INTRODUCTION: SHAKESPEARE AND THE VULNERABLE SELF

> *It would generally be a decisive refutation of a moral philosophy to show that moral agency on its own account of the matter could never be socially embodied; and it also follows that we have not yet fully understood the claims of any moral philosophy until we have spelled out what its social embodiment would be.*
>
> Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*[1]

The central claim of this study is that Shakespeare is deeply sceptical of neoclassical as well as classical glorification of the kind of personal autonomy Seneca describes as 'constancy'. Shakespeare sees this pursuit of individual invulnerability, not only as a defining feature of Roman culture, but also as the most fundamental cause of the fall of the Roman Republic. The tragic protagonists of his Roman plays strive to transcend the limits of their own physical bodies, as well as their susceptibility to passions such as pity, grief and fear, and instead come crashing back down to earth. The 'frailty' that they hope to escape proves instead an intransigent given of the human condition. Unsuccessful efforts to achieve what Hannah Arendt calls 'sovereignty' backfire politically, as well.[2] The untrammelled freedom from dependence on all others that Shakespeare's Romans idealise leaves no room for power-sharing between political rivals or for compromise across social classes, but instead leads them inexorably towards violence and, finally, civil war. As a thought-experiment, Shakespeare's Roman plays provide a prescient critique of the vision of the good that animates present-day political liberalism, the ethical ideal Quentin Skinner calls 'neo-Roman liberty'.[3]

For Peter Holbrook, 'Shakespeare's poetic personality is deeply wedded to one particular value: individual freedom.' 'More than any other pre-Romantic writer,' Holbrook argues, 'Shakespeare is committed to fundamentally modern values: freedom, individuality, self-realization, authenticity.'[4] For Ewan Fernie, as well, 'freedom' is 'a supreme Shakespearean value'. 'But what is freedom,' he asks, 'and what does it mean to invoke it as a surpassing value in Shakespeare?' 'Shakespearean drama doesn't give us a smug and sentimental liberalism.' Fernie sees an analogy between 'the politics of Shakespearean form' and 'the classic statement of liberalism', John Stuart Mill's treatise *On Liberty*, in which Mill speaks of 'a *necessary* tension between individual freedom and social flourishing'. 'The Shakespearean struggle for freedom foretells the great political passion of modernity, amounting to a serial and probing experiment in liberal democracy *avant la lettre*.'[5]

In his 'Idea for a Universal History', Kant introduces the counterintuitive claim that 'the cause of lawful order among men' is not any kind of fellow-feeling, but instead our 'antagonism', arising out of what he calls our 'unsocial sociability'. 'Man has an inclination to associate with others,' Kant observes. 'But he also has a strong propensity to isolate himself from others, because he finds in himself at the same time the unsocial characteristic of wishing to have everything go according to his own wish.' Each of us is 'propelled by vainglory, lust for power, and avarice' to achieve 'a rank among his fellows whom he cannot tolerate but from whom he cannot withdraw'. Such dissatisfaction might seem like a species of damnation. Yet, as Kant sees it, this incessant 'opposition' is salutary. 'Thanks be to Nature', he proclaims, 'for heartless competitive vanity, for the insatiable desire to possess and to rule!' 'Thus are taken the first true steps from barbarism to culture.' If human beings were not so competitive, Kant maintains, 'all talents would remain hidden, unborn in an Arcadian shepherd's life, with all its concord, contentment, and mutual affection'.[6]

Shakespeare's Roman plays very precisely contradict Kant's just-so story here of the development of civilization. As Fernie observes, 'Shakespeare is aware of how readily freedom degenerates into a violent free-for-all: a "universal wolf" that will devour everything, including itself.'[7] In his Roman plays, Shakespeare asks what kind of moral character is necessary in order for a republic or, as Fernie says, 'liberal democracy' to function. And Shakespeare's answer

is that the Christian virtue of what he calls 'pity' is what binds civil society together, rather than the pagan virtue of what he calls 'ambition'. To explain Shakespeare's sense of what goes wrong in Rome, I draw here on St Augustine's concept of *libido dominandi*, a precursor of the 'insatiable desire to possess and to rule' that Kant defends as 'unsocial sociability' and that Nietzsche later heralds as 'the will to power'. In Shakespeare's Roman plays, as in St Augustine's *City of God*, this 'drive for dominance' proves what A. C. Bradley might identify as the 'tragic trait' of pagan Rome. Figures such as Caesar and Octavian refuse to rest content with anything less than total dominion, even at the cost of provoking civil war.

Fernie sees Shakespeare's plays as staging a struggle to align 'personal freedom' with 'social flourishing'. 'No-one is simply free, no-one simply his or her own.' Instead, 'there are tensions between subjective, familial, national, and larger political identifications as alternative spheres of freedom, and these are tensions which sometimes tear apart the lives of individuals, families, and nations.' How can such disparate interests be reconciled? For a philosophical analogue of this arbitration, Fernie turns to Hegel. Like Shakespeare, Hegel's 'aim', Fernie argues, is 'to marry personal freedom at its most realized and powerful with a more comprehensive and shareable politics of freedom'. The competition for dominance that Kant sees as the engine of civilisation is for Hegel a form of false consciousness, the so-called 'master–slave dialectic', leading to inequality through competitive coercion. 'Hegel's highest evocation of the life of freedom' is instead, as Fernie says, 'mutual recognition', enabling 'reciprocal flourishing'.[8] 'It is only with the release and liberation of the slave', Hegel writes, 'that the master also becomes fully free.' 'In this condition of universal freedom, in being reflected into myself, I am immediately reflected in the other person, and conversely, in relating myself to the other I am immediately related to myself.'[9]

As Francis Fukuyama helped to clarify in his account of 'the end of history', in the wake of the revolutions of 1989, as well as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, communism in effect passed away as what William James would call a 'live option'.[10] What we see now in its place, Patchen Markell suggests, is increasing interest among social and political theorists in Hegel's concept of 'recognition' (*Anerkennung*): 'a general shift away from a "politics of redistribution," focused on the satisfaction of interests and the

distribution of material goods, and toward a "politics of recognition," focused on securing equal respect and esteem for the diverse identities borne by members of pluralistic societies.'[11] One of the first to articulate this change in perspective was Charles Taylor. In an essay, 'The Politics of Recognition', which Markell singles out as 'catalytic', Taylor describes reciprocal recognition as a 'vital human need'. 'A person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.'[12] As Fukuyama observes, 'modern identity politics' now 'revolves around demands for recognition of group identities'.[13]

Is this change necessarily for the better? Peter Holbrook finds it unsettling to see 'group rights trumping the individual ones classical liberals defended'. 'We are enjoined to become ever more guarded and careful about language, images, practices that might offend *groups*, a recent landmark example being the controversy over the Danish Mohammed cartoons, in which the reluctance of many to defend free speech showed how far the West had retreated from liberal values.'[14] In his critique of 'the politics of recognition', Markell argues that the 'pursuit of recognition' characteristic of identity politics 'comes to be bound up with a certain sort of *misrecognition*', 'not the misrecognition of *identity*', but 'an even more fundamental *ontological* misrecognition, a failure to acknowledge the nature and circumstances of our own activity'. As an illustration of this problem, Markell turns to Sophocles' *Antigone*, and what he describes as 'tragedy's critique of the pursuit of sovereignty through recognition'. For Markell, Greek tragedy does not represent 'the tension between oneself as an individual and oneself as belonging to a larger community', but instead a more complex, 'cross-cutting' tension between 'the acknowledgment of the openness and contingency of human interaction on the one hand, and the denial of that openness and contingency on the other hand through the pursuit of recognition – either of oneself *qua* individual or of oneself *qua* community member, or both'.[15]

To help explain the danger he sees latent in 'the pursuit of recognition', Markell distinguishes between 'recognition', as Taylor and others use the term, and what Stanley Cavell describes in contrast as 'acknowledgment'. 'The source of relations of subordination lies not in the failure to recognize the identity of the other, but in the failure to acknowledge one's own basic situation and circumstances.' That

is to say, the primary problem with identity politics as it is usually pursued is not so much political resistance as it is the kind of identity that it presumes to exist and that it asks its adherents to demand each other recognise. It continues to invoke the 'sovereign self' that it ostensibly aims to displace. 'What's acknowledged in an act of acknowledgment is not one's own identity – at least, not as the politics of recognition conceives of identity: a coherent self-description that can serve as the ground of agency, guiding or determining what we are to do.' Instead, 'acknowledgment is directed at the basic conditions of one's own existence and activity, including, crucially, the *limits* of "identity" as a ground of action, limits which arise out of our constitutive vulnerability to the unpredictable reactions and responses of others.' Acknowledgment is, in brief, 'an avowal of one's own finitude'.[16]

For Markell, 'the fact of human freedom, which is the condition of possibility of effective agency, also limits our practical capabilities because it is not exclusively ours but is mirrored in others'.[17] Shakespeare's Romans are unwilling to acknowledge their participation in what Hannah Arendt calls 'plurality', however, because they are too desperate to be recognised as conforming to an ideal of absolute, unattainable individual 'freedom': what Arendt calls 'sovereignty'. As Arendt observes, 'sovereignty, the ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership, is contradictory to the very condition of plurality. No man can be sovereign because not one man, but men, inhabit the earth.' 'Untouchable integrity' could only be achieved, if it were possible, through 'arbitrary domination of all others' or 'as in Stoicism, the exchange of the real world for an imaginary one where these others would simply not exist'.[18]

In *Julius Caesar* and *Antony and Cleopatra*, Shakespeare shows how Romans' characteristic drive for dominance can turn inwards, especially in defeat. Examples include Brutus' retreat into philosophy, modelled on contemporary Neostoicism, as well as Antony's escape to the more sensuous pleasures of Egypt. Antony's withdrawal into a world of wine, women and 'fancy' evokes a fading, medieval ethos of aristocratic licence, as well as the contemporary world of the theatre. The most iconic instance of such involution, however, is the practice Cleopatra calls 'the high Roman fashion': suicide. Shakespeare's Romans' futile efforts to be recognised as absolute masters of themselves prove equally self-destructive throughout, whether in the public or in the private sphere. In their

unwillingness to acknowledge the profound vulnerability of the human condition, including especially what Arendt terms 'plurality', Shakespeare's Romans prefigure what Hegel calls the 'Unhappy Consciousness' of the modern individual, and which he associates with 'the Roman Empire, the seat of Stoic strength of mind', in which 'a man lives unto himself alone'.[19] The would-be solipsist is 'unhappy', Hegel explains, because he finds himself torn between a 'Stoic' sense of himself and himself alone as the source of meaning and experience and a refractory 'Sceptical' countercurrent of awareness that he remains subject, somehow, nonetheless, to forces and powers beyond his control.

The new individualism that emerged over the course of the Reformation, as well as the Renaissance, as Jacob Burckhardt suggests, and that came to the fore in the Enlightenment, epitomised by Kant, is deeply indebted to early modern Neostoicism such as that of Justus Lipsius, which itself is modelled on the thought of Seneca.[20] What Lipsius calls 'constancy', echoing Seneca, Kant appropriates, refines and exalts as 'autonomy'. Selfhood is identified with an immaterial faculty of the mind, independent of the body, the emotions or society at large. Its glory is precisely its 'freedom', understood as what Fernie calls 'self-sovereignty, self-possession'.[21] With Romanticism, this dissociation of the self from the world became even more pronounced. As Holbrook notes, 'The drive toward authenticity is not only a nineteenth-century or post-Romantic phenomenon. It has a classical and Renaissance dimension.'[22] Senecan Stoicism in particular, as Geoffrey Miles explains, carries with it an '"antinomian" implication that self-consistency is all that matters, and that each individual can define virtue itself'.[23] What was once understood as an objective moral order began to be seen instead as a subjective work of art, an opportunity for the expression of each individual will.

