

Abstracts and Biographies

*DANIEL APOLLON (Bergen), As We May Be Doing Philosophy:
Informationalism – A New Regime for Philosophy?*

Philosophy and the philosopher have been living under a variety of “regimes”. Some of these regimes are rather abstract and affect the core of philosophical activity. Other regimes predominantly affect the way of expressing and carrying out a philosophical activity. In any case, philosophers have used a limited set of intellectual technologies. The author explores the landscape of post-oral, post-textual regimes of expression and gives a critical appraisal of the paradigm of informationalism, interpreted as “engineerable metaphysics”.

Daniel Apollon (b. 1951) is Associate professor of Humanistic Informatics at the University of Bergen and leader of the Research Group for Text Technology at AKSIS, Unifob, Bergen, Norway. His research interests focus on digital learning, cross-cultural and cross-linguistic aspects in life-long learning, semantic web, autonomous learning and knowledge construction by means of semantic tagging of large document resources. Publications include (together with) Austermühl Frank (ed.), *The Humanities and the Challenge of Elearning*, Bergen – Gernersheim, 2001; (together with) Sánchez-Mesa Martinez, Lambert, J., Van den Branden J., *Cross-cultural and linguistic perspectives on European Open and Distance Learning*, Transcult, Vol. I, Granada, Spain, 1999; (together with) Fure O.B, Svåsand L., (ed.), *Approaching a new millennium, Lessons from the Past, Prospects for the Future*, Proceedings of the the 7th Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI), 14-18th August 2000, Bergen [CD-ROM, 350 papers].

*LUCIANO BAZZOCCHI (Pisa), On Butterfly Feelers: Some Examples
of Surfing on Wittgenstein's Tractatus*

In the only two places where Wittgenstein touches upon the decimal numbers of *Tractatus* propositions, he claims that only those can transform his incomprehensible book into a perspicuous representation. We can now show how this is possible if we interpret them as specifics for a hypertextual implementation. By surfing on the top-down structure of the *Tractatus*

hypertext, we can see (we can feel) the logical form of Wittgenstein's masterpiece, that is, the form of the reality it represents. What pictures and reality then have in common is revealed by a charade hidden inside *Tractatus* propositions – and the differences between two levels of generalization can be seen playing the game 'spot the difference'. Can a picture, in virtue of the connection of its elements, really touch (like butterfly's feelers) reality? And when we go back to the main page, do we really withdraw these feelers? Hypertext exploration has neither a starting nor an end point; although it does have a barycentre, a pulsing heart in the middle: a point of balance (for instance: there is a rule – the rule is not here). Perhaps Wittgenstein's ladder, level by level, does not lead us to "what is higher", but rather, like Escher's ladders, to the basic level to which all the others must be reduced: to what can be said, i.e., to the world.

Luciano Bazzocchi worked for twenty years in computer science and artificial intelligence. In addition to work on Wittgenstein and some technical and epistemological articles, he published a history of artificial intelligence ("Appunti di intelligenza artificiale", in six parts, "Office Automation", 1992).

ANAT BILETZKI (Tel Aviv), Meaning as Use in the Digital Turn

What is the "meaning" of terms, concepts, and ideas now extant in the information society and in digital culture? What theory of meaning can address, in satisfactory manner, the digital turn, which is, fundamentally, a conceptual revolution? This article submits that the only way to make sense of this revolution – and it does insist that it is a *conceptual* revolution – is by harnessing a meaning-as-use theory (with this conscription of "theory" being admittedly un-Wittgensteinian). Furthermore, although it may be unfeasible to formulate a bona fide theory of meaning here, as elsewhere, Wittgensteinian steps can be fruitfully taken in describing novel cultural-linguistic circumstances and situations, thereby elucidating the digital use of terms and concepts. The applicability of "meaning as use" in the digital context will be presented, subsequently, as the best theory of meaning, perhaps the only one, that can address both the promise and the vagaries of digitization.

Anat Biletzki is professor of philosophy at Tel Aviv University. She is author of *Talking Wolves: Thomas Hobbes on the Language of Politics and the Politics of Language* (1997), *(Over)Interpreting Wittgenstein* (2003), and co-editor (with A. Matar) of *The Story of Analytic Philosophy: Plot and Heroes* (1998). Her publications include articles on Wittgenstein, Hobbes, analytic philosophy, political thought, digital culture, and human rights, and she established the graduate program for “Philosophy, Information and Digital Culture” at Tel Aviv. She is deeply involved in the Israeli peace movement and in human rights work; until recently she was chairperson of the board of B’Tselem – the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories.

