Eines.

umgekehrt auch Anselm Überlegungen der Art, wie sie später Wittgenstein anstellt, keineswegs fremd sind, erkennt man bei Beschäftigung mit der Tradition, die Anselm prägt: einer Tradition des Rationalisierens des Glaubens, die sich auf die Grammatik konzentriert und auf einem niedrigen Gebrauch von Wörtern besteht. In der Auseinandersetzung seines Lehrers Lanfrank mit Berengar von Tours steht Anselm auf der Seite Berengars (siehe Flasch 1989, S. 42). Dieser argumentiert im Streit um die Transsubstantiationslehre[17], dass diese wider die Grammatik wäre. Berengar insistiert darauf, dass das Brot Brot bleiben muss, auch oder gerade wenn es Leib Christi sein soll,[18] weil sonst die Grammatik Widersprüche hervorbringt.

> [Die biblische Satzwahrheit] muss nach den Regeln der *significatio* ausgelegt werden, die in der Grammatik gelten. Danach sind die angestammten Satzteile in der Lage einen anderen zusätzlichen und höheren Sinn zu erhalten, ohne ihre Grundbedeutung zu verlieren […]; etwas anderes ist es, daß sie Brot und Wein sind, und etwas anderes, daß sie der Leib und das Blut des Herrn sind […]. (Hödl 1990, S. 74f)

Das sachgebundene, „niedrige“ Denken gewährleistet, dass Bedeutungen und Wörter sich nicht verselbständigen. Dieses selbe Denken ist es auch, auf das sich Anselm in seinem Gottesbeweis und seinem Disput mit Gaunilo immer beruft. Etwa ist der Gottesbegriff für ihn nicht a priori gegeben (vgl. Flasch 1989, S. 17). Nirgendwo fordert Anselm für die Erkenntnis Gottes irgendeine Art besonderen Vermögens.

Was Anselm das Denken ist, ist Wittgenstein die Sprache. Wittgenstein sagt, das Leben zwingt uns den Begriff „Gott“ auf.

> Wie wird uns das Wort ‚Gott’ beigebracht (d.h. sein Gebrauch)? Ich kann davon keine ausführliche systematische Beschreibung geben. Aber ich kann sozusagen Beiträge zu der Beschreibung machen; ich kann darüber manches sagen und vielleicht mit der Zeit eine Art Beispielsammlung anlegen. (VB, S.567)

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[17] Wie aus einigen wenigen harmlosen Worten ein die Kirchengeschichten prägender Streit entstehen konnte, sieht man sehr gut in Macy 1999.

[18] Die Verbindung zwischen den beiden Sorten „niedrigen Gebrauchs“ besteht in „primitiven“ Praktiken. Das Wort „Brot“ lernen wir beim Essen.

Man kann wohl nicht behaupten, dass Wittgenstein hier eine neuartige[19] Erklärung zum Gebrauch von Wörtern geben würde, bemerkenswert ist viel mehr, dass er *dieselbe* Erklärung gibt wie sonst: auch „Gott“ lernen wir „niedrig“ gebrauchen, in gewöhnlichen Vorgängen, anhand von Beispielen. Nichts unterscheidet diesbezüglich (wie etwa auch beim „Tisch des Herrn“ in Heinrichs Beispiel) den Begriff „Gott“ von irgendeinem anderen Begriff. Auch Anselm besteht darauf, dass sein „(id) quo maius cogitari non potest“ auf der niedrigen Ebene bleibt. Anselm und Wittgenstein aber haben verschiedene Gegner: Anselm muss Gott davor bewahren, nur jenseits des Rational-Erkennbaren zu sein (ob Anselm hier Gott vor Anderen oder vor Anselm schützen muss, wird gestritten), Wittgenstein muss den Nimbus abwehren, der Gott ungerechtfertigt erhöhen könnte, und er erinnert daran, dass wir das Wort „Gott“ lernen wie alle anderen Wörter – „niedrig“.

[19] Im Vergleich zu seinen früheren Erklärungen

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Objective Interpretation and the Metaphysics of Meaning

Maria E. Reicher, Aachen

1. Introduction

The term "interpretation" is used in a variety of senses. To start with, I would like to exclude some of them from the scope of this paper. First, in some sense, *everything* can be interpreted, including *natural phenomena*. One may interpret natural phenomena as signs or symptoms of something that *causes* them. Thus, a physician may interpret the turning yellow of a patient's skin as a sign of hepatitis; a physicist may interpret traces on photosensitive material as signs of physical particles that have not been directly observed. I shall not deal with this sort of interpretation in this paper. Rather, I shall confine myself to the interpretation of *artifacts*, that is, to the interpretation of objects that owe their existence to human actions. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity and brevity, I shall further confine myself to artifacts of a particular sort, namely to *texts*. A text (as the term is used here) is a sequence of linguistic signs.

Second, we often talk about "interpretations" of musical works. In this context, "interpretation" usually means "the way in which a piece of music is *performed*". One may also talk about the interpretation of texts in this sense. Then, "interpretation" means "the way in which a text is read (or recited)" – by an actor, for instance. I shall leave aside this sort of interpretation as well.

Third, "interpretation of a text" sometimes means "description of the text's structure", especially description of rhyme schemes, metres and so on. Again, this sort of interpretation does not fall within the scope of this paper.

To put it positively, this paper concerns the interpretation of texts, where interpretation is understood, first, as an activity that aims at an *understanding* (or, perhaps, *better* understanding) of the interpreted object, and, second, as the interpretive claims (or hypotheses) which are the results of this activity. The term "interpretation" will be used here both for the activity and its results (the interpretive claims or hypotheses).

Three closely interrelated questions concerning the interpretation of texts shall be explored:

1. What does it mean to interpret a text in the first place?
2. Can interpretations be right or wrong? In other words, can interpretive claims be true or false?
3. Is there such a thing as an objective meaning of texts (i.e., a meaning that exists independently of interpretations)?

2. What Does It Mean to Interpret a Text?

As already noted, the aim of interpretation is an understanding (or better understanding) of the interpreted text. But what exactly does it mean to understand a text? A way to approach this question is to pose a further question, namely: *Which question or questions do we try to answer if we seek to understand a text?* As a matter of fact, there are various questions people try to answer in the course of an interpretation:

1. What is the text *supposed* to mean? Which meaning did the author intend?
2. What *could* the text mean?
3. What does the text mean *to me*? What do I associate with it?
4. What does the text *really mean*? (See Stecker 2003.)

At the centre of all these questions is the concept of meaning. Interpretations aim either at *intended meanings, possible meanings, subjective meanings* or *objective meanings*.[1]

[1] This is not to deny that there may be other aims of interpretation as well, e.g., "edification, which includes consolation or self-realization" (Krausz 2003, 21). However, the aim to draw some sort of satisfaction from an interpretation is not in opposition to the aim of elucidating a text's meaning. Rather, the latter presupposes the former, in the sense that in order to reach the aim of edification through the interpretation of a text, one has to make sense of the text in one way or another. Thus, the aim of edification is a "higher-level aim", based on interpretation in the sense of seeking to understand a text.

Often, one and the same process of interpretation aims at more than one of these questions. It may be, for instance, that the ultimate goal of the interpretive process is to find an answer to the fourth question ("What *does* the text mean?"), but that one approaches this question via one or more of the other questions. Perhaps one starts with asking "What could that mean?" or "What is it supposed to mean?" in order to find out what it really means.

However, it may also be the case that one is not at all interested in the question of what the text really means, but only in the question of what the text is *intended* to mean or what it *could* mean or what it means *to oneself*. The last two questions seem to play a particularly important role in the interpretation of art. Often, people declare that in reading a poem they are not at all interested in the question of what the author wanted to express or what its real meaning is, but only in what it *tells them*, which associations it raises with them, etc. – in short, in its subjective meaning.

This interest in a text's possible meanings or its subjective meaning is, of course, legitimate. It is one of the functions of artworks to provide aesthetic pleasure as well as new, interesting perspectives on reality. In order for an artwork to fulfil these functions, one does not necessarily have to know what its real or intended meaning is. There may even be cases where the search for a text's objective meaning hinders more than it promotes the attainment of aesthetic pleasure or a new, interesting perspective on reality.

As a matter of fact, however, people sometimes also search for a text's intended and even for its objective meaning. The search for a text's objective meaning is what I call *objective interpretation*.

3. Can Interpretations Be Right or Wrong?

Some hold that the categories of truth and falsehood cannot be meaningfully applied to interpretive claims and hypotheses. Defenders of this thesis claim that a text never has a meaning independently of an interpreting subject. Rather, the story goes, a text *gains* its meaning only through interpretive processes (see, e.g., Fish 1980, Shusterman 1992). For convenience, I call this view "meaning subjectivism".

Obviously, the subjectivist view is directed primarily against objective interpretations, i.e., interpretive claims that are supposed to ascribe objective meaning to a text. Given that truth is correspondence, an objective interpretive claim would be true if, and only if, the text in question has the respective objective meaning. Thus, if there are no objective meanings at all, there can be no true objective interpretations.

A subjectivist does not have to deny that a text has such a thing as an intended meaning, although she is likely to deny that the intended meaning has any relevance – at least as far as literary texts are concerned. The subjectivist claims that the intended meaning is something wholly external to the text – just as are other contingent circumstances of its genesis, like the author's dwellings, social relations or the weather. Of course, one may investigate authorial intentions – just as one may investigate other external circumstances of a text's genesis; but whatever we may find out in the course of such an investigation, it will not bring us any closer to the text's objective meaning – for there is no such thing.

Interpretive statements can only be understood as *suggestions* as to how one *could* read a text, i.e., as pointing out some of the *possible* meanings of a text. (So the subjectivist's story goes).

Now, as a claim about what people *intend to convey* with their interpretive statements and hypotheses, this is clearly wrong. Admittedly, sometimes such sentences as "This text is a parody" may be meant as mere suggestions (for the text in question to be read as a parody); but sometimes they are clearly meant as ascriptions of a property (in this case, being a parody) to a given text, i.e., as something that can be true.[2]

But perhaps this claim to truth is ungrounded. Whether it is or not obviously depends on a metaphysical question, namely the question of whether texts have objective meanings.[3]

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[2] For an analysis of the case of parody see Hermerén 2003. Hermerén grounds his objectivism to a large extent on cases like parody and irony.

[3] This does not rule out that there are conceptions of *rightness* of an interpretation according to which claims to rightness may be grounded even if texts do not have objective meanings. This is the case, for instance, if rightness is interpreted not in terms of truth but in terms of consistency, hermeneutical fruitfulness, plausibility, etc.

4. Is There Such a Thing as an Objective Meaning of Texts?

The subjectivist view is not necessarily inconsistent. However, it is in conflict with a number of well-entrenched conceptions and practices. As mentioned at the outset, I use the term "text" here as a synonym for "sequence of linguistic signs". This should be sufficiently general and vague to be quite uncontroversial.

But what is a linguistic sign? The classical view, going back to Ferdinand de Saussure, is that a linguistic sign consists of two components, namely a certain shape and a certain meaning (that is, a mental concept), where the connection between the two is (mostly) conventional, but nevertheless fairly stable. In what follows, I call this "the standard sense" of "linguistic sign".

Now, obviously, a meaning subjectivist cannot consistently admit that there are linguistic signs in this sense. For the meaning of a linguistic sign, in the standard sense, is objective meaning. It certainly does not depend on a particular interpretive act. According to the standard view of linguistic signs, as soon as a certain shape is connected with a certain meaning within a particular language, there is a sign that consists of exactly this shape and exactly this meaning, independently of whether anybody uses it in the appropriate way at a given moment. Of course, it is possible that a sign loses its meaning (that the connection between shape and meaning gets dissolved), but this takes much more than a particular interpretive act.

If single linguistic signs had objective meaning, texts would also have objective meaning. This is, of course, not to say that the objective meaning of a text is just the sum of the objective meanings of the linguistic signs the text consists of. It is not even to say that the objective meaning of a text depends exclusively on the objective meanings of the linguistic signs it consists of. It is just to say that a sequence of signs would have some objective meaning if the signs themselves have objective meaning.

Therefore, a meaning subjectivist cannot admit that there are linguistic signs in the standard sense. For a meaning subjectivist, an (uninterpreted) sign is a meaningless shape; and thus, an (uninterpreted) text must be a sequence of meaningless shapes.

The standard conception of *authorship* is the following: Authors create texts, in the standard sense of "text"; i.e., they create meaningful sequences of signs – not just sequences of meaningless shapes. An author does not just determine a particular sensual appearance, but also (and in many cases *primarily*) a more or less complex sequence of ideas, thoughts and emotions. It is not only a particular sequence of shapes, but also (and perhaps primarily) a particular sequence of ideas, thoughts and emotions that is protected as the author's "mental property" by copyright law. This can be seen, among other things, by the fact that a translation of an author's text still counts as the mental property of the author of the original.

Thus, meaning subjectivism is inconsistent with the standard conceptions of signs, texts and authorship, and it entails that one of the standard practices of interpretation – namely the search for a text's objective meaning – is nonsensical.

For what reasons should one accept such a highly revisionary metaphysical view?

5. Some Popular Objections against Meaning Objectivism

In what follows, I am going to discuss some popular objections against meaning objectivism. Some of them are more serious, others less so. I start with the less serious ones.

Objection 1: Meaning objectivism ignores the fact that reading can be a creative process in its own right.

Reply: It is correct that reading can be a creative process, but that does not entail the non-existence of objective meaning. One may grant a creative role to the reader without abolishing the author.

Incidentally, meaning subjectivists tend to overestimate the alleged creativity of readers. In the large majority of cases, readers just follow automatically the authors' pathways – unless it is particularly difficult to follow. And *if* it is difficult, usually readers either give up or they make an intellectual effort to find out what the text *means*. Only in a few exceptional cases do readers really use texts as props for their own creativity – as in the much cited bizarre fictional case of the intellectual Pierre Menard, who set out to create a new *Don Quixote* just by reading it in a new way. (See the famous story by Jorge Luis Borges in Borges 1964.)

In many cases, the reader's creativity, her subjective meaning attributions, serve the overall goal of finding out what the text really means. In other cases, the reader is creative in the sense that she uses her imagination to fill in the gaps left by the author.

Objection 2: Meaning objectivism cannot account for the fact that often (if not always) there is more than one correct interpretation of a text.
Reply: Of course, there may be more than one correct interpretation of a text. Distinct correct interpretations of one and the same text may bring to light distinct parts or aspects of the text's meaning. Meaning objectivism does not rule out this possibility. The point of meaning objectivism is only that there may be correct *as well as* incorrect interpretations.

Objection 3: Meaning objectivism ignores the fact that in many cases it is difficult (if not impossible) to know for certain what a given text's objective meaning exactly is.
Reply: That it may be difficult to explore the nature of a certain piece of reality does not, of course, entail the non-existence of this piece of reality. Meaning objectivism does not imply that infallible knowledge about objective meanings is possible.

Objection 4: Meaning objectivism involves an ontological commitment to (objectified) meanings. This is a superfluous metaphysical burden, for the assumption of objective meanings has no explanatory role.
Reply: That depends on what one wishes to explain. If one is happy to give up the standard conceptions of linguistic signs, texts, authorship and interpretation, with all that hinges on them, then, perhaps, the assumption of objective meanings indeed has no explanatory role.

But not all meaning subjectivists are willing to bite this bullet. For instance, some are not willing to give up entirely the dichotomy between correct and incorrect interpretations (see, e.g., Fish 1980, 341-2). However, from a subjectivist point of view, it is difficult to account for this dichotomy. Nevertheless, some try to give such an account. To mention just one attempt: some say that interpretations are not really correct or incorrect, but rather (more or less) "plausible" or "implausible".

But this is only an apparent way out. For the concept of plausibility makes sense only in relation to the concepts of correctness and incorrectness. To say that something is plausible is to say that it is credible and convincing. If a story that somebody tells us is credible and convincing then it is such that one is inclined *to hold it to be true*. Analogously, if an interpretation is plausible, then it is such that one is inclined to hold it to be correct. The concept of plausibility *presupposes* the concept of correctness – it cannot substitute it.

Objection 5: Meaning objectivism is incomprehensible, because objective meanings are mysterious entities.

Here is an answer to the question of what sort of entities objective meanings are: Meanings are *types of experiences*, i.e., types of presentations, thoughts and emotions. Types in general are *universals*, i.e., abstract entities that can be multiply instantiated in particular objects. Just as *shape types* can be multiply instantiated in *material* objects, meanings can be multiply instantiated in particular *mental states and processes*.

Just as this shape

CAT

is an instantiation of a shape type that is multiply instantiated, my mental representation of a cat (my cat-presentation) is an instantiation of the meaning with which this shape is associated by certain linguistic conventions. Thus, meanings are no more mysterious than other kinds of types. (Some may have reservations against an ontological commitment to universals in general, but this is another story.)

The conception of meanings as types allows a natural account of one type of creativity on the reader's part and the possibility of more than one correct reading of one and the same text. It is one of the essential aspects of the nature of types that they are incompletely determined. That is, a type determines *some* of the features of its instantiations, but not *all* of them. For this reason, one and the same type may be instantiated in particulars that are not exactly alike, such that all of the following are instantiations of one and the same shape type – despite their obvious differences:

CAT
CAT
CAT

In a similar vein, meanings are incompletely determined. My cat-presentation, for instance, may be a presentation of a fluffy cat or of a shorthaired one, of a piebald or a striped one, etc. This is one of the various senses in which a reader may "fill in the gaps" of a text.

6. The Constitution of a Text's Objective Meaning

How does a text get its particular objective meaning? The constitution of a text's objective meaning may be explicated in terms of linguistic conventions, utterance circumstances and/or author intentions.

Some try to do without author intentions. Those "anti-intentionalists" usually argue that reference to author intentions is unnecessary for the following two reasons: First, author intentions are, in principle, inaccessible to the readers. Therefore, interpretations can never be verified by means of reference to author intentions. Second, linguistic conventions and utterance circumstances suffice to determine a text's objective meaning.

Neither of these arguments is sound, however. First, intentionalism is the claim that a text's meaning is (at least partly) constituted by author intentions. This, however, does not entail that interpretive claims are to be verified through direct access to author intentions. Of course, anti-intentionalists are right in pointing out that usually we find out the author's intentions through knowledge about linguistic conventions and utterance circumstances – and not the other way around. But this does not entail that a text's objective meaning is *constituted* by linguistic conventions and utterance circumstances rather than by author intentions.

Second, linguistic conventions and utterance circumstances without author intentions do not suffice to determine a text's objective meaning. Rather, linguistic conventions come into effect only in connection with appropriate author intentions. Whether, for instance, the linguistic conventions of English determine a text's meaning depends on whether the author has the intention to write in English. And utterance circumstances alone hardly ever suffice to determine a text's meaning.

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Generisches Wissen in kategorialen Inferenzstrukturen: Zur Metaphysik des Begrifflichen.

Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Leipzig

1. Probleme des Standardmodells sprachlicher Weltabbildung

Im Folgenden geht es um die Differenz zwischen der generischen Bedeutung von Ausdrücken (Wörtern, Sätzen) und dem konkreten Sinnverstehen von einzelnen Sprechhandlungen (Äußerungen, Aussagen etc.).[1] Dabei ist das Schreiben und Lesen von nicht bloß an Einzelpersonen adressierten Texten im Allgemeinen durchaus zu unterscheiden vom Sprechen und Hören in kommunikativen Kooperationen mit realen Gesprächspartnern. Die Performation und das Verstehen von konkreten Sprechakten hat nämlich eine ganz besondere Struktur.

Wer einen Satz mit behauptender Kraft äußert, der sagt nicht einfach, dass dem Satz qua Figur nach gewissen Kriterien der Wert das Wahre zugeordnet sei. Die Wahrheiten der Sätze der Arithmetik sind aber gerade so bestimmt, und zwar auf kontext- und situations-transzendente Weise. Das macht die besondere ‚Reinheit' und die ‚Ewigkeit' mathematischer Aussagen aus. Das Muster der zu einer abstrakten Mengenlehre ausgebauten höheren Arithmetik mit ihren reellen Zahlen, Kardinalzahlen, Zahlfunktionen, Funktoren und anderen ‚Abbildungen' lässt sich aber keineswegs unmittelbar auf sachhaltige Aussagen über die Welt übertragen. Das aber wünscht man sich in der formalen Semantik. Diesen Wunsch zu erfüllen ist ihr Programm seit Wittgensteins *Tractatus.* Das aber führt in eine bloß mengentheoretische Semantik, wie man sie von Rudolf Carnap über Richard Montague bis zur so genannten intensionalen Semantik der *Mögli-*

[1] Zur zugehörigen Unterscheidung zwischen *generischen* Handlungen und *individuellen* Handlungen vgl. G. H. von Wright: „Die menschliche Freiheit" in von Wright 1994, 213.

chen Welten nach David Lewis und Saul Kripke verfolgen kann. Man denkt sich dabei die sachhaltigen Aussagen metaphorisch so, als seien den konkreten Sätzen, das heißt den Aussage-Äußerungen *p*, *in funktionaler Abhängigkeit von der Bezugssituation* durch allgemein gelernte Sinnkriterien Wahrheitswerte, das Wahre oder das Falsche, zugeordnet. Dabei wird schon im *Tractatus* das Wort „Satz“ verstanden als *Aussage*, die insgesamt sagt, dass ein korrespondierender *Sachverhalt* ‚bestehe’ bzw. eine *Tatsache* sei. Die Korrespondenz selbst ist in diesem Bild durch die *logische Form der Abbildung* bestimmt, in welcher eine durchaus syntaktisch zu fassende *logische Tiefenstruktur*, kurz: *Tiefengrammatik,* des Satzes bzw. der Aussage eine vermittelnde Rolle spielt. Diese korrespondiert ihrerseits auf gewisse Weise der syntaktischen Konfiguration des Oberflächensatzes. Insgesamt wird die Form der Abbildung (em)praktisch als bekannt und beherrscht unterstellt. Was Wittgenstein in seinem ganz offenbar idiosynkratischen Gebrauch „Satz“ nennt, heißt bei F. Kambartel „konkreter Satz“ und ist im Sinn der konstatierenden Gesamtaussage ‚$\vdash p$’ aufzufassen. Eine solche Konstatierung ist nach Wittgenstein wahr genau dann, wenn sich die Welt so verhält, wie die Aussage sagt. Der Zeichenkomplex ‚$\vdash p$’ und Kambartels Rede von einem konkreten Satz sollen dabei zunächst nur klar machen, dass es sich um *ausgesagte* oder *behauptete Sätze* handelt, nicht bloß um syntaktische Satzfiguren oder Aussagetypen.

Es sollte nicht schwer sein, dieses Standardmodell als eine Übertragung der Logik der höheren Arithmetik auf die sprachliche Abbildung innerweltlicher Tatsachen zu erkennen. Ein erstes Problem betrifft dann aber schon die wahrheitswertsemantischen (Wittgenstein) oder deduktionistischen (Carnap, Tarski) Regelungen der formallogischen Wörter „nicht“, „und“ und „für alle“. Denn man arbeitet in der Tiefengrammatik mit den formallogischen Formeln oder Aussage-Formen, welche Frege zur Analyse der Logik mathematischer Sätze entwickelt hat. Man überträgt diese damit bedenkenlos auf Redebereiche, welche möglicherweise noch gar keine sortale Gegenstandsbereiche sind, was aber nötig wäre, damit eine für die Sätze der Arithmetik und Mengenlehre entwickelte Funktionslogik überhaupt sinnvoll angewendet werden kann. Als Projektionsregeln für Konstatierungen werden außerdem ‚gezeigte’ Zuordnungen zwischen Elementaraussagen und dem Bestehen bzw. Nicht-Bestehen elementarer Sachverhalte angenommen. Man kann sich das im Grunde nur nach Art der bekannten elementaren Prädikation vorstellen. Zu denken ist an Spracheinführungen oder Kontrollaussagen der Formen „das hier ist ein Apfel“, „dies dort ist eine Birne, kein Apfel“, „der da heißt Franz“ etc.. Wittgenstein selbst hat gewissermaßen ‚vorsichtshalber’ kein derartiges Beispiel für einen Elementarsatz oder einen elementaren Sachverhalt angegeben, und zwar deswegen, weil es diese *nie rein* geben kann. Das wiederum liegt daran, dass, wie Wittgenstein später selbst einsieht, praktisch alle prädikativen Unterscheidungen immer schon zusammen mit relationalen Aussagen, insbesondere aber mit materialbegrifflichen Normalfallinferenzen auftreten. Man kann z.B. Farbprädikate nicht einfach durch einzelne Beispiele und Gegenbeispiele einführen, sondern immer nur im Gesamtsystem einer allgemeinen Praxis der Farbdifferenzierung. Eine *materiale Prädikatorenregel* wie die, dass das, was rot ist, nicht grün ist, ist daher längst schon Bestandteil des ‚Begriffs’ des Roten bzw. Grünen. Das aber hat zur Folge, dass die Aussagen „das ist rot“ und „das ist grün“ *nicht* als logisch oder begrifflich von einander *unabhängig* verstehbar sind.

Trotz der sich ergebenden Probleme bleibt die Vorstellung des *Tractatus* von einer Festlegung der Wahrheitsbedingungen für *Konstatierungen* bis heute in der formalen Semantik maßgeblich.[2] Man abstrahiert damit davon, dass wir im normalen Reden und Verstehen keineswegs bloß *formal* (etwa ‚tiefensyntaktisch’) schließen, sondern immer auch *inhaltlich*. Und das heißt, wir lassen keineswegs bloß ‚formallogisch allgemeine’ Schlüsse, wie sie für arithmetische Aussagen über Mengen gültig sind, als korrekte Schlüsse zu. Das aber wird nicht angemessen berücksichtigt. Stattdessen will man alles so weit ‚formalisieren’, dass in der entstehenden Tiefengrammatik eine logische Mengen- und Funktionalstruktur entsteht und die entsprechenden schematischen Schluss- und Rechenregeln anwendbar sind. Es wird nicht näher geprüft, ob bzw. wann das unterstellte Verfahren der Formalisierung sinnvoll möglich ist. Diese For-

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[2] Es gibt später noch allerlei zusätzlichen Verwirrungen durch den holistischen Axiomatizismus bei Carnap und Quine und eine rein sprachinterne, linguistisch-idealistische, weil ‚deflationäre’, ‚Wahrheits- bzw. Bedeutungstheorie’ bei Tarski bzw. Donald Davidson. Die Kritik am Tractatus-Modell betrifft diese und viele anderen Autoren erst recht.

malisierung ist übrigens am Ende nichts anderes ist als eine Art Arithmetisierung der Begriffslogik der Sprache.

Um zu zeigen, warum wir hier allein schon aufgrund der Zeitlichkeit weltbezogener Aussagen im Unterschied zur Situationsinvarianz von oberflächen- und tiefengrammatischen Strukturen in Probleme geraten, betrachte ich erst einmal ein durchaus schon hochkomplexes Beispiel, wie es intensiv in Andrea Kerns Analyse situationsbezogenen Wissens diskutiert wird.[3]

Wenn mir ein Mitbewohner sagt, dass Milch im Kühlschrank sei, er habe das eben gesehen, dann bedeutet das nicht, dass er sich oder ich mir dessen ‚absolut gewiss' sein kann, dass (noch) Milch im Kühlschrank ist. Es könnte z.B. eine leere Packung sein oder jemand hat unbemerkt eine andere weiße Flüssigkeit in das Milchglas gegeben. Es ist aber in aller Regel unvernünftig, am Ende sinnlos, mit ‚allen möglichen' derartigen ‚*Misfits*' zu rechnen, bis hin zu einem bösen Dämon wie bei Descartes. Das ‚*Einzelwissen*', dass Milch im Kühlschrank ist, ist ebenso wie das *Allgemeinwissen*, wie Milch aussieht und schmeckt und welche weiteren Eigenschaften sie hat, ein, wie ich sagen möchte, *bürgerliches* oder *endliches*, d.h. im Blick auf *zufällige Ausnahmen* immer auch *fallibles* Wissen. Ein entsprechender Wissensanspruch wird nicht schon dadurch zu einer bloß subjektiv gut begründeten Überzeugung, dass in seinem Gebrauch *zufällig* etwas schief *gehen kann*. Wir sollten daher vorsichtig sein mit situationsinvarianten Regeln der Art „etwas ist ein Wissen nur dann, wenn es *in einem idealen Sinn* und *sub specie aeternitatis* wahr ist". Die Regel „Wenn X weiß, dass p, dann ist p wahr" ist selbst nur als generische richtig: *Manchmal* gehen wir mit dem Satz „p ist wahr" (fast) genau so um wie mit Satz „ich weiß, dass p". Manchmal können wir also von der Aussage „ich/er weiß, dass p" *schematisch* zur Aussage „p ist wahr" übergehen – und umgekehrt. Das bedeutet aber nicht, dass die Sätze *überall* für einander substituierbar wären. Wohl aber bedeutet es, dass *performative Wahrheitsansprüche* der Form ‚p ist wahr' oder auch nur ‚$\vdash p$' und *Wissensansprüche* der Form ‚ich weiß, dass p' auch im Fall ‚zufällig' nötiger Retraktationen im Grunde *ganz gleich* behandelt werden. Denn wir modifizieren *im Nachhinein* einen sich als irreführend (‚falsch') herausstellenden

[3] Vgl. Kern 2006.

Wissensanspruch und sagen, uns vielleicht selbst korrigierend: ich *meinte nur zu wissen*, dass *p*, *denn p war/ist gar nicht wahr*. Wir sagen aber entsprechend *auch*: ‚es schien (mir) bloß so, dass *p* (wahr sei)'.

Es wäre offenbar absurd, wenn wir im Interesse einer mehr oder minder rechthaberischen Gewissheit, welche sich über Zeiten und Zufälle hinweg retten kann, ab jetzt immer bloß sagen würden: „Ich meine, im Kühlschrank ist Milch" oder „es scheint so als sei Milch da", nur weil diese abgeschwächte Aussage sich nicht so leicht als falsch herausstellen kann. Derartige Abschwächungen sind, wie W. Sellars klar sieht, erstens nur sinnvoll, wo wir schon wissen, was es heißt, die nicht abgeschwächte Aussage: „Im Kühlschrank ist Milch" mit guten Gründen zu machen und etwa auf einen Zweifel hin mit etwas mehr Betonung zu sagen: „Es ist wahr, ich habe sie gesehen", oder: „Ich weiß es, ich habe sie probiert". Der Dauergebrauch der abgeschwächten Form würde, zweitens, den Kontrast zwischen Sein und Schein zerstören und damit auch die Informationskraft der Aussage. Daher dürfen wir Aussagen, dass *p*, nur dann abschwächen zu „mir scheint, dass *p*", wenn es schon *gute Gründe für einen Zweifel* gibt. Dazu sagt schon Hegel, dass wir unsere Zweifel *in den bloß formalen Zweifel* setzen sollten. Genauer, der epistemische Skeptizismus gerade auch in allen Versionen des subjektiven Empirismus ist sophistisch. Er ist eine Überreaktion auf die schlicht anzuerkennende *Endlichkeit* und *zufällige Fallibilität* alles realen Einzelwissens, einerseits, und auf die *Entwicklungsfähigkeit des begriffsbestimmenden Allgemeinwissens*, andererseits.

Die ‚Normen' bzw. impliziten ‚Regeln' materialbegrifflichen Schließens sind in gewissem Sinn zugleich eine soziale Institution der Sprache und eines allgemeinen Wissens. Die Funktion des Allgemeinwissens besteht in seiner Anerkennung als Lizenz zum inferenziellen Gebrauch der betreffenden Sätze. Sie artikulieren nämlich Inferenzregeln für den Normal- oder Defaultfall. Wir müssen freilich immer noch *mit Urteilskraft* bestimmen, ob der Einzelfall einer intendierten Anwendung *nahe genug am Normalfall* liegt. Diese Einsicht findet sich schon bei Platon. In eben diesem Verhältnis von verbal lehrbaren eidetischen Allgemeinwissen und entsprechend artikulierten Einzelerkenntnissen liegt die Endlichkeit oder Fallibilität unseres realen Welt-Wissens. Das heißt, im Einzelfall haben wir oft noch mit allerlei Zufälligkeiten zu rechnen. Und es ist das allgemein Relevante des Falles immer erst noch aktiv zu bestimmen. Diese *logische* Endlichkeit jedes sprachlichen Einzelbezugs auf die Welt ist als solche anzuerkennen und nicht etwa zu beklagen. Sie begrenzt den Sinn des *prima facie* durchaus verständlichen Wunsches, das Schließen durch eine Reduktion auf die Anwendung *rein schematischer Deduktionsregeln* leicht lernbar und exakt kontrollierbar zu machen und damit *urteils- und erfahrungsfrei* zu halten. Entsprechend *wünschen* wir uns eine alle irgend möglichen Anwendungsfälle abdeckende, in diesen Sinn *universelle*, also *ausnahmslose*, Sicherheit und eine zugehörige subjektive Gewissheit im weltbezogenen Wissen. Doch diese Wünsche sind nicht erfüllbar. Was sie ausmalen, sind kontrafaktische Illusionen, bestenfalls richtungsbestimmende Ideale. Das ist am Ende die zentrale Einsicht des späteren Wittgenstein, die mit einer entsprechenden Einsicht Hegels auf vielleicht überraschende Weise zusammenfällt.

R. B. Brandom hat in seiner Sprachphilosophie herausgearbeitet, dass und wie die Sprecher in Einzelaussagen auf der Grundlage geteilter Inferenznormen für die Hörer Schlusslinzenzen artikulieren. Nicht analysiert hat er den materialbegrifflichen Status der Grundlage, des generischen Allgemeinwissens, jedenfalls nicht über die formale Logik hinaus. So lizenziert z.B. die Äußerung des Bedingungssatzes „Wenn die Straße nass ist, hat es geregnet" dazu, im Falle einer nassen Straße auf vorherigen Regen zu schließen – statt etwa auf ein Spreng- oder Reinigungsfahrzeug. Entsprechend lizenziert uns ein beliebiger Satz *S*, der von einer andern Person behauptet wird, im Zusammenhang mit einem sich aus einem kanonischen Wissen als allgemein zulässig ergebenden Bedingungssatz der Form „Wenn *S*, dann *S**" dazu, aufgrund der Behauptung des anderen entweder zu behaupten (auszusagen), dass *S**, oder *S** einfach selbst wieder für weitere Übergänge der geschilderten Art zu gebrauchen.

2. Differenzielle und inferenzielle Gehalte

Mit unseren Begriffen, artikuliert durch (prädikative) Wörter *P* und (situationsabhängige) Sätze *S*, klassifizieren wir also nicht einfach Dinge, Situationen oder Ereignisse, um dann bloß zu sagen, dass sie in dieser und nicht in jener Klasse liegen.[4] Zumindest außerhalb der Mathematik ist eine Klassifikation *von etwas als etwas*, also eines *x*, das ein Ding, eine Situation oder ein Ereignis sein mag, als ein *P*, nur sinnvoll, wenn sie erstens mehr oder minder gemeinsam nachvollzogen werden kann, und wenn sie zweitens mit relevanten inferenziellen Folgerungen, so genannten Normalerwartungen, oder irgendwelchen relevanten und guten, also wichtigen und richtungsrichtigen Orientierungen verbunden ist. Ich weiß zum Beispiel nicht schon dann, was, sagen wir, ein Transistor ist, wenn ich Transistoren wiedererkennen und von anderen Teilen (etwa in Kisten von Geräteteilen) verlässlich unterscheiden kann. Das kann oft schon eine von uns entsprechend eingerichtete Sortiermaschine. Ich weiß es erst dann, wenn ich auch etwas darüber weiß, was man mit Transistoren Besonderes tun kann bzw. nicht tun kann. Auch in anderen Beispielfällen muss ich etwas darüber wissen, was normalerweise zu erwarten ist, wenn etwas ein *P* ist, etwa im Fall von Stühlen, Pflanzen, Tieren, Stoffen, aber auch von Planeten, Atomen oder deren Kernen. Man kann das durchaus auch als eine Einsicht des Amerikanischen Pragmatismus von William James, John Dewey bis Wilfrid Sellars, Richard Rorty und R. B. Brandom in die inferenzielle und pragmatische Dimension der Begriffe Bedeutung und Wahrheit, Sinnverstehen und Wissen ansehen. Dabei unterstelle ich hier erst einmal, es wäre schon klar, was Dinge, Qualitäten, Situationen, Sachverhalte oder Ereignisse sind bzw. wie wir auf sie Bezug nehmen können, auch wenn es zu diesen unterschiedlichen Kategorien immer noch einiges zu klären gilt, zumal sie als solche noch keineswegs immer schon Klassen von ‚Entitäten', also gegenstandsartige ‚Ontologien' bilden.

