Kit Ping Wong

The Territory and the State. The Urbanisation of Dongguan

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During the course of its development,
the State binds itself to space
through a complex and changing relation
that passed through certain critical points …
Is not the secret of the State, hidden because
it is so obvious, to be found in space?
The State and territory interact in such
a way that they can be said
to be mutually constitutive.[1]

The city of Dongguan is a prime example of extended industrial urbanisation in a contemporary form. It is located along the Hong Kong to Shenzhen corridor, near the provincial capital city of Guangzhou in the eastern part of the Pearl River Delta. [Fig. 1] In the last few decades, it developed into "the world's factory" as a result of the rise of global production systems. By plugging itself into Hong Kong's international financial centre and its commercial and port infrastructure, it launched a strategy of export-led industrialisation that drove the urbanisation of numerous towns and villages. This resulted in large clusters of foreign enterprises, sub-contracting factories, and large concentrations of Chinese migrant workers in various labour-intensive manufacturing industries.[2] As a result, the entire once-rural county of Dongguan was transformed into a manufacturing zone, with countless factories making clothing, shoes, furniture, computers, electronics, household goods, mechanical and metal parts, machinery, and so on. With the production of athletic shoes for famous brands and computer and electronic components for global companies, this world factory also became a key player in global supply chains, one of the important pillars of China's export economy and a driver of Hong Kong's global business centre.

In Dongguan, it was not the traditional centre of Guancheng that became the motor of rapid industrialisation; rather, it was the towns and villages. Travelling through the endless urbanised territory of Dongguan is like passing through countless contiguous industrialised towns and villages. Dongguan is a giant hodgepodge of factories, village houses, condominium towers, villas, shopping malls, hotels,



DONGGUAN'S EXTENDED URBANISATION
Fig. 1

street shops, wholesale markets, patches of farmland, parks, and the like. It seems to be a world of different contingencies, people, buildings, logics, and practices that emerged spontaneously at different times and places.

F. 1 This conceptual map of Dongguan's extended urbanisation illustrates the relative position of Dongguan to Shenzhen, Hong Kong and Guangzhou as well as the general directions of urban corridors. The actual size of Dongguan's centre within this constellation is not to scale, but accentuated to distinguish it from other, more well-known centres in the region.

However, this seemingly fluid, amorphous, disorienting space of global production stands in stark contrast to the territorial power structure of Dongguan. It is a city-territory—with towns and villages—that forms a kind of "territory with many territories" based on village collectives and defined by complex and contradictory power relations. These territories tie all villagers to a communal landownership that determines the redistribution of land, income, resources, and, thus, everyday lives. The village collectives are not autonomous but form an extension of the state power with the task of managing local villagers, migrant workers, small entrepreneurs, and domestic and foreign capitalists in their

territories. But these territories are also filled with land uses that do not conform to the legal framework of "rural land" but result from ambiguous and often illegal practices. Therefore, the villagers are constantly involved in land conflicts and have developed their own way of holding land and securing their village rights. This is a capitalist space deeply embedded in the Chinese state's territorial power, but it appears to be intrinsically contradictory and clearly different from what Henri Lefebvre conceptualised as a homogenising "state space," using the example of the French state in the 1970s.

In this chapter, I investigate how this contradictory space of *extended urbanisation* was produced in Dongguan during the 1980s and 1990s and how it was subsequently restructured and transformed into a space of *concentrated urbanisation*. My question is how the territorial power of the state materialised in this extended urban space and its various dynamics and contradictions. On a theoretical level, I argue that an analysis of extended urbanisation in China requires an analysis of the state space that goes beyond conceptions of a static and homogeneous nation. I approach this question from the perspective of China's changing relations between the state and the territory and their intersection with urbanisation processes.[3]

In China, the production of territories results from constant changes in state power and the political technologies that enable the party-state to achieve domination.[4] The central state reshuffles the levels of subnational governments and reorganises their administrative and territorial powers, thereby shaping different levels, forms, and processes of urbanisation. This enables the state to manipulate and encompass both concentrated and extended urbanisation processes at all subnational levels according to its national strategies and policies. However, this chapter shows that the exertion of the state's territorial power in China is neither a top-down nor a bottom-up process but has to be understood as a bundle of multiple contradictory processes. China's state space is not homogeneous; it can be heterogeneous, paradoxical, and conflictual.

At the same time, the analysis of spaces of extended urbanisation in Dongguan allows us to rethink the relationship between state power, the territory, and urbanisation, presenting the question: How are urbanisation processes, with their specific material, regulatory, and social characteristics, associated with the rise of particular forms of territorial powers? In the following section, I first raise the question of state-territory relations in the context of extended urbanisation in China. I argue that the popular concept of *desakota*, which is often applied to the analysis of China's extended urbanisation, gives no clue to understanding the significance between the territory and state power on the one hand and between state power and urbanisation on the other. The analysis of desakota leaves us with a simplistic economic model reflecting the transformation of vast rural areas under conditions of globalisation. It is based on thinking in binary oppositions, assigning top-down powers to the state and bottom-up reactions to the villages, and mapping the geography of power in terms of centre and periphery. It, thus, conceptually falls into a "territorial trap."[5] I suggest that it is essential to explore the specific relationships between the state and its territories in China to better understand its relentless process of urbanisation.

The second section explores the history of the state's manipulation of territories that emerged and developed in Guangdong. It focuses on the changes occurring in the transition from Mao to the post-Mao period and analyses the development of what Henri Lefebvre called a "state mode of production." The idea of the manipulation of territories by the state emerged during my cartographic research of Shenzhen in 2013, through which I discovered the shifting boundaries of this city-territory. To effectively grasp this systematic domination of state power over territory and urbanisation, I have chosen the scale of the entire Guangdong Province and traced all the changes in administrative boundaries, internal territories, and governments, and I analysed how this territorial apparatus mastered and manipulated the development of different cities,

their forms, scales, and urbanisation processes. The maps show that the ongoing changes in Chinese territories are not only the results of state strategies and its regulation of urbanisation but also depend on the dynamics of the internal contradictions of the state space itself.

In the subsequent sections, I will present Dongguan as my case study in which I explore how these spaces of extended urbanisation were produced and evolved over decades and how state power occurred and reproduced itself through the urbanisation process. The case study shows how the city of Dongguan was re-territorialised into a three-tiered system of a city-territory, towns, and villages that all became institutional actors of extended urbanisation. This territorial arrangement constituted a specific form of state domination, which created various conflicts and contradictions, and finally initiated a fundamental shift towards concentrated urbanisation after 2000. The case study explores this shift in detail through fieldwork in several villages of Tangxia town. It shows that extended urbanisation followed neither the system of state-owned "urban land" nor collective-owned "rural land." Instead, it was the result of alternative strategies developed by the villagers in their struggles against the domination of towns and the abuse of power by local cadres associated with the expropriation and development of rural land at the expense of villagers. It also explores the question of agency and shows how local villagers and migrants shaped the process of the production of space.

This study is based on my intermittent fieldwork from 2013 to 2018 in Dongguan. The fieldwork included interviews and mapping sessions with local professionals (planners and scholars), villagers, and migrant workers. I used a specific method of mapping to understand the material production of these spaces of extended urbanisation.[6] I also conducted interviews with local informants to investigate territorial regulations, social relations, and modalities of everyday life, as informed by Lefebvre's theory of the production of space.[7] I analysed all of these aspects from a historical perspective and reconstructed the pathways of urbanisation to better understand fundamental shifts and changes in the process itself, the power relations, and everyday life. As the questions concerning land and state power are sensitive for villagers, this research required building trust. Contacts with local villagers were therefore crucial for conducting this fieldwork: I stayed in the villagers' homes, hung out and discussed with young villagers, and conducted semi-open interviews with villagers and migrants, whom I found through snowball sampling. All these field methods were important for creating a deeper understanding of urbanisation processes because they often revealed a different reality than could be assumed from extant scientific literature or appearances at first sight. Furthermore, it also revealed stark contrasts from one villager to another and from one village to another. I gave a first account of this research in my article "Territorially-Nested Urbanization in China."[8]

Finally, I do not claim that this fieldwork represents China's urban development in general. There are considerable differences in the territorial regimes and the urbanisation processes across China. While the system of territorialisation is the key instrument of state power, multiple internal contradictions and effects of this system drive urbanisation processes, which can only be detected by detailed research on the ground.

STATE, TERRITORY, AND URBANISATION IN CHINA

THE CONCEPT OF DESAKOTA AS A TERRITORIAL TRAP

In the scholarly discussion of extended urbanisation, the concept of desakota provided an important perspective on the massive urban change occurring in the wider urban regions of Asia, particularly in Indonesia, India, China, and Japan. According to Terry McGee, extended urbanisation in these areas materialised in intense rural-urban interfaces outside large urban agglomerations. It led

to extended urban regions composed of three typical urban forms: an urban core, peri-urban settlements, and desakota landscapes.[9] Thus, desakota designates large rural areas undergoing dramatic socio-economic change through industrialisation and urbanisation in the context of a globalising economy. Desakota studies explored how socio-economic changes led to geographical differentiation and a specific regional division of labour and provided a broader context for regional planning. Dongguan, amongst many other regions, served as a showcase for desakota. It was seen as resulting from urban expansion in the Pearl River Delta[10] and as a bottom-up process that contrasted with state-led urbanisation processes.[11]

Despite many criticisms, the concept of desakota provided a dominant perspective in the urban studies of China. For this research, I highlight two shortcomings when applying the desakota concept to analyse urbanisation in China. First, as argued by John Friedmann, desakota seeks a generalisation of extended urbanisation in Asia at the expense of the acknowledgement of specificities and complexities in different contexts and a more thorough theorisation.[12] Because of its core methodology of aggregating statistical data, the spatial analysis is usually based on a set of functional socio-economic indicators, thereby simplifying complex changes in social spaces in urbanising regions. It relies on a morphological analysis similar to the approach of the Chicago School and presents a generalised model of a region composed of just three morphological settlement types, depending on a locational theory for an explanation.

