

NEW CONCEPTS OF URBANISATION PROCESSES

AN OVERVIEW

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This chapter explores the potential of a comparative approach in theory building and the conceptualisation of urbanisation processes. It shows one possible way in which new concepts can be generated by bringing together different experiences from various urban territories across the globe. As argued in Chapter 1, a new vocabulary is required to decipher the rapidly mutating urban landscapes and to identify the multitude of urbanisation processes that are shaping the planet to facilitate discussion and common understanding. Chapters 2 and 3 present our transductive comparative research approach. This is a qualitative and collaborative approach that led us to invent a series of methodological tools, especially specific versions of qualitative mapping, multi-sited ethnography and common comparative workshops. We could show that this methodological design enables us to identify the patterns and pathways of urbanisation, even for very large urban territories. This collective approach has resulted in the elaboration of a range of new concepts.

In this chapter we first analyse the shortcomings of the most widely used concepts of urbanisation processes, namely suburbanisation, gentrification and urban informality. This includes a discussion on the problematic of conceptualising urbanisation processes. We then introduce six of the concepts we developed in our comparative project: popular urbanisation, plotting urbanism,

mass housing urbanisation, multilayered patchwork urbanisation, bypass urbanisation and the incorporation of urban differences. We briefly introduce two additional processes during this discussion: laminar urbanisation and post-proletarian urbanisation. This selection represents the major set of urbanisation processes we have conceptualised so far. To give readers the possibility to get an all-encompassing overview on our findings, we present here a detailed summary of each concept that focuses on the relationship between the different processes. The full presentation of the individual urbanisation processes is provided in Part III of this book.

CONCEPTS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF URBANISATION

Many of the existing concepts for the analysis of urbanisation processes have serious shortcomings. Generic terms such as ‘urban restructuring’ or ‘urban transformation’ indicate that some sort of urbanisation process is going on, but they do not distinguish between different qualities and rhythms of urbanisation. An evaluation of more specific concepts reveals some additional difficulties. Firstly, there is only a very small number of well-established and clearly defined process-based concepts available for the analysis of urbanisation. By far the most widely applied and debated concepts in English-speaking urban studies are ‘suburbanisation’, ‘gentrification’ and ‘informal urbanisation’. These three concepts constitute a very restricted and limited toolset for analysing and deciphering the wide variety of urbanisation processes and the heterogeneity of urban situations developing all over the planet.

Postcolonial critiques (see e.g. Roy 2005; Tang 2014; Wu 2020) point to a second problem posed by the origin of these terms: their Anglo-American bias. It is important to reflect on the conditions under which these concepts were developed, then applied to other cases, gaining widespread acceptance and finally entering into the canon of the scientific industry. Even though many of these concepts have been used worldwide in recent years, they are nevertheless rooted in Western debates, experiences, inspirations and imaginations. Thus, gentrification was originally a very specific concept that was derived from the term ‘gentry’ that only existed in Britain and India, though with different connotations. And while various forms of peripheral urbanisation had started to occur in the 19th century and have emerged all over the planet today, the most widely applied term in anglophone texts is ‘suburb’, which is still tainted by North American debates from the 1960s. These terms designate a specific location, socioeconomic situation and urban experience, mainly connected with middle-class families living in detached houses on the outskirts of agglomerations (see e.g. Gans 1967 and Soja 2010). These origins are still effective as mostly subliminal and unconscious connotations, widely disseminated through Hollywood’s cinema and TV series. However, a wide range of other terms designate urban development outside dense central urban areas, such as *banlieue* (French) or *barrio* (Spanish), *bairro* (Portuguese), *campung* (Indonesian) and many more (see e.g. Topalov 2017). Such terms might evoke very different—in certain respects even opposite—socio-spatial contexts and experiences (such as peripheral working-class neighbourhoods or the rural-urban interface), which,

in the dominant English-language academic literature, have either been treated as simple translations or relegated to being ‘unimportant particularities’. A very informative overview on the different terms and their meanings can be found in *What’s in a Name?* edited by Harris and Vorns (2017). Ren (2017) explains at the example of Beijing that there is a whole series of Chinese terms to designate urban peripheries in everyday language and academic scholarship; some of them general, others local. However, they are all routinely translated as suburbs or suburbanisation in English. A debate on peripheral urbanisation that has been recently emerging in the Latin American context offers a much more nuanced picture of urbanisation processes beyond urban centres (see Caldeira 2017; Lukas and Reis 2022). All these efforts testify to the great variety and complexity of the urban periphery and reaffirm the need for a diversified and enriched vocabulary of urbanisation.

The term ‘informality’ also has specific connotations. Its origins lie in the designation of an informal labour market for poor immigrant workers in southern cities as opposed to the normalised, protected, ‘modern’ and Western way of formalised wage relations, put forward in the early 1970s especially by the International Labour Organisation (Souza and Tokman 1976; AlSayyad 2004). This concept was subsequently extended to embrace an entire way of life and applied to neighbourhoods that were constructed outside of the regularised and formalised procedures of housing construction and urban planning. The term ‘informal’ is thus imbued from the outset with negative connotations, designating a kind of exception or deviation from the ‘modern’ model of urbanisation (Varley 2013). Even if the concept changed its meaning over the course of various redefinitions, first in Latin America and later worldwide, and was finally turned into a positive term emphasising the transformative capacity of the urban poor evoking alternative pathways of urban development by subaltern and postcolonial studies (Roy and AlSayyad 2004; Roy 2005; Hernández et al. 2010), it still bears discernible pejorative traces from its origins.

A third shortcoming of these concepts is their one-dimensional character, which privileges only one aspect or factor as central to their definition. Again, the example of informal urbanisation illustrates this point: the distinction between the formal and the informal tends to dominate the debate, and the resulting concept is inadequate in accounting for the spatialities and lived dimensions that encompass many different modes of producing urban spaces. Furthermore, examples of urban areas displaying certain aspects of informality abound and include very different urban configurations. We might indeed ask whether the shacks along the rail tracks in Kolkata, the relatively well-organised, self-constructed neighbourhoods in Mexico City, the consolidated and normalised post-gecekondu areas

in Istanbul (Esen 2011), the wealthy residential areas in Belgrade constructed during the transition period between the socialist and the neoliberal regime (Diener et al. 2012) or even China’s urbanised villages should all be called informal settlements, only because they match certain aspects of informality in their production process. While the conceptual axis formality–informality still has great value for understanding urbanisation in general, e.g. as a ‘mode of governing’ (Roy 2005), and can be useful in the analysis and definition of territorial regulation (see Chapter 1), to use it as a characteristic and defining element of an urbanisation process is indeed questionable. As Mbembe and Nuttall (2008: 8–9) note in respect of African urbanisms: ‘[R]ather than opposing the ‘formal’ with the ‘informal’ or the ‘visible’ with the ‘invisible’, we need a more complex anthropology of things, forms, and signs in order to account for the life of the city in Africa. Analytically as well as in people’s daily experience, simplistic oppositions between the formal and the informal are unhelpful.’

A fourth issue is the loss of precision and relevance through generalisation. A concept may originate in a specific experience linked to one place and then be applied to more and more apparently similar examples in other places. Through this tactic of conceptual stretching, the original definition is relaxed to encompass more and more cases, until it becomes an almost generic term. The most prominent example of this is the term gentrification, which was originally coined to describe specific experiences in London in the 1960s by highlighting the displacement of poor residents from central locations and their replacement by more affluent social groups, accompanied by the physical upgrading of neighbourhoods and the increase in ground rents (Glass 1964). In a further important conceptual reformulation, gentrification was linked to the realisation of the rent gap as a key defining element (Smith 1996; for an overview see Bernt 2022). This concept was first applied fruitfully in Britain and North America and soon also used in some European contexts. Later it was reinterpreted as a global strategy (Smith 2002). Recently, even the term ‘planetary gentrification’ has been introduced to discuss a wide variety of examples of gentrification—understood in a very broad sense—across the world (Lees et al. 2016; see also Slater 2017). Through this process of conceptual stretching, the term gentrification has reached a high level of generality and has become almost a blanket term for any kind of urban upgrading and restructuring accompanied by some form of displacement of people and businesses. Processes such as neighbourhood upgrading in London or Berlin now fall under the same rubric as the piecemeal process of urban densification in Lagos, large-scale state-led urban renewal projects in Shanghai or Istanbul, condo developments in Jakarta or slum clearance strategies in Mumbai. Even if we acknowledge that

the term gentrification can be applied in very productive ways to many situations and has also become an important concept underpinning many political struggles, we can nevertheless imagine that a much more nuanced and richer vocabulary could be developed to designate the various emerging kinds of urban upgrading and restructuring, also reflecting varying local experiences (see e.g. Préteceille 2007; Wu 2016; Hanakata 2017). As Ghertner (2015) observes, the most violent forms of displacement take place in situations in which public, common and customary land uses are being targeted by planetary trends of land privatisation, property formalisation and tenure regularisation. These situations, Ghertner argues, are not just variations of gentrification but constitute an altogether different process. Analysing condo developments in Jakarta's former Kampung areas, which could also be subsumed under the wide concept of gentrification, Leitner and Sheppard (2017) propose instead the term 'contested accumulation through displacement', thus provincialising Harvey's (2003) concept of accumulation by dispossession. Analysing the real estate megaproject developments in Asia that lead to the conflict-ridden and sometimes violent displacements of residents and businesses, Shatkin develops a revised concept of the rent gap, noting that the specifics of current analyses of gentrification in the USA and Europe are of 'limited relevance in much of urban Asia' (Shatkin 2017: 27). These shortcomings do not mean, however, that the concept of gentrification should be restricted to places in the West or even be abandoned altogether – it still plays a crucial role in many urban territories. But it needs to be defined in a more precise way (see Bernt 2022), and it should not be used to prevent the development of other concepts, as we argue in more detail in Chapter 17.

