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1. Locution, illocution, perlocution

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Pragmatics of Speech Actions
This chapter is in the book Pragmatics of Speech Actions
1.Locution, illocution, perlocutionMarina Sbisà1.IntroductionWhen we speak, we articulate sounds with our vocal organs, and we do so in such away that they can be taken to belong to some natural language, conform to its rules,and express a certain meaning. We usually do something else as well. Our speechhas more or less precise goals, achieves or fails to achieve them, may express in-tentions or other mental states, may produce consequences of various kinds (some-times unintended), and so on. It may be said that we “use” language to communi-cate, for strategic purposes, to express emotional or other psychological states, topersuade, and even to carry out such peculiar activities as joking or play-acting.This heterogeneous set of things we do when we speak or in the performance ofwhich speech plays a major role has been analysed by philosophers and linguists inthe tradition of speech act theory, and primarily by the British philosopher John L.Austin, who proposed the three-fold distinction between the locutionary, illocu-tionary and perlocutionary acts, which is the topic of this chapter.I will firstly present and analyse Austin’s distinctions. Then I will focus on thereformulations that each of the three notions involved, that is, locution, illocution,and perlocution, have undergone in the subsequent development of speech act the-ory. In doing so, I will stick to the work of some major authors or trends of thought,aiming to show how differences in the philosophical background assumptions cre-ate differences in the descriptions of what we do when we speak and in the corre-sponding speech-act theoretic notions. In conclusion, I will propose some reflec-tions on philosophical problems concerning the various ways of conceiving ofwhat we do when we speak that speech act theory makes available and provide anevaluation of the role that these notions and conceptions play (or should be able toplay) in the analysis of discourse and conversation.2.John L. Austin on locution, illocution and perlocutionLocutionary act,illocutionary act andperlocutionary act are the names given byJohn L. Austin to three aspects of what he called “the total speech act in the totalspeech situation” ([1962] 1975: 52,148). Austin thinks that any feature of a speechact and of the situation in which it occurs may be relevant to its meaning and to theassessment of the speech act’s correctness, which, according to him, can never bereduced to the logician’s assessment of truth and falsity (cf. e.g. Austin 1975: 52).

1.Locution, illocution, perlocutionMarina Sbisà1.IntroductionWhen we speak, we articulate sounds with our vocal organs, and we do so in such away that they can be taken to belong to some natural language, conform to its rules,and express a certain meaning. We usually do something else as well. Our speechhas more or less precise goals, achieves or fails to achieve them, may express in-tentions or other mental states, may produce consequences of various kinds (some-times unintended), and so on. It may be said that we “use” language to communi-cate, for strategic purposes, to express emotional or other psychological states, topersuade, and even to carry out such peculiar activities as joking or play-acting.This heterogeneous set of things we do when we speak or in the performance ofwhich speech plays a major role has been analysed by philosophers and linguists inthe tradition of speech act theory, and primarily by the British philosopher John L.Austin, who proposed the three-fold distinction between the locutionary, illocu-tionary and perlocutionary acts, which is the topic of this chapter.I will firstly present and analyse Austin’s distinctions. Then I will focus on thereformulations that each of the three notions involved, that is, locution, illocution,and perlocution, have undergone in the subsequent development of speech act the-ory. In doing so, I will stick to the work of some major authors or trends of thought,aiming to show how differences in the philosophical background assumptions cre-ate differences in the descriptions of what we do when we speak and in the corre-sponding speech-act theoretic notions. In conclusion, I will propose some reflec-tions on philosophical problems concerning the various ways of conceiving ofwhat we do when we speak that speech act theory makes available and provide anevaluation of the role that these notions and conceptions play (or should be able toplay) in the analysis of discourse and conversation.2.John L. Austin on locution, illocution and perlocutionLocutionary act,illocutionary act andperlocutionary act are the names given byJohn L. Austin to three aspects of what he called “the total speech act in the totalspeech situation” ([1962] 1975: 52,148). Austin thinks that any feature of a speechact and of the situation in which it occurs may be relevant to its meaning and to theassessment of the speech act’s correctness, which, according to him, can never bereduced to the logician’s assessment of truth and falsity (cf. e.g. Austin 1975: 52).

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Preface to the handbook series v
  3. Preface to this handbook ix
  4. Table of contents xi
  5. Introduction 1
  6. Part I. General issues
  7. 1. Locution, illocution, perlocution 25
  8. 2. Speaker’s meaning 77
  9. 3. Implicating 107
  10. 4. Presupposing 143
  11. 5. Speech act classifications 173
  12. 6. Performative utterances 203
  13. 7. Mitigation 257
  14. 8. Power in speech actions 287
  15. 9. Speech Act Theory and intelligent software agents 313
  16. 10. Speech Act Theory, ethnocentrism, and the multiplicity of meaning-making practices 339
  17. Part II. Varieties of speech action
  18. 11. Reference and attention 363
  19. 12. Assertions 387
  20. 13. Questions 411
  21. 14. Requests 445
  22. 15. Praising and blaming 467
  23. 16. Promising 501
  24. 17. Apologies 523
  25. 18. Compliments 555
  26. 19. Speech actions and registers in ritual contexts 587
  27. 20. Speech actions in legal contexts 613
  28. 21. Silence 659
  29. 22. The structuring of discourse 685
  30. About the authors 713
  31. Name index 721
  32. Subject index 726
Readers are also interested in:
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110214383.25

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Preface to the handbook series v
  3. Preface to this handbook ix
  4. Table of contents xi
  5. Introduction 1
  6. Part I. General issues
  7. 1. Locution, illocution, perlocution 25
  8. 2. Speaker’s meaning 77
  9. 3. Implicating 107
  10. 4. Presupposing 143
  11. 5. Speech act classifications 173
  12. 6. Performative utterances 203
  13. 7. Mitigation 257
  14. 8. Power in speech actions 287
  15. 9. Speech Act Theory and intelligent software agents 313
  16. 10. Speech Act Theory, ethnocentrism, and the multiplicity of meaning-making practices 339
  17. Part II. Varieties of speech action
  18. 11. Reference and attention 363
  19. 12. Assertions 387
  20. 13. Questions 411
  21. 14. Requests 445
  22. 15. Praising and blaming 467
  23. 16. Promising 501
  24. 17. Apologies 523
  25. 18. Compliments 555
  26. 19. Speech actions and registers in ritual contexts 587
  27. 20. Speech actions in legal contexts 613
  28. 21. Silence 659
  29. 22. The structuring of discourse 685
  30. About the authors 713
  31. Name index 721
  32. Subject index 726
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