Second, the concept of desakota is caught in what John Agnew called a territorial trap because it adopts the perspective of global capitalism to account for the relentless urbanisation processes in China.[13] From this perspective, the territory is considered a container that changes with economic functions and transport infrastructure alterations. The analysis of the state is narrowed down to governments and planning systems. Such a static concept of the territory does not account for the fact that the reproduction of Chinese state power is strongly related to the *restructuring of the territory* in the context of ongoing urbanisation. There is also the question of how Chinese desakota studies could escape the problem of city-centrism if they adopt the assumption that "cities" are stable morphological units that could be understood as material spaces of capital accumulation. This assumption, however, contrasts with the Chinese understanding of the "city" as a politico-territorial unit that is systematically transformed before, during, and after the processes of urbanisation. In this context, these studies tend to perpetuate the idea of a rural-urban dualism with a "Chinese characteristic," which is either understood as a centre-periphery relationship or a dual power structure composed of the central state (top-down) and the villages (bottom-up).

This points to a general weakness in the analysis of the state in Chinese urban studies, which shows a strong tendency to apply concepts of "state-led" or "neoliberal" urban development derived from Western analyses. Consequently, such analyses were strongly criticised for de-contextualising China's history and state processes.[14] Thus, many studies focus on how planning is used as a governmental tool to propel urban development but lack an analysis of the state itself, or simply call this process state-led urbanisation. Finally, many studies focus on the Chinese dual-track rural-urban land system, highlighting the monopoly of the state in leading the development process.[15] Land is a critical means of production in this process, but it is different from the territory, which is the central state's encompassing instrument to control all levels of government power and their territorial relations, and also the key element in rural-urban relations, including the land and the hukou system (the local citizenship, see below). Therefore, it is the state's territorial power that guides urbanisation processes. My argument is that the usual conceptualisation of the Chinese state in urban studies became a "territorial trap" that prevented us from seeing how state power operated through the reorganisation of territories to produce specific forms of urbanisation and, thus, subsumed global capitalist

activities under its modality of territorialisation (but not the other way around).

THE TERRITORIAL DIMENSION OF STATE SPACE

What are the specificities of the Chinese territorial system? My argument is built on a few important studies that critically interrogate the role of the Chinese party-state in guiding urbanisation processes.[16] In particular, as Laurence Ma argued, Chinese urbanisation cannot be understood, as in Western countries, through the lens of geographical rescaling processes generated by globalisation because the Chinese territory is politically defined and organised through a ranked administrative system of territorial levels.[17] It is this hierarchical system that propels urban development. Liu Junde pointed out how China managed economic changes by unhinging the Mao regime's highly centralised planned economy. This created what he called the "administrative area economy," wherein the central state delegates powers to local governments to develop the economy within their administrative territories, according to their rank.[18] Carolyn Cartier further developed the concept of "territorial urbanisation" to specify party-state interventions in the urbanisation process of Shanghai through territorial amalgamations.[19] Her studies opened up a new agenda of how the state constantly shaped and reshaped territories to propel urban development in China.

My theoretical concerns emerged from my mapping of Shenzhen in 2013, which raised the question of shifting territories and boundaries in relation to changes in state power. It opened up a different point of departure for theorisation, examining how Lefebvre approached the state's relation to space through the production of a territory.[20] The Chinese territorial division is not a mere administrative system but an encompassing institutional and territorial regime, managing capitalist accumulation and economic growth and facing contradictions and crises. The specificity of the Chinese state mode of production is that the ruling party manages both political and economic control. It entails the continuous domination and restructuring of two key aspects: First, the entire national territory is hierarchised into a system of different rank-based territories, and the central state reshuffles all subordinated governmental levels—their rank-based territorially configured power relations. Second, in producing and reorganising the subnational territories, the governments are also advancing and shaping different urbanisation processes to support economic growth, linking the political to the urban space. As a result, the Chinese state mode of production has rapidly propelled different city-territories and urbanisation processes since the beginning of the post-Mao era.

The Chinese state space constitutes a complex and contradictory relationship between the state, the territory, and the urbanisation processes. Here, I highlight three crucial characteristics. First, this state space is not simply vertically articulated but *territorially nested*.[21] This means that the subnational governmental levels are organised according to political ranks and particular politico-territorial configurations, which complicate the geographies of state power—for example, when a decentralised territorial form has a multitude of lower-level governments or, conversely, when a centralised form has just one single government. The decentralised form of territoriality resulted from the political strategy conducted during the 1980s and 1990s to accelerate urban expansion, which led to divergent urbanisation processes and competition between governments of the same and different ranks. This strategy was then shifted during the 2000s by installing centralised governmental and planning systems, which contradicted the previous multiple territorial orders and rules and thus triggered all sorts of new conflicts.

The second characteristic of China's state space is that it materialises *through different urbanisation processes* because all territorial levels are advancing their own urbanisation strategies to increase economic growth in their areas. The outcomes of these urbanisation strategies shape the reconfiguration of the politico-territorial structure, the respective government relations, and territorial reach.

Fig. 2

Third, the state is constantly reshaping its space to engineer *new processes of urbanisation* to resolve the difficulties of governments in managing urbanisation. In doing so, the state needs to reshuffle its politico-territorial structure and reshape its internal geographies of power. However, these changes further trigger conflicts and tensions between local governments, which are already deeply involved in local economic interests.

The point is that "state centrism" remains an essential question in China because, as Brenner noted, it cannot be understood through a static, a-spatial, and non-territorial perspective.[22] Otherwise, we follow the party narrative of a powerful Chinese state. But this power is often over-emphasised because the full consequences of China's hierarchical territorial structure are neglected. Therefore, we have to adopt a dynamic *and* territorial perspective that considers the ambiguities, complexities, and contradictions between the different governmental levels that generate massive consequences for the patterns and pathways of urbanisation. The relations between the state and its space are the "secret of the State," as Lefebvre notes in this chapter's introductory quote. We must problematise how the state historically reshapes itself to maintain its political domination and reproduce its power through social and economic changes. The complexities and transformations of the state space and the resulting contradictions that are determining its urbanisation need to be analysed. Both concentrated and extended urbanisation processes are intertwined with the changing geographies of state power. Thus, the extended urbanisation of Dongguan that this chapter explores was not the result of bottom-up forces that stood outside of state power. On the contrary, this form of urbanisation has been generated by the particular territorial form of state power and the multitudes of power relations, territorial regulations, and economic logic that it entailed.

F. 2 Chinese walled-cities (cheng 城) in the Kwangtung (Guangdong) province, Qing dynasty.

Fig. 3

TERRITORY AND THE STATE MODE OF PRODUCTION

This section analyses how territory is crucial for understanding the role of state power in the processes of concentrated and extended urbanisation. Here, I explore the state-territorial changes at the provincial level of Guangdong and show how a state mode of production emerged during the Mao period and rapidly unfolded after 1979. In this process, the territorial system of the Chinese state was used to push political change and shape urbanisation processes. China's territorial system allows the central party-state to manipulate and restructure all subnational territorial levels, reshuffle governmental power relations, establish new city-territories, and shape particular urbanisation processes. This is an encompassing, systematic, and malleable form of political technology that the party-state can use to control urbanisation and governmental action at all territorial levels.

A HISTORY OF GUANGDONG'S STATE—TERRITORY RELATIONS

To better understand the contemporary Chinese state-territorial power and its changing political geographies, it is important to highlight three pre-1949 historical conditions. First, historically, China did not have a concept of "territory" equivalent to the West. However, the Chinese term *jiangyu* (疆域) refers to the "boundary (*jiang*) of the imperial realm (*yu*)," including tributary and vassal states, but without a clearly defined boundary.[23] Relatedly, the concept of *tianxia* (天下), meaning "all under the Heaven," expresses a Sino-centric hierarchy of the world order between the Chinese emperor and foreign rulers in a suzerain-tributary system. Both terms signify the ruling power of the emperor as "the son of Heaven."

Second, the meaning of ancient walled cities called *cheng* (城) is completely different from the contemporary city-territory that is called *shi* (市), which designates not a morphological form (a "city") but a politico-territorial unit. Therefore, shi can contain dense settle-

ments and large agricultural and sparsely settled areas. In contrast, cheng referred to a political centre of the empire that assumed military, defence, administrative, and social functions across many dynasties. [Fig. 2] Cheng had no autonomy or independent administration and did not develop any kind of civil society. It was the seat of a county government that administrated the city's territory and its rural surroundings, from which rural-urban relations developed.[24] However, although cheng were the centres of imperial power, this imperial power rarely extended below the level of the county, where villages and market towns were subjected to the powers of lineages and gentries, with their distinctive local and customary rules and practices.[25]

During the early twentieth century, this boundless, worldwide Chinese concept of the dynasty was supplanted by the Western concept of territory. The term *lingtu* (領土) was derived from the Japanese translation, meaning a "governed land," a sovereign state with a clear, fixed border.[26] This concept became an essential element in the nation-state formation when the empire and its tianxia system collapsed in the 1911 Revolution, and the Republic of China was founded. As I will show below, this modern concept of territory was further developed into the party-state apparatus through which the Communist Party could manipulate political, economic, and social processes and relations. Although the tianxia system collapsed, it survived as the state's ideology and later served as a tool to propagate China's hegemony in the world order.

