FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

This book, *Armenians Beyond Diaspora: Making Lebanon their Own,* is a post-genocide history of Armenians and of what *was*. It is not a history of absence, or of what should or could have been. Rather than a history of loss or simple rebirth, two interlinked viewpoints omnipresent in writings on modern Armenian history, it is a history of power – often of manipulating and managing loss and renewal, in this case in early post-colonial, Cold War Lebanon, centred on Beirut. The absence of a national homeland accepted by all and the absence of an official state did not mean that Lebanon's Armenians lacked a real, and really momentous, political life. Despite the genocide and even after it, Armenians still knew thriving political, social, cultural, ideological and ecclesiastical centres. This book gives a case in point: an often-surprising story of Armenian sociopolitical life in one such centre, Lebanon.

At the same time, this book asks: what can we learn about Lebanon, and the Arab world more broadly, by looking at it through the lens of everyday Armenian sociopolitics? This analysis of Armenians in Lebanon does not, then, only contribute to the study of Armenians. As a matter of fact, *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* is not principally concerned with demonstrating how something 'Armenian' was created. Rather, it shows how Armenians in Lebanon experienced politics everyday, and what those experiences can

teach us about interlinked national and global events. By examining changing aspects of belonging, and by exploring how these concepts travel over time and space, *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* simultaneously challenges the supremacy of the nation-state and the role of state power in regional and Cold War histories.

By demonstrating how Armenian experiences in Lebanon informed Lebanese, Middle Eastern and Cold War histories and vice versa, this book also illustrates that there is no single narrative of the modern Middle East. This argument builds on recent studies of the history of the modern Middle East that focus on hitherto ignored or lesser-known actors, and helps to move marginalised segments of society centre-stage.[1] This move is particularly crucial for studies of Lebanon, where scholars struggle to include, within a dominant narrative, members of society who have been excluded from power by design as a retort to Lebanon's sectarian formation. *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* registers Lebanon as a space of both Armenian fashioning and belonging, and challenges the tendency to read Middle Eastern history through the lens of dominant (Arab) nationalisms.

Historical Outline

While the Armenian Genocide condemned surviving Armenians to a life outside of Anatolia and destroyed Istanbul as the primary centre of Armenian economic and cultural life, it also had other effects.[2] For one, in Lebanon, and specifically in Beirut, the remnants of Armenian communities hailing from myriad points all across Anatolia, with the vast majority from Cilicia, gathered in a single space.[3] The geography of Anatolia was radically compressed into one city. Sectors in Beirut's Armenian refugee camps and later quarters in permanently-built neighbourhoods were named after their inhabitants' points of origin, for instance Marash, Hajin and Sis.[4] While back in 'real' Cilicia, residents of Marash and Sis were hundreds of miles apart, in Beirut they shared the selfsame refugee camps like Qarantina, and from the 1920s they lived in the same neighbourhood of Bourj Hamoud, where they found each other across the street and soon started to mix and mingle. And even when some started to move into other neighbourhoods, they still lived within the confines of a single city. In Beirut, the Armenian Genocide and post-genocide era had forced migrations from the Ottoman Empire, which

brought Armenians from across the empire into extreme proximity to one another.

This had far-reaching sociopolitical and cultural effects. What had been multiple Armenian communit*ies* back in the Ottoman Empire's vast lands grew into a single communit*y* in Beirut. The teaching of Western Armenian, rather than Turkish or village dialects, made Beirut (and Lebanon itself) a site of 'Armenianisation'.[5] The community was not homogeneous, though. Quite the opposite: it was extremely heterogeneous – and in a much more high-energy, involved, boisterous, vociferous and indeed conflict-ridden way than Anatolia's Armenian communities had been. Beirut was the largest urban concentration of Armenians in the Arab world, with over 70,000 Armenians (out of a population of over 1.1. million) in Lebanon by 1944.[6] As important, the Arab East's most thriving city from the mid-nineteenth century provided an energising environment for political parties, church institutions, newspapers and eventually radio stations and lay people to interact in the everyday in unprecedented ways.[7]

Early on after World War I, this process was facilitated by France, Lebanon's Mandate ruler from 1918 to 1946.[8] A key event in this regard came in 1924, when the French included Armenian inhabitants of Lebanon in the new Mandate citizenship law.[9] That particular French act had a 'negative' effect, as it were. It legally nixed, or at least drastically reduced, the chance that Armenians would return to their former homes back in Anatolia.[10] After all, they now were citizens of another national space. Coming on the heel of the consolidation of Kemal Ataturk's power, the Turkish National Movement's victory in the Turkish war of independence and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) that formalised Allied recognition of the Ottoman successor state, France's Lebanese Mandate citizenship law including Armenians happened to contribute to Turkey's Turkification.[11] The citizenship act also had a 'positive', constructive effect. It created the legal and, by extension, political framework for re-centring much of Armenian life in and on Lebanon.[12]

After Lebanon gained full independence in 1946, the country's post-colonial sectarian structure, which was firmly grounded in the Mandate period and late Ottoman times, helped to re-energise Armenian life in Lebanon, especially in Beirut.[13] This most directly and immediately profited Armenian political parties, the nationalist Dashnaks and two leftist organisations, the

Hnchaks and Ramgavars. Their presence in Lebanon marked a distinct continuity with late Ottoman times. All three were rooted in the ideologies of the late Ottoman liberal reform period, and were concerned with the Armenians' condition in the Empire's peripheries, most notably Anatolia.[14] Many survivors of those party organisations and their descendants made their way to Lebanon, and there reestablished these parties. The three parties mentioned above, as well as the Armenian communist party, which entertained close relations with Lebanon's and Syria's communist parties, modified their political platforms and adjusted to the new political theatre of Lebanon. Given this country's sectarian system, after independence Armenians were guaranteed political power, and these four parties jockeyed with one another to this end.

From the 1940s onwards, the ideologies of these Armenian organisations and institutions mirrored the ideological positions of the Cold War superpowers. Basically, the Ramgavar, Hnchak and Communist parties supported the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic (ASSR), whilst the nationalist Dashnak Party did not. This alignment held true even though the Ramgavar Party's position opposed communism, the Hnchak Party was more socialist than communist in rank and ideology and the late nineteenth-century founders of the Dashnak Party had been strident socialists. In addition, at specific moments, such as the first year of the 1946–1949 repatriation movement to the ASSR, about which more below, the Dashnak Party did not oppose the exodus of many of its members. These complexities notwithstanding, the significant ideological split between Armenian nationalists, principally the Dashnaks, and leftists faciliated US and Soviet attempts to pull Armenians around the world into their ideological corner. But at the same time, as this book shows, Armenians in Lebanon at certain moments used super powers and their alignment with those powers to articulate their own agency in intra-Armenian struggles. These struggles were played out locally within the Armenian community, but they also affected the Lebanese political sphere and even transcended that country's borders: In a regional and transnational turn, Armenian political parties headquartered in Lebanon, along with the Catholicosate of Cilicia (also known as the Cilician See), one of two surviving Armenian ecclesiastical institutions that had moved to Lebanon in 1930, vied for authority over Armenian communities in different countries in the Middle East and the Americas.[15] They also

used Cold War ideological bifurcations here to distinguish themselves from their opposition and to garner support from either power.

In the field of politics, Armenian ecclesiastical authorities played an important role. Most central here was the Cilician See, far and away the most powerful Armenian church organisation in Lebanon. It had been headquartered at Sis, in the Ottoman province of Adana (present-day Kozan), before the genocide. Thereafter, like many of its surviving congregants it resettled in Lebanon. It set up its new headquarters in 1930 in Antelias, just north of Beirut, on land donated by the US Near East Relief Foundation.[16] Politically, by the mid-1950s most Armenians saw it as an ally of the Dashnak Party. With the crystallisation of Cold War politics, this identification took on an additional significance. The Dashnak Party was seen as a supporter of the Eisenhower administration, the Baghdad Pact and Lebanon's President Camille Chamoun, and as hostile to Arab nationalism, Egypt's popular president Gamal Abdel Nasser, socialism and the Soviet Union. The Cilician See was likewise seen as an extension of these Dashnak positions by its political rivals. But the See certainly was not an arm of the Dashnaks. It also manipulated and used that party. Indeed, it used the political factionalisation within Armenian communities to expand its power. Moreover, the post-genocide move to Lebanon expanded the Cilician See's regional influence. It now became in a clear-cut fashion the spiritual head of Armenian churches throughout the Middle East. And due to tensions among Armenians supporting and opposing the Dashnak Party in the United States of America, it even became a transnational power across the Atlantic, establishing churches in America under its jurisdiction after World War II.

The Cilician See was likewise a crucial focus of collective life, also beyond politics in Lebanon. This was a quite extraordinary reversal of developments dating back to the late Ottoman period. Istanbul's nineteenth-century *tanzimat* reforms had challenged the control of religious authorities by removing them as mediators. Citizens and the state had communicated much more directly. While this act had removed a layer of protection for some inhabitants, it was likewise celebrated by non-religious elites, for many of them gained a much more unmediated access to the Armenian population.

These *tanzimat* changes punctured the relationship between congregant and religious authority amongst all *millet*s.[17] But whereas the authority of the

Greek and Jewish religious authorities never entirely recovered, the Armenian case differed. The French extension of citizenship to Lebanon's Armenians, the Cilician See's re-establishment in Antelias and the Lebanese state's sectarian structure allowed for, and indeed encouraged, ecclesiastic authorities to re-establish their presence in the Armenian community.[18] The Cilician See emerged strongly empowered. In 1929, the Jerusalem Patriarchate ceded its authority over the Armenian communities of Damascus, Latakia and Beirut, including their monasteries, churches and schools, to the Cilician See.[19] By the 1940s, the Armenian Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia, its formal name, had established Armenian elementary and high schools, numerous churches and a seminary, and published journals. Furthermore, it acted as a key community intermediary to the Lebanese government. By the same token, Armenians who otherwise could or would never have gotten involved in church politics now had the occasion to do so.

In sum, the post-genocide story of Armenians in Lebanon was, to be sure, a story of loss, and the ingathering of very diverse populations within a small urban area of Beirut was extraordinary to say the least. But, as this book shows, this process also helped to refashion Armenian identity and power. The Lebanese case thus demonstrates that the Armenian Genocide also had – in a most traumatic and tremendously tragic way, to be certain – regenerative consequences. The genocide ended up being more than exclusively a source of trauma and victimhood.

Historians, therefore, do not need to treat the genocide solely as an epistemological break and an end. Rather, they can discern in it – and in what followed – new starts and continuities as well as breaks for the Armenian populations hailing from the Ottoman Empire.

