

# Contents

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Preface.....	xiii
1. Perspectives on Modeling International Conflict, <u>Michael D. Ward</u> .....	1
PART 1	
GAME THEORETIC AND UTILITY APPROACHES	
2. The Path to Stable Deterrence, <u>Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour</u> .....	11
The Deterrence Game .....	12
A Rational Path from Preemption to Deterrence ...	18
Conclusions .....	22
Notes .....	24
3. Anticipation and Stability in Two-Person, Non-Cooperative Games, <u>D. Marc Kilgour</u> .....	26
The Conflict Model, Anticipation, and Stability .	28
Representation of Selected Stability	
Definitions .....	32
Nash Stability .....	33
General Metarationality .....	34
Symmetric Metarationality .....	36
Sequential Stability .....	37
Limited-Move Stabilities .....	38
$L^n$ Stability .....	42
Non-Myopic Stability .....	44
Equilibria .....	45
Properties of Limited-Move Stabilities .....	48
Conclusions .....	50
Notes .....	50
4. The Pathologies of Unilateral Deterrence, <u>Frank C. Zagare</u> .....	52

Stable Mutual Deterrence and the Theory of Moves .....	52
The Pathologies of Unilateral Deterrence .....	57
Three Sets of Stability Criteria .....	59
The Absorbing Criteria and Attitudes Toward Risk .....	62
Power Asymmetries .....	64
Move Limitations .....	69
Summary and Conclusion .....	72
Notes .....	74
5. Decision-Theoretic and Game-Theoretic Models of International Conflict, <u>Zeev Maoz</u> .....	76
The Initiation Game .....	77
Measuring Payoffs in the Initiation Game .....	88
The Conflict Management Game .....	97
The Negotiation Game .....	105
Conclusion .....	106
Appendix 1 .....	106
Appendix 2 .....	108
Notes .....	109
6. Moving Forward in Time: Paths Toward a Dynamic Utility Theory of Crisis Decisions, <u>James D. Morrow</u> .....	112
Dynamic Facets of Existing Rational Models .....	114
What Do We Mean by Dynamic? .....	119
Some Possible Dynamic Rational Models .....	123
Conclusion .....	128
Notes .....	129
PART 2	
ESCALATION PROCESSES	
7. Heuristic Decision Rules, the Dynamics of the Arms Race, and War Initiation, <u>Michael D. Intriligator</u> and <u>Dagobert L. Brito</u> .....	133
Deterring and Initiating Regions in the Weapons Plane .....	135
Decision Rules and Gaps .....	145
Optimizing Behavior .....	147
Gaps, Stability, and War Initiation .....	151
Conclusions .....	157
Notes .....	158
8. Arms Races as Good Things? <u>Jean-Christian Lambelet</u> .....	161
A First Illustration .....	161
A Simple Static Typology of Bilateral Arms Races .....	163

The Dynamic Dimension .....	167
A Second Illustration .....	168
Modeling Arms Races .....	169
A Third Illustration .....	170
Notes .....	172
9. Transform Methods and Dynamic Models, <u>Thomas F. Mayer</u> .....	175
Analytical Strategies and Numerical Strategies ..	175
Transform Methods .....	177
Alternatives to the Richardson Model .....	181
A Second-Order Equation Model .....	181
An Asymmetric Model .....	184
An Integrated-Lag Model .....	187
An Interrupted Model .....	190
Applications to the Soviet-American Arms Race ..	192
Application of the Standard Richardson Model .....	197
Application of the Second-Order Model .....	204
Application of the Asymmetric Model .....	206
Application of the Integrated-Lag Model .....	208
Application of the Interrupted Model .....	208
Conclusion .....	212
Notes .....	213
10. The Dollar Auction as a Model of International Escalation, <u>Barry O'Neill</u> .....	220
Past Suggestions for the Rational Strategy .....	221
The Solution .....	222
Enrichment of the Dollar Auction to Model Real Escalation .....	224
Notes .....	226
PART 3 SIMULATION PROCESSES	
11. Toward a Dynamic Theory of Conflict and Coalition Formation, <u>Urs Luterbacher and Pierre Allan</u> .....	229
Toward a Rational Theory of Conflict .....	229
The Two-Actor Level .....	230
Analysis of the Triad .....	237
Some Empirical Results .....	247
Notes .....	250
12. Modeling External and Internal Conflict in Small Countries, <u>T. Michael Clarke</u> .....	251
Small Countries and Simulation .....	251
General Structure and Purpose of SIMSWISS .....	252
Theoretical Preliminaries Concerning Politico-Economic Models .....	261

