Cosmopolitanism: Cultural, Moral, and Political

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Introduction

In this paper I tackle the difficult and contested concept of cosmopolitanism. My task divides into three parts. First, I distinguish between three main varieties of cosmopolitanism: *cultural*, *moral*, and *political*. Moral cosmopolitanism's core premise – that all human beings are owed equal moral consideration – sits at the very heart of theories of human rights and global justice, and its philosophical elaboration is therefore of great import to international ethics.

This brings me to my second task, which is to bring order and clarity to the notion of moral cosmopolitanism. I do this by offering a general distinction between the *concept* of moral cosmopolitanism and various *conceptions* of the same. Following Pogge, I make a further distinction between *institutional* and *interactional* conceptions of moral cosmopolitanism. I consider the partiality objection to moral cosmopolitanism, and argue that the resources to overcome this objection are most likely to be found in a conception of moral cosmopolitanism that takes the importance of both political institutions and human interactions into consideration. In particular, I argue that the most plausible conception proposes a moral division of labour between institutions (fulfilling positive duties) on the one hand, and individuals (fulfilling negative duties) on the other.

The third part of my paper argues for a revisionary understanding of the relationship between moral and political cosmopolitanism. The latter has traditionally been understood to be an independent theoretical domain concerned with a single political ideal: that of a world state. Using Kant as a historical example, however, I propose two adjustments to our understanding of political cosmopolitanism. The first is a more developed appreciation of the dependence of political cosmopolitan theorizing on moral cosmopolitan theorizing, and the second is a broadening of the notion of political cosmopolitanism to include not only the ideal of a world state but other strategic institutional ideals as well. All of these comsmopolitan political ideals (i.e., that of a voluntary federation of states,

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or a patchwork of international institutions dedicated to interpreting and enforcing international law) are linked by their capacity to implement moral cosmopolitan norms such as human rights. I do not argue for a particular cosmopolitan political ideal; which one we choose, after all, may depend on the conception of moral cosmopolitanism we adopt.

Diogenes of Sinope coined the term *cosmopolitan* almost two and a half thousand years ago. When asked where he came from, instead of answering that he was from Sinope or Athens, the ancient Cynic is reported to have answered: "I am a *kosmopolites* [a citizen of the world]"[1]. For us, the word *cosmopolitan* is an adjective that has come to describe pretty much anything that is *of the world* or *worldly.* A cosmopolitan city is one in which people from many different nations or cultures intermingle. A cosmopolitan person is worldly-wise, wears a coat of many *cultures*, feels unrestricted to one, or at home in many. The English language, which is now the most widely spoken on the planet, is what we might even call cosmopolitan. And if there are in fact values which all persons, races, nation and cultures share, then they could rightly be called cosmopolitan as well.

What of cosmopolitan*ism* then? The addition of an *ism* here draws attention to a philosophy or ideology. When philosophers today call themselves cosmopolitan, they are using the adjective in a new sense. They are signalling their allegiance to a particular belief or doctrine. The study of cosmopolitanism is today a burgeoning field in academic philosophy. Most works in the area devote considerable attention to the question of what cosmopolitanism is, trying to delineate the field of inquiry before they delve into it. This paper is, somewhat boringly, primarily intended to be a contribution to that first step: the task of *definition*. The clarity, however, that this effort brings will allow us to make some substantive observations later on.

We can begin by distinguishing between three kinds of cosmopolitan doctrine: the *moral, political* (or *legal*), and the *cultural*. In a sense, each variety represents the impact of the ponderous idea of universal membership (or world citizenship) on a different subject: morality, political institutions, and cultural identity.

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1 (DL, VI 63) This report comes from another Diogenes (Diogenes Laertius) who wrote during the Roman Era. His book, The Lives of Eminent Philosophers, surveys the life and thought of many ancient philosophers, and includes a chapter on Diogenes of Sinope.

1. Cultural Cosmopolitanism

It is perhaps easiest to start with *cultural* cosmopolitanism, as it stays closest to the meaning of the term in common parlance. Cultural cosmopolitanism begins by taking the eclectic, idiosyncratic, culturally mixed-up (i.e., cosmopolitan) lifestyle with which we have become so familiar in modern times, and affirms this as both a possible and fulfilling way of life. By affirming our capacity as individuals to live well in the world by forming pastiche identities that draw from cultures as disparate or as incongruous as we like, cultural cosmopolitanism is a challenge to those strands of liberal thought that defend the importance of rootedness in a single culture for individual well-being and autonomy.[2] It envisions human beings not as rigidly determined products of culture – irrevocably cast into a given cultural mold from birth – but as agents free to roam the earth and assemble (or reassemble) for themselves a unique cultural concoction by choice or by chance. Essential to this idea is the ability of persons to converse and connect *across* cultures; there must be a common human capacity or set of capacities – for language, thought, communication, etc. – that facilitates such cultural transaction.