Outline of Chapters

Chapter 1, 'Repositioning Armenians in Newly Post-colonial Nation-states: Lebanon and Syria, 1945–1946', begins our journey by following the issues that the Armenian print media in Lebanon saw as noteworthy by in the 1940s. These often-ideologically-opposed newspapers, the leftist *Ararad*, the communist *Joghovourti Tzain*, the capitalist supporter of the ASSR *Zartonk* and the firmly right-wing nationalist Dashnak *Aztag*, reflected the issues of interest of the day. As chronicled in these newspapers, Armenians in Lebanon

re-situated themselves and re-imagined their place in that Middle Eastern country and in the world more broadly during a sensitive, transitional time of change, i.e. the early post-colonial period. I dig deep into the manifold triangulations and balancing acts constitutive of Lebanese Armenians' changing views of their place in and vis-à-vis the complex making of the Lebanese state, its wider Arab environment, as well as the ASSR.

The chapter examines four main themes. One is the Armenians' position in and vis-à-vis the Lebanese polity, as well as Syria. The second concerns language, specifically the multiple roles of Arabic. The third has to do with the ambiguities of spaces relevant for Armenians in and beyond Lebanon. And the last is the fascinating political positioning of the church that, although conservative, at moments felt forced to support communist Armenia and the USSR as the ASSR's protector.

By tracing recurring news items and community concerns, this chapter provides a rich understanding of the activities of the Armenian inhabitants in Lebanon. The establishment, proliferation and continuation – many of the dailies profiled are still in publication – of an active Armenian press in Lebanon reveals the enthusiasm of such ventures and indicates the high level of literacy amongst Armenians.[20] This examination also shows how the Armenian press categorised events – as local, regional and/or international – and how these events were presented to Armenians. The coverage also demonstrates how writers and readers engaged with these items and how related concerns played out amongst Armenians and non-Armenians alike. What emerges is a complex, not at all homogeneous picture. Newspaper consumers and producers were also political party members, parliamentary members, church officials, businessmen, students, school officials and parents – a diversity that informed the different ways in which Beirut's Armenians engaged with a variety of issues in their city, in Lebanon and beyond. Last but not least, through the pages of those newspapers Armenians emerge not as passive objects of history but as active subjects, and in this sense as members of the Lebanese nation-state that carried a certain weight, even power, in it.

Chapter 2, 'The Homeland Debate, Redux: The Political–Cultural Impact of the 1946–1949 Repatriation to Soviet Armenia', studies the 1946–1949 repatriation movement, an organised Soviet drive to collect all worldwide Armenians and 'return' them to the ASSR. The story itself of

the repatriation drive has been told before, by historians and in memoirs.[21] Rather than rehashing the details, then, this chapter focuses on Lebanese Armenian political–cultural understandings of repatriation. This examination uses Armenian and Lebanese history to engage with Cold War history and – the other side of the coin – to problematise diasporic understandings of Armenians. Constructing and capitalising on the diasporic dimension of Armenian life, the Soviet Union's repatriation drive was highly successful in Lebanon. For that very reason, however – that is, because of the massive departure of Armenians friendly to the USSR – it somewhat paradoxically helped political parties opposed to the ASSR and the USSR to consolidate their power. Initially an aspect of an internal community power struggle, this new configuration mirrored Cold War power bifurcations. Lebanon's Armenians both manipulated these understandings *and* became proxy forces in that global power struggle. At the same time, Armenians' engagement in the repatriation movement formed part of, and illustrated, a broader endeavor to fashion a homeland of sorts: to find and build a final solution to prior occasions and experiences of victimhood.

This chapter explores how that initiative formed a chapter of Lebanese (and other Middle Eastern) Armenians' renegotiation of national belonging in early post-colonial times.[22] Although about a third of all Armenian repatriates travelled via Beirut (including residents of Syria and Lebanon), I also look at those who remained in Lebanon and in other countries in the Middle East. The emerging Cold War was more than simply a backdrop to the repatriation story. Moscow's initiative made repatriation possible in the first place. It was the USSR that announced the initiative to unite Armenians from around the world in the ASSR; that organised the transport of tens of thousands of Armenians to the USSR and that allowed them to enter the country; and that housed them in the ASSR, making them Soviet citizens. Also, the Soviet initiative was a victory vis-à-vis the USSR's rivals: At a time of peace, citizens of some countries voluntarily sold their belongings and moved to become part of the motherland of state socialism. But most importantly, the escalating Cold War – and the very divergent readings of, and responses to, the repatriation initiative among Lebanese Armenians – reinforced tensions between Armenian rightists and leftists. The Lebanese example shows that Armenians' response to repatriation did

not simply reflect their extant political–cultural positions. Rather, repatriation sharpened those positions.

In thinking through these issues, Chapter 2 specifically broaches three themes. First, it shows how responses to repatriation echoed issues involved with the changing Lebanese/Syrian/Armenian identity complex at the dawn of the post-colonial nation-state. Second, it examines how responses to repatriation included a retelling and a reconstitution of the history of the tragedy of the genocide. Relatedly, three decades after the genocide, the initiative automatically triggered questions about the location and nature of the Armenian homeland. And thirdly, it demonstrates how repatriation added fuel to the division between Dashnaks and Armenian leftists, foreshadowing their confrontation in the form of active debates in the press and violent conflict.

Chapter 3, 'Cold War, Bottom-up: The 1956 Catholicos Election', takes the 1956 Cilician See's catholicos election in Lebanon to illuminate Cold War understandings of the Middle East, and vice versa.[23] While in the later 1940s the excitement of the repatriation movement was a public relations victory for the USSR, supported by local Armenian institutions and assisted by Lebanese and Syrian governments, this election became a site of contestation by Cold War powers and by their state and non-state allies and proxies in the Middle East. Lebanon, staunchly pro-Western and pro-American under President Camille Chamoun, was indeed not the only state directly involved in that election. So were Egypt and Jordan, among other Middle Eastern states, as well as the Soviet Union, principally through Vasken, the catholicos of the Echmiadzin See, headquartered in the ASSR. The United States and key European states like France and Britain also made appearances in the story. Even so, it was the Armenians who were this story's main protagonists – Armenians of different, if not diametrically opposed, political convictions.

During the 1946–1949 ASSR repatriation initiative, leftists had wielded considerable power in the Armenian community of Beirut and beyond; and the repatriation initiative further boosted their influence at that juncture. But as noted in passing above, a decade later the situation had changed. Ironically, the very success of the leftist repatriation drive, i.e. the emigration to the ASSR, depleted the leftists' ranks in Lebanon and other repatriation 'donor' countries. In consequence, from the late 1940s the rightist Dashnak

Party became more preponderant, certainly in Beirut. What is more, the Cold War was much more heated by the mid-1950s than it had been in the late 1940s.

The 1956 catholicos election thus allows us to look at the Cold War in the Middle East not from the top down, through the eyes of Washington or Moscow (or Lebanon's or Egypt's state authorities, for that matter), and not through the lens of famous flashpoints like the US and Soviet reactions to the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt in 1956 or the 1958 US armed intervention in Lebanon. Rather, in the 1956 election, Armenians made use of Cold War tensions to designate a leader of the Armenian church who was seen to suit the community's interests.[24] That story also expands historians' understanding of Lebanon's Armenians: from refugees and outsiders in national politics to true participants, whose own internal politics, moreover, were also of interest to Lebanon's authorities, and who by now felt free to invade and use public spaces beyond their own neighbourhoods to express themselves politically.

I tell this story while keeping an eye on three analytical aspects. One is the overlap between the global Cold War and regional Middle Eastern inter-state competition.[25] Another is the mutual use, if not exploitation, of state actors and Armenian actors. And a third is a fascinating duality of states' approaches to the Armenian issue: both nation-state-bound and transnational. States sought to assert their sovereignty vis-à-vis ecclesiastical Armenian matters that happened on their territory; thus, the Lebanese state, and in particular President Chamoun, was involved politically and symbolically in the 1956 catholicos election. But states also tried to use Armenian issues and religious Armenian bodies, whose authority was non-secular and whose reach was not quite bound by nation-state borders (to say the least), to affect third countries' politics. The foremost example in the present case was the Soviet attempt to meddle in the 1956 election through Vasken.

In taking this approach to the 1956 election, 'Cold War, Bottom-up' continues to addresses lacunae in the secondary literature on Armenians in the Middle East and especially Lebanon, and reflects on how their case can shine a light on larger topics. Power struggles, political differences and alignments among Armenians have long been ignored in the historiography of modern Lebanon, which has described the Armenian population as a coher-

ent community. The Cold-War-related nature of inner-Armenian events and their place within the broader history of Lebanon and the Middle East has been ignored accordingly.

The fourth and final chapter, 'Making Armenians Lebanese: The 1957 Election and the Ensuing 1958 Conflict', explores Armenian participation in the 1957 elections and in the 1958 mini-civil war, both in the 'general' Lebanese and the intra-Armenian elections.[26] These events illustrated Armenian involvement in both local Beiruti and national Lebanese settings, yet in a way different from that of the previous year, in 1956. In telling this story, I make three interrelated points. First, coming a good decade after the 1946 transition from the French Mandate to post-colonial independence, Armenians were now firmly part of, and ensconced in, Lebanese politics. Armenians' (re)-positioning vis-à-vis Lebanon's imminent post-colonial independence in the mid-1940s included a fair share of double-entendres, tensions and contrasts. But already at that point it was clear that Armenians in Lebanon were indeed part of that country – and wished to remains so as well. This was shown in the clearest (and most painful) fashion possible in 1957 and 1958. Lebanese Armenians were divided along the right–left faultlines that divided Lebanese politics and society in general at that point: they were Lebanonised, one may say. Secondly, and at the same point, the Lebanese state was somehow Armenianised. It started to pay more attention to Armenian matters than before, intervening directly and by military force in Armenian neighbourhoods by December 1958 in order to finally end the internecine Armenian confrontation. Thirdly, while Armenians were Lebanonised, they also, more than other confessions in Lebanon, were very strongly – and by 1958 indeed mortally – internally divided along political lines. This division was not new, of course. It dated back to before World War II, and had been manifest in the 1946–1949 repatriation and in the 1956 catholicos election. But it came to a boil in 1958. This was the case not only because of the general Lebanese context, i.e. the accentuating right–left political polarisation that at this point in time mapped roughly, though by no means perfectly, onto the country's Muslim–Christian confessional landscape. It was the case also because the Cold War – a global constentation between left-wing versus right-wing politics and ideologies – was felt with particular acuity in the Armenian case. This was for the simple reason that

the Soviet Union included the ASSR, that is, that Armenia formed part of one Cold War superpower. In turn, this meant that leftist, and especially communist, Armenians had an especially direct connection to the Soviet Union. Vice versa, it was of supreme importance for right-wing Armenians to criticise that connection, to reject the 1920 Sovietisation of Armenia, which had been an independent republic from 1918 to 1920, and to assert the right to speak for Armenians despite the existence of Soviet Armenia.

