

## AUTHORS AND ABSTRACTS

### Wittgenstein's Later Criticism of the *Tractatus*

JAMES CONANT

The paper represents an effort to advance the debate between those who advocate resolute readings of Wittgenstein and those who deplore them. It seeks to do so by, on the one hand, attempting to correct certain misunderstandings of such readings (explaining, in effect, why they amount to caricatures) while, on the other, seeking to discourage advocates of such readings from accepting the terms of the debate as defined by the critics (thereby, in effect, embracing the caricature and seeking to defend it). The paper seeks a form of equilibrium in reading Wittgenstein that has hitherto proven elusive to commentary on his work. The difficulty has two sides which must be balanced against each other, without permitting either to assume an undue share of the burden. The first half of the difficulty is to do full justice to the profound discontinuity in Wittgenstein's thinking without neglecting (as those who are called "standard readers" do) the extent to which it is folded within a fundamental continuity in his philosophy. The second half of the difficulty is to do full justice to the profound continuity in his thinking without minimizing (as those who are called "zealous mono-Wittgensteinians" do) the extent to which it is folded within a fundamental discontinuity in his philosophy. The aim of this paper will be twofold: (1) to argue that a full acknowledgement of the moment of continuity requires a reasonably heterodox degree of mono-Wittgensteinianism, and (2) that an equally full acknowledgement of the complementary moment of discontinuity requires that the degree of this heterodoxy remain reasonably mild.

*James Conant* is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago. He received both his B.A. (1982) and Ph.D. (1990) from Harvard University.

He taught for nine years at the University of Pittsburgh before moving to Chicago in 1999. He has published articles in, among other areas, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and aesthetics, and on philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Kant, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, William James, Frege, Carnap, Putnam, Cavell, Rorty, and McDowell, among others. He has edited two volumes of Hilary Putnam's papers and co-edited (with John Haugeland) one volume of Thomas Kuhn's papers.

## **Peter Winch on the *Tractatus* and the unity of Wittgenstein's philosophy**

*CORA DIAMOND*

Peter Winch rejected the widespread view that Wittgenstein put forward two entirely different philosophies in his early and later work. He took the "two-Wittgenstein" view to be associated with serious misunderstandings of both the *Tractatus* and Wittgenstein's later thought. In this paper, Winch's reading of the *Tractatus* and his criticisms of Norman Malcolm's interpretation are examined. The paper tries to show that Winch was right in rejecting "mentalist" readings of the *Tractatus*, but that there are also problems with Winch's own reading.

*Cora Diamond* is Kenan Professor of Philosophy and University Professor Emerita at the University of Virginia. She has also taught at the University of Aberdeen and at Princeton University. She is the author of *The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind* (1991) and the editor of *Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939* (1976). A collection of her essays, *Ethics: Shifting Perspectives*, is forthcoming.

## **Wittgenstein and history**

*HANS-JOHANN GLOCK*

Wittgenstein's place in the history of Western thought has been widely discussed by scholars. But Wittgenstein's own attitude to history has so far escaped the notice of scholars. In this essay the author attempts to exploit the meagre primary resources in order to discuss and assess Wittgenstein's

own thinking about history – both the history of philosophy and history in general – and about historical modes of thought. In section 2, he introduces the historicist challenge to analytic philosophy, and distinguishes different varieties of historicism. In section 3, he critically discusses Wittgenstein's attitude to the history of philosophy, and its relation to the positions of thinkers such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, the logical positivists, Ryle and Quine. While Wittgenstein himself was indifferent or hostile to historical scholarship, he has inspired several historicists. For this reason section 4 briefly considers the question of whether Wittgenstein's reflections on other topics such as language or the nature of philosophy willy-nilly support historicism, either directly or indirectly. The final section turns from the history of philosophy to history in general. It compares and contrasts Wittgenstein's account of conceptual investigations with the genetic method derived from Nietzsche and recently promoted by Bernard Williams, according to which proper philosophy needs to take account of the historical development of our conceptual scheme.