Classicist Christopher Gill describes the difference between classical and modern subjectivity in terms of a contrast between 'objective-participant' and 'subjective-individualist' concepts of personhood.[24] Charles Taylor calls the transition from one to the other the 'expressivist turn' and traces it back to the influence of Romanticism, a paradigm shift in the history of ethics which he sees as 'tremendously influential'. Shakespeare foreshadows this pervasive change in his Roman plays and calls it into question, anticipating later criticism of political liberalism. Shakespeare

enjoys a critical distance from this now-typical perspective which we today can find it difficult to recapture. 'Expressive individuation has become one of the cornerstones of modern culture,' Taylor notes, 'so much so that we barely notice it, and we find it hard to accept that it is such a recent idea in human history and would have been incomprehensible in earlier times.'[25] As David Bentley Hart observes, 'We live in an age whose chief moral value has been determined, by overwhelming consensus, to be the absolute liberty of personal volition, the power of each of us to choose what he or she believes, wants, needs, or must possess.' The result is an unparalleled sense of licence, at once enticing and vertiginous. 'Each of us who is true to the times stands facing not God, or the gods, or the Good beyond beings, but an abyss, over which presides the empty, inviolable authority of the individual will, whose impulses and decisions are their own moral index.'[26]

In his Roman plays, Shakespeare represents this deracinated concept of selfhood as a dangerous mistake. As Stephen Greenblatt suggests, Shakespeare was 'fascinated by the idea of autonomy'. Nonetheless, he concludes, 'Shakespeare doubted that it was possible for even the most fiercely determined human being to live as if he were the author of himself.' 'Autonomy in the strict sense is not a state available for any sentient creature.' Even the supposed 'aesthetic autonomy' of a work of art, such as Cleopatra aims for in her suicide, turns out to be compromised.[27] In this sense, Shakespeare more closely resembles critics of Romanticism and modernity such as T. S. Eliot, Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor than he does the German and British Romantics who cemented his fame and who strive to claim him as one of their own.[28] Shakespeare does indeed capture the beginning of the cultural turn Isaiah Berlin describes as 'the apotheosis of the Romantic will'.[29] But he portrays this embrace of solipsism as tragically misguided, rather than as moral progress.[30] The self-absorbed, quintessentially modern form of self-consciousness Charles Taylor calls 'radical reflexivity' and that Eric Langley finds adumbrated in Shakespeare's representation of narcissism and suicide may be dazzling on stage, in the person of characters such as Richard II and Falstaff, as well as Cleopatra, but it is not in the end, all things considered, a perspective on life Shakespeare himself idealises or sees as advisable.[31]

Drawing on Shakespeare's *Coriolanus* as a recurring point of comparison, I argue that Shakespeare presents the fall of the Roman Republic, not as a by-product of economic, social or political dysfunction, but instead as a consequence first and foremost of patrician misconceptions about human nature. Violent oscillation between autocracy and civil war is not the disease itself but a symptom, as Shakespeare sees it, of a deeper malady, an a priori misunderstanding of human selfhood. Since Roman noblemen see absolute, unquestioned command as the *summum bonum*, they approach politics as a zero-sum game. Any concession is a loss; any form of dependency is a dangerous, intolerable weakness. In this Hobbesian war of all against all, they see only two ways to attain the *imperium* they seek: either objective rule over others or a retreat from public affairs altogether, in order to focus instead on subjective self-control over their own experience. Shakespeare sees both of these expressions of *libido dominandi* as doomed to tragic failure. Neither the Stoic *sapiens* nor the emperor can escape the essential vulnerability of the human condition. Instead, human beings should be understood as intrinsically interdependent and intersubjective.

In his sense of the constraints on selfhood, Shakespeare does not go as far as twentieth-century antihumanists such as Foucault, Althusser and Lacan. Instead, his emphasis on human interaction more closely resembles the *via media* of authors such as MacIntyre, Taylor and Habermas. The individual is neither a disembodied, disinterested wisp of pure agency, nor altogether flattened out and overwhelmed by impersonal forces such as 'discourse', 'ideology' or 'language'. Instead, each person should be understood as both grounded in a community and at the same time capable of transformative action within that network. Bakhtin's literary criticism of Dostoyevsky and Rabelais provides a point of comparison. The individual is neither entirely determined, like a cog in a machine, nor wholly autonomous, like a god, but instead both passive and active, like a partner in a conversation.

In order to explain Shakespeare's theory of selfhood, as well as how it differs from that of his Roman characters, I introduce the theological concept of 'passibility', meaning, susceptibility to being acted-upon, as the defining difference between the human and the divine. For Shakespeare, the Roman ideal of impassibility is unattainable, the prerogative of God alone. His perspective in this sense

is closer to Christianity or to traditional Roman *pietas* than it is to contemporary Neostoicism. The individual is embedded from birth in a web of obligations and liabilities which can never be escaped altogether, even in death. Cicero's treatise *De officiis* ('On Duties') is the most influential classical articulation of this perspective, emphasizing our individual responsibility for each other. 'We are not born for ourselves alone,' Cicero insists. 'Our country claims for itself one part of our birth, and our friends another.'[32]

What exactly does our country claim from us, however, if anything? Would Shakespeare agree with Cicero that representative democracy, in the absence of a monarch, is the best form of government? In his influential study *Shakespeare and Republicanism*, Andrew Hadfield concedes it is 'unlikely' that Shakespeare was a 'convinced republican'. Nevertheless, republicanism 'set the political agenda in Shakespeare's England'; Shakespeare 'dealt with complex and troubling political – specifically, republican – issues, from the start of his career'. As examples of 'the sorts of issues which characterized political discussion in late sixteenth-century and early seventeen-century England', Hadfield provides a useful list: 'when one could resist a tyrant; whether hereditary monarchy was the best form of government; what were the effects of the rule of queens; who could and who should occupy political offices; how exactly the people at large should be represented by their rulers; and so on.'[33]

In their collection of essays, *Shakespeare and Early Modern Political Thought*, editors David Armitage, Conal Condren and Andrew Fitzmaurice, as well as contributors David Colclough and Eric Nelson, argue in sharp contrast to Hadfield that Shakespeare was surprisingly indifferent to such questions.[34] As the editors observe in their collective introduction, citing Hadfield, among others, 'Much of what has been written on Shakespeare and political thought has been devoted to the vexed issue of what kind of constitution he endorsed. While such questions are legitimate, there is an anachronistic element to the collective emphasis upon Shakespeare's constitutional loyalty.' Shakespeare, they argue, should be situated instead 'amid the fundamental political concerns of his contemporaries: that is, in the milieu of values rather than debates about constitutions'. 'What mattered was not any particular constitution but the patterns of conduct and value that should prevail.'[35]

As Eric Nelson explains, 'political thought in Shakespeare's Europe organized itself to a significant degree around the question of what constituted, in Cicero's words, "the best state of a commonwealth".' Nelson finds it understandable, therefore, that scholars have expected to find in Shakespeare's Roman plays, moving as they do from one form of government to another, an 'intervention' in this 'canonical early modern debate'. 'Surely Shakespeare must have had a view about the best constitution (either the best absolutely, or at least the best for Rome); surely his Roman works must show us a Rome that is virtuous when governed correctly, and corrupt when governed incorrectly? Yet the striking fact about the Roman plays is that this is not so.' Shakespeare is neither 'a nostalgic partisan of the Republic' nor 'a defender of the imperial *pax romana*'. Instead, Shakespeare offers 'a view of Roman history that dissolves the question of "the best state of a commonwealth"', since, Nelson maintains, 'he believes that the choice does not matter'.[36] The editors, as well, argue in their introduction that Shakespeare was 'cynical about politics', to the point that he refused 'to commit clearly to republican or monarchical government'. 'Pessimistic to an almost Augustinian extent about humanity generally', Shakespeare 'saw no difference in choosing one constitution over another'.[37]

I would not go so far as Nelson et al. in this regard. As Maurice Samely and I have argued elsewhere, Shakespeare, like most of his contemporaries, was in favour of a mixed government, one which included a monarch. His sense of an ideal government is very close to the one Hegel describes in his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, in which popular participation in government is carefully limited. In fact, Samely and I go so far as to surmise that the parallel may not be coincidental; Hegel was an avid reader of Shakespeare's plays. His theorising about politics seems to be informed by Shakespeare's sense of a need for checks and balances on power, as well as Shakespeare's distrust of what Annabel Patterson calls 'the popular voice'.[38] Whatever Hegel's debt to Shakespeare may or may not be, however, Shakespeare himself, we propose, does have a considered and consistent view on what Nelson calls 'the best state of a commonwealth', one that is in keeping with a relatively 'pessimistic' view of human nature. As might be expected of an Englishman of his time, Shakespeare takes a compromise position, limited

monarchy, in-between classical republicanism and the imperial rule of, as Cassius says, 'one only man' (1.2.156).

In this book, I turn to a different problem. Both Hadfield and Nelson, for all their differences, read Shakespeare's Roman plays as if he were a political theorist. The question they ask is, in effect, whether Shakespeare sees the Roman Republic or the Roman Empire as having been a better form of government. I want to look at Shakespeare's Roman plays, instead, as if Shakespeare were a historian. Why does Rome change from Republic to Empire? What in fact does Shakespeare think happened? How does he explain what I call here 'the fall of the Roman Republic'? Hadfield brings up this question more than once, although he leaves it unresolved; a question Shakespeare shares with his classical sources. As Hadfield points out, Polybius' *History*, for example, 'is really a lament for the loss of the Roman Republic'. 'The question that Polybius fails to ask, however, is why the Roman Republic decayed if it was such an ideal constitution.' Sallust, too, he notes, is 'studiously ambiguous' and 'deliberately avoids the question of causation so vital in charting the reasons for the decline of the republic'. 'He simply informs the reader that the overarching pride of the Romans and the war against Jugurtha happened at the same time as part of the same process, but does not say which came first.' Reading *Titus Andronicus*, Hadfield finds an analogous lack of resolution. Why does the 'body politic' become a 'bloody mess'? 'Exactly how this structural failure occurs – whether the institutions fail the people or the people the institutions – Shakespeare, like Sallust, does not say.'[39]

At the beginning of his account of the Catilinarian conspiracy, Sallust claims that ambition first entered the world with the Persians, Athenians and Spartans. These empires, he says, were the first 'to subdue cities and nations, and to make the lust for dominion [*libido dominandi*] a pretext for war, [and] to consider the greatest empire the greatest glory'.[40] Citing this passage, St Augustine in his *City of God* seizes on Sallust's concept of *libido dominandi* and recasts it as the defining feature of the Roman character; the quintessence of *Romanitas*.[41] This 'earthly city', he explains, 'was itself ruled by its violent, immoderate desire to rule' (*ipsa ei dominandi libido dominatur*).[42] More broadly speaking, *libido dominandi* distinguishes what St Augustine calls 'the City of Man', meaning not just Rome, but all secular

civilisation, from what he calls 'the City of God', meaning the Christian community, which, although scattered now, in the end will be gathered together in the 'New Jerusalem' described in the Book of Revelation.

Elaborating on Sallust's history, St Augustine argues that Rome 'grew with amazing rapidity' on account of its 'desire for glory' and love of 'domination'. Eventually, this 'vice', however, led Rome into interminable civil wars.[43] As the Romans fought and conquered other nations, competition within Rome itself was at first kept in check by a desire to be praised for temperance, as well as service to the state, as in the case of Republican heroes such as Cincinnatus. Over time, however, the nobility began to turn on each other. As historian Ronald Syme points out, among the Roman aristocracy, even well before the fall of the Roman Republic, 'competition was fierce and incessant'. 'The political life of the Roman Republic was stamped and swayed, not by parties and programmes of a modern and parliamentary character, not by the ostensible opposition between Senate and People, *Optimates* and *Populares*, *nobiles* and *novi homines*, but by the strife for power, wealth, and glory. The contestants were the *nobiles* among themselves, as individuals or in groups, open in the elections and in the courts of law, or masked by secret intrigue.'[44] Eventually, inevitably, St Augustine explains, 'desire for dominance' was no longer kept in check by 'desire to preserve a reputation'. Internal rivalry spilled over into open violence and shameless self-seeking, with little effort made even to appear as if concerned for the greater good of the commonwealth. This change culminated in the reign of the Emperor Nero, whom St Augustine describes as 'the summit and, as it were, citadel of this vice'. But it began long before. 'History shows that there were many such.'[45]

For Cicero, the epicentre of the fall of the Republic is Julius Caesar, his contemporary. 'If there is any area in which it is impossible for many to be outstanding,' Cicero observes, 'there will generally be such competition there that it is extremely difficult to maintain "sacred fellowship". The rash behaviour of Gaius [Julius] Caesar has recently made that clear: he overturned all the laws of gods and men for the sake of the pre-eminence that he had imagined for himself in his mistaken fancy.' 'When you desire to surpass all others,' Cicero concludes, 'it is difficult to respect the fairness that is a special mark of justice.' 'Here you have a man who longed to be king of

the Roman people and master of every nation; and he achieved it! If anyone says that such a greed is honourable, he is out of his mind; for he is approving the death of laws and liberty.'[46]

Writing *The City of God* not long after Alaric's Sack of Rome, St Augustine's most immediate and express aim is not history per se, but instead, by his analysis of the causes of Rome's rise and fall, to defend Christianity against the charge that it was somehow responsible for the ongoing collapse of the Roman Empire. 'Many escaped who now complain of this Christian era', he explains, 'and hold Christ responsible for the disasters which their city endured.'[47] In his *Discourses on Livy*, Machiavelli revives this ancient complaint:

> The ancient religion did not beatify men if they were not full of worldly glory, as were captains of armies and princes of republics. Our religion has glorified humble and contemplative more than active men. It has then placed the highest good in humility, abjectness, and contempt of things human; the other placed it in greatness of spirit, strength of body, and all other things capable of making men very strong.