My analysis demonstrates that Armenian parties participated in, and contributed to, the considerable political tensions in Lebanon. Simultaneously, they used their position within the Lebanese political system to jostle for power within the Armenian community – a development that turned violent and came to a close only in December 1958, almost two months *after* the Lebanese mini-civil war had ended, when the Lebanese army intervened. These tensions and violent confrontations between Armenian parties and their armed men had a crucial spatial effect: they unprecedentedly territorialised parts of Beirut. To be sure, parts of Lebanon were already organised by sects and classes. By relative contrast, it was according to political party affiliation that in 1957–1958 many Armenians of the neighbourhoods of Mar Mikael, Sin el-Fil, Bourj Hamoud and Corniche al-Nahr were re-sorted and relocated, often by force.

As *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* situates Armenians in Lebanon within a network of daily local, regional and transnational actors and events, it engages with key bodies of literature.

Armenian Studies

Scholarly works on Armenians have traditionally been found within two overlapping fields: Armenian Studies and Diaspora Studies. Within Armenian Studies, works are further divided, focusing on Armenians as a diaspora, or as the victims of genocide.[27] Both groupings assume an Armenian collectivity, regardless of lived experiences, locality or historical context. Armenian historians paint Armenians, practically regardless of their location, as lost tribes of a singular Armenian nation.[28] They assume this nation to have a known homeland, whether real or imagined. This limits understandings of daily life and their engagement within a given locality and its population, assuming that Armenians live and conceive of themselves only within an Armenian

frame. In addition, this construction fails to consider when Armenians may or may not use such a collectivity, its associated 'homeland', or a diasporic identification to articulate their agency and exercise power in local contexts, often in a bid to claim power transnationally as well.

This 'understood' homeland, without a clear location, distracts from how Armenians actually used the term *erkir*, homeland, in a variety of specific circumstances. An ambiguous term, *erkir* is flexible and differs in meaning depending on time and space: presenting, in fact, a good opportunity to appreciate an Armenian heterogeneity. Nineteenth-century economic migrants from Eastern Anatolia, seeking employment in Istanbul, used *erkir* to denote their place of origin.[29] As Hagop Barsoumian writes, these migrants 'reminded' wealthier urban Armenians of the disenfranchised status of Eastern Anatolian Armenians.[30] By invoking *erkir*, they nurtured an emotional attachment to a place that housed a substantial marginalised Armenian population, which depended on remittances from urban centres. At the same time, by representing the *erkir* to wealthier Armenians, migrant Armenians in turn validated their presence in the city. They acted to bridge the centre and periphery, even if to reinforce the dominance of the centre.

This portrayal of Armenian inhabitants as organised communities throughout the world *and* as part of one larger Armenian diaspora connected through a singular traumatic event and to one 'known' *erkir*, encourages historians to represent Armenians as perennial victims. Richard Hovannisian's edited volumes, *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times*, for example, impressively profile practically every Armenian populated area, an incredibly diverse range of places and experiences.[31] The Introduction, however, seeks a common thread, constructing Armenians as one collective – and, to boot, all as victims.[32] In addition, it considers the eleventh-century kingdom of Cilicia as 'expatriate', as if national constructions of belonging were already created and spatially clearly set and demarcated.[33] Hovannisian's second volume, which focuses on the fifteenth through the twentieth centuries, adopts a similar tone. For example, Krikor Maksoudian's labelling of Armenians of Eastern Europe as 'assimilated' enables him to link them to Armenians in the Americas.[34] In fact, he claims that the shared attribute of 'assimilation' can aid in the understanding of both communities.[35] While I am not writing against comparative studies,

which have the potential to bring together even the most divergent experiences, I am cautious.[36]

What is particularly problematic in these depictions is that the authors provide an otherwise detailed history on particular Armenian communities and their achievements. For example, Armenians established a military organisation in Vienna, numerous merchant guilds in Poland and the Ukraine, and monasteries in Moldavia.[37] Still, whenever possible, the author stresses a connection between the Armenian communities living in Eastern Europe and those present in the Ottoman Empire.[38] It is a fact, of course, that Armenians indeed did arrive from Istanbul or from further east, for instance from Van. But I beg to differ from the author's assumption that this demonstrates that Armenians in Crimea are more authentic to the Armenian nation because of their location or that a worldwide affinity *and underlying, irreducible, indelible similarity* exists between Armenians worldwide despite their most variant locations, experiences and backgrounds.

One of the notable exceptions in Hovannisian's volumes is Ronald Grigor Suny's contribution 'Eastern Armenians under Tsarist Rule'.[39] Unlike some of his colleagues, his analysis on Armenian national awareness considers issues of class and social experience.[40] He accounts not only for territorial dispersion and its associated differences but also, more importantly, for the social divisions between peasants and urban dwellers.[41] And he couples these issues with the activity of the Russian state, which was constructing its own identity and power. He examines Armenians living in the Caucasus, their intellectual engagement with German idealist philosophies and tensions with Armenian church authorities; Armenian revolutionaries' attempts to use class issues to subvert the national; and the Armenian bourgeoisie that, growing tired with revolutionaries, 'made their peace with tsarism'.[42] He does this without engaging in how these Armenians shared a national affinity with Armenians living elsewhere. The activities, participation, achievements, failures and tragedies of Armenians under Tsarist rule are represented on their own terms.

Even more recent scholarship has continued in a similar vein, such as Razmik Panossian's *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars*. While he notes in the Introduction that 'various sources of Armenian identity formulation were quite different from one another', he

closes the same paragraph by stating, 'it also became apparent that Armenians were developing a sense of identity as part of *one* nation despite the objective differences and the historical as well as sociological divisions', thereby (re) constructing a singular national history.[43] I am not, of course, denying that mass migration due to military interventions or economic processes happened. But I am wary of connecting and reducing historical moments to one Grand Lachrymose History of Armenians worldwide as perpetual victims who all long for one and the same clearly defined homeland.

Studies of specific Armenian communities are uncommon, yet growing in number. It is important to note that such studies do not isolate Armenians from either other Armenians and/or communities and networks. Rather, they consider, paying special attention to, what *else* is going on in the community. It is in this space, I argue, that one can discern multiple power struggles, engagements and fashioning (and refashioning) of belonging and identification. In her work on Armenians in Cyprus, for example, Sossie Kasbarian does not argue against Armenian co-option within Greek nationalism.[44] Through an examination of the shared sense of belonging based in daily experience, the author demonstrates how minorities in Cyprus have and can continually impact the 'vision of the nation', and exercise 'a significant degree of autonomy in cultural and social matters'.[45] And yet, the author firmly places the Armenians of Cyprus within a worldwide diaspora and follows a shift in diasporic identity 'from exilic weakness to one of transnational resourcefulness'.[46]

While works that profile 'singular' Armenian communities can challenge the tendency to position Armenians solely in relation to other Armenians, they may (still) reinforce the separation between Armenians and other locals. James Barry's rich work on Iranian Armenians begins with the separation of Armenians from others in Iran, categorising 'two groups' of Iranian citizens: one 'excluded', the other 'mainstream'.[47] These classifications inevitably lead to a focus on the 'challenges' faced by the marginalised Armenian community, often ending with the 'threat of a loss of culture and identity', often connected to emmigration.[48] In his profile on the Armenians in Northern Iraq, Darren L. Logan adopts a similar approach to describe the challenges faced by the Armenians there. Descriptions including 'decline', 'fading' and 'remnant', not only fail to attribute any power to the Armenian population,

representing them as victims, but also juxtapose their presence with a bygone era of glory and power (that may or may not have existed, the article does not elaborate).[49] Its tone of defeat culminates in the final sentence of the article, that simultaneously typifies a warning: 'In the long run, without this protection [of the Kurdistan Regional Government] it is likely the Armenian remnant in Northern Iraq will fade away'.[50]

Other works that profile individual Armenian communities take the Armenian Genocide as a temporal and social starting point. In doing so, they thread trauma throughout their analyses of Armenian experiences and activities in their new locales. Simon Payaslian's work on Armenians in Syria states that it was Armenian Genocide survivors who 'exercised considerable command over the cognative development of the next generations'.[51] While this indeed may be the case, I wonder what else can be gained by this identification besides linking Armenian activities in this period to the violence and collective trauma of the genocide. In addition, the author's constant reference to their 'marginalisation', 'inferior status', connected to their being an involuntary diaspora (again, a reference to the Armenian Genocide), and 'decline', distracts from the activities and innovative structures carried out by these very same Armenians.[52] Even when Payaslian does cite evidence of a construction of local, Syrian Armenian institutions, the author refers to these actions as a 'tortuous task'.[53]

These understandings of Armenian life in Syria also present a linear understanding of history, forwarding an evolutionary model (refugees to diasporisation) with Armenians finally becoming 'sedentary' in the '*spyurk* (diaspora)'.[54] Viewing Armenians as sedentary within the rubric of a diaspora fails to consider Armenians in Syria on the own terms. What were the dynamics within this population? Instead of engaging with the daily lives of Armenians in Syria, Payaslian therefore almost has no choice but to view their presence through the macro-actions of the Syrian state. While this is certainly one way of studying Armenians in Syria, it prevents our access to their everyday, and separates Armenians from their Syrian co-nationals. In addition, it fails to conceive of Armenians personifying the Syrian state, even as Payaslian mentions that Armenians gained seats in the Syrian parliament.[55] It is almost as if such authors wish to draw attention to either the legacy of the Armenian Genocide and/or to transnational connections, that they have no choice but

to ignore or minimise their experiences of belonging to or being part of that very nation-state.

The Literature on the Armenian Genocide

Armenian historiography's disregard for the possibility of multiple homelands and hierarchical centres is a very powerful reflex to a singular act of violence: the Armenian Genocide.[56] This defensive construction flattens profound differences between specific communities around the world that have enjoyed incredibly variant histories and experiences throughout the century following the genocide. At the same time, it (re)connects Armenians worldwide to a singular understanding of *erkir*, generating a corollary. It homogenises the genocide as, in an effort to interconnect Armenians, the genocide's totality is stressed. Individual experiences become indiscernible. In addition, the creation of this monolith collapses different phases of extermination into each other, into a single whole.[57] But perhaps most important for this book, studies that centre on, and ultimately always return to, the genocide as the ultimate uniting factor for any and every Armenian neglect the formation of political, social, cultural, ideological and ecclesiastical centres of Armenian life post-genocide.

