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The Drama of the Peace Process in South Africa
This chapter is in the book The Drama of the Peace Process in South Africa
Drama of the peace process in South Africa: I look back 30 years186Drafting the Harare DeclarationIt was apparently in May 1989 that Tambo took active steps to prepare another ANC negotiation document.612 It was becoming clearer every day, to those who wished to see, that if the ANC did not take the initiative in placing its terms for negotiations on the table, it would very soon be forced into a negotiation framework set up by others. In order to give the platform political weight and, thereby, to outmanoeuvre those forces seeking to sideline the ANC, it would be necessary to gain the support of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and of the international community, in the first place the UN.613As I have noted in connection with the ANC’s October 1987 negotiations document, the fear that the ANC would ultimately lose the initiative if it did not act soon was already very much present in its leadership circles in the course of the year 1987, as, indeed, was the view that it was necessary to gain the support of the Frontline States and the OAU as a whole. In other words, it is clear that the Harare Declaration of 1989 had its precedents in the recent policy-making of the ANC. Yet the unfolding of the negotiation scenario, at least in the public arena, had tended to grind to a halt after the high point in 1987. The reasons for this are, no doubt, complex. A primary factor may have been that the world was waiting to see what would be the outcome in Namibia, which was regarded by many as a necessary prelude to a solution of the South African issue. The historic New York Accords, as mentioned above, were signed in October 1988.There was, too, a focus in the international arena on the developing relations between the Soviet Union and the USA. Would the two superpowers succeed in signing a meaningful treaty on the nuclear front? As it happened, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan on 8 December 1987 and they ratified it on 27 May 1988, after the US Senate had approved the treaty.614 A key issue of course was whether Gorbachev would be able to finally have his policies of glasnost and perestroika accepted in the Soviet Union despite the serious opposition, including within his own party.At the same time, as emerges from a reading of its January 8th statements, the subtheme which had emerged already at the Kabwe conference was alive and well, although, as noted, evidence of the parallel strategy, with one arm a people’s war, was still present. As it turned out, 1988 was a year 22HSRC_Drama_of_the_Peace_Process_book.indb 186HSRC_Drama_of_the_Peace_Process_book.indb 1862021/11/03 04:352021/11/03 04:35
© 2021, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, USA

© 2021, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, USA

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents v
  3. Acknowledgements vii
  4. About the author viii
  5. Abbreviations ix
  6. PROLOGUE: CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 1
  7. PART I: RESHAPING THE NARRATIVE
  8. 1 Introduction 12
  9. 2 Nelson Mandela takes the initiative 24
  10. 3 Was Mandela selling the ANC down the river? 33
  11. 4 The parallel strategy of Oliver Tambo and Thabo Mbeki 37
  12. 5 Communists take an ultra-radical stand 51
  13. 6 A qualitative shift in national and international conditions 64
  14. 7 An alliance between the ANC and imperialist capital? 69
  15. 8 Timing of the start of negotiations 74
  16. 9 The structure of the national democratic revolution in South Africa 77
  17. 10 Transitional mechanisms in the framework of the negotiation process 82
  18. 11 Resistance to neocolonialism, the key content of South African liberation 95
  19. 12 The Kabwe conference, June 1985 99
  20. 13 ‘ANC Statement on Negotiations: October 9th, 1987’ 114
  21. 14 Conclusions concerning the Mandela talks 128
  22. 15 Conclusions regarding the secret Afrikaner nationalist–exile ANC dialogue group 135
  23. 16 The Constitutional Committee 145
  24. 17 The ANC’s anniversary (January 8th) statements, 1987–1990: A shift towards a political solution 149
  25. 18 The in-house seminar on ‘Constitutional Guidelines’ 158
  26. 19 The ANC’s fragmented organisation on the negotiation (constitutional) front 164
  27. 20 ‘Constitutional Guidelines’, including my response 170
  28. 21 The SACP conference document ‘The Path to Power’, April 1989 177
  29. 22 Drafting the Harare Declaration 186
  30. 23 Confusion reigns in the last months of 1989 and early 1990 194
  31. 24 FW de Klerk’s speech on 2 February 1990 205
  32. 25 Uncertainty continues as the exiles return in 1990 210
  33. 26 Epilogue 213
  34. Notes 221
  35. PART II: EXTRACTS FROM MY DIARY, 1985–1989
  36. October 1985 – New Year’s Eve 1989 262
  37. Postscript 434
  38. PART III: INTERNAL PAPERS ADDRESSED TO THE SACP AND THE ANC
  39. 1 We need to prepare ourselves for new possible tasks (August 1985) 438
  40. 2 Economic commission (November 1985) 440
  41. 3 Response to ‘discussion document’: There is a danger that the party will be isolated (July 1986) 441
  42. 4 Some suggestions in connection with the present strategy and tactics of the liberation movement (July 1986) 445
  43. 5 Work in the Bantustans (August 1987) 449
  44. 6 The death squads – white and black (August 1987) 452
  45. 7 ANC platform for negotiations (January 1988) 455
  46. 8 A response to ‘Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa’ (extract) (November 1988) 461
  47. 9 Question of an interim phase (extract) (November 1988) 467
  48. 10 Response to the SACP’s new draft programme, ‘The Path to Power’ (March 1989) 470
  49. 11 Response to ANC discussion paper on the issue of negotiations (August 1989) 491
  50. 12 Response to a party analysis (extract) (March 1990) 501
  51. 13 Prospects for a negotiated settlement (third quarter 1990) 503
  52. Source material 505
  53. Index 515
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https://doi.org/10.1515/9781928246510-026