'This mode of life', Machiavelli writes, 'seems to have rendered the world weak and given it in prey to criminal men, who can manage it securely, seeing that the collectivity of men, so as to go to paradise, think more of enduring their beatings than of avenging them.'[48]

In the Enlightenment, Edward Gibbon took up the same old pagan charge anew. By discouraging Romans' traditional valour and ruthlessness, Gibbon suggests, Christianity left them unable to resist the onslaught of Germanic tribes such as Alaric's Visigoths. In his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, as if recalling St Augustine's opponents, Gibbon cites 'the contempt and reproaches of the pagans', who, he imagines, 'very frequently asked, what must be the fate of the empire, attacked on every side by barbarians, if all mankind should adopt the pusillanimous sentiments of this new sect?' He concludes:

> As the happiness of a *future* life is the great object of religion, we may hear without surprise or scandal that the introduction, or at least the abuse, of Christianity had some influence on the decline and fall of the Roman empire. The clergy successfully preached

> the doctrines of patience and pusillanimity; the active virtues of society were discouraged, and the last remains of military spirit were buried in the cloister.[49]

St Augustine anticipates such charges. The decline and fall of Rome should be traced back, he maintains, not to the emergence of Christianity, but instead to the ruthless *libido dominandi* that spurred on its internecine civil wars.

> How can our opponents have the effrontery, the audacity, the impudence, the imbecility (or rather the insanity) to refuse to blame their gods for these catastrophes, while they hold Christ responsible for these disasters of modern times? The brutal Civil Wars, more bitter, on the admission of their own authors, than any wars against foreign enemies – those Civil Wars which, in the general judgment, brought on the republic not merely calamity but utter destruction – broke out long before the coming of Christ.[50]

As St Augustine points out, when the Gauls and Goths did invade, they proved more merciful to the Romans, relatively speaking, than the Romans themselves had been to each other, during their infighting. 'What was the foulest and most horrible spectacle ever seen in Rome?' St Augustine asks. 'The invasion of the Gauls, long ago? The recent invasion of the Goths? Or the ferocity vented on those who were parts of their own body, by Marius, by Sulla, and by other men of renown, the leading lights of their factions?'[51] During the sack of Rome, Alaric, himself an Arian Christian, showed mercy to those who took sanctuary in Christian shrines; St Augustine argues that the Romans should be grateful. 'The barbarians spared them for Christ's sake, and now these Romans assail Christ's name.' 'They should give credit to this Christian era', instead, 'for the fact that these savage barbarians showed mercy beyond the custom of war'.[52]

For St Augustine, Christianity is the solution, not the problem. In his English history plays, Shakespeare shows himself keenly aware of the possibility of Christian hypocrisy. He understands, as well, the need for occasional moral compromise, especially during times of war.[53] Nor would St Augustine object; even at his most optimistic, he retains a lively sense of the fallenness of human nature. Taking into account, then, these important qualifications, Shakespeare, I believe, would agree with St Augustine's assessment

of 'the City of Man'. At the heart of Rome's catastrophic but inevitable decline is the absence of Christianity. In this study, I look closely at two of Shakespeare's plays, *Julius Caesar* and *Antony and Cleopatra*. Taken together, they present his account of the fall of the Roman Republic. As a touchstone for Shakespeare's sense of Roman culture, I also turn repeatedly to Shakespeare's late play about early Rome, *Coriolanus*. As Russell Hillier suggests, 'the belligerent Martius is a synecdoche for Rome', 'the species for the genus', 'the Roman substance unmasked and in the raw'.[54] Like Cicero, as well as St Augustine, Shakespeare presents the pride that Coriolanus represents as the root cause of Rome's transition from Republic to Empire. In this vision of history, the difference between democracy and autocracy is not as important as the difference between paganism and Christianity. That said, however, forms of government are not irrelevant. In the Republic, the drive that Nietzsche calls 'the will to power' strives for outward, objective conquest. In the Empire, by contrast, it turns inwards, seeking consolation in subjective fantasy.

As Hillier notes, 'Both Menenius and Volumnia identify, rather than liken, Martius with the cornerstone of the Capitol. He is, in their view, hypostatized *Romanitas*.'[55] If Coriolanus is, in some sense, Rome incarnate, what is Shakespeare's sense of Rome's distinctive character? Stephen Greenblatt sees in Shakespeare's depiction of Coriolanus 'three dreams' of an elusive, finally unobtainable 'liberty to live after one's own law':

> There is a dream of physical autonomy, exemption from the mortal vulnerability of the flesh or at least from the fear this vulnerability instinctively arouses. There is a recurrent dream of social autonomy, independence from the dense network of friends, family, and alliances that tie the individual to a carefully ordered world. And there is a dream of mental autonomy, the ability to dwell in a separate psychic world, a heterocosm of one's own making.[56]

For Zvi Jagendorf, 'The emblem of this self-sufficiency is Coriolanus fighting alone in the enemy city with its gates shut behind him and his own army outside.'[57] In the end, however, Coriolanus, the would-be 'lonely dragon' (4.1.30), renounces his doomed *bellum unius contra omnes*. Confronted by his formidable mother, Volumnia, as well as his wife and child, he calls off the siege of Rome. 'Ladies,' he proclaims, 'all the swords / In Italy and her

confederate arms / Could not have made this peace' (5.3.206–9).[58] It is as if Shakespeare, in this late Roman play, went back to Rome's early history for a change of tack: the restoration of the Republic, rather than its destruction. By going back in time, he gives his own version of Roman history a happy ending – although, to be fair, one not especially happy for Coriolanus himself.[59]

Although he seems for a time an implacable enemy of the common good, Coriolanus becomes in the end an unlikely, grudging martyr to its survival, like the early heroes of the Republic whom St Augustine, like Livy, praises for their self-sacrifice: Mucius Scaevola, Marcus Curtius and Marcus Atilius Regulus. 'Furius Camillus, who was condemned by those who envied him, notwithstanding that he had thrown off from the necks of his countrymen the yoke of their most bitter enemies, the Veientes, again delivered his ungrateful country from the Gauls.'[60] Seen in this light, as Leah Whittington suggests, Coriolanus is of a piece with other late plays such as *Cymbeline* and *The Tempest* which 'show Shakespeare seeking out new ways to explore the dramatic possibilities of estrangement and forgiveness'.[61] Coriolanus' incomplete rebellion against Rome stands in relation to the collapse of the Republic much as the tragicomedy of *The Winter's Tale* stands in relation to the utter, unrelieved tragedy of *Othello*. As Hillier observes, '*Coriolanus* stands apart from Shakespeare's other Roman plays in that pity and compassion overwhelm wrath and fury.'[62]

In *Coriolanus*, Shakespeare revisits and rewrites, in a figurative sense, the history of Rome's tragic decline into civil war. And, in so doing, he presents a compelling alternative to the characteristic Roman exaltation of 'constancy' over mutability, masculinity over femininity, and violence over 'pity' which he presents with such painful clarity in *Julius Caesar.* The senators praise his mother afterward as 'our patroness, the life of Rome' (5.5.1) and call for flowers to be strewn before her, as well as Coriolanus' wife, Virgilia. Coriolanus tells them, 'You deserve / To have a temple built to you' (5.3.206–7). Femininity, inconstancy, pity, tears, prayer, supplication: aspects of the human condition which Romans in other plays tend to despise and disavow, Shakespeare here rehabilitates and recasts as praiseworthy. The Republic cannot function without some measure of vulnerability to the claims of pity.

In *Julius Caesar* and *Antony and Cleopatra*, the characteristic Roman desire for *imperium* tends to retreat under pressure

and become subjective. Shakespeare's Romans shift with surprising facility back and forth from conquering others into solipsistic shadow-boxing: an inward-looking struggle over self-perception. Brutus' Stoicism is an introverted, intellectual variation on Caesar's more obvious pursuit of autonomy and invulnerability.[63] Brutus speaks of his own emotional condition, 'the state of man', as 'like to a little kingdom' (2.2.67–8); in his efforts to control its 'insurrection' (2.2.68), 'poor Brutus, with himself at war' (1.2.46) even in silence or in the privacy of his own study can think of himself as if he, too, like Caesar, were a celebrated military commander, a world-bestriding 'Colossus' (1.2.135). Antony's tendency to escape into wine, women and a world of his own 'fancy' is not altogether different from Octavian's relentless focus on military campaigns. Each of these characters desperately wants to be master of his own domain; only for some of them, the world-historical winners, that domain is external, out in the world at large, whereas for others, the ostensible losers, that domain is internal, confined to a smaller, more manageable arena. 'Here is my space!' (1.1.35) Antony cries, embracing Cleopatra. 'Let Rome in Tiber melt, and the wide arch / Of the ranged empire fall!' (1.1.34–5)

The starting point for my sense of this difference between Republic and Empire in Shakespeare's Roman plays is Paul Cantor's seminal study, *Shakespeare's Rome*. Citing Aristotle, Cantor proposes that 'different regimes work to bring out different sides of human nature in their citizens'.[64] 'With our notion of representative government,' he explains, 'we think that rulers should reflect the values or opinions of those they rule; more generally, that a government should take its character from the society out of which it arises.' 'In the classical understanding of the *polis*,' however, 'the regime (*politeia*) has a formative role, and is itself the primary factor in shaping or giving character to the community it rules.' Applying this approach to the contrast between *Coriolanus* and *Antony and Cleopatra*, Cantor observes that 'the comparative rigidity of political hierarchy in the Empire works to redirect the energies of men from public to private life'.[65] Under the Empire, as historian Ronald Syme explains, once-proud *nobiles* 'lost power and wealth, display, dignity, and honour'. 'No more triumphs after war, no more roads, temples, and towns named after their honour and commemorating the glory of the great houses that were the Republic and Rome.'[66] 'The rewards of public life begin to look hollow,' Cantor suggests,

'whereas private life seems to offer new sources of satisfaction.' Antony therefore drifts away from the objective field of battle into a 'private and subjective world'. 'The Roman world portrayed in *Coriolanus* is one of hard, solid objects, palpable to the touch and thus unquestionably real. In *Antony and Cleopatra* this tangible world begins to dissolve into a realm of shadows that seem to hide the true reality.'[67]

In his more recent book *Shakespeare's Roman Trilogy*, Cantor argues that 'the buried theme of Shakespeare's Roman plays is the way that the dissolution of the Roman republican regime prepared the way for the rise of Christianity in the Roman Empire'.[68] Regarding Roman history, Cantor may well be right. Regarding Shakespeare's plays, however, I am not so sure. As a response to imperial subjugation, Hellenistic schools of thought such as Stoicism and Epicureanism were an important precursor of the more radical ethical revolution Christianity represents. Nevertheless, I would be hard-pressed to see this transition as Shakespeare's focus. Cantor misjudges here at times, as it seems to me, Shakespeare's aims in turning to Roman history, as well as Shakespeare's own distinctive sense of historical causation. As a result, our accounts of Shakespeare's Roman plays end up simultaneously entangled and opposed. For example, Cantor is at pains to emphasise the similarities between Stoicism, Epicureanism and Christianity.[69] I, by contrast, draw attention to their differences.