The historiography of the Armenian Genocide also often maintains the representation of Armenians as perennial victims of oppression, disregarding Armenian agency and power. Armenians indeed *were* victims of genocide. But this is not, I would argue, a continuous state for all Armenians. It makes no sense to call all Armenians worldwide 'genocide survivors': what of the distinctions between them? Moreover, many works treat 1915 as an epistemological break for both Armenians and Armenian historiography. I question the totality of this break and the resulting lack of distinction between the experiences of a segment of the Armenian population who were the targets of genocide and Armenian historiography in its entirety. In Hovannisian's volumes, for example, Christopher J. Walker's contribution on the Armenian Genocide begins and ends with the author proving that genocide occurred.[58]

Perhaps this is an understandable consequence of (admittedly fewer and fewer) politicians and academics' denial of the genocide or their attempt to justify mass deportation. It may even be necessary. Nevertheless, it also lends itself to distractions. Works on Armenians mention the genocide even

if they treat pre-genocide events or concern a population that was little or not at all affected by these tragic events and/or their survivors. Thus, the genocide has been used to explain (away) the economic superiority of the Iranian Armenians – they were not its victims – and the assimilation and lack of engagement with constructing an Armenian national home amongst the Armenians in Ukraine and Poland.[59] With regard to Armenians in Iran, this can be particularly egregious, as it concurrently denies that those inhabitants experienced hardship during the Russo-Persian War (1826–1828), World War I and the Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941.[60] Surviving the Armenian Genocide 'explained' the miserable conditions of Armenians living in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine in its wake, and not the stipulations placed upon them by French and British mandate powers, such as preventing Armenians from moving out of organised camps until 1923, or the lack of facilities made available and provided for by British occupation forces.[61]

Bedross Der Matossian profiles the more recent historiographic trends of Armenian Genocide scholarship and how it has begun to engage with new methodologies and approaches. The growing use of Armenian sources, Raymond Kévorkian's contention of the 'second phase of the genocide', which targeted the survivors of the deportation in Syria and Upper Mesopotamia, Ronald Grigor Suny's focus on the fear of a 'crumbling empire' as an important factor in leading to genocide, Donald Bloxham's contention of a nationalist genocide and Fuat Dündar's, Uğur Ümit Üngör's, and Taner Akçam's emphases on demographic engineering as a compelling factor of the genocide have all contributed to our grasp of the Armenian Genocide.[62] The ensuing debates have likewise broadened our understandings of its premeditation, contigency, continuum and motives.[63]

And yet, because scholars of the Armenian Genocide seem compelled to address the policy of disavowal by successive Turkish governments, the institutions of state ideology and national historiographic discourse, they inevitably turn into prosecutors seeking a flawless indictment against decades of denial. They construct the field as the lone possibility to pierce this discourse and correct this injustice. While I do not take further issue with this position, leaving it up to individual scholars to qualify their interventions, I am concerned that we may miss the productive and creative elements that Armenians engaged in in the wake of the genocide. This, even in cases when

authors themselves are interested in revealing such fashioning. Take Melissa Bilal's 'Lullabies and the Memory of Pain: Armenian Women's Remembrance of the Past in Turkey', as one such example.[64] In exploring how lullabies 'intervene against the ordinariness of forgetfullnes', and 'from the margins of memory' they have been pushed to, Bilal's work also demonstrates how these women's everyday performances *produce* historical knowledge.[65] In addition, these songs and their singing are said to simultaneously 'establish bridges between generations in a family' and challenge the 'grand fissure' narrative of the Armenian Genocide.[66] While unexpected, these melancholic songs have the capacity to create – and act as conduits not only between generations, as Bilal states, but also between time and space. And yet, Bilal's work is more often categorised solely as being part of the 'growing work on Armenians in post-genocide Turkey'.[67]

Lebanese Historiography

By studying such actions, *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* also challenges the historiography of Lebanon. Recent works on Lebanon have called into question histories that left out ethnic and religious minorities which did not support particular understandings of Lebanon. These had constructed Lebanon as an abnormal state – as if there was a natural or standardised form to follow – and depicted its political system, population composition and nation-state borders as reasons why the state was bound to fail or break-down. This tautological construction only confined Lebanon and paralysed its historiography.[68] It has encouraged scholars to view Lebanon through the lens, solely, of conflict and of its corollary, sectarianism. This is evidenced by the overabundance of works on the 1975–1991 Lebanese Civil War and by the dearth of studies on the periods before and after this period.[69] To be sure, there have been exceptions in the field of history, for example Max Weiss' *In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi'ism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon*, Linda Sayed's study on how the Shi'i community in Jabal Lubnan both used and circumvented the sectarian structure to assert itself, and Ussama Makdisi's classic *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon*.[70] Some of the most important interventions have been by anthropologists. Lara Deeb's *An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi'i Lebanon* and Joanne

Nucho's *Everyday Sectarianism in Urban Lebanon: Infrastructures, Public Services and Power* challenge familiar notions, focusing on how the Lebanese use state and power structures to exercise their own power in everyday interactions.[71] Together, these historical and anthropological works shift our focus to marginalised inhabitants of Lebanon and narrate additional stories of that country.

The need to explain Lebanon's so-called propensity for violence also directs works dedicated to minority populations, such as the Druze.[72] At the same time, influential histories that focus on Lebanon's violence have ignored populations that have not played a substantial role in propagating or maintaining conflict. This is certainly true for the Armenian inhabitants of the country. A celebrated history of Lebanon, Kamal Salibi's *A House of Many Mansions*, mentions the Armenians five times, always as outliers and outsiders, failing to consider their presence or contributions as active members of Lebanese society.[73] Salibi claimed Armenians did not share Arabic as a 'common language' or 'an Arab way of life', as if substantiating his own refusal to consider Armenians as active members of Lebanese society.[74] While he identified Armenians as a non-Arab and therefore non-local refugee population, relegating them as present yet absent from making any meaningful impact onto the country's history, another classic, Fawwaz Traboulsi's *A History of Modern Lebanon*, failed to mention Armenians at all.[75] This is doubly problematic as his history consciously seeks to address the gaps of previous historical scholarship on Lebanon.[76]

In sum, even when Armenians are mentioned by historians of Lebanon, they are solely viewed as a refugee population, as outsiders. In a fascinating but problematic twist, this reinforces Armenian historiography's construction of Armenians in the region as a victimised population apart. These two historiographies, the Lebanese and the Armenian, therefore treat Armenians in a complementary way. As a result, both historiographies impose an exclusively diasporic reading of Armenian history, never quite considering Armenians, regardless of their present *locale*, as being really linked with and belonging to anywhere other than the imagined homeland. This fails to consider the contribution of Armenians in and to Lebanon, apart from and in addition to a larger Armenian diasporic community. It also strips Armenians in Lebanon of their agency, failing to consider their presence in the country beyond

being victims of the genocide – and all of this despite the fact that the French Mandate government extended citizenship rights to the Armenians in 1926, meaning that Armenians were allocated rights and restrictions as an official Lebanese sect.

While this book explores Lebanese Armenians, its ultimate aim is not to insert an Armenian story within a national Lebanese one, let alone to lionise the contributions Armenians have made to Lebanon.[77] I do not seek to merely include yet another ethno-religious group within the history of Lebanon. *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* does not attempt to make the Lebanese history fuller, or more complete. Rather, I contend that scholars have hitherto ignored *everyday engagements* amongst Lebanese, including Armenians, focused as they have been on exploring, and viewing, Lebanon as a conflict-prone state. My study of how Armenians lived in Lebanon in the 1940s and 1950s challenges these *overall* conceptions about Lebanon. As important, it advances additional methods for viewing the inhabitants of Lebanon, Armenians and non-Armenians alike, and expanding our understandings of Lebanon, diaspora and the Cold War in the Middle East. These interrelated analyses offer new ways to narrate these fields of study, not only by bringing marginalised groups into the fore, but also by looking at notions of power articulated in everyday life. When and where *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* considers state power, it does so while focusing on everyday struggles for power. These actors both used state power and circumvented it, established local institutions that often engaged in transnational activities, and were at once targets of Cold War proxy warfare and able to exploit the competition amongst the superpowers to claim their authority amongst other inhabitants.

As this discussion demonstrates, the fields of Armenian studies and Lebanese historiography do not consider that Armenians 'fit' their subjects. So – where and how *do* Armenians fit? Again, I am not seeking to pry open a field in order to insert Armenian actors into it, thus rendering it more 'complete'. *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* contends that there is no idealised history that is to be pursued. Moreover, it cautions against so-called 'corrective histories' that buttress nationalist understandings of a community's contributions. Armenians in Lebanon created and participated in an active political life that has never been represented in scholarship on its own terms without being connected to a story of victimhood, a real or imagined faraway

homeland or other Armenian communities. This presents a valuable opportunity to challenge these representations and perhaps more significantly, to enhance our understandings of early post-colonial, Cold War Lebanon and the inhabitants who engaged with local, regional and transnational powers during this period, and in so doing, articulated an agency of their own. Considering these histories necessarily frees Armenians from the marginalised periphery of history books, diasporic accounts and nationalist renderings. It likewise helps us understand Armenians not simply as victims but, rather, as actors, irrespective of their tragic past, statelessness and shallow historical footprint in Lebanon. And it advances the notion that Lebanon, and Beirut more specifically, was simultaneously an Armenian centre as much as it has been understood as an Arab and Lebanese one. In this way, these findings contribute to and complicate existing studies of Lebanon, Beirut and the Middle Eastern region more broadly.

Cold War Histories

In an effort to locate missing histories during the Cold War era, recent trends in international history have pointed to the Middle East, where a fascinating array of actors engaged with Cold War superpowers below and beyond the state level. These local and transnational histories have produced additional ways to understand how the Cold War affected and was used by regular people.[78] These encounters add to the more familiar stories of the region that focus on Gamal Abdel Nasser, the non-Alignment movement and how Egypt's president engaged with Western powers and the USSR. They also contribute to stories that centre on the overthrow and public execution of the Iraqi King Faisal II in 1958, the establishment of the United Arab Republic that same year and its fall in 1963, and how the governments of Jordan and Lebanon attempted to dissipate the ensuing tension in 1958 and after.[79]

Still, these newer works continue to view the period as a contest for supremacy between local, regional and international *powers*, and not necessarily amongst the inhabitants of the region, or amongst the more marginal members of society.[80] And even though these revisions have at least resulted in Lebanon being considered more of a player in this period than in the past (and linked Lebanon to transnational studies on the global drug trade), they continue in the worn vein of attempting to understand the 'inevitable' break-

down of civil society in the 1975 civil war.[81] Unsurprisingly, no attention has been paid to how Armenian inhabitants of the region, already ignored in national historiographies, engaged with the tension enacted by Cold War powers and became Cold War players themselves. *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* contributes to studies on the interface between the Cold War and the region by addressing exactly this issue: by demonstrating how marginal actors – in this particular case Armenians – used and were used by the state and greater powers in their local struggles for power.