Einem *x*, das ein *P* ist, werden also qua *P* immer noch weitere Eigenschaften *Q*, *R* usf. zukommen. Oder es wird das *x* in gewissen Relationen *R* zu anderen Gegenständen *y*, *z* stehen. Indem wir solche Allgemeinheiten artikulieren, drücken wir nicht immer schon ‚absolut notwendige'

[4] In der Wahrheitswertlogik Freges entstehen viele einstellige Satzformen der Form S(x) mit genau einer freien Zahl- oder Mengenvariable auf der Grundlage von Relationen $S(y_1,y_2,\ldots,x)$, die, wie schon bei Platon, ihrerseits als parametrisierbare Satzformen $S_{y1,\, y2,\ldots}(x)$ aufgefasst werden. Es ist klar, wie man über Quantorenbindungen der y-Variablen zu x-Prädikaten gelangt.

oder in allen Einzelfällen automatisch gültige, sondern zumeist ‚nur' *generische Normalfallinferenzen* aus.

Universelle Quantifikationen oder *Allaussagen* in sortalen Gegenstandsbereichen, wie etwa auch im Fall der Rede über alle einzelnen Äpfel in einem Korb, unterscheiden sich dabei wesentlich von *generischen Aussagen* oder *Allgemeinaussagen*. Eine solche Allgemeinaussage wäre z.B., dass Menschen sprechen können und Tiere sich selbst bewegen. Manche können das nicht (mehr), obwohl sie (noch) leben. Gerade weil die formale mathematische Logik nur universelle Quantifikationen kennt, taugt sie nicht dazu, das Verhältnis zwischen generischen und empirischen Aussagen darzustellen. Und weil sogar die mathematisierten Sätze der *Geometrie* in Bezug auf reale Körperformen selbst schon generische Sätze sind, welche im Modus des Idealen allgemeine Aussagen über räumliche Gestalten zu artikulieren erlauben, ohne dabei über alle Einzelanwendungen sprechen zu können, können wir die realen Anwendungen der mathematischen Wahrheiten auf die Welt gerade nicht angemessen analysieren, wenn wir uns nur auf die formale Prädikatenlogik des ‚und', ‚nicht' und ‚für alle' stützen.

3. Semantik der Ausdrücke vs. Verstehen von Äußerungen

Das philosophische Standardmodell sprachlicher Bedeutung orientiert sich dabei nicht erst seit Frege, Russell und Wittgenstein, sondern schon seit der Antike an der Idee situationsinvariant tradierbarer Inhalte, wie sie die *Schrift*, insbesondere aber die *Zeichenschrift der Mathematik* allererst ermöglicht. Mathematik ist ‚die' Wissenschaft über das durch situationsinvariante Zeichenfolgen und eben damit notwendigerweise immer schematisch Lehrbare. Dabei haben schon Parmenides und Platon die Spannung bemerkt und das Verhältnis thematisiert zwischen dem Begriff einer ‚ewigen', bzw. generischen oder eidetischen, also möglichst situationsinvarianten, damit aber immer nur formalen (formen- oder strukturbezogenen) Wahrheit einerseits, einem in konkreten Fällen immer situations- und gegenwartsabhängigen ‚empirischen' Weltbezug andererseits, wie er durch Wahrnehmung und Anschauung vermittelt ist. Die ‚Richtigkeiten' im Weltbezug manifestieren sich im Glücken eines teils individuellen, teils kommunikativen und kooperativen *Handelns*, kurz, in einer *diskurs-*

gestützten Praxis. In einer solchen bildet *das Begründen* im Kontrolldiskurs nicht, wie W. Sellars' und R. B. Brandoms Entwürfe oder kartographischen Skizzen einer pragmatisch fundierten Sprachtheorie nahelegen, ein *basales* Sprachspiel, sondern gehören, wie man aus den Einsichten aus Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie entnehmen könnte, immer nur zur Selbstvergewisserung der Gemeinsamkeiten des Verstehens, Schließens und Urteilens. Diese Gemeinsamkeiten entstehen dadurch, dass wir einen gemeinsamen Gebrauch durch allgemeine sinnbestimmende Differenzierungen zusammen mit zugehören differenziellen *Inferenzen* entwickeln, und zwar über die *Entwicklung generischen Wissens*. Der Inhalt generischen Wissens ist also im Grunde dasselbe wie der jeweilige Begriff. Beide lassen sich logisch nur im Rahmen der Geschichte ihrer Entwicklung begreifen. Das ist die zentrale Einsicht, mit der Hegel die irreführende Zeitlosigkeit der Transzendentalphilosophie Kants und mit ihr die achrone Überzeitlichkeit der Begriffsanalysen im Logischen Empirismus des letzten Jahrhunderts weit hinter sich gelassen hat. Begriffe sind dabei nicht einfach, wie bei Frege, als Prädikate zu deuten, sondern viel allgemeiner als eine Art Titelwörter, mit denen wir einen ganzen Bereich von Subthemen oder gar Praxisformen überschreiben.[5] So ist insbesondere auch der Begriff des Wissens nicht einfach in der Form ‚x weiß, dass *p*' durch vermeintlich zureichende und hinreichende Bedingungen zu definieren, zumal es im Fall generischen Wissens nicht darauf ankommt, ob eine oder viele Personen es kennen, sondern ob es ‚uns' insgesamt verfügbar ist.

Damit wird auch schon klar, wie sich ein kategorialer Begriff, etwa der Begriff der Zahl oder der Begriff des Tieres, des chemischen Stoffes oder des physischen Körpers, von bloßen sortalen bzw. prädikativen Aussonderungen in schon formal konstituierten Gegenstandsbereichen unterscheiden. Denn um einen Titel für ganze Rede- und Gegenstandsbereiche zu verstehen, bedarf es eines gewissen Ausmaßes einer ‚holistischen' Beherrschung des ganzen Bereiches. Frege hatte dagegen, nach meinem Urteil zwar aus verständlichen Gründen, aber in irreführender Weise, den

[5] In gewisser Weise ist z.B. der Begriff der natürlichen Zahl ‚holistisch' bestimmt, nämlich durch die Art und Weise der Bestimmung der Richtigkeit aller arithmetischen Sätze, in denen symbolische Terme ‚für' natürliche Zahlen oder gebundene Variablen für solche Terme auftreten.

Begriff der Zahl als sortale Aussonderung aus einem universalen Bereich ‚aller möglichen Gegenstände' zu definieren versucht, also einfach über eine ‚Definition' eines komplexen Prädikats der Art „x ist eine Zahl genau dann, wenn A(x)". Bis heute ist noch kaum bekannt, wann und wo derartige Definitionen sinnvoll möglich sind, wann und wo nicht. Frege ist ja auch mit seinen Zahldefinitionen nicht etwa bloß zufälligerweise gescheitert. Denn es gibt keinen universalen sortalen Bereich aller möglichen Gegenstände sinnvoller Rede. Jeder ‚wohldefinierte' Gegenstandbereich ist vielmehr lokal durch einen kategorialen Begriff und den zugehörigen generischen Wissensbereich bestimmt. Das hat, erstaunlicherweise, Aristoteles schon gewusst, ist aber bei Kant, Frege und in der Analytischen Philosophie in Vergessenheit geraten.

Zunächst aber ist noch auf die logischen Mehrdeutigkeiten der Verwendung von Wörtern wie „wir" oder „uns" hinzuweisen. Denn als *distributives Wir* würde es auf jeden von uns bzw. auf alle einzelnen Mitglieder einer Gruppe von Menschen verweisen, und sei es auf alle Menschen hier und heute, oder auf diejenigen, welche bisher lebten. Distributiv verwendet ist das „Wir" z.B. dann, wenn wir sagen, dass wir beide, du und ich, gerade tanzen oder spazieren gehen, obgleich nur jeder für sich allein oder je mit jemandem anderen tanzt oder spazieren geht. Ein *gemeinsames Wir* setzt dagegen eine Art *gemeinsames Projekt* oder eine gemeinsame *Praxis* samt zugehöriger *Arbeitsteilung* oder besser *Rollendifferenzierung* voraus. Man denke etwa an den Fall, dass wir als Forscher etwas suchen oder erreichen. Dabei ist es zunächst gleichgültig, ob wir in die Praxis sozusagen hineingeboren wurden oder ein Projekt selbst in einer expliziten gemeinsamen Intention entwerfen.

Im *generischen* Sinn verweist das Wort „wir", in manchem ähnlich wie das Wörtchen „man", nicht anders als ein generisches Satzsubjekt wie „die Forscher", „die Deutschen" oder auch „der Mensch" auf ein gedachtes *allgemeines Subjekt* eines *gemeinsamen* Tun, zum Beispiel auch auf das generische Subjekt ‚unseres' Wissens und Könnens. In diesem Sinn wissen *wir*, wie es auf dem Mond aussieht, oder weiß ‚man', was Einsteins Relativitätstheorie wirklich bedeutet, nicht, weil jeder von uns diese wüsste, sondern *weil einige von uns* das wissen. Gleiches gilt für unser Können. Nicht jeder von uns bzw. jeder einzelne Mensch, muss können, was ‚wir' im generischen oder auch prinzipiellen Sinn der Aussage ‚können' bzw. was

‚der Mensch kann'. Oft können etwas nur wenige; und doch können es dann wir Menschen, zum Beispiel 100 Meter schneller als in 10 Sekunden zu laufen.

Im Bezug auf das generische Wir können sich viele einzelne, ja (fast) alle von uns in ihren Geltungsansprüchen irren, ohne dass ‚wir' uns insgesamt irrten. Das generische Wir *kann* sich in seinem generischen Wissen in gewissem Sinn nicht irren. Denn das generisch-allgemeine Wissen, die *science générale*, sozusagen, ist der Maßstab des Wahren, so wie Rousseaus *volonté générale*, wenn man sie recht versteht und etwa als Form eines ganz und gar rechtmäßig erlassene allgemeine Gesetzes deutet, nie Unrecht sein kann, sondern das Recht sozusagen definiert, nämlich als (idealer) Maßstab von Recht und Gerechtigkeit.

Jetzt können wir uns besonderen Beispielen generischen Wissens zuwenden. Was also wissen wir in unserer Epoche? Und was wusste man in früheren Epochen, von dem wir heute sagen, dass man damals nur meinte, es zu wissen, weil es nur so schien als sei der Inhalt wahr?

Ein großes Beispiel liefert dazu die *Geometrie*. Seit den Zeiten des Pythagoras ist sie ein Grundmuster für eine ideal formulierte und schematisch verfasste allgemeine Theorie, nämlich im Blick auf *Passungseigenschaften* räumlicher Körperformen. Was aber heißt es, diese ‚Theorie' für wahr oder richtig zu halten, unter Einschluss von Urteilen der Art, dass der vierte Winkel im Rechteck ein rechter Winkel ist (also in Kopien der anderen drei Winkel passt) und dass es in einer Ebene zu jeder Geraden durch jeden Punkt genau eine Parallele gibt? Es bedeutet, dass man in dieser Theorie einen riesigen Bereich unserer Erfahrung im Umgang mit Körperformungen und geformten Körpern elegant darstellen und verbal schließend ‚vorausberechnen' kann. Das ist eine Art *großes Faktum*, das sich als solche grundsätzlich von Einzeltatsachen im Sinne des *Tractatus* unterscheidet, zumal die Prinzipien oder Axiome der Geometrie, wie man seit der Antike weiß, nicht unmittelbar durch Einzelwahrnehmungen widerlegbar oder begründbar ist. In genau diesem Sinne artikulieren sie keine einfache ‚empirische' Fakten. Die Geometrie beschreibt aber auch nicht einfach eine allgemeine Eigenschaft unserer ‚Sinnlichkeit', wie Kants Analyse suggeriert.

Newton erkennt dann schon, dass die platonisch-cartesische Idee einer mathematisierten *Kinematik* der Default-Bewegung von Festkörpern und der *Dynamik* der Richtungsänderungen und (anderen) Beschleunigungen nicht ohne Berücksichtigung von *Massenzahlen* möglich ist. Leibniz anerkennt eben dies. Und er sieht die Notwendigkeit der Erweiterungen algebraischer Größenbereiche und Ausdrucksformen in der analytischen Geometrie durch ein kalkülmäßiges Rechnen mit ‚Infinitesimalen', wobei sich erst später (etwa bei Lagrange) herausstellt, warum diese im Unterschieden zu den erst im 19. Jahrhundert durch Dedekind einigermaßen klar definierten *reellen Zahlen* als solche gar keine Größen sind, sondern bloß Notationsmomente des Integral- und Differentialkalküls. In Daltons Chemie wird die Wissenschaft von den Stoffen und den Stoffumwandlungen in chemischen Reaktionen (im Nachgang zu Lavoisier) auf eine neue theoretisch-modellartige Grundlage der generischen Darstellung und Erklärung der betreffenden Prozesse gestellt.

Überall geht man dabei über die Empirie im Sinn einer bloßen *Historia*, der *empirischen Sammlung einzelner Beobachtungsberichte* und deren *anekdotisch-zufälligen Erklärung* weit hinaus, auch weit über durch bloße Statistiken gestützte Zukunftserwartungen; und zwar dadurch, dass *generische Inferenzformen* entwickelt werden, die als ‚wissenschaftliche Gesetze', etwa von der Natur, also als ‚Naturgesetze', festlegen, was ein vernünftiges materialbegriffliches Schließen oder Begründen in einem Wissensbereich ist, was nicht. Der auf Hume zurückgehende Empirismus bedroht eben dieses *institutionelle* Verständnis aller generischer Gesetze, also des allgemeinen Wissens und am Ende jedes Verstehens begrifflicher Inhalte, indem er sie ‚psychologistisch' als bloße *Gewohnheiten* darstellt. Damit erkennen er und der Empirismus sie nicht als für einen Wissensbereich *relativ apriorische* und doch nicht bloß *terminologisch-analytische* Setzungen.

Ein Sonderfall der Entwicklung von Begriffen bzw. eines generischen Wissens ist dabei der, dass wir, etwa im Rahmen einer so genannten Theorie, ein ganzes System expliziter Regeln vorschlagen, diese satzartig artikulieren und für ihren allgemeinen Gebrauch argumentieren. Was diesen Inferenzen material korrespondiert, wird gerade im Empirismus unter dem systematisch eher irreführenden, weil psychologistischen, Titel der *Erwartung* thematisiert. Der dabei ersichtliche Sog in eine subjektiv-psychologistische Deutung generischen Wissens liegt darin, dass die Anerkennung von den durch dieses Wissen gestützten Normalinferenzen durchaus immer auch eine Komponente der ‚Automatisierung' von Schemata des Urteilens und Schließens durch Verleiblichung hat. Damit können und müssen wir, vom Einzelnen her gesehen, von Erwartungen und Gewohnheiten reden. Soweit behält Hume Recht. Er hat aber den transsubjektiven Status der erlernten bzw. internalisierten und damit in eine Art zweite Natur verwandelten ‚impliziten' Schemata des begrifflich denkenden Schließens ganz offenbar unterschätzt.

Insbesondere ist ein *generischer Gebrauch* von Sprache, der durch gemeinsame Kontrollen und Beurteilungen der Erfülltheit von gemeinsam anerkannten Bedingungen eine normative Form hat, von konkreten *Einzelverwendungen* zu unterscheiden. Hinzu kommt die Differenz zwischen der empraktischen Form der Existenz von Normen in einem generischen, also allgemeinen, Gebrauch und deren explizite Artikulation in einem System von allgemeinen Ausdrucks- und Inferenzformen bzw. Inferenz*regeln*.

Die Beziehung zwischen (Formen in) einem allgemeinen Gebrauchs und (empirischen Verhältnissen in) einer einzelnen Verwendung wird schon von Platon thematisiert. Platons Dialektik lässt sich darüber hinaus schon als die Entwicklung einer möglicherweise zunächst bloß ahnenden Einsicht in die bis heute in ihrer Bedeutung noch kaum verstandene Differenz und Beziehung zwischen Sprechsprache und Schriftsprache deuten, und zwischen einem generischen Wissen über eine allgemeine Form oder Struktur (*eidos*) auf der einen Seite, der Anwendung der Form auf empirische Einzelfälle auf der anderen Seite. Hinzu kommt der Unterschied zwischen dem Sinnverstehen im realen Gespräch und der Interpretation von Schriften. Denn diese werden wie Runen oder Buchenstäbe räumlich neben einander gelegt (*legein*) bzw. als Zeichenfolgen aufgeschrieben. Das so Geschriebene, der situationsinvariante *logos*, ist dann zunächst wieder zu lesen (*legein*), also in Vokalsprache umzuwandeln, und das Gesagte ist im Blick auf relevante Bezugsmöglichkeiten inferenziell auszulegen.

4. Der synthetisch-apriorische Status von Allgemeinwissen

Was aber ist der Status der inferenziellen Formen und Normen, Schemata und Regeln? Wie oder durch wen ist er bestimmt? Und wie verhalten sich implizite bzw. empraktische Normen zu explizit artikulierten Regeln und Bedingungssätzen?

Um zu verstehen, wovon die Rede ist, wenn jemand von Wasserstoffbrennzellen oder Ähnlichem spricht, sollte man wohl wissen, erstens, dass durch Verbrennung (Oxydation) aus Wasserstoff Wasser (H_2O) entsteht und vielleicht auch schon, dass dabei im Unterschied zur Verbrennung von organischen Energieträgern wie Kohle, Erdöl oder Erdgas kein unerwünschtes Kohlendioxid (CO_2) entsteht. Um zu verstehen, was ein Wort wie „Karfreitag" bedeutet oder warum „Waterloo" nicht mehr bloß ein Ortsname ist, muss man ebenfalls schon einiges, jetzt über unsere europäische Kultur, Religion und Geschichte wissen. Entsprechendes gilt für Ausdrücke wie „Differentialquotient", „Plancksches Wirkungsquantum" oder „Raumzeitkrümmung".[6]

Das Allgemeinwissen ist dabei im Allgemeinen nicht mehr weiter Gegenstand der wissenschaftlichen Forschung, sondern seine Voraussetzung. Der Zweifel an dem, was als selbstverständlich anzuerkennen ist, ist daher nicht etwa tief, sondern eher unvernünftig. Und doch bedarf es dann oft auch der philosophischen Reflexion auf das Selbstverständliche; aber nicht so, wie Skeptiker und überskrupulöse Logiker meinen, die mit einzelnen Beispielen allgemeines Wissen infrage stellen. Wie wichtig das sich damit ergebende Problem ist, sieht man daran, dass nicht einmal Statistiken in der Lage sind, generisches Wissen infrage zu stellen oder gar zu erzeugen. Das hätte eine Einsicht Humes sein können; denn dieser erkennt ja die Unlösbarkeit des so genannten Induktionsproblems. Das Problem wird oft so dargestellt, als ginge es um die Frage, ob wir bzw. warum es vernünftig sei, aufgrund von Einzelfällen, von denen wir Erfahrungswissen *post hoc* im Sinn von empirischen, d.h. historisch-deskriptiven, *Einzelaussagen* haben, einfach durch Fortschreibung bisheriger Häufigkeiten auf neue Fälle *praeter hoc* schließen. Das aber wäre unmittelbar überhaupt nicht immer

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[6] In gewissem Sinn beginnt die wissenschaftliche Arbeit ebenso wie die berufsbezogene Fachausbildung erst, nachdem eine entsprechende Lesefertigkeit als disziplinäre und daher durchaus immer spartenbezogene Voraussetzung für ein lebenslanges Weiterlernen gelegt ist – mit der Folge, dass ein Fachwechsel wie z.B. von der Physik zur Philosophie in aller Regel zu einem lebenslangen Dilettantismus und die so genannte Interdisziplinarität, wenn sie nicht in einer mühsamen Kooperation von disziplinär Gebildeten zu einem thematischen Problem besteht, zur Amateurwissenschaft mit ad-hoc-Urteilen ohne begrifflichen Tiefgang und ohne die Breite schriftlich tradierter Erfahrungen tendiert.

vernünftig. Allerdings führt schon die Darstellung des Problems in die Irre. Denn es werden die generischen Inferenzformen, welche unsere empirischen Schlüsse und Erwartungen leiten, keineswegs durch einzelne Beobachtungen von Häufigkeiten begründet. Wie aber dann?

Eine erste und wichtige Beobachtung dazu ist ebenso robust wie allbekannt. Wir lehren und lernen Handlungsweisen und die dazu gehörigen Unterscheidungs- und Inferenzformen empraktisch. Das ist zunächst eine einfache pädagogische Tatsache. Dazu artikulieren wir manche dieser generischen Formen und ihren Geltungsbereich explizit. Dabei wissen wir im Allgemeinen, dass ihr Gebrauch im Einzelfall fallibel sein kann und fassen sie daher nicht einfach als empirische All-Aussagen auf. Wir versuchen sie auch nicht bloß auf unsere eigenen bisherigen Erfahrungen zu stützen, wie Hume in irreführender Weise unterstellt. Wir begründen bestenfalls, gemäß dem so genannten Schluss auf die beste aller erreichbaren Darstellungen bzw. Erklärung, dass es (noch) keine bessere allgemeine Defaultorientierungen als die bisher vorhandenen gibt. Das bedeutet immer nur dieses, dass aus *den uns bekannten* nach Möglichkeit die besten generischen Darstellungen oder Erklärungen auszuwählen sind. Dabei ist eine generische Erklärung besser als eine andere, wenn die Einbettung von Einzelfällen in das allgemeine System von (ggf. kausalen) Erklärungen bzw. in die erklärenden Theorien insgesamt zu einer besseren Orientierung führt. Dabei kann es sein, dass sich die Einfachheit der Regeln und des Lernens verbessert, aber auch die Adäquatheit der Erklärungen im Blicke auf die Vielfalt der Einzelanwendungen. Man hat dabei immer eine Art Reflexionsgleichgewicht herzustellen. Reflektierende Urteilskraft ist dabei die Kunst, neue und hoffentlich bessere generische Erklärungen zu entwickeln.

Wenn daher Karl Popper erklärt, dass Gesetze und Theorien immer nur vorläufig in der Wissenschaft akzeptiert werden, ist das in folgendem Sinn ebenso richtig wie trivial: Wir entwickeln unser generisches Wissen und eben damit unsere Begriffe gemeinsam, und zwar nach Möglichkeit unter Berücksichtigung der je besten Ideen für Artikulation und Darstellung und der breitesten Erfahrung. Daraus folgt aber keineswegs „dass alle Gesetze und Theorien Vermutungen oder vorläufige Hypothesen sind.“[7] Denn unsere Unterscheidung zwischen Gesetzen und Vermutungen ist eine

[7] Popper 1995. 86.

Unterscheidung zwischen einem von uns als generischem Wir anerkannten Wissen und den epistemischen Haltungen einzelner Personen zu irgendwelchen möglichen Aussagen, etwa auch zu Gesetzesalternativen oder alternativen Theorien.

Das führt uns offenbar auch zum Problem des Verhältnisses zwischen synthetisch-apriorischen Aussagen zu empirischen Aussagen. Dabei ist erstens das Relationale im materialbegrifflichen Apriori zu beachten. Denn Aussagen der Art: ‚man kann nicht in die Vergangenheit reisen' oder ‚es gibt genau drei Raumdimensionen an physischen Festkörpern', gehören zu den Voraussetzungen jeder empirischen Zeit- bzw. Ortsangabe, wie ein längerer Moment der Reflexion zeigen könnte. Viele derartigen Aussagen bestimmen und beschränken die Bereiche des physikalisch, chemisch, biologisch oder dann etwa auch handlungsmäßig Möglichen auf gewisse absolute Weise und begründen damit eine Art materialbegriffliche (nicht einfach ‚empirische') Notwendigkeit. Man denke etwa an die Aussage über die Lichtgeschwindigkeit als Maximalgeschwindigkeit, an chemische Reaktionsgesetze oder an andere so genannte Naturgesetze, denen zuwider *handeln* zu wollen noch unsinniger wäre als über ‚Möglichkeiten' zu *reden*, welche nicht durch diese Notwendigkeiten oder Gesetze beschränkt sind.

Wie aber ist generisches Wissen überhaupt, und wie sind formal- und materialsynthetische Naturgesetze insbesondere begründet? Und wie lassen sich entsprechende ‚Irrtümer' widerlegen? Kurz: Was ist der wahrheitslogische Status eines konkreten materialbegrifflichen Apriori? Das und nur das ist die richtige Frage im Nachgang zu Kant, nicht die das Thema und seine Problem völlig ignorierende These, die seit Quine sogar als tief gilt, es seien alle sinnvollen Aussagen ‚irgendwie empirisch', am Ende sogar die formalanalytischen.

5. Wahrheitsbedingungen generischer Aussagen

Die Frage betrifft die Wahrheitsbedingungen generischer Aussagen, welche generisch berechtigte und nicht bloß subjektiv zufällige Defaulterwartungen explizit artikulieren. Wie sind diese ‚gesetzt'? Und welche der implizit gehandhabten, also empraktisch anerkannten Inferenzformen bzw. Normen sind ‚wirklich richtig'? Welche sind falsch oder beruhen auf Vorurteilen oder vorschnellen Urteilen?

Nicht nur Hume, sondern der gesamte Empirismus (miss)versteht die generischen Aussagen als universelle All-Aussagen. Doch das sind sie gerade nicht, wie ich unter anderem in einer Überlegung zur ‚Logik des Aber' vorgeführt habe.[8] Das ‚Aber' signalisiert dabei mögliche Ausnahmen von Normalfällen. So bewegen sich z.B. alle Körper stetig in Raum und Zeit. *Aber* subatomare Partikel wie Elektronen scheinen sich anders zu verhalten. Sie scheinen in gewisser unstetiger Weise zu ‚springen'.

Viele Zaubertricks operieren, wie wir wissen, mit der Normalerwartung, dass Dinge sich stetig im Raum bewegen und dass nichts einfach aus dem Nichts entsteht. Zauberer erzeugen ihre Illusionen nicht etwa dadurch, dass sie die Grundsätze vernünftigen Urteilens über Dingbewegungen außer Kraft setzen. Sondern sie zeigen uns, dass unsere Kontrolle solcher Stetigkeiten in der Wahrnehmung aufgrund der Perspektivität jeder Anschauung immer auch defizitär ist. Die Kontrolle lässt sich eben dadurch austricksen, dass unsere Wahrnehmungen sozusagen selbst schon mit Normalerwartungen arbeiten. Häufig interpolieren wir Bewegungsstücke, als hätten wir sie gesehen oder haptisch gefühlt, obwohl das nicht so war. Die Überzeugung, dass immer alles mit rechten Dingen zugeht und dass es keine Zauberei gibt, die echte Wunder vollbringt, bedeutet dabei oft nur, dass wir – mit Recht – an den generischen Prinzipien der Stetigkeiten in Entstehungen und Bewegungen von dinglichen Körpern festhalten.

Leider wird dieses sinnvolle Prinzip zumeist gleich mit einem universaldeterministischen Kausalprinzip verwechselt, nach dem angeblich die Vergangenheit und Gegenwart die Zukunft voll und ganz determinieren würden. Es gibt aber absolut keinen zureichenden Grund dafür, ein Kausalprinzip in dieser universellen Form für wahr zu erklären. Allerdings ist das Prinzip, alles Geschehen nach Möglichkeit kausal aus seinen Ursachen zu erklären, als generische Orientierung keineswegs sinnlos oder auch nur auf den Fall der physikalischen Mechanik der handlungsfreien (in diesem Sinn ‚natürlichen') Bewegung von mittelgroßen Festkörpern zu begrenzen. Dennoch ist der Glaube an das Prinzip *der Aberglaube*, wie Wittgenstein sagt. Wittgensteins eigene, im Grunde durchaus noch logisch-empiristische, auch Russell verpflichtete Begründung dieser These im *Tractatus* reicht aber nicht aus. Denn als Glaube ist er Verzicht darauf, die reale Funkti-

[8] Stekeler-Weithofer 2009.

onsweise derartiger methodischer Prinzipien begreifen zu wollen. Da gegen ein dogmatisches Wollen oder Nichtwollen kein Kraut gewachsen ist, lässt sich der Glaube an einen universellen Kausalnexus auch nicht einfach als falsch beweisen, auch wenn er in einem weiteren Sinn argumentativ widerlegbar ist. Denn generische Prinzipien sind grundsätzlich bloß über freie Anerkennungen als ‚wahr' gesetzt und müssen sich über ihre guten Orientierungen in einem pragmatisch-praktischen Gebrauch ‚bewähren'. Daher gibt es für generische Prinzipien keine ‚absoluten' Beweise oder Gegenbeweise (Widerlegungen), sondern sie ergeben sich aus einem freien argumentativen Streit um die realiter bestmöglichen allgemeinen Orientierungen bzw. deren expliziten Artikulationen. D.h. die ‚Wahrheit' generischer Inferenzen und Sätze besteht darin, dass sie sich in einem geschichtlichen Prozess einer gemeinsamen Vernunftentwicklung bewähren, wobei nicht jede faktische Anerkennung, also der bloße Konsens einer Mehrheit, ausreicht. Denn es ist da immer noch die sokratisch-platonische Frage zu beantworten, ob die Mehrheitsmeinungen auch wirklich die realiter *bestmöglichen* Theorien oder Darstellung- und Erklärungsformen anerkennen.

Diese Anerkennung besteht außerdem nicht etwa bloß in der verbalen Zustimmung zu expliziten Sätzen, sondern in einer konsequenten Inferenzpraxis bzw. der Anerkennung entsprechender generischer Inferenzen als ‚erlaubt', ‚richtig' oder ‚vernünftig'. Man sieht dabei, erstens, warum ein Explizitmachen generischer Inferenzformen so wichtig für eine selbstbewusste Vernunft werden kann, da wir jetzt eine *explizite*, d.h. zunächst bloß verbale, am Ende sogar schriftlich fixierte, Anerkennung mit einer *realen, praktischen*, *konkreten* konfrontieren können. Damit können wir sowohl das Verbale durch die Praxis des realen Tuns kontrollieren, als auch das reale Tun durch unser Reden. In eben dieser gegenseitigen Kontrolle besteht (Selbst)Bewusstsein und in nichts sonst. Diese Form des (Selbst)Bewusstseins geht weit über die bloß individuelle Vigilanz oder Wachheit, die Aufmerksamkeit oder Attention und die Geistesgegenwart oder Awareness hinaus. Sie gibt unserem Leben erst seine genuine Stabilität und überpräsente, ‚überzeitliche' Form. Daher gibt es auch kein rein privates Bewusstsein. Das individuelle Bewusstsein ist immer nur – freilich perspektivisch-subjektive – Teilnahme an einer der Form nach allgemeinen Praxis der Kontrolle von Reden durch Tun und Tun durch Reden, wenn man nur das „Reden“ hier weit genug versteht, nämlich unter Einschluss aller Imaginationen der Einbildungskraft, und dann auch aller Formen der Kommunikation, von der Mimik oder Geste bis zum Bild.

Nicht die bloß verbalen Konsequenzen, sondern die praktischen Konsequenzen im Einzelhandeln und in der Kooperation mit anderen Personen geben unserem Reden Sinn. Trotz der Selbsteinbettung in den Pragmatismus wird im Inferenzialismus von W. Sellars bis R. B. Brandom diese Tatsache durchaus noch unterschätzt und die Bedeutung der verbalen Schließens bzw. der Züge in einen Dialogspielen des Anerkennens und Gebens verbaler Gründe (*giving and asking for reasons*) überschätzt.

Es gehört darüber hinaus zu jeder sprechaktbezogenen Logik, dass der, welcher eine relevante Ausnahme einer relevanten Normalinferenz (oder ‚Normalerwartung’) kennt, sie auch nennen muss. Denn nur dann erweist er sich als kooperativ, wobei schon H. P. Grice auf die Bedeutung derartiger Kooperationsmaximen hingewiesen hat, allerdings ohne die Spannung zu sehen, die in Bezug auf seinen subjektiven Intentionalismus der Bedeutung entsteht. Um gut zu kooperieren, muss ich auf die Frage, ob noch Milch im Kühlschrank, in einem entsprechenden Fall sagen: „es ist *zwar* noch Milch im Kühlschrank; *aber sie ist sauer.*“ Und ich *darf* nicht einfach sagen: „Ja“. Till Eulenspiegel, die Karikatur des scholastischen Gelehrten oder formalanalytischen Philosophen, würde dagegen darauf bestehen, dass ein ‚Ja’ hier ‚rein formal’, also im Sinn einer rein schematischen Logik, ‚wahr’ sei. Damit sehen wir, wozu es führt, wenn wir alles nur aus dem formalen Blickwinkel verstehen möchten: Erst eine Art Sophismuskritik gegen diese Art von ‚Prokrustik’[9] macht ein robustes Sinnverstehen und vernünftiges Urteilen möglich.

Daher entwickeln wir unser generisches Wissen gerade auch in seiner verbalen (schriftlichen) Artikulation nicht etwa so, dass wir alle Einzelausnahmen berücksichtigen würden, sondern eher so, dass wir *relevante allgemeine Ausnahmetypen* im *logischen Modus der Besonderheiten* entwickeln, also unsere Begrifflichkeit weiterhin allgemein ausdifferenzieren. Die kategorialen Momente des Allgemeinen, Besonderen und Einzelnen, d.h. der je besonderen Anwendung allgemeiner Gesetzlichkeiten auf Ein-

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[9] Vgl. dazu den Scherzartikel „Prokrustik“, in: H. J. Sandkühler et al.: *Enzyklopädie Philosophie*, Hamburg: Meiner, 2010.

zelfälle, bleiben dabei immer erhalten. Erhalten bleibt damit auch die Aufgabe des Hörers oder Lesers, mit Relevanzbeurteilungen und Nachsicht die rechten Schlüsse zu ziehen, und das sind nie bloß formal-sophistische.

6. Materiale Möglichkeiten und inhaltliche Notwendigkeiten

Außerhalb eines schon anerkannten oder wenigstes als anerkennungswürdig vorgeschlagenen generischen Wissens gibt es keine gute Gründe, keinen angemessenen Begriff der notwendigen Geltung und damit auch keinen sinnvollen Begriff des Möglichen. Denn das Mögliche ist immer nur das, was wir unter Bezugnahme auf notwendige Unmöglichkeiten noch als berücksichtigenswert anerkennen bzw. was jeweils sinnvollerweise zu berücksichtigen ist.

