

CHAPTER 4

'A SPACIOUS MIRROR': INTERPELLATION AND THE OTHER IN *ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA*

In her influential reading of *Antony and Cleopatra*, Janet Adelman argues that the problem of moral judgement is central to the experience of the tragedy, not just for the characters themselves, but also for the audience.¹ 'The desire to judge and be judged correctly is one of the dominant passions of the play.' 'The dramatic design of *Antony and Cleopatra* forces us to acknowledge the process of judgment at every turn.' In keeping with this focus on ethical evaluation, 'the most characteristic dramatic technique in *Antony and Cleopatra* is the discussion of one group of characters by another.' This recurrent 'framing' of the action, as if it were a play within a play, draws in the audience and forces us to participate, as well, in the act of judging. 'For we are, in a sense, the most minor of the characters who stand aside and comment; or at least we as audience are silent extensions of them.'²

Anne Barton sees the position of the audience in *Antony and Cleopatra* in much the same light. 'Our place of vantage is basically that of Charmian or Enobarbus: people sufficiently close to their social superiors to witness informal and often undignified behavior, without participating in its motive and reflection like the confidantes in *Garnier and Jodelle*.' Antony and Cleopatra have a quality of 'opacity', a 'moral ambiguity', that elicits what Barton calls 'evaluation', and Adelman, 'judgment', from other characters, as well as the audience. 'In this tragedy,' Barton writes, 'other characters are continually trying to describe Cleopatra and Antony, to fix their essential qualities in words.' Like Adelman, however, Barton sees this 'dilemma of judgement' as interminable, insoluble.

And, like Adelman, she cites Cleopatra's description of Antony as akin to a perspective painting, one way a 'Gorgon' (2.5.116), the other way a 'Mars' (2.5.117), as a paradigmatic symbol. Like Antony here, *Antony and Cleopatra*, as Barton and Adelman see the play, simultaneously evokes and frustrates the desire for definitive moral judgement. 'In effect,' Adelman writes, 'we are forced to judge and shown the folly of judging at the same time.'³

The concept of interpellation that I introduce in this chapter, modifying Althusser's antihumanist version, further develops Adelman's insights into 'judgment', as well as Barton's thoughts on 'evaluation'. Adelman observes, 'Judgment depends on where one stands.' Each moral judgement 'tells us as much about the judge and his perspective as it does about the accused'.⁴ I agree; I use the term 'interpellation', however, rather than 'judgement', because I want to emphasise not only, like Adelman, that judgement is grounded in a subjective relationship with another person, rather than in impersonal, objective fact, but also that such judgements are not merely inert, solipsistic expressions of the judging self. Instead, for Shakespeare, judgements possess a kind of power over the other. To judge other people, if they know about that judgement, is to alter their perception of themselves, unless they are able to muster some sort of psychological resistance. Even that resistance, moreover, may be broken down. By being led in triumph, for example, or defeated in open battle, people can be forced to change the way they see themselves.

Shakespeare sees the fall of the Roman Republic as a tragedy, and the way that he describes it evokes, probably not coincidentally, a contemporary decline in the political power of the English nobility. Like Wayne Rebhorn, John Cox and J. L. Simmons, I would suggest, nonetheless, that Shakespeare himself does not see the crisis he describes in such terms, as an effect of economic forces such as Norbert Elias's 'monopoly mechanism'. The rise of the great demagogue, Julius Caesar, and Rome's transition to Empire is in part, as he sees it, a backlash against the injustices of patrician oligarchy. The generosity which Antony attributes to Caesar in his account of Caesar's will goes far to help him win the support of the Roman plebs. But these promises of material gain are not on their own enough to secure the success of his oration.⁵ Without Brutus' cold, standoffish emphasis on disinterested reason and Antony's own contrary ability, like an actor, to weep, rail, gesticulate and walk among the people, to show them Caesar's wounded body and elicit pity, it is

some question whether the pledges that he claims to have discovered in Caesar's will would have been enough to sway the crowd. If pity itself, especially, were not so pervasively repressed, Antony would not be able to manipulate it so successfully.

Shakespeare recognises that political structures can shape historical change. Like St Augustine, however, as well as Cicero, he sees the collapse of Rome's traditional political institutions as more immediately a result of a flawed moral paradigm. The impossibility that his Roman characters tend to idealise is incompatible in the long run with a functioning civil society, because it leaves no room for compromise or concession. If everyone aims to be a law unto himself, then the only possible end result is what Hobbes calls 'the war of all against all': civil strife, culminating in the rule of a strongman. The exaltation of individual autonomy that drives this political conflict is articulated in Shakespeare's Roman's images of the ideal self: the Stoic *sapiens*, the marble statue, 'the northern star', Mount Olympus. And it is rooted in a set of characteristic misconceptions about the nature itself of selfhood. Shakespeare's Romans seem to believe, at times, that passibility can be transcended, when in fact it is a given of the human condition. They also tend to assume that the relation between self and other is necessarily antagonistic, a zero-sum game, when in fact it can be peaceful, collaborative and mutually beneficial.

In this chapter on *Antony and Cleopatra*, the vulnerability to shame that I describe in terms of interpersonal 'interpellation' should be understood as one more instance of the same basic human condition of passibility that I described in simpler terms in my analysis of *Julius Caesar*. Human beings by their very nature as human, as opposed to divine, are vulnerable to others' moral judgement of their character, just as they are vulnerable to being physically wounded. Shadi Bartsch notes, for example, that the gaze in ancient Rome was seen as capable of playing a 'sinister role', as well as an admiring one, in 'interpersonal dynamics among both the elite and commoners', a role captured in the superstitious fear of the so-called 'evil eye' evident in apotropaic Roman iconography.

The individual on display could suffer the debilitating effects of the evil rather than the emulatory eye, of aggression and Schadenfreude rather than admiration. This form of the gaze could be figured as a weapon, and was sometimes imagined as penetrating its human object, or else feeding itself on the sight of suffering.⁶

Coriolanus' crisis, when he is confronted by his mother, illustrates this problem. By leading the Volscians' sack of Rome, Coriolanus imagines that he will be able to blot out the Romans' earlier censure of his behaviour, as well as the humiliation of his banishment. As Volumnia explains to him, however, Coriolanus will not thereby free himself from all opprobrium. The world is larger than Rome, and posterity cares about other things outside and beyond the simple exercise of military might. If Coriolanus succeeds, he will go down in history as a traitor, not as vindicated.

If thou conquer Rome, the benefit
Which thou shalt thereby reap is such a name
Whose repetition will be dogg'd with curses,
Whose chronicle thus writ: 'The man was noble,
But with his last attempt he wip'd it out,
Destroy'd his country, and his name remains
To th'insuing age abhorr'd.

(5.3.142-8)

Antony and Cleopatra imagine that they will find a refuge from such final judgement in the afterlife, in each other's company. As I explain here, however, in the conclusion to my analysis of *Antony and Cleopatra*, 'The Last Interpellation', Shakespeare introduces some significant cause for doubt that the two lovers' imagined escape to Elysium will turn out in the manner they expect.

Ontologically speaking, Shakespeare recognises that the other is an integral participant in self-definition. The other may be divine or human; unchosen or chosen. What it cannot be, however, is altogether eradicated from self-awareness. Without the other as its ground of self-awareness, the self falls into a tautological abyss: a sense of meaninglessness N. K. Sugimura describes as akin to Sartre's existential 'nausea'.⁷ When Antony believes that Cleopatra has betrayed him, he is utterly bewildered. 'I made these wars for Egypt' (4.14.15), he explains. Cleopatra and her soldiers, as well as his, represent for Antony what Timothy Reiss calls 'spheres' or 'circles', the matrix of human relationships which he sees as defining passible, pre-modern selfhood. Cleopatra is part of Antony's understanding of himself, the anchor of a constitutive network: 'the Queen - / Whose heart I thought I had, for she had mine, / Which, whilst it was mine, / Had annexed unto't / A million more, now lost' (4.14.15-18). Deprived of his consort, Antony compares

himself to a 'cloud' or 'vapor' which for a time looks like a 'citadel' or a 'mountain', but then abruptly 'dislimns' and becomes 'indistinct' (4.14.1-14).

The impossibility of self-definition without reference to another also appears earlier and in a more humorous light in Antony's drunken description of a crocodile. 'What manner o' thing is your crocodile?' (2.7.41) Lepidus asks. 'It is shaped, sir, like itself,' Antony explains. 'It is as broad as it hath breadth. It is just so high as it is [etc.]' (2.7.42-3). 'What color is it of?' (2.7.46) Lepidus asks. 'Of it own color too' (2.7.48). The point of the joke is that it is impossible to describe anything without some sort of reference to something other than itself. The selfsame without the other is incomprehensible. Antony finds himself in like case later on, when he believes that Cleopatra has abandoned him for his rival. The patent inadequacy of his response to Lepidus is amusing at the time, but also a prefiguration of the fate that awaits him, alone and confused on the Egyptian coast after the battle of Actium.

Much as Shakespeare suggests here, in this bit of drunken banter, in his account of what he calls 'recognition' (*Anerkennung*), Hegel advances a claim which at first might seem paradoxical: our individual self-definition is not and cannot be autonomous, but instead can be better understood as emerging out of interpersonal relations between the self and the other.⁸ Sticking strictly to philosophy, rather than theology (Buber) or literary criticism (Bakhtin), the most influential twentieth-century inheritors of this Hegelian sense of the importance of the other are Sartre and Ricœur: that is, the claim that the other plays a constitutive role in self-perception, where the other is understood as other people, rather than as God (Lévinas), language (Lacan), 'ideology' (Althusser) or 'discourse' (Foucault).⁹ Sartre for his part is dismayed by the intersubjective relatedness Hegel emphasises; the tangling-up of one self-awareness with another that Arendt, as well, considers part of what she calls 'plurality.' This inextricable connection between one consciousness and the next, as Sartre sees it, introduces painful feelings of shame, undermining the very possibility of peaceful human sociability. The self and the other are doomed to perpetual conflict: each aims to reduce the other to an object, an 'it' rather than a 'thou', in order to preserve an incompatible sense of itself as what Arendt would call 'sovereign'. Enjoying one's own agency, Sartre suggests, is possible only at someone else's expense. Ricœur, by contrast, is

more optimistic. Like Hegel, he believes that an alternative to the 'master-slave dialectic' is possible: a state of mutual 'recognition' which he sees exemplified in healthy romantic relationships, practices of ritual gift-exchange, and the legal recognition of individual rights.¹⁰ Sartre's sense of the relationship between self and other as a 'zero-sum game' resembles that of Shakespeare's Romans, doomed to oscillate between autocracy and civil war. Ricœur's, by contrast, like Cicero's, envisages a viable republican alternative.

