Introduction

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Written specifically for this volume, these essays offer an integrated assessment of the historical antecedents and functioning of German democracy fifty years after two postwar German states were launched as part of the architecture of the cold war. At the same time, the book also celebrates a teacher, mentor, colleague, collaborator, and friend of the authors, whose work has inspired a stream of scholarship only partially represented here. Andrei S. Markovits's influence has been important in sustaining the highest standards of scholarship and teaching in comparative politics, and especially in advancing the understanding of German politics and society in the United States, his adopted homeland.

Professor Markovits has established a formidable presence in academic circles as well as in public forums. His influence in academia comes from more than twenty years of dedicated service since he was awarded the doctorate in political science by Columbia University in 1976, where he also earned a B.A. (1969), the M.B.A. (1971), and an M. Phil. (1974), after crossing the Atlantic with the *Matura*, the Gymnasium certificate conferred by the Theresianische Akademie in Vienna. Markovits's scholarly output is prodigious by the usual standard: the publication of twelve books, over ten dozen scholarly articles, several dozen reviews, the bulk of this oeuvre in

leading scholarly presses and refereed journals. Criticism of America's unperfected democracy was a major theme of the 68 generation, but Markovits's experience with America in 1968 was one of liberation of his Jewish identity as well as freedom to develop intellectually. His first trip to Germany and Berlin came in 1974. There he developed an immediate and abiding interest in the prospects for German democracy and reform. A project on organized labor was his first sustained effort, and produced the international study (co-authored with Christopher Allen), *Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany, and Sweden* (George Allen & Unwin, 1984) and also his *Politics of the West German Trade Unions: Strategies of Class and Interest Representation in Growth and Crisis* (Cambridge University Press, 1986), whose major contribution lay in its trenchant and nuanced characterization of the reflexes of these major actors in Germany's highly organized polity. Markovits's analysis developed out of keen sensitivity for the relationship between the incentives provided by Germany's institutional framework and the meaning attached to it by actors with a reform agenda explicitly connected to the memory of Germany's moral tragedy in this century – i.e., his work is most deeply about political culture. Later, when the reform project received new impetus from the Green Party, Markovits (with Philip Gorski) offered the first full length American analysis of the party, *The German Left: Red, Green, and Beyond* (Oxford University Press, 1993; also published in German in 1997). His (with Simon Reich) *German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe* (Cornell University Press, 1997) has in its German edition elicited favorable commentary from public figures such as Green Party leader and current German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (who contributed the foreword) and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Federal Republic's longest serving foreign minister.

However, his influence on the outlook of a generation of scholars is underestimated by the quantity of his publications. As important as the analyses themselves is the teamwork he fostered on joint projects over many years, mainly in and around Harvard University's Center for European Studies, Markovits's intellectual *Heimat*, which he thought "embodied historically oriented political sociology at its best." At Harvard, Markovits teamed up with budding academic talents who went on to establish their own careers and further

parts of the overall research program that preoccupied Markovits in the same spirit of generous scholarly collaboration. This volume is a product of that activity.

Markovits's 68-generation pedigree is demonstrated in developing analyses that have immediate relevance for public affairs. One has the sense that he was led to Germany because the German experience in the twentieth century teaches us more about what to make of our citizenship in a liberal democratic setting than any other study. It is this public side of Markovits's scholarship that helps us understand the urgency, acuity, and compassion that animate his texts. It also makes explicit the links between scholarly analysis and politics. Witness the printed commentary and speaking engagements on both sides of the Atlantic on topics as various as the student movement, the strategy of organized labor, popular music, the organization of sports, German foreign policy, political parties, German unification, and the Holocaust.

This book takes up the key issues of democracy in the Bonn and Berlin republics. Philip Gorski opens the volume with a neo-Weberian reworking of Barrington Moore's question about the antidemocratic denouement in 1933 Germany.[1] His question: what could resist the encroachments of absolutism at work all over Europe in the early modern period? Gorski finds the answer in neighboring Netherlands. Absorbing the social movement literature that began to appear a full decade after the publication of *Social Origins*, he argues that the Calvinist movement gave powerful impetus to republican virtues that did not persist in Lutheran Germany, despite quite similar starting points on the eve of the Reformation.