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents v
  3. Acknowledgements vii
  4. About the author viii
  5. Abbreviations ix
  6. PROLOGUE: CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 1
  7. PART I: RESHAPING THE NARRATIVE
  8. 1 Introduction 12
  9. 2 Nelson Mandela takes the initiative 24
  10. 3 Was Mandela selling the ANC down the river? 33
  11. 4 The parallel strategy of Oliver Tambo and Thabo Mbeki 37
  12. 5 Communists take an ultra-radical stand 51
  13. 6 A qualitative shift in national and international conditions 64
  14. 7 An alliance between the ANC and imperialist capital? 69
  15. 8 Timing of the start of negotiations 74
  16. 9 The structure of the national democratic revolution in South Africa 77
  17. 10 Transitional mechanisms in the framework of the negotiation process 82
  18. 11 Resistance to neocolonialism, the key content of South African liberation 95
  19. 12 The Kabwe conference, June 1985 99
  20. 13 ‘ANC Statement on Negotiations: October 9th, 1987’ 114
  21. 14 Conclusions concerning the Mandela talks 128
  22. 15 Conclusions regarding the secret Afrikaner nationalist–exile ANC dialogue group 135
  23. 16 The Constitutional Committee 145
  24. 17 The ANC’s anniversary (January 8th) statements, 1987–1990: A shift towards a political solution 149
  25. 18 The in-house seminar on ‘Constitutional Guidelines’ 158
  26. 19 The ANC’s fragmented organisation on the negotiation (constitutional) front 164
  27. 20 ‘Constitutional Guidelines’, including my response 170
  28. 21 The SACP conference document ‘The Path to Power’, April 1989 177
  29. 22 Drafting the Harare Declaration 186
  30. 23 Confusion reigns in the last months of 1989 and early 1990 194
  31. 24 FW de Klerk’s speech on 2 February 1990 205
  32. 25 Uncertainty continues as the exiles return in 1990 210
  33. 26 Epilogue 213
  34. Notes 221
  35. PART II: EXTRACTS FROM MY DIARY, 1985–1989
  36. October 1985 – New Year’s Eve 1989 262
  37. Postscript 434
  38. PART III: INTERNAL PAPERS ADDRESSED TO THE SACP AND THE ANC
  39. 1 We need to prepare ourselves for new possible tasks (August 1985) 438
  40. 2 Economic commission (November 1985) 440
  41. 3 Response to ‘discussion document’: There is a danger that the party will be isolated (July 1986) 441
  42. 4 Some suggestions in connection with the present strategy and tactics of the liberation movement (July 1986) 445
  43. 5 Work in the Bantustans (August 1987) 449
  44. 6 The death squads – white and black (August 1987) 452
  45. 7 ANC platform for negotiations (January 1988) 455
  46. 8 A response to ‘Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa’ (extract) (November 1988) 461
  47. 9 Question of an interim phase (extract) (November 1988) 467
  48. 10 Response to the SACP’s new draft programme, ‘The Path to Power’ (March 1989) 470
  49. 11 Response to ANC discussion paper on the issue of negotiations (August 1989) 491
  50. 12 Response to a party analysis (extract) (March 1990) 501
  51. 13 Prospects for a negotiated settlement (third quarter 1990) 503
  52. Source material 505
  53. Index 515
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