Like Marx, Cantor tends to represent ideology as a product of physical conditions. More specifically, Cantor argues that 'the corruption of the Roman Empire softened it up and made it possible for Christianity to sweep the ancient world'. And, again, he may be right. With time, Cantor maintains, 'Rome's great captains and even its ordinary people are corrupted by the wealth that flows into the city from conquered lands, and devotion to the common good gradually weakens until the city is ripped apart by private factions.'[70] It is a venerable vision of history, one that Cantor shares with Ibn Khaldun, as well as Livy and Montesquieu. Nevertheless, Shakespeare himself does not see cultural history as a product of impersonal economic change. Instead, like St Augustine, Shakespeare tends to represent what Marx would call the 'base' as a product of what he would call the 'superstructure'. Beliefs are the engine of history, not material resources. As George Bernard Shaw was wont to complain, Shakespeare is also more inclined,

like Thomas Carlyle, to the 'great man theory of history'.[71] World-historical events in Shakespeare's plays are represented as the result of individual choices between moral paradigms, rather than those choices as themselves a response to such events. Antony, for instance, is not so much victim as author of his own ignominious demise. Cantor focuses on the differences between the Republic and the Empire.[72] I think Shakespeare, however, saw them as two sides of the same coin; two societies equally obsessed with command and control. The effort to secure individual 'liberty' takes on different guises, depending on what Stanislavski would describe as the 'given circumstances' of each character. But the underlying, tragically misguided goal remains the same.

Both Cantor and I agree with A. D. Nuttall that Shakespeare is attracted to Roman history as an occasion to work through ethical and political thought-experiments, evaluating various competing claims in light of a kind of evidence. As Nuttall writes, 'The cultural separateness of the Roman world, its independence of Christianity, makes it a perfect laboratory for free-ranging political hypothesis.'[73] Cantor for his part sees Shakespeare weighing up the relative merits of life in the Republic as opposed to the Empire. 'The Roman plays taken as a whole pose a Hegelian tragic choice between antithetical ways of life, each of which embodies a distinct and defensible vision of human excellence.'[74] Warren Cherniak comes to a similar conclusion about republicanism in the Roman plays, in keeping with a long tradition within Shakespeare studies:

> Shakespeare's habitual practice is to juxtapose differing perspectives on a character or event without privileging a single voice as clearly preferable. This habit of mind has been associated with the rhetorical tradition of arguing *in utramque partem*, speaking with equal eloquence on either side of a given question, or attributed to a Keatsian 'negative capability'.[75]

As Peter Holbrook observes, 'we are often told Shakespeare did not advance a particular view of life.' 'Emphasizing Shakespeare's intellectual openness can be overdone,' however, he believes, 'with the plays and poems ending up a bland, self-cancelling rendezvous of perspectives'.[76] Holbrook cites Richard Strier: Shakespeare is not 'the less Shakespeare' for 'having had beliefs that he expressed in his plays'. 'When Sidney said that the poet "nothing affirms,"'

Strier notes, 'he had in mind factual claims, not ethical and political ones. Only a peculiar version of post-Romantic poetics could lead to the view that the poet "nothing affirms" in general.'[77] As it happens, I tend to disagree with Strier as well as Holbrook regarding what it is, more precisely, that Shakespeare 'affirms'. To wit, I am much more sympathetic than they are to what Strier calls the 'Burkean' thesis that 'Shakespeare's social and political views were deeply conservative'.[78] Setting that contention to one side, however, I wholeheartedly agree with both Holbrook and Strier that Keats' claim about Shakespeare's '*Negative Capability*' is a misleading and counterproductive myth, needlessly disabling even the possibility of fruitful debate.[79]

In contrast to Cantor, as well as Chernaik, I propose here that Shakespeare uses Rome's transition from Republic to Empire as a case study to evaluate the personal and political implications of a proto-liberal ethos which prizes autonomy above relatedness and which was emerging in his own time as an alternative to Christianity, as well as the ethics of Aristotle and Cicero. Over the course of this thought-experiment, weighing the claims of this resurgent neo-Roman paradigm against his sense of human nature, as well as the evidence of history, Shakespeare comes to a conclusion: a society which adopts this individualistic ethos, whether it be as large as a nation or as small as a marriage, will inevitably oscillate between autocracy and civil war. The self-sufficiency that such a radical pursuit of liberty idealises and seeks in vain to secure precludes the power-sharing necessary for stable, peaceful coexistence. Hegel captures this dilemma in his account of the master–slave dialectic, which I am inclined to believe was in part inspired by his study of Shakespeare's Roman plays. 'The earliest writing of Hegel's we have', Ewan Fernie points out, 'is a free adaptation of Act Four, scene one from *Julius Caesar*, which the philosopher wrote as a fifteen-year-old schoolboy.'[80] As Cantor says of Nietzsche, 'sometimes it seems as if everyone studied *Julius Caesar* in high school'.[81]

Rome as Cantor sees it was undone, not only by its windfall of prosperity, once it defeated Carthage, but also by 'its encounter with alien ways of life in the lands the Republic conquered'. 'Adapting to the ways of life of the very peoples they defeated, the Romans came to embrace an ethos of defeat. That is the ultimate tragedy of the Roman Republic.'[82] All of Shakespeare's

pagans, however, including his Greeks and Egyptians, as well as his Romans, chase different forms of radical autonomy that from a Christian perspective are impossible to attain, as well as undesirable even if they were. Roman and Egyptian alike are chasing variations on the same impossible dream. Shakespeare's Romans' problem, moreover, as Cantor himself stresses, elsewhere in the book, is by no means 'an ethos of defeat', but the exact opposite. Roman protagonists such as Coriolanus, Julius Caesar and Mark Antony are profoundly unwilling to make any kind of concession to each other, even at the price of deluding themselves, blundering into disaster and committing suicide. 'Shakespeare's Romans are extraordinarily competitive,' Cantor writes, 'just like Nietzsche's Greeks, to the point of striving to become gods, and they are destroyed in the process.'[83]

Alongside Cantor's account of Shakespeare's Rome, I am deeply indebted to Gordon Braden's study of Seneca's influence on drama in the sixteenth century, *Renaissance Tragedy and the Senecan Tradition*. Like St Augustine, Braden presents Seneca's one-time pupil, the Emperor Nero, as the acme of unchecked Roman *libido dominandi*.[84] Having achieved unparalleled authority, Nero became, as it were, baffled. Frustrated, tetchy and increasingly paranoid, he set up rigged artistic competitions, fake chariot races and show trials of imagined opponents, all to have someone, somehow to defeat. Until the rise of Nero's predecessor, Julius Caesar, opportunities for limited political power had been available to most male patricians through a traditional structure Braden calls 'Republican timocracy': 'a finely graded system of clearly specified *dignitates*, competitively achieved, of which the *cursus honorum* is the central, enduring form'. Under Augustus Caesar, however, the corruption of honours and enfeeblement of public offices which began under the influence of Julius Caesar became fixed and definitive. Augustus 'preserved much of the honorific paraphernalia and rhetoric of the Republic', but 'it could no longer mean what it used to mean'.[85]

Braden suggests that 'the politics of imperial terror' can be best understood as an ad hoc response to the dissolution of this traditional Republican structure for acquiring and validating a sense of personal power. Thus its 'bizarre air of improvisation and make-believe': having conquered Rome itself, as well as the better part of the rest of the world, Roman emperors such as Nero no longer

knew how to express their will to power. With the collapse of the 'stylized rivalry' at the core of 'Republican timocracy', other aristocrats also found their will to power stymied; indeed, much more obviously so. Their response, Braden suggests, was to turn inwards. Stoicism projects disengagement, detachment, indifference. In fact, however, Braden argues, Stoicism can be better understood as 'the inner form of imperialism'. 'Imperial aggression and Stoic retreat are both informed by a drive to keep the self's boundaries under its own control.'[86] Cicero makes much the same point in *De officiis*. 'There have been many,' he observes, 'and there still are', who seek 'tranquility' by 'abandoning public business and fleeing to a life of leisure', including 'the noblest and foremost philosophers' as well as 'certain strict and serious men who could not endure the behavior of the populace or its leaders'. 'Their aim', 'common both to those who desire power and to such men of leisure', is 'the aim of kings: that needing nothing, and obeying no one, they might enjoy liberty, the mark of which is to live just as one pleases'.[87]

For Braden, Stoicism is what Freud might term a 'sublimation' of the drive that St Augustine calls *libido dominandi*, and that Braden himself more typically refers to by the Greek terms *thymos* or *thymoeides*: 'the ambitious, competitive part of the soul . . . living for victory and honour'. The idealised wise man may be dispassionate, but the actual, practising Stoic is in fact just as driven by ambition, just as much a slave to passion, as a power-mad emperor. '*Imperium* remains the common value, the desideratum for both sage and emperor.' Suicide in this context, the characteristic death of the 'noble Roman', is not a renunciation of worldly power, but instead a demonstration of its all-encompassing scope. 'Suicide is the natural fulfillment of the wise man's life, the point where his drive for control becomes totally and unsurpassably self-referential in a final triumph over the world outside.'[88]

Braden sees the resurgence of Stoicism in the Renaissance as in part an effect of a social 'dislocation' of the aristocracy in the early modern period, a loss of their former political independence which mirrors that of the Roman patriciate in the first century BC, during the transition from Republic to Empire. Stoicism 'serves the need of an honorific selfhood deprived of its referents'. In particular, 'the military function of the nobility as a class was on the way out'. 'Medieval aristocratic values' proved tenacious, however, 'even under changing social and political conditions'.[89] Braden draws

particular attention to what Charles Trinkaus calls *autarkeia*, the ideal of 'psychic and moral self-sufficiency' which Petrarch first identified as a distinctive feature of classical thought.[90] For ancient Greek noblemen such as those described in Homeric epic, *autarkeia* ('self-sufficiency, independence') was political, defended by force of arms. Neostoicism allowed the early modern nobility to continue to lay claim to this ideal, if only in a more subjective sense, even as they lost their traditional martial capacity. It also opened up aristocratic modes of self-regard to poets, playwrights and scholars.[91]

In his emphasis on a broader 'Senecan tradition', Braden says relatively little about Shakespeare's Roman plays. In a later article, however, Wayne Rebhorn singles out Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*.[92] In this tragedy, he argues, Shakespeare depicts 'the transformation of the English aristocracy between the reign of Henry VIII and the Civil War', a historical process Lawrence Stone describes in his classic study *The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558–1641*. Rebhorn argues that Shakespeare finds a historical analogue for this contemporary crisis in the fall of the Roman Republic, a collapse which, like Cicero, he sees as beginning with Julius Caesar. Admittedly, he says, '*Julius Caesar* is set well before the start of the Silver Age and the orgies of destruction associated with Tiberius, Caligula, and Nero.' 'Nevertheless', the tragedy presents 'a Renaissance vision of the imperial self whose drive for mastery during the chaos unleashed by the Civil War in Rome has been turned away from the vast expanse of the empire and inward towards the ruling class itself.'[93]

If *Julius Caesar* evokes the beginning of the decline of the Elizabethan aristocracy, *Antony and Cleopatra* shows its *terminus ad quem*, out on the horizon. David Quint proposes that 'Shakespeare's Roman plays' present 'a schematic treatment of a nobility losing its status before the pressure of new historical forces'. In *Coriolanus*, for example, 'the urban populace . . . dictates new conditions to the patricians'. In *Antony and Cleopatra*, Shakespeare shows 'the demise of a feudal aristocratic order and its style of greatness'. The two lovers, Antony and Cleopatra, embody 'outmoded noble values and behaviors', receding before the advance of Octavian, the 'universal landlord' (3.13.72).[94] In his Longman edition of the play, Quint presents Antony and Cleopatra in more detail as representative of a 'magnificent individualism', doomed in their own time, as

well as Shakespeare's, by the 'double advent' of 'political absolutism' and 'Christianity'. With the rise of English Calvinism, as well as a new urban bourgeoisie, 'the Renaissance culture of individual aggrandisement' was giving way to 'a narrower, less aristocratic, more mercenary, and more puritanical culture'. Octavian's Rome represents the future, 'a new era of calculation and efficiency'. Egypt, 'a realm of excess', 'older and culturally richer', represents the past, 'the outmoded ethos of an old aristocracy', 'a world of greatness that now seems to be a dream of the larger possibilities of human experience'. This 'dream-world' will now become 'a province of homogenizing Rome'.[95]

What Rebhorn sees in *Julius Caesar*, Quint sees in seventeenth-century tragedy more broadly considered, including French and Spanish drama, as well as English plays such as those of Shakespeare.

> A defining strain of seventeenth-century tragedy – something larger than a subgenre – dramatizes the loss of a particular, high aristocratic identity and focuses the genre on the travails of a nobility newly imperiled and disempowered by the centralizing projects of a newly powerful monarchy.