At the same time, culture itself must be something that can be exchanged, altered, translated, or combined in idiosyncratic configurations if we are to believe in the lifestyle of the cosmopolite. After reminding us that this lifestyle is a viable option, the cultural cosmopolitan can't help but also remind us of the ubiquity of cultural change, interchange, and the resulting indefiniteness of cultural boundaries. In this way, cultural cosmopolitanism moves from a claim about the self and the good life to a claim about the nature, or fluidity, of culture in general.

As Scheffler (2001) has noticed, however, there is a more ambitious claim often tied in with these considerations. This is the notion that cultural cosmopolitanism may be *unavoidable* in modern times, i.e., that it is the *only* possible and fulfilling life choice we can make. Scheffler calls this an *extreme* variant of cultural cosmopolitanism, to be contrasted with its more *moderate* counterpart – the simple affirmation of the While the latter doctrine remains ambivalent, the former looks down on adherence to the values and traditions of a particular community as an outmoded and impracticable life-choice.

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2 For classic and influential arguments on the liberal multiculturalist side, see Joseph Raz (1994) and Will Kymlicka (1995). Jeremy Waldron's 1992 article entitled "Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative" remains the stock example of a cosmopolitan challenge to liberal multiculturalism.

Why hold this more extreme view? Stated as such, it's surely too extreme to be acceptable. One way of making sense of this position would be to consider Jeremy Waldron's point that "Cultures live and grow, change and sometimes wither away; they amalgamate with other cultures, or they adapt themselves to geographical or demographic necessity." (Waldron, 1992, pp. 787-788); If immersing oneself in the traditions of a particular community (and only that community), today, requires artificially halting this process by committing our governments to the *preservation* of cultures, then there is indeed a sense in which, as Waldron asserts, anti-cosmopolitanism "is like living in a Disneyland and thinking that one's surroundings epitomize what it is for a culture really to exist" (Waldron, 1992, p. 763).

There is another way of making sense of the extreme form of cultural cosmopolitanism, however, but it involves an adjustment in our conception of the ideal of the cultural cosmopolitan. In a later article, Waldron elaborates on Kant's notion of *ius cosmopoliticus* – which governs the relations between foreign persons and peoples – to show that what makes someone's cultural identity cosmopolitan is not so much its hybridity as the *form of allegiance* that person adopts towards the norms and practices of their culture. Since all human persons, according to Kant, are stuck together on the surface of the earth and thus "destined by nature to [develop], through mutual compulsion under laws that come from themselves, into a *cosmopolitan society,*" (Kant [1784] 1991, p. 332) they must fashion a universal coercive law for themselves. Given the scope of this political project, it requires people of different moral, philosophical, cultural, and religious backgrounds to come to terms with one another in a free and open-minded manner on decisions about law. According to Waldron, this makes it important to approach one's cultural traditions not as brute and non-negotiable aspects of their identity – worth practicing simply because they are *yours* – but as norms and practices funded by an array of *reasons* that are open to interrogation. This is what makes agreement (or even debate) about constitutional essentials possible, and it shows how adopting such a rational attitude towards one's cultural beliefs, norms, and practices, is a matter of accepting the modern conditions of an emerging global community.

This way of understanding cultural cosmopolitanism has far more in common with ancient Cynic and Stoic cosmopolitan doctrine of a universal community of rational beings. Exiled from Sinope, then a resident in Athens and later Corinth, we might think that Diogenes the Cynic's migratory lifestyle would have induced him to sing the praises of cultural hybridity. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Diogenes was famous for his complete indifference and even hostility towards local custom and conven-

tion. Much like Socrates, the anecdotes surrounding the life of Diogenes depict him as a consistent, ideologically-committed social dissident. While this did make him wildly idiosyncratic, it did not make him a cultural cosmopolitan in the moderate sense of the word: someone who embraces and at times willingly adopts the ways of others.

Of what is known about ancient Cynicism, one certainty is its insistence on life in conformity with universal reason and virtue as opposed to life in accordance with local custom and law. Rather than assemble a coat of many cultures, the ancient Cynics sought to purify themselves, so to speak, of the morally corruptive influence of any local identity or affiliation. The idea of cultural attachment has a patent moral dimension. Does cultural attachment (i.e., being America, being Inuit, being Jewish), for instance, entail giving *preference* to members of one's cultural group, in the same way as one gives preference to the members of one's family? Should this sort of preference-giving be seen as a justifiable, even desirable thing? The ancient Stoics and Cynics thought not. As Nussbaum notes: "Class, rank, status, national origin and location, and even gender are treated by the cynics as secondary and morally irrelevant attributes. The first form of moral affiliation for the citizen should be her affiliation with rational humanity; and this, above all, should define the purposes of her conduct" (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 29). This brings us to *moral* cosmopolitanism.

