

CHAPTER 13

Euro-Japanese Universalism, Korean Confucianism, and Aesthetic Communities

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The Advent of European-Japanese Universalism since the Nineteenth Century

During the nineteenth century, core Western countries such as Great Britain, Germany, France, and Russia began to penetrate into East Asia, and the traditional East Asian tributary system centered on China was challenged. The consequence of war between Great Britain/France and China in the years between 1839 and 1860 demonstrated the ineluctable dominance of the main European powers over China.

It is interesting to note that until the eighteenth century Chinese civilization had served Europe as a model to be emulated, or at worst as a rival. China had a *lingua franca*, a centralized bureaucratic system, and sophisticated philosophies in the form of Confucianism and Buddhism. Yet suddenly, from the nineteenth century on, Chinese civilization came to seem increasingly ossified, straddled by serious and inherent defects that could only be remedied through the tutelage of Western modernity.

The images and the knowledge of East Asia produced by key Western countries in the course of the nineteenth century were based on a simple premise. Everything that had occurred to put Western countries in their current position had been inevitable, progressive, civilized, and universal; this included ideas and movements such as the rise of capitalism, liberal democracy, and the development of the natural sciences and industrialization. At the same time, whatever resisted these forces was feudal, barbaric, reactionary, and backward.

What is distinctive in this era in East Asia is the role of Japan as a late colonizer. In the wake of Perry's expedition to Japan, during the period 1868–1912, and under the slogan of “enrich the country, strengthen the military” (*fukoku kyōhei* 富國強兵), Japan transformed itself along the Western model of the aggressive nation-state. As a late colonizer, Japan presented two faces: inferiority regarding Western domination and superiority vis-à-vis its Asian neighbors. Japan defined itself as a paradox, part of a larger community of oppressed Asian nations standing against Western hegemony, while also being the most Westernized, civilized country among Asian nations.

As a late colonizer, Japan began to develop a knowledge of Korean Confucianism from both of these perspectives. Korean Confucianism was seen as the main source of Korea's backwardness: Korea was destined to fall because of its preoccupation with pedantic and unproductive debates, ignorance of the state of the people's welfare, and blind dependence upon the Zhu Xi school of Confucianism that was followed by the Korean literati. At the same time, Japan was developing a “Pan-Asian” theory of culture regarding the “yellow race” on the basis of which Japan claimed the exclusive right and “burden” to intervene in Asian countries. As an Asian country that had successfully adjusted to the Western model of an aggressive nation-state, Japan began to cultivate a kind of European-Japanese universalism, nurtured in the soil of racism and Pan-Asianism, and to introduce it into the neighboring cultures, including Korea, where it was combined with local Confucian beliefs and practices. In this way Japan was able to introduce European universalism along with selected elements of the Japanese tradition, including Japanese Confucianism, especially the Wang Yangming School (*Yōmeigaku* 陽明学) and the National Studies School (*Kokugaku* 国学).

Inoue Tetsujirō (1855–1944), philosopher and proponent of the theory of Eastern philosophy (*Tōyō tetsugaku* 東洋哲學)—as distinguished from Western philosophy (*Seiyō tetsugaku* 西洋哲學)—argued that Japanese philosophy was unique in that it combined the merits of both Eastern and Western philosophical traditions. Although today Inoue's arguments are seriously challenged, they were representative of the Euro-Japanese universalism that dominated the modern intellectual climate in East Asia at the time.

Some Forms of Orientalism and Occidentalism in Interpreting Korean Confucianism

Many intellectuals in late nineteenth-century Korea, including Yun Ch'i-ho (1864–1945), a Korean “enlightenment” intellectual educated at Emory and Vanderbilt Universities in the United States as well as in Japan, began to express a highly iconoclastic attitude toward Confucianism, viewing it as a shackling

ideology of backwardness, oppression, hierarchism, laziness, and hypocrisy, and thereby incompatible with modern values such as individualism, tolerance, and freedom, which he felt the Korean people should be pursuing. Commenting on a situation where a Chinese teacher quit his position in his Western-style school without prior notice, Yun wrote:

The more Confucianism a Chinaman has the less reliable he is in words. Shame on Confucianism! After having absolute control over the body, mind, and heart of a nation over twenty-five centuries the system has ever failed to make honest men and women of its worshippers.

