Preface

Few studies on Asia Pacific approach it from a global perspective. This one attempts to do just that, placing the region in the context of worldwide trends. It is written with two sets of conditions in view: the end of the Cold War, and the beckoning of the twenty-first century.

The reader may already be familiar with the economic clout and vast potential of the Asia Pacific region. Still, it is appropriate to offer a brief comment on its strategic relevance to the United States, drawing on the lessons that can be derived from a retrospective view of post-1945 world politics.

It is often said that our century was defined by three global wars—the two world wars and the Cold War—and that the United States, in the last half-century, fought three wars across the Pacific—the Pacific War (1941–1945) with Japan, and the Korean and Vietnam wars.[1] When these events are mentioned in the literature, it is typically to show how global international relations affected events in Asia Pacific. But what is not readily apparent—much less appreciated—is how past events in Asia Pacific likewise helped shape or reshape events elsewhere, sometimes events of momentous proportions. One example is the impact of the Korean War on global politics. As one author put it, without the Korean War, many of the characteristics associated with the Cold War—higher defense budgets, a militarized NATO, great Sino-U.S. hostility followed by post-1972 China-card playing, and U.S. security commitments throughout the world—probably would not have developed the way they did.[2]

The Vietnam War is another example in the same category. There is no need to rehash its well-known effects on domestic politics in the United States and on the conduct of regional relations. I shall only mention its influence on international relations theory. The fact that the preponderant military power of the United States failed to stop the North Vietnamese from engulfing South Vietnam remains a puzzle to many. From the consequent scholarly soul-searching, however, have come important insights that have increased our understanding of the nature of power, and its limitations; David Baldwin's "paradox of unrealized power" and Jeffrey Hart's "three measures of power" are two examples.[3]

There is a paradox concerning the place of Asia Pacific in U.S. strategic thinking, however. Every recent U.S. president has asserted that the United States is a "Pacific power." It is nevertheless true that, like the former Soviet Union, the United States tended to subordinate the Pacific to

the Atlantic in its strategic thinking about foreign policy. The chapters in this book show how the kaleidoscopic changes in world politics since the late 1980s, along with three decades of phenomenal economic success of Asia Pacific nations, have brought a new age of geoeconomics. If things should turn out as this book anticipates, the twenty-first century will witness the rise of a non-Western bloc (i.e., Asia Pacific) to share the world stage with two Western blocs—one European and one (post-European) North American—on an equal footing and with similar values. That eventuality will change priorities for U.S. foreign policy thinking. More important, it may change the very nature of international relations in the state-centric Westphalian system we live in.

The term "Asia Pacific" used in this volume refers generally to Japan, China, the four Asian NIEs (newly industrializing economies: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), and Southeast Asia, including Indochina and members of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations). In the literature, Canada, the United States, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand, among others, are sometimes included in the broader term "Pacific Basin," but this volume offers no separate chapters on the roles of these countries in the security and econopolitical life of Asia Pacific.

A few brief words about the organization of the book are in order. Chapter 1 begins with a definition of what constitutes the end of the Cold War and proceeds to identify the major attributes that characterize the so-called post–Cold War era on the larger world scene. It then explores how global changes manifest themselves at the Asia Pacific regional level and whether there are regional deviations from the global norm.

Each of the next eight chapters, 2 through 9, focuses on a country or area, looking at the general question of how new circumstances brought on by a new era will affect international relations within the Asia Pacific region. There are chapters assessing how the new era bears on Japan (Gordon), China (Hsiung), and Taiwan (Clark). Two chapters survey bilateral relations: between Russia and Japan (Berton) and between the Philippines and South Korea (Celoza and Sours). The chapter by Berton also evaluates the former Soviet Union's role in the region. One chapter (Gordon) covers members of ASEAN. One chapter (Chow) explores the prospects of regional integration in Asia Pacific, and does so in the global context of the trends of competitive trade-bloc formation. Two chapters discuss the United States' changing role, with its challenge for theory (Chan) and possible strategic responses (Denoon).

The book ends with two concluding chapters that, while drawing upon the findings of the previous chapters, also focus on the transition from the end of the Cold War to the coming of the twenty-first century. Chapter 11 provides a retrospective of Asia Pacific's rise as a solid economic force, with a view to assessing how it will fare in the post–Cold War era. The final chapter measures the bequests of our century and speculates on the global and regional balance of power in the new century. It also compares

the evolving relative strengths of the three competing trading blocs (Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific) over time, in an attempt to answer the compelling question of whether there is going to be a "Pacific Era."

Except for Chapter 10, by Peter Chow, all chapters grew out of papers presented on two consecutive panels I chaired at the 1992 annual conference of the International Studies Association (ISA), in Atlanta. The panels' common theme ("Post–Cold War International Relations in Asia Pacific") fit the general theme of the ISA conference: "Prospects for Progress in a Changing International Environment." I wish to acknowledge the warm support given by the ISA 1992 Program Committee chairman, Professor James Lee Ray of Florida State University, in endorsing the two panels for the annual conference.

The contributors to this volume demonstrated a superb self-discipline and sense of responsibility in submitting their panel papers and then the final drafts of their chapters on time and, in some cases, even well ahead of time. Steve Chan consistently finished his work months before the deadline, despite his sabbatical spent in Singapore part of the year. Bernard Gordon, who spent a term visiting at Kobe University, Japan, nonetheless finished two chapters on time. This hard work made my job as coordinator and editor much easier; I wish to thank all the contributors. I owe a special debt to Peter Chow for adding a chapter on regional integration as an original contribution to the book, meeting the deadline despite a family loss.

In the preparation of portions of this book, I was ably aided by my research assistant, Mr. Li Wei, at New York University. I also received generous comments and encouragement from my colleagues, among them Leah Haus and Steven Brams, as well as David Denoon. To them, and others who have helped, I owe my sincere thanks.

—JCH

■ NOTES

1. James A. Leach, "A Republican Looks at Foreign Policy," 71 *Foreign Affairs* 3:27 (Summer 1992).

2. Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," 24 *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4:563–592 (December 1980).

3. David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics," 31 *World Politics* 2: 161–194 (1979), develops the point about the nonfungibility of power and finds power to be not an undifferentiated mass but situation-specific. The U.S. nuclear force may be adequate to deter a Soviet missile attack, but was inadequate for deterring the North Koreans from capturing the Pueblo. Jeffrey Hart, "Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations," 30 *International Organization* 2:289–305 (Spring 1976), defines power as control over resources, actors, and events. If control over resources cannot convert to control over events, he notes, then power, no matter how immense, is to no avail. Either Baldwin's or Hart's formulation would explain why, despite its vast high tech power, the United States failed in Vietnam.