Unsere räumlichen Ordnungen der Dinge und unsere zeitlichen Ordnungen von Ereignissen stützen sich entsprechend auf ein *sehr* allgemeines Wissen, wie es sich etwa so erläutern lässt: Aus der Aussage, dass an einem gewissen Ort in Paris der Eiffelturm steht, folgt inhaltlich, dass sich am selben Ort kein anderes Bauwerk als dieser Turm befinden kann, also nicht z.B. das Trocadero. Dass zwei Köperdinge nicht denselben Ort einnehmen (können), ist aber offensichtlich keine *rein formallogische* Wahrheit. Formallogisch ist viel mehr möglich, als wir realiter im vernünftigen Urteilen als sinnvolle Möglichkeiten zulassen bzw. zulassen sollten. So ist es rein formallogisch sicher möglich, in die eigene Vergangenheit zu reisen. In den Texten, in denen über solche Reisen geredet wird, kommt unser Normalbegriff des Zeitlichen durchaus völlig durcheinander, so dass wir am Ende nicht mehr genau wissen, wovon wir reden. Formallogisch ist es zwar auch möglich, dass ein Gott für Joshua die Sonne anhält bzw. dass diese morgen nicht mehr ‚aufgeht' – etwa weil die Erde sich aus irgend einer uns heute unbekannten Ursache nicht mehr dreht. Daraus folgt aber noch lange nicht, dass es irgend vernünftig wäre, mit solchen *bloß verbalen Möglichkeiten* je zu rechnen. Das immerhin gibt sogar auch Hume zu, aber ohne daraus den Schluss zu ziehen, dass das bloß formalanalytische Schließen auf der Grundlage bloß verbalterminologischer Definitionen viel zu schwach ist, um auch nur einem einzigen weltbezogenen Wort oder Satz (s)einen differenziellen und inferenziellen Inhalt zu geben.

Es ist sogar noch schlimmer. Humes Idee einer ‚sinnkritischen' Philosophie kollabiert gerade deswegen, weil es ihrer eigenen Methode zufolge viel zu viele verbal vorstellbare Möglichkeiten gibt, etwa die, man könne mit Bäumen oder Katzen sprechen oder diese könnten mit einander wie wir sprechen, um von der möglichen Existenz von Göttern ganz zu schweigen. Entsprechendes gilt für Hundeliebhaber, die ihren Lieblingen ein Denken zusprechen, ohne dass ihnen die Differenz zu der Art und Weise klar wäre, wie wir kontrollieren, ob ein Mensch (etwas) wirklich denkt oder ob wir das bloß meinen.

Eine logische Kritik an transzendenten Überzeugungen braucht offenbar einen anderen, weiteren Begriff des Logischen, wie er allein zu einem engeren Begriff des logisch bzw. sinnvoll Möglichen führen kann. Das ist Kants ursprüngliche Einsicht. Humes Kritik an ‚jeder' Transzendenz, auch an der Transzendenz eines innerweltlichen Allgemeinwissens jenseits meiner wenigen eigenen Erfahrungen, ist am Ende nichts als bloßer Dogmatismus und nicht etwa sinnkritische Philosophie. Schlimmer noch, aller Empirismus und alle bloß formalanalytische Philosophie verhindern ein angemessenes Verständnis realer Wissenschaft.

Es ist dabei insbesondere wichtig, bloß metaphorische bzw. figurative Gebräuche (in Einzelfällen wenigstens grob oder im Allgemeinen) von Normalgebräuchen zu unterscheiden. Der figurative Gebrauch zeichnet sich nämlich dadurch aus, dass gewisse Normalfallinferenzen auszuklammern oder besondere Vorsichtsmaßnahmen bei der Deutung zu beachten sind. Das Problem ist, dass man in der entsprechenden Abweichung von einem implizit als bekannt unterstellten Kanons offen lässt, welche Abweichungen zu beachten sind. Oft ist uns freilich gar nicht klar, wo und wie wir von einem Normalgebrauch zu einem metaphorischen Gebrauch übergehen, und was es umgekehrt heißt, dass wir durch gewisse Schematisierungen Metaphern in typischen Kontexten auch wieder zurück in Normalgebräuche verwandeln.

Das Wort „notwendig“ gehört dabei zu einer Modallogik, die keineswegs bloß formal zu verstehen ist. Dann was formallogisch oder mathematisch möglich ist, ist noch lange nicht physikalisch möglich, was physikalisch als möglich erscheinen mag ist noch lange nicht als biologische Möglichkeit realisiert etc. Im Grunde ist jede allgemeine Wissenschaft, soweit sie über die Historie des Berichtens von Einzelfakten hin-ausgeht, Wissen von dem, was gemäß der Disziplin kategorial möglich und notwendig ist. Kurz, wissenschaftliches Wissen ist generisches Wissen, das als solches einen materialen Begriff des Notwendigen definiert, ggf. mit kontingenten Ausnahmen. Seine Entwicklung ist die Entwicklung der kategorialen Titelbegriffe der Disziplin, etwa der Zelle in der Zellbiologie oder des Begriffs des Tieres in der Zoologie.

In gewissem Sinn ist dabei richtig, in einem anderen falsch zu sagen, es gebe keine notwendige Verknüpfung zwischen den Ereignissen in der Natur, sondern wir hätten diese Verknüpfungen bloß in unseren Theorien hergestellt. Es ist richtig insofern, als es keine Möglichkeit gibt, Möglichkeiten oder Notwendigkeiten als solche irgendwie wahrzunehmen. Das Einzige, was als möglich oder unmöglich bewertet werden kann, sind Inhalte von Aussagen, wie Wittgenstein schon im *Tractatus* klar macht. Dort allerdings operiert er noch mit einem sehr engen Begriff der Notwendigkeit und damit mit einem sehr weiten Begriff des Möglichen, nämlich dem einer bloßen formalen Logik. Dieser Begriff muss kategorial ausdifferenziert werden. Und dies hat durch die Bestimmung des kategorial Notwendigen bzw. Möglichen in den je begrenzten Dimensionen disziplinbezogenen generischen Wissens zu geschehen. Relevant dafür sind die zugehörigen materialbegrifflichen Normalitätsbedingungen und Unmöglichkeitsaussagen in den jeweiligen Dimensionen, also etwa der Physik, Chemie, Biologie oder auch in anderen Bereichen des Wissens und technischen Könnens.

Es ergibt sich, dass die formalen Quantifikationen über so genannte mögliche Welten, wie sie in der neueren formanalytischen Philosophie üblich geworden ist, ganz problematisch werden. Das schematisch Exakte ist hier klarerweise inhaltliche unstreng, vage und großzügig, und zwar aufgrund eines eklatanten Mangels an Besonderungsregeln für Urteile über Möglichkeiten und Notwendigkeiten, um von der inhaltlichen Leerheit des Begriffs einer ganzen möglichen *Welt* gar nicht weiter zu sprechen. Denn die einzigen Konkretisierungen dieser Metapher sind mathematische Mengenstrukturen. Das gilt klarer Weise für Autoren wie Montague und Kripke. Dem mystischen Überschwang bei David Lewis mit seinem Pathos realer pluraler Welten mag teilen, wer will. Dasselbe gilt für Putnams höchst vage Thesen über so genannte Zwillingswelten. Wir wissen nämlich absolut nichts über diese ‚Welten' außer dem, was uns die Sätze ihrer Schilderer sagen, die wir zunächst als ‚möglicherweise wahr' und dann als ‚in der möglichen Welt wahr' betrachten *sollen*, ohne das wirklich ganz klar wäre, was das heißt. Es ist nämlich ganz unklar, was es heißen soll, dass ein Stoff praktisch alle Eigenschaften von Wasser hat, aber nicht H_2O ist. Denn welche praktischen chemischen Eigenschaften des Wassers soll er dann noch haben, welche nicht? Es ist erst recht unklar, was es heißt, nicht bloß willkürliche Aussagen über einen ‚Welt' zu fällen, in der Personen in die Vergangenheit reisen oder sich an andere Orte ‚*beamen*' lassen können etc. Denn wir verstehen Möglichkeiten nur als Abwandlungen unserer Wirklichkeit, und das wiederum nur, wenn unsere Normalfallinferenzen des Verstehens, also die materialbegrifflichen Bedingungen unseres generischen Wissens auf hinreichen robuste Weise erfüllt bleiben.

Die berühmte, nach meiner Einschätzung aber eher als berüchtigt anzusehende, Methode des *Gedankenexperiments* oder der *eidetischen Variation* vergegenwärtigt uns daher am Ende nur *ex negativo*, was wirklich gilt oder was wir jedenfalls normalerweise als selbstverständlich annehmen. Der Fall ist logisch durchaus analog zu dem, dass wir aus der Denk-Annahme, dass es eine größte Primzahl gäbe, zwar beweisen können, dass es keine gibt, aber ohne zu wissen, was es bedeuten würde, dass es ‚wirklich' eine solche Zahl geben könne.

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Reality and Construction

Texts Do Not Reflect Outer Reality. What Do They Do Then?

Krzysztof Abriszewski, Toruń

The problem of world-language relation may be posed in a number of ways. Indeed, one could re-write the entire history of philosophy focused on that question. Nevertheless, there are more and less important subproblems gathered in here. I view the problem of innovation as a tough one. Uses of language and the processes in the world are relatively stabilized when nothing changes, thus we stay happily untroubled. However, when a change occurs, resulting for example, from a scientific cognitive development, we are puzzled and try to figure out an explanation. How is it that yesterday we wrote so-and-so, and today our view has expanded, and writings changed, and all that works somehow? Since we start with the language-world dichotomy, then the very problem boils down to a question of a relation between the opposite poles in the context of occuring changes. Here, scientific texts enter the stage, because of their crucial role in scientific cognitive practices. Thus a problem emerges: what do the scientific texts do? A realist would respond: scientific texts reflect reality, and they progressively improve at that.

On the other hand, constructivist approaches reject the thesis of texts reflecting some “outer reality”. One possible argument here points out the philosophical vagueness of “reality” and “reflecting” (see for example: von Foerster / Poerksen 2002, 17-63). Those concepts work well as commonsensical, but they are not useful in a philosophical argument. Yet, the realist could defend the thesis saying that the principle of charity forces us to exchange the problematic concepts for some unproblematic ones. The first ones are only cognitive shortcuts. While saying “reality” one may think of certain “pieces of reality” – states of affairs, situations, objects, relations etc. While saying “reflect” one may think about making descriptions, fabricating scientific texts, which progressively describe "pieces of reality".

In my text, I would like to argue against the idea of reflecting reality in scientific texts. But it is not my intention to violate the charity principle and criticize the notions of reality or reflection.

I would like to point out four models, which help in rejecting the metaphor of reflecting the reality. These are: Josef Mitterer's non-dualizing way of speaking (Mitterer 1992, 1996, 2001), Bruno Latour's circulating reference (Latour 1999), Ludwik Fleck's idea of thought styles and collectives (Fleck 1999) and some general assumptions of epistemological contructivisms (see for example: Riegler 2001).

Josef Mitterer analyses a structure called „dualizing way of speaking", which is so deeply inscribed in philosophical discourse that it has become a condition of a rational thinking. Thus philosophizing equals to solving problems generated by and inside the structure. Mitterer says:

> There are no problems at the beginning of philosophy. There are only unproblematized assumptions. Those assumptions consist of dichotomous distinctions (in epistemology and philosophy of language these are for example such dichotomies as: language-world, object-description, object-proposition, being-consciousness, subject-object, and others) (Mitterer 1996, 3).

Mitterer points out that dualizing structure dominates in philosophy since Plato. This thesis could be backed up by findings from history and cultural studies, especially works by Eric Havelock (for example Havelock 1963) and orality/literacy studies in general (see for example: Olson 1994). I claim that Plato (and other ancient philosophers) created the dualizing structure in response to alphabet writing, a new powerful communication technology. One of its advantages is the ability to bind together written symbols and phenomena (events, objects, relations) in a non-written world. Such is an experience of the first traders, and people who run temples or political institutions. Mitterer's critical work magnificently demonstrates how and why the dualizing way of speaking is not able to fulfill its promises. Though, it speaks about the other side of discourse, the very access goes through language. An object of description is never an "innocent", "untouched" object waiting outside the discourse. It is always inscribed in our language games. This argument doesn't say that physical reality is actually textual. It says that the textual, the physical, the social and so on, are intertwined so inextricably that the dualizing speaking is not able to pinpoint the complexities of knowledge processes. And needles to say, the idea of texts reflecting reality belongs to the dualizing way of speaking.

Mitterer's non-dualizing speaking, developed as an alternative, views knowledge getting and cognitive processes as moving from a *so far* description to a *from now on* description. So the general picture is of a network of descriptions. But, as I believe, the notion of "description" must not be interpreted narrowly, purely linguistically. I'd rather follow Jacques Derrida and point out that words like "description", "to de-scribe", "to inscribe" and "to scribe" always suggest marking physical traces (Derrida 1976). Whether there are traces on paper, clay plate, sound waves, lab computer signals, digital photos, or plant samples collected by a botanist, is a minor issue. The conclusion is as follows: when asking "what do the scientific texts do?" the answer would be: "they tie together different descriptions making networks".

In his *Pandora's Hope*, Bruno Latour introduces and elaborates the concept of circulating reference (1999, 24-79). The concept is a result of using methods of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) to answer the question "how do the scientists pack up the world into words?", or "how is it that scientists start with a research subject, and end up with a report (a book, paper, conference speech) in their hands? First of all, they never leap over a huge abyss separating the domain of things from the domain of signs (or knowledge). This leap is a myth. However, they undertake a number of actions, manipulating their objects, making physical traces (as mentioned above), and doing translation. Latour follows translations in scientific research aiming at determining whether the Amazon forests expand or shrinks in favor of savannah. The scientists first select a small piece of land in the forest-savannah border, then they collect samples, describe them and put into order. After that they are ready to sketch preliminary schemes illustrating correlations. Only then they start to make a report. Instead of one big leap and a binary opposition (e.g. between world and words), there is a chain or a network of actions. Latour describes that as circulating reference. Similarly to electric current, the path leading from an initial research subject to a final report requires the circuit (network) to be uninterrupted.

A number of conclusions follow. First: it doesn't make sense to speak of two domains, when there are multiple leaps. My studies proved an amazing variety in this respect. For example, a sociological survey needs several steps, while a friend of mine working in an oncological laboratory needed over two hundred steps for his research to be done. Second: it doesn't make sense to use a metaphor of mirroring, since there are more diverse relations. More accurately, one may speak of circulating (following Latour) or translations. Third: one is hardly able to qualify pieces of translation networks as belonging to "world" or "language", because the previous elements are always more material, while the next ones are more sign-like. So either you enable gradual belonging to world or words, or give up the categories altogether. Fourth: scientific texts do not reflect outer reality, so when answering "what do they do" question, one just says "they belong to networks of scientific practices". This leads to the following question: "what do they do in those networks?" To answer this, one has to, according to ANT, study the very texts. We will get back to this later on. But first, I would like to refer to two other criticisms of the mirror concept.

Ludwik Fleck, in his *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact* (1999), offered a couple of insights about scientific texts. First, authors always inscribe their friends and foes in scientific texts. Secondly, the functions of journal texts are different from those from handbooks. The former written as a sort of drafts, always enter the heat of scientific controversies. They may become classic, be attacked, criticized or just ignored. The latter present finished, ready-made knowledge.

This assumes that a text is not just a story about a piece of world, but always a participation in a game with other fellow scientists. Thus saying that texts reflect reality and all the other text elements are a contingent vehicle, hardly holds on. It sounds reductive, and reduction always needs to be thoroughly justified. All the while, if we removed the game aspect of the texts, the very scientific activity would be impossible. Science is a collective enterprise, and isolated, solitary geniuses are pop-cultural myths.

The journal-handbook distinction also stresses the collective character of science. Scientific thought styles need diverse tools for different purposes – practicing in journal texts, and fixed contents of handbooks. One cannot name the most important ones without falling into reductionism. Get rid of them (journals or textbooks) and you undermine the scientific practice again. Furthermore, it is easy to expand Flecks observations to other accounts and their functions – reports for non-academic institutions, conference presentations, lectures for doctoral students, seminar discussions etc. Scientists developed the whole gamut of tools to facilitate their job, which Fleck described as manipulating of active and passive factors. Different texts do different jobs with that. Handbooks come up to 100% of passive factors, while seminar discussions may involve much more active elements to search for new paths, surprising solutions or astonishing concepts. So, here is the conclusion of the Fleck part: when asking "what do the texts do", one answers that they operate on active and passive factors, stimulate connections among them, change their status, search for the new ties, finally, they themselves turn into active/passive elements.

Risking overgeneralisation, I would like to unite various constructivisms under a label of "epistemological constructivism". It says that we are not able to say anything about reality in itself, instead we operate only in the representations, which are our cognitive constructs (see Riegler 2001). Yet, we cannot manipulate them at will, they are just representations conditioned by our biology, culture, psychology and so on. Thus, they do not reflect anything, and accordingly, texts do not reflect anything. They operate on the cognitive system (biological organism, individual, culture) inner representations, referring to inside and outside of the system. Thus texts could be viewed as inner constructed representations of outer reality and of states of the system. I wouldn't like to accept all the constructivist assumptions, however one constructivist step seems crucial here. It exchanges "reflecting" for "representing". Then, instead of searching for the (in)accurate reflection, we may ask different questions: "what is represented?", "what is the medium of representation?", "what is the purpose of representing?", "what's its mechanism?".

Let me sum up the arguments. Philosophical structure consisting of a relation of mirroring world in texts needs to be dissolved. We should ask what happens in texts, how do texts participate in reconstructing of our collective world, instead of just asking what a given text is about. The latter is a practical question, not a general, philosophical one. This leads to a next question: "what kind of network does the text help to build?" What circulates in the reference chain? How is a particular text connected to other texts, where are the active and passive elements? And, what does it mean "to represent"?

Thus, by giving up a reflecting metaphor, four others may prove to be useful: network assembling, reference circulating in circuits, activating and dis-activating, and representing.

Now, I'd like to present my second argument, which is of a different kind. The first one referred to four general concepts, or models, which help to give up the idea of mirroring, and therefore any dualizing philosophical discourse that speaks about language and world. Now, relying on empirical studies done in science studies on scientific texts, I would like to indicate several phenomena common in scientific texts. This would be my direct answer to the initial question. Unfortunately, there is no room for examples, so I just list them referring to works of Bruno Latour and others (Latour 1987, 21-62; Latour / Bastide 1986; Latour / Woolgar 1979, 151-186; Callon / Law / Rip 1986).

1. Scientific texts associate the known and usual with the unknown and unusual. That is called "a cognitive profit". Or, alternatively, they also reassemble the known in an unusual way.
2. But sole associating won't do. Scientific texts need to convince their reader that it is so. Thus the second task: to lead a reader from a beginning to an end without losing him/her. S/he needs to be overwhelmed by nuances of arguments, convinced by the author's claims while dropping all the doubts. The text has to change its reader. It needs to take care of him/her.
3. The author, through the texts, becomes a new expert covering the presented area. If s/he succeeds, and the texts is viewed as credible, s/he will get credits, and change his/hers scientific status. But if s/he looses, s/he will become a fiction writer, an illusion expert, will miss a chance and loose the reputation. Furthermore, the author himself/herself defines his/her new abilities in the very text: being just a continuator, sole revolutionist, or modestly completing missing parts of a worldview.
4. This also means that each text actively modifies all the other texts, it refers to in footnotes. It confirms, approves or rejects them. The former authors are called "brilliant researchers", or "irresponsible frauds". It pinpoints contradictions and amazing solutions.

5. Thus each text interprets other texts. It cuts out concepts and fundamental ideas, points out crucial claims, evaluates other's arguments.
6. If the text succeeds, and leads its reader safely all the way down, there is a possibility that the reader will then act – will undertake a research or write a new text. So the scientific text may possess an ability to stimulate actions.
7. Texts by speaking of the unknown, introduce new phenomena and new beings into our collective life. And, while doing that present a brave new world, or our old familiar world anew.
8. Philosophers of science tried to solve a problem of induction – how to leap from a finite number of empirical cases to a general proposition. Scientific texts usually need to solve that without much hesitation. So, finally, they are also able to solve sophisticated philosophical problems.

Here are the conclusions. Even, if at first sight scientific texts seemed to reflect "outer" reality, it is not so. We listed both general arguments, and generalizations from observations and empirical investigations. So doing philosophy by relying on language-reality opposition is nothing more than just a mistake. And here is the bad news: some of the traditional philosophical models are not useful anymore, officially becoming now museum pieces. But there is also a good news: the problem is much more complex than it seemed before, so we, philosophers, have still a lot of work to do.

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Conceptualizing Technoscience in a Reasonable, Constructivist Way

Ewa Bińczyk, Toruń

It is personally satisfying for me to take part in the discussion about reality and construction by presenting a specific, “reasonable” version of constructivism. Of course, *this* version is the most promising one, at least in my opinion. Let me admit from the beginning that it is widely inspired by Bruno Latour`s actor-network theory and also other results of the so-called STS – science and technology studies.

One of characteristic, troublesome areas of the discussion about constructivism (and reality) is the special status of scientific knowledge, often legitimized by a “miraculous”, practical success of technology. Let me underline that in my paper I will picture science and technology as practically successful, underdetermined and historically institutionalized at the same time.

Moreover, as I believe, constructivist position turns out to be especially convenient and useful, when we analyze the role of scientific discoveries and technological innovations in the globalized world. The parameters of our reality (understood as social, normative, symbolic and also material/physical context) are constantly transformed on such a large scale that only dynamic, relational and anti-essentialist theoretical frameworks prove to be able to grasp these processes. Therefore, the last purpose of my presentation is to argue that a reasonably projected constructivism is a theoretical background needed to carefully rethink the most important political problems of the risk society today.

The conceptualization presented here can rightly be labeled as pragmatic or Darwinian. I define science and technology similarly in this perspective, as two spheres of a historical, collective practice of controlling and predicting isolated phenomena (Richard Rorty defines scientific activity in a parallel way). Scientific and technological efforts aim at “coping” with reality or domesticating the environment. I will consider science in this paper as a collective undertaking in its whole complexity, not only in its intellectual dimension – not only as a set of theories (this would be a reductionist decision, considering only one kind of scientific results).

Conceiving cognition as, first of all, effective action, seems theoretically valuable, as I think. This is openly assumed regarding cognition of all organisms, not only human beings, within such biologically inspired fields, as radical constructivism or enactivism. Ernst von Glasersfeld, Niklas Luhmann or Francisco Varela for instance study the dynamic processes of knowing, emerging from the multiple interactions of the organism with the environment. They define the function of cognition not as representation, but as viability (resulting in adequate behavior or fitting).

Unfortunately, those two fields analyze cognition mainly in its individual context. Yet human cognitive activity is a collective, multidimensional phenomenon. It is enriched through human coordination and language, through the use of instruments, laboratories and artificial systems, for instance informational technologies, like writing. Therefore, to describe human cognition adequately, such theories as enactivism or radical constructivism must be supplemented.

I accept some form of a "flat" realism, just to state that human practices (also cognitive) take place in the context of a certain environment. Ludwik Fleck articulated a similar position, when he wrote "I use the word "reality" only for grammatical reasons, in sentences about cognitive activities" (Fleck 1986, 196, trans. E.B.). Even Bruno Latour answers affirmatively to the question "Do you believe in reality?" (Latour 1999, 1-23).

Nevertheless, this realism is epistemologically trivial, being supplemented by a decisive anti-representationalism. The decision to avoid excessive epistemological, representational claims seems justified, especially if we remember the unsuccessful philosophical trials to indicate universal, rational algorithms of scientific method or to ensure the privileged epistemological status of scientific (or any) knowledge.

Thereby, "reality" in the model presented here is assumed only as an epistemically elusive factor, playing no decisive role. It goes without saying that the underdetermination thesis is a crucial element of my conceptualization. The article assumes that both theories and optimal practical solutions are underdetermined by empirical evidences or a material resistance.

What is interesting, radical constructivists mentioned above use similar solution. They assume explicitly some kind of the non-arbitrariness of knowledge. It is understood by Luhmann for example as the evolutionarily-controlled selectivity of the process of a cognitive system's constitution and transformation (Luhmann 1990, 77). Yet, the environment is so rich that it is possible to construct a lot of epistemic alternatives. In effect, human knowledge is underdetermined, it cannot claim uniqueness: no matter how viable the cognitive solution might seem, it can never be regarded as the only possible one.

Several statements concerning the term "construction" should be added at this point. "Construction" turned out to be a very dangerous metaphor – we observed many examples of misunderstandings and erroneous interpretations in this respect (cf. Hacking 2000, 1-62). First of all, construction is never freely done by an individual actor. Constructing is a collective work, historically rooted. In this point the term „construction" proves to be close to the classic sociological term "institutionalization" or even to the term "stabilization".

Constructing is also for me a multidimensional undertaking – not only social and symbolic, but also material. Let us consider such contemporary examples of constructed entities, as the ozone hole, frozen embryos, data banks, hybrid corn, experts systems or psychotropic drugs (cf. Latour 1993, 49-50). The first of them, the ozone hole, is not only a physical phenomenon, for it is caused by the human intervention, made visible by human scientific practices and instruments, and becomes a subject of controversies and concern through documents, conferences and legal instruments. Many layers are intertwined here: normative, material, social and symbolic.

Moreover, as the examples above illustrate, the effects of constructing are not artificial, false or merely textual – they can be objective and real. Every potentiality that is domesticated through collective human practice can be called "constructed". The domestication has both cognitive and practical dimension, it took place for instance in the Neolithic Revolution when breeding and agriculture was invented, supported by a new form of knowledge. The other example is coping with bacterias through the invention of hygienic procedures, vaccines and antibiotics that emerged together with specific biological theories generating new ontological claims (Latour 1988).

The important limitations of constructing are previous constructions. New conceptual structures or practical solutions should be compatible with those already existing. In the history of technoscience we observed that alternative solutions or theories had been cut off or ignored.

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Nowadays, scientific and technological efforts constitute the innovative "core" of culture, where systematic and professional constructing takes place. It became possible especially due to the institutionalization of an experimental method in a certain historical moment. If we focus on an empirical, laboratory-centered dimension of science (as Science and Technology Studies did), we perceive mainly the successful practices of controlling and predicting. Because they are so strongly dependent on instruments and analogical to technological efforts, Bruno Latour, for instance, proposes to use the uniform term "technoscience" (Latour 1987). This term stresses that there is no significant difference between those two fields: while solving *both* theoretical and practical problems, scientists try to replicate experiments and engineers work to create working machines.

Technoscience is funded on its internal systematic character. It is also institutionally rooted in laboratories. In a powerful, innovative context of laboratory it becomes possible to make errors without consequences, to repeat trials, to negotiate hypotheses looking for the best explanations or solutions (Latour 1983). In laboratories, scientists and engineers professionally domesticate the environment. They construct entities, build connections, establish relations, while minimizing costs and disturbances. The work in laboratory is a mundane question of guessing, trying as much as possible to manipulate ordinary objects, models, graphs, tables, maps, materials and samples.

Of course, technoscientific work is acted out in the physical, material context. Interventions in material context in laboratories give voice to facts and codetermine the content of scientific knowledge. As Latour puts it: "Objects that exist simply as objects, detached from a collective life, are unknown, buried in the ground" (Latour 1999, 193). Scientific knowledge is always underdetermined and embodied in complex processes of laboratory transformations. Microorganisms are only visible, when we prepare them, by staining with aniline dye. Reality is prepared and also stabilized by such instruments, like radio sonograms, microscopes, computer tomographs, ultrasound scanners. Nevertheless, we cannot unambiguously determine the material factor (understood as the innocent, empirical „input", absolutely independent from human procedures, assumptions, categorizations, theories, interventions, etc.).

The stability of content in the history of science can be understood here, if we take into consideration that it is maintained exactly by laboratory standardized methods and instrumental procedures. Scientific equipment is much more stable than theories, paradigms or even established facts.

Spectacular practical success of science can be described and explicated from this point of view as well. It derives from large efforts to replicate procedures, standardize criteria and stabilize technoscientific achievements. Selected solutions invented in laboratories are next "capitalized" in artifacts, larger technological systems and material infrastructures incorporated into reality outside laboratory. "Science in action" transforms the whole context of human practice (Latour 1987).

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Such diagnoses of the modern society, as for example Ulrich Beck`s, Anthony Giddens`s and also Latour`s view suggest that scientific and technological interventions, incorporated into the industry, reshape society on a large scale and produce many unintended side effects. Unexpected, dangerous consequences are visible in many distant fields: material, environmental, institutional, political, economic and normative. Technoscientific dynamics generates currently new forms of risk and destabilization.

I will use the terms "risk" in a manner close to the way in which Beck uses it (Beck 1992). Risk is here a probability of some dangerous, unpredictable side effects of an innovation. Risk is always a social construct in many dimensions (in spite of being really harmful, like chemical pollution). It must be recognized, described, articulated, estimated by its spokespersons. The multidimensional construction of risk has also a normative background. It is impossible to objectively define "dangerousness," without taking into consideration certain axiological preferences. Moreover, there are no effective, unproblematic methods to calculate risks.

We must agree that human practices, interferences and constant decision processes permanently transform the border parameters of reality. From the historical moment in which the professional laboratory has been invented, socializing new potentialities, i.e. incorporating them into collective has taken a very intensive, accelerated form. Technoscience and industry simply introduce too many *deep* changes on an extensive scale. Global context of mutual interdependence, feedback effects, and reciprocal interactions only intensifies this situation.

In regard to the hybrid nature of so many entities incorporated into reality today, we need a new, non-anthropocentric paradigm to describe it. This is why (among other reasons) Latour does not speak about society anymore. He uses the term "collective" instead, defining the associations of humans and non-humans. The extent of current ecological, medical, biotechnological or genetic interventions make this terminological decision quite reasonable.

According to Beck our society enters into a phase of a "reflexive modernity". We live in the era of catastrophes, openly discussed controversies, changing role of experts, and the emerging phenomena of the counter-expertise. There are also important political changes. Politicians are forced to make quick decisions in the conditions of uncertainty or a partial recognition. The modern society envisages also growing political fights over risk-defining positions.

As a result, many assumptions, taken for granted until now, demand serious problematization. Among them are the Enlightenment idea of progress (defined as inevitable), the ideological fundaments of a capitalist system, the premise that knowledge is a nonproblematic good and technology is a beneficial, innocent instrument.

"Reflexive modernity" needs to question also those values that constitute a market infrastructure (such as profit, constant consumption, or production demands). The uncritical attitudes towards them caused among other a high level of the commercialization of science. It becomes painfully visible for example in biomedical research, especially in the context of patenting embryos, human genes and new organisms.

Despite the fact that it seems almost incredible, we need to take into account today that the majority of products should never be produced! It is postulated regarding the amount of pollution that production of some objects requires; regarding the danger some products pose (like weapon or certain chemicals); regarding the triviality of many needs created by the advertising practices, targeting also children.

In conclusion let me simply enumerate selected theses resulting from the problems discussed in the article.

1) A public open debate about innovations must be created, before they are introduced into society. Directions and the very reasonableness of technoscientific research should not be discussed *post factum*, when it is usually too late. This is how a systematic helplessness is projected.
2) Not only experts, representatives of corporations or government, but also sociologists, ethicians and lay people afflicted by a change, should be invited to the discussion. At this point paternalism of state and experts should be avoided.
3) We should stop analyzing the relation between technoscience and society in terms of the *impact* of one independent sphere on another, or in terms of *isolated, innocent* discoveries/gadgets. We observe rather deep and global interconnections between heterogeneous elements. Introducing an innovation in one sphere may cause a serious unexpected effect in another, distant domain.
4) No matter how difficult such project may seem, we should try to create global, institutional, systemic monitoring of the industry and technoscientific development. We need intellectuals to moralize those issues, problematize them and build a global macroethics which is still in its initial stage.

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How the Category of Embodiment Transforms the Problems of Philosophy of the Language: The Case of Understanding

Aleksandra Derra, Toruń

> The 'embodiment' refers to the dynamical interactions between the brain, the body and the physical/cultural environment.
>
> (Gibbs 2005, 67)

1. Introductory remarks

In recent decades of the research activity of cognitive science the current known as 'embodiment' (embodied cognition, embodied mind) has been more and more visible in such different and inter- and disconnected areas as philosophy, socio-cultural studies, phenomenology, developmental psychology and biology, evolution theories, neurophysiology, neurocomputational modeling, robotics, linguistics and others (Rohrer 2007). It has also been cognitively fruitful and refreshing in shaping new ways of treating fundamental philosophical issues in such distinctions as: mind/body, inner/outer (Svensson / Lindblom / Ziemke 2007, 252), subject/object, the objective/the subjective (Lakoff / Johnson 1980), the theory/the experience or problems: of understanding, the status of linguistic meaning and category of reference (Zlatev 2007), the role and the character of metaphor – naming only few. One has to be aware of the fact that embodied approach constitutes complex philosophical project in progress and as such is very difficult to analyze and judge. Nevertheless, I claim that it has transformed the basic problems of philosophy of language and the modes of studying so dramatically that it is worth taking a closer look at the consequences it has brought for philosophical studies of language. Let us keep in mind that the category of embodiment is tightly connected with re-formulated philosophical category of knowledge, where knowledge is treated as situated, embedded in the environment and cognitive capacities of the subject as a dynamic and unstable phenomenon which relies on many different factors (neuronal, phenomenal, social and cultural), including unconscious ones (Lakoff / Johnson 1999, 102-103). Consequently, the aim of the embodied approach to language is very different from disembodied one. I want to specify what kind of differences we are exactly talking about here, but before I will do so, let me shortly characterize the category of embodiment.

2. Three ideas of embodiment

Dealing with vast, complex and complicated material, overfilled with various theories formulated in embodied approach to cognition and mind, I have decided to select and name three, the most representative presentations of the category of embodiment as I see it (though there are different and more complex typologies in literature: Ziemke 2003, Rohrer 2007). They will be called respectively: neuronal, experiential-phenomenological, socio-cultural. These modes of understanding of embodiment are not mutually exclusive. They appear in one theory, but very often one of these modes becomes dominant in certain conception. Let me point out their most important features.

While talking about embodiment we can treat is as the physical substrate and emphasize neuronal realization of all cognitive activities we are examining (Rohrer 2007, 359). This is connected with methodologies which are supposed to be more ‘objective’ for they use findings from neuroscience (neurophysiology, neuropsychology or neurocomputational modeling). The main assumption here is that embodied cognitive systems need to have physical grounding and that in case of humans, basic features of neuronal organization determine human cognition to the large extent. In other words, cognition is in non trivial way dependent on its physical medium, which means more than just the fact it is realized by brain and its neurons. Among other things it means for example that human conceptual thought is ruled out by various processes which are beyond human conscious awareness (Lakoff / Johnson 1999, 9-15). We should be able to construct models which will explain the correlation between neuronal, behavioral and conceptual levels of human cognition.

The second sense of the category of embodiment seems to be the most known and can be called experiential-phenomenological. We are taking into account two interrelated dimensions here, namely personal experience connected with one's body, and broadly understood environment (together with other people with whom we interact) in which this experience takes place. The main idea, which is directly taken from phenomenology (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty), is that by means of introspection and reflection we can study the role our bodies play in shaping our identity and our culture. Body is understood here as an object of perception and an indispensable source of perception, as a physical object and as a phenomenon very different from materially understood entity. It is emphasized here that bodies project fundamental and initial orientation onto the objects in the world we live in. According to this view, human cognition has its beginnings in sensorimotor system generated by human body with its specific characteristic. In other words, we can interact with the world because we are equipped with sensorimotor capacities, which leads us to another sense of embodiment.

The third understanding of the category of embodiment refers to the wild notion of praxis and practices which in case of humans take place in social and cultural environment. It is underlined here that when an individual performs (acts) we can deduce the form of cultural level of embodiment from that practice and vice versa. The question here is also how a particular person with her body and mind is constructed by the means of being embedded in a particular culture (Rohrer 2007, 350). Great significance is attached here to the notion of interaction, both with other embodied minds and with the environment. We emphasize here that not only nervous system and motor and perceptional capacities of our bodies are relevant to cognition, but also the fact that they are situated in a certain place, historical time and given mother tongue.