The effects of homogenising strategies become especially clear in the concept of 'suburbanisation', which has become a generic term that can be applied to all kinds of urbanisation processes unfolding beyond the confines of relatively dense urban core areas (which then by default are defined as 'urban'). While it is illuminating to learn that today the vast majority of urban populations live outside central urban areas, it is another question whether it is useful to assemble a wide array of very different urban experiences under the conceptual umbrella of 'global suburbanisms' (Keil 2013). The vague definition of suburban as a combination of a non-central population, economic growth, urban spatial expansion and 'suburban ways of life' (Keil 2013: 11) embraces all sorts of urban territories, whether their residents have a high or low income, whether they are of high or low density, already well established or recently built, dominated by private developments, self-constructed settlements or mass housing urbanisation. Directly related to these problematic aspects of the concept of suburbanisation is the dualism between 'city' and 'suburb' that it entails

(see also Schmid 2023). As the large comparative project Global Suburbanism recently demonstrated (Keil and Wu 2022), urban territories lying beyond the urban core may display very different forms and dynamics, and even in the same territory very different urban configurations may emerge that do not fit at all into such a binary construction.

Moreover, processes that could be defined as gentrification affect many suburban areas today. Lees et al. (2016: 211) recognise that suburbanisation and gentrification processes are becoming increasingly blurred. If we take these observations seriously, we can conclude that almost the entire contemporary urban world is becoming suburban, while at the same time it is also becoming gentrified. We arrive here at a paradox. As these terms are stretched to encompass more and more cases or singularities, they become at the same time fuzzy and lose much of their explanatory capacity. As Robinson (2016: 19) aptly puts it: much difference risks remaining unconceptualised, leaving us with concepts without difference and difference without conceptualisation.

As a result of these standardising tactics all sorts of urban constellations are straitjacketed into a few generally accepted concepts, leading to the reduction of conceptual complexity, the simplification of explanations and misleading interpretations of urban realities. Furthermore, these tactics restrict the imagination and reduce scholars' inventiveness in producing new concepts. In contrast, a range of conceptual experimentations and proposals, particularly derived from southern experiences, go in a different direction and enrich the urban vocabulary, such as 'tenement urbanism' (Huchzermeyer 2011b), 'occupancy urbanism' (Benjamin 2008), 'subaltern urbanisation' (Mukhopadhyay et al. 2020) and 'recombinant urbanisation' (Balakrishnan 2019). A certain number of concepts also address urbanisation processes occurring beyond the suburbs, such as 'desakota', 'periurbanisation' or 'exurbanisation', mainly inspired by the development of various rural-urban constellations (see e.g. McGee 1991; Andersson et al. 2009; Schmid 2023). All these contributions have inspired our own study and could form the basis of a broad agenda of conceptual differentiation.

Conversely, several research projects followed or were inspired by our own comparative endeavour. Lindsay Howe (2022) developed an entire range of specific terms to distinguish the variety of urbanisation processes for townships in the extended urban region of Johannesburg, and Meth et al. (2020) conceptualised a series of urbanisation processes in a comparative study of urban peripheries in Johannesburg, eThekweni and Addis Ababa, that they call 'speculative', 'vanguard', 'auto-constructed', 'transitioning', and 'inherited' peripheries.

URBANISATION PROCESSES

In this section we present a short version of each urbanisation process we have developed in our project. At the end of this chapter we add a list that summarises the full set of concepts. More detailed discussions of these concepts can be found in Part III of this book.

Our definitions of urbanisation processes are organised according to the three-dimensional conception of urbanisation elaborated in Chapter 1. The first dimension captures the material production of urban space based on the construction of settlements, production sites and infrastructure, everyday actions and interactions. The second captures the production of conceptions of urban space, including processes of territorial regulation through which power structures are inscribed into a territory. The third captures the production of lived space and thus the patterns and dynamics of differences that emerge, consolidate or become incorporated during urbanisation.

POPULAR URBANISATION

Popular urbanisation was the first concept we identified in our project, and it serves here as an example of our comparative procedure. It became clear at the very beginning of our comparative discussions that neighbourhoods in Mexico City, Lagos, Istanbul and Kolkata were shaped by very similar dynamics. They were all located at peripheral areas and at least initially inhabited by low-income people. The houses were at least partly self-produced by their residents and were thus marked by incremental processes of construction, and in some cases developed a great capacity for adaptation to the needs of their inhabitants.

To name this urbanisation process, we borrowed the term *urbanización popular*, which is frequently used in the Latin American literature (Navarro and Moctezuma 1989; Azuela 1993; Duhau and Giglia 2008). However, its original use and definition is very close to that of informal urbanisation, and our own definition is quite different. In order to indicate this distance, we used the English translation 'popular urbanisation'. In our definition, we conceived of popular urbanisation as a process that points to the ways in which people establish themselves in the urban environment through collective processes of appropriating and producing space (Streule and Schmid 2014). The key to the definition of this urbanisation process is its multidimensionality, and this can be summarised by three main aspects: firstly, the material transformation of the urban territory with strong participation by the inhabitants; secondly, residents' capacity to fight and negotiate successfully for access to the land and (relatively)

favourable territorial regulations, which requires good political organisation; and thirdly, the collective experiences of the inhabitants during their everyday life and popular struggles for recognition.

In all four cases the massive immigration of people and the blatant lack of affordable housing have been key drivers of the process. In the absence of proactive interventions by governments to provide affordable housing, communities started to produce what seemed to be spontaneous and makeshift settlements. In historical terms, we can understand popular urbanisation as an alternative to the process of mass housing urbanisation that started in Hong Kong and Paris about at the same time as popular urbanisation first emerged in Mexico City and Istanbul.

In all these cases, gaining access to the land involves various forms of collective mobilisation and struggle and usually concerns either collective land, state-owned land, state-protected land (such as wetlands or nature reserves) or marginal land that is not already used (such as marshy or land along the shore of a sea or lake). We can thus understand popular urbanisation as a specific urban strategy in which individuals and groups engage in intricate webs of negotiation with state actors to secure incremental gains in tenure security, infrastructure and amenities.

The extent to which these settlements are able to take hold and consolidate into less precarious neighbourhoods that sometimes even develop considerable urban qualities and can be adapted to the needs of their inhabitants depends on the collective mobilisation of the residents and their capacity to negotiate successfully with various state actors. In Istanbul and Mexico City, relatively rapid processes of consolidation could be established, and popular settlements acquired a certain stability and suitable infrastructure and sanitation. The image of the shack so often evoked in both popular and scientific accounts and representations referred in fact only to brief episodes in both cases. On the other hand, in Kolkata and Lagos popular urbanisation has played a very limited role, mainly because most of the land was either in private hands or embedded in complex structures of ownership, and it was not possible to develop enough pressure through political mobilisation for popular urbanisation to take place.

In Istanbul, the first stages of popular urbanisation emerged in the second half of the 1940s. These settlements, called *gecekondu*, were largely constructed on state-owned land in close proximity to factories. They were initially treated as a 'social disaster' (Şenyapılı 1998: 308) and the only viable option seemed to be to demolish them immediately. Their rapidly increasing number, the need to house cheap labour power for the growing industries and the inability of the state to meet these needs, forced subsequent administrations to follow a policy of tolerance and regulation. Consequently, *Gecekondu*

residents organised themselves, sometimes under the influence of socialist and revolutionary groups (Aslan 2004) and also through clientele arrangements, and leveraged their voting power to obtain tenure security. In many areas, mafia-like groups, as well as communitarian networks organised the parcelisation and trade of land. Following new tenure laws in the 1980s, many former *gecekond* areas rapidly transformed into dense urban neighbourhoods. Increasing tenure security went hand in hand with the commodification of informal land markets (Öncü 1988). Thus, in the case of Istanbul the process of popular urbanisation turned into a different process, which we call plotting urbanism.

A similar situation developed in Mexico City, where the state tolerated popular urbanisation while seeking to control and regulate the process. When in 1954 the Federal District (*Distrito Federal*, the federal state that governs the central area of Mexico City, recently renamed *Ciudad de México*) implemented restrictions on illegal subdivisions and trade of *ejido* lands (a form of communal agricultural land), this propelled popular urbanisation in neighbouring federal states. In the following decades, the process generated housing for millions of residents in once remote places that today have become fairly central as a result of the massive expansion of the urban region. The regularisation of these neighbourhoods was closely linked to social and political struggles. Mexico City, like many other Latin American cities, has a long history of grassroots organisation. Neighbourhood associations led by charismatic leaders have been a crucial aspect of popular urbanisation, as they have organised the struggle for the provision of basic infrastructure and services. Today, in the face of continuing illegal subdivisions and land occupations, local governments follow a selective policy of regularisation and eviction, especially to prevent encroachments on nature reserves.