Quint points out that the English 'crisis' Stone identifies is not without contemporary parallels on the Continent. 'Conflict between king and noble vassal, between royal court and local grandee, provided a political issue and literary theme throughout the Middle Ages.' By the seventeenth century, however, 'this conflict was, in fact, nearing its end, decided in favor of the monarch'. The 'style of noble independence and self-assertion' which Antony and Cleopatra represent had become 'the object of nostalgia'.[96] Stone's description of bellicose, independent English noblemen abandoning their warlike ways for a new civility can be understood as an instance of the larger phenomenon Norbert Elias calls 'the civilizing process'. The warrior culture of aristocrats in feudal society was giving way to *courtoisie*.

Stone and Elias provide pervasive and appealing paradigms for present-day critics' understanding of the economic and political bases of early modern intellectual history, including literary history. There is some question, however, whether they accurately describe Shakespeare's understanding, as a kind of historian himself, of the Roman history that he presents in *Julius Caesar* and

Antony and Cleopatra. Consider, for instance, St Augustine's concept of a characteristic Roman *libido dominandi*. Every desire or *libido*, one might say, can be reimagined as a species of fear. The desire to dominate, in this case, is the obverse of a fear of being dominated, of being subject to a *dominus* or 'master', in the manner of a slave. This fear could be interpreted, then, as an effect of the rise of a centralised and increasingly overbearing political authority. Roman aristocrats start to crave power so desperately because they feel it slipping away. Once it has indeed dissipated, dissolved by political and economic forces beyond their command, they then try to retrieve it by withdrawing into the one arena still within their control, their own private, domestic and subjective experience, as apparent both in Brutus' Stoic silence and Antony's tendency to distract himself with romantic idylls in Egypt. Shakespeare's plays, however, do not present so neat an order of cause and effect. Antony's debauchery, wasting time and opportunity in Alexandria, does not occur solely after his defeat, as a kind of consolation, but also precedes and in fact causes his political decline. Brutus' withdrawal from public affairs does not begin with Caesar's rise, but instead could be said to help enable that ascent, by removing one of the traditional, competitive restraints on Caesar's populist demagoguery, a patrician counterweight rivalling in stature Caesar's previous opponent, Cato of Utica.

Writing on Shakespeare's early English histories, John Cox begins by acknowledging that these plays 'reproduce what we now recognize as the central processes of change in sixteenth-century English political life'. To speak of Shakespeare, however, he goes on, 'as if he had read Lawrence Stone' would be 'wilful anachronism'. Shakespeare, like most of his cohort, did not conceive of these processes in 'the conceptual terms of the modern social historian'.[97] Wayne Rebhorn makes much the same point in regard to Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*. 'Like Stone,' he concedes, 'the play suggests that the aristocracy is undergoing a profound change that will eventuate in its ultimate loss as a class of any real power and influence, in its marginalization by increasingly absolutist monarchs.' Nonetheless, 'the analytical perspective offered by the play is not Stone's'. Stone 'emphasizes economics and social history', whereas Shakespeare 'presents the situation in moral terms'. 'Shakespeare's play is analytical, revealing the self-destruction, the

suicide, to which an entire class is being impelled by its essential values and mode of self-definition.'[98]

For Shakespeare, subjective *libido dominandi* such as that apparent in Brutus' Stoicism is a displacement or refinement of the kind of objective *libido dominandi* more obviously manifest in Caesar's political ambition. Both Senecan withdrawal and Neronian aggression are expressions of the same core paradigm, a tragically flawed value-system which idealises absolute power. This exaltation of power creates what Rebhorn calls a 'zero-sum game'. Any increase in anyone else's capacity to dominate is seen as an increase in one's own vulnerability to being dominated. The rise of the other thus comes to seem intolerable; a threat to be countered with desperate, pre-emptive aggression, or else avoided by withdrawing from public life altogether. Rebhorn sees *Julius Caesar*, especially, as depicting 'a struggle among aristocrats – senators – aimed at preventing one of their number from transcending his place and destroying the system in which they all ruled as a class'.[99]

In his literary history of what he calls 'the dramaturgy of power', John Cox argues that English court politics in the 1590s gave rise to a 'contemporary shift in the sense of human self', characterised above all by an effort to secure 'social or political invulnerability':

> The scramble to win individual purposes and good advantages became increasingly frantic and cynical, eventually issuing in Essex's violent bid for power just after the turn of the century. Court striving was therefore increasingly risky, like contemporary voyages to the new world: one could win enormous benefits, but in the process one risked losses that were even more spectacular.[100]

Contemporary interest in Tacitus bespeaks a more pervasive sense of Elizabeth herself, at the end of her reign, as ever more capricious, ruthless and autocratic. 'Because the environment of the court was so insecure, it became increasingly receptive to strategies for achieving apparent invulnerability.' Cox draws attention to two such 'strategies' in particular as characteristic developments. Humanists as well as courtiers could pursue 'the new ideal of the invulnerable self' either through Machiavellian maneuvering, like that of the devil or personified 'Vice' of medieval drama, or else through a Senecan withdrawal into cultivated indifference. 'For humanist and courtier alike, social advancement was highly competitive, heavily dependent on favor at the top, and therefore risky

in the extreme.' Stoicism thus became newly 'attractive', as it once had been for Seneca. 'The ancient Stoic ideal of *apatheia* had been cultivated in a very similar atmosphere in imperial Rome – the Rome of Livy, Suetonius, Seneca, and Tacitus.'[101]

Cox suggests that characters such as Caesar and Brutus may be understood, not only as counterparts to English aristocrats, but also as representing members of Shakespeare's own more immediate circle, London's humanist intelligentsia: disgruntled Neostoics such as George Chapman, as well as rebels against Calvinism such as Christopher Marlowe. 'Interest in the ideal of the invulnerable self became widespread among a new class . . . the privileged minority whose literacy alone gave them considerable power and widened their scope for literary self-perpetuation and display.'[102] Geoffrey Miles observes that '"Stoicism" and "constancy" became code words for a certain fashionable pose of cynical and affectless "cool."'[103] The characteristic striving for autonomy, even to the point of antinomianism, which Harry Levin gives the name 'overreaching', and which Anthony Esler links to 'the aspiring mind' of the Elizabethan 'younger generation', a variation on the self-sufficient 'pose' of Neostoicism, can be seen as readily in the literary careers of some of Shakespeare's fellow playwrights as in the more martial exploits of swashbuckling noblemen such as Raleigh, Sidney and Devereux.[104]

In his study of early modern English republicanism, *Open Subjects*, James Kuzner argues that early modern idealisation of invulnerability, a reaction to increasingly absolutist, centralised power, is itself inevitably damaging to efforts to replace that autocracy with healthy, functioning representative government. As Braden explains, 'Stoicism is not finally a philosophy of political resistance. The essential Stoic strategy for dealing with a tyrant is not interference but indifference.'[105] For Kuzner, atomistic *autarkeia* is not a viable model for republican selfhood: neither Senecan retreat into the self ('refusing to be moved by others' words') nor Machiavellian striving to dominate the other, even if only, as a courtier, through flattery and deceit ('occluding interiority so as to manipulate others'). Instead, Kuzner turns to the kind of 'open' political engagement Cicero proposes as an alternative. 'For Cicero,' Kuzner observes, 'as for many Renaissance figures, shared vulnerability is central to community's existence.' 'As Cicero understands them, republics both must make peace with,

and even recognize their dependence on, vulnerability of various kinds.'[106] Kuzner cites Cicero's *De amicitia* ('On Friendship'), written the same year as Caesar's assassination: 'Take away the bond of kindly feeling from the world, and no house or city can stand.'[107] Kuzner find Cicero's thought in this respect adumbrating that of Jürgen Habermas.[108]

Kuzner sees Shakespeare as profoundly sympathetic to Cicero's sense that 'the courage required of us to embrace vulnerable being' is 'the most crucial republican virtue'. 'Shakespeare', Kuzner argues, 'advocates an intersubjective openness which resembles that advocated in Cicero and Livy in the classical period and, more recently, in Habermas's later work.' In his Roman plays, especially, Shakespeare illustrates the inevitably tragic end of all attempts 'to withdraw into a well-bounded selfhood'. 'For Shakespeare, bounded selfhood is a pernicious fiction.' Cicero recognises that 'susceptibility – to change, decay, and transformation that one does not will – cannot be eliminated, whatever we might wish.' So, too, Shakespeare illustrates that 'selves are vulnerable in constitution, incapable, on their own, of fully mastering either the passions threatening to undo them from within or the violence threatening from without'.[109] Cox sees Shakespeare in much the same light. 'No other Elizabethan playwright is as sensitive and sympathetic to the vulnerability of even the most admirable of human beings, and none so insistently uses this vulnerability as a way of qualifying the claims of privilege.'[110]

In my analysis of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* and *Antony and Cleopatra*, I take up the concept that Cox and Kuzner introduce as 'vulnerability' and subsume it under its more formal, technical name of 'passibility'. When these authors refer variously to 'vulnerability', 'susceptibility' or 'weakness', what they are describing is, in more precise language, the theological concept of 'passibility', meaning 'susceptibility to being acted-upon'. To be passible is to be subject to external causation. To be impassible, by contrast, is to be invulnerable to any kind of action from without. The term itself, 'impassibility', as a description of a characteristic of the divine, is derived from Stoicism, which emphasises an analogous state, *apatheia*, as the sine qua non of the ideal human being, the *sapiens* or 'wise man'. Like most forms of classical philosophy, Stoicism tends to assume that anything divine or ideal is by definition impassible. In Kuzner's language, its selfhood is 'bounded', rather than 'open.' Within Stoicism, for example, the degree of *apatheia* that a

philosopher attributes to the *sapiens* or ideal 'sage' is the best index of his place in a spectrum of Stoic thought, ranging from radical to moderate. So also, in speaking of deities, the degree of impassibility that a theologian attributes to God or the gods places him in a spectrum of possibilities ranging from the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle to the figure Jesus, whom Nietzsche often describes simply as 'the Crucified'. The degree to which impassibility is idealised is not only the chief criterion for distinguishing between rival schools of Stoicism, but also for distinguishing between rival concepts of the divine, especially the theology found in classical philosophy as opposed to that of Christianity.

What I aim to show in this study as a whole is that throughout *Julius Caesar* and *Antony and Cleopatra* Shakespeare's Romans strive to achieve what Kuzner calls 'bounded selfhood' and Cox describes as 'the new ideal of the invulnerable self'. That is to say, Shakespeare's Romans are distinguished above all by their persistent efforts to escape their own human passibility. This flight from vulnerability is what drives what St Augustine calls *libido dominandi*, both in its objective expression as absolutist political ambition and in its subjective expression as a retreat from reality itself. Since passibility cannot be escaped, the attempt to do so brings tragedy, however, both to individuals and to ancient Rome more generally, as a society. At the root of this problem, as Shakespeare sees it, is a maladaptive value-system. Like aristocratic contemporaries such as the Earl of Essex, as well as ambitious Neostoic humanists, Shakespeare's Romans idealise impassibility. Their ideal self is transcendent, invulnerable. As human beings, however, they would be better served by an ideal that instead embraces the most basic, inescapable facts of our human condition: embodiment, vulnerability, sympathy, dependence. In the symbolic language of the play, 'the northern star', 'the beast without a heart', needs to yield to 'flesh and blood'. In more abstract terms, the Neostoic ideal of 'constancy' needs to give way to the Christian paradox of 'strength made perfect in weakness' (2 Cor. 12:9). As Kuzner explains, 'The strongest social structures are held together by weakness.' 'To form the bonds of friendship – bonds that sustain community – means to give oneself over to susceptibility and to loss.'[111]

An underlying assumption of my argument is that the ideal self or 'ego ideal' of psychoanalytic theory is susceptible to cultural

influence. Even Freud, who for the most part sees human behaviour as biologically determined, grants in his later work that the ego ideal reflects the idiosyncrasies of an individual's social context. The ego ideal represents an intersection of the distinctive, historically contingent value-systems of a society as a whole with the individual experience of a given member of that social group. In the first section of the first chapter, 'Brutus vs. Brutus', I briefly introduce the concept of the ego ideal as it appears in the work of Freud and Adler.[112] I then turn to the particular example of Shakespeare's Rome. The behaviour of Shakespeare's Roman characters, I propose, can be described in terms of the peculiar character of their ego ideals, fantasies of selfhood which, as Freud and Adler suggest, we can see represented most clearly in their concepts of the divine.