3. Traditional (disembodied) versus embodied approach to language

The considerations in this part of my paper have to be necessarily oversimplified. I want to point out some fundamental and basic ideas which underlie the traditional way of studying language in philosophy. I do not intend to show that all theories which one can find in the broad theoretical area of the philosophy of language, especially when one takes all its nuances into account, are good illustrations for all theses stated in the so called disembodied approach to language. On the contrary, the advocates of the embodied approach quite often draw some inspirations and solutions from complex philosophical tradition of dealing with language conceptions. Nevertheless, we can conclusively point out important and essential differences. Just by looking at the companions to the philosophy of language and basic manuals to that domain of philosophy, we can enumerate its fundamental problems, categories and notions. For example, we can find there the problem of meaning and theories of meaning (with such notions like propositional attitudes, holism, naturalized semantics, metaphor); the problem of the relation between language, truth and reality (which generates among others such issues like realism and its oppositions, theories of truth, analyticity, rule-following); the trouble with reference, identity and necessity (with such terms like rigid designation, objects and criteria of identity, modality) (Hale / Wright 2000). Language is mainly treated here as a phenomenon which can be described on a symbolic, formal level (the idea developed out of Chomskyan linguistics) where meaning is a kind of abstract content (Rowlands 2004, 173). What is more, language seems to be a kind of passive, transparent medium between cognitive subject and the world as an object of cognition (where object/subject distinction and the objective/subjective distinction are taken for granted).

The idea of language as something embodied is quite often connected with the famous work on metaphor done by Lakoff and Johnson (Lakoff / Johnson 1980). When we oversimplify their view we can say that the metaphor plays the fundamental role in shaping our ways of thinking, hence it also creates reality we live in. This fundamental linguistic category is embodied in very direct sense, namely because basic metaphors are based on bodily relations. When we follow Lakoff and Johnson in their later book *Philosophy in the Flesh*, we can give more detailed explanation. They claim that the world's languages make use of quite a small number of basic image schemas which are tightly related with the function of human's body (Lakoff / Johnson 1999, 36). As Gallagher used to put it, language is a modality of human body, which is supposed to be illustrated in gestures – treated as the origin of human language in integrative theory of gestures which Gallagher advocates, and in relations between language centers and motor areas in the human brain (Gallagher 2005, 125). Additionally, Gallagher claims that the body generates gestural expressions only if there is another person, for it motivates and mediates this process (Gallagher 2005, 129).

There is an indispensable need of posing the following question: 'Why philosophy of language traditionally understood is not sufficient?'. We could answer initially and preliminary in a very general hence unsatisfactory way. Namely, that it does not describe natural language as it is used by humans in their everyday activities. The embodied approach underlines the need of taking into account the full context of everyday life of humans – including especially the subjective experience. The traditional approach with its theoretical inclination (with meaning as something symbolic, formal, often explained in terms of truth-conditions; knowledge as built up out of propositions) seems to be too narrow in understanding language and therefore not able to describe human cognition. To put it differently, language in embodied view is seen as an integral part of human bodies, hence as an important component of their functioning, also on neuronal level. It is 'not just as an abstract formal system' (Feldman 2006, 8, 333). If one of the aims of the philosophy of language is to describe human cognition, it has to characterize human language experience using evidence from psychology, neuroscience and philosophy. As we can deduce from the mentioned presentations of the category of embodiment, the problems of meaning and understanding are in a sense empirical problems. Though 'empirical' should not be treated here as in the neopositivist view rightly so criticized by Quine (Quine 1951). Language for example can be treated as a source of data which will allow us to understand human experience. The embodiment plays the central role in the generation of language and this role has to be made more specific for using language as such. To sum up, the traditional approach to language to the large extent simplifies the object of its studies. The embodied current tries to underline the complex character of the phenomenon of language and does not promise to include all of its aspects in one theory.

4. The case of understanding

Let us oversimplify and claim that according to the traditional view of language, to understand a sentence means to be able to map the expressions which are heard or seen onto representation on their meaning (Weiskopf 2009, 6). Meaning here as we have seen before, is an abstract formal entity which can be computed by a cognitive system. Let me now compare this approach with the embodied one.

Embodied neuronal approach states that understanding language involves almost the same neuronal activity as in the case of moving and perceiving (Feldman 2006, 5), which means that more or less the same basic neuronal mechanism is functioning when people use abstract thoughts and when they move their hands. This results in initial claim that the capacity to use and understand language is an integral part of broader bodily-neuronal cognitive system, and as such is not a kind of higher order cognitive faculty. It cannot be treated separately, but rather as continuous with other human mental activities. Following the studies of simulation mechanisms and the functioning of mirror neurons we can see that they play fundamental role in human capacity of understanding others and probably also of understanding language. Roughly speaking, in order to understand the action which is observed by a given agent, she simulates what she is observing by means of her own sensorimotor processes (Svensson / Lindblom / Ziemke 2007, 253-254). It is worth noting that the evidence from contemporary brain science suggests that the genesis and the evolution of language involves complicated net of interactions between 'the internal' (neuronal, physical) and environmental elements, which means that nature vs. nurture debate in case of language is cognitively fruitless (Feldman 2006, 282).

Phenomenological and socio-cultural view of embodiment suggests that understanding language is a part of wider category of understanding others, which requires practices with shared experience that makes the communication possible. Zlatev for example introduces the concept of mimetic schemas which coordinate embodiment and situatedness of human cognitive subject in a frame of work which can be coherent. According to him linguistic symbols are embodied because their meaning is partly constituted by these mimetic schemas. Their functioning involves phenomenological body, representational structure (though with a reformulated sense of representation) and the possibility of pre-reflected sharing them with others (Zlatev 2007, 326). Once again: body as a phenomenon, neuronal mechanisms and environment full of others, integrally constitute basics for functioning of language and language understanding. We should treat understanding as a process in which agents use their knowledge about how their body could interact in environment. In embodied approaches language communication and (communication in general) does not occur between Cartesian minds producing specific theory in internal mental realm. As a result of this theory speech, gestures or certain actions appear (Gallagher 2005, 212). Rather these gestures, interactions and speech constitute understanding itself. Gallagher points out that the understanding of other' intentions is possible because they are directly seen in others' embodied actions which mirror our own ability to act (Gallagher 2005, 224). The crucial notions here are common situation and social context which allow us to use our practical know-how, and make use of understanding others and understanding others' linguistic expressions possible. We can do so, long before such philosophical phenomenon like theoretical reason is fully developed (so, also earlier than mature adults language is used). One is not able to understand language and what is more is not able to explain the functioning of language learning system unless one is able to point out the relevant information which is available for a language user from her social and linguistic environment (Rowlands 2004, 200).

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Wittgenstein and the Literary

Das erlösende Wort

James C. Klagge, Blacksburg

Wittgenstein was not easily distracted from his work. During the Great War, within two weeks of being stationed at Krakow, he was making philosophical entries in his notebooks. In his coded notebooks, he would comment on the adverse conditions, physical and spiritual. He would also comment on how his philosophical work was progressing.

After almost two months of philosophical entries, Wittgenstein took stock in his coded remarks (Wittgenstein 1991, 32, 17.10.14): "Yesterday worked very hard. The knot is tightening more and more, but I have found no solution [*Lösung*] … Will the *erlösende* thought come to me, will it come??!!" A month later he returns to this concern (44, 21.11.14): "Worked a considerable amount. But still I can never express the one *erlösende* word. I go round about it and get very close, but still I cannot lay hold of it itself." And the next day: "The *erlösende* word not expressed. Yesterday it was right on the tip of my tongue. But then it disappears again." But this concern didn't emerge in his philosophical notebooks until 20.1.15 (Wittgenstein 1979a, 39): "The *erlösende* word—?" and then six months later, more articulately (54, 3.6.15): "The *erlösende* word still hasn't yet been spoken."

When Wittgenstein's philosophical notebooks from this period were first published and translated in 1961, Anscombe translated *erlösende* as "key." There is no reason to suppose she paused over this translation—"key" makes sense in the contexts, though it is not a dictionary translation. But the word has resonances in German that are lost with that translation. For instance, when Job says (Job 19:25): "I know that my redeemer liveth", Luther's German Bible renders "redeemer" as *Erlöser*. Similarly, when the psalmist calls on the Lord (Psalm 19:14) as "my strength, and my redeemer", Luther again has it as *Erlöser*.

Wittgenstein then drops the word from his work, and reflections on his work, up through the *Tractatus*. We never hear whether he found "the one *erlösende* word," or even what it could have been. But it seems to have been, for Wittgenstein, something that would constitute a solution [*Lösung*] to his philosophical problems. We might conjecture that the *erlösende* word of the *Tractatus* turned out to be no word at all, but silence—as recommended in proposition 7! "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

When writing to Ludwig von Ficker, a prospective publisher for the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein explained (Wittgenstein 1979b, 94-5):

> I once wanted to give a few words in the foreword which now actually are not in it, which however, I'll write to you now because they might be a key [*Schlüssel*] for you: I wanted to write that my work consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of everything which I have *not* written. And precisely this second part is the important one. For the Ethical is delimited from within, as it were, by my book; and I'm convinced that, *strictly* speaking, it can ONLY be delimited in this way. In brief, I think: All of that which *many* are *babbling* today, I have defined in my book by remaining silent about it.

Or, one might say, only silence can *redeem* such babbling.

But upon Wittgenstein's return to philosophical work in 1929, he resumed the search. In a notebook in 1929, he writes (Wittgenstein 1994-95 v. 1, 176): "The task of philosophy is to find the *erlösende* word." And then in another notebook from the same year (Wittgenstein 1994-95 v. 2, 68) he repeats this sentence, adding: "The *erlösende* word is the solution of a philosophical problem." In conversation with Schlick (Waismann 1979, 77, 2.1.30) Wittgenstein comments: "Everything we do consists in trying to find the *erlösende* word."

On 18.1.31, he elaborated (Wittgenstein 1994-95 v. 3, 156): "The philosopher strives to find the *erlösende* word, that is, the word that finally permits us to grasp what up until now has intangibly weighed down our consciousness." And then he uses my favorite comparison in all of his writing: "It is as if one had a hair on one's tongue; one feels it but cannot grasp/seize it, and therefore cannot get rid of it." He continues: "The philosopher delivers the word to us with which one/I can express the thing and render it harmless."

Wittgenstein liked these three sentences from 1931 so well that they reappear in a typescript based on the manuscript (TS 211, 158), and are preserved among cuttings taken from that (TS 212, 1115). Then they are used in his so-called "Big Typescript" of 1933 (Wittgenstein 1993, 165), where Luckhardt and Aue translate as the "liberating" word. Portions or slight modifications of these sentences appear in typescripts (TS 220, 83, TS 238, 11, and TS 239, 84) that serve as early drafts of the *Investigations*, but the phrase does not make it all the way into the *Investigations*.

Yet I believe the idea retains a role in the *Investigations* nonetheless. Starting with the opening section of the *Investigations* (§1), Wittgenstein states "Explanations come to an end somewhere." This is a truism—Wittgenstein might have called it a rule of grammar—but it is a truism that, oddly enough, is easy to lose sight of. It's the kind of thing we need to be reminded of (PI §127): "The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose." What is that purpose? Well, we tend to push too far in our desire to understand. Yet not everything can get explained. (Zettel §315): "'Why do you demand explanations? If they are given you, you will once more be facing a terminus. They cannot get you any further than you are at present.'"

And the truism holds not just for explanations, but for reasons (PI §326): "the chain of reasons has an end"; justifications (OC §192): "justification comes to an end"; grounds (OC §204): "giving grounds … comes to an end"; and definitions (Wittgenstein 1989, 236): "There must be some indefinable things." In each case the press for further … explanations, reasons, justifications, grounds, definitions leads us ultimately either in a circle or into an infinite regress. That is the truism.

Being truisms, these claims are apt for inclusion in Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks. He holds (PI §599): "Philosophy only states what everyone admits." If we accept these truisms, then we will come to realize that it is untenable to feel that there *must* be a further … explanation, reason, justification, ground, definition in every situation. And so we can relax, content that, say, some words cannot be given essentialist definitions. But Wittgenstein's use of the truisms is generally more ambitious than this. For he wants to insist that justification, say, ends not only *somewhere*, but *sooner than we expected*.

For Wittgenstein, it is important not only *that* we stop, but *where* we stop. In a lecture on 28.4.47, Wittgenstein is reported to have said (Wittgenstein 1989, 90): "It is important in philosophy to know when to stop—when not to ask a question." Or, more famously: "The difficulty here is: to stop" (Z §314).

Stopping at the right place is crucial. The *erlösende* word is *whatever gets us to stop*. The temptation to push further "has intangibly weighed down our consciousness." If I can say "Enough!" I "render it harmless." Enough … explaining, justifying, defining! Wittgenstein writes (MS 115, 30): "Ease of mind begins in philosophy when the *erlösende* word is found." I have done all I need to do. I can rest content where I am now. I am redeemed, liberated, from misguided temptation.

But, given our temptations, *where* I reach bedrock is not any kind of truism. And, indeed, Wittgenstein's places to halt can be quite controversial. Wittgenstein's infamous discussion of the seeds (Z §§608-14, & see Klagge, 1999) illustrates this. Wittgenstein's case evokes our feeling that there *must* be a difference between the seeds, which would explain their producing different plants. "But must there be a physiological explanation here? Why don't we just leave explaining alone?" (Z §614). Well, granted, we *could* leave explaining alone here—after all, explanations have to come to an end somewhere. But why *here*? No doubt it is some modern mechanistic scientific urge that drives us beyond this point, but to label it as such is not to undermine it.

Where we are willing to halt the chain is a matter of temperament. That Wittgenstein can rest content with halting the chains sooner than many of us is an important respect in which his (C&V, 6-7/8-9) "spirit is … different from that of the prevailing European and American civilization." For "the typical western scientist … will not in any case understand the spirit in which" he writes. His "way of thinking is different from theirs." That Wittgenstein can say "enough!" when he can is an important respect in which his temperament is at odds with ours.

We might say the urge to explain is a natural one, but Wittgenstein sees it as a cultivated urge (or rather, a civilized urge—in a bad sense). But it is clearly this urge that he sets himself against. "People who are constantly asking 'why' are like tourists, who stand in front of a building, reading Baedeker, & through reading about the history of the building's construction etc etc are prevented from *seeing* it" (C&V, 40/46, 3.7.41). "It often happens that we only become aware of the important *facts* if we suppress the question 'why?'; and then in the course of our investigations these facts lead us to an answer" (PI §471). "… attempts at justification need to be rejected" (PI II, 200). This is certainly not a modern approach to things!

Wittgenstein's later mentions of the *erlösende* word recognize an element of contingency (MS 124, 218; and also MS 179, 3v; both from the mid-1940s): "Whoever does not have these assumptions, for that person it is not the *erlösende* word." As Wittgenstein put it in a 1938 lecture (Wittgenstein 1993, 411): "*Now* (today) we have every reason to say there must be a difference [between the seeds]. But we could imagine circumstances where we would break this tradition." The *erlösende* word does not work in the face of all temptations—in all traditions—and can only be effectively spoken under the right circumstances. It cannot easily be understood by us. Perhaps "only a small circle of people … to which I turn … because they form my cultural circle, as it were my fellow countrymen in contrast to the others who are foreign to me" (C&V, 10/12).

While Wittgenstein's utterance of the *erlösende* word is not easily understood by us, it does fit into a certain trajectory of thought. I would like to conclude by tracing two notable points in this trajectory—texts that raise the issue, and people or characters who have been willing to say "enough" before the rest of us.

Job's Suffering

The book of *Job* in the Hebrew Bible tells the story of a righteous man who suffers greatly, and how he responds. It appears that God is goaded by Satan into allowing Job to be tested, to see if his righteousness is deeply ingrained, or whether it is only a result of his healthy and prosperous life. Thus, his health and prosperity are taken from him to see if he will remain faithful to God, or will instead curse God. The story is very rich with ideas and yet difficult to understand. It is often seen as relevant to the popular question "Why do bad things happen to people?" That seems like a natural question. A traditional answer is that people who suffer must have done something wrong to deserve their suffering.

Job opens with an omniscient narrator stating that Job (1:1) "was perfect and upright … and feared God and eschewed evil." Of course, Job and his friends do not occupy an omniscient perspective, and are not privy to this information. Nevertheless, even after he suffers the loss of his children, his estate, and his health, Job himself is confident that he is sinless (10:7): “You [God] know very well that I am innocent.”

Job is visited by three friends, ostensibly to “offer him sympathy and consolation” (2:11). But the friends, rather than offering compassion, raise the question why Job is suffering, what he has done wrong, and what he can do about it. They are full of advice. Eliphaz (22:4-5): “Do you think [God] is punishing you for your piety and bringing you to justice for that? No, for your great wickedness, more likely, for your unlimited sins.” He goes on to conjecture a number of common sins.

Finally (32:1) “These three men stopped arguing with Job, because he was convinced of his uprightness.” None of Job’s friends can name any wrong-doing of his. Rather, their conception of life is that Job *must* have done something wrong. Job is suffering while God is just and all-powerful, therefore Job must be sinful. Though Job differs from his friends in maintaining his innocence, he actually agrees with them in supposing that there must be *some* explanation for his suffering. The difference is that he is ready to blame God. Job is suffering while God is all-powerful and Job is innocent, therefore God must be unjust.

They all suppose that suffering can always be explained. There must be an answer to “why?” A commentator on Job writes (Newsom 1996, 422):

> That impulse remains intensely strong in many people. The words that echo in the mind of a person to whom a catastrophe has occurred are frequently ‘Why? Why did this happen?’ Even those who do not want to claim that ‘sin’ is always the cause of suffering nevertheless may be heard to say, ‘Everything happens for a reason’.

Either Job’s guilt, or God’s injustice. Or, more commonly, God’s mysterious ways—mysterious in the sense that there is a rationale, only not one accessible to us.

So far we have the following parallels to Wittgenstein’s seed case: No sins by Job are ever revealed. We respond that there must be a difference between the seeds. Job’s friends insist that he must have sinned. Job insists God must be unjust.

Then, finally, God appears on the scene: “Then from the heart of the whirlwind The Lord Yahweh gave Job his answer” (38:1). Essentially his response is: Who are you to ask these questions? I'm in charge here! He asks Job a series of rhetorical questions, not meant to be answered. In sum: "Enough!" To which Job replies (40:4) "What can I say?" (42:2, 6): "I know that you are all-powerful … I retract what I have said."

Perhaps the best way to understand this is to see God as rejecting the search for explanation or justification. Bad things happen—get used to it. Stop trying to explain it; stop asking for a justification. This may leave open the possibility that there is some explanation—perhaps beyond us. But it makes clear that we have no business looking for it. Who are we to …? Here, God's display of power is the *erlösende* word. Job's response is silence (40:4-5): "I had better lay my hand over my mouth. I have spoken once, I shall not speak again." And (42:3, 6): "You have told me about great works that I cannot understand … I retract what I have said, and repent in dust and ashes."

This certainly upsets our conceptions of justice and of God. But if this upsets our concepts of justice and God, it is high time they were upset! Must there be a moral explanation here? Why don't we just leave explaining alone? Today, in case we actually discovered a case like Job's, we should look frantically for an explanation.—But in other circumstances we might give this up. God, by overawing Job and his friends, is trying to move them to those other circumstances.

If we look at the story wholly from the human point of view of Job and his friends, the "moral" would be that the universe is amoral, even with God in it. This is not a conclusion that would sit easily with many people—suffering as a tragic fact of life. Newsom (625, 630-1) writes:

> What Job has been confronted with in the divine speeches will have rendered his old moral categories no longer adequate to his new perception … They insist that the presence of the chaotic be acknowledged as part of the design of creation, but they never attempt to justify it … When that happens, it is as though a spell is broken. Job is released from his obsession with justice and can begin the process of living beyond tragedy.

An earlier commentator (Scherer 1954, 1192-3) writes:

> Job is no longer asking 'why?' … There is now for him a place where the problem is not solved, but it is beginning to dissolve … It does not disturb him any longer at the point where it first disturbed him. He is willing to leave it …

Whether this is something one can accept is a matter of temperament.

To complete the comparison then, the voice of God from the whirlwind in *Job* occupies a position on the same trajectory that Wittgenstein travels.

Ivan and Suffering

Unlike the book of *Job*, with which he was merely familiar, Wittgenstein was certifiably obsessed with Dostoevsky's great novel, *The Brothers Karamazov*. In 1929 Wittgenstein told Drury (Drury 1984, 86): "When I was a village schoolmaster in Austria after the war I read *The Brothers Karamazov* over and over again. I read it out loud to the village priest."

In Book 5, Ivan Karamazov meets with his brother Alyosha, a novice at the local monastery and disciple of the Elder Zosima, to talk. In Chapter IV, "Rebellion," the rationalistic Ivan marshals several forceful examples of innocents—mostly children—suffering, and rejects God's world in which such things can happen: "I cannot understand why the world is arranged as it is" (Dostoevsky 1976a, 224). Ivan rejects all possible justifications for such unmerited suffering: retribution, or counterbalancing goods, or some greater harmony. Ivan carries on the case of Job, only with stronger evidence. Ivan is driven by the need to understand, but has no resources to do so.

Dostoevsky made the strongest case he could for Ivan. In a letter he wrote (Dostoevsky 1976b, 758): "Everything my hero says … is based on reality. All the anecdotes about children took place, existed, were published in the press, and I can cite the places, I invented nothing." Indeed, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church wrote to Dostoevsky (Rosen 1976, 884) to find out what refutation was possible. (The novel was being published serially.) Dostoevsky insisted: "My hero chooses a theme *I* consider irrefutable." Or, at any rate, irrefutable from Ivan's rationalistic perspective. There is no rational answer to the question "why?" here.

But Dostoevsky did have a carefully planned response (Dostoevsky 1976b, 761-2): "… will it be answer *enough*? The more so as it is not a direct point for point answer to the propositions previously expressed … but an oblique one. Something completely opposite to the world view expressed earlier [by Ivan] appears in this part, but again it appears not point by point but so to speak in artistic form." Dostoevsky's answer is Part Six of the novel, "The Russian Monk." Here we are told the life and teachings of Father Zosima. These are presented as a *zhitie* [a Saint's Life, in Church Slavonic]—a hagiography.

Dostoevsky's strategy is to appeal to the reader's emotions in a way that calms the urge to ask *why*. Three incidents from Zosima's life before becoming a monk are related, in which, at crucial points, transformations take place that are not explained, but simply presented. Between the first and second story there is a retelling of the Job story (Dostoevsky 1976a, 270-71) that Zosima recalls from childhood. He focuses on the question of how getting *new* children could be any consolation to Job for the loss of his original children (271): "But how could he love those new ones when those first children are no more, when he has lost them? Remembering them, how could he be fully happy with those new ones, however dear the new ones might be?" No answer, but rather: "But he could, he could. It's the great mystery of human life that old grief passes gradually into quiet tender joy." Of course this does not always happen. Some people are eaten up by old grief—it consumes them: "Why? Why me?" Such people are not *wrong* to ask these questions, but such questions are not obligatory. Some people have the temperament to let them go.

Ivan will be eaten up, if not ultimately destroyed, by his inability to let go of his questions. The appeal of traditional Orthodox belief will not work with him. He would not understand where Zosima and Alyosha, and for that matter Dostoevsky stand on these issues. The *erlösende* word does not work for everyone.

Readers of the novel in English or German have little chance of experiencing Dostoevsky's "reply" unaided. But it is possible to imagine parallel experiences that might resonate with English speakers—that might constitute the *erlösende* word for them. Dostoevsky uses Church Slavonic and other forms of speech reminiscent of religious experiences. One might think of favorite Bible passages rendered in the King James Version, such as the 23rd Psalm, or favorite traditional hymns, such as "Jesus Loves Me," or "Amazing Grace," sung in church as a child. Even if you are not religious, what recollections from childhood can still bring tears to your eyes? The memory of Thanksgiving dinner or Christmas morning with now-gone relatives present. Looking through a box of treasures from your childhood. A lullaby your mother sang you. Any experiences that can help you recapture a lost sense of innocence or reverence—these can be the *erlösende* word that Dostoevsky offers.

Is this a fair "answer"? Should Job have backed down and accepted the new children, as he did? Should Ivan have taken on Alyosha's temperament? Who can say? In a letter to von Ficker (Wittgenstein 1979b, 91, 24.7.15) Wittgenstein uses the term in a more religious sense: "I understand your sad news all too well. You are living, as it were, in the dark, and have not found the *erlösende* word." Wittgenstein stands in the same trajectory of thought as Dostoevsky and his character Father Zosima.

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Wittgenstein and Literature

Brian McGuinness, Siena

There are obvious ways in which the study of Wittgenstein's thought must have recourse to the facts of his life. The innocent reader, *der Unbefangene*, who reads "The world is all that is the case" or the description of St. Augustine's account of a child's learning (or rather coming) to talk may be swept along by the author's art like someone caught up in a conversation on a Russian train, and this is in part the aim. But when reflection sets in he is bound to ask who the author is and what cultural assumptions he is making. There are literary and other allusions that the reader needs to catch and this cannot be done without some knowledge of the background and even education of the author. This becomes more necessary as these, from being alien in language and geography, become also remote in time. There are further difficulties arising from the fact that Wittgenstein's "works" are for far the most part the product of posthumous selection and editing, in the first place by trusted friends and then by those whom these in turn trusted. Such works are incomplete if left without some account of their genesis and genre – for the author is not there to define them. Such an account will necessarily explain what Wittgenstein was engaged on at various times of his life and any hindrances that prevented him for all second half of his life from producing a finished work – *die wohlgeratne Butterwälze*, the well turned out slab of butter, to which Wilhelm Busch, deliberately down to earth, likens the final product of the poet.

But apart from the facts that "a shilling life will give you", what help to the understanding of his philosophy does the detail, whether core or husk, of his life give us, fascinating though that it may be in itself? Isn't biography in the end a distraction from our aim of understanding his thought? Do we need to know "what porridge had John Keats"? When Paul Engelmann was planning the publication of the first memoir describing Wittgenstein's early life, Elizabeth Anscombe told him that if by pressing a button she could have destroyed all biographical material, she would have done so. Margaret Stonborough (Wittgenstein's sister) told Hayek, who had similar plans, that Ludwig would have disdainfully rejected any idea of a "life" that went into his education, family, and feelings. We owe to the dead respectful silence: his work would speak for him.

Yet Wittgenstein himself could almost be said to have lived his life in order to recount it (to borrow Garcia Marquez's title *Vivir para contarla*). After a life, full of change and incident, certainly, but one would have thought sad, he said it had been a wonderful one. We shall see later why it was only at this moment that it could be seen as such. From all the accidents there had been something to learnt or won. Everything was lived at a high level of interiorization. Every element: war, love, rejection, the death of loved ones, exile, racial persecution, concern for his sins and salvation was wrestled with in search of the perfect – usually the most difficult – solution and this was usually a search for the right spontaneous reaction (a typical Wittgensteinian paradox or "double bind"). And this wrestling was not so much recorded as conducted in diaries or *Tagebücher*. Reading of books so entitled – by Tolstoy, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky and Gottfried Keller – was part of the culture of his generation of the family. They tended to model and guide their lives by literature such as this. It was perhaps their nearest approach to religion. Much of the most intimate part of Wittgenstein's own diaries was written in a simple code understood in his family, as if it were addressed to them, like one of the "confessions" (*Geständnisse*) he often talked about and more than once made. The most confessional volume of his diary passed after his death to his most trusted sister until she confided it to his best friend in Austria. Only recently has it come to light.

In Keller we find the idea that keeping a diary was the only road to integrity and constancy: a man should always be reflecting on his own character. (We are not far from Socrates' *ho anexetastos bios ou biôtos anthrôpôi*.) Wittgenstein in general had more need of it than Keller. There were intervals – in a note of 1929 (just returned to Cambridge and philosophy) he comments that (strangely enough, as he significantly says) he had for some years not felt this need and indeed we have no *Tagebücher* between the wartime notebooks and precisely this remark. The only writings that remain from that period are reports of dreams (W. W. Bartley III must have seen some of these) and a brief sketch of an autobiography covering his earlier years. Since these were preserved it is unlikely that much else was destroyed. He was trying to collect his thoughts, as he told Keynes, and clearly some of these ran towards "biography" (autobiography was meant) but he did not get far. In these years he tried everything but philosophy to occupy himself – architecture, music, physical labour, sculpture. It is natural to think that he, like the comrades from whom he received letters, was recovering from the war, which marked so many of his generation. F. R. Leavis noted this as late as 1930. It is a natural speculation that his reluctance to return to philosophy was a part of this crisis. He gave it up, just as he gave away his fortune.

What is interesting is that it was when he returned to philosophy that the writing of diary-like notes again seemed natural. In the notebooks in which he recorded his thoughts for future reflection or use, personal reflections abound. He interrupts his philosophical writing to exclaim, sometimes but not always in code, on his weaknesses, his vanity, his sins or his aspirations –all of which of course might infect his philosophical writing as much as any other aspect of his life. He constantly felt that he could easily relapse into vanity, in philosophy as elsewhere. In the case of autobiography itself (he said, reflecting on his current activity) this would compound his faults, make him yet *schmutziger* (sully him yet further). One mustn't minimize, embellish, or pretend but, like Pepys (whom he added to the list of models), write at the level of the life one lived, neither exploring what lay beneath the surface[1] nor looking down from a height. One may say that his real life was there in such writing. He once wrote:

> Something in me speaks in favour of writing my biography. The fact is I want for once to spread my life out clearly, so as to have it clear in front of me and also for others.[2]

His first aim was, as he often said, *mit sich selbst ins reine zu kommen*, to come to terms with himself, to see and accept, and by so doing change, as

[1] To be sure, he (like Keller) included dream reports, but these are treated (almost biblically) as moral insights.

[2] MS 108, 47 (28.12.1929): "Etwas in mir spricht dafür meine Biographie zu schreiben und zwar möchte ich mein Leben einmal klar ausbreiten um es klar vor mir zu haben und auch für andere."

far as was possible, his nature – as a poor sinner, as he was wont to say I a Dostoievskian way – and with Dostoyevskian pride.

The particular form of his own life Wittgenstein saw as a function of his unhappy family, from which each member tried to escape in his own way[3]. He said this in a letter to his then only surviving brother and it is natural to suppose that he is thinking particularly of the sons, of whom three had already committed suicide. There were failings too on the female side: he speaks later of making a confession on behalf of his mother, which her withdrawn nature would not have allowed her to make for herself. Perhaps her withdrawn character was what she had to confess. He found her love stifling and indeed thought that the whole female family erred by excess of *Liebenswürdigkeit*. This is of a piece with his fiercely holding himself aloof from his sister Hermine in the 1920s. His relation with the active sister, Margaret, was the nearest to a relation of equals, but note that she defined herself by, wanted to be known for, the achievements of her father, brothers and sons. The male element was the defining one, typified by the father, the great industrialist who carried all before him. Wittgenstein hardly ever speaks of his attitude towards his father (who died when he himself was 24): in notes for a biography (mentioned above)[4] he juxtaposes "Latin exercises for Papa" with "Thoughts of suicide" and we know that his father (not the most patient of men) became dissatisfied with the poor results of home education. At the end Wittgenstein wrote movingly to Russell of his father's "most beautiful death. ... I think that this death was worth a whole life"[5]. Perhaps through all his life the philosopher was hoping for such a death himself, the *totum simul* (the unique chance to see one's life as whole), the acceptance[6]. The figure of his father perhaps also appears in the constant struggle within him between male and female elements (Weininger's classification actually fitted this family situation). A

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[3] Letter to Paul Wittgenstein. All letters quoted can be found in the *Gesamtbriefwechsel* published online (and on CD-ROM) by InteLex. On the theme of the family see: McGuinness 2006.

[4] See McGuinness 2001, p.48.

[5] "Letter to Russell, 22.1.1913", in: McGuinness 2008.

[6] He repeatedly recommended to friends Tolstoy's *The Death of Ivan Illich*, where the dying man is finally redeemed by his acceptance of what is happening.

degree of violence and intolerance was expected of the brothers, following the model of the father[7]. Commenting on how difficult it was to share a house with Paul, one sister says, "But suppose it had been Kurt!" The Wittgenstein we are concerned with was after all the easiest of these three. He indeed favoured in theory the driven and practical side of his father, so he started life as an engineering student with the design of being an aviator, and later he wanted to do philosophy in a businesslike way. Two of his brothers tried to escape from the father's model through music: one seems to have been driven to suicide, the other (Paul) succeeded in living a musician's life, but (since he had to overcome the loss of his right arm) only by supreme efforts of will. Ludwig, for his part, said that music was half of his life, but a half he had written nothing about: compare his remark that his mother had never brought a thought to completion except at the piano. In this and many ways the female side of him was obvious to others – his sisters thought of him as the Alyosha of the family, and he was probably thinking of this identification when he exclaimed, "I am Smerdyakov, I am Dr Mabuse!"[8]

He made a rather different (but not contradictory) exclamation to Moore, "Of course I want to be perfect", but deep rifts within him made this bewildering for others – perhaps an inevitable consequence of the overweening ambition it represented[9]. He could be the kindest and most inspiring of friends and companions. But his very force of character meant that his fierceness when it broke out issued in breaks with friends and denunciations. He could be a charming companion when met by chance but also, when he had not established a relationship, be timid, tongue-tied and awkward. He accused himself of cowardice, though his almost foolhardy courage in the First World War is well attested. It is impossible not to be

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[7] Hermine describes Paul's left-handed playing as a "*Vergewaltigung*" (here not quite "rape"): as if he were doing violence to the music, the piano, or himself. She also says it reminds her of something in their father.

[8] It is relevant that Alyosha in fact understands and shares the impulses of the others: he too is a Karamazov.

[9] Moore incidentally was quite unaware of his own inability to compromise, his own perfectionism, see below. Averse as he was to religion he either did not catch or deliberately ignored the echo of the Gospel precept "Be perfect therefore as your heavenly Father is perfect", *Matthew* 5.48.

reminded of Freud's well-known analysis of Dostoevsky[10]: a man of the greatest need and capacity for love possessed by destructive tendencies directed chiefly (but not only) against himself, full of feelings of guilt, writing about great sinners and presenting himself as one of them, given to attacks of illness, constantly speculating on the possibility of an early death, his greatest wish to die in an inspired moment, such as often preceded his epileptic attacks. Freud saw here a need to be punished, stemming from Dostoevsky's relation with his father and thought that the neurosis so generated finally led to a misapplication of great affective and intellectual gifts. Still Freud himself thinks *The Brothers Karamazov* one of the four great (of course Oedipal) works of Western civilization and the neurosis was perhaps necessary for its production. If analysis had counterfactually changed Dostoevsky into a progressive liberal, he could never have written that book.

A Freudian account of his own life would have had little interest for Wittgenstein either. The only advantage he saw in a nephew's entering analysis was the shame bound to be engendered by all the things he had to admit to his analyst. Confession was of the first importance. When Wittgenstein said, in 1931, that it (*eine Beichte*) must be part of the new life (scil. that he meant to lead), he was not saying that confession without a new life was pointless but that no change was possible without confession. A true life meant the acknowledgement of all the meanness of the past and not just, as in Goethe's ideal vision, confession to a wise adviser who will enable one to bear the burden of guilt and order one's life better[11], but precisely to those on whom or in relation to whom past meanness or deceptions have been practised. Thus in 1931 and again in 1936-7 he went round (or when necessary wrote) forcing on former pupils now peasants or on relations, friends, colleagues or patrons, recitations and requests for forgiveness that they often misunderstood and whose purpose baffled them, "eccentric" Keynes called it, and we have seen Moore's reaction. Others

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[10] Freud 1929. Even those who point to Freud's limited biographical knowledge and a certain lack of scruple in enhancing it admit the value of his insights. See e.g Joseph Frank: "Freud's article contains some shrewd and penetrating remarks about Dostoevsky's masochistic and guilt-ridden personality" (Frank 1977, 28).