In contrast to both Istanbul and Mexico City, the process of popular urbanisation in Lagos and Kolkata was always seriously hampered by very low tenure security. In contrast to its common representation as a stereotypical 'city of slums', popular urbanisation in Lagos is the exception rather than the rule. Lagos's popular settlements, such as parts of Ajegunle or Makoko (the iconic settlement at a prominent spot built on stilts in the waters of the Laguna, often pictured in the media), account for only a very small portion of the urbanised territory. Our analysis has found that popular urbanisation has not been able to take hold in Lagos due to the absence of accountability on the part of state actors as they undertake demolitions and forced evictions, together with the collusion of customary landowners and the lack of powerful grassroots organisations promoting shared living space; as well as the highly individualistic strategies of survival and claim-making. Thus, the process of plotting urbanism dominates most of Lagos.

Similarly, the process of popular urbanisation plays only a minor role in Kolkata. Large parts of the areas officially designated as slums are in fact *bustees* (see e.g. Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority 2005). The Urdu term *bustee* (or *basti*) does mean slum, but in most cases areas designated as bustees are a specific form of tenement settlement, which are legal urban entities based on a three-tiered tenancy system: firstly, the landowner; secondly the hut owner (the *thika* tenant who has a lease from the landowner) and, thirdly, the bustee dweller to whom the hut has been let (Sengupta 2010). Thus, areas of popular urbanisation, according to our definition, occurred in only a limited number of areas in Kolkata, such as in the south, settled mainly by Hindu refugees from East Bengal after the partition of India in 1947 or in certain peripheral areas in the eastern fringe, close to or even inside the wetlands (see e.g. Roy 2004). Additionally, toehold settlements have been constructed by very poor people on state land, e.g. along roads, railway lines and channels.

These four examples of popular urbanisation demonstrate the necessary conditions for this process to emerge and flourish. A key condition is the availability of cheap land (e.g. public or collectively owned land) that allows the construction of the first illegal settlements. Another important condition is a state strategy of tolerating and even negotiating the construction and consolidation of these settlements. The presence of collective networks, a certain degree of political organisation and specific collective traditions are also necessary for the success of popular urbanisation. What, then, are the advantages of popular urbanisation? While it is born out of specific and often precarious conditions, it can advance utopian moments of collectivity, engagement and mutual self-help. It offers residents some very practical advantages, such as a high degree of flexibility and adaptability of the houses, the incremental evolution of the settlement in response to their needs and requirements, the adaptation of the built structure to changing socioeconomic situations, and opportunities for social inclusion.

PLOTTING URBANISM

In the course of our research we identified another urbanisation process, which at first sight appeared to be very similar to popular urbanisation and, like the latter, is often subsumed under categories such as informality, incremental urban development or slum. However, on closer examination we saw that it possesses fundamentally different dynamics and internal contradictions. This process was apparent in a surprising combination of cases, namely Istanbul, Kolkata, Lagos and Shenzhen. In fact, we needed quite some time before we came to accept it as a common process and then to elaborate a more precise and convincing definition that we could apply productively to all four cases.

Unlike popular urbanisation, in which collective action, political organisation and self-help play decisive roles, this process is mainly defined by three other characteristics: firstly, the relationship to the land is based on a territorial compromise that allows for the existence of multiple conflicting systems of landownership and land regimes. Secondly, market mechanisms and commodification play an important role, which also creates specific social relationships between landlords or rentiers, who often still live in the area, and their tenants. Finally, the process proceeds in a piecemeal and incremental way, plot by plot, without overarching planning, which creates a variety of local situations. We therefore called this process 'plotting urbanism' in order to stress the fundamental role of the plot, but also allowing some allusions to the strategic and dubious meanings of plotting in the sense of scheming for individual gain.

Plotting urbanism refers firstly to piecemeal and speculative land development or the densification of existing settlement areas. In the case of Istanbul, it is often the result of the consolidation, intensification and increasing commodification of 'post-gecekondu' areas (Esen 2011). In Kolkata, it designates old bustee areas that have been undergoing dramatic redevelopment and verticalisation. In Shenzhen, it comprises the emergence of 'urbanised villages' in the context of state-driven urban development. In Lagos, plotting is so dominant that it must be seen as just the ordinary way of urban development in its ever-expanding and densifying urban peripheries.

Plotting urbanism occurs often in the presence of conflicting multiple claims to land, which are a source of contradictions that are circumvented and exploited by landlords and various authorities, largely in the pursuit of individual gain. In most cases it can be understood as a kind of a territorial compromise that articulates entrenched, customary, collective or just illegal rules and regulations with formal or state land regimes. Thus, individual landowners, land mafias, religious communities, village communities and big landowning families have considerable power in negotiating access to land. Plotting allows a rapid increase in population, and usually results in extremely dense spaces with poor urbanistic qualities. Because of its piecemeal and uncoordinated character and the prioritisation of individual gain over public good, the resulting living environment is often deficient in common facilities and public spaces, even if there might be a vibrant public life.

Its main contrast with popular urbanisation is the key role played by the production of housing for rent. In fact, plotting often realises the potential rent gap in the area. Here modifying Neil Smith's (1996) original concept, we define the rent gap as the difference between the actual rent obtained in an area, and the potential rent that could be captured through intensification and marketisation

(see also Özdemir 1999). The rent gap itself is produced and realised by the stabilisation of a land regime, which potentially turns dwelling units with very low realised exchange value into assets that can be developed for the market. As a consequence, the landlord-tenant relationship shapes the social relations in significant ways.

Signs of commercialisation were already present in the very beginning of popular urbanisation in Istanbul. Settlers often had to pay fees to dubious gatekeepers and owners, and individual houses could be sold in the informal market as well. With increasing tenure security, the tendency towards commercialisation intensified in the late 1970s. With a series of amnesties in the 1980s which not only regularised land tenure but also encouraged densification (Ekinci 1998), old gecekondu neighbourhoods underwent a dramatic transformation. This marked the shift from popular urbanisation to plotting urbanism. Plotting happened in different ways, in the form of the replacement of existing gecekondu structures with multistorey apartment buildings, and in some peripheral areas, agricultural land was illegally subdivided by its owners and sold for apartment construction without the required permits (Yonder 1987). In both cases the resulting built environment was very dense and of inferior quality, due to substandard construction techniques and materials, and inefficient land use allocation. While it allowed many residents to achieve upward mobility through rent accumulation (Borataş 1994: 28; Işık and Pınarcıoğlu 2001), a major downside of the process has been the entrenchment of exploitative relations within informal land markets and the emergence of rentier ethics amongst the urban poor (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu 2001). Transformation of gecekondu areas through plotting almost disappeared in the 2000s with the introduction of an urban renewal agenda. In the last few years however, plotting has re-emerged in some late-generation gecekondu areas.

In Lagos, plotting could be seen as the long-entrenched common process of urbanisation. Successive colonial and national governments have had little effect in regulating Lagos's land market. Even the Land Use Act of 1978, which was intended to place all land in Lagos under the control of the governor, has contributed to rather than resolved land disputes. Due to the complicated and costly procedures involved in securing formal land titles, and a lack of enforcement on the part of the governments, most plot-owners have not sought formalisation. This lack of formal tenure security did not, however, prevent the growth of a highly dynamic and expanding land market overseen by indigenous landowning families that act as surveyors and regulators. This results in an ambiguous status quo, in which the state tolerates the customary authority over land, and plot owners and tenants try to negotiate individual arrangements. While many established migrants are able to afford plots, new migrants join the system as tenants. Previously

peripheral but now highly central areas have developed into dense residential areas through plotting. Some plot owners in central areas are selling their now valuable plots to embark on a second round of plotting in rapidly developing areas in more peripheral places, where they can afford more land. Similarly, the tenants—who constitute the majority of the residents in plotted areas—save up their money in the hope of becoming plot owners themselves. After buying the land from the indigenous owners, the plot owners build incrementally as money becomes available, and rent out units to finance the rest of the construction.