GREGORY CHAITIN (Yorktown Heights, NY), Irreducible Complexity in Pure Mathematics

By using ideas on complexity and randomness originally suggested by the mathematician-philosopher Gottfried Leibniz in 1686, the modern theory of algorithmic information is able to show that there can never be a “theory of everything” for all of mathematics.

Gregory Chaitin is at the IBM Watson Research Center in New York, and is the discoverer of the remarkable Omega number. His theory of algorithmic information deals with complexity and randomness and develops an idea in Leibniz’s 1686 “Discours de metaphysique.” A non-technical overview of this work, “Meta Maths: The Quest for Omega,” has recently been published by Atlantic Books in London.

JOS DE MUL (Rotterdam), Wittgenstein 2.0: Philosophical Reading and Writing after the Mediatic Turn

One of the crucial claims of media philosophy is that the content of philosophy cannot be abstracted from its mediatic form. According to Nyíri the genesis and direction of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is connected with the emergence of ‘secondary orality’. Although Nyíri’s claim that form and style of Wittgenstein’s later writings are inherently connected with his cri-

tique of the Platonic culture of the book, is convincing, in this paper, contrary to Nyíri, it is argued that Wittgenstein was not so much on his way back to (a philosophy of) oral culture, but that he was rather struggling his way into a new, post-literate way of thinking and writing. It is argued that an electronic edition of his *Nachlass* is more appropriate to disclose the proto-hypertextual nature of Wittgenstein's thinking. However, as Hrachovec has convincingly shown, the *Bergen Electronic Edition* of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* is only a half-hearted attempt to do so. Discussing the development of Wittgenstein's conception of the possibility of 'thinking machines' in the light of the development of Web 2.0, it is argued that a mediatic re-reading of the *Tractatus* might not only help us to understand the database ontology that underlies the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein, but also to disclose the *Nachlass* accordingly.

Jos de Mul (* 1956) studied philosophy, art history and law at the universities of Utrecht and Amsterdam. Since 1993 he is Full Professor in Philosophy of Man and Culture at the Faculty of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and scientific director of the Research Institute "Philosophy of Information and Communication Technology" (ICT). Among his book publications are: *Romantic Desire in (Post)Modern Art and Philosophy* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1999) and *The Tragedy of Finitude. Dilthey's Hermeneutics of Life* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004).

FRED DRETSKE (Durham, NC), The Metaphysics of Information

Everybody agrees that information is important. Maybe even necessary. Nonetheless, there isn't much agreement about what it is. Engineers, computer scientists, educators, librarians, newscasters, the CIA and even the neighborhood busybody seek and dispense it. We spend billions on its collection, storage, and retrieval. There is, though, little or no consensus about the nature of this commodity. To merit all this attention – an attention amounting, at times, to obsession – information must be at least three things: (1) It must be a semantic (intentional) entity; it must, that is, be about something; (2) it must be true; there is no false information; and (3) it must be transferable. Anything lacking one or more of these properties isn't information.

Fred Dretske retired from Stanford University in 1998 and has been a research professor (no teaching duties) at Duke University for the last eight years. His books include *Knowledge and the Flow of Information* (1981), *Explaining Behavior* (1988), and *Naturalizing the Mind* (1995). A collection of his essays, *Perception, Knowledge, and Belief*, was published by Cambridge Press in 2000. His current work is on self-knowledge and conscious experience.

*LUCIANO FLORIDI (Hertfordshire/Oxford), A Subjectivist
Interpretation of Relevant Information*

