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# Bareness, as in "Bare" Particulars': Its Ubiquity

Many philosophers have argued that ordinary things are bundles of properties, where these properties are universals, entities able to be properties of more than thing. Consider, for the sake of simplicity, two red spots or images. The red in the one spot is, let us also suppose, the same as the red in the other spot. Thus, the two spots share a common property. This would seem to imply that they are the same entity. But they are two. It is therefore concluded that there must be other entities present, two of them, one in each spot. This accounts for there being two different things. This further entity is a particular, and, since in itself it has no properties, it is said to be, in itself, in its own being, "bare": in so far as it is anything, that is, anything other than itself, it is so by virtue of its being with the properties that, together with it, constitute the ordinary thing. In itself, it never ceases to be bare, but at the same time it never is naked – it always comes clothed, if you wish, by properties.

Now, many philosophers have objected to bare particulars. Russell, for example, once argued that "One is tempted to regard 'This is red' as a subject-predicate proposition, but if one does so, one finds that 'this' becomes a substance, an unknowable something in which predicates inhere ...". How, Russell and others ask, could a good empiricist ever admit into his or her ontology these horrid little things? How could one actually believe that these little things populate our world? After all, you can't even see them!

What I wish to argue is that, after all, a bare particular is not such a horrid thing – that particulars are there in things, that they are bare but that such bareness both is to be expected and is innocuous, that such bareness is in fact ubiquitous, and that it not only harmless, but a central feature of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Cf. E. B. Allaire, *Bare Particulars*, in M. J. Loux, ed., *Universals and Particulars* (Notre Dame, Ill.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), pp. 281-290. For discussion of particulars, objecting to them on account of their bareness, see H. Hochberg, *The Positivist and the Ontologist: Bergmann, Carnap, and Logical Realism* (Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and Atlanta, GA: Rudopi, 2001), Ch. 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Bertrand Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1948), p. 97.

world of the empiricist.

I

Begin with ordinary sensible things, red images, for example, and the properties of and relations among these things.

William James was characteristically perceptive on these things. He carefully distinguished the properties of things and the relations among them. With an apt metaphor he likened the world of which we are conscious to the world of a bird's life. "Like a bird's life, it [the world as experienced] seems to be made of an alternation of flights and perchings," where the resting-places are "usually occupied by sensorial imaginations of some sort." The flights are relations, the perchings are properties – relations among and properties of sensible things.

As for the resting-places, James observes that "In the sensations of hearing, touch, sight, and pain, we are accustomed to distinguish from among the other elements the element of voluminousness." He refers to the discussion found in James Ward, who refers to this element as "extensity." James notes that "this element [extensity] [is] discernible in each and every sensation"; and comments that "extensity, being an entirely peculiar kind of feeling indescribable except in terms of itself, and inseparable in actual experience from some sensational quality which it must accompany, can itself receive no other name than that of *sensational element*."

Extensity is, it is clear, a distinguishable part of the things we experience. Each ordinary thing has, as an element within it, its extensity. It is there, upon the extensities, that perchings perch; and it is among these elements that flights take off and come to rest. Let us refer to the extensity of a thing like a red image as its "area." The quality of redness as a property of the thing is a perching upon the area in the thing. And if one red image is to the left of another, then the relation of being to the left of is a flight that takes off from the area of the one thing and comes to rest on the area of the other.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>William James, *Principles of Psychology* 2 volumes (New York: Henry Holt, 1890), vol. 1, p. 243.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup><u>Ibid</u>., vol. 1, 134.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>"Encyclopedia Britannica", 9<sup>th</sup> edition, article "Psychology," p. 46, p. 53.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. 2, pp. 135-136.

Ontology is not, or ought not to be, at least for the empiricist, all dialectical. As Locke and Hume and Russell and William James argued, it ought to be rooted in ordinary concrete things, the sensible things with which we are acquainted in ordinary experience. But it is often stated, even by those with empiricist leanings, that bare particulars are introduced for dialectical reasons, by way of argument and not because they are presented in experience. Bergmann, who says he accepts the Principle of Acquaintance, once wrote that "I, of course, have convinced myself that I am actually presented with two things [two particulars in two images]. Yet I am loath to rest the case on this conviction, for I am convinced that a very major part of it is dialectical." Just how has he convinced himself? If it is by looking, by virtue of his being aware of them in experience, then 'convince' is surely not correct: one accepts that red exists because it is given in experience, and for the same reason, it would seem, one should accept that (bare) particulars exist because they are given in experience. Being convinced consists of being given an argument that moves one from ignorance to justified belief. Of the obvious one need not be convinced. If you are confronted with one who does not know these entities, one who is not acquainted with them, then, one does not offer an argument but rather, as William James puts it, all I can do is "...say to my friends, Go to certain places and act in certain ways and these objects will probably come."8 Bergmann's way of putting his point suggests that (bare) particulars are introduced into one's ontology on dialectical grounds rather than the fact of acquaintance. But that is not what is demanded by the empiricist stance.

Consider again our two red concrete objects, the two red images. We have this fact: the red in this image is indistinguishable from the red in that image. In this sense, there are two references to, two definite descriptions for, the same entity, that is, an entity which indistinguishably itself in two things. It is for this reason that we can refer to this property and properties in general as "universals". That the property in the one image is indistinguishable from the property in the other image is what is meant when we speak of them as the same property. That properties in things are in this sense the same accounts for why we apply the same predicate,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>G. Bergmann, "Strawson's Ontology," in his *Logic and Reality* (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 171-192, at p. 185.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>James, *Principles*, vol. 1, p. 221.

namely 'red', to the two things. Given the traditional usage, this implies that properties are universals. As G. E. Moore once put it (as usual, in his somewhat convoluted way),

In the case of two sense-data, A and B, both of which appear to me to be red, I often cannot tell that the most specific shade of red which A presents to me is not exactly the same as the most specific shade which B presents to me. I also cannot tell that the most specific shade which A presents to me is not an absolutely specific shade. And I think I can see quite clearly that it is logically possible both that it is an absolutely specific shade, and that it does in fact characterize A and B.

There is no argument to the effect that we need to construe properties as universals in order to account for why we apply the same predicate to different things. To the contrary, we do apply the same predicate to different things, and we do so on the basis of the commonsense fact that the property in the one is the same as the property in the other. It is this commonsense fact that leads us to say that properties are universals. Again, as Moore puts it,

... it is quite certain that many characters of concrete things <u>are</u> common characters, and also that many are <u>not</u>. And if ... we use the phrase 'is a universal' in a sense which logically implies 'is a common character', it follows, of course, that ... we shall have to say that many of the characters of concrete things are universals... <sup>10</sup>

At the same time, the colour property of a green spot is clearly distinguishable from the red which is the property of another spot. The property in this case in the one spot is different from the property in the other spot.

In this sense of 'different,' the area upon which the property red perches in the one image is distinguishable from and therefore different from the property red which is perched upon the other image. Moore notes the role of areas in determining the differing of things.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>G. E. Moore, "Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular?" in his *Philosophical Papers* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959), pp. 17-29, at p. 24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Ib<u>id</u>., p. 31.