[11] In *Dichtung und Wahrheit*.

wrote saying that they thought even better of him, so George Thomson and Ludwig Hänsel. "What a tripwire!" Wittgenstein exclaimed, though his mentor Wilhelm Busch could have told him what would happen[12]. His aim had been to destroy a whole edifice of lies (as he thought it) that made him seem better than he really was. By (again) a Wittgensteinian double bind the effect was, not to establish the truth, but to make him seem better or worse than was the reality. Part of what he had hoped, to judge by a later passage, was that persons who both loved and valued him would make this humbling of himself easier for him.

For the confessions were not something owed to them but were principally parts of his effort to reach a true life for himself, precisely by recognizing (not just writing) that he was an *armer Sünder,* a miserable sinner. This is what Spinoza had failed to do, so that his remarks about himself left Wittgenstein uneasy[13]. The admission of guilt (*Geständnis* is the word he uses in these passages) is the recognition of one's own worthlessness. Unable to be good, he muses (tentative as always in religious matters), this recognition of worthlessness may enable a man to have faith in and identify with a Redeemer who will take the guilt from him.

But how did his philosophy enter into this and do we need to know this life or "Life" in order to understand or profit from that philosophy? At some times he thought his work was comparatively unimportant. It dealt with one form of the illusions of grandeur or profundity that beset us – but only some of us, the thinkers. Its methods though are the same in essence as those required in the moral sphere. A man has to realize that he is just a man ("Er ist, wie die Menschen sind." was a typically dismissive judgement.) and to be aware of the temptations and idols that mislead him. Again and again in philosophy it is a problem of the will not of the understanding that is attacked. This accounts for the passion that sometimes invested Wittgenstein's criticism of the mathematicians for example. We may compare G.E.Moore's, though a kindly man, going red at the neck in discussion. For these two, philosophy was not a game. Truth had to be sought seriously. But that brings us near to another temptation: vanity and the wish to win at all costs. (There was vanity too in the composition of the

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[12] Paul Engelmann copied out as a warning to himself Busch's "Die Selbstkritik".
[13] In a confessional notebook from Norway (MS 183, 96) 12 October 1931.

Tagebücher and the invention of similes – another Wittgensteinian "bind".) I think it is arguable, however, that his method in philosophy was Wittgenstein's nearest approach to the insight he wanted to convey generally, a help to see the world aright. Wittgenstein's own example was that of the "hero" at the end of Wilhelm Busch's *Eduards Traum*. Only a man of heart can see that he is worth nothing and then everything will turn out right. *Das Weitere findet sich*, says Wittgenstein too at the end of one of his most fervent *Bekenntnisse* and perhaps this was the kind of tranquillity he hoped his philosophy would lead to (He frequently quoted Heinrich Hertz's ideal: *der nicht mehr gequälte Geist*.)

Nicht mehr gequält zu sein, "not to be tortured any more" – the ideal reminds one of Dean Swift's epitaph *ubi saeva indignatio ulterius lacerare non posset*, "where (i.e. in the grave) fierce indignation can no longer tear his heart". The solution in philosophy is to be at peace with oneself, that of life is nothing other than death. A complete catharsis indeed. We shall see shortly what Wittgenstein thought of tragedy in an exchange of letters with his brother Paul (the one-armed pianist) at the beginning of 1935. Be it said here that there is something tragic about all Wittgenstein's writings – a clash if not of modes of life, of ways of seeing or talking about them. None of them do we want to abandon and yet we feel the tension. Hence the polyphony of his works which has been noted – and compared with Dostoevsky[14].

To return to the correspondence with Paul. The relation between the two brothers had, it seems to me, spontaneity, without a shadow of dutifulness or formality. How much this had to do with maleness, how much with the fact that they had been close in age, joint Benjamins of the family when it went through a number of crises, how much to intellectual affinity I must leave to emerge.

Paul was the elder by two years and always the more practical and worldly wise. He would tell Ludwig how to deal with the High Command

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[14] The tragic character of Dostoevsky's novels and the polyphony this gave rise to were first noted by Vyatcheslav Ivanov, though the latter feature is now frequently associated with Mikhail Bakhtin. It is quite uncertain whether Wittgenstein knew the work of either, though Mikhail's brother Nicholas Bachtin was a close friend of his at one time.

when the latter wanted to change his arm from artillery to infantry during the war: later he would explain how impossible it was for Ludwig, even in a mountain village of Lower Austria, to conceal his membership of their well known family, just as he had told him when they were children that it was impossible to conceal their Jewish descent in order to get into a gymnastic club. All this without any condescension, as between brothers. Ludwig perhaps took the lead when it was a matter of personal relations within the family, explaining very rationally to Paul why he should not take offence at what seemed to him a reluctant invitation to perform for the others[15]. But otherwise there was an exchange between equals. Ludwig would send Paul friends or old comrades for practical help, just as Paul would ask Ludwig for information on comrades when he needed it. Paul showed especial kindness to Ludwig's friend and younger colleague Rudolf Koder, offering piano lessons and introducing him to the world in other ways. He even bought him a dinner jacket.

When, after his teacher training in Vienna, Ludwig went to live in the first of his villages, Paul provided support in an unobtrusive way, packages of food and the like. Paul seems to have been fairly sure of being welcome – he offers to come over and play a particular piece of music – whereas their sister Hermine had great difficulty in obtaining an invitation. Paul sometimes walked across from the Hochreith[16] with a book in his pocket, which he meant to read to Ludwig. A letter one March mentions such an intention, though the road was not yet open. The book on that occasion was Daudet, though for himself Paul usually carried Vergil. During a later eremitical period in Ludwig's life Paul would send blankets, dried pea soup, chocolate – whatever was required – to Norway. Ludwig protested, but mildly, at this practical charity, which came wrapped in good-natured humour[17].

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[15] For another example of Ludwig's peace making within the family see: Prokop 2003, p.199.

[16] A serious walk, but one fitting into the almost fanatical regime by which he was able to overcome the loss of his right arm.

[17] Herzlichen Dank für die „Südfrüchte"! Schokolade, Wurst & Käse sind aber keine Südfrüchte und überhaupt solltest Du Dich ein bißchen mäßigen! wrote Ludwig (Thank you for the "tropical fruit" – but chocolate, sausage and cheese are not tropical fruits and anyway you should be more moderate!) Paul jokingly said that

Literature was one bond for these two. Paul loved to quote the German classics: it is an indication of common tastes that, to soften some advice to Ludwig, he said, "It is physic not poison that I offer you[18]", a quotation from *Nathan der Weise* – just when (though he can hardly have known this) when Ludwig was reading the same play. (We find it as a point of reference again in these letters. It was part of what I have called their *geistige Kinderstube* or intellectual nursery training.) That Paul read to Ludwig we know only from the letter quoted above, but it is of a piece with Ludwig's reading Johann Peter Hebel to the young people in the Renngasse[19] and Wilhelm Busch or Rabindranath Tagore to the bemused philosophers of the Vienna Circle[20]. The brothers shared their reading as they shared their music, all in the family manner. These new letters indicate the sort of conversations that the two will have had. Paul (who has been unable to see Ludwig at Christmas) criticizes Friedrich Hebbel's *Nibelungen*, comparing it unfavourably with Wagner's treatment of the same material, on account of its mixture of ancient and modern, pagan and Christian elements and of other infelicities[21].

Ludwig answers on 26.1.1935 with great appreciation of Hebbel. Perhaps indeed (Joachim Schulte has suggested) Paul is being provocative here, siding with later taste against one of the family's household gods. For Hebbel had been an associate of their grandfather Hermann Christian, along with Ernst von Brücke (a relation by marriage), Bonitz and other members of the German and *evangelische* Colony in Vienna[22]. Ludwig's reasoning is in part wrong-headed and unfair to Wagner – think of the *Meistersinger*! – but in general perceptive and provocative and couched in

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"as well-fed as a board school teacher in a mountain village" had become proverbial. In fact, times in Austria were very hard after the war.

[18] "Es ist Arznei nicht Gift, was ich Dir reiche".

[19] Marguerite Sjögren (previously Respinger) in *Granny et son temps* A la Baconnière, 1982, p.100, writes of hearing "la poésie de mon pays alémanique lue avec une compréhension profonde" – *Galeotto fu il libro e chi lo scrisse*, we might say, for this was the beginning of an intense and tortured relationship. ("The book and its author were pandars to us", the words are those of Dante's Francesca.)

[20] See McGuinness 2002.

[21] See Appendix (or Handout) for the relevant part of the text.

[22] So Hermine Wittgenstein in her *Family Memoir*.

the style that was brought out in Ludwig by conversations with valued friends – Sraffa or Engelmann, for instance. In his family it was his brother that could best elicit it. Paul had what Ludwig needed in an interlocutor, a brisk intelligence and a slashing style, the latter surprisingly akin to Paul's impetuous German cursive hand, a hand, by the way, such as none of his carefully westernized brothers and sisters used. His literary style (so to term it) recalls that of his father, whose essays on economic matters and practical politics show equal contempt for the amateur and the professor[23].

Another bond between them was music, which was all of Paul's life and half (so he himself said) of Ludwig's. It dominated family life and hospitality in the Alleegasse and (it seems) would bring Ludwig back when little else could. Paul writes often to ask what he should prepare to play – fourhanded – for Ludwig when he came – their mother and Fräulein Staake are mentioned as his accompanists. Brahms's Haydn variations, Weber overtures, Bach trios and works by Josef Labor are examples of what was prepared. On a special occasion the violinist Fräulein Baumayer would play and Helene sing, just for Ludwig. These were not meant to be concerts, but concerts were also organized – usually for the music of Labor, their "house composer". This term is not an exaggeration in the "Wittgenstein" literature[24]. Nearly all Labor's compositions after 1915 were commissioned by Paul and the composer's frequent use of the clarinet surely either influenced or was influenced by Ludwig's choice of that instrument for both relaxation and schoolwork[25]. The taste for Labor corresponds to Ludwig's remark that his own cultural ideal was not one of his own time (*ein zeitgemäßes*) but perhaps of the time of Schumann, or at least *a* continuation of the ideal of that period though not the one that actually occurred[26]. Here he perhaps overlooks (as Joachim Schulte points out) Brahms and Bruckner, whom he did admire – on the other hand Labor (whom Ludwig also admired) with his gentle eclecticism was an exception in his own period and so a confirmation of the remark. Paul's agreement in

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[23] See Wittgenstein 1984.
[24] See Alber 2000.
[25] Certificates, however, show that Ludwig offered the violin as his instrument at the Teacher Training College.
[26] *Culture and Value* p.2.

taste should be noted: whatever about his performance style, he too was a musician of the nineteenth century (as Prokofiev sensed[27]).

Paul's playing was not always appreciated in his family. "*Muß man so dreschen!* " ("Does he have to pound the piano like that!"?) his mother is reported to have said and in a letter from New York Margaret, after hearing one of his recitals, incognito in consequence of a rift in the family, writes "his playing has become much worse. I suppose that is to be expected, because he insists on trying to do, what really cannot be done. It is *eine Vergewaltigung*" (Letter of 1942). Ludwig has deeper reasons for criticism (and at a period when Paul's playing was still at its best). In a letter of the 1920's (no nearer date is known), he writes to Paul:

> I think you are unwilling to lose yourself in and behind the composition: on the contrary, it's yourself that you want to present. I am well aware that, that way too, something comes out that's worth hearing, and I don't mean just for a hearer who admires the technique, but also for me and for anyone who can appreciate the expression of a personality. On the other hand I wouldn't turn to you if I wanted (as I usually do) to hear a composer speak.

But even here there are a couple of exceptions, I mean, for example Wagner. (I won't now start to philosophize about why you bring a different sense to your interpretation of Wagner from that of most other composers.) And also Labor, whom you play with a certain self-renunciation (or so it seems to me).[28]

Wagner's total conception of the world corresponded to something in Paul's character, who had more of the masculine violence of his father – he was the Dmitry among the brothers, if one may yield to the parallel with Karamazovs that almost imposes itself, while Ludwig (often in his lifetime thought of as an Alyosha) might better be seen as the Ivan. In Paul's case this was of a piece with his adherence to the school of Leschetitzky and virtuoso music, while Ludwig was more at home with the *Hausmusik* of the earlier period. Ludwig too had in him more of the feminine side of the family, as he sometimes admits. He thought himself lazy like his brother Kurt (who however was more violent in the family circle). In various as-

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[27] In a letter, where he points out that his own is, of course, music of the twentieth century, quoted in Flannel 1971, 120.

[28] See Appendix.

pects of his life it is clear that he had great difficulty in reconciling divergent elements in his personality (elements akin to the M and W of Weininger). For this reason he always thought and usually wrote dialectically. Both sides of each philosophical question had to be heard, a decisive solution was hardly attainable. More important still was the difficulty of reconciling himself with the person that he was and of being true to personal relationships or to his aspirations in life. The only guide was what – in the situation of the moment – was acceptable, tolerable, what one could live with, what one could face the world (or a friend or one's Maker) with, what one didn't feel to be in bad taste (all of these are attempts to translate *anständig* or related words). Thus his own behaviour might seem impulsive rather than principled, for the principle was at a higher level. These moral attitudes are mirrored (for him it was inevitable) in the artistic preferences such as we find here. He could not, in serious art, expect a resolution, a Happy End. Wagner has been thought of as a Schopenhauer without the pessimism, because he sometimes glimpses, sometimes proclaims such a resolution, but Ludwig preferred the starker recognition of incompatibles. They are what set the tasks of life for us. Whoever failed to face these had gone to the dogs – the Devil had indeed taken him – to echo a frequent invocation of his. He preferred or understood the final despair of Lenau's Faust (kin to Marlowe's) rather than the transfiguration envisaged by Goethe. In a remark some have found surprising he said at the end of the War, "What a terrible position a man like Hitler is in at the moment." – Ludwig (like the Dostoevsky he so much admired) could envisage only too vividly the extremes of sin and guilt. Only on his deathbed did he totally succeed in feeling or seeing that he had escaped them.

It is a saddening index of the time in which these letters were written that Ludwig takes the basic problem faced in the works discussed to be that of race, implicitly echoing Paul's scorn for what he thought the gratuitous introduction of Christianity at the end of the *Nibelungen*. Yet Hebbel's trilogy turns at every point on how near, or how fully committed to the new religion the figures depicted are. Hebbel is attempting to describe the victory of Christianity over paganism, evidently not a victory without human cost. True he thought religion a mythology among other mythologies, but still it was a powerful one. This theme is not absent from Wagner either. A largely racial treatment of these myths, on the other hand, was detected if not intended in the Fritz Lang's 1920's films of the *Nibelungen* (loosely based on Hebbel or on the original, not on Wagner's re-working), which became cult-films for the Nazis by the date of our letters. Fritz Lang, himself half-Jewish (as one was forced to say) but surely not for that reason had drawn his wicked figure from a particularly vivid presentation by the visiting *Habimah*, thus enabling Goebbels to say with typical cynicism, "The Jews have provided us with the weapons to use against them." An example, in more ways than one, of how everything can be distorted.

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Appendix: Letters exchanged between Paul and Ludwig[29]

Paul to Ludwig. 12.1934

The first disappointment was Hebbel's *Nibelungen* [a trilogy]. I find them a total failure. This starts even in the dedication – to his wife "So take this depiction, into which you have breathed life, for yours it is, and if it has power to endure, then let the fame be entirely yours" [Hebbel's wife's acting of Brunhilde in another dramatist's work had indeed given Hebbel the courage to attempt a dramatic treatment himself]. A dramatist who writes a dramatic trilogy should have some higher aim! Then there's this mixture of antique and modern themes – a mistake Wagner doesn't make. When Siegfried goes on his travels, Kriemhild is told to pack the armour on top! We hear "that old folk are so attached to animals" and yet at the same time we have the pre-historic fairy-tale figure of Brunhilde from Isenland.
Hagen and Gunter, who behave in a craven and mean fashion in Parts 1 and 2, become heroes in the last section. (Even if that's how it is in the [original] epic, that's no excuse for a dramatist.)
Why on earth has Kriemhilde's Revenge 5 Acts? The plot is stretched out like dough for strudel. If she wants to slay Hagen why doesn't she do it at once?
The whole time she talks of wanting to avenge Siegfried, but in the last scene when she does slay Hagen, she suddenly begins with the treasure of the Nibelungs, which has only been casually mentioned before. So she was only concerned about the gold?
At the end Dietrich von Bern takes over the rulership "in the name of Him who expired on the Cross". So here we have another new theme, which has at most been hinted at before. There's no rhyme or reason in all this.
Not to mention the fact that Brunhilde after having been introduced so solemnly is simply lost sight of! (Here too Wagner is more logical.)
No doubt these mistakes are outweighed by merits that I fail to recognize, but mistakes they remain.

Die erste Enttäuschung waren die Hebbelschen Nibelungen: ich finde sie ganz verfehlt. Anfangen tut's schon mit der Widmung an seine Frau... "drum nimm es hin, das Bild, das du beseelt, denn Dir gehörts, & wenn es dauern kann, so sei's allein zu deinem Ruhm..." Wenn ein Dichter eine Dramen-Trilogie schreibt, muss er Höheres bezwecken.

[29] Material quoted from Ludwig and Paul Wittgenstein by kind permission of the Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge, and the Heirs of Paul Wittgenstein respectively. Translations by Brian McGuinness.

Dann diese Mischung von Antike & Neuzeit (ein Fehler, den Wagner nicht macht): Kriemhild soll, wenn Siegfried auf die Reise geht, den Panzer zu oberst einpacken!!! Siegfr. Tod, 4. Akt 6. Szene. Kriemhild: ... "dass alte Leute, so an Thieren hängen" (Kriemh. Rache, 1. Akt. 3. Szene). Aber daneben die ganz vorgeschichtliche märchenhafte Brünhilde aus Isenland.
Hagen & Günther, die sich im 1. & 2. Theil gemein & niedrig benehmen, werden im letzten Stück zu Helden. (Sollte das im Epos auch der Fall sein, so ist das keine Entschuldigung für den Dramatiker)
Warum hat überhaupt Kriemhilds Rache 5 Akte? Die Geschichte zieht sich wie ein Strudelteig; wenn sie Hagen erschlagen will, warum tut sie's nicht gleich?
Die ganze Zeit spricht sie davon, Siegfried rächen zu wollen; in der allerletzten Szene, wo sie den Hagen erschlägt, fängt sie plötzlich vom Nibelungenschatz an, von dem bisher nur ganz nebenbei die Rede war. Also nur um das Gold ist ihr zu thun gewesen?
Zum Schluss übernimmt Dietrich von Bern die Herrschaft "im Namen dessen, der am Kreuz erblich." Also wieder ein neues Thema, von dem man vordem höchstens Andeutungen gehört hat. Ohne Sinn und Verstand!
Dass Brünhilde, nachdem sie so bedeutungsvoll eingeführt worden ist, einfach untern Tisch fällt, davon ganz abgesehen. (Auch darin ist Wagner logischer.)
Diese Fehler werden jedenfalls von Vorzügen überwogen, die mir nicht erkennbar sind. Aber da sind sie, die Fehler.

Ludwig to Paul. 26.1.1935

Many thanks for your long letter. I can only answer in a fragmentary and quite unsatisfactory manner. The more so since I haven't the Hebbel by me and haven't read it for a long time.
I believe none of the features you criticize is really a mistake but in saying that I am in no doubt that one can say that the powers of the writer were not remotely adequate to represent the conflicts that call for representation here. What this comes to is that in the last resort the attempt was not a successful one. It's rather, I think, as if one were reading a book about for example aesthetics, which one found to be as a whole, as a systematic treatment, mistaken and yet to contain again and again scattered remarks of great value on the theme. In this case too one continually notes profound observations and brilliant *aperçus*, many more no doubt than I can even imagine. I think one can as little compare Hebbel and Wagner as one could a blind man with a lame one, except in so far as neither can walk properly. In Wagner there isn't the least trace of tragedy from beginning to end, any more than there is in a myth or a fairy tale. I.e. there are no clashes between powers that we feel to be equally justified. If there are clashes then it is between light and darkness. For Hebbel

the essential thing is that both sides are in the right. Thus in Wagner there are no problems, whereas Hebbel abounds in problems. And in his case the clashes are always between types, cultures, peoples, races, periods – see [his] *Herodes und Mariamne*, *Gyges, Genoveva.* One could even say that the second half of the 19th Century was constantly concerned with the problem of race, i.e. with the comparison, the evaluation, and the claims of different races. Hence we also find among Hebbel's works of that period *Die Jüdin, Die Argonauten, and Die Makkabäer*. In all of these a confrontation occurs (whereas in [Lessing's] *Nathan* there is no confrontation in this sense.
For Wagner, on the other hand, the problem is solved and light is marked off from darkness. (Which is why the other [dramas] are in better taste [nearer to decency].)
Wagner's is an attempt to dramatize a myth whereas Hebbel wants to show the clash between different worlds including the clash between a world full of mystery and the world of everyday. So much for your first ground of complaint.
As for the second [it is not perfectly clear how Ludwig divides Paul's letter], this is not a mistake at all (or so I believe). Is the character of the King in *Die Jüdin* heroic or base? Both!
Only that can properly be called a mistake whose removal or correction would improve the mistaken whole.
Kriemhild takes her revenge not simply on two people but on a whole culture. (Just like when Daisy Nagy wouldn't let her children learn German.) She allies herself to a foreign culture against the house of her own family. The difference between the two cultures is displayed splendidly in the dialogue between Etzel and Dietrich before the arrival of the Nibelungen.
That a new theme is introduced as epilogue is not in itself a mistake, but I would not say that it here has the effect that it ought to have produced. The meaning however is that at the end the whole old epoch with all its conflicts goes under and a new one arises. But enough and more than enough! [Ludwig here adopts the preaching tone his father loved to mock.]

Herzlichen Dank für Deinen langen Brief. Ich werde Dir ihn nur abgerissen & <u>ganz ungenügend</u> beantworten können. Umsomehr als ich den Hebbel nicht bei mir habe & ihn schon lange nicht mehr gelesen habe.
Ich glaube, keiner der Züge die Du tadelst ist wirklich ein Fehler; & dabei bin ich doch nicht im Zweifel, daß man sagen kann, die Kraft des Dichters habe nicht entfernt zur Darstellung der Konflikte ausgereicht, die hier dargestellt werden sollen. Womit ich aber nur sagen will, daß letzten Endes das Unternehmen nicht gelungen ist. - Es ist, glaube ich, als lese man ein Buch, sagen wir über Aesthetik, & fände es im ganzen, als System, verfehlt, aber immer wieder ausgezeichnete Bemerkungen zu dem Thema durch das Buch verstreut.

So kann man auch hier immer wieder tiefe Blicke & schöne Erfindungen sehen, & gewiß viel mehr solche als ich es immer nur ahnen kann. Ich glaube, vergleichen kann man Hebbel & Wagner so wenig wie einen Blinden & einen Lahmen, außer insofern, als - beide nicht recht gehen können. In Wagner ist nicht das geringste Tragische von Anfang bis zum Ende; sowenig wie in einem Märchen oder im Mythos. D. h. es sind nirgends Zusammenstöße von Mächten, die wir als gleichberechtigt empfinden. Wo Zusammenstöße sind, da zwischen Licht & Finsternis. Das Wesentliche für Hebel ist gerade, daß jeder Recht hat. D. h.: bei Wagner ist kein Problem, während es bei Hebel von Problemen wimmelt. Und zwar sind die Zusammenstöße bei ihm immer zwischen Typen: Kulturen, Völkern, Rassen, Zeitaltern (Vergl. ‚Herodes & Mariamne', ‚Gyges', ‚Genoveva'). - Man könnte auch so sagen: Die zweite Hälfte des 19ten Jahrhunderts hat sich immer wieder mit dem Rassenproblem beschäftigt; d. h., mit dem Vergleich, der Wertung, den Ansprüchen der Rassen. Daher damals unter den Hebbelschen Dramen, auch die ‚Jüdin', die ‚Argonauten', die ‚Makabäer' entstanden sind. In allen diesen findet eine Auseinandersetzung statt. (Im Natan ist dagegen in diesem Sinne keine Auseinandersetzung.)
Für Wagner ist dagegen das Problem gelöst & Licht & Finsternis geschieden. (Darum schon sind die Andern so viel anständiger.)
Bei Wagner soll der Mythos dramatisiert werden; bei Hebbel soll der Zusammenstoß zwischen verschiedenen Welten gezeigt werden und zwar unter anderem der Zusammenstoß sozusagen einer geheimnisvollen & einer alltäglichen. Das bezieht sich auf Deinem ersten Tadel.
Ad No.2: dies ist, glaube ich durchaus kein Fehler. Ist der Charakter des Königs in der ‚Jüdin' heldenhaft oder niedrig? Beides! -
Fehler kann man eigentlich nur das nennen, dessen Beseitigung oder Korrektur die fehlerhafte Sache verbessern würde.
Kriemhild rächt sich nicht einfach an zwei Leuten, sondern an einer ganzen Kultur. (Das ist, wie wenn die Dasy Nagy ihre Kinder nicht deutsch lernen läßt.) Sie verbündet sich mit einer fremden Kultur gegen die ihres Elternhauses. Der Unterschied der beiden Kulturen wird in großartiger Weise auseinandergesetzt im Gespräch zwischen Etzel & Dietrich vor der Ankunft der Nibelungen.
Der Hort & Siegfried sind für Kriemhild in gewissem Sinne Eins. Den Hort versenken war etwas Ähnliches, wie etwa die Leiche des Gemordeten schänden - das empfindet man auch nicht darum als schmerzhaft, weil einem am toten Körper soviel gelegen ist. Siegfried war für Kriemhild Macht & Stärke & der Hort ist ein Symbol dieser Macht in mehr als einem Sinn.
Daß, sozusagen als Epilog, ein neues Thema eingeführt wird, ist glaube ich, allein kein Fehler; aber ich will nicht sagen, daß es hier die Wirkung tut, die es tun sollte. Der Sinn ist doch der, daß am Ende die ganze alte Epoche mitsamt

ihren Konflikten versinkt & eine neue anbricht. Aber nun genuch & übergenuch!!

Ludwig to Paul. Letter from the 1920s.

I think you are unwilling to lose yourself in and behind the composition: on the contrary, it's yourself that you want to present. I am well aware that, that way too, something comes out that's worth hearing, and I don't mean just for a hearer who admires the technique, but also for me and for anyone who can appreciate the expression of a personality. On the other hand I wouldn't turn to you if I wanted (as I usually do) to hear a composer speak.
But even here there are a couple of exceptions, I mean, for example Wagner. (I won't now start to philosophize about why you bring a different sense to your interpretation of Wagner from that of most other composers.) And also Labor, whom you play with a certain self-renunciation (or so it seems to me)

Du willst Dich - glaube ich - nicht hingeben & hinter der Komposition zurücktreten, sondern Du willst Dich selbst darstellen. Ich weiß nun, daß auch dabei etwas heraus kommt, das dafürsteht gehört zu werden & zwar meine ich nicht nur für den, der die Technik bewundert, sondern auch für mich & jeden der einen Ausdruck einer Persönlichkeit zu schätzen weiß. Dagegen werde ich mich nicht an Dich wenden, wenn ich (wie es bei mir meistens der Fall ist) einen Komponisten sprechen hören möchte. Aber auch hier gibt es ein paar Ausnahmen und zwar z.B. Wagner. (Ich werde jetzt nicht anfangen, darüber zu philosophieren, warum Du Wagner in einem anderen Sinne wiedergibst, als die meisten anderen Komponisten) & auch Labor, den Du mit einer gewissen Selbstentäußerung spielst (oder mir zu spielen scheinst).

Writing Philosophy as Poetry: Wittgenstein's Literary Syntax

Marjorie Perloff, Stanford

"His disposition," Bertrand Russell wrote of the young Wittgenstein in 1912, "is that of an artist, intuitive and moody."[1] A similar judgment was made some fifteen years later by Rudolf Carnap in Vienna:

> His point of view and his attitude toward people and problems … were much more similar to those of a creative artist than to those of a religious prophet or a seer. When he started to formulate his view on some specific philosophical problem, we often felt the internal struggle that occurred in him at that very moment, a struggle by which he tried to penetrate from darkness to light under an intense and painful strain. … When finally, sometimes after a prolonged and arduous effort, his answer came forth, his statement stood before us like a newly created piece of art or a divine revelation. (Monk 1990, 244).

And Wittgenstein himself, hoping, in 1919, to persuade Ludwig von Ficker, the editor of the literary journal *Der Brenner*, to publish his controversial *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, remarked, "The work is strictly philosophical and at the same time literary" (Monk 1990, 177).

What is it that makes Wittgenstein's philosophical writing also – or perhaps even primarily – *literary*? "What is it," asks Terry Eagleton in the introduction to his own screenplay about the philosopher, "about this man, whose philosophy can be taxing and technical enough, which so fascinates the *artistic* imagination?"[2] The appeal is especially remarkable, given that Wittgenstein's writing, in the *Tractatus,* as well as in the *Philosophical Investigations* and the various posthumously published collections of notes and lectures, is known primarily in English translation – translation that for those of us who are native Austrian speakers often seems to distort what are in the original colloquial speech patterns and conversational rhythms.

1 Cited in Monk 1990, 43.
2 Eagleton, Terry: "Introduction to Wittgenstein" in Eagleton 1993, 5.

This is especially true of Wittgenstein's most obviously "poetic" work, *Culture and Value*, a collection of aphorisms and meditations on literary, religious, and anthropological topics, assembled from the philosopher's notes by G. H. von Wright in 1977. In the translator's note to the 1998 edition, Peter Winch admits that his original translation (1980) was problematic enough to warrant extensive revision.[3] But even this new version is characterized by translations like the following:

> Die Tragödie besteht darin daß sich der Baum nicht biegt sondern bricht.
>
> You get tragedy where the tree, instead of bending, breaks (CV 3).

More accurately, this would read, "Tragedy occurs when the tree doesn't bend, but breaks." Or again,

> Die Religion ist sozusagen der tiefste ruhige Meeresgrund, der ruhig bleibt, wie hoch auch die Wellen oben gehen. (CV 61)
>
> Religion is as it were the calm sea bottom at its deepest, remaining calm, however high the waves rise on the surface.

But "sozusagen" literally means "so to speak," not the coy "as it were," and the "Meeresgrund" would not today be designated as the "sea bottom" but rather as the ocean floor, the stillness at whose deepest point is compared by Wittgenstein to the unshakability of true faith, impervious as that faith is to the passing religious fashions (the waves) of everyday life.

Elizabeth (G. E. M.) Anscombe, the translator of the *Investigations* and much of the later work, is more faithful to the original but similarly misleading when it comes to Wittgenstein's vernacular phrasing.[4] The adjective "herrlich," as in "Ist das Wetter heute nicht herrlich?" ("Isn't the weather beautiful today?") for example, is regularly rendered by the rather

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[3] Winch, Peter 1998: "Note by Translator". In: CV, xviii-xix. Here and in my citations from the *Philosophical Investigations* and elsewhere, I have altered the English translation when it has seemed to me incorrect or inappropriate.

[4] Having chosen Anscombe as the official translator of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein arranged for her to spend some time in Vienna to improve her Oxford-acquired German. Wittgenstein's own last stay in Vienna (December 1949-March 1950) , on the occasion of his sister Hermine's death, coincided with Anscombe's, and they evidently met two or three times a week, but he was himself so ill he may not have paid much attention to the actual translation process (see Monk 1990, 562).

prissy "glorious." "Reigenspiele" is oddly translated as "games like ring-a-ring-a roses," a name that not only overspecifies, since there are many other circle games (e.g. "A tisket, a tasket"), but also uses a now little-used name for the familiar childrens' game "Ring around the rosie."[5] Or again, the proposition "Es ist uns, als müßten wir die Erscheinungen *durchschauen,*" (PI 90), "We feel as if we had to *see through* outward appearances" – a common enough state of mind – becomes the more abstract "We feel as if we had to *penetrate* phenomena."

Even in such ungainly translation, however, Wittgenstein's writing has impressed its readers as decidedly "poetic." But in what sense? In a well-known journal entry of 1934, reproduced in *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein remarks:

> Ich glaube meine Stellung zur Philosophie dadurch zusammengefaßt zu haben, indem ich sagte: Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur *dichten.*
>
> I think I summed up my position vis-à-vis philosophy when I said: philosophy should really be written *only* as one would write poetry. (CV 28)

These words, so difficult to render in English,[6] accord with the frequent links made in *Culture and Value* between philosophy and aesthetics, for

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[5] PI, §21, §32.

[6] Wittgenstein's proposition, as I have noted elsewhere ("'But Isn't the *Same* at Least the Same?' Wittgenstein and the Question of Poetic Translatability," in Gibson / Huemer 2004, 53n12) is all but untranslatable, because there is no precise English equivalent of the German verb *dichten* – a verb that means to create poetry but also, in the wider sense, to produce something fictional, as in Goethe's *Dichtung und Wahrheit,* where fiction is opposed to truth. My own earlier translation: "Philosophy ought really to be written as a *form of poetry"* (Perloff 1996, xviii and passim) is not quite accurate, since there is no reference to *form of writing* here. Peter Winch, whose first edition of CV renders Wittgenstein's sentence as "Philosophy ought really to be written only as a *poetic composition*," revises it for the 1998 edition to read "Really one should write philosophy only as one *writes a poem*." The word "poem" is misleading – Wittgenstein did not, after all, write poems – and perhaps the most accurate translation is David Schalkwyk's: "Philosophy should be written only as one would write poetry" ("Wittgenstein's 'Imperfect Garden': the Ladders and Labyrinths of Philosophy as *Dichtung*", in Gibson / Huemer 2004, 56). Or, to be even more colloquial, one can follow David Antin's "One should really only do philosophy as poetry" (Antin 1998, 161).

example, “The strange resemblance between a philosophical investigation (perhaps especially in mathematics<)> and an aesthetic one. (e.g., what’s wrong with this dress, what it should look like, etc. …” (CV 29). But *how* the two are related, how philosophy is to be written *only* as poetry: this remains a puzzle, not just for Wittgenstein’s reader, but for the philosopher himself. Indeed, no sooner has he made the statement above than Wittgenstein adds somewhat sheepishly, “With these words, I was also acknowledging myself to be someone who cannot quite do what he would like to do” (CV 28). And a few years later: “I *squander* untold effort to make an arrangement of my thoughts that may have no value whatever” (CV 33).

This is not just false modesty. In its first “poetic” forays, Wittgenstein’s writing has a predilection for aphorisms – terse and often gnomic utterances – modeled, it has been suggested, on those of Schopenhauer,[7] and, more immediately, on the maxims of Heracleitus. In Guy Davenport’s words:

> “The limits of my language are the limits of my world.” “The most beautiful order of the world is still a random gathering of things insignificant in themselves.” Which is Heraclitus, which Wittgenstein? “The philosopher,” says one of the *Zettel*,
> “is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him a philosopher.” And: “What about the sentence—*Wie ist es mit dem Satz*—‘One cannot step in the same river twice’?” That Heraclitean perception has always been admired for its hidden second meaning. *One* cannot step … it is not only the flux of the river that makes the statement true. But is it true? No, Wittgenstein would smile (or glare), but it is wise and interesting. It can be examined. It is harmonious and poetic.”[8]

But unlike Heracleitus, Wittgenstein embedded his philosophical aphorisms into a network of “dry” logical and mathematical propositions of the sort “If *p* follows from *q*, the sense of “*p”* is contained in that of “*q”* (5.123). How to reconcile these two seemingly unlike modes of discourse? This was the problem the young Wittgenstein posed for himself, as we can see in the *Notebooks 1914*-16, composed during the First World War,

[7] See, for example, Hans-Johann Glock 2000.