*Hans-Johann Glock* is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Reading. He has held research fellowships and visiting professorships at St. John's College, Oxford, Queen's University (Ontario), Bielefeld University, and Rhodes University, South Africa. He is the author of *A Wittgenstein Dictionary* (Blackwell 1996) and of *Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality* (Cambridge University Press 2003). He has edited *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy* (Blackwell 1997), *Wittgenstein: a Critical Reader* (Blackwell 2001) and *Strawson and Kant* (Oxford University Press 2003), and co-edited (with Robert Arrington) *Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations* (Routledge 1991) and *Wittgenstein and Quine* (Routledge 1996). At present, he is working on a book *What is Analytic Philosophy?*

## **Of knowledge and of knowing that someone is in pain**

*P.M.S. HACKER*

This paper is a defense of Wittgenstein's grammatical observation that 'I know I am in pain' is either no more than an emphatic assertion that the speaker is in pain, or it is philosophers' nonsense. Preparatory to the enterprise Wittgenstein's position, commonly misconstrued, is carefully circum-

scribed and elaborated. A connective analysis of the concept of knowledge is essayed. Knowledge converges on the category of ability, not of state or mental state. Emphasis is placed on the discourse contexts in which the concept of knowledge is needed. The semantic field to which the concept of knowing belongs is sketched. This provides a set of eight conditions against which the sense or lack of sense of 'I know I am in pain' can be determined. Tested against those conditions 'I know that I am in pain' is patently anomalous, and Wittgenstein's analysis is vindicated. Recent objections to Wittgenstein's account, including the association of knowing that *p* with being able to act for the reason that *p*, are examined and found wanting.

*P.M.S. Hacker* is a Fellow of St John's College, Oxford. He is author of numerous books on the philosophy of Wittgenstein, including the monumental four volume *Analytic Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations* (Blackwell, 1980–96, the first two volumes of which were co-authored with G.P. Baker), *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy* (Blackwell, 1996), and *Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies* (OUP, 2001). His most recent book, co-authored with the Australian neuroscientist M.R. Bennett, is *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience* (Blackwell, 2003). He is currently writing a trilogy on human nature, the first volume of which is entitled *Human Nature: the Categorical Framework*.

## Trying to keep philosophy honest

*LARS HERTZBERG*

For Wittgenstein the struggle to maintain one's honesty, rather than formulating certain complex ideas, was central to the difficulty of philosophy. Today many philosophers in the analytic tradition are eager to leave the influence of Wittgenstein behind. In this essay, an attempt is made to convey an idea of the loss to philosophy that would involve. Wittgenstein's attitude to the problems of philosophy is captured in *PI* § 116: "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use"; *PI* § 593: "A main cause of philosophical disease – a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example"; and *OC* § 549: "Pretensions are a mortgage which burdens a philosopher's capacity to think". These remarks suggest that the way out of philosophical bewilderment is to

relinquish the ambition to formulate certain ideas that will provide a solution to it. Rather, we should quicken our sense of the way words are used by people who say things because they have something to say. We should let ourselves be taught by the examples rather than use examples as illustrations of preconceived solutions. In doing so we must relinquish our control of the process of investigation. This is perhaps the hardest thing in philosophy.

*Lars Hertzberg* is professor of philosophy at Åbo Akademi University. He received his master's degree at the University of Helsinki and his doctorate at Cornell University (1970). He has written *The Limits of Experience* (1994), as well as a number of essays on the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, ethics and Wittgenstein. He is the editor of *Perspectives on Human Conduct* (1988, with Juhani Pietarinen) and of *The Practice of Language* (2002, with Martin Gustafsson), and has translated some of Wittgenstein's works into Swedish. His current research concerns the grammars of the will.