Such exemplary ideals can also appear in other forms, however. They can be human heroes, for instance, drawn from legends of antiquity.[113] The hypothetical *sapiens* of the Stoics is a good example, as well as his perceived incarnation in figures such as Socrates, Cato and Brutus' own ancestor, Lucius Junius Brutus. Less obviously, the ideal self can be expressed metaphorically as an animal, a star, a monster or even an inanimate object such as a statue or a sword. When Coriolanus asks for followers to accompany him in his drive against Aufidius and his Antiates, for example, the Roman soldiers cry in unison, 'O me alone! Make you a sword of me!' (1.6.76). Coriolanus himself 'outdares his senseless sword / And when it bows, stand'st up' (1.4.53–4). As Dostoyevsky writes in *The Adolescent*,

> A man cannot live without worshipping something; without worshipping he cannot bear the burden of himself. And that goes for every man. So that if a man rejects God, he will have to worship an idol that may be made of wood, gold, or ideas. Those that think they don't need God are really just idol worshippers.[114]

The aspirations that such symbols both express and shape are not always practicable, however, or even internally coherent. Brutus in particular is torn between two rival schools of thought. In keeping with the precepts of Epicureanism, Seneca advocates a complete withdrawal from politics, since such activity will inevitably impinge upon the *apathia* ('freedom from passion') of the true *sapiens*. Cicero, however, much to the contrary, insists on service

to the state as a necessary component of virtue. 'Those who are equipped by nature to administer affairs', he maintains, 'must abandon any hesitation over winning office and engage in public life.'[115] In order to convince Brutus to abandon his initial retirement from public life in favour of this kind of more proactive political engagement, Shakespeare's Cassius makes a symbol of Brutus' ideal self, the statue of his ancestor, Lucius Junius Brutus, seem to come alive and exhort him personally to rejoin the political arena. As a statue, mute, immobile and imperturbable, this statue, as well as others in the play, aptly represents Seneca's ego ideal: the indifferent gods of Epicureanism. As it seems to come alive, however, communicating with Brutus in the form of a letter, urging him to take action, the statue comes to represent more closely instead the ego ideal of Ciceronian Stoicism: the illustrious forebear whom it depicts and whom Brutus decides in the end to imitate.

In the second section, '"A marble statue of a man"', I turn from internecine debates within classical philosophy to the later conflict in the Renaissance between Neostoicism and Christianity. In *Julius Caesar*, Shakespeare uses the history of ancient Rome as a testing-ground to evaluate the claims of contemporary Neostoicism, measuring them against the competing standard of Christianity. I stress that Shakespeare is responding primarily to early modern Neostoicism, rather than to classical Stoicism itself, partly to draw attention to the concept of 'constancy', a buzzword promulgated by Shakespeare's Neostoic contemporary, Justus Lipsius, and partly to forestall over-scrupulous questions of exact chronology. Strictly speaking, Seneca post-dates the fall of the Roman Republic by almost a century. Cicero's *De officiis* was written several months after Caesar's assassination, when Rome had already degenerated into open civil war. Shakespeare uses the tipping point of the transition from Republic to Empire as an opportunity to telescope both of these perspectives backwards in time. In Brutus' divided impulses, Shakespeare is able to illustrate both the patriotism of the Republican citizen and the despair of the Imperial subject.

In the first section of the second chapter, 'Power and Passibility', I introduce the theological concept of passibility in more detail as a useful tool for distinguishing between different ethical ideals, both in general and in Shakespeare's Roman plays in particular. Differences between these ideals, I propose, can be seen most clearly in competing concepts of the divine. In keeping with

its admiration for absolute power, classical philosophy describes its deities as impassible, even impersonal: abstract forces such as 'Fate', 'the One' or 'the Form of the Good'. Christianity, by contrast, glorifies empathy and therefore describes its version of the divine, 'Christ crucified', as necessarily passible, as well as personal. God must be vulnerable, sentient, in order to feel compassion for the suffering of man. As objects of what Wayne Rebhorn calls 'emulation', a mixture of admiration, imitation and competition, these divine exempla affect day-to-day decision-making. Citing Rebhorn's concept of 'emulation', Coppélia Kahn represents this 'cultural practice' as a root cause of Shakespeare's Romans' characteristic cruelty. The tragedy of Shakespeare's Romans is not emulation itself, however, but the inhuman character of the ideal self which they choose to emulate: the unfeeling, invulnerable form of the divine Caesar describes metaphorically as 'Olympus' and 'the northern star'. This ideal leaves no room for the susceptibility to empathy, reciprocal respect and openness to compromise which Shakespeare, like Cicero, sees as integral to healthy human interdependence.[116]

In his history of personhood, *The Mirages of the Selfe* (*sic*), Timothy Reiss argues that the modern concept of the self, the Cartesian *ego cogito*, emerges in the early modern period, beginning with Petrarch, as a result of an effort to separate personhood from the most basic given of the human condition: the state of being 'embedded in and acted on by' what he calls 'circles' or 'spheres' of influence. Modern concepts of personhood tend to present relational factors such as social status, kinship, moral duties and religious beliefs as mere contingencies, accidents surrounding but not defining the self. In the pre-modern period, however, these various forms of what Reiss calls 'passibility' were understood as intrinsic to selfhood. The self is not autonomous, but embedded, existing in a state of reactivity. Reiss might easily sound therefore as if he were a fellow traveller with those, like Lacan or Althusser, who argue for what Ricœur calls 'the shattered subject'. For these antihumanists, individual agency is an illusion; the self is in fact altogether at the mercy of impersonal forces such as language or economics. Reiss insists, however, that the susceptibility to external influence he ascribes to the passible self is not the same as mere 'passivity'. 'None of this is to say that persons are wholly determined by context, that personal identities are socially, culturally,

and ideologically fashioned as mere semes of an overarching discourse, meanings made by a symbolics of power. Webbed, made and making in multiple contexts, personhood still has real agency (of endlessly varied sorts).'[117] Reiss's metaphor, 'webbed', suggests the kinship between his 'circles' of influences and Taylor's conceit of a 'web of interlocution'. Reiss argues that the attempt to project modern concepts of the self as independent of such 'webs' or 'circles' back into the pre-modern past is anachronistic.

Charles Taylor, however, has a different agenda, as does Reiss's other key source, Alasdair MacIntyre. From their perspective, the pre-modern concept of what Reiss calls the 'passible' self is in fact more accurate, even today, than the isolated, incorporeal phantom Ricœur calls 'the Cartesian subject'. Modern ethics as they see it is led astray by efforts to imagine individuals as capable of radical autonomy, much less to represent that 'liberty' as the highest good. Reiss introduces similar misgivings about the application of 'universal' ethics such as those formulated by the United Nations to nations that may not share Western assumptions as to what it means to be a person. Kant's belief, for instance, in the possibility of disinterested action seems to him especially dubious.

Shakespeare, I propose, sees his Romans much as MacIntyre, Taylor, Ricœur and Reiss see us moderns. He sees his Romans' characteristic Neostoicism, moreover, much as these philosophers see Kantian ethics. The problem is not that individual agency, the defining characteristic of the so-called 'bourgeois subject', is entirely illusory. The problem is rather that its scope is more limited than characters such as Caesar, Antony and Coriolanus would like to believe. Like Icarus, they try to fly too close to the sun, and as a result they plummet back down to their death. Kantian disinterestedness, for example, such as Brutus seems to strive for is not so much good or bad as flat-out impossible. The ideal of the unattached, unencumbered self is not only unattainable, but dangerous to pursue; 'liberty' in the 'neo-Roman' sense proves to be a tragically misleading aim.

In the second section of the second chapter, '"Constancy" and "Frailty"', I look more specifically at feminist interpretations of *Julius Caesar* put forward in the 1980s and 1990s by Janet Adelman, Madelon Sprengnether, Cynthia Marshall, Gail Kern Paster and Coppélia Kahn. The characteristic Roman disdain for femininity that these authors attribute in their earlier work to men's

'pre-Oedipal' desires to detach themselves from their 'suffocating mothers' and establish themselves as masculine, and then in their later work to the political pressures of patriarchy and male rivalry, I see instead as an effect of a more fundamental Roman discomfort with passibility. The two female characters in the play, Portia and Calpurnia, can themselves be read, not only as individuals, but also as symbols of repressed aspects of Brutus and Caesar. The women represent their husbands' underdeveloped capacity for pity.

In the conclusion to my analysis of *Julius Caesar*, 'Shakespeare's passion play', I explore the possibility that Shakespeare's depiction of Julius Caesar is indebted to the representation of Augustus Caesar in medieval English biblical drama. Shakespeare's Julius Caesar's unabashed description of himself as 'Olympus' and 'the northern star' strongly resembles Augustus Caesar's opening speech in the Towneley cycle, as well the same character's opening speech in the Chester cycle. Both of these speeches, moreover, are themselves parodies of God's opening speech in each case, the great 'Ego sum' with which each cycle opens. In further support of this suggestion, I compare Shakespeare's version of the Caesar legend to that of other, roughly contemporary authors such as Marc-Antoine Muret and Sir William Alexander. These authors model their Caesar on the example of Seneca's Hercules, borrowing repeatedly from his *Hercules furens* and *Hercules Oetaeus*. That Shakespeare deviates from this tradition, and that he also departs in various intriguing details from his most immediate source, Plutarch's 'Life of Julius Caesar', suggests that he had in mind a different precedent. Like the traditional cycle-play 'Caesar', Shakespeare's, too, is a bloviating, ineffectual parody of Christ.

In my discussion of *Julius Caesar*, I focus on susceptibility to emotions, especially 'pity', and a very literal, physical kind of passibility. In my analysis of *Antony and Cleopatra*, I turn, by contrast, to a subtler form of vulnerability. Shakespeare, I argue, sees the self as profoundly sensitive to moral judgement. Every individual is perpetually, ineluctably embedded in overlapping matrices of moral evaluation, judging and being judged in turn. I describe this process of judgement as 'interpellation', modifying the sense that it has for Althusser, in order to stress the fact that Shakespeare sees the perceptions of others as a powerful force, not easily dismissed. Despite the many different, formidable defence mechanisms that

each individual psyche can potentially bring to bear, other people are at times capable of altering our own self-perception. Denial, disavowal and retreat from 'nature' into an alternative world of 'fancy' allow some measure of escape. If other people are more powerful, however, or more numerous, exposure to their opinion can over time prove impossible to ignore. The most drastic example of this kind of exposure, in Shakespeare's Roman plays, is to be led in triumph as a captive through the streets of Rome, and this prospect represents therefore for characters such as Antony and Cleopatra, as well as Brutus, a kind of *summum malum*. Brutus insists that he will not, under any circumstances, 'go bound to Rome'. And, indeed, he does in the end kill himself, once his defeat is apparent. In the first section of the third chapter, 'Stoic Suicide as "Hobgoblin"', I compare Cleopatra to Brutus and propose that Cleopatra's death is in fact surprisingly consistent with Stoicism, despite her vividly passionate life.[118]

Shakespeare's interest in the Roman triumph is one expression, among others, of a more general fascination on his part with a paradox built into the very nature of honour itself. Characters who are concerned about honour pride themselves, above all, on their self-sufficiency. Their claim to honour, as they see it, is grounded in an autarchy akin to that of a medieval lord. They want to see themselves as masters of their own sphere of influence, including their bodies, their emotions and even their relations. They bristle at the thought of any kind of dependence on anything other than themselves, because that measure of fragility, however slight, would imply that they are somehow vulnerable, somehow less than ideal. Much literary criticism of *Antony and Cleopatra* focuses on the differences between the Egyptians and the Romans; in this respect, however, they are essentially akin. The same mindset can be seen in Shakespeare's ancient Greeks, as well, in *Troilus and Cressida* and *Timon of Athens*. Shakespeare's pagans, or at least, those of his pagans who belong to the upper class, such as Cleopatra, reflect the value-system of the contemporary English nobility, but exaggerated, or perhaps rendered clearer, by the absence of Christianity. The self is all; the other is unnecessary, irrelevant; or so they would like to believe.