Much akin to this contrast between Sartre and Ricœur, Shakespeare's *Coriolanus* presents two competing models of the circulation of political and economic power. The first paradigm of distribution, that of the patricians, leads to commoners on the dole, as a result of aristocratic hoarding: 'storehouses cramm'd with grain' (1.1.79–80). The other, that of the plebeians, consists of free trade in an open market. Much of the stage business of the play, for example, consists in Coriolanus going to and from 'the marketplace'.¹¹ Menenius and Volumnia convince him to visit it, however, only much against his wishes. When what he calls the 'price o' the consulship' (2.3.74) proves too high, Coriolanus leaves in a huff. He is unwilling to negotiate; like Sartre, he assumes that a concession to another is simply a loss, rather than perhaps the basis for a long-term gain. It is significant therefore that the plebeians are described repeatedly, by contrast, as 'trades' (3.2.134, 4.1.13). Theirs is a tacit bargain, like that of a 'marketplace': I will honour you, if you will honour me. What Ricœur identifies as 'recognition' thrives upon collaboration, founded in mutual respect. People greet each other in the street; each 'citizen' or 'neighbour' knows and is known; praises and is praised in return. After Coriolanus is banished, the tribune Sicinius rejoices to see 'tradesmen singing in their shops and going / About their functions friendly' (4.6.8–9). As Annabel Patterson suggests, in *Coriolanus*, 'Shakespeare's audience is invited to contemplate an alternative political system': the early Republic.¹² James Kuzner, as well, sees here an inspiring depiction of 'a limited yet germinal version of participatory government'.¹³

Francis Fukuyama takes up this model of shared 'recognition' in his discussion of what he calls 'the end of history': the emergence of liberal democracies in the modern period. 'The failure to understand the thymotic component of what is normally thought of as economic motivation leads to vast misinterpretations of politics and historical change.' For example, 'virtually the entire civil liberties

and civil rights agendas, while having economic components, are essentially thymotic contests over recognition.¹⁴ Fukuyama's definition of *thymos* connects Braden's take on what St Augustine calls *libido dominandi* with Ricœur's emphasis on 'recognition', as well as Charles Taylor's concept of a 'politics of recognition'. 'Thymos is something like an innate human sense of justice: people believe that they have a certain worth, and when other people do not *recognize* their worth at its correct value – then they become angry.' *Thymos* becomes disordered and unmanageable when characters such as Coriolanus are unwilling to accept others' assessment of that worth as anything less than infinite, divine. A peaceful 'commonwealth' (4.16.14) requires the interdependent exchange of mutually reinforced self-esteem or 'recognition'. Coriolanus, however, balks at this prospect. Like Sartre, he is unable to see the other as anything other than a threat to his own absolute autonomy. This distrust of his fellow citizens is an effect of what Rebhorn calls the 'imperial self', a vision of himself that leaves no room for their independent agency. As Volumnia says, 'thou hadst rather / Follow thine enemy in a fiery gulf / Than flatter him in a bower' (3.2.90–2). For Coriolanus, as for Sartre, 'hell is other people'.¹⁵

How did Shakespeare arrive at such a prescient understanding of the relation between the self and the other, anticipating the conclusions of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Continental philosophy? The analogy to Ricœur is revealing, in part because his avowed intellectual indebtedness to Aristotle, in addition to other, more modern thinkers such as Hegel, provides a clue to what may be, with some degree of historical plausibility, Shakespeare's own philosophical source. Part of the inspiration for Ricœur's insistence that self-knowledge requires the other is Aristotle's description of friendship in his *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*, in which the philosopher describes the friend as *allos autos*, 'another self'.¹⁶ Aristotle argues that, since friends are by nature similar, to perceive a friend is, in a sense, to perceive oneself. Cicero picks up on the idea in his *De amicitia*, translating it by the now-famous phrase *alter idem* (literally, 'another the same').¹⁷

Shakespeare, however, may have also encountered Aristotle's thought about friendship in another incarnation, as well, the so-called *Magna moralia*, a treatise once thought to have been written by Aristotle, but whose authorship is now disputed, and which as a result has drifted into relative obscurity. In the *Magna moralia*,

the author, whoever he may be, vividly compares the friend to a mirror, and Shakespeare seems to take up this conceit, not without some interesting modification, in two conversations much-noted for their philosophical implications. The first exchange, in *Julius Caesar*, begins when Cassius asks Brutus if he can see his own face. The second, much analogous, appears in a slightly later play, *Troilus and Cressida*, when Achilles asks Ulysses what he is reading. As Christopher Tilmouth suggests, *Troilus and Cressida* is 'necessarily central to any discussion of Renaissance intersubjectivity'.¹⁸ Throughout the play, as Lars Engle observes, crises of evaluation 'turn reflexively on themselves and become debates over the nature of the activity of valuing', bringing on 'an anxiety about assessment amounting almost to vertigo'. 'How may value in men and women be assessed?'¹⁹

'Eye to eye opposed': Shakespeare's 'strange fellow'

I begin this section by comparing Cassius' conversation with Brutus at the beginning of *Julius Caesar* about Brutus' inability to see his own potential with Ulysses' conversation with Achilles in *Troilus and Cressida* about the impossibility of maintaining honour in isolation. The basic premise of both of these discussions is a commonplace of present-day philosophical anthropology: self-image is constructed through relation with the other. Within his much earlier historical context, however, the degree of sophistication Shakespeare brings to bear upon the subject is unusual. In order to explain Shakespeare's sense of the role of the other in self-perception, I draw upon the example of Bakhtin's analysis of Dostoyevsky. Bakhtin's chief source for his concept of intersubjectivity is Buber, and it is some question whether Shakespeare, too, might have been inspired by some more abstract thinker. Ulysses in *Troilus and Cressida* claims to derive his ideas from a 'strange fellow', whom he never names, but whose book he enters reading, and critics have put forward various hypotheses about this author's possible identity. Several have suggested Plato's *First Alcibiades*. Others propose Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*.

I propose here that the most likely real-world model for Ulysses' book is a summary of Aristotle's ethics, the *Magna moralia*, once thought to have been written by Aristotle, but now considered of dubious authenticity. The theory of friendship

that Aristotle or pseudo-Aristotle articulates in this treatise strongly resembles the idea of the other as a reflection of the self that appears in *Antony and Cleopatra* when Maecenas describes Antony as Octavian's 'spacious mirror', and that seems likely to have inspired similar descriptions of the other as a 'mirror' or 'glass' in *Julius Caesar* and *Troilus and Cressida*. The friend is 'another self' (*allos autos*). Shakespeare greatly complicates Aristotle's original conceit, however. In brief, Shakespeare grants the other a much greater degree of independent agency in shaping self-perception than Aristotle does in his theory of friendship, even though he articulates the relationship between self and other in similar figurative language.

Near the beginning of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, Cassius asks Brutus an odd question. 'Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face?' (1.2.51). The question comes across in context as an abrupt non sequitur. Brutus, however, being of a philosophical bent, does not seem taken aback. Instead, he replies in kind; apparently, he is ready at any moment, without blinking, to enter into a Socratic dialogue or (a more likely model) a Ciceronian philosophical disputation. 'No, Cassius; for the eye sees not itself / But by reflection, by some other things' (1.2.52–3). Cassius, expecting just such an answer, seizes on the concession as an opportunity to begin to flatter his interlocutor:

Tis just,
And it is very much lamented, Brutus,
That you have no such mirrors as will turn
Your hidden worthiness into your eye
That you might see your shadow[.]

(1.2.54–8)

Suspecting what game is afoot, Brutus asks Cassius to clarify his intent. 'Into what dangers would you lead me, Cassius, / That you would have me seek into myself / For that which is not in me?' (1.2.63–5) Cassius replies.

Since you know you cannot see yourself
So well as by reflection, I your glass
Will modestly discover to yourself
That of yourself which you yet know not of.

(1.2.67–70)

Cassius, of course, wants to convince Brutus that he is capable of recreating the glorious accomplishment of his ancestor, Lucius Junius Brutus, in driving out Tarquin Superbus, by joining him and the other conspirators in overthrowing Caesar. For present purposes, however, what is notable about the exchange is the emphasis on the necessity of the other in self-perception, mediated through a recurrent metaphor of a mirror or 'glass'. The trope is not uncommon in ancient literature; for example, in their essays on anger, both Plutarch and Seneca cite the benefits of looking in a mirror when angry. 'To see oneself looking so unnatural and all confused,' Plutarch writes, 'is no small step toward the discrediting of this ailment.'²⁰ As Jean-Pierre Vernant explains,

In seeing your face in a mirror you know yourself as others know you, face-to-face, in an exchange of glances. Access to the self is gained through an external projection of that self, through being objectified, as if one were another.²¹

A very similar exchange occurs in a slightly later play, Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida*, where it receives much more substantial elaboration. Like Cassius with Brutus, Ulysses wants to persuade his interlocutor, Achilles, to return to the field of action, and he begins his work of persuasion with an unusual opening stratagem: a markedly contemplative conversation, abstract and seemingly divorced from any topical concern. He enters reading, as if oblivious to Achilles' presence; earlier, he specifically instructs the other Greeks to ignore Achilles, so as to set the stage. His curiosity piqued, Achilles falls for the trap. 'What are you reading?' (3.3.95) he asks.

