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3 The Evolution of Proxy War Since 1945

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Proxy War
This chapter is in the book Proxy War
Chapter 3the evolution of proxy War SinCe 1945any intervention presents risk. regardless of time or technology, fueling existing violence as a means to intervene in the affairs of another state adds concerns about fog and friction. War has a way of confounding policy because it is so difficult to account for the myriad variables that in-fluence its outcome. in addition, interventions have known second-order effects. a state may get drawn into the conflict deeper than it intended, even leading to a direct intervention. if the conflict breaks bad, domestic and/or political costs could skyrocket. a rival state may enter the fray and raise the costs or spoil the opportunity to achieve the desired objectives. for good or ill, these factors influence the outcome and duration of an intrastate conflict.1in this chapter, i aim to shed some light on how the changing times have influenced the use of proxy war. i argue that the general reason states use proxies has not changed, but the structure of the world order and the underlying factors that accompany different types of order do influence a state’s use of proxy war. More specifically, i develop a model that de-scribes, and potentially predicts, the conditions under which a state will resort to proxy war.has proxy war changed? richard haass predicted at the end of the twentieth century that “the post–Cold War world promises to be a messy one where violence is common, where conflicts within and between
© 2020 Stanford University Press, Redwood City

Chapter 3the evolution of proxy War SinCe 1945any intervention presents risk. regardless of time or technology, fueling existing violence as a means to intervene in the affairs of another state adds concerns about fog and friction. War has a way of confounding policy because it is so difficult to account for the myriad variables that in-fluence its outcome. in addition, interventions have known second-order effects. a state may get drawn into the conflict deeper than it intended, even leading to a direct intervention. if the conflict breaks bad, domestic and/or political costs could skyrocket. a rival state may enter the fray and raise the costs or spoil the opportunity to achieve the desired objectives. for good or ill, these factors influence the outcome and duration of an intrastate conflict.1in this chapter, i aim to shed some light on how the changing times have influenced the use of proxy war. i argue that the general reason states use proxies has not changed, but the structure of the world order and the underlying factors that accompany different types of order do influence a state’s use of proxy war. More specifically, i develop a model that de-scribes, and potentially predicts, the conditions under which a state will resort to proxy war.has proxy war changed? richard haass predicted at the end of the twentieth century that “the post–Cold War world promises to be a messy one where violence is common, where conflicts within and between
© 2020 Stanford University Press, Redwood City

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents v
  3. Acknowledgments vii
  4. 1 Introduction 1
  5. 2 Sharpening the Definitions of Indirect Intervention and Proxy War 26
  6. 3 The Evolution of Proxy War Since 1945 41
  7. 4 A Theory of Proxy War 83
  8. 5 America’s Proxy War in Laos 125
  9. 6 South Africa’s Proxy War in Angola 157
  10. 7 India’s Proxy War in Sri Lanka 182
  11. 8 Conclusion 201
  12. Notes 215
  13. Index 243
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https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503608733-004

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents v
  3. Acknowledgments vii
  4. 1 Introduction 1
  5. 2 Sharpening the Definitions of Indirect Intervention and Proxy War 26
  6. 3 The Evolution of Proxy War Since 1945 41
  7. 4 A Theory of Proxy War 83
  8. 5 America’s Proxy War in Laos 125
  9. 6 South Africa’s Proxy War in Angola 157
  10. 7 India’s Proxy War in Sri Lanka 182
  11. 8 Conclusion 201
  12. Notes 215
  13. Index 243
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