Thomas Ertman adds an additional layer to the redefinition of the analytical premise of "German exceptionalism" by focusing on nineteenth-century constitutional arrangements, and by expanding the scope of cross-national comparison beyond Britain and France to encompass the other European late industrializers: Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Once again, Moore provides the basic orientation, but fails the ultimate test, for

1. Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).

constitutional dualism was a common starting point, unaffected by late industrialization, social mobilization (bourgeois revolution), reactionary bureaucrats, or institutional barriers. Germany's "exceptionalism" consisted instead in the stability of this constitutional dualism, quite unlike the evolution towards parliamentarism in all the other cases. Consequently, Germany's real breakthrough to democracy came with the adoption of full parliamentarism in 1949.

A natural question to emerge from these two historical chapters concerns the relationship between Germany's postwar democratic institutional "container" and the legacy of predemocratic attitudes. Though studies have suggested a dramatic evolution of attitudes in Germany supportive of democracy by the 1970s at the latest, the chapters in this volume suggest a nuanced view of the infrastructure of postwar republican German democracy. They suggest that part of Germany's democratic experience consists in a collective and consensual approach to issues of public policy. It is notoriously hard to define an attitudinal constellation of the ideal or typical "democrat." Whatever that may be, individual attitudes may matter less in producing a functioning democracy to the degree that the groups populating Germany's highly organized public sphere are licensed to develop, contest, and implement public policy. One important theme running through these chapters is the promises and limitations of the neocorporatist mechanisms associated with the notion of Modell Deutschland – in their starkest form, trade unions and trade associations bargaining over work and economic issues, but also including a welter of parapublic institutions supervising many other dimensions of public life.

Institutions and attitudes both play a central role in Christopher Allen's account of the challenges to be negotiated by Germany's social market economy at the edge of the twenty-first century. Starting from the premise that the social market economy has served Germany exceptionally well both economically and politically, Allen frets about an "unintentional departure" from this institutional matrix under the siren songs of neo-Liberalism. For it is not so much the "external" shocks of German unification, European integration, and globalization that threaten Germany's unique brand of organized capitalism, but an almost Platonic forgetfulness of the handsome anatomy and virtues of Modell

Deutschland by a new generation of bankers, industrialists, and politicians, as opportunities provided by the new international context make it easier for them to bail out of the German institutional matrix.

Sluggish job creation in reunified Germany is frequently cited as prima facie evidence for the superiority of British-American style labor markets. In grappling with this aspect of Germany's economic policy challenges Michael Huelshoff attempts to demonstrate that policy innovation not only can, but in fact does continue to be defined without abandoning Modell Deutschland. The author argues that Germany's ideology of social consensus, a key cultural trait, is a precondition of institutional arrangements and provides a uniquely German method to generate responses to the so-called Standort problem (attracting industrial investment) that other models – the Anglo, the Dutch or the European – cannot. In particular, in contrast to the others, despite significant decentralization of decision making in the labor market, the German approach leaves trade union power intact.

Whatever the role of ideology in producing social consensus, Germany's political institutions virtually require it. In recent years the complaint has been aired that the urgency of policy reform makes these institutions a luxury Germany can no longer afford. The central target of this thinking has been the Bundesrat. Stephen Silvia's analysis of Bundesrat involvement in Germany's episodes of legislative gridlock presents a periodic pattern caused mainly by shifting majorities in the Federal Republic's two legislative houses. He notes that policy gridlock has become more acute of late, lending credence to the theory that increasing complexity of policy is driving a corresponding intensification of intergovernmental relations. If true, then governability could be enhanced in either of two ways: greater decisional efficiency or greater social consensus.

At this point, some commentary about the relevance of the European Union is required. Already in the 1930s, the Ordo-Liberals were impressed with the contribution of both competition and the state in producing economic success that worked for society as a whole, hence, the social market economy. Increasingly, the EU is becoming an important locus of state-like market regulatory functions, be it by way of market definition (product standards) or

surveillance of the behavior of market agents. As this role has developed, another layer of government has been superimposed on the already complex system of intergovernmental relations. It is probable that "Brussels" is part of the pattern of even greater gridlock in German legislative affairs. In this sense, the "Bundesrat issue" is actually one about the evolving constitution of Europe. New information technologies comprise only one important field in which EU internal market concerns have constitutional reverberations for the member states. Beth Noveck's analysis of Germany's 1997 media law in this volume portrays the Länder-Bund contest over competence in this area as the defining feature of the legislative process and raises the question of whether the democratizing impulse behind the Federal Republic's media-relevant Grundgesetz articles are being inadvertently sacrificed in the unseemly struggle.