In the first decade after the Republic of China's founding, new forms of cities also emerged in Guangdong alongside the historic walled cities and towns [Fig. 4]. This included the colonial cities of Hong Kong and Macau and the treaty ports for foreign trade, such as Jangmen. It also included new Chinese cities such as Canton (Guangzhou, originally a walled city) and Swatow (Shantou, a treaty port).

F. 3 The old city centre, Guancheng, Dongguan.

These cities designated as shi gained a kind of autonomous legal status with an independent city administration. This was a period of modernisation in which many walled cities demolished their walls and expanded their city areas. In this process, Guangdong's cities and towns remained the centres of international, regional, and domestic trade networks and governed, specialised, and commercialised agricultural systems in their rural hinterlands. After 1949, the meaning and the forms of Chinese cities and rural-urban relationships radically changed when the new version of a state-territorial apparatus was developed under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The rise to power of the CCP after the Second World War led to the development of a new territorial regime through which Mao Zedong built a totalitarian party-state to realise the new "Socialist China." It was a centralised regime with a dual system to govern urban and rural areas. New city-territories (shi) were designated as sites of the socialist industrial production system that eliminated any capitalist commercial and consumption functions. *Danwei* (work units) helped reach this goal and were established as each industrial city's lowest political and social units. They had to meet state target values for industrial outputs, provide employment and social benefits, govern workers' social reproduction, and conduct surveillance.[27] Rural areas were re-territorialised into village collectives that served as encompassing political-economic units combining military, political, administrative, social, and economic functions.[28] They formed a three-tiered system of agricultural collectivisation, consisting of people's communes, production brigades, and production teams. Village collectives forcefully subjected all peasants, their bodies, and their labour forces to fulfil the state's quota of agricultural production without even leaving them enough food for themselves.

The *hukou* system was another state strategy to incorporate the people into the territorial control system. It implemented a compulsory household registration based

on residency permits linked to a place of birth. To this day, it constitutes an encompassing control mechanism of the population that differentiates between a rural and urban residential status and regulates entitlements to social services and welfare. It is also an instrument to control rural-urban migration and labour distribution.[29] Through these institutionalised distinctions between rural and urban realms, the state eventually established its power over all aspects of the social production and reproduction process.

In launching the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958, the central state introduced two major territorial processes to manipulate rural and urban relations. First, some rural areas were incorporated into large cities as their designated "countryside" (郊區). For example, Guangzhou (Canton) gained a large agricultural area to supply food and resources from village collectives. Second, a new territorial governing system was implemented called "city-leading-counties" (市管縣). This system forced the territorial subordination of counties under a city's jurisdiction, as exemplified in Guangzhou and Shaoguan. [Fig. 5] By 1976, Guangzhou administered seven counties to accelerate industrialisation and solve the food shortage problem. This territorial amalgamation transformed the historical form of the walled cities (cheng) into a city-territory, and the city was transformed into a politico-territorial form (shi) to encompass and control the urban-rural relations.

Accordingly, Mao's new territorial regime eliminated the pre-1949 administrative system and imposed a new state space by creating an all-encompassing, homogenising, and hierarchical territorial structure. It thus gave rise to a new state mode of production based on the political domination of the CCP. The state became the only agent exercising political and economic power and social control. As Wang notes, "People's land and assets, 'means of production,' basic supplies, and personal mobility were all thoroughly and institutionally centralised into the CCP-controlled people's communes, various units, and agencies."[30]

During the post-Mao era, the state-territory relationship changed again, but in a contradictory way. On the one hand, it had to adapt to the new political agenda of economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping. But, on the other, it had to maintain the politico-territorial system introduced by Mao in order to keep CCP's control of the political and economic realms. Although Deng advocated for economic *and* administrative reforms, the premier at the time, Zhao Ziyang, noted that Deng adovcated for economic reforms but it was an instrument to uphold the party's power in China.[31] If the party-state still dominated political and economic changes, we should ask how the creation of city-territories became a state strategy to promote economic growth in a way that the CCP could maintain its domination over all governments and urbanisation processes.

The answer is revealed in Figures 6 to 9. [Fig. 6–9] They show how the province of Guangdong underwent a constant reshuffling of territories and administrative boundaries during the post-Mao era. These territorial shifts articulated a direct relationship between the geographies of state power and urbanisation processes. The party-state became the central agent of the production of space through its manipulation of the administrative divisions of territories. The constant re-territorialisation of Guangdong led to a massive rise in the number of cities. From 1988 to 1994, the number of large cities (deputy-provincial and prefecture-level) increased from 9 to 21, and of the small cities (county-level) from 6 to 33. These processes also fundamentally restructured these cities and resulted in different urbanisation processes. As a result, all Chinese cities were territorially reconfigured and transformed into different large city-territories, which replaced the old forms of walled cities (cheng) or town settlements. These new city-territories (shi) incorporate both rural and urban areas within their jurisdictions and express a new rationale of governmental relations: "city-leading-countryside" (城市帶動農村). This means that cities and towns become the centres of development and govern both rural *and* urban relations. It can be understood



GUANGDONG'S WALLED CITIES AND NEW URBAN SETTLEMENTS 1908–1943
FIG. 4



FORMATION OF CITY-TERRITORIES 1960–1976
Fig. 5

F. 7 The transformation of Guangdong through territorial splitting and boundary readjustment.
F.9 Consolidation of prefecture-level city-territories through transforming counties and county-level cities into “urban districts”.



FORMATION OF NEW CITY-TERRITORIES 1977–1987
Fig. 6



FULL TRANSFORMATION OF GUANGDONG INTO CITY-TERRITORIES, 1988–1992
Fig. 7



MULTIPLICATION OF COUNTY-LEVEL CITY-TERRITORIES 1993–1999
Fig. 8



EXPANSION OF URBAN DISTRICTS SINCE 2000
Fig. 9

as an attempt to overcome the contradictions of the previous dual rural-urban system. This principle clearly contrasts with Mao's slogan of the "countryside-surrounding-cities" (農村包圍城市), which was used to mobilise the rural masses.

Guangdong experienced several rounds of re-territorialisation to create these new forms of city-territories. In fact, Mao had already changed course in 1960 when he adopted the principle of "city-leading-counties" (see above). This principle was stipulated as the territorial form of large cities in 1982. [Fig. 6][32] In this way, the two largest cities in the Guangdong Province, Guangzhou and Shaoguan, further expanded their administrative jurisdictions to encompass more counties. Shenzhen and Zhuhai, China's first Special Economic Zones (SEZs), were founded in Guangdong in 1980 and transformed directly from rural counties to deputy-provincial and prefecture-level cities, respectively. Foshan, Jiangmen, Zhanjiang, and Maoming underwent a process of "city-prefecture amalgamation" by repealing the prefectures (an older administrative echelon initially managing counties) and then merging those counties and the old prefecture-level cities. Between 1988 and 1993, another round of territorial splits and administrative reshuffling took place that doubled the numbers of city-territories and readjusted their size: large city-territories (shi) were split into two or more city-territories, the Huiyang prefecture was repealed, its territory subdivided into four new city-territories, and the Hainan island was split from Guangdong and became a province. [Fig. 7] All these cities showed the various ways of territorial reorganisation and administrative reshuffling that shaped the size, form, and hierarchy of governmental relations in Guangdong.

Apart from the large cities, Guangdong's number of small cities drastically increased from six in 1988 to 33 in 1993. [Fig. 7–8] They were county-level cities to serve the state's strategy of developing small cities and towns in China. As the lowest rank, this new form of city was created by the re-territorialisation of rural counties (縣改市) (e.g., Dongguan in 1985) or through an amalgamation of an old county-level city and its historically related neighbouring county (e.g., Chaozhou in 1983). This territorial process facilitated extensive urbanisation by authorising lower-level governments to develop small cities and towns. Concomitantly, it hierarchised a multicentric form of a city-territory. A new form of territorial relations emerged by transforming counties into small cities: "city-leading-cities" (代管市). This means that a prefecture-level city-territory administers county-level cities on behalf of the provincial government. In this case, Guangzhou adopted the configuration of a "large city leading four small cities" that rapidly accelerated its multicentric processes of agglomeration and urban expansion during the 1990s. [Fig. 8]

However, since 2000 many cities have expanded their city centres by transforming counties and county-level cities into "urban districts" (市轄區). [Fig. 9] In Guangzhou, the four county-level cities were changed into urban districts to facilitate the metropolitan plan of "Greater Guangzhou." They immediately lost their city status while the Guangzhou government centralised its power over urban development, planning, and budgeting for the entire territory. It completely changed its urban development strategy from a decentralised, multipolar model to a centralised pathway of concentrated urbanisation.