ULYSSES A strange fellow here
 Writes me that man, how dearly ever parted,
 How much in having, or without or in,
 Cannot make boast to have that which he hath,
 Nor feels not what he owes but by reflection;
 As when his virtues shining upon others
 Heat them, and they retort that heat again
 To the first giver.

ACHILLES This is not strange, Ulysses.
 The beauty that is borne here in the face
 The bearer knows not, but commends itself

In 1961 Mikhail Bakhtin wrote up a set of notes, 'Toward a Reworking of the Dostoyevsky Book', which were published posthumously. Bakhtin was strongly influenced by Martin Buber, who himself owed much to Hegel and Heidegger, and presents in these notes what seems to be a summary of his understanding of Buber's central claim that relationships with other people, as well as God, are the most fundamental given of human existence.

*To be means to communicate. Absolute death (non-being) is the state of being unheard, unrecognized, unremembered . . . To be means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself. A person has no internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and always on the boundary; looking inside himself, he looks into the eyes of another or with the eyes of another.*²²

As a literary critic, Bakhtin's purpose in evoking this line of thought is to harness it to the claim that Dostoyevsky's greatness consists chiefly in his artistic method, which is not simply to put forward aspects of his own self, a tendency Bakhtin calls 'monologism', but instead to allow his characters to take on a life of their own. 'Here, a multiplicity of consciousnesses is opened up': the 'polyphony' that Bakhtin sees as the distinctive feature of the novel at its best. Bakhtin is reacting here against an idea which he encountered in German criticism, that Dostoyevsky 'only projected the landscape of his own soul', or, in other words, that the artist at his craft is essentially a microcosm of Hegel's World-Soul, making his own nature manifest to his own consciousness by making it separate from himself.²³ To draw an analogy to Shakespeare studies, this latter interpretation of Dostoyevsky's art, the one that Bakhtin rejects, closely resembles Coleridge's account of Shakespeare's method. Reacting against Dr Johnson, Coleridge mocks the idea of Shakespeare 'going about the world with his Pocket-book, noting what hears and observes'.²⁴ Instead, like the spider in Swift's *Battle of the Books*, Shakespeare spins out his characters from his own internal cogitation – or so Coleridge maintains. 'Whatever forms they assumed, they were still Shakespeare.' Coleridge insists that Shakespeare created 'a vast multiplicity of characters' by 'simple meditation': 'he had only to imitate such parts of his character, or to exaggerate such as existed in possibility, and they were at once nature and fragments of Shakespeare.'²⁵

Bakhtin would be horrified by such solipsism. In contrast to Coleridge, Bakhtin argues that the great artist does not derive his material from within, but from without, in his openness to the subjectivity of the other. Dostoyevsky's subject is not himself, but instead, 'interaction among consciousnesses', 'the interdependence of consciousnesses'. 'He depicts confession and the confessional consciousnesses of others in order to reveal their internally social structure.' Dostoyevsky in particular, as well as the novel more generally in its 'polyphony', reveals a great truth about human nature. 'I cannot manage without another, I cannot become myself without another; I must find myself in another by finding another in myself (in mutual reflection and mutual acceptance). Justification cannot be *self*-justification, recognition cannot be *self*-recognition.'²⁶ It is not a stretch to apply Bakhtin's praise for Dostoyevsky and the novel to Shakespeare and the drama. Shakespeare, in fact, explicitly acknowledges the intersubjectivity that Bakhtin describes, whereas Dostoyevsky's awareness of this aspect of human existence remains more implicit.

The question remains, however: how much of Shakespeare's remarkable philosophical prescience is his own, and how much does he owe to other sources?²⁷ In brief, the first major source to have been proposed for Shakespeare's thought about the role of the other in self-perception is Plato's *First Alcibiades*.²⁸ The authenticity of the dialogue is now disputed, but in antiquity it was considered an ideal introduction to Plato's thought. As Steven Forde notes,

The neo-Platonist Iamblichus wrote that the *Alcibiades* I contains the whole philosophy of Plato, as in a seed. The Islamic sage and Platonic commentator Alfarabi concurs, saying in effect that in the *Alcibiades* I all the Platonic questions are raised as if for the first time.²⁹

In the *First Alcibiades*, Plato's Socrates presents a very early account of a phenomenon that, two millennia later, proves to fascinate John Donne, as well as Shakespeare. There is 'something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes': 'the eye looking at another eye . . . will there see itself.'³⁰ Or, as Shakespeare writes, 'eye to eye opposed / Salutes each other with each other's form' (3.3.108–9). Plato's application of this conceit, however, is very different from

Shakespeare's.³¹ As an alternative to the *First Alcibiades*, T. W. Baldwin suggests Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, available in English in John Dolman's 1561 translation, as a possible source and highlights this passage: 'The soule is not able in this bodye to see him self. No more is the eye whyche although he seeth all other things, yet (that whiche is one of the leaste) can not discern his owne shape.'³² Cicero's application of the metaphor of the eye, however, is again very different from Shakespeare's. Cicero himself probably has in mind Plato's *First Alcibiades*; as in that dialogue, his larger argument here is that the soul exists and is distinct from the body, even though it cannot be seen.

In the *First Alcibiades*, Socrates draws an analogy. 'If the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye.' He then refines the position further: to see itself, the eye must not only look at the eye, but 'at that part of the eye in which the virtue of the eye resides', namely, 'sight'. So also self-knowledge depends upon the soul looking at that part of itself 'in which virtue resides', that part of the soul 'which has to do with wisdom and knowledge' and which thus 'resembles the divine'. To fulfil the Delphic precept, 'Know thyself', Alcibiades must ignore his own handsome body, popularity and great wealth, and instead focus on his intellect: that part of himself which is able to access 'wisdom'. In sum, Socrates' aim here is not to convince Alcibiades that his honour, like Achilles', requires other people's confirmation. On the contrary, he urges Alcibiades to ignore 'the Athenian people', lest his 'true self' be 'spoiled and deformed'. As Shadi Bartsch explains,

the kind of mirroring that takes place here might be designated vertical rather than horizontal: what it shows back to the viewer is the godlike quality of his own soul, rather than any social truth about himself or his visual partner.³³

Strictly speaking, it is possible that Shakespeare had access to the *First Alcibiades* in various contemporary editions of Ficino's Latin translation. More immediately, however, Shakespeare may have encountered the conceit of eyes reflecting other eyes in the work of his English contemporaries. Kenneth Deighton points out a brief parallel in Nashe's *Unfortunate Traveller*: 'the eye that sees round about it selfe, sees not into it selfe.'³⁴ Baldwin draws attention to similar passages in Sir John Davies' *Nosce Teipsum*, both

of which echo Cicero fairly closely. 'The minde is like the eye . . . Whose rayes reflect not, but spread outwardly, / Not seeing it selfe, when other things it sees.' And again: 'Mine Eyes . . . Looke not into this litle world of mine, / Nor see my face, wherein they fixed are.'³⁵ The introduction of the 'face' here lends plausibility to the idea that these passages may have inspired Cassius' introductory question, 'Can you see your face?' Nevertheless, much is missing, in particular Shakespeare's emphasis in both conversations on the metaphor of 'reflection'.

In the Library chapter of James Joyce's *Ulysses*, John Eglinton, proud of his learning, complains of Shakespeare that 'he puts Bohemia on the sea-coast and makes Ulysses quote Aristotle'.³⁶ The first charge is obviously correct, but what about the second? In their studies of allusions in *Ulysses*, Weldon Thornton and Don Gifford both see Eglinton as simply mistaken.³⁷ In *Troilus and Cressida*, it is Hector, not Ulysses, who name-drops Aristotle. Debating whether or not to return Helen to the Greeks, Hector accuses Paris and Troilus of speaking 'not much / Unlike young men, whom Aristotle thought / Unfit to hear moral philosophy' (2.2.167–8). The reference is to the beginning of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, where in discussing his method Aristotle emphasises the importance of empirical evidence, rather the more abstract 'demonstrative proofs' typical of Plato. 'A young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life . . . and further, since he tends to follow his passions.'³⁸ The reference is not isolated, although it is more explicit than usual; W. R. Elton identifies a number of other debates, as well, in *Troilus and Cressida* derived from ideas about virtue presented in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.³⁹

Joyce, or Joyce's Eglinton, may well be right, however, if not perhaps in the sense that he intended. Shakespeare's Ulysses does, in fact, 'quote Aristotle'; or at least, pseudo-Aristotle. Shakespeare's chief source for his understanding of the role of the other in self-perception seems to be Aristotle's concept of friendship, as mediated in particular by an arresting description of the friend as a 'mirror', needful even for the 'self-sufficing man', in the *Magna moralia*. 'The way of thinking about self-knowledge expressed in these Aristotelian passages', Christopher Gill observes, 'is in sharp contrast to the idea, central to the Cartesian tradition in modern thought, that consciousness or knowledge of oneself is primary and fundamental to other kinds of awareness.'⁴⁰ Within Shakespeare studies, the key

passage comparing the friend to a mirror has been overlooked as a possible source for *Troilus and Cressida*, most likely because it appears in a treatise whose authorship is now disputed, and which has largely dropped out of the standard Aristotelian canon.⁴¹ In classics, however, the metaphor has sparked renewed interest, figuring as a touchstone in work by Martha Nussbaum and Shadi Bartsch on conceptions of selfhood in antiquity. For Nussbaum, this section of this treatise, which she sees as authentically Aristotelian, presents 'the clearest version' of 'Aristotle's argument' that 'one further benefit of friendly love' is 'the increase in self-knowledge and self-perception that comes of seeing and intuitively responding to a person about whom you care'.⁴²

The *Magna moralia* is relatively short, despite its name; scholarly opinion remains divided whether it is Aristotle's own early draft of the more complex thought that appears in his *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* or a simplified epitome put together by a later author. For brevity's sake, I will simply refer to its author as 'Aristotle'; 'Aristotle' is who Shakespeare, if he did read the work, most likely would have thought its author to be. The most relevant passage runs as follows:

As then when we wish to see our own face, we do so by looking into the mirror, in the same way when we wish to know ourselves we can obtain that knowledge by looking at our friend. For the friend is, as we assert, a second self.