## **Evaluating the *Bergen Electronic Edition***

*HERBERT HRACHOVEC*

The *Bergen Electronic Edition*, which has been published starting in 1998, is now completed and has dramatically changed the field of Wittgenstein philology. Wittgenstein's entire writings are available in easily accessible facsimiles as well as in carefully prepared diplomatic and normalized transcriptions. The focus of the paper is on some shortcomings of the digital edition that may be partially responsible for the amazing lack of recognition the innovative work done at the Bergen Wittgenstein Archives has received. In order to discuss this topic, one has to deal with some issues outside the scope of Wittgenstein philology proper. As it turns out, the Bergen project raises some fairly general questions pertaining to the socio-economics of computer-assisted scholarship. It's only against the background of several conditions imposed upon the humanities by the current implementations of digital technology that a certain weakness of the Bergen approach can be apprehended and – hopefully – corrected. The first part of this contribution attempts to give an outline of the overall problem, whereas the second one presents ongoing research to address some desiderata revealed by the preceding analysis.

*Herbert Hrachovec* (<http://hrachovec.philo.at/>) teaches at the Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna. He has held scholarships and visiting appointments at the universities of Oxford, Münster, Cambridge (MA), Berlin, Essen, Weimar, Bergen, as well as Klagenfurt. Awards for innovative teaching at the University of Vienna in 2001 and 2002. Area of specialization: Analytic Philosophy, Aesthetics and Media Theory. He is currently deputy chairman of the Department of Philosophy. Publications include: *Drehorte. Arbeiten zu Filmen* (1997), “Kleine Erzählungen – und ihre Medien” (in: *kultur.wissenschaften*, 2004), “Picture This! Words versus Images in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass” (in: *Essays on Wittgenstein and Austrian Philosophy. In Honour of J.C. Nyíri*, 2004), “RFCs, MOOs, LMSs: Assorted educational devices” (in: *Cultural Attitudes towards Technology and Communication 2004*, 2004). Hrachovec was Guest Editor of *The Monist: Interactive Issue* 80:3 (1997).

## **Impure reason vindicated**

*ALLAN JANIK*

It is less that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy offers us a new paradigm of rationality than that it helps us to recover an old, unjustly neglected one. The central notion in his later philosophy is the idea of following a rule, where there are no formal rules to which we can appeal, but examples to be imitated. This view of rule-following ultimately entails the primacy of practice over theory in epistemology. The primacy of practice, the assertion that in traditional terms belief is groundless, in turn, implies that practice must take care of itself. That, further, entails that rationality is practice-immanent. Theory can neither capture nor justify the character of practice. Moreover, the practice-immanent character of rationality determines that the rationality of our actions and beliefs must be reconstructed *ex post facto* on the basis of reflection upon what we do in the normal case of events. Such a claim and such reflection is the basis of the Common Law, which is in fact *inter alia* rooted in the Aristotelian notion of *phronesis*.

*Allan Janik* was born in 1941 in Chicopee, Massachusetts/USA. He received his A.B. in philosophy from St. Anselm, his M.A. from Villanova and his PhD from Brandeis. He is currently Research Fellow at the University of

Innsbruck's Brenner Archives Research Institute. He is also Adjunct Professor for the Philosophy of Culture at the University of Vienna and has held visiting professorships in Graz, Innsbruck, Bergen, Stockholm School of Economics, TU Stockholm, Mexico City, and Northwestern University. Publications include *Wittgenstein's Vienna* (1973, with Stephen Toulmin), *Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger* (1985), *Style, Politics and the Future of Philosophy* (1989), *The Use and Abuse of Metaphor* (2003).

## **A brief history of Wittgenstein editing**

*ANTHONY KENNY*

The article reflects on the history of the publication of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* in the half-century after his death. It does not aim to be a complete narrative, but is based on the author's personal experience of the process, as a translator and as a Trustee of Wittgenstein's literary estate. It describes the complicated legal structures that have governed copyright in the *Nachlass*, and discusses the abortive Tübingen project and the eventual *Wiener Ausgabe* of certain texts. Finally it raises the question whether, now that the successful Bergen-Oxford electronic edition is available, there is any merit in aiming to produce a complete hard-copy *Gesamtausgabe*.