Moral Cosmopolitanism

The Stoic philosopher Seneca proposed that each of us belongs to at least two commonwealths: the local country of our birth and the universal commonwealth of reason, which includes all human beings regardless of their origin, class, or culture (Seneca, *de otio*: 4, quoted in Schofield 1991, p. 93). I may stand next to some of you as a foreigner, but I also stand next to you as a fellow human being endowed with all the capacities that follow from our common nature. Stoic thinkers fixed on the unique capacity for reason as most worthy of praise in individuals, and founded the fellow citizenship of humanity on its boundless moral value (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 30); since we all possess the divine capacity of reason, the human community is one of moral equals. Stoic world citizenship, then, has at its core an ethical doctrine; it entails first and foremost the equal and fundamental moral status of individuals and obliges us to consider the good of all humankind in our actions (*Ibid.*, pp. 29-30). A favourite and striking visual exercise of Marcus Aurelius' was to imagine the whole human race as a single body (*Ibid.*, p. 34); to disregard one part of humanity is like

chopping off one's limb. In some such way, Marcus and the Stoics admirably refused to recognize anything human as alien.

For our purposes, Stoicism is relevant for its offering of the core concept of moral cosmopolitanism: the equal and fundamental *moral* status of all individuals, regardless of race, creed, ethnicity, origin, or geographic location. But how exactly is this status to be understood? There are many options. It might imply some form of globalized consequentialism, where all actions are assessed according to their aggregate benefit or detriment to the welfare of humankind.[3] Or it could imply that we treat each person never merely as a means to an end but as an end in itself, as an equal member in a Kantian universal "*kingdom of ends*"? (Kant [1785]1997, pp. 429-434). It has been said to require the recognition of each person's equal dignity, or their entitlement to a set of central human capabilities that make human flourishing possible (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 76). Does it require that we treat each person as having equal standing as an addressee of moral justification (Beitz, 2005, p. 17)? Is moral equality about securing individual autonomy or observing duties generated by the basic interests and well-being of persons? Or is this rather a theological doctrine, grounded in the idea that human beings are morally equal in the eyes of God their creator?

My assertion is that all of these notions can fit under the rubric of moral cosmopolitanism. One way of making sense of this is to distinguish, as Rawls did, between the *concept* of moral equality and various *conceptions* thereof (Rawls [1971] 1999, p. 5). We may disagree in our *conceptions* of cosmopolitanism while agreeing on the core content of its *concept*. The former develops, interprets, and adds crucial details to the latter, but it does not contradict its formulaic content. A concept is surrounded by a nebula of derivative conceptions, so to speak. In the case of justice, an institutional virtue according to Rawls, the nebula of conceptions surrounds the core notions of non-arbitrariness and the fair consideration of individual claims, which make up its concept (*Ibid.*, p. 5). In order to understand moral cosmopolitanism, we will want to know what lies at the heart of its concept of equality.

Contemporary theorists such as David Miller have located the core of moral cosmopolitanism in the idea that "we owe all human beings moral consideration of some kind... and also that *in some sense* that consideration must involve treating their claims equally" (2007, p. 27). Miller, like many others, recognizes that this core needs further elaboration. He calls this the premise of *weak* cosmopolitanism, to be contrasted with any of its *stronger* counterparts, which add premises that go beyond equal moral

3 Peter Singer (2002) has recently popularized this view (with extension to animals).

concern to argue for a substantive view about what sort of *treatment* it requires, i.e., the globalization of a particular principle of distributive justice (*Ibid.*, 43-44).

One way of isolating the cosmopolitan concept of moral equality is offered by Pogge, who reduces it to three interrelated claims: *individualism, universality,* and *generality*:

> First, *individualism*: the ultimate units of concern are *human beings*, or *persons* – rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, *universality*: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to *every* living human being *equally* – not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, *generality*: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern *for everyone* – not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or suchlike (Pogge [2002] 2008, p. 175).

This seems like a fair rendition of the basic concept of moral cosmopolitanism; however, these principles remain too abstract to be meaningful. If the wrongness of murder is indifferent to borders, race, or ethnicity, this must be because our moral *concern* is focused on some cross-border *feature* of persons: not simply their *humanity*, but some more specific aspect of their humanity that is violated in the act of murder. "Humanity" seems far too vague and trivial an aspect of persons to illuminate the root of this moral prohibition. What might this aspect be then? Again, there are countless ways of fleshing this feature out (*Ibid.*, pp. 175-176). At the risk of smuggling a *conception* of moral equality into its *concept,* we nevertheless have to make a decision here. Following Allen Buchanan, I would argue that the most plausible as well as minimal flesh we can put to the bones of the concept of moral equality is by focusing on basic human *interests* or *well-being* (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 131-137).

In *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination* (2004), Buchanan argues that the concept of equal moral regard (what he calls the Moral Equality Principle) is not only fundamental to any moral theory worth thinking about (Buchanan, 2004, p. 88), it also provides a foundation for the existence of basic human rights (*Ibid.*, pp. 90-91, 131-135). "One of the most important ways we show equal concern and respect for persons is by acknowledging that there are human rights" (*Ibid.*, 90); and this, via respect for basic human interests. Buchanan appeals to our intuitions here, arguing for this link by listing examples of basic rights that seem to serve or protect basic human interests. So for example, the right not to be tortured, not to be discriminated against on grounds of gender or religion, and the right to resources for subsistence: these rights are rooted in such basic interests as avoiding psychological and physical harm or pain, finding

spiritual fulfillment, and living a minimally decent life free of cruelty and oppression (*Ibid*., p. 134-137).