STATE, TERRITORY, AND URBANISATION

Following the history of Guangdong presented above, three implications have to be highlighted to rethink the changing relationship between the state, its territories, and urbanisation processes. Firstly, the state organises territories and guides urbanisation in China to assert its domination in both the political and economic spheres. After 1978, the definition and designation of city-territories became the key instrument of the state to promote and control urbanisation. A "city" in China was no longer a dense urban settlement because it also contained large rural areas that served as support spaces and land reserves for future

urbanisation. City-territories currently cover every inch of land in Guangdong. Regardless of whether areas were urban or rural at the beginning of this process, they were all reconfigured into a hierarchical territorial system that defined their status and rank and, thus, their political power relations. Any changes in the status and rank of the territory required the approval of the central state, which made decisions according to national urbanisation strategies. In this way, the urbanisation of the Chinese territory was internally organised according to a rank-based political-territorial system.[33] Under this new state mode of production, the state simultaneously controlled urbanisation processes and local governments at all levels while managing capitalist activities in space. Subsequently, it orchestrated, concentrated, and extended urbanisation and manipulated urbanisation processes to adapt to changing conditions and circumstances. On the ground, this led to very different patterns and pathways of urbanisation.

Secondly, with their complex and changing politico-territorial structures, all these city-territories determined the intertwining relationship between the urbanisation process and internal governmental relations. A prefecture-level city-territory comprises urban districts, counties, and county-level cities with sub-districts, towns, and villages at the lowest level. They are territorially nested inside one another according to their ranks. Ranks determine their level and scope of governmental (administrative, economic, fiscal, and legislative) powers, territorial form, and organisation. Thus, large cities are city-territories with urban districts, while small cities don't have districts. There is also a wide range of inter-governmental relations, such as "city-leading-counties" or "city-leading-cities." In this way, a city-territory can be understood as a constellation of numerous sub-territories with different statuses, multiple governments with different ranks, different territorial regulations, and political relations. The internal relations of a city-territory are like an inter-territorial matrix:[34] If a new strategy of urbanisation is launched, every territorial unit is subdivided, amalgamated, and rearranged to create a new configuration of relations appropriate to the implementation of the new strategy.

Thirdly, while this territorial regime was crucial for the reproduction of state power during the period of economic reforms (and the massive political and economic changes since), it also led to complex new geographies of state powers and to new contradictions that had strong impacts on power relations and urbanisation processes, which necessitated more changes to the territorial system. For instance, Shenzhen adopted a configuration of "city-leading-county" to manage its fast and massive urbanisation process during the 1980s, which led to subsequent contradictions. Since 1992, Shenzhen underwent two rounds of a "territorial fix" and abolished the county, town, and village systems to resolve various kinds of institutional fragmentation. And yet, large-scale contestations also emerged in each round of territorial restructuring, in which villagers could secure their land interests through plotting.[35]

THE URBANISATION OF DONGGUAN

In the previous section, I explained how Guangdong's territorialisation has shifted from multicentric to concentrated forms of state power. Nevertheless, Dongguan, with its polycentric constellation of towns and villages, did not get the state's approval to change its administrative divisions to resolve its fragmented territorial structure and, thus, to coordinate its urbanisation processes better. In this and the following sections, I show how Dongguan's politico-territorial restructuring was played out and how it shaped a particular form of extended urbanisation. Dongguan's territorial structure did not show a clear vertical articulation of state power, and its urbanisation processes were dominated neither by top-down nor bottom-up strategies. Instead, I suggest that the urbanisation of Dongguan's villages was rooted in the multitudes of territorial powers

and their contradictory practices. As a result, the villages rapidly transformed into fragmented urban spaces, each of which had a specific form of social relations, land politics, and villagers' consciousness.

Historically, Dongguan was an agrarian society, with the walled city of Guancheng as the county's seat. [Fig. 10] In the nineteenth century, Dongguan had three merchant towns, which were also trading ports (Guancheng, Taiping, Shilong), two additional ports, and many small market towns that served as trading places between the vast rural areas and some large cities like Guangzhou, Foshan, and Hong Kong.[36] The CCP's rise to power led to a radical territorial transformation of Dongguan that eliminated the pre-communist urban and rural economy and society.[37] In 1958, the entire county was divided into 13 people's communes with 190 brigades, and the three merchant towns were transformed into urban communes with state landownership and state-owned enterprises. [Fig. 11][38] Rural areas were likewise subject to massive changes with the elimination of the classes of the gentry, landlords, and wealthy peasants, who lost their land and property ownership. By abolishing rural townships, a three-tiered system of communes, brigades, and teams was established to implement agricultural collectivisation and collective land ownership under the control and exploitation of the party-state apparatus. The hukou system controlled internal migration, labour regulation, and food distribution in towns and villages (see above). By 1979, Dongguan was composed of three urban communes and 29 rural communes, with 545 brigades at the lower level.[39] However, this territorial structure would soon be subject to a new round of re-territorialisation.

During the post-Mao period, Dongguan experienced a rapid, extensive form of urbanisation that completely transformed vast rural areas into various industrialised towns and villages. On the highest level, several rounds of re-territorialisation led to the formation of new city-territories in the East Pearl River Delta. It was not only the historical centre of Huizhou that lost its importance, but also many counties underwent a radical transformation. [Fig. 12] Bao'an County first became Shenzhen City at the prefecture level in 1979 and then the deputy provincial level in 1981.[40] In 1985, Dongguan became a county-level city to propel rural industrialisation. Thus, the walled city of Guancheng, with a city area of 15 km^2, was expanded to a city-territory encompassing 2,456 km^2 containing a great variety of urban and rural areas.[41] In 1988, the Huiyang prefecture was abolished, and its territory was subdivided into four prefecture-level city-territories with different territorial structures. Like the other three, Dongguan became a prefecture-level city-territory led by the provincial government without being amalgamated with or subordinated under Shenzhen or Huizhou's historical centre. In this process, Dongguan gained a lot of rural areas for urbanisation; but it did not have counties (like other cities) that offered land reserves for future urban expansion. Its territory was configured into a three-tiered governmental structure—city-town-village—that laid down the fundamental dynamics and politics of its ongoing urbanisation processes.[42]

Although export-led industrialisation and foreign investment from Hong Kong were the main economic forces of extended urbanisation, Dongguan's specific form of territoriality set the primary condition and dynamics of how these urbanisation processes and power relations played out and how they would change in the future. The city-territory of Dongguan consists of 29 towns and 542 village collectives[43] surrounding the old city centre of Guancheng. [Fig. 13][44] While the legal, governmental framework in China usually dictates that a city is leading counties (and not towns), the three-tiered administrative system of Dongguan was based on pragmatic political arrangements. While the city covered the whole territory, its administration was only responsible for the planning and development of the city centre. Without counties, the towns had greater discretion in fiscal policies, planning, economic development, and construction, and the village collectives were designated as "administrative districts" (管理區) by the



Fig. 10



Fig. 11

F. 10 Dongguan's walled city, Guancheng, 1905.
F. 11 Dongguan's administrative divisions in 13 People's Communes, 1958.



FORMATION OF CITY-TERRITORIES IN THE HUIYANG PREFECTURE
Fig. 12

provincial government and continued to be politically mobilised as an extension of the town governments in charge of rural industrialisation.[45] Therefore, several administrative, economic, and planning tasks were devolved to lower levels, from the city to the town governments and from the towns to the village collectives. As noted by the then city party-secretary Li Jinwei, this was a three-tiered territorial government instead of four. This meant that all territorial levels—the city (Dongguan), the towns, and the villages—could have a larger share of profit from economic development.[46]

Instead of developing into a major city like Shenzhen, Dongguan's "mass mobilisation" strategy aimed at taking advantage of Hong Kong to attract foreign capital and industries. This strategy added to the explosive urban growth during the 1990s and 2000s. [Fig. 13] At the level of the villages, the industrialisation process led to a boom in new industrial areas. They formed distinct, self-contained neighbourhoods with factories, migrant workers, housing, social facilities, and related infrastructures. The rapid expansion of highways strengthened the north-south economic corridor between Guangzhou and Hong Kong. A range of ports (e.g., Zhongtang, Wangniudun, Machong, Shatian, Humen), Hongkong-Macau logistic control points (e.g., Fenggang, Chang'an), and railway hubs were built in different towns.

These centres and hubs grew with the rapid expansion of transportation networks to cope with the increasing flows of people, imports, and exports. These developments also reshaped the relationships between the city centre and the central and peripheral towns. Because the urban development of Dongguan's city centre was restricted within its small city district (市區), towns located along the north-south corridor soon had a much higher concentration of population, industries, and



activities. In 2004, the migrant population of Chang'an town grew to 678,000, of which its three villages had 78,000, 83,000, and 84,000. The key industries in Dongguan included information and communications, computers, electronics, furniture, clothing, and metal and machinery. Numerous specialised and related industries formed clusters and networks in different towns and villages. Different social and economic activities flourished, including the construction industry, wholesale and retail markets, entertainment, transportation, and various consumer and producer services.

Dongguan's three-tiered, multicentric structure led to divergent political and economic trajectories and generated various contradictions and conflicts. The main problems were that territorial politics were intertwined with land interests and that the political actors were also the leading economic actors in their areas. Thus, on the lowest level, the village offices[47] were responsible for local administration, including migrant workers and labour affairs, building, fire safety, sanitation, policing, and social stability. The village offices also developed the village land, constructed facilities and infrastructures, and directly connected to foreign investors. On the higher levels, though the city administratively leads the towns, the town governments were in charge of developing the land in their areas. Likewise, the towns should lead the villages, but the village collectives are the owners of the village's rural land, and the villagers have a right to land use. Thus, urban development was strongly complicated by these contradicting interests, which gave rise to various conflicts, particularly on questions of urban expansion and land expropriation.

F. 12 Several rounds of re-territorialisation of the Huiyang prefecture led to the formation of city-territories.



EXPLOSIVE URBAN SPACE:
DONGGUAN'S THREE-TIERED TERRITORIAL SYSTEM
Fig. 13

The following case study of Tangxia explores these contradictory processes and their power relations, which emerged in the processes of extended urbanisation and enabled a new stage of urban development.