Diaspora Studies

Finally, a word is due about Diaspora Studies. This scholarly field has adapted to focus on the multiple attachments displayed and experienced by populations both transnationally and locally.[82] These innovative studies recognised how Armenians inhabited both local and transnational spaces – often simultaneously – moving away from the more rigid associations of traumatic dispersal and expanding beyond the Jewish, Armenian and Greek 'ideal types'.[83] And yet, viewing Armenians in Lebanon as *solely* a diasporic community misses additional power dimensions articulated by members of this community.[84] As *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* demonstrates, Beirut – as well as Lebanon – was an especially salient node for intra-Armenian struggles for power and informed local, regional and global experiences. This particularity allowed Armenians to make Lebanon an Armenian global centre, partly due to the historical role Beirut enjoyed from the late nineteenth century onward, along with the configuration of the Lebanese state that recognised Armenians as one of the seventeen sects and therefore privileged their confessional elites. Accordingly *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* demonstrates the categorisation of the Armenian diasporic community, something that is often occluded in studies of diaspora. This story therefore challenges the homogenising aspect of 'diaspora' as an experience and study, while contributing to studies that highlight the plurality of diasporas and the struggle to move diaspora theory 'forwards'.[85]

In drawing attention to how Armenians in Lebanon imagined and constructed a categorisation of Armenian communities worldwide, marking themselves as *the* source of authority, *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* also reveals new sites of power and power struggles, challenging the positionality

of historic centres of Armenian authority, such as Istanbul and even the Armenian Republic.[86] Istanbul had served as the centre of Armenian power due to its existence as the imperial capital, the power afforded by the Ottoman state upon the Armenian Patriarchate, how that institution exercised power and its historic connection to the Armenian provinces and population in Anatolia, the remnants of a historic Armenia.[87] Reorienting the centre for Armenian life from its historic centre in the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul, to Beirut, in the Lebanese nation-state, also questions the scholarly categorisations in works on Armenians.[88]

Understanding the power struggles profiled in *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* transforms histories of Lebanon, Armenians and the greater Middle East. They demonstrate that the creation and maintenance of Beirut as the centre for Armenian power was not just a consequence of the Ottoman defeat in World War I and the Armenian Genocide. Rather, it was a reflection of how Armenian individuals, institutions, political parties, as Lebanese citizens, state officials and political actors made it so. In addition, such an understanding begs the question of why one should analyse the activities of Armenians in Lebanon through the activity of Armenians in other locales? This positioning both reifies the nation-state and fixes the identification of Armenians, thus divorcing them from individual activities, their locales or transnational and global concerns.

Almost always connecting Armenians to an external homeland, whether real or imagined, Diaspora Studies flatten the experiences of Armenians in Lebanon and homogenise them, connecting them to a larger Armenian community that exists beyond Lebanon.[89] Situating Armenians exclusively within Diaspora Studies almost by necessity ignores, or at least smoothens, differences amongst Armenians within a particular location. They posit a more unified experience amongst Armenians, indeed helping to textually produce that experience. But they fail to consider Armenians' everyday engagements, entanglements and confrontations, for instance in Lebanon where they became part of local life.[90] They also assume that Armenians in Lebanon do not meaningfully interact with, and create long-term relationships with, non-Armenians. In this sense, studies of Armenians as a diaspora treat their subject in a self-referential way. They assume that an internally-developed Armenian identity trumps all. Interrelations with others, here

Lebanese, come to matter only by way of background, not as a central dimension of Armenian life.

Moreover, many works in Diaspora Studies push us to understand Armenians as sharing, fundamentally, a *singular* experience, as if identifying or being identified as an ethnic group guarantees a shared experience irrespective of specific history, location and agency.[91] I am not denying the connections between Armenians in Lebanon and elsewhere, of course. The transnational nature of certain Armenian institutions in Lebanon helped them claim power outside of the nation-state's borders, in effect challenging the authority of the nation-state.[92] But we cannot simply view Armenians' experiences in Lebanon solely through the lens of a diasporic connection, for this approach by itself limits the historical lessons we can draw from their experiences.[93] Exclusively diasporic understandings of Armenians also render the lives of those included within the categorisation as one of tension: being in one place, but thinking of another.[94] It is quite ironic that, were we to focus on Lebanese Armenians' connections to other Armenian communities worldwide, we would in fact narrow our understanding of them.

By searching for connections to a homeland or to other Armenians – and being built on the assumption that those connections are *the* most fundamental trait of an ethnic group – Diaspora Studies can fail to consider when and why Armenians in Lebanon leveraged their diasporic identity as a political power tool vis-à-vis internal rivals, regional ones and larger global powers.[95] In this way, Armenians in Lebanon, articulated a diaspora identity that was neither oppressed nor alienated within the hostland.[96] In fact, *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* demonstrates that at certain moments, they manoeuvred the socio-political sphere in Lebanon to the extent that they dominated it. These tactics used the rhetoric of the homeland and of the Armenian nation to mark and increase power. But this does not mean that either were present as a presumably 'natural' unit. Rather, time and again, they were used and constructed in very specific contexts.

Notes

1. See for example, Orit Bashkin, *New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); Julia Phillips Cohen, *Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship in the Modern Era* (New York:

Oxford University Press, 2014); Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014); Lerna Ekmekçioğlu, *Recovering Armenia: The Limits of Belonging in Post-Genocide Turkey* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016); Heather Sharkey, *A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Talin Suciyan, *The Armenians in Modern Turkey: Post-genocide Society, Politics and History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016); and Max Weiss, *In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi'ism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

2. For works on the history of the Armenian Genocide see, amongst others, Raymond H. Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011); Ronald Grigor Suny, *'They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else': A History of the Armenian Genocide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015); and Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Goçek, and Norman M. Naimark, eds, *Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
3. For works that profile the arrival of the two waves of Armenian refugees to Lebanon, the first at the end of World War I and the second when the French government ceded the Alexandretta *Sanjak* to Turkey, see Hratch Bedoyan, 'The Social, Political, and Religious Structure of the Armenian Community in Lebanon', *The Armenian Review* 32 no. 2 (1979): 119–30; Vahe Sahakyan, 'Between Host-Countries and Homeland: Institutions, Politics and Identities in the Post-Genocide Armenian Diaspora (1920s to 1980s)' (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2015), 121–41; Nicola Schahgaldian, 'The Political Integration of an Immigrant Community into a Composite Society: The Armenians in Lebanon, 1920–1974' (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1979), 49–62; Vahé Tachjian, 'Des camps de réfugiés aux quartiers urbains: processus et enjeux', in *Les Arméniens 1917–1939: La quête d'un refuge*, eds Raymond Kévorkian, Levon Nordiguian, and Vahé Tachjian (Paris: Réunion des musées nationaux, 2007), 113–45; and Vahé Tachjian, 'L'établissement définitif des réfugiés arméniens au Liban dans les années 1920 et 1930', in *Armenians of Lebanon: From Past Princesses and Refugees to Present-Day Community*, ed. Aïda Boudjikanian (Beirut: Haigazian University Press, 2009), 59–94.
4. For a map that demonstrates these proximities, see Vahé Tachjian, 'Des camps de réfugiés', 120.

5. Joanne Randa Nucho, *Everyday Sectarianism in Urban Lebanon: Infrastructures, Public Services and Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 16.
6. Nicola Migliorino, *(Re)constructing Armenia in Lebanon and Syria: Ethno-cultural Diversity and the State in the Aftermath of a Refugee Crisis* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), 89. These numbers are based on Albert Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), Appendix B, Table II, 386. In terms of sheer numbers, Syria had the largest population of Armenians, with approximately 121,000 out of 2.8 million people in 1943. The vast majority of Armenians living in Syria and Lebanon (and the Greater Levant for that matter) came as a direct result of the Armenian Genocide. By 1925, there were approximately 52,000 Armenians in Lebanon (approximately 2,000 of whom were native) and 120,000 in Syria (approximately 20,000 of whom were native). Migliorino, *(Re)constructing Armenia*, 32–4. Richard Hovannisian's 1974 article is still used a benchmark for Armenian population figures in the Middle East. He puts the number of Armenian refugees in 1925 in Iran at 50,000, adding to the substantial number of Armenians historically living there, and in Egypt at 40,000. Richard G. Hovannisian, 'The Ebb and Flow of the Armenian Minority in the Arab Middle East'', *Middle East Journal* 28, no. 1 (1974), 20. For more on Armenians in Iran, including their participation in the political realm, see Houri Berberian, *Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911: The Love for Freedom Has No Fatherland* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 34–66.
7. For more on the intellectual construction of Beirut, see Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Cyrus Schayegh, *The Middle East and the Making of the Modern World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).
8. Of course, one could date the relationship between Cilician Armenians and the French (and British) government earlier than the establishment of the Lebanese Mandate with the discussions and debates surrounding the formation of the Légion d'Orient. The blend of the expectations of the Armenian elite and of the French government with French and British imperial ambitions resulted in the creation and use of the legion, though not in the lands where the Armenians had imagined. See Susan Pattie, *The Armenian Legionnaires: Sacrifice and Betrayal in World War I* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2018); and Andrekos Varnava, French and British Post-War Imperial Agendas and Forging an Armenian Homeland after the Genocide: The Formation of the Légion d'Orient in October 1916',

The Historical Journal 57, no. 4 (2014): 997–1025. For more on the history of Middle East mandates see Cyrus Schayegh and Andrew Arsan, eds, *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates* (New York: Routledge, 2015); Nadine Meouchy and Peter Sluglett, eds, *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives/Les Mandats français et anglais dans une perspective comparée* (Leiden: Brill, 2004); Idir Ouahes, *Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate: Cultural Imperialism and the Workings of Empire* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2018); and Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Specifically on the French mandate rule in Syria, see Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) and Benjamin Thomas White, *The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011).

9. Migliorino, *(Re)constructing Armenia*, 54–5. In the nineteenth century, Ottoman citizenship had been extended to all imperial subjects with the *Tanzimat* reforms of 1839, culminating in the constitutional era of 1876. For more on how these reforms impacted the Empire's minorities see Cohen, *Becoming Ottomans*, and Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution*.
10. With the Ottoman Empire's defeat in the World War, the survivors of the Armenian Genocide had hoped and lobbied to be able to return to Anatolia. For example, in 1918, 50,000 Armenians in Aleppo held a rally and articulated their demands to Boghos Nubar Pasha, head of the Armenian Delegation in Paris, including the 'rapid repatriation of deportees'. See Vahram Shemassian, 'The Repatriation of Armenian Refugees from the Arab Middle East, 1918–1920', in *Armenian Cilicia*, eds Richard Hovannisian and Simon Payaslian (Costa Mesa: Mazda, 2008), 422–3. Despite difficulties in transportation, safety, and bureaucracy, Armenians did return. On the short-lived French polity in Cilicia and its subsequent fall to Kemal Ataturk's forces, see Garabet K. Moumdjian, 'Cilicia Under French Administration: Armenian Aspirations, Turkish Resistance, and French Stratagems', in *Armenian Cilicia*, eds Richard Hovannisian and Simon Payaslian (Costa Mesa: Mazda, 2008), 457–89. On the hasty withdrawal of the French and its consequences for the repatriated Cilician Armenians, see Richard G. Hovannisian, 'The Postwar Contest for Cilicia and the 'Marash Affair'', in *Armenian Cilicia*, 495–518. On the strategies and failings of French and British policies in repatriating Armenians to Cilicia see Vahé Tachjian,

'The Cilician Armenians and French Polity, 1919–1921', in *Armenian Cilicia*, 539–55.