The context of the passage is an inquiry about the ability of human beings to be self-sufficient, in the manner of Aristotle's God: 'for if God is self-sufficing and has need of none, it does not follow that we shall need no one.'⁴³ To be self-sufficient is portrayed as an ideal state, one which the idealised 'self-sufficing man', like the Stoic *sapiens*, can to some degree approximate. Even he, however, cannot do without friendship. 'If, then, it is pleasant to know oneself, and it is not possible to know this without having someone else for a friend, the self-sufficing man will require friendship in order to know himself.'⁴⁴

Several details suggest that this passage is the primary source behind Ulysses' 'strange fellow', as well as Cassius' proffering himself as Brutus' 'glass'. Plato's observations about the eye in the *First Alcibiades* are not irrelevant; Shakespeare may well have been

aware of the conceit through one indirect route or another, perhaps by way of Cicero, perhaps by way of Sir John Davies, and he does seem to press it into service here. The argument which he uses it to illustrate, however, is not Plato's, but instead, a variation on Aristotle's theory of friendship. First, the context: Ulysses is trying to convince Achilles that he cannot be self-sufficient, specifically, that his pride cannot sustain itself, but instead depends upon the approbation of other people. Similarly here, Aristotle introduces the necessity of friendship for self-knowledge as a limit upon what he calls the 'self-sufficing man'. Second, the conceit: the emphasis throughout both of the passages from Shakespeare's plays, both the one in *Julius Caesar*, and the one in *Troilus and Cressida*, on 'mirrors' and 'reflection', ranging from Cassius as Brutus' 'glass' to Ulysses' later and more artful variations on this theme: an 'arch' that returns the echo of a 'voice'; a 'gate of steel' that reflects both the 'heat' and 'figure' of the 'sun'. Third and last, Cassius' description of himself as an idealised friend: a like-minded member of the aristocratic elite. 'Be not jealous on me, gentle Brutus' (1.2.71), Cassius asks.

Were I a common laughter, or did use
 To stale with ordinary oaths my love
 To every new protestor; if you know
 That I do fawn on men, and hug them hard,
 And after scandal them; or if you know
 That I profess myself in banqueting
 To all the rout, then hold me dangerous.

(1.2.72–8)

This emphasis on one singular, virtuous friend, separate from the crowd, is very much in the spirit of Aristotle. In the *Magna moralia*, the friend is only a 'second self' if he is 'very great': 'as the saying has it, "Here is another Hercules, a dear other self."' In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle says bluntly, 'such men are rare'. Moreover, 'such friendship requires time and familiarity'. It is only this kind of friendship, however, 'the friendship of the good', which is 'proof against slander'.⁴⁵ That such a friend would be compared to a mirror makes more sense, perhaps, if we remember that mirrors were once a luxury good. As Shadi Bartsch observes:

we moderns tend to take mirrors for granted: a cheap one can be bought for a few cents at any drugstore, and they surround us in our lives from the first bathroom stumbles of the morning. The ancient mirror, by contrast, was an object of comparative rarity and considerable expense.⁴⁶

Shakespeare does not simply rest upon what he receives from Aristotle, however. Instead, he gradually revises Aristotle's theory of the role of the other in self-perception, so that it comes to represent his own, rather different social reality instead. Aristotle's sympathies are aristocratic; his social circle, like Plato's, was *hoi kaloikagathoi* ('the beautiful and the good'): the upper-class men of Athens. The opinion of the *dēmos*, the people at large, was held in relative contempt. The milieu was overwhelmingly homosocial. Wealthy, educated men's primary emotional relationships were, for the most part, with each other, often shading over into homosexual romance. Aristotle's idea of the friend as a 'second self' shares, as a result, many of the qualities that people today might more typically look for in a marriage or other romantic partnership.

Shakespeare, by contrast, was a petit bourgeois, a man from the provinces who came to London to seek his fortune. His world was primarily that of the theatre, and the theatre as marketplace, a freewheeling, entrepreneurial endeavour. For Shakespeare, the sturdy support of a single male friend, like Antonio in *The Merchant of Venice* or Antonio in *Twelfth Night*, is a great boon; akin, one might say, to securing a patron. These characters' relationships with Bassanio and Sebastian, respectively, are portrayed sympathetically, and prove occasions for admirable self-sacrifice. For all their inherent nobility, however, such friendships also prove, in the end, doomed and inadequate. Shakespeare rose to prominence hard-pressed by other concerns, as well: those of the hustling, cash-poor capitalist. In such circumstances, the esteem of one friend is not really enough.

'What's aught but as 'tis valued?' (2.2.53) Shakespeare's Troilus asks, speaking of Helen. As a professional playwright, Shakespeare lived under pressure of much the same question, one with immediate, economic force. For him, unlike Aristotle, the other that determines the 'value' of the self is not one but many, not a 'second self' but *hoi polloi*: the people out there paying to see his plays. As Lars Engle points out,

Shakespeare's theatre, itself subject to varied contemporary evaluations and occasionally threatened with closure by the more adverse of them, produced plays for money; the plays so produced were subjected to immediate valuation from audiences; through them actors strove to please.

As I discussed in the introduction to this chapter, in *Coriolanus*, especially, Shakespeare uses 'the marketplace' as a metaphor for the social component of self-esteem regulation. Here, I want to focus instead on a related metaphor, that of the theatre. Shakespeare lays the groundwork for this underlying conceit in *Julius Caesar* and *Troilus and Cressida*, and it comes to a head in the play that is the subject of this chapter in particular, *Antony and Cleopatra*. As Engle observes, 'the contingency of evaluation served as a recurrent enabling irritant for Shakespeare's creativity. Problems of worth, price, and value everywhere vex his texts.'⁴⁷

In *Julius Caesar*, Cassius invokes the classical topos of the single, privileged male friend. At the same time, however, he is careful to suggest that he is only one of many. He speaks not just of himself as Brutus' 'glass', but also of 'mirrors', plural, and 'eyes', plural. 'Many of the best respect in Rome' (1.2.59), he says, 'have wished that noble Brutus had his eyes' (1.2.62). He has the conspirators scatter anonymous letters to Brutus, so that it seems as if an eager audience, the Roman people, is already in place, waiting only for Brutus to act in order to bestow their plaudits. Most telling, however, is a conversation between Cassius and Brutus, immediately after they assassinate Caesar.

CASSIUS	How many ages hence Shall this our lofty scene be acted over In states unborn and accents yet unknown?
BRUTUS	How many times shall Caesar bleed in sport That now on Pompey's basis lies along, No worthier than the dust?
CASSIUS	So oft as that shall be, So often shall the knot of us be called The men who gave their country liberty.

(3.1.111-18)

No such conversation occurs in Plutarch; it is a Shakespearean interpolation, of a kind that will return again at more length in *Antony and Cleopatra*. It is also deeply anachronistic.

For Roman *optimates* such as the historical Brutus and Cassius, keenly conscious of their aristocratic status, to be associated with the theatre would have been a cause for concern, not celebration. Mark Antony's great love of the theatre, for example, like the Emperor Nero's later on, was seen among the senatorial class as scandalous, especially among those more mindful of traditional class distinctions.⁴⁸ Conservative statesmen such as Brutus and Cassius did not aim to be represented on stage. In *Antony and Cleopatra*, a later play, Shakespeare corrects the lapse in his own historicism; Cleopatra is plausibly horrified at the thought of being imitated before the public eye. What we see here, by contrast, in *Julius Caesar*, in addition to some rich irony, is Shakespeare's own concept of success, success as a playwright, bleeding over into his characterisation of these ancient figures. He makes sense of the conspirators' desire for lasting glory as liberators of Rome by comparing it to his own desire for immortality as an author. The same kind of shading over into his own experience occurs in *Troilus and Cressida*, as well, when Ulysses speaks of 'applause'. The 'arch', reverberating with the sound of speech, which Shakespeare substitutes there for Aristotle's 'mirror' is an allusion to another echoing, circular space: the 'wooden O' of the theatre.

Not every play meets with 'applause', however. As Brutus and Cassius soon discover, their 'lofty scene' does not prove the smash hit they had expected it to be. Shakespeare's keen awareness of his own dependence as a playwright on the approval of his audience seems the most likely basis for the most radical revision that he makes to the understanding of the role of the other in self-perception that he found in his primary source, Aristotle's theory of friendship. For Aristotle, the friend who serves as the 'second self' is chiefly an object of contemplation, rather than himself a thinking subject. He is not a physician, giving a diagnosis; that kind of evaluation is reserved for the self alone. Instead, he is more like a portrait of the self, 'warts and all', in which one's moral failings can be discerned at one remove. 'We are not able to see what we are from ourselves,' Aristotle says.

That we cannot do so is plain from the way in which we blame others without being aware that we do the same things ourselves; and this is the effect of favor or passion, and there are many of us who are blinded by these things so that we judge not aright.⁴⁹

Cicero makes much the same point in *De officiis*: 'Somehow it is the case that we can detect failings better in others than in ourselves. Consequently a very easy way for pupils to be corrected is if their teachers imitate their faults in order to remove them.'⁵⁰

For Aristotle, a 'second self' is valuable, because it allows the self to see itself as if it were disinterested. What that second self thinks of the self, the other's opinion of the self, is not really important. Shakespeare includes an example of this kind of 'mirror' in *Antony and Cleopatra*, when Caesar receives the news that Antony is dead and begins to weep. 'Caesar is touched' (5.1.33), Agrippa observes. Maecenas replies: 'When such a spacious mirror's set before him, / He needs must see himself' (5.1.34-5). In this moment of apparent grief, Caesar invokes Aristotle's concept of the single, extraordinary friend, 'another Hercules', describing Antony in death as 'my brother, my competitor / In top of all design, my mate in empire, / Friend and companion' (5.1.42-4). The comparison flatters the speaker, however, as well as its subject; by praising Antony in these terms, Octavian moves to appropriate his dead rival's residual grandeur for himself.