... there are cases in which I can distinguish between two concrete things, A and B (as, for instance, when I distinguish between two different parts of a sheet of white paper), although I cannot perceive that A is *qualitatively unlike* B in any respect whatsoever – either in shape, or size or colour. <sup>11</sup>

As we saw James, following Ward, making the point, every sensible thing comes as a piece as it were of extension; there is an area which defines each thing. Thus, we have *one image - one area*, or *one concrete thing - one area*.

Now, ordinary concrete things, images for example, are individual things, we have *this* image and *that*. A concrete thing, a this or a that, is something complex. It has properties and these properties are *with* each other. An ordinary thing is thus a group of properties that are with one another. But it is *not just* a group of properties that are with one another: there is also the *area* that is in the thing. An ordinary concrete thing is thus a group of properties together with an area; and these entities are with one another forming the thing..

Furthermore, an ordinary thing is not just a thing: as a group of entities that are with each other, the ordinary thing is a *fact*. An ordinary thing is a particular, but it is a particular fact. The qualities in the fact do not make it a particular fact, it is not by virtue of the qualities in that fact that it is distinguished from other facts. For, after all, the qualities in the fact, the properties of the thing, are universals. That which distinguishes the fact from other such facts is the *area* in the fact. *It is the area which is the entity which makes an ordinary thing a particular*. In that sense, the area itself may be called *the particular* which is in the particular fact which is the ordinary thing. Since things are wholes of which areas and properties are parts, and the properties are universal, the only entity that is unique in each concrete thing is the area. *Areas are particulars*, and as such they *individuate concrete things*.

The case is not dialectical. The case is made in terms of that with which we are acquainted. Areas are there and these are the reasons why we take the two concrete things to be different, different particular things. Allaire turns it around: we make two references and therefore the

<sup>12</sup>Cf. G. Bergmann, "Synthetic A Priori," in his Logic and Reality, pp.272-301, at p. 288.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 28.

particulars must be there – at least, so he argues. Allaire's way of putting it makes it seem as if the dialectics are central. He asks us to consider two red discs. He then argues that

To claim that both discs are but collections of literarily the same universals does not account for the *thisness* and *thatness* which are implicitly referred to in speaking of them as *two* collections. That is, the two collections of characters ... are, as presented, numerically different. Clearly, therefore, something other than a character must be presented. <sup>13</sup>

Not: something other is presented but: something other must be presented. But for one who accepts a Principle of Acquaintance what counts is what <u>is</u> presented. The dialectics are not there to convince one that one must be presented with certain things, but rather to convince one that entities which are in fact there, entities which are in fact presented to us, provide a solution to the traditional ontological problem of individuation.

They *are* presented, and these entities *do in fact, we subsequently argue*, solve/dissolve the traditional problem. Their role relative to the traditional problems *is* a matter of dialectics: they are presented in our sensible experience of the world, and because they do in fact exist we can appeal to them to solve/dissolve the traditional problems: they are not there because they must be.<sup>14</sup>

But areas, particulars, are never naked: they are always presented as with some quality or other. Here, we clearly have to distinguish an entity from facts involving that entity. In stating a fact about an entity one is saying something about that entity: one is stating what that entity is like, how it is characterized. These facts about the entity are things that can be said.

However, the area really is just an area. We can say things about it;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>See E B. Allaire, "Bare Particulars," p. 288.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>H. Hochberg, *The Positivist and the Ontologist*, p. 50, suggests that the identification of the areas in things with particulars is a "desperate" attempt to convince oneself that particulars are presented to one in ordinary experience. Perhaps. Hochberg suggests that the move is wrong-headed, but in fact he does not say why the identification ought not be made. Hochberg does note that Bergmann, having once made the identification (see fn. 12, above), later more or less dropped the point and relied upon dialectics to make the case for bare particulars. But that is not to establish that the earlier identification is wrong. For myself, I, like James (whom Hochberg does not mention) and Bergmann (on occasion), find the identification persuasive.

specifically, we can state what qualities are with it. But in itself it has no characteristics, and nothing can therefore be said about it, that is, said about it as it is in itself. In this sense, *the particular is bare*: it cannot be described, since there is about it, as it is in itself, nothing to describe. In itself, it cannot be described, it can only be named.

If "to say something" is taken to mean "to assert a proposition", then nothing can be said about the areas in things; that is why they are said to be "bare." They are presented to us in our experience of things, and they can be referred to, but there is nothing sayable about them.

To make the point again, however: while areas are bare, in the sense just explained, they do not come to us in experience as unclothed: they are not naked. They all occur as parts of ordinary things, that is, as having qualities and as standing in relations. As James put it,

In minds able to speak at all there is, it is true, some knowledge about everything. Things can at least be classed, and the times of their appearance told. But in general, the less we analyze a thing, and the fewer of the relations we perceive, the less we know about it ... <sup>15</sup>

Areas always occur as, and are always presented as, parts of facts.

#### III

The empiricist admits entities into his or her ontology provided that they conform to the *Principle of Acquaintance*: admit no entity unless one is acquainted with it. What we must recognize about the basic entities of the world is that they are in themselves wholly, or logically, or ontologically, self-contained. Acquaintance with them is thus *mere* acquaintance. Acquaintance with a quality or a relation or an area is thus *not knowledge about*. To be sure, we are acquainted with facts, with the bundles that are ordinary things. This provides us with knowledge about the entities in the facts that are thus presented. But mere acquaintance with the basic entities is dumb.

James put the point in his usual telling way:

I know the color blue when I see it, and the flavor of a pear when I taste it; I know an inch when I move my finger

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>James, *Principles*, vol. 1, p.221.

through it; a second of time, when I feel it pass; an effort of attention when I make it; a difference between two things when I notice it; but *about* the inner nature of these facts or what makes them what they are, I can say nothing at all. <sup>16</sup>

But there are philosophers who argue that our experience of sensible things is not in this way dumb. The point can be made in a simple way. It is argued that in order to know what the quality red is we must also know that it is *not* the quality green, and, more strongly, that red's qualifying something is incompatible with green's qualifying that thing. Thus, in knowing *red* one also knows that

(I) 
$$(x)[red(x) \sim green(x)]$$

So, on this view, when we know *red* in itself, we also know something about *red*, namely, that being red is incompatible with being green. (I) describes (part of ) the being of red, and so is part of the meaning of 'red'.: it is a metaphysical necessity. Acquaintance, then, always is, or involves, knowledge about.

The pattern goes back to Aristotle. His metaphysical scheme is designed to provide a way of explaining sensible events. On his view, an ordinary thing is a *substance*. A substance has qualities present in it. Sensible events are the being in a substance of a sensible quality. Change consists in one quality ceasing to be in a substance followed by the coming to be in that substance of a different, and incompatible sensible quality.