The maxims of Confucianism are simply beautiful. But what is the use of them? A system that has no power to make its believer practice its maxims is as bad as a Chinese proclamation full of fine things never intended to be carried out. A rule can't work without someone to work it. Confucianism is *powerless* and therefore *useless* because its foundation is no higher than filial piety. It contains the seeds of corruption in its doctrine of the inferiority of women, of absolute submission to kings, of its everlasting "go-backism." Its materialism makes men gross. It has no life and vitality in it to advance or improve. Now when a system of teaching has no power to make its professor a better man than he might be otherwise it is worse than useless.

A Confucianist thinks he has reached the principle of virtues when he fulfills the prescribed rules of filial piety. With him this exceedingly commonplace virtue made uncommon covers every sin—licentiousness, revengefulness, lying, hatred, great dissimulation....¹

More subtle forms of interpreting Confucianism in Korea according to an increasingly influential Euro-Japanese universalist perspective were developed by other Japanese scholars, including Takahashi Tōru (1878–1967).²

Attacking mainstream Neo-Confucianism for its political-factional conflicts that had no philosophical value, its dependency on China, its neglect of the people's welfare, and its general responsibility for Korea's backwardness, Takahashi reevaluated the statecraft of marginalized Confucian scholars, such as Chŏng Yag-yong, Yu Hyŏng-wŏn, and Chŏng Che-du, and the Wang Yang-ming School in Korea of the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries.

Takahashi's perception of the eighteenth-century "Confucian Statecraft School" (*Keirin no gaku* 經倫の學) as a failed forerunner of modernity came from his appreciation of Japanese Confucian statecraft studies, such as the Wang Yangming School or various other Confucian schools during the late Tokugawa period. This Confucian scholarship on statecraft is thought to be a key factor behind Japan's ability to achieve an aggressive nation-state status without being

colonized. Takahashi's appraisal of Chǒng Che-du, a Wang Yangming scholar in Korea, also derives from a Japanese chauvinistic attitude because many of the participants in the Meiji Restoration, including the likes of Nakae Tōju, Kumazawa Banzan, and Yoshida Shōin, were perceived to be from the Wang Yangming School.³ Presented with the model of Euro-Japanese universalism, Takahashi saw the statecraft of the Wang Yangming School in Korea as either very weak or absent altogether. In his view, because the Confucian tradition in Korea had become ossified, it could only achieve modernity through Japanese tutelage.

Interestingly, Korean nationalists also developed their reinterpretation of Korean Confucianism within the confines of a chauvinistic Euro-Japanese universalism. Chǒng In-bo (1893–1950), one of the scholar-journalists and founders of the *Chosŏnhak* 朝鮮學 (nationalist Korean studies) movement in the 1930s, brought back into the foreground of Korean national history such marginalized Korean traditions as Wang Yangming Learning and Practical Learning (*Sirhak* 實學), Confucian scholars like Chǒng Yag-yong, and even Tan'gun, the mythical founder of the Korean nation. Chǒng In-bo argued in his book *Extended Studies of Wang Yangming* (*Yangmyŏnghak yŏllon* 陽明學演論) (1933) that while the Cheng-Zhu school had undermined traditional Korean society with its futile metaphysical debates between rival political factions, Wang Yangming Studies was able to encourage the Korean people to achieve modernity through practicality (Ch. *shixin* 實心; K. *shilshim*) and self-assertiveness (Ch. *zhuti* 主體; K. *chuch'e*).⁴ As an ardent proponent of the idea of "practical learning," Chǒng was also one of the editors of the *Complete Works of Chǒng Yag-yong* (*Yŏyudang chŏnsŏ* 與猶堂全書), compiled with An Chae-hong and Kim Sŏng-jin during the period between 1934 and 1938. It is noteworthy that Takahashi Tōru and Yun Ch'i-ho joined the celebrations upon the publication of the work. In a predictable manner, Takahashi expressed his approval of *Yangmyŏnghak yŏllon* in his published review of it in 1955.