One of the complaints frequently vented about current theories of information is that they are utterly hopeless when it comes to establish the actual relevance of some specific piece of information. Most of the time, most of us are interested in knowing not so much whether something is an instance of information, but rather how much that something is relevant for our purposes. Strictly speaking the complaint seems unfair. For no theory of information, from the purely syntactical to the most strongly semantic, is meant to cast any light on the phenomenon of relevance. Critics, however, have at least a sort of normative point. For they protest that such theories should care more about the relevance of what they model as information. If they do not, this is their problem and a reasonable explanation of why they can be largely disregarded when it comes to one's informative needs in real life. Starting from this general perspective, in this talk, I will a) introduce the general debate on informational relevancy in a variety of context, from search engines and information retrieval to online advertising, from juridical procedures to everyday information processes, from medial diagnosis to scientific experiments; b) argue that a general theory of relevant information may be provided by a counterfactual and metatheoretical analysis of the degree of relevance of (some information) *i* for an agent *a* as a function of the accuracy of *i* understood as an answer to a question *q*, given the probability that *q* might be asked by *a*. This analysis will uncover some intricate issues; and finally c) show that a subjectivist interpretation of relevance as indicated in (b) can satisfactorily account for all the main applications and interpretations of the concept of relevant information that may be encoun-

tered in contexts such as those listed in (a).

Luciano Floridi is Research Chair in Philosophy of Information, Department of Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, Fellow of St Cross College, University of Oxford and Director of the IEG, the interdepartmental research group on the philosophy of information, Oxford University. His area of research is the philosophy of information. His works include over seventy articles and several books on epistemology and the philosophy of computing and information. He is currently working on a new book entitled *The Philosophy of Information*, to be published by Oxford University Press.

NEWTON GARVER (Buffalo), Grammar and Silence

The silence at the end of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* comes as the conclusion of his search to determine how meaning is possible, and is expressed in the oft-quoted sentence, "Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen." The 'must' in this sentence is a logical rather than a moral 'must', and the sentence itself a tautology rather than an exhortation. In his later work he continued his search for clarity by means of "grammar" rather than logic. Did this revision nullify the silence? When we understand what his "grammar" comprises, we see that when philosophy is restricted to grammatical clarifications, a restriction to which he was committed, we are obliged to note that making moral or metaphysical pronouncements is some other use of language than making grammatical remarks. That is a grammatical remark, just as the silence at the end of the *Tractatus* was a logical remark. So the silence persists in a slightly different form. It is remarkable that even when he was not doing philosophy, as occurs throughout the remarks collected in *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein is reticent about making moral and political judgments. Although such judgments would not be philosophical (they would not be grammatical clarifications), it is difficult to see why a person who is a philosopher should not also express such judgments.

Newton Garver is SUNY Distinguished Service Professor and an active Quaker. Now retired from classroom teaching, he has published on Wittgenstein and philosophy of language as well as on the concepts of justice and violence. He frequently posts short essays on <http://buffaloreport.com/>.

His most recent books are *Wittgenstein & Approaches to Clarity* (Humanity Books 2006) and *Limits to Politics* (Center Working Papers, 2nd edition 2007). As a Quaker he has been active in the Alternatives of Violence Project, having facilitated about 50 three-day workshops in local prisons, and he is currently engaged in calling attention to the 30,000 Bolivian Quakers, all of whom are Native Americans, and their educational needs and aspirations.

*PETER KEICHER (Karlsruhe), Heidegger und Wittgenstein zur
Ontologie und Praxis der Technik*

Part I of this paper reconsiders Wittgenstein's critical remarks on the notion of 'progress'. Part II sketches the shift in Heidegger's ontological interpretation of technology from a 'metaphysical' to a more 'metaphorical' point of view. Part III discusses the main thesis of Heidegger's *Der Weg zur Sprache* in which he addresses Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's theories on the relation between language and information. Part IV shows that Heidegger criticizes 'Gestell' ideologies but supports the use of modern technologies in the sciences, while he compares the right applications of technologies with forms of art. Part V shows parallels between Wittgenstein's views on progress and his critique of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, followed by Part VI with an interpretation of Wittgenstein's critical remarks on dogmatism. Part VII examines parallels between philosophical and technical issues in the *Philosophical Investigations*. The main thesis of the paper is that Wittgenstein's pragmatism is a necessary and useful supplement to Heidegger's ontological definition of technology.