By itself, this argument does little to rule out the possibility of other, non rights-based manners of respecting equal human interests. For instance, the moral equality principle stated flatly could serve as a basis for some variant of globalized consequentialism that treated individual interests equally but aggregatively, permitting grave harm towards some if it were to lead to enough benefit for others.

Regardless of this indeterminacy, for us, the main attraction of Buchanan's reading of moral equality lies in its ability to accommodate a variety of conceptions thereof, while at the same time adding some much-needed specificity to the original concept. The Kantian emphasis on rational autonomy as a basis for moral equality can now be incorporated as one of several important ingredients in most or even all individuals' well-being; so too can the notions of human dignity and equal capabilities, which can play a parallel role in conceptions of moral equality.[4] In this way, a conception of moral equality as equal concern for basic human interests best mimics the behaviour of a *concept* of moral equality – a common centre of convergence for various *conceptions* of the same.

But if this is our concept of moral cosmopolitanism, then it is even less determinate than Rawls' concept of justice (on which all members of a liberal society can agree). In the latter case, we at least knew what the concept applied to: *social institutions*. Moral cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, seems to apply to the *whole of morality* – all possible moral subject matters or *iudicanda*, as Pogge has called them (Pogge 2007, p. 312). In order to develop more determinate conceptions of moral cosmopolitanism, we need to distinguish between its application as a moral standard for evaluating institutions, on the one hand, and individual or group behaviour on the other. In other words, we follow Thomas Pogge in treating moral cosmopolitanism as a doctrine that holds implications for both *interactional* and *institutional* justice (Pogge [2002] 2008, p. 176).

Once we relegate the scope of moral cosmopolitanism to a specific domain or subject matter, we have already moved away from its concept and into a *conception* of moral cosmopolitanism. We take a more specific stance on what the demands of moral cosmopolitanism are and on whom

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4 It should be noted that these very same notions are those most often used in arguments for the existence of human rights (On human rights and autonomy, see e.g., Griffin (2008, Ch. 8) This only bolsters the case for a connection between the concept of moral equality, as we have defined it, and that of human rights. This also fits with Joseph Raz's proposal of an interest-based theory of rights which was intended to illuminate and explain the entire tradition of political and moral discourse about rights (Raz, 1986, p. 166).

they fall. Pogge himself endorses an institutional conception of cosmopolitanism or what he calls *social-justice* cosmopolitanism (*Ibid.*, p. 176; 2007, pp. 316-321). Social-justice cosmopolitanism prescribes norms of social and economic justice on the basis of which we can assess alternative institutional structures at the domestic and international level. What makes these norms cosmopolitan is their ultimate concern for the basic human interests of all persons. Pogge takes the target of such norms to be the institutional protection of human rights (including rights to resources and basic subsistence) via coercive law, for all persons regardless of nationality (Pogge 2002/2008, p. 176).

Before specifying how a just global social and economic order can be practically attained or what it might look like, social-justice cosmopolitans outline the principles of such an order. Thus, Pogge (1989 § III), Beitz ([1979] 1999, p. 170), and Tan (2004, pp. 55-61) have claimed that Rawls' principles of domestic justice, as outlined in *A Theory of Justice* ([1971] 1999, pp. 65-73), are the best principles for determining how to distribute goods and liberties fairly among all members of the world community. Caney (2005, pp. 122-125) has suggested the validity of a patchwork of global principles of distributive justice, and Nussbaum (2000, Ch.2; 2006, Ch.5) argues for the globalization of a *capabilities* approach to distributive justice and human rights.

Part of the attraction of this institutional approach to moral cosmopolitanism is that it focuses the *range* of demands placed on individuals to aid the world's poor, ailing, hungry, and sick. Our duties towards humanity are mediated by the presence of political institutions, and our primary responsibility is to try and promote feasible reforms in *them.* The individual fate of more than six billion earthly inhabitants do not directly intrude into the scope of our lateral moral concern. A purely *interactional* approach to moral cosmopolitanism, on the other hand – one that envisages the moral community of human beings in abstraction from all institutional structures – would make direct and potentially very strong demands on individuals towards other individuals, regardless of relations of geographical proximity, kinship, race, or nationality. If we view all human beings as moral equals to whom we owe direct respect and proper treatment of some kind, then we (especially in the developed world) may be overwhelmed by demands to help those who are suffering all over the world. This would make any constricted focus of our moral and economic energies – say to our friends, family, or compatriots – seem unjustified. But how can such basic forms of partiality be unjust? The claim that such impartiality is unreasonable and subversive forms the *partiality objection* to moral cosmopolitanism.