[8] Guy Davenport, “Wittgenstein”, in Davenport 2000, 334. The reference is to Wittgenstein’s 1933 note: “The man who said that one cannot step into the same river twice said something wrong; one can step into the same river twice,” (PO, 167).

sometimes in the midst of battle. On 6.7.16, for example, Wittgenstein confided in his diary, "Colossal strain this last month. Have thought a lot about all sorts of things, but oddly enough, can't make the connection with my mathematical train of thought."[9] The very next day, however, he notes, "But the connection will be made! What cannot be said, *can* be not said" (GT 69). And a few weeks later, "Yes, my work has expanded from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world."[10]

How does such expansion work? In §4.46 and its sequelae in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein concerns himself with *tautology*: "the tautology [e.g., either it rains or it does not rain] has no truth-conditions, for it is unconditionally true" (§64.4611). Again (§6.12), "The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies *shows* the formal – logical – properties of language, of the world." Now consider the implications of the role of tautology in logic for a discussion of the word *happy* (*glücklich*). In the *Notebooks*, the word first appears in the entry of 8.7.16 as part of a meditation on belief in God:

> I am either happy or unhappy, that's all. It can be said: good or evil do not exist.
> He who is happy must have no fear. Not even of death.
> Only someone who lives not in time but in the present is happy. (NBK 74)

The first sentence above is a tautology, although of a seemingly different kind from the mathematical and logical tautologies Wittgenstein has been discussing in earlier sections. And now tautology gives way to judgment: to be happy is to have no fear of death, in other words to live in the present, not the future. And so, after insisting that "Death is not an event in life. It is not a fact of the world," Wittgenstein posits:

> In order to live happily I must be in agreement with the world.
> And that is what "being happy" *means* ...
> The fear of death is the best sign of a false, i.e. a bad, life.
> When my conscience upsets my equilibrium, then I am not in agreement with

[9] GT, 68. My translation: there is not yet an English translation of the GT. The methodological importance of this and subsequent passages in the *Geheime Tagebücher* was first noted by David Antin in "Wittgenstein among the Poets," *Modernism/Modernity* 154-55.

[10] NBK, 79.

> something. But what is this? Is it *the world*?
> Certainly it is right to say: Conscience is the voice of God.
> For example: it makes me unhappy to think that I have offended this or that man. Is that my conscience?
> Can one say: "Act according to your conscience whatever it may be"?
> (NBK 75)

But the meaning of "conscience" turns out to be as elusive as that of "happiness." Indeed, the final line of this sequence suggests that all one can say is "Lebe glücklich" (Be happy!). And this bit of non-advice leads, in its turn, to the formulation of 29.7.16, that "the world of the happy is *different* world from the world of the unhappy" – a return to the tautological mode of 8.7.16 that is picked up verbatim in *Tractatus* 6:43.

The discourse now turns to good and evil and once again the issue of the will, but at the end of this section (NBK 78), we read yet again:

> The world of the happy is a different world from that of the unhappy.
> The world of the happy is *a happy world.*
> Can there then be a world that is neither happy nor unhappy?

Can one transcend tautology? In his next entry (30.7.16), Wittgenstein writes:

> Again and again I come back to this! Simply the happy life is good, the unhappy bad. And if I *now* ask myself: But why should I be *happy*, then this of itself seems to me to be a tautological question; the happy life seems to be justified, of itself, it seems that it *is* the only right life. (NBK 78)

There seems, indeed, to be no further *explanation* of the happy life – only its assertion:

> But one could say: the happy life seems in some sense to be more more *harmonious* than the unhappy. But in what sense?
> What is the objective sign of the happy, harmonious life? Here it is again clear that no such sign, one that can be described, can exist.
> This sign cannot be a physical, but only a metaphysical, a transcendental one.
> (NBK 78)

There we have it. In circling round and round the word *happy*, the text cannot reach conclusion. When, some entries later (29.10.16), Wittgenstein declares, "For there is certainly something in the conception that the end of art is the beautiful. And the beautiful *is* what makes happy" (NBK 86), we have not really gotten anywhere, for *beauty*, as he well knows, is just as elusive as *happiness* – it is here called "transcendent," which is to say, indefinable. "What cannot be said, *can* be not said."

The *Notebook* entries on "happy" were made over a three-month period, and the reader may well wonder why variations on the original distinction between "happy" and "unhappy" are made again and again, both here and in the *Tractatus*. But repetition with slight permutation – a form of repetition reminiscent of Gertrude Stein or Samuel Beckett rather than of Plato or Heracleitus – is the key to Wittgenstein's method here.[11] Only by beginning again and again, to use Stein's phrase, by reformulating a particular notion until it gradually manifests or reveals itself, can philosophy make any sort of progress. And "progress" is too strong a word here, for, as Wittgenstein puts it in a 1930 Lecture, "Philosophical analysis does not tell us anything new about thought (and if it did it would not interest us)." Rather, "Philosophy is the attempt to be rid of a particular kind of puzzlement."[12] In this case, it is only by circling round the proposition "The world of the happy is a happy world," that we begin to understand that happiness, man's most persistent goal, cannot be defined or even specified. Nor is definition or specification necessary. When, for example, we read the famous opening sentence of Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*-- "Happy families are all alike. Each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way" – we don't stop to ask what Tolstoy means by the words "happy" and unhappy." We know very well what is at stake; we also know that this novel is not going to be about happy families.

But what makes a sentence like "The world of the happy is a happy world" an instance of *Dichtung*? In a 1931 entry in *Culture and Value*, we read:

> Die Grenze der Sprache zeigt sich in der Unmöglichkeit, die Tatsache zu beschreiben, die einem Satz entspricht (seine Übersetzung ist), ohne eben den Satz zu wiederholen.

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[11] In Perloff 2002, 180-90, I discuss Lyn Hejinian's Wittgensteinian long poem "Happily" (Sausalito: Post-Apollo Press, 2000), which plays further variations on the word *happy* and its cognates and shows how this kind of conceptual poetry works.

[12] Wittgenstein 1980, 35, 1.

> The limit of language manifests itself in the impossibility of describing the reality that corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence. (CV 13)

And in *Zettel*, we read, "Knowledge is actually not *translated* into words when it is expressed. The words are not a translation of something else that was there before they were."[13]

Poeticity, these statements suggest, depends upon the conviction that "language is not *contiguous* to anything else. We cannot speak of the use of language as opposed to anything else."[14] For if one *begins* with the actual words spoken or written, word choice and grammar are seen to be everything. The variations on the proposition "The world of the happy is a *different* world from the world of the unhappy" are essential, not because they say anything "new" – they don't – but because the very act of repetition and qualification, repetition and variation brings home to the reader, as to the philosopher-poet himself, the impossibility of defining happiness, even as its central function in our lives is clearly demonstrated.

Indeed, unlike traditional aphorisms, Wittgenstein's short propositions don't really "say" anything. Or, to put it another way, what they "say" is enigmatic. "Death is not an event in life," (TPG 6.4311), for example, is an arresting aphorism but not because it is true. For death (someone's else) could certainly be an event in my life. And even the specter of my own death determines how I live, what I do. Wittgenstein's sentences are thus characterized, not by their metaphorical force or their use of the rhetorical figures like antithesis and parallelism, but by what I would call their *opaque literalism*. The sentences say just what they say – no difficult words to look up! – but they remain mysterious, endlessly puzzling, enigmatic. In what context and to whom is it meaningful to say "The world of the happy is a happy world"? Isn't it rather like saying, to quote a famous little poem, "So much depends / upon / a red wheel / barrow / glazed with rain / water / beside the white/ chickens"? And how do we move from one proposition to the next, the decimal system of the *Tractatus* constituting, as

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[13] Wittgenstein 1967, §191. In German, this reads, "Das Wissen wird eben nicht in Worte *übersetzt*, wenn es sich äußert. Die Worte sind keine Übersetzung eines Andern, welches vor ihnen da war."

[14] Wittgenstein 1980, 112.

David Antin has so convincingly demonstrated[15], a framework that defies the very logic it claims to put forward?

No Gaps in Grammar

In Wittgenstein's later writings, the propositional-aphoristic mode of the *Notebooks* and the *Tractatus* gives way to a rather different style. To begin with a representative passage, consider the famous analogy, early in the *Investigations*, between the language game and the game of chess (PI §30-§31):

> [End of] §30. One must already know something (or do something with it) in order to be able to ask its name. But what must one know?"
> 31. When you show someone the king in a game of chess and say, "This is the king, you are not explaining to him how the piece is used --unless he already knows the rules of the game, except for this last identification: the shape of the king. It is possible that he learned the rules of the game without ever having been shown an actual chess piece. The form of the piece here corresponds to the sound or the physical appearance of a word.
>
> But it is also possible that someone has learned the game without ever having learned or formulated the rules. Perhaps first he learned by watching quite simple board games and advanced to increasingly complicated ones. Here again one could give him the explanation "This is the king"—if, for example, one were showing him chess pieces of an unfamiliar design. But again, this explanation teaches him the use of the chess piece only because, as we might say, the place for it had already been prepared. Or even: we might say explanation only teaches him the use of the piece, when its place has been prepared. And in this case, it happens, not because the person to whom we give the explanation already knows the rules, but because, from another perspective, he already has command of the game. …
>
> Consider this further case: I am explaining chess to someone and begin by pointing to a chess piece and saying "This is the king. It can move like this, etc. etc." In this case, we'll say that the words, "This is the king" (or this one is called "king") only provide a definition if the learner already "knows what a piece in a board game is." That is, if he has already played other games or watched other people playing "with understanding"—and so on. Again, only then would he [be able to ask the relevant question, "What is this called?—that is, this piece in a game.

[15] Antin 1998, 151-56.

> We can say: only someone who already knows how to do something with it can meaningfully ask for its name.
> And we can also imagine a situation in which the person questioned answers, “You choose the name”, and so the questioner would have to take the responsibility for the whole thing.

In this passage, the terse and enigmatic propositions of the *Tractatus* are replaced by what looks like a much more casual, free-wheeling discourse. Its central figure is the analogy between a given word and a chess piece: just as the meaning of the various chess figures – king, queen, pawn – depends entirely on their *use* in the game itself, so, Wittgenstein asserts in §43, *contra* the Augustinian theory of language as pointing system where “Every word in the language signifies something” (PI §13), that “*the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”*

Commentary on Wittgenstein’s passage often refers to the “chess metaphor” in the *Investigations*, but it is important to note that here and elsewhere, Wittgenstein’s figures are not full-fledged metaphors or even similes. Metaphor is by definition a figure of transference in which *a* can be *substituted* for *b*. In Shakespeare’s sonnet #73, for example, we read:

> That time of year thou mayst in me behold
> Where yellow leaves, or none, or few, do hang
> Upon the boughs that shake against the cold,
> Bare, ruin’d choirs were late the sweet birds sang.

Here the identity of old age and the autumn of the year is complete; the metaphor, moreover, doubles over in line 4 as the bare branches “where late the sweet birds sang” become the “bare, ruin’d choirs” of medieval churches – perhaps the Gothic vaults of monasteries destroyed during the Reformation. The choristers (sweet birds) no longer sing in the empty church stalls (the tree branches).

Wittgenstein’s figures of speech, on the other hand, always begin with the assumption that the analogy between *a* and *b* is only that-- an analogy, useful for exemplifying one’s points in a philosophical discussion. The chess piece called the king cannot be substituted for a particular word or phrase in a discussion of language: we all know, in other words, that language is not *really* chess. Or consider the following locutions in *Culture and Value*:

> A new word is like fresh seed thrown on the ground of the discussion. (CV 4)
>
> Compare the solution of philosophical problems to the gift in the fairytale that magically appears in the enchanted castle and when one looks at it outside in daylight, it is nothing but an ordinary piece of iron (or something similar). (CV 13-14)
>
> Talent is a spring from which fresh water is constantly flowing. But this spring loses its value if it is not used in the right way. (CV 20)
>
> The idea is worn out by now & no longer usable. … in the way silver paper, once crumpled, can never quite be smoothed out again. Nearly all my ideas are a bit crumpled. (CV 24)
>
> Language sets everyone the same traps; it is an immense network of well kept wrong turnings. … So what I should do is erect signposts at all the junctions where there are wrong turnings, to help people past the danger points. (CV 25)
>
> My thinking, like everyone's, has sticking to it the shrivelled husks of my earlier dead thoughts. (CV 27)

Such proverbial statements, as Wittgenstein students have long remarked, are characterized by their homely, everyday wisdom, their common sense. Old ideas can't be recycled any more than silver foil can be smoothed out again; outmoded thoughts are like shrivelled husks; seemingly brilliant solutions to philosophical problems are like those fairy tale gifts that emerge in the harsh light of day as pieces of junk. Wittgenstein knows very well that the items compared are discrete, that words and phrases function only in specific language games.

Now let us return to the chess passage in §31. Here, as throughout the *Investigations,* the author presents himself dialogically – as someone having a conversation with someone else. Typically, he begins with a question: here, at the end of §30, "But what does one have to know?" Question, exclamation, interruption, interpellation: even when, as in the *Investigations,* there is a written text, not a series of lecture notes recorded by others, Wittgenstein "does" philosophy by setting up everyday dialogues or interviews, as enigmatic as they are childlike. In the chess discussion, for example, Wittgenstein begins by positing that the explanatory sentence "This is the king" makes no sense unless the player already knows the rules of the game. But there are other possibilities. The interlocutor might have learned chess by watching, first simple board games and then more difficult ones. "This is the king" might refer to an unusual chess piece, one that doesn't have the usual shape of the king. Or again, the sentence "This is the king" may be spoken by a master of the game to explain what move he is about to make. Or a non-native speaker who knows how to play chess may ask what this particular piece is called in the foreign country he is visiting.

Is it all common sense? Yes and no. Each example appeals to our actual practices, to our reference to how we do things in everyday life. But precisely because we are so familiar with these practices, it is difficult to understand what they mean. It seems as if the exempla in §31 work up to the authoritative generalization in the penultimate sentence, "*We can say: "only someone who already knows how to do something with a given piece can meaningfully ask for its name*" – a generalization that actually repeats the final proposition of §30 cited above, "One must already know something (or do something with it) in order to be able to ask its name." Has the interim passage with its chess examples then made no difference in understanding, especially given that the final sentence--

> And we can also imagine a situation in which the person questioned answers, "You choose the name", and so the questioner would have to take the responsibility for the whole thing--

far from providing closure, opens up the debate for further possibilities?

Consider what happens in §32:

> Someone coming into a foreign country will sometimes learn the language of the natives from ostensive definitions that they give him; and he will often have to *guess* the meaning of these definitions; and will guess sometimes right, sometimes wrong.
> And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a foreign country and did not understand the language of that country; that is, as if the child already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already *think*, only not yet speak. And "think" would here mean something like "talk to oneself."

The continuity between §31 and §32 is at first elusive. Just when we think we understand that the word "king" in chess is meaningless unless we know how to play the game, Wittgenstein shifts ground and attacks the Augustinian theory of language as pointing system from a different angle. The new analogy –wonderfully absurd--is between a stranger in a foreign country and a child communicating within its own not-yet-learned language system. Is the child's "thought" then like the foreigner's native language, prior to the "new" language to be learned? The posited analogy is patently absurd, for what could that prior language possibly look and sound like? How does one talk to oneself without talking? As Wittgenstein puts it frequently, does a young child hope before it has learned the word "hope"?

Analogies thus provide sometimes positive, sometimes negative reinforcement: in either case, they lead us to *revise* our previous understanding of this or that fixed notion. It is this *processive,* self- corrective, and even self-cancelling nature of Wittgenstein's propositions – their deployment of language as "a labyrinth of paths" (PI §82), their use of countless examples, anecdotes, narratives, and analogies – that gives the text its poetic edge. For the "naturalness" of its talk, its colloquial, everyday language and story-telling is everywhere held in tension with a set of larger assumptions that are as fixed and formally perfect as is the architectural design of the severely modern house Wittgenstein designed for his sister in Vienna. However much the individual exempla in the text are open for discussion and debate, the unstated axiom governing them is that "language is not contiguous to anything else," and that accordingly, the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the text enacts that theorem, presented as a non-theorem, at every turn. *Showing,* not *telling,* is the mode.

Here the testimony of Wittgenstein's Cambridge students is apposite. "His lectures," Norman Malcolm recalls, "were given without preparation and without notes. He told me once he had tried to lecture from notes but was disgusted with the result; the thoughts that came out were 'stale,' or, as he put it to another friend, the words looked like 'corpses' when he began to read them."[16] Two other Cambridge students describe the performance as follows:

> At first one didn't see where all the talking was leading. One didn't see, or saw only very vaguely, the point of the numerous examples. And then, sometimes one did, suddenly. All at once, sometimes, the solution to one's problems became clear and everything fell into place. In these exciting moments one realized something of what mathematicians mean when they speak of the beauty of an elegant proof. The solution, once seen, seemed so simple and ob-

[16] Malcolm 1984, 23.

> vious, such an inevitable and simple key to unlock so many doors so long battered against in vain. One wondered how one could fail to see it. But if one tried to explain to someone else who had not seen it one couldn't get it across without going through the whole long story.[17]

In a literary context, the "exciting moments" described here are known as epiphanies. Suddenly, in such Wordsworthian "spots of time," the object of contemplation becomes radiant, and we *see* into the life of things. Consider Wittgenstein's late notebook entries published under the title *On Certainty* (*Über Gewissheit*).[18] The basic subject of this little book is what one knows and how one knows it: the paragraphs numbered 300-676, written in the last months of Wittgenstein's life try to define the point when doubt becomes senseless – a question that is answerable only by referring it to actual practice. And here Wittgenstein's examples are especially imaginative:

> 332. Suppose that someone, without wanting to *philosophize*, were to say, "I don't know if I have ever been on the moon; I don't *remember* ever having been there. (Why would this person be so alien from us?).
>
> In the first place: how would he know that he was on the moon? How does he picture it to himself? Compare: I don't know if I was ever in the village of X." But I couldn't say this either if X were in Turkey, because I know that I have never been to Turkey.
>
> 333. I ask someone, "Have you ever been to China?" He answers, "I don't know." Here one would surely say, "You don't *know*? Do you have any reason to believe that perhaps you have ever been there? Have you for example ever been near the Chinese border? Or were your parents there at the time you were about to be born? -- Normally, Europeans do know whether they have been to China or not.
>
> 334. In other words; the reasonable person doubts such a thing only under such-and-such circumstances. …
>
> 341. . . the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, like the hinges on which these turn. …

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[17] Gasking / Jackson 1967, 50. I owe my knowledge of this and related passages to David Antin 1998, 160. Antin's own "talk pieces" are later instances of this Wittgensteinian paradigm.

[18] OC. The selection of notes and their numbering was made posthumously by the editors, not the author.

> 343. But it isn't that we just *can't* investigate everything and are therefore forced to be satisfied with assumptions. If I want the door to move, the hinges must be intact.
>
> 344. My life consists in that there are certain things I am content to accept.

Here is the negative capability of the late Wittgenstein – the capacity, in Keats's words, "of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts without any irritable reaching after fact & reason"[19] – a mental state closely allied to the moment of poetry. Of course, Wittgenstein suggests, one can always demand specification of a proposition to the point where there could be certainty, as in "2 x 2 = 4," but, even in this case, "the spoken or written sentence '2 x 2 = 4' might in Chinese have a different meaning or be pure nonsense" (OC 10). Not what a statement *is* but what one does with it is what matters. So, to use the hinge analogy above, if you want the door to move, the hinges must work. In everyday life we know quite well whether or not we have been to China or on the moon, just as we know that we have two hands and two feet without looking at them to check out the truth. "Ordinary language is alright."[20]

But Wittgenstein's "ordinary language" is of course extraordinary. In the passage above (§332-43) and throughout *On Certainty*, persuasion depends on the poet-philosopher's astonishing rhetorical skill. Examples must be short and concrete; they must speak to the interlocutor's everyday experience, using conversational speech patterns, reinforced by vivid analogies like that of words turned to corpses or worn-out ideas like crumpled silver foil. The exempla must meet the test of common sense; indeed, they must be so literal that they make us laugh. Even in our own age of moon exploration, the response "I don't know" to the question, "Have you ever been on the moon?" is absurd. Indeed, the absurdity of many of Wittgenstein's propositions shows their affinity to the joke, the riddle, or the tall tale, as these variants appear in the language-game itself: "Imagine a language-game "When I call you, come in through the door. In an ordinary case, it will be impossible to doubt that there really is a door" (OC §391). A child, presented with such a possibility, would either laugh or put for-

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[19] John Keats, Letter to George and Tom Keats, 21, 27 December 1817, in Keats 1982, 43.

[20] Wittgenstein 1965, 28.

ward an alternate game – for example, "Let's pretend none of the things in this room exist." And therein would lie a different language game, a different poetic act.

The Right Tempo

In the much-cited Preface to the *Philosophical Investigations,* Wittgenstein describes the method whereby he ordered the "*remarks*, short paragraphs, of which there is sometimes a fairly long chain about the same subject" into the larger structure of the book:

> After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination. – And this was of course connected with the very nature of the investigation. Namely, it forces us to travel over a wide range of thoughts, criss-cross [*kreuz und quer*], in all directions. …r Thus this book is really only an album. (PI unpaginated).

An album is most typically a medley, a commonplace book or loose collection of disparate items, collaged together *kreuz und quer*, without much thought of the controlling structure. But despite this disclaimer, Wittgenstein's "remarks" are the result of much more intensive *dichten* than is usually thought. Etymologically, the verb *dichten* comes from the adjective *dicht (*thick, dense, packed*)*: *dichten* originally meant "to make airtight, watertight; to seal the cracks (in a window, roof, etc.)" – in other words, something like the Zen phrase "to thicken the plot."

Poets, indeed fiction-makers of all stripes, are those that make thick or dense, that pack it in. Again and again, in *Culture and Value* and related texts, Wittgenstein talks of the need for *slow* reading:

> Sometimes a sentence can be understood only if it is read at the *right* tempo. My sentences are all to be read *slowly*. (CV 65)

> Thoughts rise to the surface slowly, like bubbles. (CV 72)

> Of the sentences that I write down here, only the occasional one represents a step forward; the others are like the snip of the barber's scissors, which must be kept in motion so as to make a cut with them at the right moment. (CV 76)

> Raisins may be the best part of a cake; but a bag of raisins is no better than a cake; and he who is in a position to give us a bag full of raisins, cannot necessarily bake a cake with them, let alone do something better.
> I am thinking of [Karl] Kraus & his aphorisms, but of myself too & my philosophical remarks.
> A cake is not, as it were, thinned out raisins (CV 76)

The last remark here is especially telling. Aphorisms, so central to the *Tractatus* and earlier work, cannot *in themselves* make a poetic-philosophical discourse. If they remain discrete, like so many separate raisins in a bag, they fail to cohere into a fully-formed "cake." But coherence, in this instance, is not a matter of linearity, of logical or temporal movement from a to b to c. For Wittgenstein, the *criss-crossing* of threads must be *dicht* – thick and dense – and, as in the case of lyric poetry, only *slow reading*, can unpack the meanings in question.

"My sentences must be read *slowly*." The necessity, in an information age, of slowing down the reading process, was central to the thinking of many of Wittgenstein's contemporaries – for example, the Russian avant-gardists Velimir Khlebnikov and Alexeii Kruchenykh: the term *ostranenie* (estrangement, defamiliarization) was always associated with slowing down the reading (or viewing) process in art. Duchamp's concept of the *delay*, as in calling his *Large Glass* (*The Bride Stripped Bare by her Bachelors, Even*) a "delay in glass," is another instance. To say "Philosophy must be written only as one would write poetry" is to be aware of the need for density and resonance – rather than logic and sequential argument-- in the verbal construct.

One of Wittgenstein's most intriguing works in this regard is the "Remarks on Frazer's *Golden Bough* (1936), first edited and published in 1967 by Rush Rhees.[21] On the surface, this seems to be a rather loosely organized set of scattered "remarks": it begins "One must start out with error and convert it into truth," and then contains the isolated lyric line, "I must plunge into the water of doubt again and again" (PO 119). Again and again

[21] "Remarks on Frazer's *Golden Bough*," in PO, 115-55. In their head note, the editors point out that the first bilingual book edition of this text (Retford: Brynmilll 1979) left out a considerable number of the remarks; "the extant editions disagree about what to include and what to leave out of Wittgenstein's remarks" (116). There is, then, no definitive text of this essay.

is the key here: in what follows, Wittgenstein repeats, questions, challenges, exclaims, circling round and round the issue of Frazer's misunderstanding of "primitive" religious practices in *The Golden Bough.* "One would like to say: This and that incident have taken place; laugh if you can" (PO 123). Or, "What a narrow spiritual life on Frazer's part! As a result: how impossible it was for him to conceive of a life different from that of the England of his time!" (PO 125). And even more scathingly, "Why shouldn't it be possible for a person to regard his name as sacred? It is certainly, on the one hand, the most important instrument which is given to him, and, on the other, like a piece of jewelry hung around his neck at birth" (PO 126-27).

Only after pages of such "criss-cross" emotional commentary, does Wittgenstein zero in on what is his central case: that if the vegetation ceremonies of the peoples in question are understood, not as opinions or beliefs, but as *practices,* their behavior will emerge as not so "primitive" after all:

> I read among many similar examples, of a Rain-King in Africa to whom the people pray for rain *when the rainy period comes.* But surely that means that they do not really believe that he can make it rain, otherwise they would do it in the dry periods of the year in which the land is "a parched and arid desert." For if one assumes that the people formerly instituted this office of Rain-King out of stupidity, it is nevertheless certainly clear that they had previously experienced that the rains begin in March, and then they would have had the Rain-King function for the other part of the year. Or again, toward morning, when the sun is about to rise, rites of daybreak are celebrated, but not during the night, when they simply burn lamps. (PO 137).

And the essay now multiplies examples of similar misunderstandings on Frazer's part, culminating in the assertion, "If they [the primitive people Frazer talks of] were to write it down, their knowledge of nature would not differ *fundamentally* from ours. Only their *magic* is different" (PO 141).

Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough was, of course, not intended for publication, at least not in the present form, and so our expectations of it are different from those we have of the *Investigations*. But when we remember that even the latter, his most "finished" work, was undergoing continual change between the time of its "completion" and Wittgenstein's death in 1951,[22] we can see that the formal constraints are quite similar. To insure that the reader will absorb them "slowly," Wittgenstein's sentences are paratactic and metonymic; they circle around a "point," at first quietly, even casually, then with increasing deliberation, until the "meaning" of this or that argument suddenly crystallizes. From the gnomic aphorisms of the *Tractatus* to the "common-sense" analogies that multiply and spill over into the next paragraph in the *Investigations* and *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein's writings enact their central motive: words and phrases can be understood only in their particular context, their use. Not *what* one says but *how* one says it is the key to doing philosophy. And that, of course, is what makes it poetry as well.

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[22] See especially Wittgenstein 1982. In these volumes, Part II of the *Investigations* is heavily revised and expanded.

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Ludwig Wittgenstein über Wilhelm Busch – “He has the REAL philosophical urge.”

Josef G. F. Rothhaupt, München

> The Busch is second hand & nasty, but I thought I was lucky to find it at all. The letters are rather difficult to understand, I imagine, because he uses quaint & odd expressions (but they are wonderful). He has the REAL philosophical urge.

So schreibt Wittgenstein aus Wien in einem Brief vom 22.1.1950 an Rush Rhees in Swansea. Bei „The Busch“ handelt es sich konkret um die Publikation *Wilhelm Busch an Maria Anderson. Siebzig Briefe* (Rostock 1908).[1] Kurz vor seinem Aufenthalt in den U.S.A. hatte Wittgenstein ein Exemplar dieses Buchs in einem Antiquariat in London entdeckt und gekauft, zunächst selbst darin gelesen, es alsdann Georg Henrik von Wright geliehen und es zuletzt Rush Rhees als Geschenk zu Weihnachten 1949 zukommen lassen. Er selbst kannte und schätzte diese „Siebzig Briefe“ seit 25 Jahren, denn sein Freund Ludwig Hänsel hatte ihm im Jahre 1925 dieses Buch geschenkt.[2] Wittgenstein war mit dem zeichnerischen und schriftstellerischen Gesamtwerk von Wilhelm Busch sehr gut vertraut. Für ihn avancierte Wilhelm Busch (1832–1909) zu einer Person mit „REAL philosophical urge“.

Bereits im Jahre 1914 hatte Kurt Tucholsky die Werke von Wilhelm Busch gewürdigt. Er hebt dabei überzeugend hervor, dass es neben dem allseits bekannten „Publikums-Busch“ auch einen weitestgehend unbekannten „Philosophen-Busch“ gibt. In seiner Rezension eben jener „Busch-Briefe“ vermeldet er (Tucholsky 1975, I, 202):

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[1] Die Publikation ist auch von Josef Rothhaupt unter http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/432/1/24-2-94.TXT ediert.

[2] Siehe die Briefe Wittgensteins im September 1949 an Margarete Stonborough, vom 1.1.1950 an von Wright, am 22.1.1950 an Rhees und bereits im Mai 1925 an Hänsel. Alle Briefe werden hier zitiert nach Wittgenstein 2003.

> Es geht die dumpfe Sage, dieser Busch sei ein Philosoph gewesen. Aber die Leute lachen ruhig weiter über seine Bildchen und sagen: Es wird schon nicht so schlimm gewesen sein. [...] Von diesem andern Busch ist „Eduards Traum“, ein bildloses, schmales Büchelchen, und von diesem Busch sind die wunderschönen Briefe an die Freundin Multatulis, an Maria Anderson. [...] Busch ist der Reiter über den Bodensee, der sehr gut weiß, daß er auf einer gefrorenen Eisdecke galoppiert. Und wie dieser kräftige Mann den brüchigen Untergrund fatal lächelnd aufzeigt und dann immer wieder zu dem starken Lebensgefühl zurückkehrt, das es ihm ermöglicht, trotz alledem weiter zu atmen: das findet sich auch hier in den nachdenklichen Briefen.

Exemplarisch werden hier anfangs zwei Zeugnisse präsentiert, die nicht nur eine bestehende enge Wahlverwandtschaft zwischen Wittgenstein und Busch dokumentieren, sondern auch die philosophische Bedeutsamkeit dieser Wahlverwandtschaft markieren. Im Jahre 1927 fanden erste Treffen und Gespräche zwischen einigen Mitgliedern des Wiener Kreises (Moritz Schlick, Friedrich Waismann, Rudolf Carnap) und Wittgenstein statt. Und für das Zusammentreffen am 4.7.1927 hat Carnap folgenden Kurzbericht festgehalten: „Mit W.[ittgenstein] bei Schlick. Wieder über Esperanto. Dann über Intuitionismus, schließlich liest er uns Wilhelm Busch vor.“[3] Ein Vierteljahrhundert später findet sich in Wittgensteins Testament als Punkt vier folgender Passus:

> I make the following gifts of specific articles or chattels namely: - To Dr. Benedict Richards my French Travelling Clock my Fur Coat my complete Edition of Grimm’s Fairy Tales and my book “Hernach” by W. Busch To Dr. Ludwig Hänsel in Austria my volume of Lessing’s Religious Writings To Mr. R. Rhees the rest of my books and what I call my Collection of Nonsense which will be found in a file To Miss Anscombe all my furniture

Es ist einerseits überraschend und andererseits gerade bezeichnend für Wittgenstein, dass er gezielt ausgewählte Bücher testamentarisch an bestimmte Personen vermacht. Interessanter- und bezeichnenderweise bekommt Dr. Benedict Richards Wittgensteins dreibändige Edition *Kinder- und Hausmärchen. Gesammelt durch die Brüder Grimm* (München/Leipzig 1910) und dessen *Hernach* von Wilhelm Busch (München 1908). Dass

[3] In Rudolf Carnaps Nachlass, der in Pittsburgh verwahrt wird, befindet sich ein am 6.2.1956 in Kurzschrift verfasstes Dokument mit der Überschrift „Über Wittgenstein, aus meinem Tagebuch“.

gerade das offiziell testamentarische Vermachen des eigenen Exemplars *Hernach* an seinen engsten Freund Ben Richards auch eine symbolische Bedeutung hat, belegt alleine schon die Tatsache, dass Wittgenstein bereits zu Lebzeiten diesem Freund ein Exemplar von *Hernach* (Helen Gottschalk, New York ca. 1945) mit der handschriftlichen Widmung „To Ben / from Ludwig / w. l.“ geschenkt hatte. Dass es zudem eine ausdrucksstarke Geste ist, belegen die Umstände der Entstehung und Veröffentlichung von Buschs *Hernach* selbst. Zu Lebzeiten hatte Busch besondere Zeichnungen, sehr kurze Bildgeschichten (mit Text), Skizzen, Schnitzel gesammelt, als druckfertiges Manuskript zusammengestellt und eingesiegelt 1905 über seinen Neffen seiner Schwester als Geschenk – mit der Bemerkung, dass es nach seinem Tode, also „hernach“, veröffentlicht werden könnte – zukommen lassen. Und so geschah es nach Wilhelm Buschs Tod dann ja auch. Und so erhielt nach Ludwig Wittgensteins Tod Ben Richards dessen persönliches *Hernach*-Exemplar.

Geht man ins Detail und wendet sich dem Studium der Rezeption des zeichnerischen und schriftstellerischen Œuvres Wilhelm Buschs durch Ludwig Wittgenstein zu, so findet man sowohl in Wittgensteins Gesamtnachlass als auch im Gesamtbriefwechsel und in weiteren Zeitzeugendokumenten eine Fülle an Material. In Wittgensteins Besitz befand sich etwa eine (Original-)Zeichnung Wilhelm Buschs.[4] Von den beiden hier gezeigten Fassungen eines Bildmotivs bei Busch wurde die erste (linke) in der postumen Veröffentlichung *Wilhelm Busch: Künstlerischer Nachlass*

[4] Diese Zeichnung befindet sich nun im Nachlass von Ben Richards (1924–2000). Sie ist in Bildrahmung gefasst, welche auf der Rückseite die Aufschrift „Eigenthum v. Dr. Ludwig Wittgen[…] (Leihgeber)“ trägt. Die Zeichnung selbst hat in Passepartout gesetzt die Maße 87x50 mm und das gerahmte Bild hat die Maße 145x120 mm. Eine genaue (auch kunstwissenschaftliche) Expertise dieser Zeichnung steht noch aus. Nach dem Tod Buschs fanden Verkaufsausstellungen von Teilen seines Werkes statt. Eine davon wurde 1909 in Wien veranstaltet. Es liegt also im Bereich des Möglichen, ja gar des Wahrscheinlichen, dass die Familie Wittgenstein bzw. Ludwig Wittgenstein in jungen Jahren selbst Buschsche Originalzeichnungen erworben hat. Wichtige Informationen und die Bereitstellung von Fotokopien habe ich Michael Nedo bezüglich der gerahmten Buschzeichnung im Nachlass von Richards zu verdanken. Und fachmännische Auskunft bezüglich der Einordnung dieses Zeichenmotivs und anderer Zeichnungen in das Buschsche Gesamtwerk verdanke ich dem Experten Hans Ries.