TANGXIA: ONE OF DONGGUAN'S 28 TOWNS

Tangxia is located in the south-east of Dongguan, adjacent to Shenzhen at the former Kowloon-Canton Railway. In only two decades, this town transformed from a remote rural area to an important producer of manufactured goods exported to the world via Hong Kong. In 2005, it was one of China's "Top Thousand Towns" (千強鎮), accommodating a cluster of 1,083 foreign and 1,205 domestic factories and a total population of 372,300.[48]

The following section will present the urban transformation of Tangxia, initially through extended rural industrialisation during the 1990s. After 2000, it turned to real estate and the development of new centres, facilitated by the construction of highway networks and, later, a high-speed rail, following the pathway

of urbanisation in other parts of the Pearl River Delta. In this process, Tangxia's extended urbanisation turned into concentrated urbanisation. Similar to other towns in Dongguan, Tangxia's 19 village collectives were the main actors in the urbanisation processes. This was related to a process of decentralisation of state power towards the town and village cadres. After 2000, a process of political realignment took place that again recentred the administrative power of Dongguan's city government. However, these changes in state power were not straightforward; instead, they resulted from the interplay between urbanisation and state power that created a fragmented, conflictual urban space.

Prior to 1948, Tangxia was a "rural township" (鄉), a basic-level rural administrative unit below the county, with a market and 132 village settlements. The township was governed by lineage villages and local gentries based on kinship and relations of proximity. However, this entire rural system was dismantled in 1958 when the CCP extended the new state order into rural areas under the new logic of collectivisation. In the wake of this territorial restructuring, Tangxia town was reorganised into a three-tiered territory composed of the Tangxia People's commune, 18 production brigades, and 161 production teams.[49]

In 1979, with the implementation of the new political agenda of economic reform under Deng Xiaoping, Tangxia adopted a strategy of rapid export-led industrialisation that started the process of extended urbanisation. During the early 1980s, rural industrialisation proceeded without large-scale land transformation. According to the national policy, the production teams managed the land, redistributing farmland, hill areas, housing zones, and self-reserved land to individual village households. Tangxia attracted foreign investors who set up processing and assembly manufacturing plants in old buildings and on vacant land. They were either members of the extended village families (most from Hong Kong), or they were introduced through the villagers' overseas networks.

The introduction of a new form of decentralised, three-tiered territorial arrangement in Dongguan in 1988 (see the previous section) delegated political power in Tangxia to the town and the village cadres. Tangxia became an "urban township" (鎮), leading 19 village collectives—the main actors dealing with foreign investors—to establish industries and businesses at the village level. Politically and administratively, the village collectives under the town's leadership were in charge of administration, development, and security. Each village collective was administered by a village office, usually composed of three to seven village party cadres. It was structured by a two-tiered system of land ownership and a collective administration consisting of brigades and production teams. Each brigade was led by the village party-secretary (the "first leader"), whose power was delegated by the town-level party committees that had the political task of managing the village territory. The production teams also had leaders chosen by the respective village households.

The new territorial structure of Tangxia accelerated the process of extended urbanisation. Rural industrialisation was further boosted by both the implementation of a new stage of national economic reform in 1992, and Dongguan's development strategy called the "second industrial revolution" in 1994. Backed by the town government of Tangxia, village offices started to expropriate farmland from individual households in the name of a policy of "integrated planning and development." They used large parts of rural collective land for urban uses, such as manufacturing, commerce, housing, social facilities, roads, and infrastructures. Large tracts of farmland were divided into plots for factories, and land adjacent to roads was used for self-built housing. Soon, each village had three or four large clusters of factories that the villagers called "industrial estates." [Fig. 14]

This process of urban transformation proceeded piece by piece without formal planning by selling "50-year land-use rights leases" to investors.[50] The village office was responsible

for providing the land, roads, and basic infrastructure, as well as the leaseholder constructed factories, dormitories, and facilities. The leaseholding fee was usually settled by cash, which opened the door for various forms of corruption. None of these leases were acknowledged by the law, however, because farmland could officially only be transformed into urban land through acquisition by the government. Nevertheless, the leases were used as the main local tool for selling rural land for profit, and investors built their factories on this land in the name of the village collectives.

Initially, land for housing was for locals to construct self-built homes for personal use, but later it was sold to both villagers and non-villagers in a commodified manner. In many villages, hundreds of plots were demarcated for self-built housing,[51] and later, even the village offices themselves engaged in the construction of housing that they sold to non-villagers. This practice was illegal. Such large-scale land conversion violated the national law on the non-alienable and non-transferable nature of village housing land. As land revenue was the primary source of local government,[52] and the local GDP was the leading indicator of political performance, which was relevant for their position and annual bonuses,[53] local cadres strived to keep their housing development projects and land investments.

In this run for the commodification of land, various land conflicts emerged within the villages, as there was often no collective consensus on land expropriation, land transfer, investments, and the distribution of revenues. For example, in 1993, some people in a village protested to the town government against land commodification by their leader, which resulted in a "compromise." Half of the land was sold at a market price, and the other half was redistributed to all village households at a lower price. This massive land transformation supported by local policies and practices was clearly circumventing state regulations and laws. But regulation of the land was complicated because different government levels operated with their own interpretations of rules and laws. For villagers, it was never clear which regulations were applied, which constructions could be counted as legal or illegal, and why a land transformation was possible in one village but not in others. But it was clear to them that different temporary measures or collaborative frameworks could be available to make things possible or get them legalised. Thus, local practices took advantage of ambiguity, and land deals and real estate projects were often undertaken in the name of state policies while violating national land regulations. As a result, the land of these villages became contested territories, full of buildings that were legally "problematic" or "non-conformable."

The rapid, extensive form of urbanisation in Dongguan also changed the villagers' relationships with their land. For the village collectives, land became an instrument for making huge profits, and village cadres expropriated land from individual households. This not only triggered land disputes but also formed the particular way villagers acted on the land. Although individuals could not change the dominant political structure, they could express their resistance and materially secure their land rights by constructing houses. By owning a building on a housing plot, villagers could secure the right to use that land.[54] Thus, villagers grasped opportunities each time land was auctioned by the village office to acquire plots by pooling money from their own savings, relatives in Hong Kong, land compensation, or by reselling village land to non-villagers.[55] The construction of individual houses that were rented out to migrants became a common practice of villagers. In this way, housing construction proceeded plot by plot, resulting in the individualised but large-scale urbanisation process of plotting.[56]

Village teams could also be an essential platform for villagers to intervene in the land development process and counterbalance the domination of village leaders. Some teams succeeded in pressuring village leaders to redistribute plots for collective investment in factory construction and leasing. Consequently, the investment of village teams became an important

Fig. 14

way of land development, and both individual villagers and village teams became involved in shaping their villages; they learned to invest and manage rental properties, pooled money, made leases, and collectively decided on the use of buildings, income redistribution, and savings. Even more importantly, they were circulating information and paying attention to anything related to the village's office and the situations and opportunities occurring in the immediate or broader surroundings. These activities and learning processes shaped the villages' internal dynamics and formed village politics.

In this way, local state power at the town and village levels made possible export-led industrialisation based on foreign investors, which drove Dongguan's extended urbanisation. In the 1990s, most of the village farmland was converted into industrial and housing land, and the vast agricultural landscape of Tangxia was utterly transformed into an urban-industrial zone.

F. 14 Clusters of factories: village's industrial estates.

URBAN SPACES AND EVERYDAY LIVES

In the late-1990s, a new industrial boom started in Dongguan when Taiwan undertook a profound economic restructuring and lifted restrictions for large-scale investment in China, which led to a massive move of Taiwanese enterprises towards Dongguan.[57] In the wake of this process, Tangxia experienced a substantial influx of Taiwanese enterprises, particularly in electronics, which further pushed the pace of urbanisation. Between 1997 and 2006, the number of migrant workers in Tangxia increased from 77,000 to 345,000.[58] Thus, several hundred to several thousand local villagers lived in each village, compared to 10,000 to 60,000 migrant workers.[59] This section shows how these spaces of extended urbanisation became the arenas of social change where a particular form of spatial transformation went hand in hand with fundamental changes in everyday life. Local villagers and migrant workers created their own spaces for making a living and earning profits during the booming economy.

Fig. 15

Fig. 16

Fig. 17

F. 15 Rural migrants in an old village settlement.
F. 16 Streetscape, Tangxia old town centre.
F. 17 A migrant street vendor in a village centre.
F. 18 A kinship-based workshop: manufacturing of electric cables and conductors.

As a result of the large-scale arrival of migrant workers, many village houses were transformed into rental housing. By 2010, the number of rental housing units in Tangxia reached 19,799, accommodating nearly 300,000 registered temporary residents.[60] In old village sites, villagers used—often subdivided—old houses for renting or constructed new houses with three housing units on empty plots. These often-dilapidated houses were densely placed next to each other, accessible only by small alleys, forming clusters of the migrant population within each village. [Fig. 15] Five- to six-storey self-built houses that villagers partially or entirely used for renting spread along roads and streets. The ground floors were used for shops, businesses, or workspaces, while the upper floors were dwellings.