Peter Keicher, Studium der Philosophie an der Universität Karlsruhe (TH) und an der Université Paris VIII – Vincennes à Saint-Denis, Stipendiat der französischen Regierung (Außenministerium, diplomatischer Dienst), ERASMUS Stipendiat an der Universität Bergen, französische *Maîtrise* über Jean-François Lyotard, Diplomarbeit (DEA) über Martin Heidegger und Jean-François Lyotard, Herausgeber der interdisziplinären Zeitschrift *tacho, Zeitschrift für Perspektivenwechsel*, wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Wittgenstein Archiv in Cambridge, Redakteur des Springer Verlag, Wien New York, Gastforscheraufenthalte und EU-Stipendiat am Wittgen-

stein Archiv an der Universität Bergen, Promotion über Ludwig Wittgenstein an der Universität Karlsruhe (TH) und an der Université Paris VIII – Vincennes à Saint-Denis (*Lieux et transformations de la philosophie*), DFG-Forschungsprojekt zu Wittgensteins Nachlass, Grundlagenforschung zu Wittgensteins Nachlass, Aufsätze zur ästhetischen Praxis bei Wittgenstein „Aspekte musikalischer Komposition bei Ludwig Wittgenstein“ (*Das Verstehen des Anderen*, 2000), „Aspekte malerischer Gestaltung bei Ludwig Wittgenstein“ (*Traditionen Wittgensteins*, 2004), „Wittgensteins Bücher“ (*Schreibprozesse*, 2007).

DIETER KÖHLER (Karlsruhe), Towards Future Digital Scholarship

Analytical philosophy as well as hermeneutics have long ignored the media aspects of language and the importance of the division of labour for the formation of theories. With the Internet having altered academic discourse, these issues seem to have received more attention. However, the Internet poses not only a theoretical challenge for philosophy in particular, but also a more practical one for the humanities in general. Therefore, in order to retain autonomy over their research agendas, it is mandatory that the humanities establish a professional discipline of “humanities computing” within their departments; this to combine information technology, (digital) philology and net-based knowledge communication. Insofar as a future philosophy utilises digital media, it is not a mere observer of these endeavours, but profoundly affected by them.

Dieter Köhler is assistant professor at the Department of Philosophy and research coordinator of the Centre for Multimedia Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (Germany). He holds a doctoral degree in philosophy from Heidelberg University, has worked at Bamberg University as a post-doctoral researcher and at the Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand) as a visiting professorial fellow. He had been an “invited expert” in the Document Object Model interest group of the World Wide Web Consortiums (W3C). His publications include articles on analytical philosophy, information ethics, and computing. He maintains an Internet portal on philosophy as well as several open source projects in the field of humanities computing.

MATTHIAS KROSS (Potsdam), Medienphilosophie als ethisches Projekt? Vilém Flussers Wittgenstein

Vilém Flusser (1920–1991) gilt als einer der Begründer der gegenwärtigen Medienphilosophie. Weniger bekannt ist, dass er vor allem in seinen frühen, während seines Aufenthalts in Brasilien entstandenen kleineren Schriften – z.B. die Rezension der *Philosophischen Bemerkungen* in der *Revista brasileira de filosofia*– oder grundlegenden Arbeiten, z.B. *Língua e Realidade* (1963), wesentlich von der Philosophie Wittgensteins beeinflusst ist. Auch später ist er immer wieder auf dessen sprachphilosophische Einsichten zurückgekommen, wenn auch mit einer eigenwilligen, an Camus und Sartre orientierten existenzialistischen Wendung. In dem Beitrag werden verschiedene Stadien der Auseinandersetzung Flussers mit Wittgenstein nachgezeichnet und wird zugleich ein Beitrag zur Rezeptionsgeschichte Wittgensteins in der Medienphilosophie geleistet.

Matthias Kroß, geb. 1953, Studium der Geschichte, Politologie, Philosophie und Kunstgeschichte in Marburg, Bremen und Berlin. 1993 Promotion an der Freien Universität Berlin mit der Arbeit *Klarheit als Selbstzweck. Wittgenstein über Philosophie, Ethik, Religion und Gewissheit*. Seit 1995 Wissenschaftlicher Referent am Einstein Forum, Potsdam. Seit 1997 Lehrtätigkeit an der Universität Potsdam. Zahlreiche Aufsätze zur Philosophie Wittgensteins. Herausgeber der Buchreihe *Wittgensteiniana* im Berliner Parerga Verlag. Zuletzt erschien darin: (Hg.): „Ein Netz von Normen“ *Wittgenstein und die Mathematik* (2008).