For Shakespeare, the other is not merely an object, however, like a statue or in Antony's case, a dead body, but an independent subjectivity. The other judges the self, and that judgement has weight. This independence of the other, a freedom either to approve or disapprove of the self, is, in fact, his or her most important quality. Whether or not the other resembles the self in external, objective respects such as social status, wealth or gender is not nearly as important to Shakespeare as it is to Aristotle (or Octavian). Instead, what matters is the other's internal, subjective opinion of the self. This new emphasis on the other as a thinking subject is the reason why Shakespeare complicates Aristotle's relatively simple image of a mirror by introducing an additional, much more complex simile, the self and the other as two eyes reflecting each other: a conceit that he borrows, perhaps, from Plato. Shakespeare wants to stress the idea that the other is not merely an object, like a 'glass', but instead itself sentient, itself a locus of consciousness. The self looks at the other, and the other, of equal dignity, also looks back: 'eye to eye opposed / Salutes each other with each other's form' (3.3.108-9).

In the conversations about intersubjective 'reflection' in *Julius Caesar* and *Troilus and Cressida*, Shakespeare's primary point

seems to be that the self requires the approval of the other in order to sustain its own positive self-image. He points out, in other words, the fatal flaw in narcissism. Narcissus starving beside his own reflection is a symbol of the inability of the proud to sustain their pride without Echo, that is, without other people.⁵¹ In *Troilus and Cressida*, Agamemnon complains about Achilles' arrogance in terms that evoke, not only Narcissus, but also Shakespeare's Roman paragon of pride, Coriolanus. 'He that is proud eats up himself. Pride is his own glass, his own trumpet, his own chronicle; and whatever praises itself but in the deed, devours the deed in the praise' (2.3.156–8). The last conceit here is much compressed, and may therefore be obscure; what Agamemnon means is that whoever praises himself in any way other than doing the deed itself for which he would be praised, forestalls whatever praise would have otherwise accrued to him for that deed.

Agamemnon's basic premise, that pride leads to a kind of emotional starvation, appears again as a central motif in *Coriolanus*. As Volumnia says, indignant, 'Anger's my meat: I sup upon myself / And so shall starve with feeding' (4.2.50–1). Bakhtin describes such narcissism as '*proud solitude*': the attempt 'to do without recognition, without others'. This would-be escape from the other, which he sees as the essence of pride, Bakhtin also sees as profoundly impossible. The proud man cannot heal his wounded honour in isolation, because, Bakhtin explains, 'no human events are developed or resolved within the bounds of single consciousness'. 'A single consciousness is *contradiction in adjecto*. Consciousness is in essence multiple. *Pluralia tantum*.' Like Shakespeare, as opposed to Aristotle, Bakhtin insists that the other is not simply an object of perception, but instead itself an independent, thinking subject, collaborating in the very act of perception itself, even as it is being perceived. 'Not another *person* remaining the object of my consciousness, but another autonomous consciousness standing alongside mine, and my own consciousness can only exist in relation to it.'⁵²

In *Antony and Cleopatra*, Shakespeare takes the idea that the other is a thinking subject, rather than an object, still one step further. The other is not merely a necessary sounding-board or reflective device, required to sustain a positive self-image. The other is also active, possessed of agency. It need not simply accept whatever self-representation the self puts forward, like wax

taking on the impress of a seal. Instead, the other can reject that image and put forward an alternative, a representation of the self that might well be less than flattering. The self, now on the receiving end, is then obliged somehow to metabolise that bitter medicine. Just as the other is surprisingly active, so also the self can be surprisingly passive. The self can be acted-upon, can have its self-image forced into a different shape, whether it wants to accept that revision or not. In a lucid moment early on, Antony presents this process in a surprisingly positive light, as akin to plowing a field or ‘earring’: a pun on ‘hearing’. ‘Oh, then we bring forth weeds / When our quick minds lie still, and our ills told us / Is as our earring’ (1.2.115–17). Without feedback from others regarding our ‘faults’, Antony suggests, we are prone to fall prey to delusions about ourselves: ‘weeds’. ‘Speak to me home,’ he says. ‘Mince not the general tongue’ (1.2.111).

What if the self, however, does not have such ‘ears to hear’ (Ezek. 12:2; Matt. 11:15, 13:9, 13:43; Mark 4:9, 4:23, 7:16; Luke 8:8, 14:35)? We are not immediately or entirely obliged to change our understanding of ourselves, in response to external feedback; we can deny the validity of criticism, repress our awareness of it, or project it onto someone else; perhaps even the accuser. For other people to be able to introduce humbling changes in our self-perception, the kind of reality check Antony calls ‘earring’, either we ourselves must be receptive to that change, or the other must be sufficiently powerful, somehow, to be able to overcome our psychological defences: mechanisms such as denial, repression and projection, supported by a combination of intelligence, confidence and charisma. That power of the other over the self can come about through a single, unusually strong cathexis, such as that of Coriolanus with Volumnia or Antony with Cleopatra. It can also be a function of sheer, stupefying number, however, as, for instance, when the other is not a single person, but an entire populace: a massive, hostile crowd lining the streets of Rome. Hence the significance of the Roman triumph in Shakespeare’s thought: the triumph is a species of involuntary theatre, the scenario in which the power of the other over the self, a power to revise the self’s proffered version of itself, is most keenly evident. To be led in triumph is public exposure of powerlessness at its most extreme: an exaggerated, clear-cut version of life’s many other, less overwhelming occasions for embarrassment.

'I would not see't': Suicide as Audience Management

In the previous section, I set out Shakespeare's understanding of the relation between self and other in some detail. What are the limits of our ability to deceive ourselves, in the interests of preserving an internal sense of control? Through the power of the imagination, the grandiose self can often persevere, at least temporarily, as if sceptical, nay-saying critics were powerless, or did not exist, and could not therefore redefine its self-image, through their power of 'reflection', as less than ideal. This construction of a separate world 'as if' requires the cooperation, however, of an enabling, sympathetic other such as Achilles' Patroclus or Antony's Cleopatra. The actor cannot buy into his own 'supreme Fiction' without a willing audience. In this section, I explain more fully how the idea of the other as a 'mirror' or 'glass' that appears at the beginning of *Julius Caesar*, as well as Brutus' horror in the end at the thought of being led in triumph, becomes in Shakespeare's later Roman play, *Antony and Cleopatra*, a much more complex investigation of the ability of the other to impose moral judgment on the self, a process that I call 'interpellation', albeit in a different sense than Althusser. Human beings are not only passible physically and emotionally, but also ethically. That is to say, we are vulnerable to being shamed, despite our ability to retreat into a separate, more subjective space of imaginative freedom, the interior world Katharine Maus describes as 'inwardness.' The objective world can intrude upon that idyll in the form of the other, even given the surprising strength of psychological defences such as denial and dissociation.

In this section, I focus on the motives behind the cultural practice Cleopatra calls 'the high Roman fashion'. The simplest explanation for Roman suicide is that it is a way to turn defeat into a kind of victory. Apparent powerlessness becomes instead an opportunity for a spectacular display of agency. Once Antony dies, Cleopatra the sybarite turns against materiality itself, for example, in terms that recall Hamlet, as well as Duke Vincentio in *Measure for Measure*. Now that she is no longer in command, life as a passible human being, embedded in the 'grotesque' material world, seems to her to be subject to innumerable indignities. Suicide, by contrast, seems to offer the subjective restoration of her former sense of omnipotence. Above all, what Antony and Cleopatra both alike hope to escape by committing suicide is the possibility of

being exposed to moral judgement. To be led in triumph through Rome, or to see themselves mocked on stage represents for them an intolerable instance of the process that I call 'interpellation', in which the other forces the self to revise its own self-image, despite its efforts to resist that alteration. Caesar would extend his victory from the objective world of fact inwards, into the subjective realm of self-perception.

In order to forestall this possibility, both Antony and Cleopatra turn to the expedient of suicide. As long as they do not let themselves see themselves being seen by others as defeated, they believe they can preserve their sense of themselves as finally victorious. Suicide forestalls being exposed to the critics that they know they will encounter, if they are ever taken alive to Rome. Instead, the two lovers carefully limit their audience to people whom they trust to see them as they wish to be seen. This tactic of limiting exposure to shame by recourse to what I will call here 'audience management', as opposed to 'event management', also appears in Seneca's advice to aspiring Stoic philosophers. Like Roman suicide, Roman 'philosophy' such as Brutus' is a performance for a sympathetic coterie. Cleopatra's performance of her own death, as if she were again arriving to meet Antony on the banks of the river Cydnus, illuminates this theatrical quality of Senecan Stoicism. The histrionic nature of the quintessential 'noble Roman', Brutus, appears in a more obvious, exaggerated form as the efforts of an Egyptian queen to preserve her sense of herself as akin to a goddess, Venus. Both characters want to see themselves as exemplars of glamorous autonomy: the liberty of the Roman patrician; or, in Cleopatra's case, the licence, luxury and imperious autocracy of the Eastern potentate. They can identify with these godlike ideal selves, however, if and only if they can persuade their audience that these personae are in fact who they really are.

For Shakespeare's Romans, the simplest and most immediate reason for committing suicide is to thwart an opponent. By robbing an enemy of something he desires, even if only the opportunity to gloat, the defeated protagonist demonstrates a final, contrarian agency. For instance, Plutarch reports that when Julius Caesar heard of Cato's suicide, he saw it as a blow to his glory, since it robbed him of a chance to appear magnanimous. 'O Cato, I begrudge thee thy death; for thou didst begrudge me the sparing of thy life.'⁵³ From this reply, St Augustine concludes that Cato's suicide, rightly

understood, was an act of envy. Cato 'envied' Caesar 'the glory of pardoning him (as indeed Caesar himself is reported to have said); or if envy is too strong a word, let us say he was ashamed that this glory should be his.'⁵⁴ When Shakespeare's Cleopatra tries to kill herself, her Roman guard Proculeius protests, 'Cleopatra, / Do not abuse my master's bounty by / Th'undoing of yourself' (5.2.41-3). So also in Daniel's version, Proculeius laments:

Ah *Cleopatra*, why shouldst thou, (said I)
Both injurie thy selfe and *Caesar* so?
Barre him the honour of his victorie,
Who ever deales most mildly with his foe?