(München 1908) reproduziert und befindet sich die zweite (rechte) eben im Nachlass von Ben Richards. Gerade dieses Motiv ist für Wittgenstein sehr passend, nämlich: eine männliche Halbfigur in Rückenansicht am Tisch sitzend, denkend-schreibend konzentriert, sich mit der Schreibfeder am Kopf kratzend, während ein Insekt (eine Wespe etwa) im Begriff ist, diese Person in die Glatze zu stechen. Man stelle sich den Effekt vor: aus der (spekulativen) Gedankenwelt zurück auf den Boden der (alltäglichen) Tatsachen. – So heißt es in Wittgensteins *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*: „Zurück auf den rauhen Boden!“ (PU §107E)



Dass Wittgenstein sich intensiv mit künstlerischem Zeichnen, insbesondere auch jenem von Wilhelm Busch, beschäftigt hat und ein sehr gutes Auge dafür hatte, illustriert ein Brief, den er kurz vor dem 18.11.1929 an seine Schwester Hermine, die ihm zuvor eine ihrer eigenen Zeichnungen zugeschickt hatte, schrieb:

> Danke für Deinen Brief & das Blatt. Ich glaube daß in dieser Zeichnung Deine besten malerischen Qualitäten nicht zum Ausdruck gekommen sind & zwar vielleicht darum, weil hier ‚Strich‘ nötig wäre, wie vielleicht überall, wo etwas nur angedeutet ist. Wenn der Busch z.B. einen Mist auf dem Boden zeichnet, so drückt sein Strich Mist aus & man fragt sich nicht lange: sind das Strohhalme oder alte Fetzen? Deine Blumen auf dem Grab aber sind, wenn ich mich nicht irre, weder wirkliche Blumen, noch ein Symbol für solche, sondern nur ungenau gezeichnete Blumen, Bänder etc., & der Schatten wo er in größeren Flächen auftritt, wirkt durch die gleichmäßige Schraffierung tot; er ist glaube ich auch nur ein ungenau gezeichneter Schatten, in dem man sich nicht auskennt.

Und annähernd zwei Jahrzehnte später, am 9.2.1948, notiert Wittgenstein in Manuskriptband MS137, 16/1+4 (der Nachlass wird hier immer zitiert nach Wittgenstein 2000) folgende zwei aussagekräftige philosophische Bemerkungen:

> –C Was ist das Kriterium dafür, daß für Einen das Gesicht im Bild Bildgesicht ist<,> mit einem wirklichen den engeren Zusammenhang verloren hat? (Ich denke an Busch'sche Zeichnungen mit wenigen Punkten & Strichen.)

> –C Ein selbstgefällig lächelndes Schwein bei Busch („Hernach"). Ich würde nicht ausrufen „Genauso macht's ein Schwein!" Bei andern Bildern aber gerade das.

Recherchiert man in Buschs *Hernach* sämtliche Darstellungen von Schweinen, so findet man insgesamt fünf Vorkommnisse – von denen zwei für Wittgensteins Bezeichnung „ein selbstgefällig lächelndes Schwein" in Frage kommen, nämlich:



Wittgensteins Rekurs auf das zeichnerische Œuvre Buschs ist besonders in der zweiten Hälfte der vierziger Jahre nachweisbar. Neben den bereits vorgestellten Exempeln lassen sich weitere anführen.

Ein Manuskripteintrag vom 10.8.1946 in MS131, 12 lautet:

> ∫ / Der Schwanz des Fuchses & das eine aufgehobene Bein in einer Busch'schen Skizze. – Ich sehe das, wie es gemeint ist. Ich kann mir natürlich nicht den Fuchs dazu <in der Vorstellung> ergänzen.

Diese Referenz bezieht sich auf eine Zeichnung in der Bildgeschichte „Der unverschämte Igel", die postum ebenfalls in *Hernach* erschienen ist. Gerade dieses Beispiel macht deutlich, wie intensiv Wittgenstein das Werk von Busch in Details rezipiert hat, wie er sich davon zu ganz eigenen Gedanken und philosophischen Überlegungen hat anregen und inspirieren lassen. Verstehbar ist die besagte Einzelabbildung nur im Kontext des vorhergehenden und des nachfolgenden Bildes einerseits und des Bildertextes andererseits, denn den Schwanz des Fuchses als solchen und das gehobene Bein des Fuchses als solches kann man nur sehen „wie es gemeint ist“, wenn man mit der Kontexteinbindung vertraut ist. Zusätzlich erschließen kann man dann auch, dass der Fuchs, der weiß, „was zu machen ist“, auf den Igel seinen Urinstrahl gerichtet hat.



Zwar gleich macht sich der Igel dick
Und zieht sich in sich selbst zurück.

Der Fuchs, der gern den Igel frißt,
Weiß aber, was zu machen ist.

Und weiß, wie man ihn fassen kann,
Und schüttelt und verzehrt ihn dann.

Weiterhin findet sich etwa in Manuskript MS136, 60a der Eintrag vom 4.1.1948 folgenden Wortlautes:

> ?/ Es ist doch sehr merkwürdig, daß man keinerlei Schwierigkeiten hat in einer Figur wie  ein Gesicht zu sehen, obwohl doch die Unähnlichkeit des einen Winkels mit einer Nase, des andern mit einer Stirn, etc. unglaublich groß ist, oder eine Ähnlichkeit kaum vorhanden. Man hat – wie gesagt – hier <in diesen Strichen> keinerlei Schwierigkeit ein menschliches Gesicht zu sehen; man möchte sagen //möchte geradezu sagen//: ‚so ein Gesicht gibt es‘. Oder auch: ‚es ist dies zwar die Karikatur eines menschlichen Gesichts, aber eines bestimmten wirklich //in der Wirklichkeit// möglichen <(>Gesichts<)>[‘]. […]

Das hier wiedergegebene Gesicht hat verblüffende Ähnlichkeit mit der Zeichnung des Gesichts von Friedrich II. von Preußen, dem „Alten Fritz“, wie sie der zweite Teil von Buschs „Anleitung zu historischen Portraits“ bietet.



Dass Wittgenstein tatsächlich mit dem dreiteiligen Karikaturwerk „Anleitung zu historischen Portraits“ vertraut war, lässt sich mit einem anderen Manuskripteintrag, der bereits in den dreißiger Jahren entstanden ist, belegen. Das Manuskript MS148,17 enthält Aufzeichnungen für Vorlesungen, die Wittgenstein im akademischen Jahr 1934/35 gehalten hat. Und dort findet sich neben der Skizze eines Gesichts der Eintrag “If you do this & this & this & this you get Napoleon.”



Ist man mit dem Buschschen Œuvre vertraut, so erkennt man hier leicht die zeichnerisch-karikaturistische Vorlage dieser Bemerkung, nämlich abermals Buschs „Anleitung zu historischen Portraits“, diesmal der erste Teil davon:

Mach still und froh



Mal so	und so,	Gleich steht er do	bei Austerlitz	und Waterloo.

Und dieses Beispiel hat Wittgenstein auch in seinen Vorlesungen verwendet, denn in den Vorlesungsmitschriften *Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932-1935* (Oxford 1982, 179) von Alice Ambrose und Margaret

MacDonald ist folgende Aufzeichnung vorhanden: “Consider the following: ‘If you draw the diagonals of a pentagon you get a pentagram’, and ‘if you do this and this … you get Napoleon.’” Anschließend findet sich als Halbfigur die Zeichnung von Napoleon Bonaparte.

 Diese Napoleon-Zeichnung belegt allerdings, dass die Hörer der Vorlesung nicht mit dem Buschschen Original vertraut waren bzw. von Wittgenstein nicht damit vertraut gemacht worden sind. Wittgenstein hatte ja in seinen Aufzeichnungen das in der Buschschen Zeichenanleitung für Napoleon als Schlussbild vorhandene Bild gewählt und auch mit der Formulierung “If you do this & this & this & this” darauf Bezug genommen.

Aber eben nicht nur bei konkreten philosophischen Fragestellungen – wie etwa den soeben dokumentierten Beispielen –, sondern auch bei der grundlegenden philosophischen Problemstellung einer „Zeichenweise, die metaphysisch“ ist und insofern „gesehen [wird] mit dem Ewigen als Hintergrund“, also „metaphysische Tiefe“ hat, spielt das Werk Wilhelm Buschs eine bedeutende Rolle. Wittgensteins Nachfolger als Professor für Philosophie in Cambridge, Georg Henrik von Wright, äußerte sich dazu am 9.4.1995 in einem Brief[5]:

> Noch einen kleinen Zusatz zu unserem früheren Briefwechsel über Busch. Ich erinnere mich, dass Wittgenstein große Bewunderung für die Zeichnungen von Busch geäussert hat; die Zeichnungen in „Hernach“, die wir mehrmals zusammen angesehen hatten, hat er als „metaphysisch“ bezeichnet; er sagte sie hätten eine „metaphysische Tiefe“; genau was er damit gemeint hat, weiss ich nicht – aber es war Lob und nicht Tadel. – Auch die „platonischen Briefe“ hat er sehr gerne gehabt; [...]

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[5] Der Verfasser dieses Artikels [J.G.F.R.] ist Empfänger dieses Briefs. Es ergab sich für ihn die Gelegenheit mit G. H. von Wright intensiveren Austausch u.a. über Wittgensteins Beziehung zu bestimmten Schriftstellern und Künstlern – insbesondere auch zu Wilhelm Busch – zu führen. Mit „die ‚platonischen Briefe‘“ ist die Veröffentlichung *Wilhelm Busch an Maria Anderson. Siebzig Briefe* gemeint; diese wurden nämlich später auch unter dem Titel *Platonische Briefe an eine Frau* (Leipzig, Insel Verlag, 1944) veröffentlicht. G. H. von Wright hatte ein Exemplar davon („Insel-Bücherei“, 1950, Nr. 358) höchstwahrscheinlich als Geschenk von Wittgenstein erhalten.

Recherchiert man in Wittgensteins Gesamtnachlass, so findet sich eine dazu explizit aussagende Bemerkung vom 9.2.1948 in Manuskript MS137, 88:

> |Es ist merkwürdig, daß man die Zeichnungen von Busch oft ‚metaphysisch' nennen kann. So gibt es also eine Zeichenweise, die metaphysisch ist. – ‚Gesehen mit dem Ewigen als Hintergrund' könnte man sagen. Aber doch bedeuten diese Striche das nur in einer ganzen Sprache. Und es ist eine Sprache ohne Grammatik, man könnte ihre Regeln nicht angeben.|

Jedoch nicht nur das zeichnerische Werk und die vielen Bildergeschichten von Busch – etwa *Schnurrdiburr oder Die Bienen* (1869), *Plisch und Plum* (1882), *Maler Klecksel* (1884) – waren für Wittgenstein bedeutsam.[6] Neben der bereits erwähnten Veröffentlichung *Wilhelm Busch an Maria Anderson. Siebzig Briefe* schätzte und verwendete Wittgenstein gerade auch das schriftstellerische Werk von Busch – allem voran die beiden Prosaerzählungen *Eduard's Traum* (1891) und *Der Schmetterling* (1895), aber auch den autobiographischen Text *Was mich betrifft* bzw. *Von mir über mich* (1886), die Gedichtsammlungen *Kritik des Herzens* (1874), *Zu guter Letzt* (1904), *Schein und Sein* (1909) und die Märchen- und Sagensammlung *Ut ôler Welt* (1910).[7]

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[6] Hier werden exemplarisch weitere Stellen im Wittgensteinnachlass, die auf das Buschsche Œuvre Bezug nehmen angeführt. *Schnurrdibur:* MS111, 2f → TS211, 9 → TS233B, 20. *Plisch und Plum:* MS107, 249. *Maler Klecksel:* MS150, 59; MS152, 31; MS140, 37 → D308, 51; D310 → MS115ii, 275; MS134, 178 → TS229, §1650/TS245, §1650.

[7] *Eduards Traum:* MS183, 142; MS183, 233; vgl. MS111, 16; MS154, 17v; MS169, 30v; MS171, 6. *Eduards Traum* ist auch ediert von Josef Rothhaupt unter http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/431/1/23-2-94.TXT. *Der Schmetterling:* James Taylor am 24.9.1938 an Wittgenstein: „I read 'Der Schmetterling' twice. The sketches are as good as you said they were. I didn't like some of the sourness of the face the author pulls, he's not as hard boiled as he thinks he is, a tougher person wouldn't have needed to be sour about some things. (After I've written the sentence above I see I've put it in a way like the way you once put a comment on Kaffka [sic!] to me.) But I liked the book." Wittgenstein am 6.11.1947 an G. H. von Wright: „'Der Schmetterling' I don't like as much as 'Eduards Traum', but it's wonderful in parts. Especially the homecoming. You are quite right, I found the book by an extraordinary chance in a shop in Vienna." Wittgenstein am 22.12.1947 an G. H. von Wright: „'Der Schmetterling' is, in part, marvelous e. g.

Durch Wittgenstein „habe ich vieles von der deutschen Literatur kennen und schätzen gelernt, was mir bisher unbekannt geblieben war – so die Prosaerzählungen von Wilhelm Busch“ (von Wright 1983, 15). Dies berichtet Georg Henrik von Wright, dessen Exemplar von Buschs *Der Schmetterling* (Verlag C. Bertelsmann, Gütersloh 1943, Kleine Feld Post-Reihe, 1. Auflage der Feldausgabe) ein Geschenk Wittgensteins an ihn ist und die Widmung „To v. Wright from Ludwig Wittgenstein with good wishes“ enthält. Wittgensteins Schwester Margarete Stonborough-Wittgenstein hatte ihrem Bruder Ludwig zum Weihnachtsfest 1931 ein Exemplar von *Eduard's Traum* geschenkt, was dieser in jenem Exemplar auch durch den Eintrag „von Margarete zu Weihnachten 1931“ dokumentiert hat.[8] Ein besonderes Zeugnis der Vorliebe Wittgensteins insbesondere für die beiden Buschschen Prosaerzählungen ist ein von Paul Engelmann nach Wittgensteins Tod in Israel ausgearbeiteter und gehaltener Vortrag zum Thema „Wilhelm Busch als Philosoph“ (Somavilla 2006, 160-622), in welchem es etwa heißt:

> Ich verdanke die Kenntnis dieser beiden Schriften von Busch ... [*Eduard's Traum* und *Der Schmetterling*] der persönlichen Bekanntschaft und dem jahrelangen geistigen Kontakt mit Ludwig Wittgenstein, der mir diese beiden Bücher geschenkt hat, <für die> er <von> leidenschaftlicher Bewunderung erfüllt war. / Sie wissen, daß W.[ittgenstein] zwar, zum Unterschied von den Positivisten, an Höheres geglaubt hat: Es gibt allerdings Höheres aber man kann es

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the end when he comes home – ‚Es war ein lustiges Schneegestöber bei nördlichem Winde ...‘.“ *Ut ôler Welt* – „Der Schmied und der Pfaffe“. Ist „Himphamp“ das bezeichnende Wort im Buschschen Märchen „Der Schmied und der Pfaffe“, so verwendet Wittgenstein ein umgangssprachliches Wort für „Lärm“ im Sinne von „Radau“, nämlich „Klamauk“ (MS105, 30+34 → TS208, 54+55 → TS209, 74; MS113, 113v), das dann fälschlich als „Klamank“ transkribiert wurde (TS211, 690 → TS212, 1602 → TS213, 640). Das Märchen „Der Schmied und der Pfaffe“ ist auch unter http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/430/1/22-2-94.TXT von Josef Rothhaupt ediert.

[8] Es wurde überprüft, dass sich Wittgensteins handschriftlicher Eintrag nicht auf „Marguerite Respinger“ bezieht. Siehe dazu Rothhaupt / Seery 2000, S. 123f. G. H. von Wright hat mir [J.G.F.R.] mitgeteilt, dass er sich bei einem Besuch bei der Witwe von Rush Rhees dieses Exemplar (Bassermann'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, München, 1925, 27.-30. Tausend) hat mitnehmen dürfen. Es wird sich nun im Nachlass von G. H. von Wright befinden.

> nicht aussprechen steht <ja> im Tr<actatus>. / Daß man es nicht aussprechen kann, ist die Behauptung, durch die er von den Positivisten irrtümlich als einer der ihrigen reklamiert werden konnte. Aber während diese meinen, was man nicht sagen kann, das existiere nicht, oder <doch> nur als periphere Randzone des Aussprechbaren, und es käme daher im Leben gewiß nicht darauf an, ist W., wie <andererseits auch> alle Metaphysiker, <zu denen er ja durchaus nicht gehört,> die meinen, man könne davon reden, davon durchdrungen, daß es im Leben und überhaupt gerade auf das ankäme, was sich nicht sagen läßt. / Er scheint in seinem Nachlaßwerk Investigations dahin zu kommen, doch Wege zu suchen, um indirekt darüber etwas zu sagen, oder vielmehr, die sinnvolle Frage danach zu stellen. / Aber in der Hauptepoche, <der> des Tr. hat er den Hinweis auf das gegeben, was nicht ausgesprochen wird, sondern was sich zeigt.

Hier wird vom Ansatz her verständlich, warum Wittgenstein gleich bei einem seiner ersten Gespräche mit Mitgliedern des neopositivistisch orientierten Wiener Kreises aus einem Werk von Wilhelm Busch – es dürfte sich aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach um *Eduard's Traum* gehandelt haben – vorgelesen hat, warum er seit Ende der zwanziger Jahre trachtete, sich von den Auffassungen der Mitglieder des Wiener Kreises zu distanzieren, warum er sich nach der Veröffentlichung der *Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung* bemüht hat, mit seinem Philosophieren redlich einen Weg zwischen metaphysischer Scylla einerseits und (neo-)positivistischer Charybdis andererseits zu bahnen. Dabei erweist sich für Wittgenstein die Zuschreibung „He has the REAL philosophical urge" an Wilhelm Busch als angemessen. Auch mit Worten im „Nachruf" (Hänsel 1951) auf Wittgenstein von Ludwig Hänsel lässt sich das soeben Ausgeführte bestätigen:

> [Es] gehörte zu ihm die Treue zu seinen Freunden [...] wie die Treue zu den Büchern, die er liebgewonnen hatte. Er laß immer wieder dieselben Bücher, empfahl sie, schenkte Exemplare davon seinen Freunden, las daraus vor. Er kannte sie fast auswendig. Was er zitierte, waren Sätze, über die andere hinweglasen, die ihn aber ergriffen hatten um ihrer Wahrheit, ihrer Wärme, ihres echten Tonfalls willen. Zu seinen Büchern gehörte [...] „Eduards Traum" von Wilhelm Busch. Noch bei seinem letzten Aufenthalt in Wien zitierte er daraus mit schmerzlichem Ernst eines seiner Lieblingswörter: „Und Spaß beiseit', meine Freunde, nur wer Herz hat, kann so recht fühlen, und zwar von Herzen, daß er nichts taugt. Das Weitere findet sich."

Paul Engelmann berichtet in seinen *Erinnerungen an Ludwig Wittgenstein*, dass Wittgenstein diese Stelle vom Schluss der Buschschen Erzählung *Eduard's Traum* in für ihn markanten Kontexten gern und öfters zitierte:

> Niemand hat so gut gefühlt, daß man mit jeder Sprache sozusagen in ihrer eigenen sprechen muß; mit der philosophischen in der dort allein angemessenen Exaktheit, mit der Umgangssprache aber nicht etwa „unexakt", was ja eine Afferei wäre, aber auch nicht exakt, weil das hier nicht geht, sondern indem man ihr gar nicht antwortet und ihr bloß Fragen stellt. „Das Weitere findet sich."

In Wittgensteins Tagebuch MS183, 233 findet sich folgende sehr interessante Eintragung vom 6.4.1937:

> Eine Auslegung der Christlichen Lehre: Wach vollkommen auf! Wenn Du das tust, erkennst Du, daß Du nicht taugst; & damit hört die Freude an dieser Welt für Dich auf. Und sie kann auch nicht wiederkommen, wenn Du wach <u>bleibst</u>. Du brauchst aber nun <u>Erlösung</u>, – sonst bist Du verloren. Du mußt aber am Leben bleiben (und diese Welt ist für Dich tot) so brauchst Du ein neues Licht anderswoher. In diesem Licht kann keine Klugheit, oder Weisheit, sein; denn für diese Welt bist Du tot. […] Dieses Leben aber ist die Liebe, die menschliche Liebe, zum Vollkommenen. Und <u>diese</u> ist der Glaube. „Alles andere findet sich."

Dass es sich bei der Erzählung *Eduard's Traum* auch gerade um einen philosophisch relevanten Text handelt, geht bereits aus Bekundungen von Wilhelm Busch selbst hervor. Im April 1892 schreibt Busch an seinen Freund, den berühmten Maler in München, Franz von Lenbach:

> Besten Dank für die freundlichen Worte über meinen kleinen Schnickschnack auf Druckpapier. Viel werden's ihrer nicht sein, denen wie dir in angestammter Hellhörigkeit schon ein leichtes Säuseln der Probleme genügend ist, um sich selbstdenkend zu belustigen. Ein emsiger Schritt des Wortes schien mir heilsam. Durch stilistische Behaglichkeit nach Landesbrauch wäre mir meine Sache leicht unpassend dick geworden.

Und im Dezember 1893 schreibt Busch über die Erzählung: „[…] ein kleiner Scherz, nicht ohne Fleiß, denk ich, durchdacht, zur Unterhaltung für wenige, die an so was Vergnügen finden. Die Probleme sind eingewickelt und wollen nicht losgemacht sein […]". Also ein literarisches Kleinod für Wittgenstein, ein Gustostück für Wittgenstein, der ja jene „angestammte Hellhörigkeit" hatte und dem „schon ein leises Säuseln der Probleme" genügte „um sich selbstdenkend zu belustigen", – oder in angestrengter und anstrengender Art und Weise damit und/oder darüber zu philosophieren. So hat dann auch Paul Engelmann, der ja, wie bereits dargetan, von Wittgenstein mit *Eduard's Traum* bekannt und mit den philosophisch relevanten Inhalten darin vertraut gemacht wurde, in seinem Nachlass in Jerusalem (PEA 233/107) folgendes Notat hinterlassen:

> „… um endlich mal zu erfahren, was eine Sache ist, abgesehen davon, wie sie uns vorkommt, …" – so ironisiert und erled[i]gt der von Wittgenstein als Philosoph höchstgeschätzte Wilhelm Busch das erkenntnistheoretische Problem, an dessen Lösung sich Jahrhunderte die Zähne ausgebissen haben; es käme uns dann eben wieder irgendwie vor, wäre also nicht unabhängig von ihrem Vorkommen.

Geschildert wird in vollkommener Groteske die Reise, des beim Einschlafen zu einem „denkenden Punkt" schrumpfenden Helden Eduard, in einen Gedankenraum und in die Traumwirklichkeit, nämlich: ins Reich der Arithmetik, der Geometrie, der Intelligenzen, der Wissenschaften, des Museums, der Politik, des Weltalls; zu den „vier guten Vorsätzen" (Willich, Wolltich, Wennaber, Wohlgemuth); in die „Bergstadt"; zurück in Eduards familiäre Alltagswelt. Sicherlich davon angeregt notiert Wittgenstein am 28.1.1932 in sein Tagebuch:

> Es gibt einen Gedankenraum in dem <den> man beim Einschlafen weiter oder weniger weit reisen kann & beim Erwachen gibt es eine Rückkunft aus größerer oder geringerer Entfernung <Weite>.

Das Eintauchen in solch einen Gedankenraum und die Rückkehr aus ihm bilden Anfang und Ende der Prosaerzählung *Eduard's Traum*. Nach einem kurzen Prolog beginnt die Geschichte indem zuerst Elise und dann auch Eduard, Elises Mann, zu Bett gehen. Eduard passiert dann – so erzählt er seine Traumreise – „etwas Sonderbares":

> Mein Geist, meine Seele, oder wie man's nennen will, kurz, so ungefähr alles, was ich im Kopf hatte, fing an sich zusammenzuziehen. Mein intellektuelles Ich wurde kleiner und kleiner. Erst wie eine mittelgroße Kartoffel, dann wie eine Schweizerpille, dann wie ein Stecknadelkopf, dann noch kleiner und immer noch kleiner, bis es nicht mehr ging. Ich war zum Punkt geworden. / Im selben Moment erfaßte michs, wie das geräuschvolle Sausen des Windes. Ich wurde hinausgewirbelt. Als ich mich umdrehte, sah ich in meine eigenen Nasenlöcher. / Da saß ich nun auf der Ecke des Nachttisches und dachte über

> mein Schicksal nach. / Ich war nicht bloß ein Punkt, ich war ein denkender Punkt. Und rührig war ich auch. […]

Und nach einer langen ereignis- und erlebnisreichen Traumreise kehrt Eduard wieder aus dem Gedankenraum in die Alltagswelt zurück:

> **„Eduard, steh' auf, der Kaffe ist fertig!!"** / Ich erwachte. Meine gute Elise, unsern Emil auf dem Arm, stand vor meinem Bett. / Wer war froher als ich. Ich hatte mein Herz wieder und Elisen ihres und dem Emil seins, und, Spaß beiseit, meine Freunde, nur wer ein Herz hat, kann so recht fühlen und sagen, und zwar von Herzen, daß er nichts taugt. Das Weitere findet sich.

Buschs Erzählung *Eduard's Traum* endet alsdann mit einem kurzen Epilog.

Leicht lassen sich im Wittgensteinschen Gesamtnachlass – neben dem bereits dokumentierten Lieblingszitat Wittgensteins: „Das Weitere findet sich." – weitere Zitate aus und Anspielungen auf diese Erzählung anführen. Etwa: „<Sieht er nicht <so stolz> aus als ob <er selbst gemolken wäre>>", heißt es in Manuskript MS154, 17v. Wittgenstein zitiert hier aus *Eduard's Traum* (Abschnitt 9). Der größere Kontext – der hier nicht ausgebreitet, sondern nur angedeutet und in einer später noch zitierten Textpassage markiert werden kann – ist dabei in zweifacher Weise wichtig und aufschlussreich; zum einen das Umfeld, in welchem dieser Satz in der Prosaerzählung selbst steht; zum anderen das Umfeld, in welchem dieser Satz in eine Bemerkung Wittgensteins über den „jüdischen Geist" eingefügt ist.

Weiterhin steht in *Eduard's Traum* (Abschnitt 12) folgende Passage:

> Stehlen hat keiner mehr nötig; höchstens wird von kleinen Knaben noch mal hin und wieder eine Zigarre stibitzt. Man betrachtet dergleichen als angeborenen Schwachsinn, wo der Betreffende im Grunde nichts für kann, und bringt ihn deshalb in die Anstalt für Staatstrottel zu den übrigen.

Sicherlich angeregt durch diese Stelle vermerkt Wittgenstein im Jahre 1949 in seinem Taschennotizbuch MS169, 30v:

> Könnte man sich denken, daß Menschen Lügen als eine Art Wahnsinn betrachteten. – Sie sagen „Es ist doch nicht wahr, wie kann man's denn dann sagen?!" Sie hätten kein Verständnis für die Lüge. „Er wird doch nicht sagen, er hat Schmerzen, wenn er keine hat! – Sagt er's doch, so ist er verrückt."

Und kurz darauf greift er diesen eigenen, aber durch die Buschlektüre inspirierten und eingefärbten Gedanken im Manuskriptspiralblock MS171, 6 wieder auf, wenn er schreibt:

> Ist es z.B. möglich, sich Menschen vorzustellen, die darum nicht lügen können, weil die Lüge für sie nichts als ein Mißklang wäre. Ich will mir einen Fall denken, wo die Menschen nicht aus Moralität wahrhaftig sind, sondern in der Lüge etwas Absurdes sehen. Wer lügt würde als geisteskrank angesehen. Besser ausgedrückt: Das Lügen oder die Verstellung müßte diesen Leuten als Perversität erscheinen.

Anfang der sechziger Jahre hat Paul Fechner diesem Prosatext Buschs „Reiselust nach der Grenze des Unfaßbaren“ attestiert und für das Werk eine philosophisch-existenzielle Dimension konstatiert (Fechner 1961/62, 7):

> „Eduards Traum“ [...], die graziöseste Dichtung des Sechzigjährigen, in der die Reiselust sich am freiesten, reichsten und so überlegen entfaltet, daß man unwillkürlich immer nach dem rechten Platz suchen geht, der diesem souveränen Spiel der Phantasie mit den Problemen des Daseins wie in ihrer Spiegelung in den philosophischen Betrachtungen der Zeit eigentlich zukommt. [...] Ein Mann, der die geistige Sphäre seiner Zeit lebendig mitgelebt hat, macht sich von der Höhe ihres Besitzes das Vergnügen, einmal statt mit den Realitäten des Daseins mit ihren abstrakten Skelettierungen sein Spiel zu treiben, neben die Komik der menschlichen Wirklichkeit die der menschlichen Begriffsdichtung und ihrer ewigen Inkongruenz zu eben dieser Wirklichkeit zu stellen.

Eine enge Wahlverwandtschaft zwischen der in *Eduard's Traum* vorhandenen Ideologie- und Zivilisationskritik und jener von Wittgenstein – etwa in seinen Bemerkungen „Zu einem Vorwort“ in Manuskript MS109, 207-212 im November 1930 – vertretenen Zivilisationskritik ist ebenfalls nicht von der Hand zu weisen. (Vgl. Smedt 1976 und DeAngelis 2007) So schreibt Busch in der der Erzählung (Abschnitt 9) eine markante Passage, der Wittgenstein dann auch das bereits erwähnte Zitat in MS154, 17v – den „gemolkenen“, stolzen Ziegenbock betreffend – entnommen hat:

> Ich sah sie, ich sah sie leibhaftig, die hohen Forscher, ich sah sie sitzen zwischen ihren Mikroskopen, Retorten und Meerschweinchen; ich erwog den Nutzen, den Vorschub, den berechtigten Stolz und alles, was ihnen die Menschheit sonst noch zu verdanken hat, und in gedrückter Ehrfurcht verließ ich die geheiligten Räume. Aber ein Kritiker – denn Flöhe gibt's überall – sagte zu einem anderen, mit dem er vorüberging: „Da drinnen hocken sie, Zahlen im Kopf, Bazillen im Herzen. Alles pulverisieren sie: Gott, Geist und Goethe. Und dann die Besengilde, die gelehrte, die den Kehricht zusammenfittchet vor den Hintertüren der Jahrtausende. – Siehst du das Fuhrwerk da? Siehst du den

> Ziegenbock, der jeden Morgen sein Wägelchen Milch in die Stadt zieht? Sieht er nicht so stolz aus, als ob er selber gemolken wäre?“

Wittgenstein vermeldet pointiert in seinem Vorworttextkorpus in MS109,204:

> Dieses Buch ist für diejenigen <die> geschrieben, ~~welche~~ <die> dem Geist <seinem Geist> in dem es geschrieben ist freundlich gegenüberstehn. Dieser Geist ist, glaube ich, ein anderer als der der <des Stromes der> großen europäischen & amerikanischen Zivilisation. ~~Dieser~~ <Der> Geist <dieser Zivilisation> dessen Ausdruck die <~~moderne~~> Industrie, Architektur, Musik <der Faschismus & Socialismus> der Jetztzeit <unserer Zeit> ist, ist ein dem Verfasser fremder & unsympathischer Geist <fremd & unsympathisch>.

Im Buschschen Œuvre finden sich zudem etliche Zeichnungen und Texte, die zwar nicht direkt zitiert im Wittgenstein’schen Œuvre nachzuweisen sind, deren Inhalt aber klar mit wichtigen Punkten der Philosophie Wittgensteins in Zusammenhang steht bzw. in Zusammenhang zu bringen ist. Zwei Beispiele mögen hier genügen. (Busch 1923, II, 364 und 267)

Eine auffallende Ähnlichkeit



Student: „Aber tausendsapperlot, Onkel, ich finde eine auffallende Ähnlichkeit zwischen Dir und dem Brunnen da.“
Onkel: „Ah! Wieso denn, Du Schlingel?“
Student: „Weil man auch, weiß der Himmel wie lang, pumpen muß, bis 'mal 'was 'rauskommt.“

Während Karikatur und Dialog mit dem Titel „Eine auffallende Ähnlichkeit“ Wittgensteins Konzept der „Familienähnlichkeit“ zuzuordnen sind, können Karikatur und Dialog „Fester Glaube“ mit Bemerkungen von Wittgenstein zu den Grundlagen der Mathematik einerseits und über Gewissheit andererseits in Verbindung gebracht werden, etwa mit einer Bemerkung vom 14.5.1932 in Manuskript MS113,108r (die zudem ein Transferprofil sogar ins so genannte *Big Typescript* hat, nämlich: MS154, 45v → MS113, 108r → TS211, 682 → TS212, 1651 → TS213, 662): „(Die Philosophie prüft nicht die Kalküle der Mathematik, sondern nur, was die Mathematiker über diese Kalküle sagen.)“

Fester Glauben

Professor: „. . Und nun will ich Ihnen diesen Lehrsatz jetzt auch beweisen.“
Junge: „Wozu beweisen, Herr Professor? Ich glaub' es Ihnen so.“

Wie eingangs dokumentiert spricht Ludwig Wittgenstein gerade Wilhelm Busch „the REAL philosophical urge“ zu und knüpft diese Aussage konkret an die Lektüre von *Wilhelm Busch an Maria Anderson. Siebzig Briefe*. Buschs Brief vom 25.7.1975 an Maria Anderson – er sei hier exemplarisch angeführt – liest sich folgendermaßen:

> Liebe Mary!
> Die Thätigkeit des Blumenkohl-ähnlichen Gehirns pflegt man Geist zu nennen. Sie haben gesagt, daß Sie meinen Geist liebten. – Gut! – Was kümmert Sie denn meine physikalische Beschaffenheit? Sollten Sie etwa Geist und Seele mit einander verwechseln? – Das Bild der Seele, welches durch Vermittlung der Sinne im Gehirn sich zeigt, heißt Körper. – Wehe, wehe!! – Kommt Ihnen mein Geist, der vielgepriesene, gar so ungenügend vor??? –
> Ahem! Ihr W. B.

Im Manuskriptringbuch MS144, 10 hat Wittgenstein in seine Bemerkungen zur „Philosophie der Psychologie – Ein Fragment“ einmalig folgende markante, bedeutende Aussage aufgenommen: „Der menschliche Körper ist das beste Bild der menschlichen Seele.“ (Wittgenstein 2001, 1002) Mag dieser Satz auch von Nietzsche inspiriert sein,[9] so ist die thematische Verknüpfung mit dem Brief von Herrn Busch an Frau Anderson nicht nur unübersehbar, sondern grundlegend, denn die Rede davon, dass der menschliche Körper (nicht „Leib“ wie bei Nietzsche) das beste BILD der Seele ist, findet sich nur bei Busch (nicht „Seele ist auch nur etwas am Leibe“ wie bei Nietzsche).

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[9] In Wittgensteins Nachlass lassen sich dazu mehrere Referenzen nachweisen, nämlich: MS152, 35 → MS115ii, 284: „(Und <Z.B.> Geist ist auch nur etwas am Körper Zaratustra [sic!]). Diese Idee muß uns noch beschäftigen“. MS124, 7: „Aber sagst Du nicht doch daß ‚Seele nur etwas am Körper sei‘ – Daß, wenn Du das Benehmen der Menschen (eines Stammes) beschrieben hast, Du alles beschrieben hast? […]“; MS131,69: „‚Und die Seele ist auch nur etwas am Körper‘ (Nietzsche) Und warum soll mir nicht der Körper wieder zerfließen & Seelenzustände, Sinnesdaten, zurückbleiben? […]“; MS137, 66b → TS232, §689: „Sag ich etwa ‚& die Seele ist auch nur etwas am Leibe‘? Nein. (Ich bin nicht so arm an Kategorien.)“ Als Referenzwerte werden dazu Nietzsches *Also sprach Zarathustra,* in: Nietzsche 1999, Bd. 4, 257-258 (Teil III: „Von alten und neuen Tafeln“, § 16) und 39-41 (Teil I: „Von den Verächtern des Leibes“) angegeben. Siehe Brusotti 2009, 354-356.