Peter Singer, who proposes a comprehensive variant of global consequentialism, has become an easy target for such objections. He is famous for pointing out the drastic and in some respects absurd disregard we show towards the fate of others in our everyday behaviour. In one example among many, he asks us to imagine that our duties to suffering persons abroad are as strong as our duties to save a child drowning in a pond that we happen to be passing by (Singer, 1997). Similarly, the money allocated to needless luxuries in the developed world is morally preposterous in light of the good it could do for the global poor (or even the earth's atmosphere) (Singer 2002, pp. 188-189). Although he does not refer to himself as a cosmopolitan, Singer clearly endorses a conception of moral cosmopolitanism. Interestingly, the form that he endorses is neither purely interactional nor institutional, however. Instead, he appears to endorse what Pogge has referred to as a *monistic* or *holistic* approach to moral cosmopolitanism (Pogge 2007, pp. 321-328). According to this view, injustice is primarily a property of *states of affairs,* and only secondarily a matter of individual and group behaviour (interactions) or institutional design (institutions).

As Pogge puts it, "Monistic cosmopolitanism co-ordinates all human agents and all humanly shapeable factors towards one unitary goal [for all *iudicanda*]: to make the world as just as we can make it" (*Ibid.*, 321). This fits the consequentialist spirit of Singer's version of moral cosmopolitanism. All actions, institutions, and choices are evaluated with reference to the overall benefit/harm they produce. It is not my purpose to offer a full criticism of this conception of moral cosmopolitanism, or any other. Nevertheless, there are good grounds for thinking that this conception verges on impracticability. The difficulty with such a view is not simply that, like interactional moral cosmopolitanism, it directly challenges what we tend to think are justified forms of partiality towards friends, family, coreligionists, and co-nationals; in its totalitarian co-option of institutions, individuals, human cultures, and subcultures towards the goal of making the world a better place, it is unable to place a non-arbitrary limit on both the range or strength of the obligations owed towards the whole of humanity. Singer himself only demands that each member of a developed country devote a minimum of one percent of their annual income to a cause that fights world poverty (*Ibid.*, pp. 193-195). We may even intervene on his behalf and propose a maximum – a threshold or target – for this aid in the eventual worldwide protection of basic human rights. But the holistic goal of 'making the world a better place' is too ambitious to properly justify these bare-minimums and bare-maximums. Any limitations to human sacrifice appear arbitrary, and the many impractical and personal goals that make life worthwhile are given no free-reign. Singer is surely able to provide

some answers to these criticisms, but I believe we are better off looking towards a conception of moral cosmopolitanism that in spirit is more respectful towards human practice and practicality.

Can an interactional conception of moral cosmopolitanism avoid the partiality objection? One instinct might be to refine the doctrine by restricting it to merely negative responsibilities on the part of individuals not to harm human beings in certain ways. We can plausibly invoke human rights here as the appropriate side constraints. According to this variant then, life can go on as usual, we can act with as much partiality as we like, as long as we don't violate the basic human rights of other persons (*Ibid.*, pp. 328-330). Assuming that we in fact can come up with a slimmed-down list of (primarily negative) human rights that do not make such positive demands, we here have a more workable conception of interactional moral cosmopolitanism, at least one that appears able to face the partiality objection straight-on.

But this adaptation renders the doctrine too anaemic. Surely, the most valuable insight of moral cosmopolitanism is that we do owe something positive to others, be they strangers, foreigners, or the neighbour next door, and human rights are not simply negative rights, they include obligations to educate and provide an adequate standard of living for all persons. What we owe them is certainly more than a policy of simple non-interference or an attempt on our part not to implicate ourselves in any injustice being perpetrated against them. Pogge's institutional conception suggests a path along which we may fulfill these further obligations, i.e., through supporting a more just global institutional structure. But, on its own, the institutional conception is also lacking. It fails to acknowledge the obvious human dimension of moral cosmopolitanism – that there are moral constraints on individual and group behaviour that bind us regardless of the presence of social institutions and a covering law.

The most plausible conception of moral cosmopolitanism, I would suggest, one that still captures the basic thrust of the concept, yet also respects the partialities, normalities, and inane practices of human life, ought to incorporate a focus on both interactions *and* institutions. In this way, such a doctrine could acknowledge the importance of social institutions for securing people's rights and liberties while also acknowledging the person-to-person relevance of the concept of moral equality. In my eyes, the best way of piecing together such a conception would be to call for something like a globalized division of moral labour between persons or groups on the one hand, and institutions on the other. Our positive duties towards others can be mediated via our support for just institutional arrangements and reforms, while our negative duties towards them are satisfied as long as we respect certain non-negotiable side constraints on

our conduct. This view, I take it, can easily stem the partiality objection by demanding only minimal duties not to harm others at the lateral, interactional level (where the partiality objection plays out). Whatever other special obligations we wish to take on are up to us. With potentially overwhelming positive duties to humanity removed from the interactional domain of moral concern and displaced onto our relationship with social institutions, we have a conception of moral cosmopolitanism that makes clear and sensible demands on individuals without abolishing their actual habits and practices.