(303-6)

Suicide is a kind of sabotage, like that committed by a kamikaze pilot. It prevents the antagonist from being able to display his otherwise-superior power, and that outcome is seen as desirable, at whatever cost; even if that power might have been used to pardon. 'Tis sweet to die when we are forced to live' (74), says Daniel's Cleopatra. In Shakespeare's version, Proculeius, trying to calm Cleopatra, seems not to realise that he is only exacerbating her frenzy to escape. 'Let the world see / His nobleness well acted, which your death / Will never let come forth' (5.2.43-5). To act 'his nobleness', not her own: that is what Cleopatra refuses to accept, no matter how comfortable the terms. She sets up an alternative performance of our own, one that she herself can choreograph, precisely to replace and prevent the one that Caesar has in mind.

Above all, suicide forestalls the possibility of being led in triumph. Antony takes satisfaction in the fact that 'Not Caesar's valor hath o'erthrown Antony, / But Antony's hath triumphed on itself' (4.15.15-16). When Antony asks Eros to kill him, he reassures him, 'Thou strik'st not me; 'tis Caesar thou defeat'st' (4.14.69). Likewise, Cleopatra maintains, Antony's wife, Octavia, 'with her modest eyes, / And still conclusion, shall acquire no honour / Demuring upon me': 'If knife, drugs, serpents, have / Edge, sting, or operation, I am safe' (4.15.26-30). A more thorough explanation of these characters' suicide would require some investigation, however, of the extraordinary distress that they feel at the thought of being led in triumph. The ground of such an

explanation, I propose, is a feature of human existence that these characters instinctively discern and fear: the power of the other to interpellate the self.

The concept of interpellation is associated with Althusser, who uses it to explain what he sees as the relationship between 'ideology' and the individual:

Ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or 'transforms' the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called *interpellation* or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you there!'⁵⁵

The metaphor is familiar, and for that reason useful here, although it makes more sense in this case to assign it a different tenor. What Althusser imagines an impersonal force, 'ideology', doing to individuals, Shakespeare sees individuals incessantly doing to each other. Each individual consciousness is at once active and passive, interpellating others and being interpellated in turn, like eyes reflecting other eyes. Such interpellation can be resisted, but not entirely. In the perpetual negotiation with the other over self-perception that I have described, at times a peaceful collaboration, but at other times a violent conflict, a triumph is the nuclear option, penetrating even the most hardened, wilfully solipsistic, self-enclosed self-consciousness. Only one escape seems to remain: pre-emptive suicide.

The relationship between triumph and suicide Shakespeare explores in *Antony and Cleopatra* elaborates upon a germinal version of the connection that he found in Daniel's *Cleopatra*. There, in her opening monologue, Cleopatra spends some time reflecting on the particular horror of being 'seene' as powerless, and its incompatibility with her own understanding of her 'selfe':

Thinke *Caesar*, I that liv'd and reign'd a Queene
Doe scorne to buy my life at such a rate,
That I should underneath my selfe be seene,
Basely induring to survive my state:
That Rome should see my scepter-bearing hands
Behind me bound, and glory in my teares,
That I should passe whereas *Octavia* stands,
To view my miserie that purchas'd hers.

Shakespeare's Cleopatra replies to Proculeius:

Know, sir, that I
Will not wait pinioned at your master's court,
Nor once be chastis'd with the sober eye
Of dull Octavia. Shall they hoist me up
And show me to the shouting varletry
Of censuring Rome? Rather a ditch in Egypt
Be gentle grave unto me!

(5.2.51-7)

The images here of being pinioned and hoisted aptly convey the powerlessness, the sense of being transformed into object, which Cleopatra hopes to escape. As before, she emphasises the gaze: Octavia's 'sober eye' seconds the image of her 'modest eye', earlier, in Cleopatra's conversation with Antony. Cleopatra's stated preference to stay in Egypt, under whatever circumstances, further clarifies the nature of her distress. It is not simply public exposure that is the problem, but the attitude of that public, hostile or friendly. 'Rather make / My country's high pyramids my gibbet / And hang me up in chains!' (5.2.59-61). If she must perforce undergo some sort of public humiliation, Cleopatra would rather that it happen in Egypt, because she believes that she will find there a more sympathetic audience. The Egyptian peasants would be respectful, deferential, or so she seems to imagine, not 'shouting' or 'censuring' as they would be in Rome.

In more general terms, however, Cleopatra is no great admirer of the working class. She associates them with being acted upon, that is, the state of passibility matter itself represents. *Antony and Cleopatra* opens with Antony denouncing 'kingdoms' as 'clay' and the 'earth' as 'dungy', feeding alike both 'beast and man' (1.1.36-7). 'The nobleness of life', he proclaims, is in contrast 'to do thus' (1.1.37-8), presumably, embracing or kissing Cleopatra. What is 'noble' is to escape from the restrictions upon the self that matter imposes into an alternative, mutually sustained fantasy world of infinite, godlike splendor: 'new heaven, new earth.' Antony dead, Cleopatra finds herself brought back down, however, to 'this dull world', which she now sees as 'no better than a sty' (4.15.63-4): 'the dung', she calls it, which is both 'the beggar's nurse and Caesar's' (5.2.7-8). Cleopatra is often interpreted as a voluptuary, and for most the play she is. What we see here, however, is a

reversal of that perspective: a marked disdain for matter, once it is no longer under her control.

Cleopatra's retreat from materiality appears later, as well, in a conversation with her chambermaid Iras, as they discuss Dolabella's report that Caesar intends to send them to Rome. 'Now, Iras, what think'st thou?' (5.2.206) she asks:

Thou an Egyptian puppet shall be shown
In Rome as well as I. Mechanic slaves
With greasy aprons, rules and hammers shall
Uplift us to the view.

(5.2.207–10)

'Puppet' here recalls 'pinioned', earlier, and 'uplift', 'hoist'; the point is that Cleopatra and Iras will no longer be autonomous centres of agency, but instead acted upon from without, like blocks of wood – or like victims of a crucifixion. 'Slaves' reinforces the idea of a loss of 'liberty'. 'Rules and hammers' echoes Antony's vow to Octavia, just after their marriage: 'I have not kept my square, but that to come / Shall all be done by th' rule' (2.3.6–7). Cleopatra's reference to such 'mechanic' tools, 'rules and hammers', in so far as it recalls Antony's 'rule' and 'square', reveals her fear of being subjected to either form of constraint, the moral ('patience', 'temperance') as well as the material ('pinioned').

The other underlying strain in Cleopatra's portrait of the Roman people is disgust at the basic fact of human embodiment. The description of the plebeians' aprons as 'greasy', for example, recalls her earlier description of the entire 'world' as a 'sty'. Cleopatra continues, to Iras' horror: 'In their thick breaths, / Rank of gross diet, shall we be enclouded / And forced to drink their vapour' (5.2.210–12). Cleopatra's disdain for people of Rome, forced, as she sees them, by their poverty to do 'mechanic' labour, their breath 'thick' with the stink of 'gross diet', is itself inspired by a reaction against the nature of matter itself as acted upon, rather than agent. As imprisonment, like old age, can make all too painfully clear, the body itself is a curb upon the autonomy of the will, more often than it is its uncomplaining instrument.

Cleopatra's desire to escape the 'dung' of 'this dull world', once it is no longer hers to command, a disgust that she projects on to symbols of embodiment, is not far afield from Hamlet's wish that his 'flesh' would 'melt, / Thaw and resolve itself into a dew'

(1.2.129–30). Hamlet is not simply or solely Puritanical here; his revulsion at the flesh is the obverse of his desire to escape from what he sees as a kind of prison. The Neoplatonic, Gnostic fantasy of becoming pure soul, bodiless, is misunderstood if conceived of as mere priggery. *In extremis*, a desire to escape being ‘flesh and blood’ can also be interpreted as a manifestation of the aristocrat’s characteristic desire for liberty at whatever price, even death: the characteristic effort of the ‘noble Roman’ to transcend passibility itself.

The climax of Cleopatra’s speech on the horrifying indignities that await her and Iras in Rome is the prospect of being mocked on stage.

The quick comedians
Extemporally will stage us and present
Our Alexandrian revels; Antony
Will be brought drunken forth; and I shall see
Some squeaking Cleopatra boy my greatness
I’th’ posture of a whore.

(5.2.215–20)

‘Extemporally’: the ‘quick’ comedians now, not Cleopatra, will be the ones with the power to be spontaneous, to act upon a whim, independent of that ‘time’ (*ex tempore*) that I have described already as her enemy. Not only that, but worse, they will redefine as low, mundane and reprehensible (‘drunken’, ‘squeaking’, ‘whore’) those moments, ‘our Alexandrian revels’, which for Cleopatra were the height of her ‘greatness’: Antony at her beck and call, amid all the riches of Egypt. Finally, worst of all, Cleopatra will be forced to ‘see’ all this herself; she will be among the audience. Iras, in response, proposes a solution. ‘I’ll never see’t, for I am sure my nails / Are stronger than mine eyes!’ (5.2.222–3). The suggestion is characteristic of Cleopatra and her court. Iras’ proposal to blind herself echoes Cleopatra’s threat to ‘spurn’ the ‘eyes’ of the messenger who brings her news of Antony’s marriage; physical mutilation is a physical analogue of Cleopatra’s wilful, self-imposed blindness throughout to the limits on her own power, as well as Antony’s. Her and her chambermaids’ response to a loss of power is, in general, denial. If the relational process of self-perception starts to tip towards a loss of prestige, they opt out; metaphorically speaking, they rip out their own eyes, like Oedipus.