In the wake of the Great Depression of 1929, Japan became a national socialist regime in opposition to the Allies, adopting Pan-Asianism as an ideology and launching a series of military attacks: on Manchuria in 1931, China in 1937, and Pearl Harbor in 1941. Its ideology combined Shinto-Confucian elements with totalitarianism. Imperial Confucianism (*Kōdō Jugaku* 皇道儒學), supporting the national socialist regime in Japan and the ideology of unifying the five Asian races—Japanese, Korean, Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese—was a Confucian form of Occidentalism. In a 1931 article, Takahashi restrained his harsh criticism of Korean Confucianism with a more positive tone, lauding it as an exemplar of national education. Originally Takahashi was adamant in criticizing T'oegye (Yi Hwang) (1502–1571) as a mere imitator of Zhu Xi as follows:

T'oebye is the typical example of Korean Confucian thinking, more broadly representative of all Koreans' way of learning. Lacking in creativity and originality, he was just an authentic transmitter of Zhu Xi. In interpreting the Classics, he modeled himself after Zhu Xi's Collected Commentary without considering works prior to Zhu Xi. By contrast, Ogyū Sorai and Itō Jinsai, heroic Japanese Confucians, initiated the National Learning School, a civil school, rather than the Zhu Xi School, a bureaucratic school. This is the stark difference between Japanese and Korean Confucianism; there is an everlasting disparity between the two nations and schools.⁵

Yet, according to Abe Yoshio (1905–1978), one of Takahashi's disciples, this same T'oebye was elevated in 1944 beyond the level of practical scholar to that of creator:

At the moment the peninsula [Korea], as part of imperial Japan, is committed to the construction of a moral world. It is worth reflecting on the practical thought of Yi T'oebye, the foremost educator-scholar of the Korean peninsula and the creator of the philosophy of moral national education. Thereby it is never insignificant for us to consider how best to act as loyal subjects of the emperor and train our spirits. Moreover, it is urgent and relevant for educators on the peninsula whose mission it is to transform the people.⁶

Colonial scholars such as Takahashi Tōru and Abe Yoshio had situated T'oebye, like Wang In, who was the putative transmitter of Confucianism from Korea to Japan in ancient times, as the creator of moral cultivation in Korea, which was then transmitted to Japan. Prior to 1930, T'oebye had seemed a quintessential Cheng-Zhu Confucian, responsible for the ossified Confucian tradition of Korea. Yet during the war period he was transformed into a model of national education, contributing to the ultra-nationalistic Imperial Confucianism headed by the Japanese emperor.

During the war, Confucianism was employed as part of the strategy of fundamental "otherness" vis-à-vis Western domination. Confucianism as a whole became a representative and inclusive culture of the "yellow races," antagonistic to the egoistic, hedonistic, dominant Western culture. According to Korean Confucian scholar Yi Myōngse, American and British civilization, characterized by individualism, materialism, and utilitarianism, is inherently greedy and exploitative. To save the repressed yellow race from becoming the prey of the dominating West, Japan had a moral duty (*dōgi* 道義) to fight on behalf of the Asian peoples: "Our imperial army is invincible because we fight for benevo-

lence and righteousness (*renyi* 仁義). The Sage's dictum that the benevolent do not have enemies proves this."⁷

A Critical Assessment of Modern Assumptions

THE PRACTICAL SCHOOL: WAS THERE A PRACTICAL SCHOOL IN SEVENTEENTH- THROUGH NINETEENTH-CENTURY CHOSŎN?

The colonialist Takahashi's interpretation of Korean Neo-Confucianism as being unproductive and that an anti-Zhu Xi Confucianism (i.e., a "practical" Confucianism, including the Wang Yangming School) emerged from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries is still influential today. Nationalist as well as socialist historiographies have argued that there emerged a practical Confucian school, termed *Sirhak* 實學, whose characteristics were practical and whose emphasis was on statecraft, capitalist development, individualism, and evidence-based science.

It is interesting to see that in the history of the Confucian tradition, Neo-Confucians referred to their school as *Sirhak*, in contrast to the "unproductive" Buddhist studies (*Xuxue* 虛學). In this tradition, emerging Confucian schools, including Neo-Confucianism and the Wang Yangming School, have used this general term to refer to themselves. Yet Takahashi's idea of a practical school seems to derive from a Eurocentric perception of Asian history, because we can discern in the features of this "practical school" a mere collection of European "universal values" such as individualism, capitalism, empiricism, and rationality.