It is of course still too early to judge the impact of EMU – economic and monetary union – on the content and structure of social policy and more broadly the Ordnungspolitik of the member states, Germany included. However, it is at least possible that the passing of the Deutsche Mark and its substitution by the euro, along with the new powers assigned to the European Parliament by the Treaty of Amsterdam, will provide significant new opportunities for identification of the EU as a – if not the – legitimate framework for major policy decisions. As important, Germany's "third sector" – the social movements and movement organizations, especially in the environmental area – is reflecting major changes in Germany's social structure that have already challenged the centrality of the Modell Deutschland institutional complex. The increasing importance of the service sector is creating the conditions for a Euro-level recalibration of Germany's institutions, a process that is likely to take a generation to consolidate, but whose leading indicators – European works councils, increasingly Europeanized regulatory standards, and movement toward a new balance between public regulatory and redistributive measures (bluntly: more environment, less entitlement) – are already at hand, even if responsibility for job creation measures continues to be decentralized. Europeanization will also create a new political context for affiliation and identification, including greater atten-

tion to supranationality on the one hand and local regionalism on the other, affecting Länder governments in particular. Whether Germans embrace this situation as "European domestic politics" or react defensively will depend on EU policies, general economic conditions, and cues from German elites.

In addition to issues of political economy, the futures of Germany and the EU are mutually contingent to a high degree with respect to attitudes about Brussels and the world beyond German and European borders. Karen Donfried's analysis of German foreign policy after 1990 confirms Markovits and Reich's thesis about Germany's "culture of reticence."[2] She shows that while Russia's present efforts to reconcile great power status and democracy mirror those of Imperial Germany, in the context of imperial decline overlaid with anarchic developments – terror bombings carried out by self-styled holy warriors – disguised as clashes of cultures, present day parliamentary Germany now has to be coaxed into playing its role in upholding international order. The centrality of Germany's role under its new "red-green" government in managing the Kosovo crisis constitutes a major breakthrough in this regard.

The psychological infrastructure of this reticence is the real subject of Carolyn Höfig's reflection on the relationship of the Germans to the automobile. If the triumph of consumerism has given the lie to pretensions to the Kulturstaat hoped for by some after the War, it has also taken the German particularism out of attitudes toward the rest of the world. Indeed, what was perhaps most surprising about unification is the relative absence of nationalist sentiment. Recent opinion polls give Germans nearly the highest scores on European, as opposed to national, orientation. To some extent, the operation of the EU internal market may be a powerful stimulus to the creation of a multicultural, if not cosmopolitan, reality. In the case of automobiles, models from all EU producers freely circulate in Germany, subject to heavy EU involvement in the ongoing evolution of automobile technology, inter alia, via environmental and safety standards. One has only to recall "le Waldsterben," that 1980s addition to the French lexicon, to appreciate the Europeanization of critical elements in Germany's consumer culture. Equally worth noting is the critical support of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Germany's new third political force with

special strength in the younger age cohorts, for the project of European integration.

Despite these developments, EU consumerism, even its critical variety, has not resolved serious contradictions in the functioning of Modell Deutschland that challenge us to contemplate afresh the meaning of democracy and reassess the degree of its attainment in the Federal Republic. At core, the problem is that the inclusiveness that has facilitated the functioning of German democracy is not complete. Systematic exclusion of various groups from putative citizenship rights point to serious flaws in the design of Modell Deutschland. Any egalitarian pretensions Germans may harbor are challenged by the deteriorating situation of women, even as the workforce becomes increasingly feminine. In their analysis of the structure of Germany's welfare institutions, Patricia Davis and Simon Reich identify a troubling pattern in Germany's gendered system of workforce participation. Despite increasing financial outlays in the 1990s, access to social resources by women has actually decreased. The authors argue that this regressive outcome is an artifact of the male, full-time, skilled worker archetype, which defines the structure of the system and the entitlements it dispenses. More darkly, they argue that this result is the more or less foreseeable outcome of a bipartisan strategy of protecting the core Facharbeiter constituency, a strategy that antedates unification and the globalization debate. It is also notable that, according to the authors, this strategy encompassed resistance to EU-mandated standards for equality between men and women.