Understood as a means to an end, suicide is not inconsistent with Cleopatra's character, a sudden outbreak of unwonted Roman Stoicism, but instead the culmination of a lifelong tendency towards wilful obliviousness. Hence the subtitle of this section: 'Suicide as Audience Management'. In this play, one way of dealing with humiliation, the Roman way, is what I would call 'event management': to strive to change the external world, so that that humiliation dissipates. The quintessential Roman, once checked or slighted in some way, becomes aggressive, like Coriolanus. Taking up arms, he aims to acquire compensatory power 'out there', outside his own imagination, as Octavian does, for example, in his relentless rivalry with the other triumvirs. Another way of dealing with humiliation, however, the Egyptian way, is what I would call 'audience management': to limit exposure to the other to a carefully selected, sympathetic audience, so that the humiliation in question can be successfully denied. As I proposed earlier, Rome in this play represents the objective expression of *libido dominandi*, whereas Egypt represents its inward involution. That turn to the subjective cannot be accomplished in isolation, however. It requires collaboration, like that which can be found in a romantic relationship.

The other can conceivably serve as a catalyst for the recognition of the truth. But exposure to the other can also be finessed. Contrarian voices can be suborned; pressed into the service of some pleasing falsehood. Intransigent naysayers can be dismissed. Yes-men can be promoted. This kind of cultivation of a coterie audience is not alien to Roman Stoicism, but in fact deeply woven into its working structure. Considered as an abstraction, the Stoic wise man should, of course, be indifferent to the opinion of others. In practice, however, Stoicism, like Cleopatra's suicide, is a performance for an elite audience, a small group of fellow sages who are 'in the know'. A. D. Nuttall sees in Shakespeare's Brutus 'a conscious Stoic', performing 'an aggregate of intellectual and social postures'.⁵⁶ His behaviour is theatrical, performative, like that of Richard II; he is trying to convince an audience, and thereby, indirectly, himself, that he really is what in fact he is only pretending to be.

For whom, exactly, is Brutus performing? Who is the Stoic's audience? In his *Letters*, Seneca urges Lucilius not to seek approval from the masses, like too many of the other self-proclaimed

‘philosophers’ of his time. ‘Hucksters’, he calls them (*circulatores*, lit. ‘mountebanks, travelling showmen’). ‘For what is baser than philosophy courting applause?’ ‘Scorn the pleasure which comes from the applause of the majority.’ Seneca recognises, however, that the strenuous effort involved in the actual practice of Stoicism, especially early on, cannot be sustained without some sort of audience, whose approval the Stoic hopes to win. ‘While it is not yet safe to withdraw into solitude, seek out certain individuals; for everyone is better off in the company of someone or other – no matter whom – than in his own company alone.’ Better anyone than no one: ‘I am content only if you act, in whatever you do, as you would act if anyone at all were looking on, because solitude prompts us to all kinds of evil.’ Seneca would prefer, however, that Lucilius associate with ‘good men’. ‘Nothing is more successful in bringing honourable influences to bear upon the mind or in straightening out the wavering spirit that is prone to evil than association with good men.’⁵⁷

Seneca advises Lucilius, the would-be Stoic, to seek approval for his actions from what could be described as an audience of ever-increasing interiority.⁵⁸ ‘Withdraw into yourself as far as you can. Associate with those who will make a better man of you.’ He urges Lucilius to retreat from the population at large to the confines of a small coterie; even to the tutelage of a single mentor. ‘We should . . . have a guardian to pluck us continually by the ear and dispel rumors and protest against popular enthusiasms.’ It is ‘indispensable’, he says, ‘that we have some advocate with upright mind and, amid all the uproar and jangle of falsehood, hear one voice only’ (94.59). Ideally, Lucilius would live among the philosophers themselves that he admires and attempt to win their approval by imitating their day-to-day life. ‘The living voice and intimacy of a common life will help you more than the written word.’⁵⁹

Seneca then imagines Lucilius’ reply. “‘Whom,” you say, “shall I call upon? Shall it be this man or that?” There is another choice also open to you; you may go to the ancients; for they have the time to help you. We can get assistance not only from the living, but also from those of the past.’ If the Stoic tyro cannot find wise men among the living, then he should imagine that he is performing for some great man from the past. ‘Choose a master whose life, conversation and soul-expressing face have satisfied you; picture

him always to yourself as your protector or your pattern.’ ‘Choose . . . Cato, or if Cato seems too severe, choose some Laelius, a gentler spirit.’ ‘Set as a guard over yourself the authority of some man, whether your choice be the great Cato, or Scipio, or Laelius.’⁶⁰ For Shakespeare’s Brutus, this watchful model seems to be chiefly his ancestor Lucius Junius Brutus. Cassius tells Cinna, for example, to be sure to post a letter urging Brutus to oppose Caesar ‘upon old Brutus’ statue’ (1.3.146).

For Seneca, which master, exactly, the aspiring Stoic sage chooses as his mentor is not terribly important: what is important is that he imagine an audience of some sort, and that this audience be limited to those who would approve of Stoicism. ‘Live as you would live under the eyes of some good man, always at your side.’ ‘Live with the Catos, with Laelius, with Tubero. Or, if you enjoy living with the Greeks also, spend your time with Socrates and with Zeno . . . Live with Chrysippus, with Posidonius: . . . they will bid you be stout of heart and rise superior to your threats.’ The ultimate ideal, however, is one of unfettered self-sufficiency, in which even this imaginary audience of wise men from the past becomes unnecessary. Ideally, the Stoic *sapiens* is his own audience; he performs for himself and needs no one’s respect or approval other than his own. ‘You are engaged in making yourself the sort of person in whose company you would not dare to sin . . . When you have progressed so far that you . . . have respect for yourself, you may send away your attendant.’ ‘Be your own spectator; seek your own applause.’⁶¹

In *Antony and Cleopatra*, Shakespeare recreates this kind of ‘audience management’, but divorces it from what might be called the ‘usual suspects’: severe Roman Republican *optimates* such as Cato and Brutus. Instead, we have their polar opposites, Cleopatra and her court, performing the characteristic withdrawal from the world Seneca so strongly advocates. Alone together in the end in an isolated monument, Cleopatra and her court cultivate a coterie audience, themselves, so as to protect their imperiled self-esteem. It may seem startling to say so, but the scene recalls, in a sense, the death of Socrates, or of Seneca himself: the philosopher facing death in the company of a few select disciples. ‘Adopting high-Stoic rhetoric of resolute suicide,’ Eric Langley observes, ‘Cleopatra successfully unifies the Roman and Egyptian, bringing both models together in a single act.’⁶²

When Cleopatra appropriates buzzwords of Stoic rhetoric such as ‘liberty’ and ‘constancy’, Shakespeare drives a point home that he had already begun to make more subtly in *Julius Caesar*. The point is not that Cleopatra, posing as a Stoic, is an emblem of hypocrisy, but rather that Stoicism itself, like Cleopatra, is inherently a species of ‘hypocrisy’ (Greek, *hypocrisis*, literally ‘play-acting, role-playing’). The Stoic is just as histrionic as the Egyptian queen; he just happens to be playing a different role, for a different audience. Cleopatra takes refuge in the thought of Antony; so also the Stoic novice, in imagining the approval of some great man from the past. So, too, St Augustine, contemplating how he will stand before God. Safe in the thought of one person’s approval, they are each able, to a surprising extent, to disregard all others. Clifford Ronan sees this aspect of Stoicism as especially pronounced in early modern English depictions of Stoic suicide. ‘The element of pose and display in ancient Stoicism is strongly reflected in the Renaissance stage treatment of suicidal constancy, where there is only a fine line between heroism and heroics.’⁶³

Having lost Antony, facing the imminent prospect of being led in triumph, Shakespeare’s Cleopatra, like Brutus before her, knows that she must take pre-emptive action. Otherwise, she will be forced to suffer an irresistible interpellation; she will find herself redefined, even to herself, as less than absolute mistress of herself. Antony faces the same predicament earlier, when he comes to believe that Cleopatra is dead. Like Cleopatra addressing Iras, imagining herself being parodied on-stage, Antony explains to his manservant, Eros, ‘th’inevitable prosecution of / Disgrace and horror’ (4.14.66–7) which he foresees, if he should live.

Wouldst thou be windowed in great Rome and see
Thy master thus with pleached arms, bending down
His corrigible neck, his face subdued
To penetrative shame, whilst the wheeled seat
Of fortunate Caesar, drawn before him, branded
His baseness that ensued?

(4.14.73–8)

‘I would not see’t’ (4.14.78), Eros replies, foreshadowing Iras’ more dramatic vow that she would rather tear out her own eyes. Eros also blinds himself, in a sense, but by a different means: suicide. ‘Thus’, he says, ‘do I escape the sorrow / Of Antony’s death’

(4.14.95–6). Even in the absence of stage directions, it is fairly clear that Antony in some sense enacts the scene he describes: ‘thy master thus [etc.]’, he says. In ‘bending down’ to await the death blow that he expects from Eros, he foreshadows what it would look like if he were led in triumph; by turning from him, he shows what Eros himself is doing by committing suicide: averting his eyes. Eros’ sense of himself, like Cleopatra’s, is so tightly bound to Antony’s that he cannot bear to live, if he must first see his master either dead or defeated; it would be an intolerable humiliation for him, as well, by association. As Ewan Fernie explains, ‘the subject of shame may be ashamed of itself directly or because of others upon whom its honour depends.’⁶⁴ Suicide allows Eros to escape the shame that Enobarbus, too, finds intolerable; the ignominy of seeing the source, if only by proxy, of his own sense of self, his master, rendered powerless.

Although distraught over Antony’s death, Cleopatra aims for more, however, than merely ending her own ability to perceive. She wants to change the narrative, so that she can see herself as once again the powerful queen she once was. As if to replace even the prospect in the mind of possibly being led in triumph, a kind of involuntary theatre, Cleopatra sets up her suicide as a stage-show of her own design, one in which she will be again, if only in her own imagination, as she was at the moment of her own greatest triumph, her first meeting with Mark Antony on the banks of the river Cydnus. ‘Show me, my women, like a queen’ (5.2.226), she says. ‘Go fetch / My best attires. I am again for Cydnus / To meet Mark Antony’ (5.2.226–8). ‘Bring our crown and all’ (5.2.231), she adds, a moment after. Then, once the asp arrives: ‘Give me my robe. Put on my crown’ (5.2.279). ‘I have immortal longings in me,’ she reveals (5.2.279–80). She is dreaming of the afterlife, one in which, she believes, such finery will be appropriate.