In fact, the idea of a practical school is closely related to the reorganization of the world of learning in nineteenth-century Europe, characterized by the nation-state-funded rehabilitation of the university and professional fields. During the nineteenth century, the European world of learning began to define itself as a concentration of professionals pursuing objective truth (the rise of positivism) between two extremes—reactionaries and radicals—for the betterment of the people and the nation-state. For example, the newly unified German Verein für Sozialpolitik (Social Policy Association), founded in 1873, was the operational organization for supporting a Bismarckian centrist social-program legislation that avoided both the liberal-economic circle and social revolutionaries. It is well known that the Prussian (German) model of the world of learning was the object of emulation by Japanese academics during the nineteenth century. One of these was Shiratori Kurakichi, the founder of Eastern History (Tōyōshi 東洋史) in Japan, who studied under Ludwig Reiss, himself a student of Leopold von Ranke. Enshrining positivism as an analytical and universal method, Shiratori established the particularistic and nationalist historiography of Eastern History. The aim of the Imperial universities in Japan

was the teaching of arts and academics and the pursuit of in-depth research to meet the demands of the state. The Japanese construction of modern higher learning did not differentiate between the state and the people. It supported the ideal of objectivity and positivism as a method, and “practical studies” to meet the demands of the state.⁸

These days, an increasing number of Koreanists have found the term *Sirhak* or “Practical Learning” in seventeenth- through nineteenth-century Chosŏn to be not an indigenous term but one imposed by a linear-progressive view of history. Chŏng Yag-yong was not antagonistic to Zhu Xi but an admirer of Zhu Xi and a revisionist at the same time. The notion of self-interest was not advocated by “conservative” Confucians, nor was it by most *Sirhak* scholars.

Yet, at a deeper level, arguments about the emergence of the practical school in the early modern period are a product of the modern notion of time being linear and progressive. This teleological view, giving priority to a certain “end of history” toward which the deterministic historical route was fixed, is not congruent with postmodern sensibilities in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences, or with Confucian tradition. Non-linear and irreversible time as posited by Ilya Prigogine does not allow any teleological end to the historical process.⁹ Rather, evolving systems have their internal times of birth and death, such as oscillations, cycles, progression, and the emergence of novelty, without any transcendent, deterministic sense of the beginning or ending of time. The idea of time (*shi* 時) in the *Yijing* is historicist, emphasizing the priority of process over causal or teleological agency. In such concepts of time, a universal standard or inevitable route of history dissolves into the shifting propensities (*shi* 勢) as alternating modes of centralization and decentralization, unification and diversification—that is, *yang* and *yin*.

CONFUCIANISM AND THE STATE:

WAS T’OEGYE AN IMPERIAL TEACHER?

The dominance of Pan-Asianism from 1930 on was the basis for a strategy of “otherness,” assuming there was that essential other called the “East” in opposition to the “West.” As we have seen, as part of a Pan-Asian tradition, the Confucian tradition as a whole was interpreted in a more positive light than before, as in the aforementioned case of T’oegye. Yet, was Neo-Confucianism in Korea, including T’oegye’s philosophy, supportive of central statism? There is much evidence to show that T’oegye’s ideas were rather supportive of the domination of local elites in the Yŏngnam area, for example in his commitment to local education and community compacts, while sympathetic to the criticism of legalists and Wang Anshi, the state-led reformer of the Northern Song.¹⁰ Many topics of his counsels to the King include the necessity of a self-effacing and deferential kingship. Dismissing the arrogance of the king, T’oegye said, “When there is

no reciprocal trust, [no] agreement between ministers and kings in governing the country, benefits are not able to reach the people.”¹¹ His family consisted of local landlords who owned large areas of land and slaves in the Andong area. Though the actual relationship between Confucian scholar-officials and the monarchy during the Chosŏn period is complex, the power of the kings in sixteenth-century Chosŏn was limited, and, relative to the period of Japanese imperial rule in Korea in the 1930s, Confucians and communities at the local level enjoyed autonomy. After denouncing Korean Confucians, Japanese colonialists invented the image of T’oegye as an imperial or national teacher and educator who supported highly centralized power.