This piecemeal approach to moral cosmopolitanism appears to be that endorsed by Allen Buchanan. The concept of moral equality, according to Buchanan, also entails what he calls the Natural Duty of Justice. Together these two concepts provide us with an outline of our positive and negative duties towards others. The natural duty of justice emerges out of the concept of moral equality because it specifies how we ought to make positive efforts to ensure that the basic rights of others are protected.

Taking the Moral Equality Principle seriously commits us to the Natural Duty of Justice, because a proper understanding of the Moral Equality Principle implies that to show proper regard for persons we must help ensure that their basic rights are protected. The Natural Duty of Justice as I understand it says that equal consideration for persons requires helping to ensure that they have access to institutions that protect their basic human rights. This will sometimes require creating new institutions and will often require reforming existing institutions. (Buchanan 2004, pp. 87-88).[5]

By focusing positive duties towards others on institutions, we do not ignore the importance of genuine kindness, generosity, and universal philanthropy. We simply recognize the undeniable fact that social institutions play the single largest role in determining the life chances of human beings. The attainment of a just global order is a moral aim of first importance for all of us.

Scheffler would have done well to consider some of these finer distinctions in his discussion of moral cosmopolitanism (Scheffler 2001, Ch. 7). There, Scheffler distinguishes between moderate moral cosmopolitanism (which gives free-reign to special obligations between conationals) and its extreme counterpart, according to which our fundamental moral allegiance is to humanity at large and special obligations to others can only have derived or instrumental value (*Ibid.*, pp. 115-116). These are thus two variants of *interactional* moral cosmopolitanism: one that recognizes the ultimate value of partial obligations to friends, family, or conationals,

5 See Buchanan (2004, 85-98) for a more general discussion.

and one that poses a challenge to such forms of partiality by denying them any value beyond their service to the whole of humanity. Scheffler would have had an even easier time defending the former *moderate* view if he had kept a piecemeal approach to moral cosmopolitanism in mind. He considers two objections to the coherence of moderate cosmopolitanism that might force us to retreat to the less compromising extreme cosmopolitan view: one conceptual and the other substantive. The conceptual objection is that a basic commitment to the equality of persons entails a principle of equal treatment, and that special relationships with particular people (i.e., friends, family, and conationals) cannot in themselves justify special treatment (*Ibid.*, p. 120). The implication is that a commitment to moral equality is conceptually incompatible with the non-instrumental justification of special responsibilities. The substantive argument is that "equality and special responsibilities require policies and practices that are diametrically opposed to one another" (*Ibid.*, p. 120). Scheffler has his own answers to these objections (*Ibid.*, pp. 121-124), but the piecemeal conception of moral cosmopolitanism that Buchanan appears to endorse has good answers to each of these objections that a purely interactional conception could not furnish.

With regard to the first objection, Buchanan can argue that a commitment to a principle of equal interactional treatment does not have to entail equal treatment in *all respects.* If we flesh the principle of equal treatment out, as we did above, in terms of a minimum policy of no-harm, non-interference, or (*negative*) respect for basic human rights, then we leave enough room for special responsibilities to build up on top of this minimum level of equal treatment. But Buchanan can go beyond this and claim commitment to equal *positive* treatment of individuals under the *global institutional order*,[6] which is similarly indifferent to interactional partiality and highly morally relevant. With regard to the second objection, Buchanan can claim to specify in a fairly detailed way how nationalistic practices might be reconciled with 'cosmopolitan' ethical practices: citizens can act patriotically and form idiosyncratic bonds, provided they remain consistent in taking their natural duty of justice seriously by making efforts to promote institutional arrangements that will secure the welfare of all human beings.

That a piecemeal approach to moral cosmopolitanism can offer these answers testifies to its promise as a theory about the demands of justice. It is important that matters of institutional justice are included here. The

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6 Note that such equal treatment need not entail the flattening out of global resources equally among all nations. We could accept a Rawlsian principle of global distributive justice, which would allow for some global inequalities.

basic insight that all human beings owe each other equal moral consideration has obvious bearings on the shape of domestic and international institutions. Once we begin to consider not just the best moral norms or standards for evaluating the global institutional order, but the best political means for implementing them, we have moved into the territory of *political* cosmopolitanism.

Political Cosmopolitanism

The universal polis imagined by Stoic thinkers was not like any ordinary state. This was a *cosmic* polity (i.e., *kosmo*polites) that did not depend for its existence on human institutional structures or on any means of self-defence. Its boundaries were set by "the sun" and its laws were perfect expressions of the divine norms of reason. Thus, though it may have been *like* a city state, or perhaps the only *true* one (Schofield 1991, pp. 61-63), it was very different from any form of government achievable by mortals. The earthly version of this cosmopolis – a world state wrought by human hands and encompassing all human beings – is the archetype of political cosmopolitanism. Its actual achievement would give very tangible weight to the notion of world citizenship.

