

Contents

Preface.....	xiii
1. Perspectives on Modeling International Conflict, <u>Michael D. Ward</u>	1
PART 1	
GAME THEORETIC AND UTILITY APPROACHES	
2. The Path to Stable Deterrence, <u>Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour</u>	11
The Deterrence Game	12
A Rational Path from Preemption to Deterrence	18
Conclusions	22
Notes	24
3. Anticipation and Stability in Two-Person, Non-Cooperative Games, <u>D. Marc Kilgour</u>	26
The Conflict Model, Anticipation, and Stability	28
Representation of Selected Stability	
Definitions	32
Nash Stability	33
General Metarationality	34
Symmetric Metarationality	36
Sequential Stability	37
Limited-Move Stabilities	38
L^h Stability	42
Non-Myopic Stability	44
Equilibria	45
Properties of Limited-Move Stabilities	48
Conclusions	50
Notes	50
4. The Pathologies of Unilateral Deterrence, <u>Frank C. Zagare</u>	52

Stable Mutual Deterrence and the Theory of Moves	52
The Pathologies of Unilateral Deterrence	57
Three Sets of Stability Criteria	59
The Absorbing Criteria and Attitudes Toward Risk	62
Power Asymmetries	64
Move Limitations	69
Summary and Conclusion	72
Notes	74
5. Decision-Theoretic and Game-Theoretic Models of International Conflict, <u>Zeev Maoz</u>	76
The Initiation Game	77
Measuring Payoffs in the Initiation Game	88
The Conflict Management Game	97
The Negotiation Game	105
Conclusion	106
Appendix 1	106
Appendix 2	108
Notes	109
6. Moving Forward in Time: Paths Toward a Dynamic Utility Theory of Crisis Decisions, <u>James D. Morrow</u>	112
Dynamic Facets of Existing Rational Models	114
What Do We Mean by Dynamic?	119
Some Possible Dynamic Rational Models	123
Conclusion	128
Notes	129
PART 2	
ESCALATION PROCESSES	
7. Heuristic Decision Rules, the Dynamics of the Arms Race, and War Initiation, <u>Michael D.</u> <u>Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito</u>	133
Deterring and Initiating Regions in the Weapons Plane	135
Decision Rules and Gaps	145
Optimizing Behavior	147
Gaps, Stability, and War Initiation	151
Conclusions	157
Notes	158
8. Arms Races as Good Things? <u>Jean-Christian Lambelet</u>	161
A First Illustration	161
A Simple Static Typology of Bilateral Arms Races	163

The Dynamic Dimension	167
A Second Illustration	168
Modeling Arms Races	169
A Third Illustration	170
Notes	172
9. Transform Methods and Dynamic Models, <u>Thomas F. Mayer</u>	175
Analytical Strategies and Numerical Strategies ..	175
Transform Methods	177
Alternatives to the Richardson Model	181
A Second-Order Equation Model	181
An Asymmetric Model	184
An Integrated-Lag Model	187
An Interrupted Model	190
Applications to the Soviet-American Arms Race ..	192
Application of the Standard Richardson Model	197
Application of the Second-Order Model	204
Application of the Asymmetric Model	206
Application of the Integrated-Lag Model	208
Application of the Interrupted Model	208
Conclusion	212
Notes	213
10. The Dollar Auction as a Model of International Escalation, <u>Barry O'Neill</u>	220
Past Suggestions for the Rational Stategy	221
The Solution	222
Enrichment of the Dollar Auction to Model Real Escalation	224
Notes	226
PART 3	
SIMULATION PROCESSES	
11. Toward a Dynamic Theory of Conflict and Coalition Formation, <u>Urs Luterbacher and Pierre Allan</u>	229
Toward a Rational Theory of Conflict	229
The Two-Actor Level	230
Analysis of the Triad	237
Some Empirical Results	247
Notes	250
12. Modeling External and Internal Conflict in Small Countries, <u>T. Michael Clarke</u>	251
Small Countries and Simulation	251
General Structure and Purpose of SIMSWISS	252
Theoretical Preliminaries Concerning Politico-Economic Models	261