STEFAN MAJETSCHAK (Kassel), Psychoanalyse der grammatischen Mißdeutungen: Über die Beziehung Ludwig Wittgensteins zum Werk Sigmund Freuds

Wittgensteins Beziehung zu den Werken Sigmund Freuds, wie sie in zahlreichen Bemerkungen seines Nachlasses dokumentiert ist, läßt sich nur als ambivalent bezeichnen. Seine Bemerkungen changieren zwischen bewundernder Aneignung und heftiger Ablehnung von Freuds Gedanken. Wittgensteins kritische Lektüre Freuds war in der Forschung bereits häufig das Thema der Untersuchung. In welchem Maße Wittgenstein Freuds Ideen

positiv rezipierte, wurde dagegen weit seltener untersucht. Im vorliegenden Artikel wird gezeigt, daß Wittgensteins positive Aneignung Freuds zumindest während der dreißiger Jahre in seinem Verständnis von philosophischer Therapie greifbar wird, die nach dem Modell einiger Grundannahmen der psychoanalytischen Behandlung konzipiert ist.

Stefan Majetschak ist Professor für Philosophie an der Universität Kassel sowie geschäftsführender Herausgeber der Wittgenstein-Studien und des Wittgenstein-Jahrbuches der Internationalen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft e.V. Veröffentlichungen zu Wittgenstein u.a.: "Ludwig Wittgensteins Denkweg" (Freiburg / München 2000).

*KERSTIN MAYR (Innsbruck), (Re)-Constructing the Semantic
Architecture of Wittgenstein's Vermischte Bemerkungen by
Syntactic Analysis*

Proceeding developments in digital humanities and questions concerning the constitution and textual organisation of Wittgenstein's *Vermischte Bemerkungen* suggested the venture to apply GABEK/WinRelan®, a multi-methodological oriented text-analysis tool, to these remarks. This paper introduces the technical terminology as well as some important aspects of the working process necessary for an understanding of the retrieval of thematic patterns and semantic fields within *Vermischte Bemerkungen*.

Born 1978. Studies in German Language and Literary Studies and English/American Language and Literary Studies, University of Innsbruck. M.A. Studies in Secondary English Education (specialized in American literature, reading and writing) at the City College of New York. Currently research assistant and Ph. D. Studies (interdisciplinary literary studies and philosophy) at the University of Innsbruck. Research fields of interest: Text Theory, Text/Content Analysis (computer-supported), Literary Studies, Narratology, Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Aesthetics and (electronic) editing.

*KATALIN NEUMER (Budapest), Verdächtige Bilder und Töne:
Wittgenstein 1946–1951*

Nach einer der gängigen Positionen der heutigen Wittgenstein-Forschung habe Wittgenstein die Bedeutsamkeit der Visualität erkannt und in seiner Argumentationsweise die Bilder eine gewichtige Rolle spielen lassen. Auf der anderen Seite wird auch allgemein behauptet, daß Wittgenstein der stimmhaften Seite der Sprache eine große Bedeutung zugeschrieben hätte, woraus man u.a. auf seine Neigung zu den oralen Kulturen zu schließen pflegt. Was das erstere betrifft, erscheint die Bildhaftigkeit schon in Wittgenstein expliziten Äußerungen vielmehr als janusköpfig. Diesen Zusammenhang werde ich auf der Grundlage textnaher Analysen von einigen Stellen aus Wittgensteins letzten Jahren weiter entwickeln, wobei ich ebenfalls eine Doppeldeutigkeit der Stimmhaftigkeit nachweisen möchte. Darüber hinaus werde ich zeigen, daß Bilder und Töne in manchen Kontexten – insbesondere im Kontext des Aspektsehens und -wechsels, des Bedeutungserlebnisses und der sekundären Bedeutung, i.e. im Zusammenhang mit für die Jahre 1946–1951 charakteristischen Begriffen – miteinander in (öfters synästhetische) Verbindung gesetzt werden und mit Wittgensteins eigenem Ausdruck “verdächtig“ erscheinen. Dadurch werden Töne von ihrem Thron gestoßen und verwandeln sich in verführerischen Sirenen gesang.

Prof. Dr. Katalin Neumer, geb. 1956. Studium der Philosophie und der ungarischen Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft an der Eötvös-Universität Budapest. Längere Forschungsaufenthalte in Heidelberg, Wolfenbüttel, Fribourg, Cambridge, Wien, Prag, Bergen. Seit 1987 am Institut für Philosophische Forschung an der Ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften tätig. Seit 1995 Präsidentin der Ungarischen Wittgenstein-Gesellschaft. Jüngste Veröffentlichungen: *Die Aspekte der Seele. Wittgenstein nach den Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (Budapest 2006); *Sprache, Denken, Nation. Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte von Locke bis zur Moderne* (Wien 2005); *Traditionen Wittgensteins* (Frankfurt a.M. 2004).