What such characters discover, much to their chagrin, is that the other, even if despised, is indispensable. The paradox of honour, as Shakespeare sees it, is that the self needs the other in order

to confirm its own self-sufficiency. That very need for the other, moreover, shows that their supposed self-sufficiency is delusional. As Paul Cantor observes, a psychological double bind lies at the heart of Coriolanus' character. 'He seeks honor but dislikes the requirement of having other men to honor him. Thinking he can stand alone on the basis of his honor, he finds instead that his pursuit of honor binds him more closely to the city.'[119] Hegel describes the same problem in more abstract terms in his description of the master–slave dialectic. 'Just where the master has effectively achieved lordship, he really finds that something has come about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an independent, but rather a dependent consciousness that he has achieved.'[120]

Coriolanus is able to scoff at the opinion of his fellow Romans, not because he is truly impervious to all opprobrium, but because he is so deeply bound to one person, his mother, that no one else's approval seems important in comparison. In *Antony and Cleopatra*, the two lovers cultivate in like manner what amounts to a *folie à deux*. Cleopatra finds one powerful man whom she can seduce, one pre-eminent enough, like Antony or Caesar, that she can take him as representative of the entire world. Antony in turn is able to tap into the legendary, limitless wealth of Egypt, as well as the glamour of having won, in Cleopatra, a singular prize, a latter-day Helen of Troy. While he is in her company, moreover, Antony is able to enjoy what for Roman would have been an unaccustomed degree of absolute rule. As long as he is with Cleopatra in Egypt, Antony no longer has to go through the motions of being merely one more Roman citizen; he does not have to push away the crown, like Caesar in *Julius Caesar*, or negotiate terms with two other triumvirs. Instead, he can unabashedly behave, even in public, as if he were a god: Osiris to Cleopatra's Isis.

In the second section of the third chapter, '"Fancy" vs. "Nature"', I show that such a compact of mutual admiration is not without its own attendant dangers. For it to work without fail, their *folie à deux* would require a sangfroid that Antony and Cleopatra do not possess, perhaps to their credit: a clearheaded self-awareness that its very terms tend to preclude. Antony would have to remember that he is not, in fact, the god that he can pretend to be, while he is at play in Alexandria; his power in the larger Roman world, unlike the obedience of Cleopatra's slaves, does not answer solely to his passing

caprice. Caught up in an enchanting delusion, he comes to see himself as more autonomous than in the end he really is. Cleopatra for her part would have to be careful not to fall too deeply in love; she would have to be willing to move on from Antony, when he falls, just as she did from Caesar, to the next world-bestriding colossus, who in this case turns out to be the rather frosty, off-putting 'boy Caesar', Octavian. And, despite all Antony's fears to the contrary, she cannot. She is in the end too old and too enamoured of Antony in particular to be able to play politics with her affections as she perhaps might once have done, in her 'salad days'.

In order to explain Shakespeare's sense of human selfhood as susceptible to moral judgement, in the first part of the next chapter, '"Eye to eye opposed"', I introduce an explanation of what I take to be Shakespeare's understanding of the intersubjective relationship between self and other. Since at least the 1980s, Shakespeare studies has been decidedly historicist, at times even radically so, emphasising the contingency of aspects of the human subject such as sexuality or madness once thought susceptible to description in terms of universal, abiding and objective norms. Elements of personhood which psychologists might describe as a natural consequence of perennial features of human biology have instead been represented as primarily or even entirely dependent on the shifting contexts of contemporary culture. For a time, the influence of Althusser and Foucault became pervasive, even hegemonic. Relationships of power and subjection were held to produce 'ideology', which through literature, as well as other forms of 'discourse', 'interpellates' the individual and shapes him or her into a compliant 'subject'. Peter Holbrook, among others, laments this effect of what he calls 'the "Theory" explosion'. 'Theory's chastening lesson is that the autonomous self is a will-o'-the-wisp and that character is determined by imperious historical forces.'[121]

As Holbrook says, 'I do not recognize myself in the estranged world of the anti-humanists.'[122] Happily, however, as critics such as Nancy Selleck, Christopher Tilmouth and others have begun to suggest, Shakespeare's own understanding of intersubjectivity provides an appealing alternative.[123] In his representation of interpersonal interaction, Shakespeare complicates false dichotomies between supposedly overwhelming cultural forces such as 'discourse', impersonal, diffuse and vast in scope, and the beleaguered, supposedly powerless 'subject'. Other individuals intervene between culture

and the subject, shaping and being shaped in turn, mediating the influence of any kind of Zeitgeist. The particularity of these others should not be elided, but instead recognised as introducing the granular specificity of smaller-scale, intersubjective networks within any larger and more sweeping construct such as Foucault's epistemes. As Tilmouth explains, 'Since 1990 several critics have developed the paradoxical claim that Renaissance selfhood was in some degree vested outside the individual, *imagined* as located in other minds.' What Katharine Maus describes as 'inwardness' has been 'reconceived as an experience situated on the boundary between the person and those to whom he relates, within the dialogic domain of intersubjectivity'.[124]

Shakespeare's interpretation of the relation between self and other is in part derived from Aristotle's theory of friendship. As he articulates that theory, however, he also introduces complications, anticipating in several respects one of the most prominent trends in twentieth-century philosophical anthropology. Like Shakespeare, authors such as Martin Buber, Mikhail Bakhtin, Paul Ricœur and Jürgen Habermas have come to emphasise relations between individuals as the ground of human personhood. The other is what Martin Buber calls a 'thou', a partner in a dialogue. This ceaseless, constitutive interaction, the 'I–thou' relationship, is the most fundamental given of the human condition. Nancy Selleck argues that this sense of selfhood as 'interpersonal', 'part of a reciprocally-constituted social field', 'underpins much of the language of selfhood in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries'. Other early modern authors such as John Donne, as well as Shakespeare, 'magnify or harp on' this 'sense of engagement with a *live* other': 'a live, concrete, agentive other that is also not alien but in dialogue with the self.' 'The Renaissance self entails other selves.'[125]

Departing from Aristotle, Shakespeare's first innovation is to expand ancient thought about the role of the other in self-knowledge beyond the confines of friendship between two individuals, so that it approximates instead the relationship between actor or playwright and audience. Shakespeare's second point of revision is to present the other much more explicitly as a necessary part of self-perception: integral, not optional. Shakespeare's third alteration, however, is by far the most interesting, and appears most clearly in *Antony and Cleopatra*. As Selleck says of the narrator in Shakespeare's sonnets, in *Antony and Cleopatra* the self finds itself imbricated in 'other frames of reference *that it cannot control*'.[126] The effect of

the other upon the self is not something that the self can easily or entirely dismiss. We cannot help but be affected, in some measure, by what other people think of us. Given sufficient exposure to their perspective, their version of our selves, however troubling, begins to impinge upon our own. The risk of such forced alteration in his own self-image is the reason why Coriolanus refuses to go through the proper motions to become consul and why Brutus and Cleopatra are so horrified at the thought of being led in triumph. To be seen a certain way long enough and by enough people is to have one's self-image, howsoever unwillingly, brought into closer conformity with that collective assessment.

To explain Shakespeare's thought about this phenomenon, in the second section of the fourth chapter, '"I would not see't"', I invoke Althusser's well-known metaphor of interpellation or 'hailing', but apply it in a very different sense than Althusser himself. Althusser sees interpellation as a unilateral process with one kind of agent, an impersonal force that he calls 'ideology', and a different kind of subject, the individual, whom he presents as markedly passive, as if ideology were form, and the individual, matter. As Selleck observes, this putative 'passivity' of the subject is 'both crucial to Althusser's theory and one of its more problematic aspects'. 'In contrast to Bakhtinian theory, there is no sense here of the subject's participation in a process: "ideology" is not affected by its subjects.'[127] Like Bakhtin, Shakespeare sees interpellation instead as multilateral and reciprocal. People continually act upon each other's subjectivities, even without meaning to, so as to bring them into closer conformity with their own. Our diverse individual experiences of reality are not and indeed cannot be made entirely solipsistic; cannot be rendered self-contained, even by dint of great effort. Instead, our individual perspectives are inevitably porous, diffuse, bleeding into each other like contiguous inkblots.

Resistance to being subsumed into a shared subjective space is not altogether impossible, however. One can escape from 'common sense' into wine or 'mandragora'; imaginative fantasies ('dreams') or a romantic relationship. Just how far in practice we can escape subjective entanglement with the rival images of ourselves other people have in mind, especially those that are less than flattering, is in general a question Shakespeare seems to have found fascinating, and which he explores in particular detail in his version of the Cleopatra legend, as well as his earlier history play *Richard II*.[128] In both cases, Shakespeare's sense of the limits of perceptual

autonomy seems to be that the process I call here 'interpellation' is to some extent voluntary, but not completely so. The ability of an individual to resist interpellation is susceptible to disparities of power and, especially, number. Characters such as Cleopatra see being shown at length before a hostile, jeering crowd as too much to be able to resist, even given great powers of dissociation; such prolonged and multifaceted exposure would inevitably prove overwhelming. So, as the alternative of last resort, they commit suicide. Even suicide, however, Shakespeare suggests, may not prove in the end the definitive exit that these pagan characters imagine it will be. In keeping with Christian doctrine, for Shakespeare, the afterlife promises, not escape, but if anything, even more extensive exposure to the other. As Sartre says, *huis clos* ('no exit').

In Shakespeare's Roman plays, characters such as Antony and Cleopatra, as well as Brutus, strive to escape the possibility of being judged adversely, and their success is never complete or lasting. Coriolanus is the most obvious example; he cannot even bear to be praised, lest it suggest that his sense of himself depends in any way on the good opinion or 'voices' of other people. Coriolanus' ostensible contempt for others' opinion of him, however, is belied by his exaggerated and finally fatal dependence on his mother's approval. He and Volumnia represent the *folie à deux* broken, much as Antony and Cleopatra represent it sustained, even to the point of death. Out of all of Shakespeare's characters, these two lovers in particular come as close as possible to escaping all external interpellation, finding a kind of refuge from opprobrium in each other's flattering gaze. Subtly, however, throughout the play, Shakespeare reminds us that even personalities as grandiose as Cleopatra's may not be able to escape the Last Judgement: 'doomsday'. Human beings by their very nature as human, rather than divine, are vulnerable to processes of moral judgement that they do not and cannot ever entirely control.

In the conclusion to my analysis of *Antony and Cleopatra*, 'The Last Interpellation', I look closely at the play's recurrent, ironic allusions to Scripture and argue that Shakespeare subtly reminds the audience throughout of a Christian revelation of which the characters on stage are themselves unaware. For Shakespeare's Romans, suicide appears to be an unimpeachable defence against the possibility of any further humiliation. Suicide is a means to remain unseen and therefore unaffected by a hostile audience. This view of suicide depends, however, as Shakespeare recognises, on

a rejection or else ignorance of the Christian understanding of the afterlife. Death is only an escape, if there is nothing after death, or if death leads, not to heaven and hell, but to some sort of pagan Elysium; one that corresponds with suspicious congruity to the suicide's own fantasies. Whether or not we see Antony and Cleopatra as ultimately successful in their attempt, through suicide, to preserve their own self-contained subjective space depends, in the end, on whether or not we believe Shakespeare shares their vision of what Hamlet calls 'the undiscover'd country'.

Notes

1. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 27.
2. On 'sovereignty' and 'the frailty of human affairs', see Arendt, *The Human Condition*. On Arendt and Roman politics, as well as Roman philosophy, see Connolly, 'The Promise of the Classical Canon'.
3. Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism* (1998). On liberalism and its discontents, see John Gray, 'The Problem of Hyper-Liberalism', 3–5; Deneen, 'The Ignoble Lie'; Deneen, *Why Liberalism Failed*; and Vermuele, 'Integration from Within'; as well as David Bentley Hart, 'Christ and Nothing', in *First Things* (October 2003), 47–56, reprinted in Hart, *In the Aftermath*, 1–19. Cf. Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent*. My own impression is that in the civil rights era, racism was the centre of political contention, at least within the United States. Once civil rights more or less won the day, Christianity became the new faultline, giving rise to the so-called 'Culture Wars' of the 1980s and 1990s. I am relieved that racism is no longer as pervasive as it once was in American society. I am less sanguine, however, about the dissolution of Christianity, for fear of the 'rough beast' that has shown up to fill the void: identity politics, including the so-called 'alt-right', which I see as in essence a peripheral variation on the same. As Christianity loses its former cultural hegemony, what seems to be emerging in its place, not only in the United States, but also in the United Kingdom and Europe, is an antagonism that is not so much racial as tribal. In its sense of quasi-hereditary caste, as well as its proclivity for Machtpolitik, this increasingly unrestrained enmity between social classes, as well as geographic regions, rich vs. poor, city vs. country, at times eerily resembles the Conflict of the Orders in ancient Rome, patrician vs. plebeian, as well as the analogous tension between Roman citizens and their Italian allies (*socii*), leading up to the so-called Social War (*bellum sociale*). So, like Deneen, as well as Sandel, I wonder what happens next. Can liberalism on its own avoid degenerating into what Hobbes calls *bellum omnium contra omnes*?