As mentioned, it was through the resistance politics of plotting that villagers "took back" their land during the waves of land expropriation and commodification. On the one hand, villagers still owned large areas of collective land through land use and property rights. Although they were later disallowed from undertaking any construction on this land, it became a contested site on which villagers resisted the threats of expropriation by the town government or the village office. This explains why a large number of dilapidated, traditional houses continue to exist in many villages. On the other hand, the village collectives founded companies to manage and develop their collective property and assets. The founding of these companies was declared mandatory by the Guangdong provincial policy of 2004 to reorganise village administrations and collective assets to facilitate capital accumulation and resolve distribution issues. Hence, the villagers became shareholders and de facto "landlords," and for many of them, rent became the primary household income. In their own view, this constituted a turning point in their material and social life as they began to bind themselves to shareholding, land business, and speculation.

Thanks to the migrant population, these villages, once composed of old houses and farmland, were transformed into dense, lively, and

Fig. 18

productive neighbourhoods. As a large number of migrant workers could not be confined any longer to the discipline of factories and dormitories,[61] the reproduction of labour power was expanded to the wider surrounding of the village. Migrants worked in factories and related activities such as retail and wholesale, transportation, construction, restaurants, hotels, and entertainment centres. Thus, old village sites and multi-storey houses constituted the social space of mixed-use neighbourhoods, with a variety of small enterprises, subcontractors, workshops, hardware shops, and salons run by migrants. [Fig. 18] Old houses were used for working and dwelling, storing vendor carts and wagons, street vendors' food production, and recycling businesses for industrial waste. Around the market, makeshift structures were used for food stalls, lorry drivers were waiting for jobs, and taxi drivers were peddling for customers. [Fig. 17] These spaces contributed significantly to the booming neighbourhood economy, and migrants became their own producers of their everyday lives.

While the large influx of rural migrant workers became the engine of industrialisation, the state's hukou system continued to determine these migrants' "transient space" by denying their rights to access social welfare. It remained a heavy task for migrants to raise and teach their kids or leave them as "left behind children" in their hometowns; often, kids went to unauthorised schools or did not go to school at all.[62] Besides, village offices took the approach of "doing nothing in temporary dilapidated areas."[63] Thus, migrants faced everyday challenges such as the absence of streetlights, waste and sewage problems, or severe flooding during the rainy season. The social control of the labour force was subject to the discipline of the factory system and the policing of village offices, which were responsible for social stability, and claimed themselves as "arbiters" of conflicts between factory owners and workers in their areas. Such social control was effective until the outbreak of large-scale strikes in other towns led to their suppression by the respective town governments.[64]

Fig. 19

F. 19 City square of Nancheng CBD, Dongguan.
F. 20 A gated village apartment estate, concentrating villagers in high-rise towers.

This economic boom lasted for about a decade until the 2008 financial crisis led to factory closures and fundamentally changed these neighbourhoods. Migrants had to decide whether to stay or leave Dongguan. I talked to a private taxi driver who invested money to buy a car but no longer earned enough for basic expenses. However, some longer-term migrants with established social networks still anticipated opportunities. A workshop owner attained a local hukou because she purchased a flat in the new town centre, while a construction company owner surreptitiously built another rental house on the plot he had bought earlier to accommodate more migrants.

THE PARADIGM SHIFT TOWARDS CONCENTRATED URBANISATION

Since the early 2000s, the spaces of extended urbanisation have been regarded in the public discourse as a cause of the land shortage. The city of Dongguan started to implement new policies to realise a new vision of village space by "concentrating" villagers in high-rise residential areas. This went along with the national policy of "New Village Construction" (新農村建設) launched in 2004, which aimed at accelerating the urbanisation of rural areas, modernising villages, and maintaining social harmony. [Fig. 20] In Tangxia, five such village housing estates were constructed that seemingly fit into the city's propaganda of "being a modern people, living a modern life, building a modern city." In the early 2000s, a village office began construction of one of these estates for 0.2 billion yuan.[65] It was a gated estate for 6,000 villagers, comprising medium- and high-rise apartment blocks and some villas. This project was advertised as a village model for the country in the context of the party's mass mobilisation and was therefore visited by many other villagers.[66] As noted by a villager, it became the "state's image building," a showcase of its achievements and economic success. It embodied a representation of the state space that established its authority and legitimacy in rural areas. The design of the new building for the village office, which had 200 villagers on its own payroll, imitated the government building of Dongguan, declaring itself as a political centre of the village landscape of Tangxia. The local villagers shared a collective aspiration for such modern living, and there was a strong sense of pride and privilege. As one villager said: "My apartment is just like a luxury mansion in Hong Kong."[67]

However, the new village housing estate failed to implement the national policy of "one household, one homestead." As villagers were reluctant to give up their foothold on their collective land, no land plots were returned to the village office as stipulated for eligibility for buying an apartment. Thus, the villagers still owned a property in the old village they rented out to migrants. Therefore, the spectacular gated

Fig. 20

village estate stands out in an industrial landscape, imposing socio-spatial segregation between villagers and migrant workers and further reinforcing their uneven power relations. And at the same time, it was announcing another round of urbanisation in Tangxia based on a real estate–driven property development that ultimately led to a paradigm shift towards concentrated urbanisation.

The background of this shift was that in 1998, the Chinese government enforced more stringent land regulations on local governments, such as farmland conservation rules and land quotas for converting farmland to urban land to prevent further illegal urban expansion.[68] At the same time, Dongguan began reframing the dynamics of its three-tiered territorial structure through a realignment of the administrative power, which allowed the city government to advance urban restructuring. In this way, the city government resumed its responsibility for the territorial planning of the entire Dongguan territory, executed land-use control, and reshaped its relationships with the town governments. It also developed a new urban strategy to build more and larger centralities, new high-tech and high-end development zones, and to expand the highway and railway network. However, the city government could not get full control over urban development because it could not, like Shenzhen, transform the towns into its own urban districts. Only in 2015 was Dongguan finally granted its own legislative powers from the central state to resolve the contradictions of its government. Thus, the turn towards concentrated urbanisation was still strongly influenced by the old city-town-village administrative structure that had produced the fragmented and contradictory form of Dongguan's extended urbanisation.

Tangxia's strategic shift towards concentrated urbanisation followed the regional trend of building new centres as drivers to increase the exchange value of real estate developments. This trend ran parallel to the construction of new CBDs in Futian (Shenzhen), Nancheng (Dongguan), and the new University Town in Guangzhou. [Fig. 19] In Tangxia, however,



TANGXIA'S PARADIGM SHIFT TOWARDS CONCENTRATED URBANISATION
Fig. 21

the land had become increasingly scarce and fragmented. Therefore, in order to propel large-scale real estate development, the town government had to establish a master plan, seize the village land, and reassign it as urban land in conformity with new national regulations. The following accounts highlight some of the land conflicts in three villages at different times. [Fig. 21] It explores how local villagers, as the agents of extended urbanisation, also shaped the dynamics of the paradigm shift towards concentrated urbanisation.

LYCHEE TREES

The first example is the development of a new town centre for Tangxia in 2001, which required the implementation of large-scale land expropriation in one of the villages. This was the first large development project by Tangxia's town government, taking advantage of the simultaneous new CBD development in the centre of Dongguan. It aimed at creating a new "administrative cultural centre" with government office towers, various cultural and leisure facilities, and a public square on an area of 58 hectares. It also was meant to function as a driver for real estate development along a new highway to the old town centre. [Fig. 22] This project was located in a hilly area around a reservoir that could be used for urban development through land levelling. This meant that a total area of 168 hectares, about half of the village land, had to be seized by the government.[69]

An agreement on the compensation scheme included the land price (owed to the village

Fig. 22

office) and the compensation for crops (owed to the individual farmers). The agreement was established between the town and the village party-secretary, and the village office as the landowner received a large sum of money for the land compensation—without having to redistribute it to the individual villagers. However, the largest pieces of land were still in the hands of individual villagers who held land-use rights. Each household had different amounts of land, and some used it to plant mandarin and lychee trees or left it idle. When the rumour of land expropriation spread in the village, all affected villagers began planting lychee trees to secure their interests at stake. A villager recalled the night before the land survey: "At midnight, the hill areas were full of villagers … everyone was planting lychee trees." The villagers made last efforts to claim their land interests without a common agenda. By increasing the number of trees, they attempted to maximise their compensation. They all had heard that land was going to be sold to a developer for building a five-star hotel and a cluster of villas facing the reservoir with a national park behind. The next day, the entire hills were covered with lychee trees. The tactic worked, and a village household could receive up to four million yuan in compensation. This story became the biggest news in town, and it also came as a shock to the town party-secretary who was in charge of this project. With the money received for the trees, some of the villagers constructed houses with up to five floors on plots they had previously acquired; others bought a car, started a business, or lost money in the gambling houses of Macau.

A few months later, villagers applied a similar tactic when the town considered redeveloping an old village area in front of the future government tower. Several rounds of meetings were held between the town party-secretary and the villagers. And yet, a villager recounted, "there was a 'rush to build' (抢建). It lasted for a week until the officials came to patrol and take

F. 22 Tangxia's new town centre, 2017.

Fig. 23

Fig. 24

F. 23 "Ugly old houses" in front of the new government tower: villagers' resistance against the threats of expropriation.
F. 24 Plotting urbanism: a construction rush for compensation.

pictures, and we stopped and restarted the construction at night. When I finished it, officials sprayed the word 'demolish' (拆) on the wall." In the end, the agreement failed. The town government accepted neither the villagers' request for a compensation of 3,000 yuan per square metre (in contrast to the official offer of 300 to 700 yuan) nor a land-exchange scheme after redevelopment. It finally built a long wall in front of the new government tower to block the view of the "ugly old village houses." [Fig. 23][70]

THE BACK GARDEN OF SHENZHEN

The second example of the villagers' struggle is a land grab. It concerned about 67 hectares of village land that the village party-secretary sold to a speculator, who eventually put it to a public auction. It was offered for an opening price of 600 million yuan and finally sold to a national-level developer for an unprecedented price of 2.6 billion yuan. It became a cluster of single-family houses constituting one of the company's largest property projects in China. Originally, this poor village was regarded as remote. However, it was repositioned by the construction of a new highway that linked the new town centre of Tangxia to the PRD expressway. The village thus became part of a back garden of the CBD of Shenzhen, providing space for luxury housing next to the national park, a reservoir and a lake, and a large golf course. [Fig. 21] This attracted wealthy families from Shenzhen to buy properties and commute on the expressway to Shenzhen.