A substance is an individual, and, more particularly, an individual that endures through change. Upon the metaphysics of explanation that Aristotle proposes, every substance, that is, every ordinary object, has a *nature*. This nature is *metaphysically necessary* to the being of the object; it defines what it is in its *essence*. This nature is a *power*, an *active disposition*, that moves the object in certain defined ways.<sup>17</sup>

Thus, for example, it is the nature of a stone to *gravitate*. To be *grave* is an *active power*. In exercising this power, the object *moves itself*. This power is such that if the object is unsupported then it moves towards

<sup>17</sup>For greater detail, see F. Wilson, *The Logic and Methodology of Science in Early Modern Thought: Seven Studies* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), Study One. Also F. Wilson, *The Logic and Methodology of Science and Pseudoscience* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2000), Ch. 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>James, *Psychology*, vol. 1, p. 221.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Note the contrast to our, more recent and scientific, notion of gravity; in the latter there is no notion of *self movement*.

the centre of the universe.

More generally, let "N" be the nature, "F" the occasion of its exercise, and "G" the end of its exercise. Then we have

$$(\mathbf{D}) \qquad (\mathbf{x})[\mathbf{N}\mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{F}\mathbf{x} \quad \mathbf{G}\mathbf{x})]$$

We explain the behaviour of an object by appeal to its nature. This nature is *active*: the model is that of human volition. Thus, for Aristotle, all objects are active in the sense in which human beings are active, though some, e.g., human beings or dogs, are more active than others, e.g., stones. To say that they are more active is to say that they have more powers, more complex natures. Since the powers are active, modelled on human activities, they are *powers* the exercise of which is *towards an end*. The pre-scientific explanations of Aristotle and his successors such as Ptolemy are thus *purposive*; every explanation is a *teleological explanation*. In the case of stones, the purpose or end at which the stone's activity is aimed at achieving is being at the centre of the universe.

The activity is as it were constant. But it is not always exercised. The stone is constantly striving to be at the centre of the universe. But sometimes it is *prevented* from moving towards that end. Thus, if I hold the stone up at the top of the tower, I am preventing it from moving towards the centre of the universe. That tendency I feel as the weight of the stone. If the impediment is removed, if the stone becomes unsupported, then the tendency will manifest itself in the properties of the stone, it will in fact change places as it moves itself systematically towards the centre of the universe. In an Aristotelian world the patterns among sensible appearances that derive from the underlying natures of things are not universal: they are gappy.

The nature, that is, the "N" of (**D**), is not given to us in sense experience. It is rather, Aristotle argued, given to us in a *rational intuition*. For Aristotle, reason is what grasps the reasons for things, and the reasons for things behaving as they do are their natures. Reason, then, for Aristotle, provides us with special insight into the metaphysical structure of the world. This notion of "reason" is very different from that of the empiricists, according to whom reason aims to discover genuine matter of fact regularities, universal and exceptionless patterns of behaviour. Reason, on this empiricist alternative, does not aim at insight into metaphysical structures but is a human instrument that restricts itself to the world of sense experience, endeavouring to discover exceptionless patterns of behaviour of objects. <sup>19</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Cf. F. Wilson, The Logic and Methodology of Science in Early Modern Thought:

In (**D**), the "F" and "G" are features of the object known in sense experience. Since (**D**) relates the nature N to these features of sense experience, where N is *not* given in sense experience, it follows that (**D**) is not itself an empirical truth, something the truth of which can be discovered in sense experience. We discover its truth not by observation but by reason, that is, the reason that grasps the natures or reasons of things. A statement such as (**D**) which relates a nature to the empirically observable occasion and end of its exercise is *metaphysically necessary*.

As for understanding the natures of things, this is done, according to Aristotle, by giving a *real definition* of the nature. The nature is a *species*, and the species is defined by giving its *genus* and *specific difference*. Thus, in the case of human beings, the nature is "humanity" and the real definition is given by "rational animal", where "animal" is the genus and "rational" is the specific difference. The real definition is exhibited in a *syllogism*:

All M are P
All S are M
All S are P

"S" and "P" are the subject and predicate of the conclusion, and "M" is the middle term that joins them in the premises. When the syllogism exhibits a real definition, "S" is the species, "P" is the genus, and "M" is the specific difference. Thus, the real definition

human is rational animal

is exhibited in the syllogism

All rational are animal

All human are rational

All human are animal

In the case of stones we would have

All centre loving objects are material

All stones are centre loving objects

All stones are material

Syllogism is thus not only a form of argument but also a logical structure that exhibits the metaphysical structure of the world. It reveals the complex structure of the active dispositions or nature of an object. It reveals, in the genus, those dispositions which the nature shares with other objects, and, in the specific difference, it reveals those dispositions which distinguish it from other sorts or species of object. Thus, for Aristotle and his successors,

Seven Studies, Study One. Also F. Wilson, Hume's Defence of Causal Inference (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

understanding the natures of things consists in grasping the ways in which they are similar to and differ from other sorts of things. Explanation consists in grasping similarities and differences among things.<sup>20</sup>

That is not, however, the point that here needs to be emphasized. When we know an Aristotelean nature we not only know it as it is in itself but in knowing it as it is itself we have knowledge about it: (**D**) gives the meaning of the term 'N'. Knowledge is always knowledge about: substances are not bare entities.

### IV

Aristotle makes the ontological structure of the world a matter of necessity. This was taken further by idealists such as F. H. Bradley.

According to Bradley all knowledge is knowledge about. Like the empiricists, Bradley argues that knowledge is rooted in experience. But, because all knowledge is knowledge about, the role of *feeling* in Bradley's philosophy, specifically that feeling in Bradley's ontology/epistemology, has a very different status and role from that of the feeling=sensation of the empiricists.<sup>21</sup> The latter is indeed "mere" feeling, from Bradley's point of view, and from the empiricist position too: such knowledge of the properties in things is dumb, it involves no knowledge about those things, nothing that can be said. However, that *feeling* which plays a central role in Bradley's philosophy is anything but *mere*.

On Bradley's view, a content is ideal if it falls short of perfect reality. Now, the real is the fully individual or particular; as he puts it, "Nothing in the end is real but the individual...". This doctrine, that in order to be real an entity must be individual or particular, is applied in particular to relations: his account of relations must fulfil the condition of construing them as particulars. "A relation, to be experienced and to be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>It is worth noting that when one ascribes, in the Aristotelian system, a nature or essence to a substance, one is not merely describing it but also making a normative claim about how it *ought to be*. On this scheme the ontological structure of the universe is also a normative structure. See F. Wilson, *The Logic and Methodology of Science in Early Modern Thought: Seven Studies*, Study One. Also F. Wilson, *Socrates, Lucretius, Camus – Two Philosophical Traditions on Death* (Lewiston NY and Queenston ON: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), Ch. 3, and *passim*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Compare P. Ferreira, *Bradley and the Structure of Knowledge* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>F. H. Bradley, "Relations," in his *Collected Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), pp. 635-6.

actual, must be more than a mere abstraction. It must be an individual or particular fact, and, if less than this, it cannot be taken as itself". 23 Thus, an ideal content that falls short of full reality falls short of individuality or particularity. It is therefore abstract rather than concrete, general rather than singular or individual or particular. Further, the particularity of a thing derives from its relations to other things. The this – this physical object, this sensation, this red, this colour – is what it is only because it is *not that*. This thing itself is a particular only to the extent, then, that is an aspect of a larger relational whole. In itself it has less particularity, less reality, than the relational whole of which it is an aspect. The fully real is the relational whole that includes all other things as aspects of its own reality. The judgment that "This is a such" brings together the subject "this" and the predicate "such". This "this" is isolated from other things, but when the "such" is brought over against it and affirmed of it, that is, said to be part of the whole which is the "this", we in fact particularize the thing by bringing it into relations with other things: the "such" carries within itself relations, at least those of similarity and dissimilarity. And, with those relations, the judgment points to other things, other "thats" which are also such "suches".