YUKIKO OKAMOTO (Tokyo), Computability of Reality as an Unfulfilled Dream

Constructing a semantic web requires a profoundly contemplated ontology in a certain sense, but not in the traditional sense. However, enquiring into the background of the growth of information systems ontology, we can find their collaboration with philosophy. Furthermore, both fields seem to share a dream. Either from a practical demand for the most generous ontology or for the ideal of total clarity, both might have been driven to accomplish a dream of perfect reconstruction of reality. But there emerge fundamental differences between them, too. For the total reconstruction of reality (computability of reality), everything in the world could be rewritten by a machine-readable language and reconstructed into various databases. But could everything be explicitly represented and captured by that language? Very unlikely. Philosophy would penetrate into the dimensions of implicit background of what could be explicitly represented. Philosophical thinking also elaborates its own methodology, recurring to such dimensions. The authentic tasks for philosophy thus might be to explore such dimensions and continue questioning the meaning of cyber technology itself.

Dr. Yukiko Okamoto has been associate professor of philosophy at Kasei Gakuin University (Tokyo). She is the Commissioner of the Japan Society of Information and Knowledge and member of the Committee of the Philosophical Association of Japan. Her scholarly activities abroad started with “A Possible Theory of Moral Values” in the XVIII. World Congress of Philosophy (1988). Her Ph.D. research focused on the theory of meaning in Husserl (1997). Her publications include articles on the relationship between Phenomenology and Wittgenstein, the meaning of “Life-World” and the one titled “Computability and Meaning – some Phenomenological Issues in constructing a Cyberspace” in *Husserl Studies Japan* (2006).

*MICHELE PASIN & ENRICO MOTTA (Milton Keynes),
PhiloSURFical: Browse Wittgenstein's World with the
Semantic Web*

How many resources about Wittgenstein exist on the web? How do they

relate to each other? What is the most productive way to navigate them, from the point of view of a learner? With the development of the PhiloSURFical tool, we aim at investigating these and other related issues. PhiloSURFical is a software environment which builds on Semantic Web technologies in order to facilitate the navigation and understanding of Wittgenstein's first work, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. By relying on an ontology created to describe the philosophical domain at various levels of abstraction, PhiloSURFical presents the original text and other associated resources in a contextual manner. This can be achieved through a process of narrative pathway generation, that is, the active linking of resources into a learning path that contextualizes them with respect to one another. In this article we introduce the learning paths which PhiloSURFical makes available and highlight some of the modeling issues which emerged as fundamental in supporting such navigations, in the emerging web of data.

Michele Pasin's research focuses on the employment of Semantic Web technologies for supporting learning. In particular, he has been looking at the potential usage of such technologies in the humanities' domains. The main outcome of his PhD research at the Knowledge Media Institute (KMi) of the Open University in Milton Keynes, UK, is PhiloSURFical, a software tool that supports the smart navigation of a philosophical text by means of an extensive underlying semantic model of the philosophical domain. Previously, he graduated in philosophy at the University of Venice, where he was working mainly in the fields of epistemology and philosophy of language.

Enrico Motta is Professor of Knowledge Technologies at the Knowledge Media Institute (KMi) of the Open University in UK. His current research focuses primarily on the integration of semantic, web and language technologies to support the development of intelligent web applications, able to exploit the large scale data provided by the emerging Semantic Web. Motta is Editor in Chief of the *International Journal of Human Computer Studies* and the author of over 180 refereed publications.

VICTOR RODYCH (Lethbridge), Mathematical Sense: Wittgenstein's Syntactical Structuralism

On Wittgenstein's purely syntactical, radical constructivist account of mathematics, the *sense* (meaning) of a mathematical 'proposition' is not at all like the sense of a contingent (empirical) proposition. In the latter case, a contingent proposition has a fully determinate sense as a function of linguistic conventions, which make it possible to fully understand the sense of a contingent proposition without knowing its truth-value. In the mathematical case, however, a so-called "mathematical proposition" only has sense when we have *proved* it (with understanding) and thereby located it within the syntactical structure of a mathematical calculus. This paper aims to (1) show *how* Wittgenstein's radical position on a mathematical proposition and its sense results from his life-long view that mathematics is exclusively syntactical and invented bit-by-little-bit by human beings, (2) *propose* a particular conception of "mathematical sense" – and an interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks – that best resolves the internal tension between two of Wittgenstein's principal views on mathematics, and (3) consider some objections to Wittgenstein's view and how he does or might respond to them. The paper shows that, on Wittgenstein's account, the sense of a mathematical proposition *is* its syntactical location and its syntactical connections within a purely syntactical calculus.