If Modell Deutschland has not achieved a proper balance between collective rights and (social) citizenship, it is similarly burdened by the external boundaries citizenship imposes. To address foreigner-bashing is to return to the issues raised by Gorski's analysis of republican virtues, a leading one of which is tolerance of cultural difference, a major step beyond the taming of nationalistic atavism via consumer complacency or even a functioning welfare

2. See *The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). Long-serving German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher confirms the basic thrust of the authors' analysis in his August 1998 review, *Berliner Morgenpost,* 16 August 1998.

system for those fortunate enough to be entitled to its fruits. At one level, treatment of Ausländer has been a sad and ironic correlate of Europe's faltering labor markets and the corresponding decline of welfare institutions. The mix of public and consumer goods defining the German welfare state has been a central element of the social contract – viewed as emancipatory act by some or bread and circuses by others. Economic restructuring, post-cold war opening to the East and the disintegration of the Soviet empire all conspire, by increasing the number of Ausländer in Germany, to make the Germans confront their political culture like nothing else since the creation of the German empire in 1871. Some steps have been taken towards incorporating Ausländer, but citizenship, the ultimate sign of membership, continues to be decided predominantly on ethnic grounds, even after the legislation that came into force in 1999 extending citizenship to a larger number of immigrants. It remains to be seen whether "free movement" of EU nationals will serve as a bridgehead to a more expansive understanding of inclusion for "third country nationals." For now, indecision is troubling. It permits authorities to adopt strategies of physical and social separation that create targets and stereotypes for elements spouting nationalist and xenophobic slogans, and who all too frequently give vent to rage and cynicism in acts of brutality.

Our fascination with Germany comes in large part from the mixture of impatience and humility with which we seek to understand the conditions under which democracy emerges and thrives and to evaluate democracy's ever unfinished agenda in America and elsewhere. Germany's catastrophic course in the first half of this century continues to transfix us. And of various aspects of Germany's tragedy, none is more compelling than the Holocaust. It is eminently appropriate that this volume presents Jeremiah Riemer's essay about the reception of Daniel Goldhagen's controversial book, *Hitler's Willing Executioners* as its concluding chapter. Though it is absent as an explicit element of every other chapter of this volume, this nightmare necessarily haunts them all. In a book whose contributions labor to present the specific character of German politics against the many elements that provide the basis of comparison with other countries, the Holocaust is the experience which imparts to everything else its specific place in the summing

up. It is the meeting place of the subject and object of inquiry, a crucial feature of Germany's collective consciousness, as well as the limiting case for our time in the study of comparative politics.

Riemer explains the oddity of hostile reactions to the book among liberal scholars as an effect of some fundamental misunderstanding of Goldhagen's central point. "Eliminationist anti-semitism" proved too dissonant to the cognitive maps of this postwar generation, more experienced with large historical ideas rather than the simpler doctrines of state-sponsored hatred. In the end, the Holocaust was a matter of political culture, a culture that could be and was successfully transformed after the War, not only by American efforts but also in part by the results of painful discussions over many dinner tables between generations. The strikingly positive reception of Goldhagen during his German lecture tour and the bestseller status of his book stand in odd juxtaposition to the reaction of many critics. On the other hand, according to this view, that very reception provided vindication for Goldhagen's position that, like any other people, the Germans were educable, that there was choice, and that consequently there is deliverance from the German nightmare. It only remains to be said that, in effect, Goldhagen's analysis challenged these historians by contributing to a much more nuanced interpretation of Germany's historical Sonderweg than that which held sway thirty years ago, a theme that runs through the contributions in this book as well.

In the end, our preoccupation with Germany is an artifact of our concern for each and every issue raised in this volume. Germany has played and will continue to play a central role in the drama of defining modernity. At one level, the issues are enduring. At another level, they are new: how can a humane, civil, and democratic order be fashioned in the postnational era? Both institutions and attitudes matter. Since the 1970s, first in the academic arena and more recently in broader citizens forums, through a compassion born of personal experience and memory, through his sharp-witted analyses, through his engagement in the public sphere, Andrei Markovits has not only been a continual source of insight into European politics; he has been the conscience of a generation. With these essays we celebrate his ongoing contributions.

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