*Anthony Kenny* was for many years a lecturer in philosophy in Oxford University and a Fellow and tutor of Balliol College. He was Master of that College from 1978–1989 and Warden of Rhodes House from 1989–1999. He retired in 2001 as Pro-Vice-Chancellor of Oxford. He is the author of some thirty books on philosophical topics, including *Wittgenstein* (1973) and *The Legacy of Wittgenstein* (1984).

## **Wittgenstein in digital form: Perspectives for the future**

*CAMERON McEWEN*

A series of important digital resources for Wittgenstein research have appeared over the last 10 years. A brief history of these developments is given and a look taken at new resources which are likely to follow. A guess at the consequences of these developments for Wittgenstein research is

made. Since these digital resources for Wittgenstein scholarship are unique in the humanities, research in this area may well foreshadow possibilities in the humanities generally. The hope is expressed that this may decrease the unfortunate isolation of the humanities from the wider society around them with beneficial results for both sides.

*Cameron McEwen* is a partner in the electronic publisher InteLex (<http://www.nlx.com/>). His research interests include Wittgenstein and Heidegger and are generally dedicated to an understanding of the history and implications of ontological plurality (Plato's *gigantomachia*).

## **Wittgenstein's early philosophy of language and the idea of 'the single great problem'**

*MARIE MCGINN*

In the *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein expresses the conviction that the problems that preoccupy him – 'the problems of negation, of disjunction, of true and false' – are reflections of 'the one great problem'. He identifies this 'single great problem' as one of 'explaining the nature of the proposition'. He believes that in coming to see the nature of the proposition clearly he will, at the very same time, come to see the nature of the logical constants, the nature of truth and falsity and the status of the propositions of logic clearly. The question the author is concerned with in this paper is how Wittgenstein arrives at the idea of a single great problem, and how this idea sets the agenda for his investigation of the nature of a proposition in the *Tractatus*.

*Marie McGinn* is senior lecturer at York University, UK; she is the author of the Routledge Guidebook *Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations* (1997). Other publications include "Responding to the Sceptic: Therapeutic versus Theoretical Diagnosis" (in: *The Sceptics: Contemporary Essays*, 2002), "Saying and Showing and the Continuity of Wittgenstein's Thought" (in: *Harvard Review of Philosophy*, 2001), "Real Things and the Mind Body Problem" (in: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 2000), "Between Metaphysics and Nonsense: Elucidation in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*" (in: *Philosophical Quarterly*, 1999), "The Real Problem of Others: Cavell, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein on Scepticism about Other Minds" (in: *European Journal of Philosophy*, 1998).



## Wittgenstein: Philosophy and literature

BRIAN MCGUINNESS

In studying Wittgenstein's writings form must be considered alongside content. Logic, aesthetics and ethics (his main preoccupations as they were Weininger's) all depend upon the manner of seeing or presenting their objects. Even the arguments in the *Tractatus* are recommended as much for their limitations (even their circularity) as for their cogency. The work was literary (to Frege's dismay) and ethical (as Ficker should have seen) as well as logical. Its ironical conclusion was that the propositions of logic said nothing. Wittgenstein's second main work, the *Philosophical Investigations*, is a reaction to a certain dogmatism that he himself developed in his discussions with members of the Vienna Circle and with Ramsey. From Sraffa and from Spengler he learnt that there was no essence of language and that his work must consist in showing different language games with only a family resemblance. The willed divagations of his prepared texts in later life are an illustration of what they argue for.

Brian McGuinness taught philosophy at Oxford for many years before taking a post in Italy, where he is now retired. He has been engaged mostly in study of the life and work of Wittgenstein, re-translating the *Tractatus* (with David Pears), editing various volumes of letters, including an electronic edition of the entire available correspondence (InteLex, 2004), and publishing a partial biography (*Young Ludwig* 1988, re-issue Oxford University Press, 2005) and a volume of essays (*Approaches to Wittgenstein*, Routledge, 2002).