The formation of urbanised villages (*cheng-zhongcun*, literally ‘village in the city’) in Shenzhen was marked by conflicting interests between the city government, which followed the order of the national government to integrate the dual rural-urban land system originating in the Maoist area to propel rapid urban development, and the village collectives, whose farmlands had been expropriated by the city government for urban expansion. With the new territorial regime established in Shenzhen following China’s economic and territorial reform in the 1980s, collective landownership (‘rural land’) changed to state ownership (‘urban land’). Thus, landownership of the village collectives was systematically converted into a kind of leasehold in which only the right to use the land remained intact. The superimposition of a city territorial regime on the former village collective system gave rise to villagers’ battles to defend their land, and created interstices in which a unique form of territorial regulation evolved. In the course of successive rounds of large-scale acquisition of farmland by the city government, the village collectives fought for a land exchange policy that granted them land on which to build houses and factories. In this process, village households found an alternative source of income by riding the wave of urbanisation on their own terms; namely, by building higher and denser (Bach 2010; Hsing 2012). The city government attempted to incorporate these spaces into the city administrative system and turn village collectives into shareholding companies; however, this process of incorporation strengthened the bargaining power of the villagers (Song and Zenou 2012), as they were allowed to construct new buildings, and thus effectively to conduct their own businesses renting property. From this contradiction the process of plotting urbanism emerged, leading to the typology of urbanised villages, which attracted migrant labourers searching for cheap housing (Wu et al. 2013). Due to the lack of effective measures against illegal construction, the urban spaces produced by plotting are generally marked by varied, dense and often unhygienic living conditions. However, the generic ground floor layout of these multistorey houses offers ample possibilities for installing shops, small businesses, workshops and markets and hence street life in these urbanised villages is

often lively. Additionally, a range of public facilities was established by both the villagers’ shareholding companies and the city government. The most recent phase of plotting urbanism in Shenzhen has been dominated by a policy of urban renewal, in which most of the existing urban fabric has been demolished and replaced by condominiums and office towers, which marks the transition towards yet another urbanisation process in Shenzhen.

The process of plotting urbanism in Kolkata is an extraordinary development that first emerged in Howrah, a neglected and overlooked territory with about three million inhabitants located on the west bank of the Hooghly river, on the ‘other side’ of the city of Kolkata. Howrah bridge connects the central bazaar area of Kolkata to Howrah and Howrah station, one of the two major railway stations of the region, which in turn links Kolkata to the western part of India. Since the mid-2000s concrete structures of up to six floors with limited sanitation have popped up in the midst of the traditional bustee areas characterised by one-storey buildings with small courtyards and narrow alleys between the houses. These new buildings are not only precarious but also partly illegal; they are tolerated by a weak local state in a situation of extreme housing scarcity. Our detailed analysis shows that the specific constellation of the three-tier bustee system has allowed landowners to undertake this massive intensification. Once the original tenants were relocated by landlords to the upper (illegal) floors of the new houses, the ground floors were used to store goods for the nearby bazaars, and new homes mostly for lower middle-class residents were created on the second and third floors. This form of densification and verticalisation soon became widespread, and today large parts of the central areas of Howrah, as well as parts of the bustees in the harbour area, have been transformed into this unusual urban typology that only aggravates the precarious conditions in areas officially designated as slums (Kallenberger 2018).

As has been illustrated with these four examples, plotting urbanism can have very different starting points and show a great variety of possible pathways. In Lagos plotting has been the dominant urban process for decades, but has been little discussed in the academic, planning and policy literature and thus has not yet been understood as a specific process. In Shenzhen plotting urbanism represents a historical phase of the urban development that was an indispensable element of the extremely rapid construction of this new metropolis completely from scratch, but was then normalised and is disappearing in a process in which the plotted settlements themselves are being removed. Similarly, in Istanbul areas that developed through plotting are now under pressure to undergo further rounds of redevelopment or large-scale urban renewal. Their trajectories point towards further

incorporation of these spaces into the larger urban context and the blurring of boundaries between plotted areas and formally developed areas. Kolkata presents yet another case, as plotting arrives almost spontaneously in tenement areas. Thus, plotting can take very different shapes and trajectories, but what keeps all these examples together is the combination of piecemeal urban development, a specific constellation of overlapping and contradictory land regimes and the commodification of housing. These general criteria may be met in quite a wide range of territories. Examples are the campungs in Djakarta (see e.g. Simone 2014), the processes of 'wild urbanisation' in Belgrade (Diener et al. 2012), and certain forms of subaltern urbanisation in India (Mukhopadhyay et al. 2020; Bathla 2023), where 'plotting' is even a commonly used colloquial term.

MASS HOUSING URBANISATION AND POST-PROLETARIAN URBANISATION

A very different option for addressing large-scale housing shortage is the process of mass housing urbanisation. This term does not refer to the state-driven process of housing production for low-income groups in general. We use it to designate the large-scale production of rental or private housing initiated either directly by the state or through various forms of public-private cooperation. A key aspect of this process is the direct intervention of state actors in the urbanisation process, leading to the strategic reorganisation of urban territories. Mass housing urbanisation is thus clearly different from other large-scale urbanisation processes such as the privately organised and market-oriented production of single-family homes and condominiums, or the various forms of self-construction as well as popular urbanisation discussed above.

In Hong Kong and Paris this process unfolded during the post-war economic boom. In both territories it was provoked by a severe and politically threatening housing crisis, which made economic, technical, and organisational efforts for rapid housing construction politically necessary and economically desirable. A different version of mass housing urbanisation evolved around the turn of the century in Mexico City and Istanbul under conditions of financialised housing markets, where it served—among other things—to relocate lower-income groups from urban regeneration and renewal sites in central areas.

We define mass housing urbanisation as a process of urbanisation with three main characteristics. The first is the large-scale construction of housing units based on standardised industrial production for lower-income groups (working and middle classes). This process receives financial support from public authorities, including direct

and indirect subsidies such as regulative interventions into the housing market, the provision of social advantages for tenants and mortgage benefits. These subsidies may be granted to social rental housing and for home ownership. In both cases the state influences and structures social reproduction. Its second characteristic is the powerful intervention of state actors into the urbanisation process. Only state actors have the legal power and the organisational capacity to control the large-scale production of housing. Most important, in these cases the state holds the power of disposing of public land, as well as expropriation rights and other tools of planning and finance. Because of its organisational complexity, this process is often implemented at the scale of the nation-state. Its third defining characteristic is the strategic reorganisation of entire urban territories through the relocation of people. This often also includes resettling mostly lower-income groups from central locations to urban peripheries, thus rearranging the social composition of urban areas and transforming both the periphery and the urban centre. The standardisation of the production process, the urban design, the housing typologies and floor plans contribute to imposing normative lifestyles and consumption patterns.

In Hong Kong, mass housing urbanisation was initiated as a response to the massive immigration of refugees from China and a series of interrelated crises during the Chinese civil war and the rise of the Communist Party to power after the Second World War. It soon evolved into a governmental strategy to contain and control the immigrant population. In the mid-1950s the government started to develop entire industrial towns. In this way, an industrial working class was created, assuring the growth of labour-intense export-oriented manufacturing that became soon competitive on the world market. Like Hong Kong, the Paris Region faced an economic boom and unprecedented urban growth during the post-war period. In combination with comparatively low construction activity and the dilapidation of the existing housing stock, the region faced a severe housing crisis that posed a threat to governmental stability. In the early 1950s growing public awareness and protests provoked a shift from providing housing at the level of local government towards the strategic intervention of the nation-state into the urbanisation process. In 1958, the government created 'priority areas for urbanisation', an administrative tool that promoted the construction of large estates colloquially called *grands ensembles*. These were prefabricated housing complexes composed of high-rise towers and slabs (*tours et bars*), structured by open spaces and equipped with urban amenities. They were scattered across the entire banlieue of Paris, particularly in areas where land prices were low, and thus were often to be found in peripheral areas poorly connected with local centralities and public transport. The *grands ensembles* catapulted

the life routines of the upper working and lower middle classes from the 19th into the 20th century and provided the grounds for the formation of a consumer and leisure society.

In the 1970s, mass housing urbanisation in Hong Kong began to fulfil an additional function: it became a tool for creating civic pride and identity as a response to the social unrest that challenged the legitimacy of the colony. The government started a new town programme, aiming to build complete cities with their own centralities, as well as access to local employment, decent public housing and an improved urban environment providing leisure and public facilities. This programme became an instrument to solve the contradictions of colonialism through the production of space: instead of giving people democratic rights, it offered them a sense of belonging. In contrast, the *grands ensembles* in Paris experienced gradual decline. By the mid-1980s they had turned into zones of precarity, deprivation and stigmatisation. This was a result of the occurrence of several factors. The national neo-liberal reform programme from 1977 introduced a new governmental rationality initiating the shift from a right to housing to the duty to participate in the housing market (Kockelkorn 2020). This fundamentally altered the social composition of the social housing sector: while higher income groups left the social housing sector, low-income French citizens and immigrant populations gradually gained access to regular social rental housing. At the same time, the dramatic economic crisis of the mid-1970s, accompanied by deindustrialisation and a massive rise in unemployment, led to the gradual decline of the industrial working class. As a result, the *grands ensembles* started to enter a period of socioeconomic peripheralisation and were tied to the imaginary of racialised precarity and violence. Starting in 1990, urban uprisings erupted in the Parisian banlieue almost every year, culminating in riots in the autumn of 2005 that erupted in the post-proletarian north-eastern banlieue of Paris and soon spread across France.