Political cosmopolitanism has traditionally been associated with the ideal of a world state encompassing all persons. I propose that we amplify the range of theses that can be entertained under the heading of political cosmopolitanism. I argue for this definitional amplification not because the narrower definition is historically inaccurate, or because there are many self-declared politically cosmopolitan theses that have departed from the ideal of a world republic. Instead, I argue for it because I believe that political cosmopolitanism is best understood as an appendix to moral cosmopolitanism, something patently illustrated in the work of Kant. Given that moral cosmopolitanism can be institutionalized in various ways and in varying degrees (especially in view of the plurality of conceptions of moral cosmopolitanism), this gives us good reason to believe that political cosmopolitanism is a much wider and more interesting field than has previously been thought. We can endorse a thesis in political cosmopolitanism while opposing the ideal of a world state.

As I understand it, moral cosmopolitanism provides an aim, by reference to which the queries of political cosmopolitanism can be answered.[7] In the previous section, we saw that moral cosmopolitanism has strong

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7 The distinction bears some resemblance to that of Rawls' Ideal/Nonideal theory distinction (Rawls 1999, pp. 89-91).

implications for global and domestic institutions, prescribing norms of institutional justice that are global in scope. Such ideal moral standards (i.e., the protection of human rights, etc.) provide us with reference points according to which institutional arrangements can be ranked and assessed, but they do not by themselves provide answers to the more practical question of how they are to be implemented. The nonideal conditions of the actual world impose external constraints on what is currently politically realizable and what can reasonably be hoped for. It is the task of political cosmopolitanism to offer concrete political solutions which bear these constraints in mind. Ideals of political cosmopolitanism – which may, for example, include (a) a world republic, (b) a scattering of independent global, regional, domestic, and municipal governance institutions, or (c) a voluntary pacific federation of states – receive their impetus from moral cosmopolitan theorizing about the universal value of human rights, equal respect for individual interests, the benefits of perpetual peace, etc. But less ambitious cosmopolitan political ideals will replace more ambitious ones if the latter are considered to be too unrealistically utopian.[8]

As Pogge notes, moral cosmopolitan theorizing can be applied to the subject matter of social institutions in two ways. First, one can move directly from the basic concept of moral equality to the political thesis that "social institutions ought to be designed so that they include all human beings as equals" (Pogge 2007, p. 313). This straightforward move does yield the archetypal thesis of political cosmopolitanism: a world republic encompassing or at least open to all human beings. Second, one can move indirectly by entertaining a conception of moral cosmopolitanism that does not demand any particular institutional design outright, but that provides criteria for assessing and ranking alternative institutional designs (social-justice cosmopolitanism) (*Ibid.*, p. 313).

Despite acknowledging this dual path of influence from moral to political cosmopolitanism, Pogge defines *political* (or as he calls it: *legal*) (Pogge [2002] 2008, p. 157; 2007 §1) cosmopolitanism as "committed to a concrete political ideal of a global order under which all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties – are fellow citizens of a universal republic" (Pogge [2002] 2008, p. 175). Surprisingly, while recognizing that social-justice cosmopolitanism can indirectly endorse a plurality of institutional arrangements, Pogge confines the topic of political cosmopolitanism to only one ideal: a universal republic. I don't know why Pogge endorses

8 Kant, for instance, refers to the ridicule directed at the 'wild and fanciful' ideal of a world republic as put forth by Abbé St Pierre (1658-1743) and Rousseau (See Kant [1784] 1991, pp. 47-48). Surely this is part of the reason why he opts for the surrogate political ideal of a foedus pacificum, as I shall explain below.

such a narrow definition of the term, apart from reasons of historical precedence. Conceptual definitions, terms of art, can be quite arbitrary anyhow. My claim is that it is more useful to amplify the definition of political cosmopolitanism once we acknowledge the variety of manners in which moral cosmopolitanism can be institutionalized or politically implemented.

Pogge's definition runs two distinct ideals together: the institutional realization of equivalent legal rights and duties for every person on the planet, on the one hand, and the ideal of universal citizenship in a world republic, on the other. Stated as such, neither of these ideals (separately or together) fully defines the enterprise of political cosmopolitanism as I have characterized it. But, if we had to choose between the two, we should choose the first. The second ideal is, again, too narrow. As I said above, it constitutes merely one avenue along which to pursue the political implementation of moral cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, the first ideal is more embracing, but this depends on how we interpret the *range* of legal equivalence. If the complete set of legal rights and duties that apply to every person in the world is to be exactly the same *in all respects*, then this ideal would be too demanding. It would rule out any special legal obligations we might incur towards local forms of authority (i.e., our nation of birth) and thereby rule out the possibility of a multinational global political order that might nevertheless realize certain cosmopolitan ideals. If, on the other hand, this universal set of equivalent rights and duties constitutes only a *minimal* set (i.e., of human rights) on top of which we might pile further rights and obligations, then this could be one way of capturing the common project of political cosmopolitanism, which is concerned with the concrete implementation of a global order that takes equal account of the interests of all human beings.