Bradley's account of judgment is not terribly different from that of the Aristotelian. A judgment of the form S is P can be justified, according to Bradley, by forming an argument or, rather, inference

M is P
S is M
S is P

S implying M, implies P.<sup>24</sup> The middle term M links together the S on the one hand and the P on the other. It as it were fills out the copula in "S is P". The judgment itself refers to a reality that links S and P, but in the judgment taken alone that reality is ignored. In the inference that background context becomes explicit: the conditions that were previously external to the judgment are internalized. The connection between S and P which was external to the judgment is internal to the inference. Where S and P were unconnected, they are now connected: the being of the one becomes implicated with the being of the other. They are now no longer simply external to one another; they are connected in their very being, internally. In this internalization, the ideality of the judgment is decreased.

<sup>23</sup>.*Ibid.*, pp. 635-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Cf. F. H. Bradley, "Terminal Essays: On Judgment," p. 634ff; in his *Principles of Logic*, Second revised edition, vol. II, (London: Oxford University Press, 1922).

At the same time, the contingency of the judgment is decreased. In the judgment the terms are separate, their connection (or, rather, "connection") is contingent. As the inference fills out the judgment the separateness of the terms is decreased, and therefore the contingency. In the inference we begin to grasp the structure that constitutes the necessary ties that link the terms of the judgment into a unified Whole. As ideality is decreased in the inference, so is the contingency; or, conversely, as the inference more closely approaches reality, so does it approach a complete necessity.

In perception we isolate a portion of reality: "Lo! an S". <sup>25</sup> In judgment we locate the perceived S as a P. In such a judgment we separate the P from the S. In inference we proceed to fill in the context in which the S which is a P is located. The result is the location of the S which is P in the larger part of reality constituted by the M which links them. Now, one of the criticisms of the claim that coherence is the criterion of truth is that coherence, like consistency, is as compatible with falsehood as it is with truth. This is so even if one begins with perception, which must be an isolation of part of the total reality. Bradley avoids this problem by insisting that beyond perception there is primitive experience or feeling: in feeling we encounter Reality, or, rather, in feeling Reality is fully present, not present to us, but including us within the whole.

In the mere isolating sensation of the empiricists, we separate parts of this whole. As the empiricists see it, James among them, sensation, feeling, is indeed isolating, but, moreover, the entities known in such acquaintance are what they are, independently of any other entity. For Bradley, in contrast, sensation is indeed isolating, but that is not the end of the story. What is separated is also in itself connected to other entities. Thought moves from sensation through inference, into perception and then into judgment, and in so moving, it moves from the full reality present in feeling to ideality. In inference we gradually move to restore the lost unity. As we fill in the structures in inference, we gradually lessen the separateness of the things that are first given to us in sensation, perception and judgment. And in the ultimate judgment, or, what amounts to the same, the ultimate inference, we discover the whole truth that we previously felt but lost in sensation, perception and judgment. Only, it is not "previously": the feeling is there, with us, all the while. All the while in feeling we encounter the reality that includes us and to which we are in thought striving to return. Thus, "judgement, on our view, transcends and must transcend that immediate unity of feeling upon which it cannot cease to

<sup>25</sup>Cf. F. H. Bradley, "Terminal Essays: The 'This'," *ibid*.

depend."26

Reality is thus both the origin of the movement of thought – reality as feeling – and the goal towards which thought moves – reality as self-conscious awareness of the manifold of structures which are implicit within itself. And more: reality is the structure that guides thought as it moves from feeling to the total self-conscious awareness which is its *telos*. We accept the idealizations in judgment not because they are true – for they are not wholly true – but because we have a sense that they can be made true, and, indeed, that they can ultimately be made true. In feeling consciousness already implicitly recognizes its goal, the complete structured unity of which it is a part and which is at once the end and the guide towards that end. If at any point there were a genuine separation of knower from known or of entity from entity, or of this from such, of this from that, then there an ultimate re-union could not be achieved: no re-union without union.

Bradley's argument for this position consists in the claim that it can, where empiricism cannot, account for the soundness of inference. Upon the empiricist account of inference as defended by Locke, Hume, the Mills, and James, what we know is what is given in sensation, and what is given in sensation are entities that are intrinsically separate and isolated, in their being not related to other things. Or rather, insofar as they are related, it is only psychologically. What unity that is there is provided by the mind that judges them; objectively, however, in the entities themselves there are no connections.<sup>27</sup> This is what Russell was later to refer to as the monadistic account of relations.<sup>28</sup> James characterizes it as "sensationalism". These philosophers "deny the reality of relations," and "the upshot of this view" is that what we experience is a world consisting of

...sensations and their copies and derivatives, juxtaposed like dominoes in a game, but really separate, everything

<sup>26</sup>F. H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality* (London: Oxford University Press, 1914), p. 231.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Cf. J. Weinberg, "Relation," in his *Abstraction, Relation and Induction* (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965); and also F. Wilson, "Burgersdijck, Bradley, Russell, Bergmann: Four Philosophers on the Ontology of Relations," *The Modern Schoolman*, 72 (1995), pp. 283-310. For some criticism of the latter, see H. Hochberg, *The Positivist and the Ontologist: Bergmann, Carnap, and Logical Realism* (Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and Atlanta, GA: Rudopi, 2001), p. 176ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Cf. B. Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, Second Edition (London: Allen and Unwin, 1938), Ch. XXVI.

Bradley proposes that genuine relations are incompatible with the independence that is a consequence of monadistic view. "...a mode of togetherness such as we can verify in feeling," he tells us, "destroys the independence of our reals." Conversely, if we do make the relata independent or absolute, then we destroy their relatedness: "Relations are unmeaning except within and on the basis of a substantial whole, and related terms, if made absolute, are forthwith destroyed." The point that Bradley makes is that in the absence of any objective connections among entities there is no objective ground for the soundness of inference. Judgments are justified by inferences, and the latter can do their job only if they are grounded in objective necessary connections among things.

Judgments are clearly not themselves primitive feeling. They are not even the feeling that initially, in the growth of knowledge, isolates from the whole sensible parts. Perception unifies these sensible entities into larger wholes, and judgment develops that process further. There is a continuity of thought from primitive feeling, through isolating sensation, through perception, through judgment, to the cognitive end where the Whole is wholly conscious of itself as a unity of diversity.