A similar process of socioeconomic peripheralisation began in Hong Kong during its development into a global city and the unprecedented industrialisation of the Pearl River Delta which led to the fundamental economic and territorial restructuring of the entire region. Large parts of Hong Kong's manufacturing industry moved across the Chinese border and its urban development was marked by deindustrialisation and the growth of the financial, real estate and service sectors. The colonial government changed its territorial strategy towards metropolisation, shifted its attention from public rental housing to the subsidised sale of housing and introduced new incentives to boost home ownership. In this process, mass housing urbanisation was coupled with the expansion and financialisation of the private housing sector. These developments generated a parallel process of

socioeconomic peripheralisation: the dramatic loss of industrial jobs forced working class people into the low-end service sector, while the real estate boom led to a massive surge in property prices and rents. Many low-income families from the metropolitan centre had to relocate to the fast-growing new housing estates in the new towns that became territorial traps: they lacked local job opportunities, everyday life became precarious and social reproduction arduous.

In Mexico City and Istanbul mass housing urbanisation was launched under very different circumstances. Just as in Hong Kong and Paris, the post-war period was marked by strong economic growth (through import substitution industrialisation) and the related immigration resulted in a housing crisis. In contrast to Paris and Hong Kong however, they did not have the resources to launch fully fledged mass housing programmes. Thus, in both cities, popular urbanisation became a widely practiced strategy to accommodate the massive wave of rural-urban immigration. Only in the 2000s did new approaches to mass housing urbanisation gain traction. However, they were motivated by very different rationales; namely, the financialisation and commodification of the housing sector.

In Mexico City, peripheral municipalities approved more than 400 mega conjuntos habitacionales between 1999 and 2015. These were part of a national programme based on several reforms introduced by the Mexican government in the 1990s, including land reform, the reform of the financial market and the reform of pension laws (Álvarez 1999). In contrast to the *grands ensembles* of France and the new towns of Hong Kong, these mega conjuntos consist of mass-produced small single-family homes forming vast carpets of housing (Salinas 2016). Yet as in Paris and Hong Kong these settlements were mainly built in remote areas where land was available and cheap. Furthermore, they were detached from the existing urban fabric and often were lacking in even basic urban infrastructure and access to public transport. Newcomers were usually dislocated from the social networks they had established in other parts of Mexico City. The lack of social cohesion has resulted in great insecurity in the mega conjuntos, which became notorious for gender-based violence and vandalism. The poor material quality and rigid structure of these houses further diminished their desirability. In recent years there has been a falling demand for new houses in the mega conjuntos and an exodus of residents, generating abandonment and vacancies in many settlements (Valenzuela and Tsenkova 2019). This motivated a shift in Mexico's housing policy towards more integrated urban development. For most low-income families in Mexico City, however, the long-standing and well-established process of popular urbanisation still offers the most realistic way of getting affordable housing.

In Istanbul, mass housing urbanisation was more complex than in Mexico City. State-administered mass housing schemes that genuinely addressed the needs of low-income groups became prominent only in the 2000s. In 1984 a Mass Housing Law was passed, prescribing the establishment of a state-administered mass housing fund together with an organisation to oversee it, which is known today as the Housing Development Administration (TOKİ). Initially it was limited to giving credit to housing associations (Altınok 2012), and most of these benefited middle-class families with regular incomes. Subsequently, the administration expanded TOKİ's sphere of activities and authority allowing to undertake for-profit projects, to found or own shares in private companies, and to even implement urban renewal projects (labelled 'gecekondu transformation'). For those who are able to participate—through a mixture of coercion and consent—TOKİ's urban renewal schemes function as a disciplinary tool, both in terms of the need for adjusting to a rigid payment scheme, and to its dense repetitive living environment: pre-dominantly towers in an open landscape with a lack of well-defined streets and open spaces. Besides the difficulties in meeting their monthly payment schedules, the downsides mentioned by relocated ex-gecekondu residents include the low quality of construction, dense living conditions, restrictions on use of common areas and open spaces, diminished contact with neighbours, increasing anonymity and a lack of perceived security (Bartu-Candan and Kolluoğlu 2008; Baysal 2010).

The pathways of mass housing urbanisation in Hong Kong, Paris, Mexico City and Istanbul show a great variability of forms, typologies and regulatory regimes. Particularly important, however, are the varying rationales for launching such strategies, which can be divided into two broad categories: first, the idea that mass housing urbanisation can serve as an instrument to control, contain and reproduce the industrial working class, and, as in Hong Kong, also to produce a sense of pride and identity. However, a remarkable change occurred between the late 1970s and the late 1990s—a change from the provision of housing to its commodification, and from a social welfare approach to financialisation and promoting home ownership that occurred in all four case studies. During this research we also found that in all four case studies there was significant evidence of processes of peripheralisation (see Chapter 16). These observations indicate that there are underlying traits inherent in this particular urbanisation process, which is strongly dominated and guided by the state. The forms of state control that are imposed are expressed in norms, rules and regulations that often incorporate discipline and domestication in everyday life. Furthermore, the use of standardised and rigid material structures limits the adaptability and flexibility of mass housing. This stands in contrast to

popular urbanisation as well as to certain forms of plotting urbanism, which often result in settlements that have poor material and urban qualities but are much easier to adapt to changing individual and social needs. In this respect, the latter forms of settlement offer their residents the huge advantage of a certain degree of participation and co-determination in the production of urban space.

During our research on mass housing urbanisation, we also detected a related but different process that we call post-proletarian urbanisation. The mass housing areas in Hong Kong and Paris that are particularly affected by socioeconomic peripheralisation are former core working class areas. In Hong Kong, these are relatively central industrial areas that are currently being demolished and transformed by urban renewal projects. In Paris these areas are covering large parts of the northern and north-eastern banlieue, particularly in the Département Seine-Saint-Denis, which made up the core of the 'red belt' that was for decades governed by the French communist party. Since the late 1970s these areas have been facing rising unemployment, poverty and racialised peripheralisation. In recent years, large parts of the Plaine Saint-Denis, the huge industrial district in the middle of these post-proletarian areas, have been redeveloped for commercial and leisure use; the first large project was the Stade de France for the 1998 FIFA World Cup men's football championship. Here, we see strong parallels with the large area of South Central in Los Angeles, with a predominantly African American population that had formed an important part of Los Angeles's working class during the Fordist industrial boom. Similar to Seine-Saint-Denis in Paris, this area faced serious socioeconomic and racialised peripheralisation with the crisis of Fordism and the related process of deindustrialisation. In 1992 the Rodney King riots erupted in this area, leaving it ruined and stigmatised for many years. Today people living in South Central face gentrification and displacement. In Mexico City, barrios bravos, the 'rough' working-class neighbourhoods originating in the 19th century, came under marked pressure with the deindustrialisation of central areas, and are currently undergoing urban upgrading and gentrification. In all four cases we see how working-class neighbourhoods in globalising cities faced deep problems over deindustrialisation; on the one hand through the dissolution of the industrial working class, and on the other through processes of urban renewal and gentrification.

The discussion on suburbanisation at the beginning of this chapter has indicated the problematic of a generalisation of specific urban experiences. We have already seen that what might be called suburban areas are marked by very different urbanisation processes: popular urbanisation, plotting urbanism, and mass housing urbanisation all take place primarily in peripheral urban areas, and they affect mainly low-income groups. However, the middle classes are also settling in the urban peripheries. We even identified an urbanisation process that conforms to the classic North American concept of the suburb as a monofunctional mainstream middle-class neighbourhood with detached houses, usually lacking major centralities and public amenities. However, this process emerges only under specific socioeconomic, geographical and historical conditions, in which urban settlements expand almost unhampered into the surrounding hinterland, covering the territory like a carpet or laminated flooring. We therefore called this process laminar urbanisation.

However, the situations in urban peripheries are often far more complex. The starting point for the conceptualisation of another comparative concept was Paris, where large parts of the outer banlieue developed into a bewildering patchwork of all sorts of uses and functions in the last decades. This is the result of a succession of different patterns of urbanisation over time that were superimposed on each other, but not extinguished. Therefore, the agricultural period of the 18th century is still visible, with the inherited narrow street pattern in the former villages, the concentrically arranged allées, the huge feudal palaces and châteaux with their gardens that sometimes were transformed into public parks. The process of urban extension beyond the city of Paris in the late 19th century was mainly marked by the construction of pavillons, usually small, sometimes self-constructed working-class or lower middle-class single-family houses stretching out into the surrounding periurban areas mainly along train lines. During the period of French Fordism, the interstices of the urban fabric were filled in with grands ensembles, and also with shopping malls and all sorts of infrastructure. In the 1970s a new phase began with the construction of five villes nouvelles, state-planned new towns with their own urban centres, which were intended to restructure and redefine the huge urban periphery of Paris. Due to urban densification outside the perimeter of the villes nouvelles and the construction of various new urban functions and infrastructure a huge zone emerged, in which I argue parts of the villes nouvelles blended into their surroundings and became just one additional layer of the emerging overall urban patchwork. To characterise these areas, we introduced the term 'multilayered patchwork urbanisation'.