Victor Rodych is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Lethbridge (Alberta, Canada). He is the author of "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics" (2007), "Who Is Wittgenstein's Worst Enemy?" (2006), "Pragmatic Platonism" (2004), "Searle Freed of Every Flaw" (2003), "Popper versus Wittgenstein on Truth, Necessity, and Scientific Hypotheses" (2003), "Gödel's 'Disproof' of the Syntactical Viewpoint" (2001), "Wittgenstein's Inversion of Gödel's Theorem" (1999), and numerous other articles on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. When he isn't playing squash, Victor, his wife Rachel, and their four children spend as much time as possible in the Rocky Mountains.

DAVID G. STERN (Iowa), *Digital Wittgenstein Scholarship: Past, Present and Future*

The Bergen edition of the Wittgenstein papers was published in 2000. Even by the relatively slow-moving standards of academic publishing, one might well expect that by 2007 we should be able to assess the impact of this “digital turn” on Wittgenstein scholarship. The available evidence suggests that its impact has not, so far, been as large as early reviewers hoped — or feared. While a number of Wittgenstein experts, myself included, regard it an invaluable resource, the vast majority of work on Wittgenstein makes little or no use of the digital turn. With a few notable exceptions — principally editorial work on Wittgenstein’s writing, and the study of the composition of his work — writing on Wittgenstein in a possible world where the Bergen edition was never published would be almost indistinguishable from our own. However, we frequently overestimate the short-term effects of technological changes while underestimating their longer-term impact. The Bergen “edition” is not a book, but a piece of software, and must be evaluated in those terms. As the results of the work of the first generation of users of this software reach a broader audience, and as the software becomes easier to use, we can expect that the digital turn in Wittgenstein studies, like the web browser in the 1990s, will eventually reach a wider audience.

David G. Stern is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa. He is the author of *Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction* (Cambridge, 2004) and *Wittgenstein on mind and language* (Oxford, 1995), and co-editor of *Wittgenstein Reads Weininger*, with Béla Szabados (Cambridge, 2004) and *The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein*, with Hans Sluga (Cambridge, 1996).

LUIS M. VALDÉS-VILLANUEVA (Oviedo), *Santayana and Wittgenstein on Scepticism*

This paper draws a comparison between the treatments of scepticism by George Santayana (1863–1952) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). In spite of their differences in philosophical temperament, both philosophers shared a sustained concern for philosophical scepticism. Santayana’s

“thought-experiment” leading to the “solipsism of the present moment” is analyzed together with his *sui generis* form of dogmatism. Using James Conant’s distinction between the “Cartesian way” and the “Kantian way” with scepticism, it is suggested that Santayana’s dealing with scepticism is a variety of the Kantian way – not very remote from Wittgenstein’s aim and practice –, though without the benefit of the “return to the ordinary” provided by the analyses in *On Certainty*.

Luis M. Valdés-Villanueva is Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of Oviedo (Spain). He has also taught at the Universities of Valencia and Murcia. His interests include topics in Philosophy of Language and Philosophy of Mind. He has published, among other things, several articles on the philosophy of Wittgenstein and he is the author of a Spanish translation of the *Tractatus*. He is the current editor of the Spanish journal *Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofía*.

THE EDITORS ALOIS PICHLER AND HERBERT HRACHOVEC

Herbert Hrachovec, born 1947, is associate professor of Philosophy at the University of Vienna and member of the University’s academic senate. He has founded an electronic archive for philosophy texts and a repository for audio documents of a theoretical nature. For more detailed information see <http://hrachovec.philo.at>.

Alois Pichler, born 1966, is a member of staff at the Department of Culture, Language and Information Technology (AKSIS) at UNIFOB AS, Bergen, Norway. He is Director of the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen. He is member of the Executive Committee of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Homepage: <http://teksttek.aksis.uib.no/people/alois>.