For our purposes, the point is that Bradleyan judgments, the inferences that trace out necessary connection, are not sensations, or, at least, not just sensations in the empiricist sense. Nor, according to Bradley, are relations given in sensible experience. Bradley is thus among those whom James characterizes as "intellectualists". These philosophers are

...unable to give up reality of relations *extra mentem*, but equally unable to point to any distinct substantive feelings in which they were known, have made the same admission [as the sensationalists] that the feelings do not exist. The relations must be known, they say, in something that is no feeling, no mental modification, continuous and consubstantial with the subjective tissue out of which sensations and other substantive states are made. They are known, these relations, by something that lies on an entirely different plane, by an <u>actus purus</u> of thought, Intellect, or Reason, all written with capitals and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>James, *Principles*, vol. 1, p. 244.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1897), p. 125.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 125.

considered to mean something unutterably superior to any fact fo sensibility whatever. <sup>32</sup>

James agrees with the intellectualists that the sensationalists are wrong in holding that reality consists of unrelated sensible elements. Besides perchings, there are also flights. James disagrees with the empiricists, the sensationalists, in holding, contrary to the latter, that reality consists of sensible elements which are *related one to another in sensible experience*. These relations are given in our ordinary experience of things, rather than being all of them necessary connections that are known only by acts of thought – Thought – that is a form of knowing higher than, and different from, our ordinary sensible experience of things.

V

Bradley was not the first so to argue that the structure of things is given in non-empirical judgments of necessary connection. The pattern is Aristotelian. Thus, the 17th century English Aristotelian John Sergeant argued, in his *Method to Science*, <sup>33</sup> that science, understood in empiricist fashion, as based in sensation, cannot achieve a genuine unity, and therefore leaves things unexplained.

...Matter of Fact shows evidently, that this Method [that of experiment], alone, and Unassisted by Principles, is utterly Incompetent or Unable to beget Science. For, what one Universal conclusion in Natural Philosophy, (in knowing which kind of Truths Science consists) has been demonstrated by Experiments.

...it is ... merely Historical, and Narrative of Particular Observations; from which to deduce Universal Conclusions is against plain Logick, and Common Sense (unpaginated, d4).

Genuine science, in contrast, requires the grasp of objective necessities that tie things together into wholes. In order genuinely to understand things, this objective structure must be grasped.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup>James, *Principles*, vol. 1, p. 245.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup>London: W. Redmayne, 1696.

...'tis Connexion of Terms which I onlely esteem as Proper to advance Science. Where I find not such Connexion, and the Discourse grounded on Self-evident Principles, or (which is the same) on the metaphysical Verity of the Subject, which engages the Nature of the Thing, I neither expect Science can be gain'd, nor Method to Science Estalbish'd (*ibid*.).

In fact, Sergeant, like Bradley, argues that judgment ultimately refers to a reality implicitly mentioned in the copula. Sergeant argued that "There is but one onely Notion that is perfectly Absolute, viz. that of Existence, and all the rest are in some manner or other, Respective..." (p. 15). We begin with the notion of being or existence and subdivide it according to species and difference, as Porphyry showed. Differences are successively added to genera to create ever more inferior species. The species most inferior to the supreme genus are individual things.

... every individual Man is but One Ens or thing; since he descends Lineally from that Common Head by intrinsecal Differences of more or less, which constitute him truly One in that Line; that is, one Ens, or one Thing (p. 32).

At the other end of the scale, the supreme genus is that of being, which admits of no definition in terms of genus and difference.

...the Notion of <u>is</u>, or Actual Being, is impossible to admit any Explication... (p. 120).

But if *being* is the supreme genus it is also that which contains within itself as the source the being of all inferiors. If it is the supreme genus it is also the most determinate being, the most "fixed". As the source of all being, of all reality, being is that which links its own determinations into determinate wholes.

The Notion of <u>is</u> is the Determinate of its own Nature, and so most Fixt of it's self; and, therefore, most proper to fix the Judgment (p. 120).

Being "fixes" judgments by providing the linkage represented by the copula:

...the meaning of the word is which is the Copula, is this,

that those Words are Fundamentally Connected in the same Thing and Identify'd with it Materially; however those Notions themselves be Formally different, provided they be not Incompossible...As when we say *a Stone is Hard* the Truth of that Proposition consists in this, that the Nature of *hard* is found in that Thing or Suppositum call'd a *Stone*, and is in part Identify'd with it; however the Notions of *Stone* and *Hard* be Formally Distinct. Or, (which is the same) it is as much as to say, that that Thing which is Stone is the same thing that is Hard (p. 119).

Thus, "This Proposition Self-Existence is Self-existence is, of it self, most Supremely Self-Evident.." (p. 133). This proposition, which is the same as the propositions that "what is is" and "existence is existence", contains within itself all other predications: "...not only the Notion of the Copula, but of the Subject and Predicate too, is Existence" (p. 134). Being, of course, is God Himself. As Sergeant puts it, "...God himself has expressed his own Supreme Essence by this Identical Proposition, Ego Sum qui Sum..." (p. 145).

Our primary awareness is an awareness of being: "...the Notion of Existence is imprinted in the Soul before any other in priority of Nature" (p. 15). But this being of which one is aware is the being which constitutes the objective order of things. Thus, the connection between things is on the one hand an act of judgment while, on the other hand, is an objective connection in things.

There being ... a Real Relation between those Notions which are the Subject and Predicate, the latter being really in the understanding and That which is said of the Former, and the Former that of which 'tis said; and Relation being necessarily compleated and actually such, but the Act of a Comparing Power; it follows, that every Judgment is a Referring or Comparing one of those Notions to the other, and (by means of the Copula) of both of them to the same Stock of Being on which they are engrafted, or the same Ens; where they are Entatatively Connected (or the same Materially) before they are Seen or Judg'd to be so by our understanding (p. 121).

This awareness of being is, of course, much of a piece with the primitive feeling of Bradley's metapyhysics, the primitive feeling which has incorporated within itself Reality.

Locke, in his Essay concerning Human Understanding, 34 argued against Sergeant's account of knowledge. The necessary connections that Sergeant supposed to be there are in fact simply not to be seen. It is evident, Locke says, that we no not know the necessary connections required for an Aristotelian understanding of why parts of things cohere (Bk. IV, Ch. iii, sec. 26, p. 526ff). But even if we knew why the parts cohere, we still would not know everything necessary for a grasp of the notion of the thing in Sergeant's sense. For the notion must account for all the causal activities of the substance of which it is the notion, insofar as these activities are not merely occasional. Now, the *regular* activities of external substances include the production of the ideas of the secondary qualities, that is, the production of the simple ideas red, sweet, and so on. For these activities to be knowable scientifically, in Sergeant's Aristotelian sense, regularities revealed by sense about such activities must be demonstrable by syllogisms grounded in notions. But for that to be possible, there must be necessary connections between red, sweet, etc., and the notions or natures of the substances that cause these qualities to appear. These necessary connections must be both ontological, in the entities themselves, and epistemological, giving us, when in the mind, scientific knowledge of those entities. But, Locke argues, we grasp no such connections:

'Tis evident that the bulk, figure, and motion of several Bodies about us, produce in us several Sensations, as of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, Pleasure and Pain, etc. These mechanical Affections of Bodies, having no affinity at all with those *Ideas*, they produce in us, (there being no conceivable connexion between any impulse of any sort of Body, and any perception of a Colour, or Smell, which we find in our Minds) we can have no distinct knowledge of such Operations beyond our Experience; and can reason no otherwise about them, than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely Wise Agent, which perfectly surpasses our Comprehensions.... (IV, iii, 28, pp. 558-9; see also IV, vi, 10, pp. 384-5).