In this village, land grabs were common, even though all land transactions required the signatures of village representatives and did not necessarily lead to a mobilisation of villagers. In the words of villagers, the abuse of power was as easy as the "finger [of the village party-secretary] pointing [on a map]."[71] The village election had already turned into a game of corruption and bribery,[72] and various cases of complicities and co-optation between the village office and some villagers became known. This went hand

in hand with a restrictive political climate and politicised social ties in the village office, which controlled the administration and the redistribution of villagers' incomes, opportunities, and welfare. This meant that mobilising villagers to oppose village cadres' appropriation of funds or land resources for personal gains faced serious hurdles.

However, as this land grab generated huge windfall profits, a few villagers succeeded in mobilising massive protests against the town government and demanding a fair share of the profit. At the same time, they revealed some hidden relations of interest between the village office and town and city officials. Their protests touched on the nerves of the officials that finally opened a path for a compromise between the town government and the villagers for "not letting the issue grow bigger."[73] It resulted in the distribution of the profit—0.5 billion yuan for the city, 1.5 billion for the town, and 0.32 billion for the village office.

After this success, villagers opposed the return of land revenues to the village office because of their distrust of the village party-secretary. The land revenues were finally turned into a material form of urbanisation by subsidising the construction of high-rise apartments for the villagers. A further impact of this protest was a change in the land policy in Tangxia, stipulating that 20% of the revenues of each land sale for real estate development had to be returned to the village collectives. This deal clearly incentivised both village offices and villagers to demand higher compensations for urban renewal projects, causing further land conflicts and a tremendous pressure against dissidents. Those villagers who led the protests experienced threats, violence, and imprisonment. By 2018, informed by villagers, the town government simply abolished the village election, and the village party-secretary also became the chairman of the village office.

A HIGH-SPEED RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT

The last case is the construction of a national high-speed train station, including a proposal for a theme park, prompting different players to take advantage of the turn towards concentrated urbanisation. The train station is located in a large area of farmland, including some old village settlements, which were designated to be transformed into the train station. But the large tract of required farmland was protected by the 1998 National Land Management Law and, thus, was only rented to migrant peasant households. Several attempts to arrange land deals with investors failed because of the absence of construction-land quotas allocated by higher-level governments. In this situation, the high-speed railway construction became the key to releasing this farmland for urban development: Since the 2008 financial crisis, the national state had implemented a strategy of territorial restructuring to achieve regional integration and economic modernisation. As a result, the entire Pearl River Delta has been reconfigured by a whole range of new railway infrastructures, including high-speed rails, inter-city rails, and metro lines. These lines became instruments to open up rural land for high-end urban developments that would, in turn, increase land rents. In this case, the city government of Dongguan—not the town government of Tangxia—claimed the planning control over urban redevelopment.

Individual villagers were the first to claim their land interests, resulting in a common rush for house construction to maximise compensations. During my fieldwork west of this village in 2018, I did not find some old village houses and fishponds, as shown on the Google satellite image. I did, however, find a large group of empty, grey-walled houses in the middle of a large agricultural field. [Fig. 24] I walked through these empty buildings with only two workshops in operation. The same happened in another settlement nearby, where some workers were still laying bricks. I ended up at a huge construction site that turned out to be a high-speed railway station. It was then I realised that these houses were built for demolition, as the city government offered a compensation of about 3,000 yuan per square metre. They were owned by two of the 27 village teams,

Fig. 25

200 villagers each, who lived in a new village apartment area.

A simultaneous project was a large-scale, ten-year plan for urban renewal. A "500-year-old village" should be demolished to build a new centre close to the railway station. It was marketed as a "high-speed rail city" and "a city in the north of Shenzhen," with middle-class housing, condominiums, shopping malls, car parking, and various facilities. By collaborating with local developers, the village office combined administrative power, its own land, land rights, and also the capital. With these resources, it could incentivise the villagers to accept a scheme for a one-to-one exchange of building plots prior to and after redevelopment so that the office could consolidate the fragmented land of 400 properties. This turned unauthorised land (26.7 hectares without certification) into a property with market value.[74] The villagers called this deal "turning old tiles into gold" (瓦屋變黃金), and the village office became a developer according to the state regulatory framework, with the villagers becoming owners of alienable private properties. [Fig. 25]

F. 25 "Turning old tiles into gold": redevelopment of a 500-year old village.

This example shows no clear-cut boundary in the relationship between the state and the village. Different actors were drawn into this project at the national level and from the city government, the village office, and individual villagers and developers. Nevertheless, they created momentum in shaping this new round of concentrated urbanisation. However, this development eliminated a vibrant and heterogeneous space, which was initially developed by the villagers' efforts and by the migrant workers who created their own urban space. The urban renewal project completely destroyed this space and imposed a singular logic of space production and a single form of property management, following the urbanised pathway of urbanised villages in Shenzhen.[75]

THE POLITICS OF CONCENTRATED URBANISATION

The three examples presented above show different dynamics resulting in specific pathways of urbanisation. Understanding the different tactics and processes in the negotiations between villagers, village cadres, town officials, and higher-level governments helps to uncover the changing politics and power relations in the shift from extended to concentrated urbanisation. In the following discussion, I will highlight four key aspects of this new paradigm of urbanisation that emerged in this process, namely land politics, villagers' activism, territorial power relations, and the material element of urbanisation itself.

In Tangxia, the *power of control over the land* has played a vital role in the urbanisation process. Due to its three-tiered territorial structure (city-town-village), village land constituted a mechanism that linked social production and reproduction. By investing in land and the built environment, villagers could bolster the arenas of social reproduction. They constructed different facilities such as elderly centres, libraries, parks, parking structures, rental housing, and factories and redistributed the profit among villagers. Whereas the village land had been turned into a commodity through land leases during the phase of extended urbanisation, the focus shifted in the 2000s towards the appropriation of higher land value from real estate development. Tangxia expanded its town centre and also reorganised the messy village spaces. This new paradigm of concentrated urbanisation resorted to the instruments of master plans, land-use control and planning regulations, placing villages under centralised planning control and a regulatory framework. However, this new paradigm clashed with the extant territorial structure and created new conflicts.

In this change of land politics, the main problem was not a shortage of land as such, but the existing fragmented patchwork of the village territories, and particularly, the resulting *agency and activism of the villagers*. Engaging and negotiating in land became the terrain of claiming their vested interests and the reproduction of their social relations in the village. Villagers were well aware of the existing power relations from various experiences of land dispossession, corruption, and collusion. Through their own longstanding experiences, the villagers developed a strong understanding of local politics and the land economy. Confronted with a multitude of territorial powers and with the complicated power relations inside the village-collective system itself, villagers tended to look for individualised ways to secure their interests. Their actions were not coordinated and collective, but they learned from each other, multiplying their power. By planting more lychee trees, constructing bigger houses, or demanding higher land compensation, they claimed their right to the collective land.

From this point of view, I argue that there was not a binary and clear-cut state-village power relation that could have led to a kind of territorial autonomy in these villages. Only rarely could we see villagers deploying "collective action" by defending their land rights or developing a sense of "collective identity," as suggested by You-tien Hsing in reference to non-confrontational counter-strategies of "civic territoriality."[76] Instead, the case study clearly shows that villagers were still embedded in the *territorial power relations* of the city, town, and village levels as part of the extension of the state space.

Interestingly, the results of the interplays between the different levels were always linked to the *material aspects of the urbanisation process*. All actors maintained the momentum of urban change through confrontations, negotiations, collaborations, or complicities. One important example of this is that villagers gained land compensation and turned it into a material form by building their own multi-storey houses and high-rise apartments, extending their material influence on following rounds of urbanisation. In short, this material aspect of territory was the realm of ongoing contestations—farmlands, hills, old houses, and multi-storey apartment buildings. In this way, villagers actively engaged

in the development of the paradigm shift towards concentrated urbanisation through their activism and engagement to keep their land.

THE PRODUCTION OF EXTENDED AND CONCENTRATED URBANISATION

By interrogating the territory, this chapter explored the complexities and contradictions of Chinese state space and provided an alternative account of extended urbanisation in Dongguan. It showed how the comprehension of the territorial question changes our view on the Chinese state space and transcends a dualist conception of territory and state power. In China, territorial control should be neither interpreted as a capitalist "territorial fix" nor as "state rescaling." Instead, Chinese territories are subjected to systematic, continuously shifting control and manipulation by the central state. However, "the territory" is largely absent as a concept in Chinese urban studies. The question of the territory is often assumed to be identical to the land question. But the control over land is a means to govern social relations and production processes, and both central and local governments are involved in this process within the national regulatory framework. However, the territory is controlled exclusively by the central state, while subordinated governments at different levels cannot change their territorial structure. My argument is that the central state uses this territorial regime to have a tight grip over all subordinated levels of government.