See Lind, 'Classless Utopia'; Chua, *Political Tribes*; Wuthnow, *The Left Behind*; Lilla, *The Once and Future Liberal*; Codevilla, 'The Rise of Political Correctness'; Lind, 'The New Class War'; Kotkin, *The New Class Conflict*; Codevilla, 'America's Ruling Class'; and Appiah, *Ethics of Identity*.

4. Holbrook, *Shakespeare's Individualism*.
5. Fernie, *Shakespeare for Freedom*, 6, 2, 74, 72, 173, 66.
6. Kant, 'Idea for a Universal History', 15.
7. Fernie, *Shakespeare for Freedom*, 73.
8. Ibid., 79, 164, 6, 201, 207, 198.
9. Hegel, *Hegel's Logic*, § 436; Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition*, 79.
10. Fukuyama, *The End of History.*
11. Markell, *Bound by Recognition*, 2.
12. Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', 24, 26.
13. Fukuyama, 'Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy', 9, *Journal of Democracy* 17 (2006): 5–20; cited in Holbrook, *Shakespeare's Individualism*, 63.
14. Holbrook, *Shakespeare's Individualism*, 63.
15. Markell, *Bound by Recognition*, 59, 108, 221 n. 9.
16. Ibid., 7, 11, 36.
17. Ibid., 36, 79.
18. Arendt, *Human Condition*, 234.
19. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §§ 750–1.
20. See Brooke, *Philosophic Pride* as well as Schneewind, *Invention of Autonomy.*
21. Fernie, *Shakespeare for Freedom*, 6.
22. Holbrook, *Shakespeare's Individualism*, 140.
23. Geoffrey Miles, *Shakespeare and the Constant Romans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 9 n. 26; cited in Holbrook, *Shakespeare's Individualism*, 140.
24. Gill, *Personality*; cf. Gill, *Structured Self*.
25. Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 376.
26. Hart, 'Christ and Nothing', 47.
27. Stephen Greenblatt, *Shakespeare's Freedom*, 111, 113.
28. On 'Eliot's rejection of Shakespeare', see Holbrook, *Shakespeare's Individualism*, 154–71.
29. Isaiah Berlin, 'The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will: The Revolt Against the Myth of an Ideal World', in Berlin, *The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays*, ed. Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998); cited in Holbrook, *Shakespeare's Individualism*, 5.
30. See Patrick Gray, 'Seduced by Romanticism'.
31. Langley, *Narcissism and Suicide in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries*.

32. Cicero, *On Duties*, 1.22. Cicero cites here Plato's apocryphal ninth epistle to Archytas, 358a.
33. Hadfield, *Shakespeare and Republicanism*, 230, 95, 232, 12.
34. Nelson, 'Shakespeare and the Best State of a Commonwealth'; Colclough, 'Talking to the Animals'.
35. Armitage, Condren and Fitzmaurice, 'Introduction', 15–16.
36. Nelson, 'Shakespeare and the Best State of a Commonwealth', 253, 256.
37. Armitage, Condren and Fitzmaurice, 'Introduction', 16.
38. Patrick Gray and Samely, 'Shakespeare and Henri Lefebvre's "Right to the City"'. Cf. Patterson, *Shakespeare and the Popular Voice*.
39. Hadfield, *Shakespeare and Republicanism*, 2–24, 161, 165.
40. August. *De civ. D.* 2.2.
41. Ibid., 3.14.
42. Ibid., 1.1. Cf. Hor. *Epod.* 16.2: *suis et ipsa Roma viribus ruit* ('Rome herself falls by her own strength'); Prop. 3.13.60: *frangitur ipsa suis Roma superba bonis*; Lucan, 1.81: *in se magna ruunt*. See also Ernst Dutoit, 'Le Thème de "la force qui se détruit elle-même"', *Revue des Études Latines* 14 (1936): 365–73; cited in Braden, *Renaissance*, 14, 226 n. 10.
43. August. *De civ. D.* 5.12.
44. Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, 11–12.
45. August. *De civ. D.* 5.19.
46. Cic. *Off.* 1.26, 64; 3.83.
47. August. *De civ. D.* 1.1.
48. Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, 131 (2.2).
49. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, 260 (1.15), 682 (3.38).
50. August. *De civ. D.* 3.30.
51. Ibid., 3.29.
52. Ibid., 1.1.
53. On Shakespeare and the ethics of war, see Patrick Gray, 'Shakespeare and War', 1–25.
54. Hillier, 'Valour Will Weep', 359.
55. Ibid., 374.
56. Greenblatt, *Shakespeare's Freedom*, 106.
57. Jagendorf, '*Coriolanus*: Body Politic and Private Parts', 462.
58. All references to Shakespeare's plays are taken from *The Arden Shakespeare Complete Works*, ed. Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson and David Scott Kastan (London: Cengage Learning, 2002).
59. See Whittington, *Renaissance Suppliants*: 'whereas the non-Plutarchan Coriolanus material in circulation in the sixteenth century focused on Volumnia's supplication as a victory of the softer emotions, a harmonious restoration of relations between mother and son undergirded by the psychology of chivalry, Shakespeare found in Plutarch's "Life" the

suggestion that Coriolanus' reconciliation with Rome precipitated his demise.'

60. August. *De civ. D.* 5.18.
61. Whittington, *Renaissance Suppliants*.
62. Hillier, 'Valour Will Weep', 388.
63. On the parallels between Brutus and Caesar, see Rabkin, *Shakespeare and the Common Understanding*, 106–12; de Gerenday, 'Play, Ritualization, and Ambivalence in *Julius Caesar*'; and Pierre Spriet, 'Amour et politique: le discourse de l'autre dans *Julius Caesar*', in *Coriolan: Théâtre*, ed. Jean-Paul Debax and Yves Peyré, ser. B, 5 (Toulouse: Université de Toulouse–Le Mirail, 1984), 227–9; cited in Rebhorn, 'Crisis of the Aristocracy', 79 n. 11.
64. Arist. *Pol.* 3–4; cf. Pl. *Resp.* 8–9.
65. Cantor, *Shakespeare's Rome*, 40, 57, 45.
66. Syme, *Roman Revolution*, 490–1.
67. Cantor, *Shakespeare's Rome*, 128, 175–6.
68. Cantor, *Shakespeare's Roman Trilogy*, 3.
69. Ibid., 47–50.
70. Ibid., 83
71. In the preface to *Saint Joan*, Shaw complains of what he calls 'a void in Elizabethan drama', 'A novice can read his [Shakespeare's] plays from one end to the other without learning that the world is finally governed by forces expressing themselves in religions and laws which make epochs rather than by vulgarly ambitious individuals who make rows.'
72. Cantor, *Shakespeare's Roman Trilogy*, 12–13.
73. Nuttall, *Shakespeare the Thinker*, 171.
74. Cantor, *Shakespeare's Roman Trilogy*, 16.
75. Chernaik, *The Myth of Rome in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries*, 107; cf. 244–6.
76. Holbrook, *Shakespeare's Individualism*, 22.
77. Richard Strier, *Resistant Structures: Particularity, Radicalism, and Renaissance Texts* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 167; cited in Holbrook, *Shakespeare's Individualism*, 22.
78. Strier, *Resistant Structures*, 166.
79. John Keats, *Letters of John Keats: A Selection,* ed. R. Gittings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 32; cited in Holbrook, *Shakespeare's Individualism*, 22. Cf. Patrick Gray, 'Seduced by Romanticism'.
80. Fernie, *Shakespeare for Freedom*, 194. Cf. Hegel, 'A Conversation of Three'. For original German text, see Hegel, *Documente zu Hegels Entwicklung*, 3–6.
81. Cantor, *Shakespeare's Roman Trilogy*, 100.

82. Ibid., 87.
83. Ibid., 164.
84. Braden cites Flaubert, who himself echoes St Augustine: '*C'est l'homme culminant du monde antique.*' Cf. Gustave Flaubert, *Correspondance,* ed. Jean Bruneau, vol. 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), 209 (to Louis de Cormenin, 1844); cited in Braden, *Renaissance Tragedy*, 15.
85. Braden, *Renaissance Tragedy*, 13–14.
86. Ibid., 15–16.
87. Cic. *Off.* 1.69–70.
88. Braden, *Renaissance Tragedy*, 23, 12, 21, 24.
89. Ibid., 77–8.
90. Charles Trinkaus, *The Poet as Philosopher* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 22, 25; cited in Braden, *Renaissance Tragedy*, 73.
91. Braden, *Renaissance Tragedy*, 80.
92. Rebhorn, 'The Crisis of the Aristocracy in *Julius Caesar*', 81.
93. Ibid., 86. Cf. John R. Kayser and Ronald J. Lettieri, '"The Last of All the Romans": Shakespeare's Commentary on Classical Republicanism', *Clio* 9 (1979–80): 197–227; cited in Rebhorn, 'Crisis of the Aristocracy', 86 n. 23.
94. Quint, 'Tragedy of Nobility', 14–17.
95. Quint, 'Introduction', in William Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, xi–xxvi.
96. Quint, 'Tragedy of Nobility', 9–10.
97. Cox, *Shakespeare and the Dramaturgy of Power*, 87.
98. Rebhorn, 'Crisis of the Aristocracy', 108.
99. Ibid., 78.
100. Cox, *Dramaturgy of Power*, 69–71.
101. Ibid., 172; cf. Cox, *The Devil and the Sacred*.
102. Cox, *Dramaturgy of Power*, 70.
103. Miles, *Shakespeare and the Constant Romans*, 80 n. 37. Miles cites Monsarrat, *Light from the Porch*, ch. 4, as well as Sams, 'Anti-Stoicism'.
104. Levin, *The Overreacher*; Esler, *Aspiring Mind*; cf. also Watson, *Shakespeare and the Hazards of Ambition*.
105. Braden, *Renaissance Tragedy*, 17.
106. Kuzner, *Open Subjects*, 115, 3, 19.
107. *On the Good Life: Selected Writings from Cicero*, trans. Michael Grant (London and New York: Penguin, 1971), 189; cited in Kuzner, *Open Subjects*, 61.
108. Kuzner's insight is corroborated by Joy Connolly's work on Cicero's rhetorical theory. For Cicero, she argues, as for Habermas, 'human society exists through and in the interactions of subjects:

it is a network or web of intersubjectivity.' Connolly, *State of Speech*, 143.

109. Kuzner, *Open Subjects*, 23, 6, 115, 18–19.
110. Cox, *Dramaturgy of Power*, 77.
111. Kuzner, *Open Subjects,* 61, 6.
112. For a more detailed history of the concept of the ego ideal, see Sandler, Holder and Meers, 'The Ego Ideal and the Ideal Self'.
113. For the significance of the *exemplum* in Roman thought, see Bartsch, *Mirror of the Self*, 119–20. For its analogous significance in Renaissance thought, see Hampton, *Writing from History*, Lyons, *Exemplum* and 'The Renaissance Crisis of Exemplarity', special issue of *Journal of the History of Ideas* 59 (1998), ed. François Rigolot.
114. Dostoevsky, *The Adolescent*, 373.
115. Cic. *Off.* 1.72.
116. Cf. the concept of tragedy as a failure of 'acknowledgement' in Cavell, *Disowning Knowledge*, as well as Markell, *Bound by Recognition*.
117. Reiss, *Mirages of the Selfe*, 2, 21.
118. The title alludes to Emerson's 'Self-Reliance': 'A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.'
119. Cantor, *Shakespeare's Rome*, 95.
120. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, 236.
121. Holbrook, *Shakespeare's Individualism*, 57.
122. Ibid., 58.
123. Selleck, *Interpersonal Idiom*; Tilmouth, 'Passion and Intersubjectivity'. See also Anderson, *The Renaissance Extended Mind* and Magnusson, *Shakespeare and Social Dialogue.*
124. Tilmouth, 'Passion and Intersubjectivity', 16; cf. Selleck, *Interpersonal Idiom*, 177 n. 38 and 178 n. 41.
125. Selleck, *Interpersonal Idiom*, 4, 15–16.
126. Ibid., 92.
127. Ibid., 176 n. 38.
128. On *Richard II* as an exploration of the limits of this kind of intersubjective interpellation, see Patrick Gray, 'Shakespeare versus Aristotle'.