Starting from this observation, we found an astonishing similarity in Los Angeles, in the area of Orange County located in the south of the metropolis. Just as in Paris, dispersed centralities that structure and restructure the territory are a key factor for this process. Despite the fact that Los Angeles is often seen as the paradigmatic example of a polycentric metropolis, we realised that these centralities are distributed unevenly over the urban territory. They are in fact almost completely concentrated in two zones: one, which we called 'cosmopolitan urban' covers the central parts of Los Angeles, including Downtown LA, Hollywood, Pasadena and Santa Monica. The other zone with a high number of centralities is Orange County, the once widely discussed example of post-modern 'exopolis' (Soja 1992). In reconstructing this development, we recognised that the urban pattern is actually formed by several layers which are constituted by some entrenched urban centres, early urbanisations along suburban railway lines, industrial developments induced by the densely knit network of freeways, logistics hubs, an airport, and a wide range of cultural and consumer facilities including stadiums, amusement parks (such as Disneyland), a concert hall, a fashion centre, the largest shopping mall in the entire region and some attractive beach resorts. This contrasts with other areas in which almost no such centralities and facilities exist. It was thus possible to identify two distinct types of suburban areas in Los Angeles, namely multilayered patchwork urbanisation and laminar urbanisation.

A similar situation can be found in Tokyo, where we could also identify both processes, laminar and multilayered patchwork urbanisation. While, like in Los Angeles, large parts of the entire urban territory are dominated by laminar urbanisation (the two urban configurations of Tōkaidō and Yamanote urbanisation), a relatively heterogeneous urban configuration evolved that we call *pattchiwa-ku* urbanisation, shaped by the overlay of contrasting logics, rhythms and temporalities. The area comprises agricultural activities, residential areas, logistic hubs, large infrastructures, industrial plants and large military zones, resulting in a dispersed urban pattern marked by the simultaneity of different, largely independent urban dynamics.

In Hong Kong a comparable urban configuration emerged in the area of the New Territories which were for a long time clearly peripheral, located at the border between the colonial and the Chinese territorial regimes. Because the New Territories had been ceded by China to Hong Kong through a lease agreement, urbanisation took place according to colonial and customary laws (Tang 2014). In the post-war period this area was dominated by agricultural land, urbanising villages and mass housing estates, which were concentrated in the fast-growing new towns. Similar to the situation in Paris, the New Territories became the home of an industrial working class. This changed radically with the implementation of China's opening policy in the 1980s, which triggered the

rapid development of the main urban centralities of Shenzhen, located immediately beyond the border. Thus, the area of the New Territories that once formed the edge of Hong Kong was suddenly located in between the two main metropolitan centres of the eastern Pearl River Delta. The handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997 led to the implementation of cross-border strategies. Today, this zone is marked by a patchwork of wetlands, urbanised villages, regional market towns, large-scale mass-housing estates, condo towers, farmlands, truck parking and new cross-border infrastructures such as high-speed railways, highways and metro lines. At the same time, the large-scale development strategies aiming at regional integration in this zone is heavily contested by various forms of resistance to the demolition of non-indigenous villages and evictions.

What distinguishes multilayered patchwork urbanisation from other urbanisation processes is the simultaneous presence of multiple logics that together determine the urbanisation of the territory, so that no single logic becomes dominant. This results in a complex patchwork of more or less disjointed urban fragments. This situation is usually generated by a succession over time of different paradigms of urbanisation through which layer after layer of the urban fabric is produced and superimposed, without erasing earlier layers. This leads to the overlap of historical patterns of urbanisation and a multiplicity of spatial orientations and temporal rhythms.

These areas are often linked to various processes of industrialisation. The construction of massive transport infrastructure plays a key role in the development of these areas. The agricultural origins are often still visible as traces inscribed into the territory (farmhouses, village cores or streets laid out in wiggly patterns). This type of urban development is usually the result of central areas spilling into the urban periphery together with several rounds of urban transformation. In this process, the existing urban fragments are not demolished and replaced, but persist and are complemented by additional urban elements. As a result, the edges and the grids in the urban fabric (such as agricultural land, *terrains vagues* or industrial brownfield areas) are filled in and successively re-territorialised by new rounds of urban development.

Through massive urban expansion, these erstwhile peripheral areas are integrated into vast urban regions. They have been restructured in the last decades by the production of new urban cores and centralities, giving them a strong polycentric and even ex-centric orientation. These forms are either planned (such as the *villes nouvelles* in Paris) or emerge spontaneously, especially when they are close to infrastructural nodes (such as in Los Angeles). Such new centralities have been described as technoburbs (Fishman 1987) or edge cities (Garreau 1991); however, these terms do not capture the powerful dynamics of multilayered

patchwork urbanisation, because these new urban forms are simply moments in the maelstrom of long-term urban restructuring and are therefore constantly changing in response to wider regional territorial dynamics. They should not be analysed in isolation but must be understood as elements of a more encompassing urbanisation process.

BYPASS URBANISM

Another process that is dramatically reconfiguring urban peripheries is what we call bypass urbanism. We first encountered this process during our research in Kolkata, when we analysed Rajarhat New Town in its eastern outskirts and realised that this was not an isolated new town project, as it is usually depicted, but is embedded in a much broader process of urban development. In the east Kolkata wetlands, a roughly 30 km-long urban corridor has been developed from the International Airport in the north, passing the rapidly developing Rajarhat New Town and the modernist satellite town of Salt Lake, following the Eastern Metropolitan Bypass all the way to the south-eastern outskirts of Kolkata. Along this corridor, hundreds of condominium towers, office blocks and a wide range of private hospitals, shopping malls, luxury hotels, private high schools, universities and a science museum have been built. Many more such projects are under construction or planned. Seen from a comprehensive perspective, the Eastern Bypass is not just a motorway, but the spine of an urban corridor that literally bypasses the dense cosmopolitan core area of Kolkata. In our comparative sessions, we then realised that similar developments are occurring in Lagos and Mexico City. Mapping revealed the full extent of these developments because it allowed to see them in the wider context, and not just as individual projects. We named this process bypass urbanism.

We use the term bypass urbanism here to conceptualise an urbanisation process that goes beyond the reach of even the largest new town or urban megaproject, producing impacts on a regional scale and reorganising and reconfiguring entire urban regions. According to our three-dimensional understanding of urbanisation (see Chapter 1), we looked at bypass urbanism from three different but related angles. Bypass urbanism is a process that physically bypasses an existing urban area. It is constituted by several large real estate projects that are complemented by various infrastructure projects (such as toll highways or bridges), and attract business districts, exclusive residential areas, shopping malls, private schools and hospitals, which together have the potential to profoundly restructure the entire urban region.

Secondly, in order to be implemented, the production of these projects bypasses existing territorial regulations and planning procedures or takes advantage of certain flexibilities and legal

'grey spaces' in the regulatory system. These projects involve alliances of various private and state actors, such as private corporations and developers acting for profit, and state actors making use of private capital to achieve their own infrastructural and financial gain, additional prestige and political power. Thirdly, it bypasses everyday life in large parts of the urban region, reinforcing existing tendencies of uneven urban development, socioeconomic segregation and peripheralisation. It offers an alternative to the 'messiness' of the existing urban space by creating exclusive urban spaces that permit comfortable or prestigious lifestyles.

In Lagos, it is the marshy and sandy Lekki peninsula between Lagos Lagoon and the Atlantic Ocean that is currently being ploughed up by this rapid process of urbanisation. The central spine of this development is the Lekki-Epe Expressway, a toll road stretching 50 km east from the upmarket commercial centre of Lagos, Victoria Island, all the way to the mega-project of the Lekki Free Trade Zone at the eastern end of this corridor. This huge area is rapidly being filled with housing estates of all sizes and provenances, businesses, churches and mosques, markets and malls, private schools and university campuses, factories and large-scale industries. The western end of this zone is marked by Eko Atlantic, the elite new city quarter that is being built on reclaimed land next to Victoria Island.

In Mexico City, it is the newly built central business district of Santa Fe that initiated bypass urbanism. What used to be a dumpsite and landfill of former sand mines at the western periphery of Mexico City is today a global business centre with corporate headquarters, a private university and a huge shopping mall, surrounded by condo developments, gated communities and country clubs (see also Duhau and Giglia 2008). It extends to the residential and commercial area of Interlomas and includes well-known residential estates for the wealthy as well as residential areas located further north. It is further linked to the wealthy hills in the west of Mexico City by toll highways, and also to the nearby international airport of Toluca which offers a much faster alternative to the Mexico City international airport. This new urban configuration offers affluent people a range of amenities, private universities, malls and hospitals, and at the same time allows them to avoid the urban threats and nuisances they would encounter in the core urban areas, which are located in an earthquake zone and plagued by chronic traffic jams and air pollution.

The distinction between bypass urbanism and other forms of peripheral urban restructuring can be illustrated by our comparative research. Like multi-layered patchwork urbanisation, this process transforms the urban periphery via the production of new centralities, but in this case it is accompanied by the relative decline of the existing urban fabric. In this respect, bypass urbanism represents the opposite of current trends in most large metropolitan

territories, where central areas are upgraded through flagship projects, urban regeneration strategies and large-scale redevelopment efforts. With bypass urbanism, however, it is the geographical periphery that is made into a space where the privileged can avoid the messiness of existing urban situations, their complex urban structures, entangled land regulations and the endless processes of negotiating with various stakeholders. Thus, the former edge becomes the centre and assumes a reciprocal and privileged relationship with existing centralities. It almost seems that a 'new city' is coming into existence which bypasses the existing urban areas in terms of the material structure of the urban fabric, territorial regulations and the modalities of everyday life. With bypass urbanism a new kind of disparity appears that leads to the inversion of the centre-periphery relationship.