11. While I am not suggesting that French actions of conferring citizenship matched – for the surviving Armenians of the now former Ottoman Empire – the devastating effects of the Treaty of Lausanne, the combination of the French and Kemalist actions solidified, at least for that moment, the Armenian presence in Lebanon. For more detail on how Armenians in Turkey reacted to the treaty, different goals of the participants of the conference, the impact of the lack of state-representation for the Armenians, and the attempts to support and oppose the Armenian delegation, see Ekmekcioğlu, *Recovering Armenia*; Hakem al-Rostom, ''Rethinking the 'Post-Ottoman': Anatolian Armenians as an Ethnographic Perspective', in *A Companion to the Anthropology of the Middle East*, ed. Soraya Altorki (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 452–79; and Suciyan, *The Armenians in Modern Turkey*. This, even though the Treaty of Lausanne never even mentioned Armenia and the Armenians: Ekmekcioğlu, *Recovering Armenia*, 97; and al-Rostom, 'Rethinking the 'Post-Ottoman', 467.
12. In investigating citizenship under the Syrian and Lebanese mandates, Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens*, explores the tensions between those who used citizenship to claim agency and the Lebanese elites and French mandate officials who aimed to uphold patriarchal standards. On the extension of citizenship for Armenian inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon see Migliorino, *(Re)constructing*, 89–109. For an analysis of how this process was strengthened by France using some Armenians as subaltern colonial administrators, including as soldiers, see Keith David Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), 279–98.
13. Within the past twenty years, scholarship has questioned the epistemological break between Lebanon under Ottoman rule and the French mandate. Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) explored ruptures and continuities between Ottoman and mandate rule in the realm of sectarianism. See also, for political environmental history, Graham Auman Pitts, 'Fallow Fields: Famine and the Making of Lebanon' (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2016), and Elizabeth Rachel Williams, 'Cultivating Empires: Environment, Expertise, and Scientific Agriculture in Late Ottoman and French Mandate Syria' (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2015).
14. For more on the history of the Hnchak, Dashnak and Ramgavar parties, as well as the preceding Armenagan Party, see Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians:*

From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 200–27. In addition, by the early twentieth century, the Dashnak Party had become directly involved in the Iranian constitutional movement. As described by David N. Yaghoubian, its 'loose socialist ideals and goal of Armenian liberation were deemed compatible with the Iranian movement's progressive, antiautocratic aims'. Yaghoubian, *Ethnicity, Identity, and the Development of Nationalism in Iran* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2014), 127. For more on the involvement of the Dashnak Party in Iran see also Berberian, *Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911*.

15. On the move and establishment of the Cilician See in Lebanon, see Simon Payaslian, 'The Institutionalization of the Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia in Antelias', in *Armenian Cilicia*, 557–92. *Armenian Cilicia* is the most comprehensive volume on Cilician Armenia and the interrelated political, social, economic and religious roles of the Catholicosate.
16. Payaslian, 'The Institutionalization of the Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia in Antelias', 557–92.
17. For more on how the minority groups, including the Armenians, engaged and were affected by the Tanzimat reforms and subsequent constitutional period, see Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution.*
18. It should also be noted that this is not limited to Armenian religious institutions and that British authorities also pursued a similar policy of readdressing power 'back' to the clergy. As Bedross Der Matossian notes 'The British were further aware (as the Ottomans had been) that it was easier to deal with the religious hierarchies, and consequently vested full authority in them as the main representatives of Palestine's religious groups'. Bedross Der Matossian, 'The Armenians of Palestine 1918–1948', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 41, no. 1 (Autumn 2011): 28.
19. Avedis Sanjian, *The Armenian Communities in Syria Under Ottoman Domination* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 141.
20. This is in contrast to neighbouring Syria where seventeen printing houses were established during the Mandate Period, but most were closed within the first fifteen years of independence. Simon Payaslian, 'Diasporan Subalternities: The Armenian Community in Syria', *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 16, no. 1/2 (Spring/Fall 2007): 108–11. The hostile publishing environment of Syria was Lebanon's gain. The migration of Armenian intellectuals to Beirut reinforced the city as a literary hub. Migliorino, *(Re)constructing Armenia*, 122–24. For more on the history of publishing houses in Syria see Vayk Parikian

and Hovnan Varzhapetian, *Patmut'iwn Surioy hay tparanneru* [The History of Syrian Armenian Printing Houses] (Syria: Bibliothèque Violette Jébéjian-UGAB, 1973).

21. For more on the repatriation movement more generally and from the perspective of the USSR and Soviet Studies see, Joanne Laycock, 'The Repatriation of Armenians to Soviet Armenia, 1945–49', in *Warlands Population Resettlement and State Reconstruction in the Soviet-East European Borderlands, 1945–50*, eds Peter Gatrell and Nick Baron (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 140–62; Joanne Laycock, 'Armenian Homelands and Homecomings, 1945–1949', *Cultural and Social History* 9, no. 1 (2012): 103–23; Panossian, *The Armenians*, 358–65; Susan Pattie, 'From the Centres to the Periphery: "Repatriation" to an Armenian Homeland in the 20th Century', in *Homecomings: Unsettling Paths of Return,* eds Fran Markowitz and Anders H. Stefansson (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2004), 109–24; Farid Shafiyev, *Resettling the Borderlands: State Relocations and Ethnic Conflict in the South Caucasus* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2018), 43–95; Ronald Suny, *Looking Towards Ararad* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 163–69; and Sevan Nathaniel Yousefian, 'The Postwar Repatriation Movement of Armenians to Soviet Armenia, 1945–1948' (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2011). On the possessions brought to (and often confiscated by) the USSR, see Joanne Laycock, 'Belongings: People and Possessions in the Armenian Repatriations 1946–1949', *Kritika* 18, no. 3 (2017): 511–38. On memoirs, Joanne Laycock, 'Soviet or Survivor Stories? Repatriate Narratives in Armenian Histories, Memories and Identities', *History and Memory* 28, no. 2 (2016): 123–51, and Hagop Touryantz, *Search for a Homeland* (New York: issued privately, 1987).
22. Repatriation was a matter of concern even in locales where it did not actually take place. For example, Talin Sucijan writes about how 'various accounts and news items show that no Armenians from Turkey immigrated in 1946–1948, despite the fact that, according to the sources, hundreds of people, if not thousands, had registered'. The local Turkish press used repatriation, along with Soviet and Armenian territorial claims for Kars and Ardahan to (re)invoke anti-Armenian sentiment throughout the repatriation period. This anti-Armenian upsurge prompted the local Armenian press to respond to the Turkish press and to governments that embraced these campaigns. Suciyan, *The Armenians in Modern Turkey*, 157–68.
23. This chapter builds upon my article 'Articulating Power Through the Parochial', *Mashriq and Mahjar* 2, no. 1 (2013): 41–72.

24. Cold War tensions manifested in other Armenian religious sites as well, most notably in Istanbul (1944–1950) and Jerusalem (1948–1960). While the context of the Cold War can thread these crises, the Cilician See in Beirut was the only ecclesiastical power that played an active role in all three episodes, demonstrating both its authority and importance. For more on the patriarchal election crisis in Turkey see Suciyan, *The Armenians in Modern Turkey*, 161–97. For more on the crisis in Jerusalem see Bedross Der Matossian, 'The Armenians of Jerusalem in the Modern Period: The Rise and Decline of a Community', in *Routledge Handbook on Jerusalem*, eds Suleiman A. Mourad, Naomi Koltun-Fromm, and Bedross Der Matossian (New York: Routledge, 2019), 396–407.
25. On how the United States attempted to influence the events surrounding the Jerusalem Patriarchate and its elections, see James R. Stocker, 'The United States and the Struggle in the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem, 1955–1960', *Jerusalem Quarterly* 71, no. 2 (2017): 19–21. On an analysis of both direct and indirect interventions of the United States in Armenian affairs see Stocker, 'The United States and the Armenian Community in Lebanon, 1943–1967', in *Armenians of Lebanon (II) Proceedings of the Conference (14–16 May 2014)*, ed. Antranik Dakessian (Beirut: Haigazian University Press, 2017), and 'An Opportunity to Strike a Blow? The United States Government and the Armenian Apostolic Church, 1956–1963', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 29, no. 4 (2018): 590–612.
26. Very few works on Armenian involvement in the 1958 mini-civil war exist. Those that do position the tension and violence solely as an 'Armenian' affair. See, for example, Seta Kalpakian, 'The Dimensions of the 1958 Inter-Communal Conflict in the Armenian Community in Lebanon' (MA thesis, American University of Beirut, 1983). For more on Armenian involvement in Lebanese politics, see Schahgaldian, 'The Political Integration of an Immigrant Community into a Composite Society'; on their involvement specifically in Lebanese parliamentary elections see Zaven Messerlian, *Armenian Participation in the Lebanese Legislative Elections 1934–2009* (Beirut: Haigazian University Press, 2013). On the so-called 'third voice', an attempt to bridge the ideologically opposed Armenian parties, see Yeghia Tashjian, 'The Origin, Success and Failure of the Lebanese-Armenian "Third Force" during the Intra-communal Cold War (1956–1960)', in *Armenians of Lebanon (II)*, 181–98.
27. Of course understanding Armenians through particular fields is not unique to Armenian historiography or Armenians for that matter. Comparisons can also be made, for example, with Palestinian historiography. According to Jamil Hilal,

Palestinian historiography can largely be divided into two narratives: 'one that adopts a vocabulary of surrender and defeat, and a second that highlights heroism and resistance'. Armenian historiography largely ignores stories of defiance, opting instead to construct a singular nation, disrupted by forced migration and genocide. Jamil Hilal, 'Reflectons on Comptemporary Palestinian History', in *Across the Wall: Narratives of Israeli-Palestinian History*, eds Ilan Pappé and Jamil Hilal (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 177.