Consider Kant's political thought, for instance, where a cosmopolitical union of humankind constitutes something like the overriding *telos* of earthly political undertakings. What many commentators often underestimate in reading Kant is the extent to which he remains committed to the ideal of a world republic – what he calls a cosmopolitan constitution or society (also a *civitas gentium*) – throughout his political writings.[9] Kant is of course famous for rejecting the ideal of a world state in favour of a pacific league of nations (*foedus pacificum*) on several grounds, the most quoted of which is his professed fear of a global form of despotism.[10] But,

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9 See Kant [1795] 1991, pp. 105-106.

10 Rawls (1999, p. 36) misunderstands Kant as unequivocally rejecting a world-state on these grounds, quoting the following passage in Perpetual Peace ([1795] 1991, p. 114; Also see Kant [1793] 1991, p. 90). Monique Canto-Sperber follows Rawls in this respect (See Canto-Sperber, 2006, p. 268).

as Pogge has rightly observed, this rejection is best read as strategic.[11] Though a world state may be difficult or almost impossible to achieve in practice, Kant asserts, "it is nonetheless the inevitable outcome of the distress in which men involve one another" (Kant [1784] 1991, pp. 47-48). Among the strategic obstacles to the implementation of a world government, according to Kant, is the fact that the present nonideal conditions of the world make it such that nations are averse to limiting their sovereignty under the coercive laws of a world republic.[12] Thus, as a pragmatic intermedium, Kant opts for the negative substitute of a voluntary but gradually expanding pacific federation or congress of states that is likely to prevent war: "The latter may check the current of man's inclination to defy the law and antagonise his fellow, although there will always be a risk of it bursting forth anew," (Kant, [1795] 1991, p. 105) he writes. Pogge is right to suggest that Kant really is committed to a world republic as the highest political ideal, but that he "also understands that a pacific league is more easily reachable from the *status quo,* and that a world republic is more easily reachable from a pacific league than from the *status quo.*" (Pogge, *Forthcoming* § 1) Kant has the ideal cosmopolitical society in sight, but understands that acquiescence to the nonideal conditions of the world is an important aspect of any viable political proposal.

For our purposes, the chief value of looking at Kant's work is its illustration of the intimate relationship between the doctrines of moral and political cosmopolitanism. Kant derives the idea of a world republic from his moral doctrine of a possible *kingdom of ends*, a universal moral community of which each human being is worthy of being an equal member (Kant 1785/1997, pp. 41-45). The moral ideal of a kingdom of ends (much like the Stoic's *cosmic* polis) can become a juridical state if all persons are institutionally guaranteed the external freedoms prescribed by universal moral law under a single global sovereign.[13] According to Kant This universal juridical state is not simply a worthy aspiration, but a moral and political imperative for the entire human race (Kant [1798] 2007, p. 332). Due to the practical conditions alluded to above, however, it is an ideal 'constantly threatened by disunion', and that can only be gradually approximated. Kant thus starts out from an ideal conception of moral cosmopolitanism to consider its non ideal implementation in a conception of political cosmopolitanism. He begins by applying the concept of moral

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11 For an excellent defence of this strategic reading of Kant's remarks, see Pogge's "Kant's Vision of a Just World Order" (Forthcoming).

12 Kant also mentions the difficulty of governing "too wide an area of land" (1797/1991, p. 171) and the "contradictory" nature of a world state (1795/1991, p. 102).

13 See Pogge (Forthcoming, § 1). Kant briefly mentions the juridical realization of the kingdom of ends in the ([1785] 1997, p. 46).

cosmopolitanism to the subject matter of social institutions in a *direct* as opposed to *indirect* manner. From his basic commitment to the moral cosmopolitan ideal he straightaway derives the political counterpart-ideal of a world state under which moral equality is institutionally guaranteed. But since nonideal conditions do not permit the imminent realization of a world state, he calls instead for a voluntary union of nations.

I would argue that Kant's surrogate political ideal of a pacific federation is no less a thesis in political cosmopolitanism than is his positive ideal of a world state, (although I understand that this claim is somewhat anachronistic when applied to Kant).[14] Both a world state and a voluntary society of peoples constitute political pathways along which the concept of moral equality can (eventually, if not immediately) find concrete institutional realization, and this is Kant's basic motivating aim in considering the merits of both proposals. I think we ought to follow the grain of Kant's thought in our understanding of political cosmopolitanism. With anchoring in a conception of moral cosmopolitanism, it can embrace not just one political ideal, but a range of ideals that may be more or less politically realizable but nonetheless cosmopolitan.

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14 Kant considered the idea of a congress of states (and the laws that govern it) to be a thesis in international and not cosmopolitan law. The latter is restricted to the law (or right) of hospitality ([1797] 1991, pp. 164-175).

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