INCORPORATION OF URBAN DIFFERENCES

The processes discussed so far are located mainly in the urban periphery—even if this periphery has greatly changed in recent years. This raises questions about the development of seemingly classical urban areas whose intrinsic urban qualities are both strongly emphasised and valorised in many recent mainstream concepts, such as 'urban renaissance', 'creative city', or 'urban age'. These concepts indicate a fundamental change in the social, cultural and also economic relevance of the urban. Seen from a broader perspective, this process can be understood as the commodification of urban space. It encompasses not only the sale of parcels of land and the reservation of exclusive locations for certain privileged groups but, as Lefebvre notes, social space itself is turned into a commodity that can be bought and sold. As a consequence, urban space becomes the very general object of production, and hence of the formation of surplus value (Lefebvre 2003 [1970]: 154). In this process, urban life itself is tied into the commodification process. This means that the social qualities of urban space—difference, encounter, creativity—become part of the economic logic of systematic exploitation. The entire space becomes a commodity—including the people living in it, as well as the social resources and the economic effects produced by them (see Schmid 2012). As a result, most of these lively urban areas, full as they are of different people and activities, which are often but not always located in central areas, have changed tremendously in the last two decades.

A revealing example of this process is the dramatic long-term transformation of Shimokitazawa, a centrality located south-west of central Tokyo. The area started to develop with the expansion of the first commuter train lines in the 1920s. Like many other areas of Tokyo, Shimokitazawa quickly became a densely built district of single-family houses.

Located outside the main centralities whose development was strongly influenced by state strategies, it gradually developed into an alternative meeting place for young people with theatres, music venues, bars and shops in the postwar era. In the 1980s the popularity of this area grew rapidly, and magazines and TV shows promoted its unique atmosphere. From the early 2000s onwards local shop-owners and residents actively sought to benefit from this increased popularity and participated in the promotion of Shimokitazawa as an alternative entertainment centre for a leisure-seeking audience. Some homeowners even converted their living spaces into commercial zones. In addition to the small cafes (including Starbucks), and slow food restaurants, there was a great increase in the number of second-hand shops. Thus, Shimokitazawa finally turned into a space for the mainstream consumption of a 'different lifestyle' and was gradually leached of its place-specific qualities where encounters, exchange and innovation were once possible. However, the displacement of the original residents and socio-economic transformations has been very limited, largely due to the fact that home ownership is so widespread (as in almost all parts of Tokyo), the plots are small in size, land is scarce, and there is a strong attachment to private property. In the classical sense, therefore, this urban transformation does not fit the definition of gentrification. Instead, it points towards a different process that we sought to grasp with the term 'incorporation of urban differences'.

This process refers to the production of differences as a key element of urbanisation, as discussed by Simmel and Lefebvre. The specific quality of urban space results from the simultaneous presence of people with different historical, ethnic, cultural and economic backgrounds, and with different activities, functions and ideas, all of which meet in an urban space, interact and generate all sorts of social inventions. The urban thus turns into a productive force, continuously destabilising existing modes of coexistence and innovating new ones (Lefebvre 1991; Schmid 2012). This process, however, does not go without a contradictory dialectical movement: the commodification and incorporation of urban differences means that they become integrated into dominant market and state logics and are gradually homogenised, thereby fundamentally altering everyday life and urban experience in such areas.

The state often plays a key role in this process. In many cases it not only supports the process by using all sorts of policies and measures to upgrade, control and police these places, but even promotes and guides them in order to transform the entire urban area into a more mainstream place. With reference to Raymond Williams, we could call this process incorporation (Williams 1977; see in detail Shmueli 2008). The incorporation of urban differences thus designates the commodification and domestication of place-specific social, cultural, material and symbolic elements. Different actors involved in

the production of space initiate this process and it is implemented through various combinations of market mechanisms and state interventions. It is a multidimensional process that includes more than the generation and appropriation of land rent, the material transformation of urban space and the 'upgrading' of neighbourhoods. The vital point here is that social space itself is commodified, and thus place-specific urban qualities themselves are brought under the umbrella of urbanisation-led accumulation. In our samples we could detect these processes in almost all territories, especially in Hong Kong, Los Angeles and Paris, but also in Lagos. However, we present here only two more cases, Mexico City and Istanbul.

The Centro Histórico of Mexico City was until recently a major commercial centre for popular classes of the entire urban region. Around one million visitors came every day to shop and exchange goods; thousands of street vendors sold a great variety of mainly low-price goods such as household items, clothing and electronics. Then a devastating earthquake affected large parts of the central areas of Mexico City in 1985. Many of the poorly maintained old colonial buildings were seriously damaged and a large number of residents, businesses and institutions left the Centro Histórico. However, many shops and venues for low-income people remained and residents organised social protests, successfully fought for their right to centrality and resisted relocation. Since the late 1990s, following the UNESCO declaration of certain sections of the Centro Histórico as world heritage sites, several mayors have implemented policies of urban regeneration (Delgadillo 2009). Using the classical arguments that they were rescuing the Centro Histórico from decay and conserving its colonial heritage, successive city governments—in partnership with private investors, most notably billionaire Carlos Slim—have implemented a multi-faceted program of revitalisation and beautification, combined with various security measures (Streule 2008). Street vending was banned in 2007, after several unsuccessful earlier attempts (Cossa 2009). Consequently, large parts of Centro Histórico have been fundamentally transformed by the conversion of warehouses into lofts, the opening of new cafés, bars and art galleries and the influx of young professionals, entrepreneurs and artists to live and work in the area. What used to be a dense, crowded, busy and popular urban space has been transformed into a commodified and heavily policed shopping, leisure and tourist zone closely monitored by hundreds of surveillance cameras.

As this example shows, the process of the incorporation of urban differences includes a highly political moment. It entails the incorporation of unique—and potentially subversive—elements into spaces of hegemonic power and thus also touches the very core of recent civil protests occurring in urban centres all over the globe. The June 2013 uprisings in Istanbul were sparked precisely by

a project to incorporate differences. The project—imposed personally by then prime minister Erdoğan—aimed at the conversion of Gezi Park, the most centrally located public park of Istanbul, into a commercial complex including shops, a museum and a hotel as part of a larger redevelopment scheme. This can clearly be understood as a political project to rid central Istanbul of activist groups and other ‘undesirable elements’ and to transform it into a ‘safe’ zone for tourist consumption (Erensü and Karaman 2017). In that way, the fight for Gezi Park was also a fight about who has access to the main centrality of this metropolis and pointed to the struggle for difference and for the urban as a political project.

As these examples show, incorporating differences is a general and encompassing process that often emerges in subtle ways and might remain for a long time under the radar of public awareness and debate. But sometimes it becomes evident, when tensions become so high that a single event can ignite a social explosion, as was the case in a long series of urban revolts across very different situations, or when massive interventions by state actors lead to public outcry and heated protests, as in the case of Istanbul. Often the incorporation of urban differences is linked to other urbanisation processes, such as urban renewal, urban redevelopment, condominium development or gentrification. While they usually also include aspects of incorporation, these processes are dominated by features such as the production of new office spaces, shopping facilities and luxury housing and the realisation of potential rent gaps. In contrast, the incorporation of differences goes far beyond gentrification. It is directly related to the production of urban value and the commodification of the urban, and affects access to centrality. It directly challenges the role of urban space as a place for exchange, interaction, meeting and encounter. Often, such spaces are not replaceable; they vanish, together with the social qualities they embody. Centrality is always ambivalent in this context. While on the one hand it creates the possibility for unexpected encounters, it is also susceptible to economic exploitation. It thus touches the very core of the urban. With the concept of the production and incorporation of differences, we direct attention to precisely those aspects that are so crucial for every urban territory.

TOWARDS A NEW VOCABULARY OF URBANISATION

This chapter has argued for opening up the field of urban studies to conceptual experimentation in order to respond to various challenges posed by contemporary urbanisation. A revitalised vocabulary of urbanisation is urgently required to enable urban scholars to decipher—both analytically and cartographically—the differentiated and dynamic urban landscapes that are emerging across the planet. This calls for a shift from the long-standing emphasis on urban form to that of urban process, as well as an approach in which every urban context is regarded as theoretically generative and relevant.

What are the results of our comparative experiment? Through an examination of eight large metropolitan territories we were able to identify, develop and define a range of urbanisation processes that have not hitherto been conceptualised in this specific way. These new concepts are still in progress. More work is needed to stabilise their definitions, to expand their application and to see where, how and in what ways they may illuminate urbanisation processes in different places. We are well aware that the construction of new concepts has to go through a thorough phase of testing and evaluation, and some of the concepts discussed here may fade away during this process.