Immediately following Antony’s death, Cleopatra’s first response is to lament how empty the world seems without him. ‘All’s but naught’ (4.15.82), she says. Now, however, she sees a way out of her ‘desolation’: ‘a better life’ (5.2.1). She will meet Antony in the afterlife, and they will live there again as lovers, as before, scoffing at their enemies; praising each other; even enjoying each other’s embrace. ‘Methinks I hear / Antony call’ (5.2.282–3), she tells Iras. ‘I see him rouse himself / To praise my noble act. I hear him

mock / The luck of Caesar' (5.2.283–5). When Iras dies first, Cleopatra makes haste to join her. 'If she first meet the curled Antony, / He'll make demand of her, and spend that kiss / Which is my heaven to have' (5.2.300–2). 'Husband, I come!' she cries (5.2.286). Cleopatra's language echoes Antony's own, earlier, as he prepares to kill himself, believing that Cleopatra has already gone on ahead. 'I come, my queen,' he says. 'Stay for me' (4.14.51).

Where souls do couch on flowers we'll hand in hand
And with our sprightly port make the ghosts gaze,
Dido and her Aeneas shall want troops,
And all the haunt be ours.

(4.14.52–5)

Like Cleopatra's play within a play, 'again for Cydnus', the after-life becomes here in Antony's imagination the opposite of the triumph that he fears. In the next world, he and Cleopatra will draw all eyes upon them, as Cleopatra did upon her arrival at his camp; they will be objects of admiration, however, not scorn, as they would be now, if they arrived in Rome as captives of Octavian. They will have 'troops', as they now no longer do; they will be masters of the next world, 'all the haunt', as they now can no longer hope to be in this one. They may even enjoy the pleasures of sexual relations: 'couch' is suggestive, as are the two lovers' separate descriptions of their deaths. Cleopatra compares the asp's bite to 'a lover's pinch'. Antony compares his suicide to a wedding night: 'I will be / A bridegroom in my death and run into't / As to a lover's bed' (4.14.100–2).

Notes

1. For scholarship on Shakespeare and judgement since Adelman, see now also Curran, ed., *Shakespeare and Judgment*.
2. Adelman, *Common Liar*, 24, 31, 39.
3. Barton, "'Nature's piece 'gainst fancy'", 47; Adelman, *Common Liar*, 39.
4. Adelman, *Common Liar*, 27, 29.
5. On the relative unimportance of material or 'objective' alienation in Shakespeare's thought about political unrest, as vs. 'subjective', see Patrick Gray and Samely, 'Shakespeare and Henri Lefebvre'.
6. Bartsch, *Mirror of the Self*, 138.

7. N. K. Sugimura compares 'Shakespeare's cloud passage' in *Antony and Cleopatra* to 'an Existentialist Crisis straight out of modern literature' and Stoicism more generally to Sartre's existentialism in Sugimura, 'Two Concepts of Reality', 73 ff.
8. For more detailed discussion of the history of the philosophy of recognition, beginning with Fichte as well as Hegel and continuing to the present, see Williams' three studies *Recognition*, *Hegel's Ethics and Tragedy*, *Recognition, and the Death of God*.
9. See Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, and Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*.
10. See Ricœur, *Course of Recognition*.
11. The words 'marketplace' and 'common' occur much more frequently in *Coriolanus* than in any other play by Shakespeare. For 'marketplace', for example, cf. 1.5.26, 2.1.231, 2.2.159, 3.1.29, 3.1.111, 3.2.93, 104, 131. On 'common', see Watson, 'Coriolanus and the "Common Part"'.
 12. Patterson, *Shakespeare and the Popular Voice*, 127; cf. also Barton, 'Livy, Machiavelli, and Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*'.
13. Kuzner, *Open Subjects*, 93.
14. Fukuyama, *End of History*, 174, 177, 165.
15. Sartre's conclusion in his play *No Exit*.
16. See Fiasse, *L'Autre et l'amitié*. For Aristotle's own thought on friendship, see Pangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship*.
17. Cic. *Amic.* 21.80.
18. Tilmouth, 'Passion and Intersubjectivity', 19 n. 30; cf. 19–20 and Selleck, *Interpersonal Idiom*, 92–5. See also Christopher Tilmouth, *Passion's Triumph*, 151–6.
19. Engle, *Shakespearean Pragmatism*, 151.
20. Plut. *De cohibenda ira* 456b; cf. Sen., *De ira* 2.36.1–2; cited in Bartsch, *Mirror of the Self*, 22. See Bartsch, *Mirror of the Self*, 22–3, for additional, analogous examples of the mirror as moral instrument, drawn from authors such as Diogenes Laertius, Apuleius and Ovid.
21. Jean-Pierre Vernant, 'In the Mirror of Medusa', 142, in *Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays by Jean-Pierre Vernant*, ed. Froma I. Zeitlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 141–50; cited in Bartsch, *Mirror of the Self*, 23, and Langley, *Suicide and Narcissism*, 144.
22. Mikhail Bakhtin, 'Toward a Reworking of the Dostoyevsky Book (1961)', 287.
23. *Ibid.*, 286; cf. 301 n. 6. 'Dostoyevsky "only projected the landscape of his own soul"': Bakhtin cites here Lettenbauer, *Russische Literaturgeschichte*, 250.
24. Coleridge, *Coleridge on Shakespeare*, 78.
25. Coleridge, *Coleridge's Criticism of Shakespeare*, 46.

26. Bakhtin, 'Reworking', 287-9.
27. For a detailed history of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century source-hunting for Shakespeare's 'strange fellow', see Baldwin, 'Strange fellow'; cf. also Richards, *Troilus and Cressida* and Plato'.
28. First proposed by Richard Grant White, *Studies in Shakespeare* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1886), 298-9; cited in Baldwin, 'Strange fellow', 411.
29. Steven Forde, 'On the Alcibiades I', in *The Roots of Political Philosophy*, ed. Thomas L. Pangle (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 222; cited in Bartsch, *Mirror of the Self*, 41. Cf. Langley, *Narcissism and Suicide*, 143-4, as well as Bartsch, *Mirror of the Self*, 41-56, and Gill, *Structured Self*, 344-59.
30. Plato, *First Alcibiades*, sec. 133, pp. 552-3.
31. First observed by H. R. D. Anders, *Shakespeare's Books* (Berlin: Schriften der deutschen Shakespeare-Gesellschaft Band I, 1904), 276-8; cited in Baldwin, 'Strange fellow', 411. Plato, *First Alcibiades*, sec. 133, pp. 552-3.
32. Cicero, *Those fyve Questions which M. Tullye Cicero disputed in his manor of Tusculum*. . . 1561, trans. J. Dolman (sig. E6 v) [cf. 1.27.67]; cited in Baldwin, 'Strange Fellow', 412.
33. Bartsch, *Mirror of the Self*, 52.
34. William Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*, ed. K. Deighton (London: Methuen, 1906); cf. commentary on 3.3.102 ff.
35. Sir John Davies, *Nosce Teipsum* (London: Richard Field, for John Standish, 1599), 5, 9; mentioned but not cited in Baldwin, 'Strange Fellow', 412.
36. James Joyce, *Ulysses* (New York: Random House, 1961), 211-12.
37. Gifford, *Ulysses Annotated*, 248; cf. Thornton, *Allusions in Ulysses*, 210.
38. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, sec. 1.3, p. 3.
39. Elton, 'Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*'.
40. Gill, *Structured Self*, 356.
41. For an overview of arguments for and against Aristotle as author of the *Magna moralia*, see Cooper, 'The *Magna Moralia*'.
42. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*, 364; cf. Bartsch, *Mirror of the Self*, 52-3, as well as Langley, *Narcissism and Suicide*, 52.
43. Cicero takes up this debate about the possibility and desirability of self-sufficiency in *Off*. 1.153-60 and 2.39.
44. Arist. *Mag. mor.* 2.15. For further analysis of this problem and this passage in the context of Aristotle's other works, as well as Plato's *First Alcibiades*, see Sorabji, *Self*, 230-9.
45. Arist. *Mag. mor.* 7.12; cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 8.4.
46. Bartsch, *Mirror of the Self*, 17.

47. Engle, *Shakespeare's Pragmatism*, 1.
48. See, for example, Beacham, *Roman Theatre*.
49. Arist. *Mag. mor.* 2.15.
50. Cic. *Off.* 1.146.
51. *Non illum Cereris, non illum cura quietis / abstrahere inde potest.*
(‘Concern for neither food nor rest can draw him from thence.’)
Ov., *Met.* 3.435–6. Cf. Golding: ‘No care of meate could draw him
thence, nor yet desire of rest’ (3.549).
52. Bakhtin, ‘Reworking’, 287–8.
53. Plut. *Cat. Mi.* 72.
54. August. *De civ. D.* 1.24.
55. Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State’, 174.
56. Nuttall, *New Mimesis*, 102; cf. Nuttall, *Shakespeare the Thinker*,
178.
57. Sen. *Ep.* 52.9, 7.12, 25.7, 25.5, 94.40.
58. For further analysis of Seneca’s efforts at what I call ‘audience
management’, see Bartsch, *Mirror of the Self*, 192 ff.
59. Sen. *Ep.* 7.8, 94.55, 94.59, 6.5.
60. *Ibid.*, 52.7–8, 11.9–10, 25.6.
61. *Ibid.*, 25.5, 104.22, 25.6, 78.21.
62. Langley, *Narcissism and Suicide*, 188.
63. Ronan, ‘*Antike Roman*’, 94.
64. Fernie, *Shame in Shakespeare*, 12.