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Wittgenstein and Sebald: The Place of Home and the Grammar of Memory

David Schalkwyk, Cape Town

On page three of three of W.G. Sebald's novel, *Austerlitz*, four pairs of eyes gaze out at the reader. Two are nocturnal animals; the other pair is human, readily identifiable as the artist Jan Peter Tripp and the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein.[1] Sebald's narrator tells us, "all I remember of the denizens of the Nocturama is that several of them had strikingly large eyes, and the fixed, enquiring gaze found in certain painters and philosophers who seek to penetrate the darkness which surrounds us purely by means of looking and thinking".[2] This is the first time Wittgenstein is mentioned in the novel, and he maintains a constant, if enigmatic, presence, as he does throughout Sebald's work. He reappears in *Austerlitz* when the narrator informs us of his striking resemblance to the protagonist:

> [W]henever I see the a photograph of Wittgenstein somewhere or other, I feel more and more as if Austerlitz were gazing at me out of the it, and when I look at Austerlitz it is as if I see in him the disconsolate philosopher, a man locked into the glaring clarity of his logical thinking as inextricably as into his confused emotions, so striking is the likeness between them. (56)

This resemblance is more than an affinity of facial features: it is more like an identity of constitution, a mode of being in the world, in which "confused emotions" are as significant as the "glaring clarity of logical thinking".

Further invocations of Wittgenstein are more subtle, but hardly less striking. Jacques Austerlitz's London house is furnished, almost to the last detail, in the austere style with which Wittgenstein decorated (if that is the word) his own rooms in Cambridge. More significant than the similarities of physiognomy or aesthetic disposition, however, is Jacques Austerlitz's

[1] See Sears 2007, 219.
[2] Sebald 2001, 3.

Wittgensteinian mode of trying to make sense of the world in which he also finds himself so ill at ease. Wittgenstein writes in the Preface to the *Philosophical Investigations* that his attempts, to use Sebald's words, to "penetrate the darkness which surrounds us purely by means of looking and thinking" amounts to no more than a "number of sketches of landscapes … made in the course of … long and involved journeying … an album … of a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction … the lot [of which] in its poverty and in the darkness of this time [may be] to bring light into one brain or other—but, of course", he adds with characteristic pessimism, "it is not likely".[3] Austerlitz's own "investigations", Sebald's narrator informs us, "had long outstripped their original purpose as a project for a dissertation, proliferating in his hands into an endless preliminary sketches for a study … of the family likenesses between" the structures of capitalist architecture (44). This work finally leads Austerlitz to a psychic breakdown: "Austerlitz … sat here for hours, laying out these photographs or others from his collection … arranging them in an order depending on their family resemblances, or withdrawing them from the game until there was nothing left but the grey table top, or he felt exhausted by the constant effort of thinking and remembering" (168).

The intellectual restlessness that Wittgenstein records in his preface is matched by his personal and cultural agitation, by his state of almost permanent exile and rootlessness.[4] Marjorie Perloff points out with great perspicuity that, "Only someone who is not fully at home in the world will talk as much as Wittgenstein does about 'the language game which is one's original home'".[5] Perloff connects this sense of strangeness not only with Wittgenstein's alienation as an Austrian in England but also to his foreignness, "as a Jew, in the Vienna of his birth" (Perloff 1999, 76). Wittgenstein's Jewishness is a controversial issue. Whatever one thinks of David Stern's assertion that "Wittgenstein saw in Weininger, and Weininger's

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[3] Wittgenstein 1953, ix-x.

[4] Such a feeling of exile is noted even when he was in Austria fighting during the First World War: "This kind, friendly letter opens my eyes to the fact that I am living in *exile* here" (MS 103, pp. 17v-18v, July 26, 1916, Wittgenstein 1991, 47). For a thorough study of Wittgenstein's status as an exile, see James C. Klagge, *Wittgenstein in Exile* (unpublished manuscript).

[5] Perloff 1999, 76.

anti-Semitism a mirror of his own self-hatred, a way of figuring a relationship of identification and denial that he both had to and could not confront”, [6] it seems that this aspect of Wittgenstein’s state of exile—from himself as much as any country or culture—resonates throughout Sebald’s work and through characters as various as Jacques Austerlitz and Paul Bereyter, Max Ferber and the Sebaldian narrator himself.[7] Wittgenstein is the biographical source of many things central to Sebald’s quest, not least of which is the “moral radicalism”[8] that, in the author’s words, binds the young Wittgenstein as primary school teacher in the Austrian Alps and the teacher of Sebald’s own Tyrolian childhood, who, being a quarter Jewish and temperamentally deeply alienated from the village community, finally succumbed to his experience of internal exile by taking his own life.

I have argued elsewhere, following Perloff, that Wittgenstein’s attempts to return language to its proper home invariably reveals the uncanny within the familiar or the ordinary, or to adopt Freud’s terms, that what is *heimlich* is also likely to be *unheimlich*.[9] For Sebald the play of home and exile, the familiar and the uncanny, is inseparable from the demands and evasions of memory. Wittgenstein’s role in Sebald’s texts con-

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[6] Stern 2001, 259.

[7] Paul Bereyter, the primary school teacher in the Alpine village who ends up taking his own life – a constant obsession of all of Sebald’s protagonists, as it was with Wittgenstein – is based on Sebald’s own teacher in the Alpine village of Wertach. But Sebald declares in two different interviews that “there are echoes of Wittgenstein in his period as a schoolteacher in Austria”, especially his “moral radicalism” (Schwartz 2007, 73). The Sebald narrator’s self-imposed exile in the story “Max Ferber” further calls to mind Wittgenstein’s early move to Manchester, while Ferber himself happens to have lodged at 104 Palatine Rd, “the selfsame house where Ludwig Wittgenstein, then a twenty-four year old engineering student, had lived in 1908” (Sebald 2002, 166).

[8] “What is the use of studying philosophy … if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday life”, and his striking declaration in the Big Typescript (especially if we bear Austerlitz in mind), that “as is frequently the case in architecture, work in philosophy is actually closer to working on oneself. On one’s own understanding. On the way one sees things. (And on what one demands of them.)” (Wittgenstein 2005, 300e).

[9] See Freud 1948. For a discussion of the uncanny in relation to Wittgenstein’s work, see Schalkwyk 2004.

stitutes an uncanny paradox. His presence registers something that is largely absent from, but may also be regarded as the crux of, Wittgenstein's own philosophical work. The real, historically based journeys of all Sebald's protagonists, in a pre-World-War-II Europe and its aftermath, embody in historical and fictional shape the governing metaphors of Wittgenstein's philosophy: the ideas that a philosophical problem takes the form "I don't know my way about"; that it is the task of philosophy to return language to its proper home; that language is like the streets of an old city along which one needs to trace and retrace one's tracks, as much by reminding oneself of what one already knows as by offering a perspicuous representation of unnoticed relations;[10] and that philosophy is an ethical task of working upon oneself, in an attempt to achieve absolute honesty and the "liberating word" that will allow one to rest. Most important for Sebald, perhaps, is Wittgenstein's adherence, as Louis Sass puts it, to Nietzsche's idea that "every great philosophy is in fact 'a confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir'".[11] Sebald returns Wittgenstein's metaphors to the troubled, homeless world from which Wittgenstein himself came, performing in an allusive, fictional way what Ray Monk's biography achieves more directly. The tragic, haunting story of Paul Bereyter's life and death might be considered an invitation to imagine what Wittgenstein's life might have been like had he persisted with his goal of teaching primary school children amongst people with whom he felt an utter stranger. Sebald's own haunted attempts to find an ethical mode of representing the spiritual, emotional, and physical dislocation and obliteration of whole peoples and their identities in the Europe before, during and after the Nazis, turn also to Wittgenstein's philosophical methods in the novelist's quest to penetrate the darkness of his own time. Sebald takes from Wittgenstein a form of representation that eschews the

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[10] See Seebald 2001, 174: "If language may be regarded as an old city full of streets and squares, nooks and crannies, with some quarters dating from far back in time while others have been torn down, cleared up and rebuilt, and with suburbs reaching further and further into the surrounding country, then I was like a man who had been abroad a long time and cannot find his way through this urban sprawl any more, no longer knows what a bus stop is for, or what a back yard is, or a street junction, and avenue or a bridge."

[11] Louis Sass 2001, 99.

usual kinds of causal explanation for those which involve seeing connections. The album of sketches compiled from many journeys criss-cross in every direction connects Wittgenstein's mode of working to the acknowledged strangeness of Sebald's own prose, its mysteriously evocative photographs, and the ethical complications of his characters.

All Sebald's work is an attempt to sketch a grammar of memory in its relation to the loss of home or the condition of exile. It is a tireless, if immensely burdened, quest to carry out what Wittgenstein left undone on the terrain of memory. Sebald shows his deepest affinity with Wittgenstein in his reiterated attempts to trace the concept of memory as it constitutes personal and cultural identity, indeed the very possibility of the forms of life that lie at the foundation of Wittgenstein's notion of language itself—in the attendant dislocations of exile: strangeness, alienation, longing and recovery, all encompassed by an incessant series of real journeys. Two apparently separate historical events bear the burden of the loss or repression of memory. The first is the experience of Jewish exiles, from those conveyed at a very early age from their families and homes by the *Kindertransporte*, like Jacques Austerlitz, or as teenagers, like Max Ferber, to the even earlier dislocations of Dr Henry Selwyn and Sebald's uncle, Ambros Adelwarth. They are exemplified for Sebald by people like Jean Améry, Primo Levi, and Paul Celan, who, as he puts it, "ultimately succumbed to the weight of memory" (Schwartz 2007, 38). The second event, which directly involves Sebald himself, is what he decries as the "conspiracy of silence" in Germany after the war—the apparently willful act of forgetting, both as perpetrators and then as victims of the allied bombing of whole German cities such as Dresden and Hamburg.

Sebald's narrator or his protagonists tell their separate stories as a process in which the strands of remembering and forgetting are almost indistinguishable. Austerlitz's life story involves a slow, infinitely painful process of gradually reliving experiences that resurface from a traumatic past, but that revival of memory leads to other forms of spiritual paralysis and loss. These recollections of experiences or memories are emphatically not under the protagonist's control. They have been repressed, although one should be very careful about reading such a process in Freudian terms. Furthermore, the memories of the protagonists are always filtered through those of the narrator, who has his own reasons for repression and excavation. Often one is not quite sure whether the memories, or the lapses of memory, being recorded are those of narrator or protagonist, since the one is so often embedded in the other: the stated memories (or lapses of memory) of his protagonist are conveyed through the narrator's explicit recollection of memory or confession of amnesia. One cannot read a sentence of Sebald's prose without being aware of the complications of memory, forgetting and the difficulties of their representation.

Sebald's work is thus as much about the ravages of forgetting as it is about the mysteries of memory. There is clearly a Freudian undertow to his sense that certain traumatic events—in each case the loss of home, parents, family, a familiar and reassuringly humane existence—leads to the repression of the very memories of such comforting childhood. Such repression is not Freudian, however, because it is not sexual but rather cultural and political, and because the return of memory offers no relief but rather further pain, which in Sebald's stories almost invariably results in suicide. Sebald's work, then, asks how memory and forgetting are related grammatically, within the context of a specific European cultural life and its history of destruction. To what degree is each a voluntary act? To what degree may each be said to be the product of thought or experience? How is each related to the unconscious, especially to the processes of repression? To what extent, for example, are Austerlitz's repressed memories of his childhood in Prague, his parents who are murdered by the Nazis, and his experience of the *Kindertransporte* to England and Wales comparable to Sebald's own concern with the post-war German repression of the events of the "destruction" as he puts it, in and of Europe and Germany?

The difference may seem to lie in the respective relations of victim and perpetrator to the trauma of victimhood and the evasive guilt of the perpetrator—one is inclined to say that the victim's repression is caused involuntarily by what happened to him or her, whereas the forgetting of the perpetrator stems from more conscious motives of bad faith. And yet Sebald complicates that commonsense notion by pointing to the role of the German people as victims of the horrendous allied bombings of their cities. "People's ability to forget what they do not want to know, to overlook what is before their eyes, was seldom put to the test better than in Germany at that time",[12] he writes, alluding to the "extraordinary faculty for self-anaesthesia", and that "the almost entire absence of profound disturbance to the inner life of the nation suggests that the new Federal German society relegated the experiences of its own prehistory to the back of its mind and developed an almost perfectly functioning mechanism of repression" (11-12), citing Alexander Kluge's statement that "the population, although obviously showing an innate wish to tell its story, [had] lost the psychic power of accurate memory" (24). What is striking about Sebald's writing here is the way in which it evades the decision to attribute either agency or passivity to the collective process, and thus renders problematical the question of ethics and responsibility. Forgetting what one does not want to know suggests that such obliteration of memories is conscious or deliberate, while talk of a mechanism of repression and of losing the power of accurate memory indicates a more passive, unconscious process, in which one is a victim of forces beyond one's control.

Those who have not become victims of such self-imposed forgetting face the problem of finding an adequate way of representing the traumatic events that gave rise to the amnesia. Sebald is consequently wary of any easy recourse to actual witnessing of traumatic events. He writes of the "unreal effect of eyewitness reports", which derives from the "clichés to which they often resorted" and which "cover up and neutralize experiences beyond our ability to comprehend" (Sebald 1999, 24-5). Such eyewitness accounts therefore "need to be supplemented by what a synoptic and artificial view reveals" (25-6). Such a perspective is artificial in the sense that it is not a genuine eyewitness account—it is the product of art or fiction working with "witnesses one can trust" (Schwartz 2007, 85). But, like Wittgenstein's work, the very nature of its subject precludes the achievement of a removed, synoptic viewpoint. Sebald is more accurate when he writes, "if there is such a thing as a revelation, if there is a moment in a text which is surrounded by something like *claritas* or *veritas*, then it can be achieved only by actually going to certain places, by looking, by expending large amounts of time in actually exposing oneself to places that no one goes to" (Schwartz 2007, 85). Going, looking, exposing oneself—but also seeing connections, putting things together, making the strange

[12] Sebald 1999, 41.

familiar and the familiar strange. All of these things are encompassed in Sebald's work by the uncanny workings of memory.

Characteristically, Wittgenstein's discussions of memory are focused on the question of the degree to which remembering may be considered an experience, to what extent such an experience is the foundation of the concept of memory, and to what extent remembering provides us with the concept of the past; whether memory is a voluntary process; the relationship between remembering and aspect perception; and the affinities (or not) between remembering and cognate psychological terms like dreaming, knowing, imagining, and the experiencing of a mental image. Insofar as Wittgenstein sketches a grammar of memory, he offers two distinct notions, each differently related to the will and an experience or mental image.

We tend to think that remembering is some kind of mental experience in which images play a decisive role. But if I am asked what I have been doing for the last two hours, Wittgenstein points out, "I answer … straight off, and I don't read the answer off from the experience I am having".[13] On the other hand, I can say that I remember or recall something, and this may well involve a mental process or experience. Furthermore, I can and often do say that I *believe* I remember something. Such cases reveal "what is [indeed] subjective in psychology" (107). This is an important concession in the context of Wittgenstein's characteristic attack on the idea that the content of an experience provides us with a concept, especially when it is conceived as a private object to which only I have access. When does one ever need such a private, inner picture? Certainly not as the foundation of meaning, which cannot be based on a private object, because the vagaries of memory cannot ensure that one applies the same word to the same private object from one moment to another. One might always misremember—merely *believe* that one remembers—which means that there can be no criterion of sameness of application to sustain the repeatability of the concept as the same thing. Meaning cannot be subjective; but can memory be private and inscrutable?

This question raises questions of moment and intricate detail. For if one can always misremember then what remains to connect one moment of use with a future instance, or the past one? On what does the criterion of

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[13] Wittgenstein 1982, 105.

going on in the correct way stand, if not on the correctness of memory? Wittgenstein asks: "Does remembering teach us … that a certain event took place in the past? – then we would have to *connect it up* with past events … Whereas it is really the *criterion* for the past" (*LW,* 837). This is a characteristic, Wittgensteinian move, which seeks to get rid of any mysterious, intermediate process—any kind of third entity which would have to make the link between memory and the past. Remembering, Wittgenstein seems to be saying, unlike hoping, or wishing, or imagining, is internally or grammatically, or by definition, connected to the past. Does this mean that memory is the criterion of the *concept* of the past—i.e. memory is of the past but not of the present or the future—or the *content* of the past, that such a thing did actually happen? It clearly cannot be the latter, since that would mean that the memory of a past event would be the criterion of its truth. Memories lie. So even if a memory is part of the concept of the past, it can't be internally connected to the actuality of a past event. Memory could act as dreams do, Wittgenstein suggests, "gather[ing] together a great number of memories from the preceding day, from days before that, even from childhood, and turn[ing] them into a memory of an event that took place while a person was sleeping" (*LW,* 656).

It is especially frustrating that the very last remarks in the *Philosophical Investigations* should contain Wittgenstein's most enigmatic comments on memory. The role of remembering in connecting events (including those involving the meaning of the concept of memory) is offset by the dependence of the concept on something that is not merely an experience. Remembering is not the description of a present experience. Indeed, he states, "remembering has no experiential content". There is a distinction between saying, "Now I know what tingling is", when I experience an electric shock for the first time, and declaring that I know what remembering is because I have now remembered for the first time. And how, Wittgenstein asks, on the penultimate page, "will [I] know again in the future what remembering feels like" (*PI,* p. 231)? Is this problematic because—he leaves it unsaid—it will require memory to know?

Two points do seem to be clearly illuminating in Wittgenstein's sketch of the grammar of memory. One is Wittgenstein's suggestion that there may be two concepts of remembering: even though saying "I remember him clearly", or "I remember what I was doing last night", cannot be reduced to any particular experience, there are cases in which one might talk of the *feeling* of "Long, long ago"; more important, there is a use of the concept, when memories rise up before one's mind, for example, for which memories may well be experiences. The other is his advice that "when I say 'I remember, I believed' … don't ask yourself 'what fact, what process is he remembering? … ask rather, 'What is the purpose of this language, how is it being used?'" (*LW*, 716).

How is such language used in Sebald's work? Memory is seldom of the mundane, "I remember what I was doing for the past two hours", sort. It is concerns the interrelation of the recollection and suppression of events in which both the experiential component is very powerful, and what Wittgenstein calls the "disturbance of memory", when it behaves as a dream might, condensing and displacing specific recollections, is pronounced. Acutely aware of the ethical problems what he calls "the entire questionable business of writing", that is to say, of offering an account of things and events of which he has himself no memory, and which may be said to be both unspeakable and unutterable, Sebald strangely insinuates his prose into the "emptiness", as he calls it, "that needs to be filled" (Schwartz 2007, 85). He has a metaphysical horror of the continuous lapsing of human experience, of "how little we can hold in mind, how everything is constantly lapsing into oblivion with every extinguished life, how the world is, as it were draining itself in that history of countless places and objects which themselves have no power of memory is never heard, never described or passed on" (Schwartz 2007, 149). But his concern is also more specifically located in his own time and place, especially in the burden he bears himself, as a member of the post-war generation (he was born in 1944), of a national amnesia: "I felt increasingly that the mental impoverishment and lack of memory that marked the Germans," he writes, "and the efficiency with which they cleaned everything up, were beginning to affect my head and my nerves" (Sebald 2002, 225).

Despite the fact that such impoverishment, lack, and its concomitant, deadly efficiency finally drove Sebald from his homeland as a young man, he nevertheless assumes the burden of making up for such moral deficiencies in his writing, acknowledging his continued connection to his homeland like an "inherited … backpack" that he has "to carry whether I like it or not" (Schwartz 2007, 51). That backpack, which plays such a large symbolic role in his stories (including its allusion to Wittgenstein's visit to America towards the end of his life) is the ethical imperative of restoring and preserving repressed cultural memory. Writing, then, is a way of "re-mind[ing] people, because we've all seen images, but those images militate against discursive thinking, for reflecting upon these things. And also paralyze, as it were, our moral capacity" (Schwartz 2007, 80). There is an affinity with Wittgenstein in Sebald's suspicion of the image, especially its tendency to cut itself lose from its enabling relations and its imperious claims to self-sufficiency.[14] Returning the image to "discursive thinking" means bringing it back into relation with things that militate against our seeing it in only one way, or seeing it with a lazy, complacent eye. Such complacency is what immobilizes our moral capacity. The recovery of memory in which Sebald engages means doing what Austerlitz vainly tries to achieve in the rearrangement of his photographs, what Sebald himself attempts in his stories of layered memory and representation, and Wittgenstein strives for through the combined making of connections and seeking of a perspicuous form of representation.

Let us begin with the problems of the first-person plural pronoun, raised in Sebald's declaration that "we have all seen images". Can one speak of a collective memory, or a collective amnesia? And can a single person restore the loss of memory of a whole community or nation? Wittgenstein would try to answer these questions by turning to the grammar of the language. But which grammar, and which language? In other words, who is the "we" that would be invoked in such an exercise, which always calls upon a more-or-less unified community of speakers, as Sebald seems to do in the interview I cite?

One of the persistent issues in Sebald's stories is the loss of a sense of community, which penetrates to the core of being. This is exemplified by Sebald's quotation of Paul Amery's account on the effect of the Nazi

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[14] Cf. Sebald 2001, 101: "All of us, even when we think we have noted every tiny detail, resort to set pieces which have already been staged often enough by others. We try to reproduce the reality, but the harder we try, the more we find the pictures that make up the stock-in-trade of the spectacle of history forcing themselves upon us … Our concern with history, so Hilary's thesis ran, is a concern with preformed images, images at which we keep on staring while the truth lies elsewhere, away from it all, somewhere as yet undiscovered".

occupation of his homeland, Austria: “Everything that had filled my consciousness—from the history of my country, which was no longer mine, to the landscape images, whose images I suppressed, had become intolerable to me … I was a person who could no longer say ‘we’ and who therefore said ‘I’ merely out of habit, but not with the feeling of full possession of myself” (Sebald 1999, 160). Amery’s inability to use the first person plural in effect empties out the significance or force of the singular form. “I” depends upon the fullness of “we”. On this question of the possible communal nature of memory (and its fragility) I turn to Anna Wierzbicka, who argues that an analysis of the English concepts “memory” and “remembering” would fail to offer a universal, or even a European grammar of the terms.[15] For cultural and historical reasons, including the effects of an Enlightenment culture of scientific progress in combination with a political history that did not include major dislocation or exile for its native speakers, Wierzbicka suggest that the English notion of memory tends to be the personal recollection of experience as if from a storehouse. English memories are, as it were, things “‘kept’ in a person’s head … ‘private’ as if ‘owned’ by the person who has experienced some events” (23). This concept of memory approximates the modern, cognitive-science reduction of memory to accessible information, as when we speak of a computer’s memory, and it is exemplified by the statement by editor of a recent study of memory that the concept is to be “understood broadly as the “capacity to encode, store, and retrieve information” (cf. Baddeley 1999), but also includes the inability to retrieve information (e.g. ‘forget’)”.[16] Wierzbicka argues that Polish and Russian, and even French and German, are quite different. They retain a sense of the dynamic, rather than merely factual, quality of remembering that used to be part of early modern English, but appears now to have been attenuated, as remembering has shifted from the combination of experience and thought, as in “think over something”, to the recalling of specific content or “information”. Wierzbicka alludes to the Proustian “*il me souvient*”—as it were, “it remembers itself to me”—as a quality that, like the German *sich erinnern*, “is less active and implies less control than the English” (26). She adduces a number of cognate terms for

[15] Wierzbicka 2007.
[16] Amberber 2007, 1.

memory in Polish that, as she expresses it, imply a cultural shift or difference, from retrieving information about the past to going over, or undergoing, or re-experiencing it. The Polish word, *wspomnienia*, for example, “implies something one has lived through”, and *wspominac* refers to the activity of “bringing some memories to the surface of consciousness … bring[ing] to light things that were hidden before … creating new knowledge [or awareness] rather than activat[ing] knowledge previously stored in the mind” (30).

Wierzbicka suggests that the difference between the English sense of memory or remembering and the supposed equivalents in Polish imply “a form of life (in Wittgenstein’s sense) which is not lexically recognized in English” (30). This means that a grammar of memory is different for Polish and English, and that this difference would embody the divergent ways in which what appears to be a universal human faculty is shaped by cultural and historical experience and practice. Wierzbicka points out that the Polish concept of *wspomnienia* encompasses a “past [that] is not a purely private past but has a historical dimension and refers to the experiences which were shared by many people” (30).

This raises crucial questions regarding the grammar of memory. Is memory like the concept of pain, which only I can have (which means, in the strictest sense that I cannot be said to *have* it at all), or is it closer to the concept of perception which I can share with others (assuming that perception is not reducible to the private experiences of sense data)? Wittgenstein reminds us: “It might not strike us as so much a matter of course that memory shows us the past inner, as well as the past outer, process”.[17] Just as it may be said that no-one else can have my memories, it can also be said that my memories are of events which others remember too, and which they may remember more accurately or more completely than I do. “Memories” may imply an inner process, whereas “I remember” does not. As Wierzbicka puts it, “*Remember* implies knowledge which has its source in personal experience, but it doesn’t have to be knowledge of something that happened to me: what happened to me is the source of knowledge, not its content. In the case of ‘memories’ it is both source and content” (23). Not only is this notion foreign to the idea of the storage of information, but

[17] Wittgenstein 1980, 847.

it also encompasses a conception of communal memory which may be imbedded in the relationship of a language to the historical experiences of its people. Wierzbiecka points out that the salient features of Polish history may explain the difference between the English and Polish semantics of memory: “a history of partitions, deprivation of national independence, threat to national identity, uprisings, exile, mass deportations, forced emigration, and throughout all that, a cultivation of national memory” (31).

The subjects of Sebald’s stories are the participants in and victims of precisely such partitions, deprivations, threats, exile, forced emigration, and worse. Not only is remembering and forgetting for them more than a mere matter of retrieving or losing information, it is also connected with another concept upon which Wierzbicka focuses in her analysis of the different cultural lexicons of memory. That concept is represented by the word *pamiątka*—the diminutive of the word for memory: *pamięć*. Such a “little memory” would be translated, very inadequately, by the English phrase “heirlooms”, or perhaps “memento” or “souvenir”. These are objects of intense affective value, which continue to carry memory despite dislocation, exile, or the destruction of home and family ties. The word “also seems to suggest” Wierzbicka writes, “an appreciation that the framework of one’s life can be destroyed, that the continuity of this framework cannot be taken for granted, and that since the material links between the present and the past are likely to be fragile and limited, they should be an object of special care and devotion (almost veneration, like relics)” (33). One of the most haunting moments in *Austerlitz* occurs when the protagonist, on a visit to Terezín, where his parents were certainly interned and met their end, comes across a shop window, revealing a vast collection of household objects. These objects

> exerted such a power of attraction on me that it was a long time before I could tear myself away from staring at the hundreds of different objects, my forehead pressed against the cold window, as if one of them or their relationship with each other must provide an unequivocal answer to the many questions I found it impossible to ask in my mind. What was the meaning of the festive lace tablecloth hanging over the back of the ottoman, and the armchair with its worn brocade cover? What secret lay behind the three brass mortars of different sizes, which had about them the suggestion of an oracular utterance, or the cut-glass bowls, ceramic vases and earthenware jugs, the tin advertising sign bearing the words *Theriesenstädter Wasser*, the little box of seashells, the

> miniature barrel organ … And then there was the stuffed squirrel … which had its beady implacably eye fixed upon me and whose Czech name—*veverka*—I now recalled like the name of a long-lost friend. What, I asked myself, said Austerlitz, might be the significance of the river never rising from any source, never flowing into the sea, but always back into itself, what was the meaning of *veverka* … or the porcelain group of a hero on horseback turning to look back … in order to raise up with his outstretched left arm an innocent girl already bereft of her last hope, and to save her from a cruel fate not revealed to the observer? They were all as timeless as that moment of rescue, perpetuated but for ever just occurring, these ornaments, utensils and mementoes stranded in the Terezín bazaar, objects that for reasons one could never know had outlived their former owners and survived the process of destruction, so that I could now see my own faint shadow image barely perceptible among them. (Sebald 2001, 275-7)

In her comments about the difference between "souvenir" and *pamiątka*, Wierzbicka states that the former "evokes freedom of movement and facility of travel" whereas the Polish word "evokes transience of life, loss and destructibility of the past … it is an object which links the present with the past, and which enables the past to live on in people's thoughts and emotions" (33). It is clear from Sebald's description of the objects from Terezín that this work of memory does not belong to any specific kind of object; rather it depends upon how an object is related to others, or to the lives of those who lived with it, and used it. What is so desperately moving about Austerlitz's encounter is his sense that whatever memories or significance the mass of possessions in the shop window have or had, it is inscrutable, lost or forgotten, and moreover, that that loss wrenches him away from himself. The emotional ties and intensity that such objects indubitably once had by virtue of being woven into the lives of their owners has ebbed away, leaving only Austerlitz's isolated questions and longing, an attenuated connection exemplified by Austerlitz's discernment of his "own faint shadow image barely perceptible among" the articles.

This moment is echoed to even more devastating effect at the end of the novel, when on a visit to the Bibliothèque Nationale, Austerlitz is made aware of the fact that the library is built on the ruins of an immense warehouse where the Nazi's had collected and then redistributed the possessions that they had looted from the "homes of the Jews of Paris" (401) — "In the years from 1942 onwards, everything our civilization has produced, whether for the embellishment of life or merely for everyday use, from Louis XVI chests of drawers, Meissen porcelain, Persian rugs and whole libraries, down to the last salt-cellar and paper-mill, was stacked in the Austerlitz-Tolbiac depot … no one will admit to knowing where they went, for the fact is that the whole affair lies buried in the most literal sense beneath the foundations of our Pharaonic President's Grande Bibiliotèque…" (402-3). The objects described in Sebald's novel are thus aligned with Wierzbecka's analysis of the investment of a communal memory under conditions of loss and separation, but they have, as it were, been emptied of any specific memories and stripped of their human relations: they have become inscrutable husks whose "meanings", "secrets" and "significance" have not merely ebbed away, as all memory appears to for Sebald, but been violently taken away and horribly redistributed among the perpetrators as in the Austerlitz warehouses in Paris. It is like cutting up the victims themselves and sharing them out, or parcelling out bits of their souls.

In her analysis of the different place and concepts of memory in European languages, Wierzbicka suggests that German lies somewhere between Polish and English insofar as it also registers memory as a collective process of *living through*. It is not so much a voluntary retrieval of information, as an undergoing or re-experiencing or reliving of a past that is not reducible to the retrieval of information or images. My German is not good enough register such nuances in Sebald's prose. I am therefore speculating when I suggest that the strange, uncanny effect that Sebald has on English readers may have something to do with the way in which his writing conveys something of this different grammar of memory to English. Sebald's prose may convey syntactically rather than semantically a different form of life pertaining to the grammar of memory and its relation to historically and culturally specific forms of life that are in effect foreign to or not at home in English. Its power may thus lie in the way in which, as many translations do, it expands and enriches the conceptual possibilities of its target language, thereby rendering it receptive to different modes of cultural or historical existence, or the uncovering of traces of repressed histories and experiences. This quality may account for the haunting strangeness of Sebald's prose in English. Its sense of not quite being at home embodies in the most powerful, if subtle, ways the very substance of its modes of representation: Jacques Austerlitz's dislocation from a privileged, middle-class, Jewish childhood in Prague to an insular, oppressive, Presbyterianism in working-class Wales; Max Ferber's move from the social world of artistic consumption and trade in pre-war Munich to that of the isolated artist in the depressed Manchester of Jewish migration; and even Sebald and Wittgenstein's own repective exiles from a superficially homely existence in Germany and Austria to the oddity of academic life in provincial England.

I want to end by looking at Ruth Franklin's criticism of Sebald for presuming to make up for lost memory through the artifice, or what she terms the "illusion", of his art (Schwartz 2007, 142). The gaps of which Sebald speaks are, she claims, "gaps in literature, not gaps in memory … Gaps in memory are experience that is forever lost, and art cannot take its place" (Schwartz 2007, 141). Many critics have commented on the image at the very end of *The Emigrants*. the description of a photograph of three young women sitting behind a spinning loom in the Polish ghetto known by the Nazis as Litzmanstadt, whose names have been lost, even if their fates can be assumed with horrible certainty: "I wonder what these three women's names were—," Sebald's narrator muses, "Rosa, Luisa and Lea, or Nona, Decuma and Morta, the daughters of the night, with spindle scissors and thread" (Sebald 2002, 237). Franklin responds by saying, of her own grandmother who disappeared in such a ghetto, "I do not know what she looked like as a young woman … but my imagining her behind Sebald's loom … merely substitutes an artistic image for a blank space. The blankness, however, is closer to the truth" (Schwartz 2007, 142). This is a powerful, and moving, critique. Franklin is, of course, making a grammatical observation about the difference between memory and imagination, and the ethical dangers of confusing the two: "We appreciate the beauty of the image that the writer discerns, but it adds nothing to our understanding of why things happened as they did" (140).

The question is, as it is for Wittgenstein, whether Sebald is trying to provide a causal explanation of historical events—"of why things happened as they did" (Schwartz 2007, 142). This brings us to Sebald's deepest affinity with the Wittgenstein. The last thing that Sebald attempts to do in his writing is to provide explanations or to recapture the, to him, dubious value of an purely eyewitness notion of "truth". Hence Wittgenstein's statement that such accounts (he does not reject them altogether) need to be "supplemented by what an artificial and synoptic view reveals" (Seebald 1999, 26). In the light of Franklin's claim that art may lead to illusion, we can now recognize the force of Sebald's emphasis on the "artificial" qualities of such a view, and I hope that it is now clear how Sebald's desire for a synoptic perspective recalls Wittgenstein's similar quest.

The synoptic view is the one which enables one most clearly to see connections without offering a causal explanation (for example of what memory and forgetting *are*, or *why* people invest so much of themselves in the objects they possess). But such a view from above, for which one needs a ladder or has to leave the roughness of the world entirely, is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Wittgenstein and Sebald are both condemned to ceaseless journeys in order to recover the home that is "our" language or memory, both of which, insofar as they are "ours", lie between the singular and the plural of the first-person pronoun.[18] Such travels in both cases produce an album of sketches that can be arranged and rearranged, like Austerlitz's photographs, in various combinations, until one finds what Wittgenstein calls the "liberating word … the word that finally permits us to grasp what until then had constantly and intangibly weighed on our consciousness" (*BT*, 302e). They provide neither a unified picture of the world, nor an explanation of why it is as it is. Wittgenstein's *Remarks on Frazer's "Golden Bough"* are especially apposite:

> It is the multiplicity of faces with common features which continually emerges here and there. And one would like to draw lines connecting these common ingredients. But then one part of our account would still be missing, namely, that which brings this picture into connection with our own feelings and thoughts. This part gives the account depth.[19]

His modes of fiction allow Sebald to layer the making of connections, both in the relations among the events of experience and the processes of such narration, in which memories of narrator and protagonist overlap. Such narrative procedures produce both the possibilities of communal memory and invite us to bring those relationships "into connection with our own thoughts and feelings". Sebald shows that memory is like aspect seeing, an

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[18] See Schalkwyk 2004.

[19] Wittgenstein 1993, 143.

echo of thought in an experience that is both, as Wittgenstein puts it, an inner and an outer process.

Sebald states that "for those whose business is language, it is only in language that the unhappiness of exile can be overcome" (Sebald 1999, 161). Of course, language is the business of all human beings. That is why Wittgenstein (and Sebald for that matter) can hold both that grammar depends upon specific forms of life and also that it is worth bringing the practices of people who seem removed from us into connection with our own thoughts and feelings. But the issue of what counts as "our own" always remains open. The question is whether the unhappiness of exile, insofar as it is registered in language, can be overcome. Wittgenstein, it appears, did not find any single "liberating word that *finally* permits us to grasp what until then had constantly and intangibly weighed on our consciousness". There is no *finally*. Only a ceaseless process of traversing the places of memory and forgetting, not so that they can be explained, but so that they can be relived and clarified, in a world bit by bit brought a little closer to home.

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