## Wittgenstein's philosophy of pictures

KRISTÓF NYÍRI

The author has in a series of papers since 1989 undertaken to show that Wittgenstein's later work can be usefully interpreted as a philosophy of post-literacy, and that Wittgenstein's frequent references to Plato – the first and foremost philosopher of literacy – should be explained as attempts to arrive back at the juncture where Plato took the wrong turn. Throughout its history Western philosophy reflected the influence of linear written language; Wittgenstein was trying to liberate himself from that influence precisely at a

time when post-literary modes of communication began to transform the civilization of the West. Written language as a source of philosophical confusion was Wittgenstein's real foe. He was not clearly aware of this, perhaps since his insights originated, to some extent at least, in an impairment: dyslexia. He was striving to overcome the pitfalls of written language by elaborating a philosophy of spoken – oral – language. And he attempted to overcome the barriers of verbal language by working towards a philosophy of pictures. It is this latter dimension in Wittgenstein's thinking the author directs attention to in this paper.

*Kristóf J.C. Nyíri*, born 1944, is Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and Director of the Institute for Philosophical Research of the Academy. He studied mathematics and philosophy at the University of Budapest, where he has been Professor of Philosophy since 1986. He was visiting professor in Austria, Finland, and the US. Main publications include: *Tradition and Individuality* (1992); "Electronic Networking and the Unity of Knowledge", in S. Kenna and S. Ross (eds.), *Networking in the Humanities* (1995); *Vernetztes Wissen: Philosophie im Zeitalter des Internets* (2004).

## **Taking avowals seriously: The soul a public affair**

*EIKE VON SAVIGNY*

First, the author gives a simplified outline of what he takes to be Wittgenstein's idea that use determines meaning, and he does it in such a manner that we can put it to use in an interesting way. Then, he shows how the view of first person psychological utterances as expressions of people's sensations, feelings, moods, impressions and so on fits in with this sketch of the 'use theory of meaning'; the result will be that the commonly accepted understanding of such an utterance determines what the speaker's mental state is like. In the section "Nonverbal expressions of mental states", this conclusion is generalized to mental states that are expressed in nonverbal behavior; the result will be that commonly accepted reactions to nonverbal expressive behavior determine what the speaker's mental state is like in the same way as is the case with verbal expressive behavior. Thus, rather than arguing this anti-individualistic interpretation of Wittgenstein directly from

the text, the author tries to pin him down to it by embedding his view on avowals in his use picture of meaning.

*Eike von Savigny* was born in 1941. He received his Ph.D. and *Habilitation* from Ludwig Maximilians Universität, Munich. In 1977, he was appointed a philosophy chair at Bielefeld university. He served several federal offices in the academia. Current areas of specialization include philosophy of language and the later Wittgenstein. Among his twenty books are *The Social Foundations of Meaning* (Springer 1988), a two-volume commentary on the *Philosophical Investigations* (Klostermann, 2nd ed. 1994, 1996), and a collection of essays on the *Investigations* entitled *Der Mensch als Mitmensch* (dtv, 1996). Papers in English have been published in *Ratio*, *Erkenntnis*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Analysis*, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Nous*, *Metaphilosophy* and *Philosophical Investigations*, as well as in some collections.

## What is a work by Wittgenstein?

*JOACHIM SCHULTE*

In this paper a brief description of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* is given, and two questions regarding the status of the existing editions of Wittgenstein's writings vis-à-vis his *Nachlass* are distinguished. It is argued that for being able to give an answer to the question what to count as a "work" by Wittgenstein it is indispensable to take his method of working into account. Three criteria are proposed that may help to decide the title question.