However, we see four significant advantages of these comparative concepts. First of all, they are multidimensional. They are not defined by one single criterion, but include the material production of the urban fabric, the territorial regulations, land regimes and power relations that guide urbanisation, and the transformation of rhythms and routines of everyday life implied in the urban process. This three-dimensional approach allows us to make clear distinctions about different urbanisation processes. The material production of an urban area always involves different modalities of construction, different actor constellations, ways of profit-making and processes of inclusion and exclusion. The question of territorial regulation includes different power relations, land regimes and regulatory systems that may include customary rights, and also modes of operation that range from institutionalised corruption to illegality and various forms of informality. The third dimension is related to lived space, which is usually not taken into consideration in the definition of urbanisation processes. But it may be a crucial aspect of urbanisation, because it is directly related to experiences in everyday life in which the deployment of collective versus individual strategies, experiences of solidarity or stigmatisation and the production of urban differences play a key role in the generation of urban value.

As has become evident, this multidimensional definition allowed us to discern differences among urban processes that would otherwise have passed unnoticed. Thus, we could define popular urbanisation and plotting urbanism as two distinct processes, despite the fact that both include some kind of informality. While popular urbanisation is marked by the collective production of urban space, plotting urbanism is determined by various forms of commodification and tenant-owner relationships. In contrast to popular urbanisation, and partly also to plotting urbanism, mass housing urbanisation includes the experience of state control that contradicts self-determination. Likewise, plotting urbanism shares some similarities with the process of incorporation of differences, such as some kind of intensification of the urban fabric and change in its socioeconomic composition; but the underlying logics of the two concepts are clearly different from each other. While plotting urbanism is mainly linked to regulatory ambiguities and compromises, the incorporation of differences emerges from the transformation and commodification of specific urban qualities closely tied and related to centralities. In contrast, bypass urbanism is mainly driven by the construction of new centralities in the urban periphery and thus exhibits clear parallels with multilayered patch-work urbanisation. However, it also implies the peripheralisation of existing parts of urban territories, which is not the case in the latter process.

Secondly, these concepts are multi-relational. The conceptual boundaries of each individual concept are drawn with reference to all the other concepts we developed at the same time. Thus, plotting urbanism may follow from popular urbanisation (as was the case in Istanbul), and may be replaced by a fully formal, commodified urbanisation process (as in the case of Shenzhen). These urbanisation processes can also be understood in a strategic sense as a set of options in a given moment. Thus, we may detect alternative strategies for urban development, such as in Mexico City, where popular urbanisation presents an alternative to state-led mass housing urbanisation. Therefore, it is also possible to analyse the advantages and disadvantages of the two processes. In a similar way, the processes of multilayered patchwork urbanisation and of laminar urbanisation may occur in the same urban region and thus reflect the intense differentiation that may develop in the urban periphery. The entire set of multi-relational concepts enables us to make general comparisons of urbanisation processes; it can also be used for a more thorough analysis of urban transformations within a single urban territory by regarding it as a specific combination of distinct urbanisation processes—as shown in Part II.

Thirdly, these concepts result from a comparative procedure and are therefore not derived from generalising single paradigmatic experiences, but from using several examples from very diverse urban

contexts. They highlight differences and go beyond an idiosyncratic focus on individual cases or singularities. It is obvious that a comparative methodology also has limits: our analysis is based on a specific cross-section of large metropolitan territories and could detect only those processes that were present in the selected places at the time of observation. It will be useful to test whether these conceptual experimentations are relevant in a wider variety of urban contexts. Furthermore, we had to restrict our analysis to processes of concentrated urbanisation. It would be interesting to go further and analyse periurban areas or even more remote territories of extended urbanisation. Thus, other comparative endeavours are in progress and more may follow, not only across the divides of north and south or east and west, but also across the putative urban / non-urban divide (see Schmid and Topalović 2023).

Fourthly, this comparative project employs a transductive procedure and is thus directly linked to theory. The concrete empirical research is embedded in a theoretical framework derived from Lefebvre's open-ended theory of the production of space, oriented by the decentring perspective offered by the concept of planetary urbanisation and inspired by the imaginations and sensitivities of postcolonial approaches. As this project illustrates, these different perspectives are not mutually exclusive, but on the contrary may reinforce each other and stimulate a theoretically guided, and at the same time empirically grounded, research. While the resulting comparative concepts of urbanisation can be applied independently of the theoretical context of concept generation in this work, they are most productively combined with a dynamic perspective on urbanisation: to analyse an urban territory as an overlapping and intermingling of various urbanisation processes. Or, seen from the other side: to deconstruct an urban territory into several urban configurations and to reconstruct the urbanisation processes that produced them.

From a more general perspective, this project highlights and confirms the need to develop a differentiated view of urbanisation. The reduction of the concept of urbanisation to a limited set of universal principles or mechanisms cannot suffice to address productively the diversity and richness of the contemporary urban universe. By identifying processes of urbanisation as constitutive elements of an urbanising planet, this project offers an analysis that goes beyond the seeming contradiction between universalising and particularising research strategies.

To develop a more global and differentiated vocabulary of urbanisation is a collective project. It can be successful only if there is a common understanding of the need for and utility of such new concepts. Our project is therefore meant as a proposal and an invitation for further debate, reflection and conceptual experimentation.

LIST OF URBANISATION PROCESSES

POPULAR URBANISATION

- (1) incremental material transformation of the urban territory, participation of the inhabitants, collective production of urban space.
- (2) capacity to fight and negotiate successfully for tenure security and (relatively) favourable territorial regulations; forceful political organisation.
- (3) collective experiences in everyday life, self-help, struggles for recognition.

Examples: Mexico City, Istanbul, Kolkata, Lagos
Origin: original process

Transformation into plotting urbanism, mass housing urbanisation, urban renewal

PLOTTING URBANISM

- (1) piecemeal process of urbanisation, plot-by-plot development without overarching planning creating a wide variety of local situations.
- (2) conflict-ridden coexistence of multiple systems of landownership and land regimes; includes market mechanisms and commodification.
- (3) specific social relationships between landlords and tenants; seeking for individual gain.

Examples: Lagos, Istanbul, Kolkata, Shenzhen
Origin: original process, popular urbanisation, tenement urbanisation (bustee)

Transformation into urban renewal, condominium development, formalisation

MASS HOUSING URBANISATION

- (1) large-scale process of standardised industrial housing production; financial support by public authorities for working and middle classes.
- (2) strong intervention of state actors, strategic reorganisation of territories.
- (3) rearrangement of social composition of urban areas; imposition of social norms, lifestyle and consumption patterns.

Examples: Hong Kong, Paris, Mexico City, Istanbul
Origin: original process, popular urbanisation

Transformation into urban redevelopment

POST-PROLETARIAN URBANISATION

- (1) precarisation of working-class areas through de-industrialisation, disinvestment and socioeconomic peripheralisation.
- (2) stigmatisation and social exclusion, often accompanied by various upgrading and redevelopment strategies.
- (3) social segregation, devaluation and degradation of urban qualities in everyday life.

Examples: Paris, Los Angeles, Hong Kong, Mexico City
Origin: old working class / popular / mixed neighbourhoods (19th/early 20th century), mass housing estates, laminar urbanisation

Transformation into urban renewal, urban regeneration, urban redevelopment

BYPASS URBANISM

- (1) combination of several large-scale infrastructure and urban megaprojects, physically bypassing the existing urban territory.
- (2) bypassing existing territorial regulations and planning procedures through alliances between state actors and private investors.
- (3) bypassing urban life in existing areas; creating exclusive zones with international lifestyle; reinforcing socioeconomic segregation and peripheralisation of existing urban areas.

Examples: Kolkata, Lagos, Mexico City
Origin: original process

Transformation into exclusive urban areas

MULTILAYERED PATCHWORK URBANISATION

- (1) superimposition of several urbanisation logics; multiplicity of spatial orientations and temporal rhythms; poly-centrality, generated by entrenched and newly produced centralities.
- (2) inscription of different regimes of territorial regulation over a long period of time.
- (3) co-presence of very different patches or enclaves without strong mutual relations; disorienting daily experience

Examples: Paris, Los Angeles, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Tokyo
Origin: diverse urbanisation processes

Transformation into urban intensity

INCORPORATION OF URBAN DIFFERENCES

- (1) physical transformation of neighbourhoods; commodification of urban values.
- (2) various upgrading and redevelopment strategies.
- (3) homogenisation and domestication of lived experiences.

Examples: Tokyo, Mexico City, Los Angeles, Istanbul, Paris, Hong Kong, Lagos
Origin: relatively central areas with valuable urban qualities

Transformation into urban renewal, urban regeneration, condominium development

LAMINAR URBANISATION

- (1) single family homes; regular pattern of urbanisation, covering the territory like a carpet or laminated flooring; lack of centralities.
- (2) private, market-oriented process guided by formal regulation; owner-occupied houses
- (3) imposing a normative middle-class lifestyle.

Examples: Los Angeles, Tokyo
Origin: original process

Transformation into multilayered patchwork urbanisation, urban intensification, diversification