Political Support .....	264
Military and Civilian Government Expenditure ...	266
Military Stocks in Small Countries .....	267
Toward a Dynamic Model of Domestic Conflict ....	271
A Set of Small-Country Hypotheses .....	275
Notes .....	276
13. Simulation of Reliability Kinematics in Political Systems, <u>Claudio Cioffi-Revilla</u> .....	278
Political Reliability Theory .....	279
Basic Concepts and Equations .....	279
Some Empirical Applications .....	280
Simulation Analysis .....	282
Results .....	288
Time-Invariant (Static) Effects of Complexity .....	288
Kinematic Results: Homogeneous Trajectories .	291
Kinematic Results: Mixed Trajectories .....	302
Discussion .....	306
Aspects of Specific Findings .....	306
Some Broader Theoretical Aspects .....	308
Future Research Directions .....	310
Notes .....	312
PART 4 MODELS OF WAR FIGHTING	
14. Lanchester Models of Battlefield Attrition and the Organization of Combat Forces, <u>Martin McGuire</u> ....	319
Introduction .....	319
Troop Density on the Battlefield .....	320
The Tension Between the Need to Concentrate and to Disperse .....	320
Lanchester Attrition Processes and the Structural Relations Among Dispersion, Mobility, and Firepower .....	323
Interaction Between Adversaries .....	329
Ecological Paradigm of Interaction Between Opponents .....	332
Behavioral Paradigm of Interaction Between Opponents .....	333
Empirical Test of Force Density Effects ....	335
Decentralization and Size of Independent Operating Units .....	338
Integration of Density and Decentralization Models .....	344
Proposed Merger of Density and Decentralization .....	345
Notes .....	348

15. Dynamic Models of Guerrilla Warfare, <u>Albert A. Stahel</u> .....	354
The Principles of Guerrilla Warfare .....	354
Models of Warfare .....	356
Lanchester's Models .....	356
Volterra's Host and Guest Model .....	358
A Model for the Simulation of Guerrilla Warfare .....	359
The Guerrilla War in South Sudan .....	360
The Partisan War in Yugoslav (1941-1944) ....	361
The Guerrilla War of the Mujaheddins in Afghanistan .....	364
The Model .....	364
The Strengths and the Parameters .....	366
The Results of the Simulation .....	368
Conclusions .....	369

## PART 5 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

16. Adaptive Precedent-Based Logic and Rational Choice: A Comparison of Two Approaches to the Modeling of International Behavior, <u>Philip A. Schrod</u> .....	373
Rational Choice Models .....	374
Game Theory .....	374
Expected Utility .....	375
Economic Competition and Maximization .....	375
The Introduction of Concepts .....	376
The Existence of Mixed Strategy Solutions ...	376
The Prisoner's Dilemma/Chicken Analysis of War Initiation and Arms .....	376
The Axelrod Altruism Results .....	377
The Game-Theoretic Analysis of Deterrence ...	377
Problems with the Rational Choice Approach .....	377
Lack of Testable Theory .....	380
Inappropriateness of Results .....	382
The Irrelevance of Methodological Individualism .....	383
Inefficiency of History .....	385
Key Features of the Classical Approach .....	387
Small-N, Large-N Analysis .....	387
Use of Precedent and Analogy .....	388
Flexible Assumptions about Congition .....	388
The Sentient Organization as Primary Actor ..	389
Massive Data Bases as the Source of Inductive Theory .....	389
A Dynamic Model of Employing Artificial Intelligence Methods .....	390
An Example of a Formal Model of Historical Pattern Matching .....	395

Conclusion .....	398
Notes .....	400
17. Changes in Foreign Policy Across Time: The Logical Analysis of a Succession of Decision Problems Using Logic Programming, <u>Dwain Mefford</u> .....	401
From the Logic of Explanation to the Logic of Inherent in a Universe of Debate .....	406
Rendering the Logic of Athenian Policy on Rebellious Cities Circa the Fifth Year of the Peloponnesian War .....	408
One Case in the Series: The Evidence Thucydides Provides .....	412
Logic Programming as a Medium for Reconstructing the Universe of Debate and Decision .....	415
Conclusion .....	422
Notes .....	423
PART 6 EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL FRONTIERS	
18. A Visual Approach to International Conflict and Cooperation, <u>Michael D. Ward and</u> <u>Lewis L. House</u> .....	427
Why Graphics? .....	428
The Data Base .....	429
The Display .....	431
Looking at the Results .....	435
Mathematical Analyses and Conclusion .....	456
Notes .....	458
Appendix 1 .....	460
Appendix 2 .....	461
19. Cycles of General, Hegemonic, and Global War, <u>William R. Thompson</u> .....	462
Wright .....	464
Richardson and Moyal .....	470
Denton and Phillips .....	471
The Correlates of War .....	475
Levy .....	478
Looking for Cycles of War and Peace .....	479
20. Forecasting East-West Diplomatic Climate: A Politometric Approach, <u>Dieter Ruloff and</u> <u>Daniel Frei</u> .....	489
East-West Politico-Diplomatic Climate: Does It Matter? .....	489
Implicit Models of East-West Diplomatic Climate .....	489

Trends .....	490
Cycles .....	491
Interdependence .....	492
Stochastic Properties .....	493
The Data .....	494
Model and Methods .....	495
Statistical Results .....	498
Simulating and Forecasting the US-Soviet Politico-Diplomatic Climate .....	508
Summary and Conclusions .....	513

PART 7  
COMMENTARY

21. Connecting Domestic and International Conflicts, Past and Present, <u>Charles Tilly</u> .....	517
Violent Conflict Within and Among States .....	517
Interactions Between Domestic and International Conflict .....	522
Extraction and Repression as Links Between Domestic and International Conflict .....	524
Dynamics of Domestic Conflict .....	527
Borrowing from International Relations .....	529
Returning the Favor .....	530
References .....	533
About the Editors and Contributors .....	559