Political Support	264
Military and Civilian Government Expenditure	266
Military Stocks in Small Countries	267
Toward a Dynamic Model of Domestic Conflict	271
A Set of Small-Country Hypotheses	275
Notes	276
 13. Simulation of Reliability Kinematics in Political Systems, <u>Claudio Cioffi-Revilla</u>	278
Political Reliability Theory	279
Basic Concepts and Equations	279
Some Empirical Applicatons	280
Simulation Analysis	282
Results	288
Time-Invariant (Static) Effects	
of Complexity	288
Kinematic Results: Homogeneous Trajectories .	291
Kinematic Results: Mixed Trajectories	302
Discussion	306
Aspects of Specific Findings	306
Some Broader Theoretical Aspects	308
Future Research Directions	310
Notes	312
 PART 4	
MODELS OF WAR FIGHTING	
 14. Lanchester Models of Battlefield Attrition and the Organization of Combat Forces, <u>Martin McGuire</u>	319
Introduction	319
Troop Density on the Battlefield	320
The Tension Between the Need to Concentrate and to Disperse	320
Lanchester Attrition Processes and the Structural Relations Among Dispersion, Mobility, and Firepower	323
Interaction Between Adversaries	329
Ecological Paradigm of Interaction Between Opponents	332
Behavioral Paradigm of Interaction Between Opponents	333
Empirical Test of Force Density Effects	335
Decentralization and Size of Independent Operating Units	338
Integration of Density and Decentralization Models	344
Proposed Merger of Density and Decentralization	345
Notes	348

15. Dynamic Models of Guerrilla Warfare, <u>Albert A. Stahel</u>	354
The Principles of Guerrilla Warfare	354
Models of Warfare	356
Lanchester's Models	356
Volterra's Host and Guest Model	358
A Model for the Simulation of Guerrilla Warfare	359
The Guerrilla War in South Sudan	360
The Partisan War in Yugoslavia (1941-1944)	361
The Guerrilla War of the Mujaheddins in Afghanistan	364
The Model	364
The Strengths and the Parameters	366
The Results of the Simulation	368
Conclusions	369
PART 5	
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE	
16. Adaptive Precedent-Based Logic and Rational Choice: A Comparison of Two Approaches to the Modeling of International Behavior, <u>Philip A. Schrodт</u>	373
Rational Choice Models	374
Game Theory	374
Expected Utility	375
Economic Competition and Maximization	375
The Introduction of Concepts	376
The Existence of Mixed Strategy Solutions ..	376
The Prisoner's Dilemma/Chicken Analysis of War Initiation and Arms	376
The Axelrod Altruism Results	377
The Game-Theoretic Analysis of Deterrence ..	377
Problems with the Rational Choice Approach	377
Lack of Testable Theory	380
Inappropriateness of Results	382
The Irrelevance of Methodological Individualism	383
Inefficiency of History	385
Key Features of the Classical Approach	387
Small-N, Large-N Analysis	387
Use of Precedent and Analogy	388
Flexible Assumptions about Congition	388
The Sentient Organization as Primary Actor ..	389
Massive Data Bases as the Source of Inductive Theory	389
A Dynamic Model of Employing Artificial Intelligence Methods	390
An Example of a Formal Model of Historical Pattern Matching	395

Conclusion	398
Notes	400
17. Changes in Foreign Policy Across Time: The Logical Analysis of a Succession of Decision Problems Using Logic Programming, <u>Dwain Mefford</u>	401
From the Logic of Explanation to the Logic of Inherent in a Universe of Debate	406
Rendering the Logic of Athenian Policy on Rebellious Cities Circa the Fifth Year of the Peloponnesian War	408
One Case in the Series: The Evidence Thucydides Provides	412
Logic Programming as a Medium for Reconstructing the Universe of Debate and Decision	415
Conclusion	422
Notes	423
PART 6	
EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL FRONTIERS	
18. A Visual Approach to International Conflict and Cooperation, <u>Michael D. Ward and Lewis L. House</u>	427
Why Graphics?	428
The Data Base	429
The Display	431
Looking at the Results	435
Mathematical Analyses and Conclusion	456
Notes	458
Appendix 1	460
Appendix 2	461
19. Cycles of General, Hegemonic, and Global War, <u>William R. Thompson</u>	462
Wright	464
Richardson and Moyal	470
Denton and Phillips	471
The Correlates of War	475
Levy	478
Looking for Cycles of War and Peace	479
20. Forecasting East-West Diplomatic Climate: A Politometric Approach, <u>Dieter Ruloff and Daniel Frei</u>	489
East-West Politico-Diplomatic Climate: Does It Matter?	489
Implicit Models of East-West Diplomatic Climate	489

Trends	490
Cycles	491
Interdependence	492
Stochastic Properties	493
The Data	494
Model and Methods	495
Statistical Results	498
Simulating and Forecasting the US-Soviet Politico-Diplomatic Climate	508
Summary and Conclusions	513
PART 7	
COMMENTARY	
21. Connecting Domestic and International Conflicts, Past and Present, <u>Charles Tilly</u>	517
Violent Conflict Within and Among States	517
Interactions Between Domestic and International Conflict	522
Extraction and Repression as Links Between Domestic and International Conflict	524
Dynamics of Domestic Conflict	527
Borrowing from International Relations	529
Returning the Favor	530
References	533
About the Editors and Contributors	559