Properties are perceived to be just as they are, in themselves; to know them as they are we need not know any of the relations in which they stand to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup>John Locke, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

other entities.

the immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of identity being founded in the mind's having distinct ideas ... affords us as many self-evident propositions, as we have distinct ideas. Every one that has any knowledge at all, has as the foundation of it, various and distinct ideas: And it is the first act of the mind (without which it can never be capable of any knowledge) to know every one of its ideas by itself, and distinguish it from others. Every one finds in himself, that he knows the ideas he has; that he knows also, when any one is in his understanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another (IV, viii, 2).

Locke's appeal to an empiricist's Principle of Acquaintance is clear.<sup>35</sup>

The conclusion that Locke draws is that account of knowledge and of syllogism that Sergeant developed is not sound: we cannot erect the edifice of knowledge on the proposition that "what is, is":

> ... all purely identical propositions... obviously, and at first blush, appear to contain no instruction in them. For when we affirm the said term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real idea, it shows us nothing but what we must certainly know before, whether such a proposition be either made by or proposed to us. Indeed that most general one, "what is, is," may serve sometimes to show a man the absurdity he is guilty of, when by circumlocution, or equivocal terms, he would, in particular instances, deny the same thing of itself; because nobody will so openly bid defiance to common sense, as to affirm visible and direct contradictions in plain words; or if he does, a man is excused if he breaks off any farther discourse with him. But yet, I think, I may say, that neither that received maxim, nor any other identical proposition teaches us any thing: And though in such kind of propositions, this great and magnified maxim, boasted to be the foundation of demonstration, may be and often is made use of to confirm them; yet all it proves amounts to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup>Cf. F. Wilson, "Acquaintance, Ontology and Knowledge," The New Scholasticism, 54 (1970), pp. 1\_48; and also "Moore's Refutation of Idealism," in P. Coates and D. Hutto, eds., Current Issues in Idealism (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996), pp. 23-58.

no more than this, that the same word may with great certainty be affirmed of itself, without any doubt of the truth of any such proposition; and let me add also, without any real knowledge (IV, vii, 4).

So much the worse for the sort of reason that Sergeant defends: the world in which we live is simply not one in which there are any of the objective necessities that that account of reason supposes are there.<sup>36</sup>

#### VII

Russell made the same point against Bradley as Locke made against Sergeant. Bradley's account of relations requires the introduction of a third particular, the Whole, over and above the two entities that stand in relation to each other.<sup>37</sup> This relation is such that the one entity so related cannot be distinguished as itself independently of its necessary connections to other entities – connections which are necessary because they define the very being of the entities related. But Russell argues, with Locke and James, that entities – "thises" and "suches" – can in fact be identified as themselves without reference to the relations in which they stand to other qualities and other things. As Russell puts it:

To say that two terms which are different if they were not related, is to say something perfectly barren; for if they were different, they would be other, and it would not be the terms in question, but a different pair, that would be unrelated. The notion that a term can be modified arises from neglect to observe the eternal self-identity of all terms and all logical concepts, which alone form the constituents of propositions. What is called modification consists merely in having at one time, but not at another, some specific relation to some specific term; but the term which sometimes has and sometimes has not the relation in question must be unchanged, otherwise it would not be that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>Cf. F. Wilson, "The Lockean Revolution in the Theory of Science," in S. Tweyman and G. Moyal, eds., *Early Modern Philosophy: Epistemology, Metaphysics and Politics* (New York: Caravan Press), pp. 65-97

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>Cf. F. Wilson, "Burgersdijck, Bradley, Russell, Bergmann: Four Philosophers on the Ontology of Relations." See also F. Wilson, "The Ultimate Unifying Principle of Coleridge's Metaphysics of Relations and Our Knowledge of Them," *Ultimate Reality and Meaning*, 21 (1999), pp. 243-61.

term which has ceased to have the relation.<sup>38</sup>

Note that here Russell is allowing Bradley's point against the monadistic account of relations. On the latter, the predication of one term of a relation would not change if the other relatum ceased to exist.<sup>39</sup> Russell accepts this criticism; he accepts that the monadistic account of relations is mistaken, and that there are, objectively, genuine relational unities. What he is denying is the implication of Bradley's own account of relations that there is something about properties or qualities as presented that requires us when we are identifying them to refer as a matter of necessity to other properties, those to which they are necessarily tied. In order to know the property red it is *not* necessary to know the principle (I) that red differs from and excludes green. Russell is holding that *properties* are presented to us as logically self-contained rather than as necessarily tied to one another; he concludes that there are no such necessary connections. But such connections are required by Bradley's account of relations. The falsity of the latter view follows. Russell's rejection of Bradley's account of relations on the basis of an appeal to Locke's empiricist Principle of Acquaintance is evident.

James makes much the same point as Russell. He argues that

All the elementary natures of the world, its highest genera, the simple qualities of matter and mind, together with the kinds of relation that subsist between them, must either be not known at all, or known in this dumb way of acquaintance without *knowledge-about*.<sup>40</sup>

The basic entities are what they are independently of their relations to other things: all knowledge about presupposes knowledge by acquaintance.

Michael J. Loux<sup>41</sup> is among those who have objected to the doctrine that there are among the constituents of things, entities whose only role in one's ontology is that of individuating, grounding the particularity of ordinary things. This, he suggests, is what it means to say that these entities

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, p. 448.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup>Cf. F. Wilson, "Bradley's Impact on Empiricism," in J. Bradley, ed., *Philosophy after F. H. Bradley* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996), pp. 251-82. Also F. Wilson, "Bradley's Critique of Associationism," *Bradley Studies*, 4 (1998), pp. 5-60.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup>James, *Principles*, p. 221.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>M. J. Loux, "Kinds and the Dilemma of Individuation," *Review of Metaphysics*, 27 (1973-4), pp. 773-784.

are <u>bare</u>. Loux objects to such entities: "in themselves, they have no properties at all, so that they cannot be the object of any kind of cognitive act," and elsewhere he says that "the notion of a bare particular is epistemologically suspect":

Since bare particulars ... are essentially unknowable, since they are lacking in all characteristics, they cannot be experienced, nor can they even be conceived.<sup>43</sup>

On this doctrine, an entity can be the object of a cognitive act only if we cognize it through its properties. This is the doctrine of Sergeant, that to know a thing is to know its definition. For Sergeant, this is to know its species, and to know that in turn requires us to know the genus and specific difference. To know its genus and specific difference is to know how it is the same and different from other entities. Bradley argues the same thesis as Sergeant: to know a thing one must know its relations to other things, and in particular the relations of sameness and difference. Locke and Russell and James argue otherwise: when we are presented with a thing we thereby know it as it is, and in particular to know it we do not need to know its relations to other things.