*Joachim Schulte* is a researcher, and teaches, at the University of Bielefeld. He has published a number of articles and three books on the philosophy of Wittgenstein: *Experience and Expression* (OUP 1993), *Wittgenstein: An Introduction* (SUNY Press 1992), and *Chor und Gesetz: Wittgenstein im Kontext* (Suhrkamp 1990). He is co-editor of critical editions of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Suhrkamp 1989) and *Philosophical Investigations* (Suhrkamp 2001). He is currently working on Wittgenstein's middle period (1929–36).

## **A case of early Wittgensteinian dialogism: Stances on the impossibility of “Red and green in the same place”**

*ANTONIA SOULEZ*

The contention of this paper is to show the dialogical character (in a Bakhtinian sense) of Wittgenstein's Dictation on “Red and green in the same place...” (ca. 1931) in which several “voices” are speaking, each one defending a point of view on the kind of “impossibility” this phrase deals with. The plurality of voices indicates the plurality of “aspects” under which the “cannot” expressing this impossibility could be understood. Each voice thus elicits a standpoint with its own grammar and vocabulary, that is something like a “style of thought”. The dissonant effect dominates, leaving the grammatical voice un-assignable to a person who would endorse the corresponding point of view. The question whether the latter voice is Wittgenstein's, Schlick's or nobody's is raised. The interpretation here presented stresses features of the problem of voice differently from Cavell.

*Antonia Soulez* is professor of philosophy of language at the University of Paris 8, member of the Institute of history and philosophy of sciences and technology, IHPST (Paris 1-CNRS), and, since fall 2004, “en delegation” at the CNRS (section 35, laboratory of philosophy and music). After having worked on Greek philosophy and achieved her state-doctorate thesis on Plato's philosophy of language in the middle dialogues, she shifted towards contemporary philosophy of language and logic, devoting herself to the Vienna Circle and Wittgenstein, especially Wittgenstein “in transition”. Publications on Wittgenstein include *Wittgenstein's Leçons sur la liberté de la volonté* (PUF, coll. Epiméthée, 1998) and *Comment écrivent les philosophes?* (Kimé, 2003). Besides philosophy of language, she publishes in the field of music and is the co-founder of a new collection on philosophy and music. Soulez sometimes likes to say that her work is “pluri-registre”, or comparative epistemology.

## How many Wittgensteins?

DAVID G. STERN

The paper maps out and responds to some of the main areas of disagreement over the nature of Wittgenstein's philosophy: (1) Between defenders of a "two Wittgensteins" reading (which draws a sharp distinction between early and late Wittgenstein) and the opposing "one Wittgenstein" interpretation. (2) Among "two-Wittgensteins" interpreters as to when the later philosophy emerged, and over the central difference between early and late Wittgenstein. (3) Between those who hold that Wittgenstein opposes only past philosophy in order to do philosophy better and those who hold that Wittgenstein aimed to bring an end to philosophy and teach us to get by without a replacement. It is shown that each of these debates depends on some deeply un-Wittgensteinian, and quite mistaken, assumptions. It is concluded that Wittgenstein's most polished writing, most notably in *Philosophical Investigations* I §§ 1–425, is best understood as a kind of Pyrrhonism which aims to subvert philosophical theorizing, by means of a polyphonic dialogue. Because this delicate balance between philosophical questions and their dissolution is not achieved in most of his other published and unpublished writings, we should be very cautious when using the theories and methods we find in those other writings as a guide to reading the *Philosophical Investigations*.

David G. Stern is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa. He is the author of *Wittgenstein on Mind and Language* (Oxford, 1995) and *Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction* (Cambridge, 2004) and an editor of *The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein* (1996) and *Wittgenstein Reads Weininger: A Reassessment* (Cambridge, 2004).