On a deeper philosophical level, I argue that Occidentalism after 1930 was the reverse of the liberalism-Orientalism of the Taishō era, because both were based on a modernist epistemology of essentialism entailing interdependent notions of universalism and particularism. One strategy of this way of thinking is an assumption that a certain thing, person, or group—such as a race, nation, culture, or civilization—has an unchanging, abstract, and inherent essence. Yet, defining an entity in this way easily exposes it to historical and geographical contingencies. For example, when Occidentalists state that Asian people are inherently reticent and obedient, do they mean a person from eighteenth-century Andong? Third-century Shandong? Tenth-century Okinawa? Twenty-first-century Hong Kong?

One of the most insightful arguments against essentialist knowledge comes from the pragmatist John Dewey. According to Dewey, the most pervasive fallacy of philosophical thinking is the error of ignoring the historical, developmental, and contextualizing aspects of experience, something termed “the philosophical fallacy.” It is the abstracting of one element from the organism that gives it meaning and sets it up as absolute, and then proceeds to revere this one element as the cause and ground of all reality and knowledge. In the same context, John Dewey mentioned the invalidity of the essentialist notion of the East or West in his congratulatory remarks in the inaugural issue of *Philosophy East and West*:

I think that the most important function your journal can perform in bringing about the ultimate objective of the “substantial synthesis of East and West” is to help break down the notion that there is such a thing as “West” and “East” that have to be synthesized.... Some of the elements in Western cultures and Eastern cultures are so closely allied that the problem of “synthesizing” them does not exist when they are taken in isolation. But the point is that none of these elements—in the East or the West—is in isolation. They are all interwoven in a vast variety of ways in the historical-cultural process. The basic prerequisite for any fruitful

development of inter-cultural relations—of which philosophy is simply one constituent part—is an understanding and appreciation of the complexities, differences, and ramifying interrelationships both within any given country and among the countries, East and West, whether taken separately or together.¹²

Appreciating Uncommon Assumptions for a Viable Confucianism: Aesthetic Communities

Since the early twentieth century, assumptions of European universalism, such as universal values, nationalism-racism, scientism, a progressive view of history, capitalist economics, technological advancement, individual rights, citizenship and national sovereignty, and essentialism and objectivism, have all become objects of criticism by late-modern philosophers and Asian thinkers, and in the frontiers of some natural sciences. At the same time, cultural studies have dismissed the Western canons of white male European bias. Philosophers from the West have been urged to look within Western cultural elements, heretofore marginalized. We can observe a surging interest in pragmatism, hermeneutics, process philosophy, feminist philosophy, and postcolonialism. There is also an increased interest in non-Western philosophies, including Confucianism and Buddhism, distinctive cultural assumptions far from European universalism.

I believe we need imagination and a knowledge of viable Confucianism beyond Euro-Japanese universalism (Orientalism) and its antagonistic particularism (Occidentalism) because they have been neither philosophically coherent nor sound, and they have been historically catastrophic. It is tragic to realize that since the advent of European-Japanese universalism around 1875, the Korean people have had to endure two Sino-Japanese Wars, the Russo-Japanese War, colonization, the Japanese invasions of China, World War II, and the Vietnam War, and they are still technically fighting the Korean War. If war is the most horrible event that can befall the common people, Orientalism and Occidentalism, which have dominated the intellectual atmosphere over the last century in Korea, may be the primary sources and consequences of such tragedies.

According to Confucian philosophy, war, social conflict, sectarianism, and exclusion are the result of a failure of communication of shared experience—a lack, that is, of ritual propriety. We also need new ways to interpret Confucian philosophy and tradition that come without assumptions regarding essentialism and the linear notion of time, which are constituents of liberal ideologies.

I mentioned an essentialist strategy as one of the epistemological assumptions of European universalism. Debates over individualism and collectivism, the core concepts of modern political philosophy, are attempts to establish answers in this manner. They are conflicting answers to the same question

regarding the identity of “the people.” This became a focus of debates after the French Revolution, in which the sovereignty of the monarch was replaced by popular sovereignty. While the liberal answer has been that the people constitute a collection of “individuals” bearing rights, on the extreme other end of the spectrum it is said that the people constitute a single collective society. The issue is as follows: when many modern political philosophers deal with the relationship between the individual and society, they tend to use atomistic, essentialist, quantitative language that assumes there are two distinct entities in the form of a right-bearing individual and a general social will. As we have seen in the emergence of the modern *Yomeigaku* (Wang Yangming School) in nineteenth-century Japan, the controversy over the nature of the “people”—between the nationalist, state-oriented, right-wing idea of *kokumin* 國民 and the cosmopolitan, civic-oriented, left-wing idea of *heimin* 平民—was the East Asian form of the sovereignty debates in the modern nation-state.