The continuous changes in Guangdong's territorial structure were directly related to the central control of the production of space and the implementation of national strategies of urbanisation. We thus saw a specific form of state space emerging during Mao's time and rapidly developing after 1979, when the state used the development of city-territories as motors of national economic growth and fast urbanisation. The continuous reorganisation and re-hierarchisation of the subnational territories enabled the state to control all governments and their interrelations and to produce and regulate different urbanisation processes and their dynamics of concentration and extension. This process of state territorialisation took place *prior to, during, and after* the unfolding of urbanisation processes and subsumed capitalist activities and the forces of globalisation under state territorial power. In this ongoing process, the state constantly changed its territorial structure to master socio-economic change and maintain and reproduce its political domination.

The case of Dongguan underscores how the specific process of extended urbanisation resulted from its specific territorial structure but in a contradictory way. The specificity of Dongguan was its three-tiered form of territorial power. This meant that village collectives were incorporated into the local government structure. This enabled local party cadres to execute political tasks and also circumvent certain regulations to pursue their economic interests, which caused fragmentation of political powers on the ground. The presence of state power was seemingly everywhere in this town-village landscape. Nevertheless, it was not a clear and consistent form of state power but a fragmentary, conflictual, and contradictory one that manifested itself in the production of space. The fieldwork shows us that these contradictions of state power were at the origin of the production of the fragmented spaces of extended urbanisation.

The control of state power over the urbanisation process became highly visible through the activities of the village offices, which were accountable to the town officials, and, thus, were fully embedded in the state territorial system. The village offices had to maintain social stability, binding villagers to the collective ownership system and managing a large number of people, activities, and land transactions. This was nevertheless a contested landscape because each round of urbanisation went hand in hand with land expropriations that sparked various conflicts. Despite the establishment of a redistribution system via investments into the built environment, improvements in social

reproduction, and the formation of shareholding real estate companies, villagers were subjected to the politics of the village offices. They faced various forms of abuse of power, corruption, and collusion. Subsequently, instead of developing a consolidated identity, the villagers were caught in the dynamics of ambiguous, contested, and distrusted relationships that shaped the ongoing processes of urbanisation. Villagers developed their own way of getting hold of the land by developing and selling it piece by piece, which led to the process of plotting urbanism and the piecemeal production of space.

In producing these fragmented spaces, local villagers and migrant workers played crucial roles in making their own spaces and everyday lives. Despite their silent roles, migrant workers have established themselves in various local businesses, such as shops, construction firms, small workshops, trading, and transport. Despite their landlord-and-tenant relationships, local villagers and migrants found ways of co-existing and making their livelihoods in the villages.

The spaces of extended urbanisation were driven by various contradictions, which finally triggered a new round of urbanisation. On the one hand, the entire village territories had become urbanised in a fragmented and often chaotic manner. On the other hand, the overall urban dynamics in the Pearl River Delta turned towards centralisation and urban intensification to increase productivity and profits. Consequently, Dongguan's three-tiered territorial power structure and its mechanism of profit sharing between the three territorial levels were replaced by the territorial integration of state power and governmental relations. However, despite the introduction of centralised land regulation, the material spaces of the villages, whether legal or illegal, became the facts on the ground: The fragmentation of land allowed the villagers to negotiate the government's projects and land expropriations, considerably shaping the new forms of concentrated urbanisation.

Ultimately, the Chinese state reproduced its power through the production of space and, in turn, produced its own territorial contradictions with the fragmentation of space and power due to the linkages of the state to local economic interests. By taking into account the agency of the people in re-making space, it becomes obvious that the Chinese state neither shows a consolidation nor a fragmentation of power but rather a constant adaptation of territorial power to new challenges of economic development and urbanisation. This reveals a specific characteristic of the Chinese state: When unfolding the historical and contextual specificity of territories, this state mode of production is durable but simultaneously malleable and contradictory.

ENDNOTES

1 Lefebvre, *State, Space, World*, 224, 228.
2 Yeung, *Foreign Investment and Socio-Economic Development in China*.
3 Lefebvre, "Space and the State."
4 Elden, "Land, Terrain, Territory"; Elden, "Thinking Territory Historically"; Elden, *Understanding Henri Lefebvre*, 223.
5 Agnew, "The Territorial Trap."
6 Streule, "Doing Mobile Ethnography."
7 Schmid, "Specificity and Urbanization."
8 Wong, "Territorially-Nested Urbanization in China."
9 McGee, "The Emergence of Desakota Regions in Asia."
10 Sit, "Mega-city, Extended Metropolitan Region, Desakota, and Exo-Urbanization."
11 Lin, "Urbanization of the Pearl River Delta."
12 Friedmann, "The Future of Periurban Research."
13 Agnew, "The Territorial Trap."
14 Tang, "Governing by the State"; Buckingham, "Uncorking the Neoliberal Bottle."
15 Lin, *Developing China*.
16 Cartier, "Territorial Urbanization and the Party-State in China"; Cartier, "A Political Economy of Rank"; Chan, "Fundamentals of China's Urbanisation and Policy"; Lin, *Developing China*; Ma, "Urban Administrative Restructuring."
17 Ma, "Urban Administrative Restructuring"; Brenner, *New State Spaces;* Brenner, "The Urban Question as a Scale Question."
18 Liu, Jin, and Zhou, 中国政区地理 [*China's Administrative Geography*]; Liu and Fan, 中国市制的历史演变 [*A History of the City Administrative System in China*].
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21 Wong, "Territorially-Nested Urbanization in China."
22 Brenner, "Beyond State-Centrism?"
23 Hayton, *The Invention of China*, 189.
24 Tang, "Town-Country Relations in China."
25 Faure, *Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China*.
26 Hayton, *The Invention of China*, 190; Yu, "The Concept of 'Territory' in Modern China."
27 Lincoln, *An Urban History of China*, 212–217.
28 Zürcher, "The Chinese Communes."
29 Chan, *Cities with Invisible Walls*.
30 Wang, *The China Order*, 178.
31 Zhao, *Prisoner of the State*, 247.
32 Pu, 中国行政区划改革 [*A Study of China's Administrative Division Reform*].
33 Ma, "Urban Administrative Restructuring."
34 Ma, "Urban Administrative Restructuring."
35 Karaman, et al., "Plot by Plot: Plotting Urbanism"; Wong, "Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Dongguan."
36 Dongguan Municipal Gazetteer Compilation Committee, 东莞市志 [*Dongguan Municipal Gazetteer*], 526.
37 Skinner, "Peasant Organization in Rural China."
38 Dongguan Municipal Gazetteer Compilation Committee, 东莞市志 [*Dongguan Municipal Gazetteer*], 85.
39 Dongguan Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau, 东莞市民政志 [Gazetteer of Dongguan Municipal Civil Affairs], 50.
40 Shenzhen Municipal Gazetteer Compilation Committee, 深圳市志 [*Shenzhen Municipal Gazetteer*], 259.
41 Dongguan's Guancheng Gazetteer Compilation Committee, 东莞市莞城志 [*Gazetteer of Guancheng of Dongguan Municipality*], 102.
42 There are four prefecture-level cities without a county-level unit in China. Administratively, a prefecture-level city has the county-level units, such as urban districts and counties. Dongguan is a city without county levels that allowed it directly to govern towns, and especially to appoint town offices; otherwise, power belongs to a county led by the provincial government.
43 These numbers were based on the year of 1988. By 1998, Taiping and Humen towns were merged to form a new Humen town. Thereafter, the total number of towns became 28.
44 Dongguan Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau, 东莞市民政志 [*Gazetteer of Dongguan Municipal Civil Affairs*], 51.
45 Village collectives are legally defined as non-governmental units. In 1982, the top-tiered communes were abolished, and village collectives remained a two-tiered organisation of collective ownership, in charge of political, economic, and social tasks within their areas.
46 Sanlian Lifeweek, 东莞30年巨变 [*The Great Transformation of Dongguan*].
47 Here, I use the term "village office" to simplify the complexity of the administration of a village collective.
48 Dongguan Institute of Urban Planning and Design, "Dongguan Tangxia Master Plan (2012–2022)," IX.
49 Dongguan's Tangxia Gazetteer Compilation Committee, 东莞市塘厦志 [*Gazetteer of Tangxia Town of Dongguan Municipality*], 49.
50 The term 50 years was just a common practice in this town and could be 20 or 30 years in other areas.
51 The size of these housing plots was mainly 40, 80, and 120 m^2 that followed the existent principles of housing construction in Dongguan.
52 Lin, *Developing China*, 174; Liu, "Land-based Finance," 36–58.
53 Whiting, *Power and Wealth in Rural China*; Whiting; "The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass Roots."
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63 Interview with a villager, 2014.
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65 Interview with a village officer, 2018.
66 Perry, "From Mass Campaigns to Managed Campaigns."

67 Interview with a villager, 2014
68 Yang and Wang, "Land Property Rights Regimes in China."
69 Interview with a village officer, 2018.
70 Interview with a villager, 2014.
71 Interview with a villager, 2016.
72 Interview with villagers, 2015. There were variations of villagers' election participation in different villages. See Wong, et al., "Village Elections, Grassroots Governance and the Restructuring of State Power."
73 Interview with a villager, 2016.
74 Interview with a village officer, 2018.
75 Jiang, et al., "Whose Village?"; Karaman, et al., "Plot by Plot: Plotting Urbanism."
76 Hsing, *The Great Urban Transformation*.

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F. 21 Data from fieldwork, 2018.
F. 22 Google Earth