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**CONFLICT AND DECISION-MAKING
IN SOVIET RUSSIA**

A CASE STUDY OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY

1953-1963

“... a political science which is faithful to its moral commitment of telling the truth about the political world cannot help telling society things it does not want to hear. This cannot be otherwise in view of the fact that one of the main purposes of society is to conceal the truth about man and society from its members. That concealment, that elaborate and subtle and purposeful misunderstanding of the nature of man and of society, is one of the cornerstones upon which all societies are founded.”—Hans J. Morgenthau*

*In *Approaches to the Study of Politics*, edited by Roland Young, Evanston, Ill., 1958, p. 72.