28. See for example, George Bournoutian, *A History of the Armenian People*, vol. I: *Pre-History to 1500 AD* (Costa Mesa: Mazda, 1993); Bournoutian, *A History of the Armenian People*, vol. II: *1500 AD to the Present* (Costa Mesa: Mazda, 1994); Richard Hovannisian, ed., *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times (Volume 2) From Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth* (London: Macmillan 1997); David Marshall Lang, *The Armenians: A People in Exile* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Simon Payaslian, *History of the Armenian People* (Costa Mesa: Mazda, 1993); Christopher Walker, *Armenia: Survival of a Nation* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1980). Sebouh David Aslanian laments that many Armenian Studies scholars have demonstrated a lack of interest in connected, global histories leaving the field 'rather insular and reluctant to engage in constructive self-criticism': Aslanian, 'From "Autonomous" to "Interactive" Histories: World History's Challenge to Armenian Studies', in *An Armenian Mediterranean: Words and Worlds in Motion*, eds Kathryn Babayan and Michael Pifer (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 83.
29. Hagop Barsoumian, 'The Eastern Question and the Tanzimat Era', in *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times (Volume 2) From Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth*, ed. Richard Hovannisian (London: Macmillan 1997), 191.
30. Ibid. And while *erkir* denoted Eastern Anatolia for the migrant Armenians in urban centres, the same term referred to both the urban and provincial areas of the Ottoman Empire for Russian Armenian intellectuals. Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians*, 155. Albeit for different reasons, this understanding of the homeland seems to be consistent with the editor-in-chief of *Marmara*, the Istanbul Armenian language daily, who stated, 'The Armenians of Istanbul do not belong to *Spiurk* [diaspora]. *Spiurk* is made up of people who have left the homeland. We have not'. Ulf Björklund, Armenians of Athens and Istanbul: the Armenian Diaspora and the "Transnational" Nation', *Global Networks* 3, no. 3 (2003): 345.

31. Richard Hovannisian, *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, volume I: The Dynastic Periods: From Antiquity to the Fourteenth Century*; *volume II: From Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth* (London: Macmillan 1997). *The History of the Armenian People* is but one example of a work that brings together an impressive array of contributors while continuing what Sebouh Aslanian has called 'a general pattern' of relying on secondary source literature, and more significantly for *Armenians Beyond Diaspora*'s intervention, relying 'upon a linear narrative to chart the unfolding of the Armenian national subject in History'. Aslanian, 'From "Autonomous" to "Interactive", 94–5.
32. Richard Hovannisian, 'Introduction', in *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume 2*, vii–xi. The authors of the first volume, which focuses on the pre-modern period and ends in the fourteenth century, all reference loss and victimhood, usually in connection with a forced migration or enemy conquest. Richard Hovannisian, ed., *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, volume I*.
33. Richard Hovannisian, 'Introduction', in *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume 2*, viii.
34. Krikor Maksoudian, 'Armenian Communities in Eastern Europe', in *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume 2*, 51–2.
35. Ibid.
36. For Maksoudian, his branding suggests that Armenians in Eastern Europe by necessity relate or connect to Armenians elsewhere. The effort to connect Armenians in Eastern Europe to those living elsewhere is even demonstrated in their admitted *lack* of connection. Maksoudian also mentions the 'isolation' of Armenians in Poland to 'explain' a purported distance from Armenian life. In doing so however, he concurrently links Armenians in Poland who may or may not have been aware of Armenians in the provinces of the Ottoman Empire. And if so, it is unclear if they identified as 'belonging' to a national framework of some sort. For the reader, however, a connection has already been created. Ibid, 65–6.
37. Ibid., 63–4, 75.
38. Ibid., 65.
39. Richard Grigor Suny, 'Eastern Armenians Under Tsarist Rule', in *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume 2*, 109–37.
40. Ibid., 116.
41. Ibid., 121–6.

42. Ibid., 137.
43. Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians*, 3. (Emphasis added.)
44. In addition, Kasbarian delves into how the Greek Cypriot administered sector differentied between experiences of victimhood, essentially treating Armenians 'as second- class citizens whose loss is not (worth) the same as the 1974 [majority Greek] losses' thereby categorising its own citizenship. Sossie Kasbarian, 'Between Nationalist Absorption and Subsumption: Reflecting on the Armenian Cypriot Experience', in *Cypriot Nationalisms in Context*, eds Thekla Kyritsi and Nikos Christofis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 178, 191.
45. Ibid., 178.
46. Ibid., 183, 188.
47. James Barry, *Armenian Christians in Iran: Ethnicity, Religion, and Identity in the Islamic Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 1–2.
48. Barry, *Armenian Christians in Iran*, 246–58.
49. Darren L. Logan, 'A Remnant Remaining: Armenians amid Northern Iraq's Christian Community', *Iran & the Caucasus* 14, no. 1 (2010): 143, 152, 153, 154, 155.
50. Logan, 'A Remnant Remaining', 156.
51. Payaslian, 'Diasporan Subalternities', 101.
52. Ibid., 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 102, 104, 111, 113, 119, and 122.
53. It should be noted here that it was not considered tortuous due to any impediments put forth by the Mandate Syrian government at that time. In fact, this is once again not only a reference to the Genocide, but also to the collective memory of the 1894–1896 massacres. Ibid., 102.
54. Ibid., 93.
55. Ibid., 108.
56. Sebouh David Aslanian also observes in what he terms the 'post-genocide fixation' a 'precluded interest in other kinds of histories and identities in which Armenians in the past have also engaged''. 'From 'Autonomous' to 'Interactive' Histories'', 102.
57. It is not only different phases of the Armenian Genocide that are stitched together. Other incidents of aggression against Armenians in the Ottoman Empire are configured as additional episodes in grand narrative of violence perpetrated by Turks against Armenians. For example, the Adana Massacres of 1909 are seen either as a precursor to the genocide or its start, without considering the differences (and similarities, for that matter) in time and the political and economic environments. See for example, Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian*

Genocide: A Complete History (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 71–118. This minimises the experience of violence for the victims, homogenises perpetrators, and likewise discourages the individual examination of such events, which, when analysed, lead to a greater understanding of the living and working conditions in Adana and its environs, and of the repercussions of the 1908 Revolution outside of the centre of Istanbul. One of the notable exceptions to the homogenised reading is Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams*, 149–72.

58. Christopher Walker, 'World War I and the Armenian Genocide', in *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume 2*, 239–74.
59. On the exceptionalism of Iran see, for example, Anthonie Holslag, *The Transgenerational Consequences of the Armenian Genocide: Near the Foot of Mount Ararat* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 70. Houri Berberian's work is an exception to this. She argues that the majority of Iranian Armenians in the mid-twentieth century did not have direct links to Armenia (and to Armenian nationalism for that matter). Berberian, *Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911*, 187. On Armenian 'assimilation' in the Ukraine and Poland see Maksoudian, 'Armenian Communities in Eastern Europe', 68–9.
60. For example, through a social biography of Lucik Moradiance, Yaghoubian, *Ethnicity, Identity, and the Development of Nationalism*, 175–185, traces how local and regional historical events including these wars and hardships shaped the lives of the Armenian population in Iran.
61. A stark exception to this reading is Der Matossian, 'The Armenians of Palestine 1918–1948', 30. In addition to describing the chaos in Jerusalem during the war, the influx of surviving Armenian refugees, and the changes and tension that manifested within the Armenian community with their arrival, Der Matossian delves into how British policy manifested in Armenian affairs, especially with regards to the affairs of the Jerusalem Patriarchate.
62. Bedross Der Matossian, 'Explaining the Unexplainable: Recent Trends in the Armenian Genocide Historiography', *Journal of Leventine Studies* 5, no. 2 (Winter 2015), 150–55.
63. Ibid., 156.
64. Melissa Bilal, 'Lullabies and the Memory of Pain: Armenian Women's Remembrance of the Past in Turkey'', *Dialect Anthropology* (2018):18. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10624-018-9515-8. Bedross Der Matossian, 'The Armenians of Palestine 1918–1948', is another example. Der Matossian analyses how refugee Armenians 'infused' a dynamic new element into the community, demonstrating growth in this period. While Der Matossian does not shy away

from the hardship the refugees experienced, it is important to note his focus upon the relationship amongst the Armenian inhabitants of Palestine along with their active processes of community building (even if this manifested in intra-Armenian tension as details). Ibid., 34–39. Such a story is often relegated to studies on refugees that profile the activity of international aid organisations (instead). See for example, Laura Robson, 'Refugees and the Case for International Authority in the Middle East: The League of Nations and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East Compared', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 49, no. 4 (2017): 628.

65. Ibid., 18.
66. Ibid., 2.
67. See for example, al-Rostom, 'Rethinking the 'Post-Ottoman', 462; Amy Mills, 'Becoming Blind to the Landscape: Turkification and the Precarious National Future in Occupied Istanbul', *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 5, no. 2 (2018): 100; and Esen Egemen Ozbek, 'Commemorating the Armenian Genocide: The Politics of Memory and National Identity' (Ph.D. diss., Carleton University Ottawa, 2016), 278.
68. Tsolin Nalbantian, 'Going Beyond Overlooked Populations in Lebanese Historiography: The Armenian Case', *History Compass* 11:10 (2013): 821–32.
69. See for example, Robert Fisk, *Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon* (New York: Nation Books, 2002); Theodor Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of Nation* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2015); Dilip Hiro, *Lebanon Fire and Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993); David Hirst, *Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East* (New York: Nation Books, 2011); Samir Khalaf, *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Elizabeth Picard, *Lebanon: A Shattered Country* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 2002); Kamal Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958–1976* (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books. 1976).
70. Max Weiss, *In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi`ism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Linda Sayed, 'Sectarian Homes: The Making of Shi'i Families and Citizens under the French Mandate, 1918–1943' (Ph.D diss., Columbia University, 2013); Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Los Angeles: University of

California Press, 2000). There are of course, additional exceptions. See also Ziad Abu-Rish, 'Conflict and Institution Building in Lebanon, 1946–1955' (Ph.D diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2014); Andrew Arsan and Cyrus Schayegh, eds, *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates* (New York: Routledge, 2015); Nadya Sbaiti, '"If the Devil Taught French": Strategies of Language and Learning in French Mandate Beirut', in *Trajectories of Education in the Arab World: Legacies and Challenges*, ed. Osama Abi-Mershed (New York: Routledge, 2010).

