The Campaign and Battle of Manzikert, 1071

The Battle of Manzikert on August 26, 1071 is widely regarded as one of the most significant turning points in medieval history, frequently presented as the culmination of a Turco-Islamic assault upon the Byzantine bulwark of a Christian world struggling for survival. Emperor Romanus IV’s campaigns between 1068 and 1071 do, in many ways, represent the empire’s fightback against an enemy that for decades had penetrated deep into Asia Minor, its heartland and strategic bulwark. Yet Manzikert was not a disaster. This book examines the geopolitical background and the origins of the campaign that led to the battle, the main protagonists, and their strategies and battle tactics. It also evaluates the primary sources and the enduring legacy of the battle, for both the Greek and Turkish historiography of the twentieth century.

Theotokis Georgios :

Georgios Theotokis is a historian specializing in the military history of the eastern Mediterranean in late antiquity and the Middle Ages. He has published numerous articles and monographs on the history of conflict and warfare in Europe and the Mediterranean in the medieval and early modern periods.

Maximilian Lau:
Debate over the causes and effects of the Battle of Manzikert (1071) has long preoccupied many academics, university students, and people generally interested in Byzantium. Georgios Theotokis opens his book by presenting that debate’s central question: why exactly did a single battle lead to the quick loss of Anatolia, so that Asia Minor, a Roman province since classical antiquity, became the Turkish homeland? He states his answer from the outset: the battle proved geopolitically decisive because it introduced an element of chaos into Byzantine history, especially due to the capture of Romanos IV Diogenes. [...] In sum, this is a highly valuable work [...]. I will certainly be adding it to reading lists in the future, and I encourage other historians to use it as a starting point for further investigation.