## Wittgenstein and the relation between life and philosophy

KNUT ERIK TRANØY

My paper raises two questions about the relation between life and philosophy. (1): What can philosophy do for the philosopher him/herself? Case in point, Heidegger: Can philosophy influence or determine a philosopher's

political commitments? (2): Can a philosopher use his moral philosophy – say, medical ethics theory – to help others (doctors, nurses) “resolve” their practical moral problems? – It made quite an impression on me when (in 1950) I asked Wittgenstein why he had resigned from his Cambridge chair, and he answered: “Because there are only two or three of my students about whom I could say I do not know I have done them any harm.” Was this the same person about whom Gilbert Ryle in an obituary wrote that Wittgenstein was a philosophical genius and a pedagogical disaster, and who on his deathbed (in 1951) said, “I’ve had a wonderful life”?

*Knut Erik Tranøy*, born 1918, Ph.D. Cambridge 1953, a personal friend of Wittgenstein. Founder of the Philosophy Department at the University of Bergen (1959). Since 1978 professor of Philosophy at the University of Oslo, since 1986 lecturer of Medical Ethics at the Faculty of Medicine, University of Oslo. Areas of research: Ethics, Medieval philosophy, Theory of science. Publications include “Slow cures and bad philosophers” (in: *Wittgenstein: personality, philosophy, ethics*, Durham 2001), *Medisinsk etikk i vår tid* [Medical ethics in our times] (Bergen 1994, rev. ed. 2005), “Wittgenstein in Cambridge 1949–51. Some personal recollections” (in: *Essays on Wittgenstein in honour of G.H. von Wright*, Amsterdam 1976, pp. 11–21), *Filosofi og vitenskap i middelalderen* [Philosophy and science in the Middle Ages] (Oslo 1983), “Thomas Aquinas” (in: *A Critical History of Western Philosophy*, London 1964, pp. 98–123), *Thomas av Aquino som moralfilosof* [Thomas Aquinas as moral philosopher] (Oslo 1957).

## **Remarks on Wittgenstein’s use of the terms “Sinn”, “sinnlos”, “unsinnig”, “wahr”, and “Gedanke” in the *Tractatus***

*GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT*

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein makes a tripartite distinction: “The certainty, possibility, or impossibility of a situation is not expressed by a proposition, but by an expression’s being a tautology, a proposition with a sense, or a contradiction” (5.525). In 4.464 Wittgenstein says: “A tautology’s truth is certain, a proposition’s possible, a contradiction’s impossible”. Of tautolo-

gies Wittgenstein further says that they are senseless, but not nonsensical. They are a sort of extreme cases in the operation with otherwise meaningful sentences. Wittgenstein does not make a corresponding statement about contradictions – but it appears to be correct to infer that they too are senseless though not nonsensical. Since a meaningful sentence is neither necessary nor contradictory, it is contingent. This means that it and its negation are both possible. It is important to note that, on the *Tractatus* view, meaningful sentences are contingent. This is something which commentators have not always clearly observed.

*Georg Henrik von Wright* was born in Helsinki on 14 June 1916. He earned his Doctorate from the University of Helsinki in 1941. In 1946 he was promoted to the position of Professor of Philosophy at the University of Helsinki. In 1948 he accepted an invitation to succeed Wittgenstein as Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge University. After Wittgenstein's death in 1951 von Wright resumed his former position at Helsinki. Wittgenstein's will entrusted the management of his literary estate to von Wright, Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees. As a philosopher von Wright represented the analytical tradition, earning an international reputation in logic and philosophy of language as well as in the fields of moral and legal philosophy. Beginning in the late 1960s von Wright supplemented his scientific work, becoming increasingly influential as an active cultural critic. Von Wright was a member of the Academy of Finland during the years 1961–1986. Over the decades he studied and taught as a visiting professor in many universities and was active in several scientific societies, associations, foundations and commissions. He received Honorary Doctorate degrees from fourteen universities. In 2003 von Wright's list of publications contained 559 titles. His most important philosophical works include *The Logical Problem of Induction* (1941), *Norm and Action* (1963), *Explanation and Understanding* (1971), and *Philosophical Papers I–III* (1983–1984). His works have been published in 16 different languages. On 16 June 2003, von Wright died at his home in Helsinki.