Thus, in order to know we do not need to know its species or its genus or any other property that it might have or to which it might be tied. An entity for which this is true is, as Loux says, *bare*. Locke and Russell and James are thus arguing on the basis of the empiricist's Principle of Acquaintance that all presented entities are bare. In other words, it is not just particulars, individuators, that are bare. So are properties. And so are relations. *For the empiricist, all basic entities are bare: bareness is ubiquitous*.

The same point can be put another way. If, as we have suggested, to say something is taken to mean to assert a proposition, then with regard to the basic entities of the world, be they particulars in things or the qualities of things or the relations among things, we cannot say what they are. Their being, what they are in themselves, cannot be expressed in a proposition. They can only be named, not said. Or, rather, as Locke saw, if it be said, as in, for example, "this is this", the proposition in which it is said is trivial

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>Loux, "Kinds," p. 771.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup>M. J. Loux, "Particulars and their Individuation," in Loux, ed., *Universals and Particulars: Readings in Ontology* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), pp. 235-249, at p. 239.

and verbal.<sup>44</sup> Russell could make the same point. So could James. Since the being of the basic entities, what they are in themselves, can only be grasped in perception and not said, it is evident that such entities are *ineffable*. Bradley, too, has ineffable entities, or, rather, *an* ineffable entity. This is Reality as such, the Whole or the Absolute. To say something is to express a judgment, and a judgment S-P is always ideal, partially false, at least insofar as it requires us to separate the subject S and the predicate P. We achieve the truth, the whole truth, when we abolish the distinction between subject and predicate, when we grasp the ultimate unity which, precisely because it is a unity, cannot be said but only felt or experienced. It is the ineffable.

The difference between the ineffable in Locke (or Russell or James) and the ineffable in Bradley is that for Locke (and Russell and James) the ineffable is located in ordinary experience, whereas for Bradley it is located either as it were below ordinary experience, in *mere* feeling, or above ordinary experience, ordinary perception, in Absolute consciousness, the consciousness which the Whole, the Absolute, has of itself.

Furthermore, even though for Locke and Russell and James the basic entities that constitute ordinary things are ineffable, it does not follow that nothing can be said about them. To the contrary. To say that the entities are bare and to say that they are ineffable is to make the same point. But to say that they are bare is not to say that they are presented devoid of properties, and devoid of relations. It is clear from Locke and Russell and James, and from acquaintance itself, that we are always presented with complexes, with facts, and not with solitary entities, entities somehow in total isolation from each other. To the extent that these entities do stand in various relations to other entities, things can be said about them, namely, such things as that this is next to that or that this has such and such a property. Bradley's ineffable entity, however, stands in relation to nothing: all other entities lose their own being within its enfolding totality, its smothering wholeness. For Bradley, nothing can be said that is wholly true. For Locke and Russell and James, in contrast, there are many things that can be said that are not just true but wholly true. What can be said, and truly said, is that things stand in various relations to each other. It is just that the intrinsic being of these entities, what they are in themselves, is not

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup>On this point, which is in effect about the nature or ontological status of logic, see. F. Wilson, *The Logic and Methodology of Science in Early Modern Thought: Seven Studies*, Study Two.

constituted by those relations to other entities.

As we saw, Russell and James allow, with Bradley and against Hume and the Mills, that there are objective relational structures. What they reject is that these objective connections are necessary to the intrinsic being of the entities that they relate. To put it another way, what Russell and James are arguing is that there are connections in the world of the empiricist but these are not *essential*. In this sense, the entities of Locke's world are all separable, though not in fact separate. This is in contrast to the monadistic account of relations on the one hand and Bradley's account on the other. On the former account, things are not only separable but separate. On Bradley's account, things are not only not separate but also not separable: the relations that structure them into unities are necessary, defining the intrinsic being of the entities related. For Russell, however, while entities are indeed structured by relations into unities, the related entities are separable in the sense that the relations are not necessary, not essential to the being of the things related.

It follows that for empiricism, and specifically empiricism as developed by Russell and James, because none of the relations in which things stand are essential, reason cannot consist in the grasp of essential truths. In this respect, then, Russell agrees with Locke and the other empiricists such as James that the soundness of inference does not consist in the grasp of objective necessary connections.

Thus, understanding is no longer the grasping an *entity* that provides an underlying unity to the apparently separable. It is, rather, the recognition of things as falling under certain general patterns, universal and exceptionless but contingent regularities, that hold among the logically and ontologically separable entities of experience.<sup>45</sup> And reason, reason that grasps the reasons of things, is no longer the grasping of an entity that unifies things understood within itself, but is rather the judging that certain universal but contingent patterns obtain among things.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup>Cf. F. Wilson, "The Rationalist Response to Aristotle in Descartes and Arnauld," in *The Great Arnauld and Some of His Philosophical Contemporaries*, ed. E. Kremer (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), pp. 28-68.

## VIII

Having just argued that all basic entities are bare, it needs to be qualified. Bare they may be, but they are not quite naked.

Thus, in experience qualities are qualities and not relations, while relations are relations and not qualities. These are two different forms of being. Those who do not begin clearly with the empiricist Principle of Acquaintance are sometimes inclined to deny this fact. Such a one was Frege. Properties, he argues, are indeed among the objects ("things") in the world. But he also construes predication on the model of functions in mathematics. His basic model for predication is given by mathematical formulae like

(1) 
$$2^2 = 4$$

On this model, the sentence

a is red

that is,

(2) 
$$red(a)$$

is not in itself complete. "a is red" is an instance of the function

just as

(3) 
$$2^2$$

is an instance of the function

$$(4) x^2$$

This has two difficulties. First, if sentences like (1) are basic, then, as we said, expressions like (2) are not complete, no more than expressions like (3) are complete sentences. Sentences like (1) represent a particular mapping by the function " $x^2$ " of the number 2 onto the number 4. On this model, expressions like (2) are incomplete in the sense of representing a mapping of one thing, a, onto something, without indicating what that something is onto which the object a is mapped. The complete sentence would have a form similar to the form of (1):

$$red(a) = ...$$

But what is it that the function "red(x)" maps the thing a onto? Frege

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup>G. Frege, "On Concept and Object," in his P. Geach and M. Black, trans., *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gotlob Frege* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), pp. 42-51, at p. 51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup>G. Frege, "Function and Concept," in Geach and Black, *Philosophical Writings of Gotlob Frege*, pp. 21-41, at p. 31.

argues that it is the True:<sup>48</sup>

$$red(a) = T$$

Or, perhaps, it is the False. The problem here is that the True and the False are two monsters, at least from the empiricist perspective: they are certainly not given in any way in any sensible experience of the world. This is one difficulty of Frege's position.

The other is the fact that a mapping is a *relation*. The function (4), for example, represents a relation that connects the number 2 on the one side to the number 4 on the other side. As a function it is a relation with particular properties. Specifically, it is one-one or bi-unique, and is therefore a definite description, or, rather, expressions such as (3) are definite descriptions. But for all that a function is still a relation. This makes qualities like red into relations. In our experience of things, however, we clearly distinguish qualities like red, on the one hand, and relations like, for example, next to on the other hand. Any language which would perspicuously represent differences in the world would therefore represent relations in one way and qualities in another way: the different objective forms of these entities would be represented by different logical or grammatical forms in language. In this way, if we take Frege to be constructing a perspicuous language – and what else could a Begriffschrift be? - then to the extent that he assimilates qualities to relations, ignoring the difference of these things in the world, - to that extent his proposed language fails to be perspicuous – fails, in other words, to be adequate as a Begriffschrift.