71. Lara Deeb, *An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi'i Lebanon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) and Joanne Randa Nucho, *Everyday Sectarianism in Urban Lebanon: Infrastructures, Public Services and Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). See also Jared McCormick, 'Hairy Chest, Will Travel: Tourism, Identity, and Sexuality in the Levant', *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 7, no. 3 (November 2011): 71–97. In the field of political science, see, Melani Cammett, *Compassionate Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism in Lebanon* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2014).
72. See for example, Nejla M. Abu Izzedin, *The Druzes: A New Study of Their History, Faith, and Society* (Leiden: Brill, 1993); Robert Brenton Betts, *The Druze* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); and Kais Firro, *A History of the Druzes* (Leiden: Brill, 1992).
73. Kamal Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 4, 46, 82, 138.
74. Ibid., 4.
75. Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto Press, 2012).
76. Ibid., vii–ix.
77. While an incredibly valuable and welcome addition, Christine Babikian Assaf, Carla Eddé, Lévon Nordiguian, Vahé Tachjian, eds, *Les Arméniens du Liban: Cent ans de presence* (Beirut: Presses de l'Université Saint-Joseph, 2017), aims to do just that. It focuses on the Armenian contribution *to* Lebanon and influence *in* Lebanon, and as such, considers Lebanon (and Armenians) as a separate, fixed construct.
78. See for example, Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, eds, *The Cold War and the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009).
79. Still, these works that focus on the power of certain states and so-called 'key players' continue to be the majority. See for example Antonio Perra, *Kennedy*

and the Middle East: The Cold War, Israel and Saudi Arabia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2017) and Roby C. Barrett, *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy Under Eisenhower and Kennedy* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009). A related contention connects both American and Soviet Cold War policy in the region to the so-called growth of 'radical Islam'. See for example, Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Patrick Tyler, *A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East – from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009); Stephen Kinzer, *The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War* (New York: St Martin's Griffin, 2014); Yevgeny Primakov, *Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, 2009); and Galia Golan, *Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War Two to Gorbachev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

80. I. Zake, ed., *Anti-Communist Minorities in the U.S.: Political Activism of Ethnic Refugees* (New York: Palgrave, 2009) is an exception to this, but even this welcome work does not engage with communities in or from the Middle East. Ben Alexander's contribution in the work does profile the Armenians, but examines the community from the United States and their relationship with Soviet Armenia, and does not integrate works on the Middle East. Ben Alexander, 'The American Armenians' Cold War: The Divided Response to Soviet Armenia' in *Anti-Communist Minorities in the U.S.: Political Activism of Ethnic Refugees* (New York: Palgrave, 2009), 67–86.
81. Paul Thomas Chamberlin, *The Cold War's Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace* (New York: HarperCollins, 2018).
82. See for example, Ien Ang, 'Together-in-difference: Beyond Diaspora, into Hybridity', *Asian Studies Review* 27, no. 2 (2003): 141–54; Anthony Gorman and Sossie Kasbarian, 'Introduction', eds Anthony Gorman and Sossie Kasbarian (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 1–30; Anthony Gorman, 'The Italians of Egypt: Return to a Diaspora', in *Diasporas of the Modern Middle East: Contextualising Community*, eds Anthony Gorman and Sossie Kasbarian (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 138–70; Kim D. Butler, 'Multi-layered Politics in the African Diaspora: The Metadiaspora Concept and Minidiaspora Realities' in *Opportunity Structures in Diaspora Relations: Comparisons in Contemporary Multilevel Politics of Diaspora and Transnational Identity*, ed. Gloria Totoricagüena (Reno, Nevada: Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada, 2007), 19–51; May Farah, 'Palestinian Refugees in

Lebanon: Worthy Lives in Unworthy Conditions', in *Diasporas of the Modern Middle East*, 274–300; Anaheed al-Hardan, 'The Palestinian Refugee Community in Syria', in *Palestinians in Syria : Nakba Memories of Shattered Communities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016); M. H. Ilias, 'Malayalee Migrants and Translocal Kerala Politics in the Gulf: Re-conceptualising the 'Political', in *Diasporas of the Modern Middle East*, 303–37; Finex Ndhlovu, 'A Decolonial Critique of Diaspora Identity Theories and the Notion of Superdiversity', *Diaspora Studies* 9, no. 1 (2016): 28–40; Dominic Pasura, 'Competing Meanings of the Diaspora: The Case of Zimbabweans in Britain', *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 36, no. 9 (2010): 1445–61; Khachig Tölölyan, 'The Contemporary Discourse of Diaspora Studies', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, no. 3 (2007): 647–55.

83. For innovative works on Armenians see for example, Sylvia Alajaji, *Music and the Armenian Diaspora: Searching for Home in Exile* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015); Björklund, 'Armenians of Athens and Istanbul', 337–54; Der Matossian, 'The Armenians of Jerusalem in the Modern Period', 396–407; Sossie Kasbarian, 'The "Others" Within: The Armenian Community in Cyprus', eds Anthony Gorman and Sossie Kasbarian (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 241–73; Kasbarian, 'Between Nationalist Absorption and Subsumption', 177–97; Susan Paul Pattie, *Faith in History: Armenians Rebuilding Community* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997); Susanne Schwalgin, 'Why Locality Matters: Diaspora Consciousness and Sedentariness in the Armenian Diaspora in Greece', in *Diaspora, Identity, and Religion: New Directions in Theory and Research*, eds Waltraud Kokot, Khachig Tölölyan and Carolin Alfonso (New York: Routledge, 2004), 72–92; Khachig Tölölyan, 'Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Transnation', *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 9, no. 1 (2000): 107–36; and Yaghoubian, *Ethnicity, Identity, and the Development of Nationalism in Iran*.
84. While perhaps 'merely' paying homage, most studies on diaspora, however inventive, continue to mention Armenians as a paradigmatic example. Waltraud Kokot, Khachig Tölölyan and Carolin Alfonso, 'Introduction', in *Diaspora, Identity, and Religion: New Directions in Theory and Research*, eds Waltraud Kokot, Khachig Tölölyan and Carolin Alfonso (New York: Routledge, 2004), 1–2; William Safran, 'Deconstructing and Comparing Diasporas', in *Diaspora, Identity, and Religion*, 9–30; and Khachig Tölölyan, 'The Nation-State and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preface', *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1, no. 1 (1991): 4.

85. On the plurality of diasporas see for example, Donna R. Gabaccia, *Italy's Many Diasporas* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 5; Anthony Gorman, 'The Italians of Egypt: Return to a Diaspora', in *Diasporas of the Modern Middle East: Contextualising Community*, eds Anthony Gorman and Sossie Kasbarian (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 139. Kim D. Butler calls for works on the diaspora to deal with 'metaconstructs and the millions of micro-level interations of which they are constituted', in Butler, 'Multilayered Politics in the African Diaspora', 25–7. While she is more concerned with a 'decentered diaspora' where the 'homeland is not the principal actor, but merely "the glue" that defines the community', *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* instead focuses on how Armenians in Lebanon used the concept of a homeland to (re)orient local and distant Armenians to power structures in Lebanon.
86. In this way, I veer slightly away from Tölölyan in 'Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Transnation', 107–36. His emphasis on the transnational, which he notably argues is not a synonym for diasporal, includes diasporic communities (importantly both new and old) and the homeland. *Armenians Beyond Diaspora* instead demonstrates how Lebanon became an Armenian centre, often at the expense and purposeful alienation of the Armenian Republic.
87. For more on the historic role of Constantinople/Istanbul for Armenians see Panossian, *The Armenians*, 83–6. For more on the centrality of Istanbul amongst revolutionaries and intelligentsia as well as the tension between these groups, the *amira* classes, and the Armenian Patriarchate see, Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution*.
88. Hakem al-Rustom, for example, divides works on Armenians into three group:1) history of the genocide, 2) diaspora communities, and 3) work on Armenians in Turkey, in 'Rethinking the 'Post-Ottoman', 452–79. And yet, while I certainly celebrate such interventions, these rubrics, however unintentionally, connect all works on Armenians to the Armenian Genocide. After all, they associate the formation of diaspora communities with the Genocide, and the labelling of the third category as Armenians *remaining* in Turkey links them with its destruction and trauma. In addition, these groupings encourage an anachronistic centring of Armenian power to Turkey, as they do not take into account the activity and agency in other locales.
89. There remains an overall frame around work on Armenians that seems to compel scholars to identify a community as a diaspora, and that homeland is contentious. This, even in scholarship that acknowledges the difficulty in defining diaspora, homeland, and return and their never-ending construction. See for example,

Pattie, *Faith in History*, on the Cypriot Armenian community. An exception to this reading is Kasbarian, 'Between Nationalist Absorption and Subsumption', 177–97, and the collection *Diasporas of the Modern Middle East*. Nevertheless, even while the contributors of this volume maintain that communities living and settling in diasporic and 'host' spaces are 'in practice, their homes', they likewise assume an overarching 'diasporic experience'. Gorman and Kasbarian, eds, *Diasporas of the Modern Middle East*, 2–3.

90. This, even in works that focus exclusively on Lebanese Armenians. Aida Boudjikanian, for instance, states that '. . . this community [Lebanon's Armenian community] has been considered for a long time as one of the most important of the Armenian Diaspora'. Aida Boudjikanian, 'Introduction', in *Armenians of Lebanon: From Past Princesses and Refugees to Present-Day Community,* ed. idem (Beirut: Haigazian University Press, 2009), xvii. See also Scout Tufankjian and Atom Egoyan, *There Is Only the Earth: Images from the Armenian Diaspora Project* (New York: Melcher Media Inc., 2015).
91. See for example Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2008), where Armenians are constructed first as a category, and then slated under 'victim diasporas'.
92. While acknowledging the porous boundaries of the 'transnational moment' Khachig Tölölyan cautions against privileging this mobility, and stresses, along with Pnina Werbner, that contemporary diasporas require 'settled diasporic nodes in which a public sphere and civil society peculiar to them develop'. Tölölyan, 'The Contemporary Discourse of Diaspora Studies', 653–654; and Tölölyan, 'Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Transnation', 111–12. Rogers Brubaker is also sceptical of claims of 'unprecedented porosity'. Rogers Brubaker, 'The "Diaspora" Diaspora' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1 (2005): 8–9. Ien Ang importantly notes that in forwarding the position that diasporas challenge the limitations of the nation-state, it must be noted that they 'have and assume their own boundedness and apartness'. Ang, 'Together-in-Difference: Beyond Diaspora, into Hybridity', 142–4. In 'Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Transnation' Tölölyan also profiles the importance of institutions, elites, and material resources in the Armenian Transnation (which he defines as the Armenian Diaspora and the homeland), and examines their impact not only in the case of Armenians, but also in the theory of diasporas. Tölölyan, 'Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Transnation', 107–36.
93. Perhaps the failure to consider Armenians outside of the diasporic model is due to the prominent place the Armenian case occupies in Diaspora Studies.

In this field, Armenians have been a 'classical' case, along with the Greeks and the Jews. William Safran, 'Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return', in *Diaspora* 1, no. 1(1991): 83–99, was one of the first to ascribe this 'classical' status to Armenians, expanding from John Armstrong work on the Jewish Diaspora: *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982). While these classical cases could be taken as starting points to look at non-normative cases, as Brubaker suggests, how does one go beyond them when the starting point is the very case they are considering? Brubaker, 'The "Diaspora" Diaspora', 1–19.

94. Safran, 'Deconstructing and Comparing Diasporas'', 12.
95. This goes beyond James Clifford, 'Diasporas', *Cultural Anthropology* 9, no. 3(1997): 302–38, and Paul Gilroy, *There Ain't no Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) which suggest that diaspora could be a way to express being part of the host country, rather than about longing. These works, while they expand the notions of diaspora and make significant contributions to the field, do not consider the daily construction of hierarchy within diasporas.
96. This counters William Safran's discussion in 'Deconstructing and Comparing Diasporas', in *Diaspora, Identity, and Religion*, 12.