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2 Clientelism: Premodern, Modern, Postmodern

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2 Clientelism: Premodern, Modern, Postmodern _ Ay§e Giine§-Ayata _ From a unilinear developmentalist perspective, the existence and perpetua-tion of clientelistic relations in modern or developing societies came as a surprise to many scholars. In general the expectation was that patron-client relations of all types would be replaced by "modern" forms of participa-tion. In fact, the first studies of participation in developing countries almost explicitly voiced such an expectation. Later, especially as empirical studies on this subject increased, the objective became understanding the role of such "nonmodern" mechanisms of participation in political development. Two viewpoints emerged on this issue. Boissevain (1966), Powell (1970), Weingrod (1968, 1977), and Silverman (1970), among others, argued that clientelism was a step forward in terms of political development. It was the means of connecting center and periphery, serving to increase political con-sciousness where direct participation was limited. It led central elites com-peting for positions of power to contact local leaders for support. It con-nected local leaders, often opponents of centralization, to the central government, which could rely on them for control. At the same time, the positions of local patrons could be buttressed, and these individuals could channel central government resources for the consolidation of power and private gains. In a parallel manner, sometimes they could reduce the impact of rapacious central governments on the local communities. With the expansion of state administration, even local offices became attractive for their connections and access to centers of power beyond the locality. With modernization, the number of linkage roles expanded and competition among local elites increased, but demands for particularistic application of policies and delivery of benefits continued to prevail. Research indicated that clientelism was not only inevitable but also functional. Challenging this approach, Lemarchand and Legg (1971), Zuckerman (1977), Barnes and Sani (1974), and Schneider et al. (1972) claimed that clientelism did not lead to either democracy or modernization. On the con-trary, it had a constraining effect on the enactment of universalistic policies and discouraged the development of citizen participation and support as contingent to general policy implementation. They argued that even in 19
© 1994, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, USA

2 Clientelism: Premodern, Modern, Postmodern _ Ay§e Giine§-Ayata _ From a unilinear developmentalist perspective, the existence and perpetua-tion of clientelistic relations in modern or developing societies came as a surprise to many scholars. In general the expectation was that patron-client relations of all types would be replaced by "modern" forms of participa-tion. In fact, the first studies of participation in developing countries almost explicitly voiced such an expectation. Later, especially as empirical studies on this subject increased, the objective became understanding the role of such "nonmodern" mechanisms of participation in political development. Two viewpoints emerged on this issue. Boissevain (1966), Powell (1970), Weingrod (1968, 1977), and Silverman (1970), among others, argued that clientelism was a step forward in terms of political development. It was the means of connecting center and periphery, serving to increase political con-sciousness where direct participation was limited. It led central elites com-peting for positions of power to contact local leaders for support. It con-nected local leaders, often opponents of centralization, to the central government, which could rely on them for control. At the same time, the positions of local patrons could be buttressed, and these individuals could channel central government resources for the consolidation of power and private gains. In a parallel manner, sometimes they could reduce the impact of rapacious central governments on the local communities. With the expansion of state administration, even local offices became attractive for their connections and access to centers of power beyond the locality. With modernization, the number of linkage roles expanded and competition among local elites increased, but demands for particularistic application of policies and delivery of benefits continued to prevail. Research indicated that clientelism was not only inevitable but also functional. Challenging this approach, Lemarchand and Legg (1971), Zuckerman (1977), Barnes and Sani (1974), and Schneider et al. (1972) claimed that clientelism did not lead to either democracy or modernization. On the con-trary, it had a constraining effect on the enactment of universalistic policies and discouraged the development of citizen participation and support as contingent to general policy implementation. They argued that even in 19
© 1994, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, USA
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