If our argument is correct, then any (basic) relation is bare, but it always has the property of being a relation. This is a property shared by all relations: it is the highest genus among relations. As the highest genus it is represented in a perspicuous language by the grammatical or logical form of the expressions used to refer to specific relations. For that reason each relation is said to have the *logical form* of being a relation.

Now, the same point applies to areas. Areas, that is, the entities that we have decided are particulars which, since the rule is one area - one image, individuate concrete things. Each area is a particular or individual, and has the property of being an area. In a perspicuous language we customarily represent the presence of a particular in a fact by labelling it with the subject term of the sentence expressing that fact. Names of individuals or particulars share the grammatical or logical form of being subject terms. This is usually represented in a perspicuous language by

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup>Frege, "Function and Concept," p. 28, p. 30, p. 32.

having a common form, e.g., lower case letters from the beginning of the alphabet. This grammatical or logical form of the name of an area represents that the thing so named has the property of being an area.

Since an area is a particular, this grammatical or logical form is said to represent that each particular has the logical from of *particularity*. G. Bergmann is such a one. On the one hand, he specifically identifies areas as particulars – bare particulars.<sup>49</sup> On the other hand, he argues that particulars have the logical form of *particularity*.<sup>50</sup> What we are arguing, then, is that there is nothing particularly mysterious about the notion of particularity: it is simply the property of being an area.

Areas – particulars – are in facts, ordinary things, together with the properties that are with them. These properties come in various genera – red is a colour, B-flat is a tone, etc. They are all, however, to be contrasted to particulars: they can occur in more than one concrete thing. Since each property is a universal, Bergmann refers to the common property that picks them out as *universality*. This is represented in language by making the terms which refer to properties have the grammatical or logical form of occurring in the predicate spot – pictorially, these names of properties are taken from the set, say, F, G, H, ...

There is indeed such a common property. It is not, however, a property parallel to the property of particularity. The latter is an affirmative concept. In contrast, that which all properties have in common is that they are *not particular*. Red is a colour, but what makes it a universal is that fact that it is not a particular, that is, not an area: colour is a positive concept, universality is negative. <sup>52</sup> Bergmann makes particularity and universality as logical forms with much the same status – he misses the point that one is positive and the other negative.

It has also been claimed that universals have the property of being recognizable or re-identifiable and that this property is lacking for particulars. Thus, Allaire has suggested that "individuals [bare particulars] are *merely* numerically different from each other and thus not re-

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup>G. Bergmann, "Realistic Postscript," in his *Logic and Reality* (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 302-340, at p.288. Compare F. Wilson, "Effability, Ontology and Method," *Philosophy Research Archives*, 9 (1983), pp. 419\_470.

G. Bergmann, "Ineffability, Ontology, and Method," in his *Logic and Reality*, pp 45-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup>Bergmann, "Ineffability, Ontology and Method," *passim*. Compare Wilson, "Effability, Ontology and Method."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup>Cf. F. Wilson, "Effability, Ontology and Method."

identifiable as such."<sup>53</sup> This is supposed to mark a difference in kind between universals and particulars. "The fundamental difference *in kind* between particulars and characters is that the former are bare, the latter are not. That is, particulars cannot be recognized ('re-recognized' would be better perhaps), characters can be. This is brought out that (at least some) characters are re-identifiable without criteria, things [particulars] are not."<sup>54</sup> Allaire speculates that the fact that particulars are not and characters are re-identifiable "explains why they [particulars] have been overlooked so often."<sup>55</sup> Let us leave the latter as it may be, and ask ourselves whether Allaire's way of distinguishing characters, i. e., universals, from (bare) particulars is one that makes sense. Certainly, given that particulars and universals are equally bare, it cannot be a way of distinguishing bare entities from those that are somehow not bare. Yet this way of separating particulars and universals is not without its point. Only, it does not point to an *intrinsic* difference between the two kinds of entities.

The point is that to speak of things being "re-identifiable" is to make a comment more about our cognitive capacities than it is about the nature of the things cognized.

To say that things are re-identifiable is to say that we can recognize

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup>Allaire, "Bare Particulars," p. 289. Compare Bergmann, "Strawson's Ontology," p. 174.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup>E. B. Allaire, "Another Look at Bare Particulars," in M. J. Loux, *Universals and Particulars*, pp. 297-303, at p. 301. Allaire is responding to V. C. Chappell, "Particulars Re-clothed," in Loux, *Universals and Particulars*, pp. 290-295. Chappell is commenting on Allaire's "Bare Particulars." Chappell argues that Allaire's case in "Bare Particulars" does not establish on phenomenological grounds that there are bare particulars, but in the end makes the case on dialectical grounds. Allaire's "Another Look" responds.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup>Allaire, "Bare Particulars," p. 289. Bergmann makes the same point, "Strawson's Ontology," p. 174.

not only difference but also sameness among characters. In contrast, to say that things are not re-identifiable is to say that we can recognize difference but not sameness.

Now, we have agreed that for areas the rule is: one image - one area, or one concrete thing - one area. Particulars do not as it were repeat themselves in more than one thing. It follows that what is significant about them for our getting on in the world is that we recognize difference. But since there is no repetition, there is no need for us to recognize sameness. This is not to say that there is no sameness – that, surely, is there – but we have no occasion to notice it. Characters, in contrast, do repeat themselves – that is why they turn out to be universals. Being in more than one thing, they are locally separate from themselves, as Moore put it: "... with this sense of 'locally separate' [that is, that something can 'be in two different places at the same time'] it seems to me perfectly obvious that a quality can be 'locally separate' from itself: one and the same quality can be in two different places at the same time."56 Since qualities or characteristics of things can be in two different places at the same time while they are the same quality, if we are to get on in the world, if we are to find our about it and amongst the things in it, then we have need not only to recognize difference among characters but also on many an occasion to recognize sameness, recognize that this is the same characteristic here as over there.

Thus, characters are indeed re-identifiable, particulars are not. But this is not an intrinsic difference, one that is built into the natures of the things. It is rather a reflection of, on the one hand, the fact that each ordinary concrete thing such as an image has within it one particular and that that particular is unique to it, and, on the other hand, the cognitive ends that we have as creatures trying to make our way about in the world.

**Conclusion**: Bareness is often cited as an objection to a category of entities – particulars – whose ontological role is to individuate. This is what makes them such horrid little creatures. But in fact, it ought not to be shocking. Certainly, it ought not to thought by an empiricist to be an objection to particulars. For, bareness turns out to be ubiquitous in the empiricist's world: when the latter is clearly thought through it becomes evident that the properties of things, which no one seems to find horrid, just as much as particulars, are bare. So, just as the empiricist can admit universals as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup>Moore, "Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular?" p. 25.

licensed by the Principle of Acquaintance, so he or she can also admit particulars as licensed by that Principle.