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8. The Korean War and the Cold War of the 1950s

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America in the World
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8The korean War and the Cold War of the 1950sThe Cold War took an ominous turn in 1950. Open hostilities erupted on the Ko-rean Peninsula, split at the thirty-eighth parallel following Japanese occupation during World War II. Troops and tanks from the communist north poured into the pro-Western south. What many historians interpret today as a civil war between Koreans immediately appeared to policy makers around the world, and in Wash-ington in particular, as part of a global communist assault orchestrated by Beijing and Moscow. American policy makers responded with force, vowing to defend the southern regime, while plotting as well a long-term evolution of American society and military planning capable of defeating the global communist threat over time.They soon split over exactly how much force they might best employ in Korea and beyond. President Harry S. Truman in particular wanted South Korea lib-erated, but not at the cost of a broader war in Asia against Chinese and Soviet troops. Others, most notably the American commander in the region, General Douglas MacArthur, believed there should be no limits on the American war effort against global communism. This clash between Truman and MacArthur became one of the signature moments in the struggle between civilian and military con-trol of American war making in the nation’s history. The struggle also encapsu-lated the broad questions of the 1950s for American policy makers: how much was enough to secure American interests and Washington’s allies, and how much—in defense spending, domestic surveillance of communist threats, or the size of gov-ernment itself—would undermine the very freedom they hoped to defend. At the moment MacArthur lost his job for too often and too vocally endorsing a whole-sale assault on communism, including perhaps even the use of atomic weapons, Truman’s White House embraced the National Security Council’s NSC-68, a global blueprint for vastly expanding the national security state. Such debates continued within Washington’s highest policy-making circles even after Republi-cans regained control of the White House under Dwight D. Eisenhower.Eisenhower in fact presided over the very massive expansion of federal power he personally loathed. He had long preached against the dangers of a “garrison state,” yet he proved largely powerless in the end to constrain the Cold War state’s reach into most facets of American life. By the close of his presidency, federal power was pervasive as never before in arenas as diverse as transportation policy, higher education, science funding, and industrial planning. He entered office on a wave of optimism, catalyzed later in 1953 when Joseph Stalin’s death seemed to create

8The korean War and the Cold War of the 1950sThe Cold War took an ominous turn in 1950. Open hostilities erupted on the Ko-rean Peninsula, split at the thirty-eighth parallel following Japanese occupation during World War II. Troops and tanks from the communist north poured into the pro-Western south. What many historians interpret today as a civil war between Koreans immediately appeared to policy makers around the world, and in Wash-ington in particular, as part of a global communist assault orchestrated by Beijing and Moscow. American policy makers responded with force, vowing to defend the southern regime, while plotting as well a long-term evolution of American society and military planning capable of defeating the global communist threat over time.They soon split over exactly how much force they might best employ in Korea and beyond. President Harry S. Truman in particular wanted South Korea lib-erated, but not at the cost of a broader war in Asia against Chinese and Soviet troops. Others, most notably the American commander in the region, General Douglas MacArthur, believed there should be no limits on the American war effort against global communism. This clash between Truman and MacArthur became one of the signature moments in the struggle between civilian and military con-trol of American war making in the nation’s history. The struggle also encapsu-lated the broad questions of the 1950s for American policy makers: how much was enough to secure American interests and Washington’s allies, and how much—in defense spending, domestic surveillance of communist threats, or the size of gov-ernment itself—would undermine the very freedom they hoped to defend. At the moment MacArthur lost his job for too often and too vocally endorsing a whole-sale assault on communism, including perhaps even the use of atomic weapons, Truman’s White House embraced the National Security Council’s NSC-68, a global blueprint for vastly expanding the national security state. Such debates continued within Washington’s highest policy-making circles even after Republi-cans regained control of the White House under Dwight D. Eisenhower.Eisenhower in fact presided over the very massive expansion of federal power he personally loathed. He had long preached against the dangers of a “garrison state,” yet he proved largely powerless in the end to constrain the Cold War state’s reach into most facets of American life. By the close of his presidency, federal power was pervasive as never before in arenas as diverse as transportation policy, higher education, science funding, and industrial planning. He entered office on a wave of optimism, catalyzed later in 1953 when Joseph Stalin’s death seemed to create

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents v
  3. Acknowledgments vii
  4. Introduction: The Long American Century 1
  5. 1. Motives of Expansion 7
  6. 2. Imperial America: War with Spain and the Philippines 32
  7. 3. Varieties of Empire 56
  8. 4. The Rise and Fall of Wilsonianism 79
  9. 5. Isolation and Intervention 107
  10. 6. World War II 131
  11. 7. The Beginning of the Cold War 157
  12. 8. The Korean War and the Cold War of the 1950s 182
  13. 9. The Nationalist Challenge 206
  14. 10. Years of Crisis 231
  15. 11. The Vietnam War 255
  16. 12. The Era of Détente 281
  17. 13. Escalating and Ending the Cold War 305
  18. 14. Globalization after the Cold War 331
  19. 15. The Age of Terror 354
  20. Sources 379
  21. Index 395
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https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400851454-010

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Contents v
  3. Acknowledgments vii
  4. Introduction: The Long American Century 1
  5. 1. Motives of Expansion 7
  6. 2. Imperial America: War with Spain and the Philippines 32
  7. 3. Varieties of Empire 56
  8. 4. The Rise and Fall of Wilsonianism 79
  9. 5. Isolation and Intervention 107
  10. 6. World War II 131
  11. 7. The Beginning of the Cold War 157
  12. 8. The Korean War and the Cold War of the 1950s 182
  13. 9. The Nationalist Challenge 206
  14. 10. Years of Crisis 231
  15. 11. The Vietnam War 255
  16. 12. The Era of Détente 281
  17. 13. Escalating and Ending the Cold War 305
  18. 14. Globalization after the Cold War 331
  19. 15. The Age of Terror 354
  20. Sources 379
  21. Index 395
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