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2. The Political Economy of Stalin

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A History of Marxian Economics, Volume II
This chapter is in the book A History of Marxian Economics, Volume II
2 The Political Economy of Stalin I The Stalinist System As the Great Depression engulfed the economies of Western capitalism, the rate of growth in the Soviet Union dramatically accelerated. Between 1928 and 1937 industrial production increased threefold, rising from less than one-third of national product to nearly one-half. It more than doubled again between 1937 and 1953, constituting close to 60 per cent of total output at the time of Stalin's death. Only through large investments was this made possible. On average, over 20 per cent of output was devoted to accumula­tion in each year. The consumption of workers and peasants fell sharply; it was not until the early 1950s that real wages regained their level of 1928, while peasant living standards fell even more, and took longer to recover.1 Accompanying the 'great leap' forward, a 'revolution from above' established a new mode of production. The grain crisis which began in late 1927 brought measures of procurement reminiscent of War Communism, and was followed after 1928 by a policy aiming to 'eliminate the kulaks as a class' and quickly to collectivise peasant agriculture.2 This was substantially achieved by 1934, and virtually completed by the end of the 1930s. It brought with it the requisite political control over the allocation of agricultural output, so removing the constraint on the expansion of industry which had operated through much of the 1920s. Rapid industria­lisation in its turn allowed a significant mechanisation of agriculture to take place during the 1930s.3 Renationalisation of non-agricultural enterprises occurred simultaneously with collectivisation, and administrative allocation largely replaced market transactions. A series of five year plans became the guiding force for most production. Nevertheless the 'command economy' was only imperfectly planned. In the early years especially, voluntarism and war imagery were pervasive; there were 'no fortresses . . . Bolsheviks cannot capture'.4 Output targets were raised without regard to capacity limits, pressure for overfulfilment was intense, and 'shock tactics' were employed on specific projects. Concepts of

2 The Political Economy of Stalin I The Stalinist System As the Great Depression engulfed the economies of Western capitalism, the rate of growth in the Soviet Union dramatically accelerated. Between 1928 and 1937 industrial production increased threefold, rising from less than one-third of national product to nearly one-half. It more than doubled again between 1937 and 1953, constituting close to 60 per cent of total output at the time of Stalin's death. Only through large investments was this made possible. On average, over 20 per cent of output was devoted to accumula­tion in each year. The consumption of workers and peasants fell sharply; it was not until the early 1950s that real wages regained their level of 1928, while peasant living standards fell even more, and took longer to recover.1 Accompanying the 'great leap' forward, a 'revolution from above' established a new mode of production. The grain crisis which began in late 1927 brought measures of procurement reminiscent of War Communism, and was followed after 1928 by a policy aiming to 'eliminate the kulaks as a class' and quickly to collectivise peasant agriculture.2 This was substantially achieved by 1934, and virtually completed by the end of the 1930s. It brought with it the requisite political control over the allocation of agricultural output, so removing the constraint on the expansion of industry which had operated through much of the 1920s. Rapid industria­lisation in its turn allowed a significant mechanisation of agriculture to take place during the 1930s.3 Renationalisation of non-agricultural enterprises occurred simultaneously with collectivisation, and administrative allocation largely replaced market transactions. A series of five year plans became the guiding force for most production. Nevertheless the 'command economy' was only imperfectly planned. In the early years especially, voluntarism and war imagery were pervasive; there were 'no fortresses . . . Bolsheviks cannot capture'.4 Output targets were raised without regard to capacity limits, pressure for overfulfilment was intense, and 'shock tactics' were employed on specific projects. Concepts of

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents v
  3. Acknowledgements ix
  4. Introduction xi
  5. Part I: The Great Depression and Stalinism
  6. 1. Marxian Economics and the Great Depression 3
  7. 2. The Political Economy of Stalin 24
  8. 3. The Soviet Mode of Production 48
  9. Part II: The Long Boom
  10. 4. ‘Has Capitalism Changed?’ 75
  11. 5. Marx and Keynes 91
  12. 6. Monopoly Capital 109
  13. 7. The Falling Rate of Profit 128
  14. 8. The Permanent Arms Economy 149
  15. Part III: New Theories of Imperialism
  16. 9. Capitalism and Underdevelopment 167
  17. 10. Unequal Exchange 186
  18. 11. Critics of Underdevelopment 205
  19. Part IV: Value and Exploitation
  20. 12. Value Theory Before Sraffa 227
  21. 13. Sraffa and the Critique of Marxian Theory 245
  22. 14. Marxian Value Theory After Sraffa 265
  23. 15. Marxian Political Economy and Surplus Economics 291
  24. Part V: Current Controversies
  25. 16. The ‘Second Slump’: Theories of Crisis after 1973 311
  26. 17. Rational Choice Marxism 335
  27. Conclusion 387
  28. Index of Names 397
  29. Index of Subjects 403
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https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400862931.24

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents v
  3. Acknowledgements ix
  4. Introduction xi
  5. Part I: The Great Depression and Stalinism
  6. 1. Marxian Economics and the Great Depression 3
  7. 2. The Political Economy of Stalin 24
  8. 3. The Soviet Mode of Production 48
  9. Part II: The Long Boom
  10. 4. ‘Has Capitalism Changed?’ 75
  11. 5. Marx and Keynes 91
  12. 6. Monopoly Capital 109
  13. 7. The Falling Rate of Profit 128
  14. 8. The Permanent Arms Economy 149
  15. Part III: New Theories of Imperialism
  16. 9. Capitalism and Underdevelopment 167
  17. 10. Unequal Exchange 186
  18. 11. Critics of Underdevelopment 205
  19. Part IV: Value and Exploitation
  20. 12. Value Theory Before Sraffa 227
  21. 13. Sraffa and the Critique of Marxian Theory 245
  22. 14. Marxian Value Theory After Sraffa 265
  23. 15. Marxian Political Economy and Surplus Economics 291
  24. Part V: Current Controversies
  25. 16. The ‘Second Slump’: Theories of Crisis after 1973 311
  26. 17. Rational Choice Marxism 335
  27. Conclusion 387
  28. Index of Names 397
  29. Index of Subjects 403
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