However, it is hard for us to encounter the Leviathan as a personalized collective polity. Society as a whole, independent of process, is an abstraction from larger complex transactional processes. According to Ch’oe Han-ki, a nineteenth-century Korean Confucian scholar, if you achieve proper communication between self and others (in his words, the penetration of configurative energy), there is continuity between them, and relationships will be productive. In the same context, it is hard to assume a discrete self in our experience. Once you accept this abstract entity as reality, there are two contested entities, namely the discrete individual and the collective society. These entities, far from authentic experience, can become a source of the variety of social and ethical theories in which ideas regarding the individual or state compete with each other for priority. Individualism is closely related to liberalism and utilitarianism, in which individual rights, freedom, and autonomy are an end where government or communal purpose cannot intervene and rather are used as a means for the happiness of individuals. By contrast, collectivism is closely related to totalitarianism, which argues that individuals should be in the service of a greater good, such as the aims and interests of the nation-state. Seemingly contradictory, what they have in common is their view of the individual or community as a self-sufficient entity that requires others as a means to achieve its own ends.

Elsewhere I mentioned that we need to construct a viable Confucian philosophy without essentialist assumptions. Now we begin to focus on experience instead of abstraction. Experience is communal and aesthetic. The term aesthetic is derived from the Greek *αἰσθητικός* (*aisthetikos*), meaning “esthetic, sensitive, sentient,” which is in turn derived from *αἰσθάνομαι* (*aisthanomai*), meaning “I perceive, feel, sense.” I argue for the notion of “aesthetic communities” as conceptual sources for a viable interpretation of Confucianism without an essentialist assumption.

The self is not a discrete entity but an experiential or aesthetic field in the sense that the person has as many selves as there are others who recognize the person. This is also true for a variety of groupings, such as ethnicity, gender, sexual preference, one's own lived body, family, fraternity, religious community, nations, international communities beyond national boundaries, and so on. Fields are composites, vague and full of shared experience constituting their meaning. Ch'oe Han-ki thought it was configurative energy forming the emergence of the self and others as focus-field relations. This radical relatedness permits the self and others to communicate at a deep level and to achieve an associated humanity (Ch. *ren* 仁; K. *in*), penetration of the spiritual configurative energy (Ch. *shenqi tong* 神氣通; K. *shin'gi t'ong*), consensus (Ch. *yitong* 一統; K. *ilt'ong*), and impartiality (Ch. *gong* 公; K. *kong*) in shared experiences. This vagueness of shared experience is focused and made immediate through its embodiment by a particular focus, such as *this* communal exemplar, *this* mother, *this* leader of a fraternity, and *this* historical model. This is a performance of optimal signification (*yi* 義) by which the meaning of the group is made present in its exemplary personalities or symbols.¹³

Optimal signification of shared experience means responding to the world with our senses in meaningful, skilled, productive, active, and shared ways. It is the art of communities (*li* 禮) that allow humans to feel one with each other in a meaningful, rich, and productive way. The term art or aesthetic here denotes neither individualistic creativity nor a special domain outside the ordinary business of life. Art is an integral part of communal life (*li*). It includes facial expressions, calligraphic style, table manners, and quality human relations in the workplace and at memorial services, which are the source and expression of collaborative creativity.

Lastly, it seems worthwhile to think about democracy from a Confucian standpoint. As I mentioned, these days we may be entering a period of disintegration for European universalism, in which liberal democracy, capitalist economic systems, and technological progress lose their legitimacy and power. Yet democracy should not be thought of as the product of a European bias, but in fact as something in conflict with liberalist assumptions in general. John Dewey did not think democracy to be the product of the inevitable progress of Western civilization, nor possible with liberalist assumptions. Rather he presumed that democracy meant full participation and communication in many forms of communities. The interpretation of the Confucian idea as aesthetic communities may be a viable alternative to the European universalist interpretation of Confucianism as well as democracy. How can we reconstruct the idea of democracy and viable Confucianism without intellectual assumptions constructing the modern world? I believe this to be the direction of the collective discussions and research being conducted today worldwide by scholars interested in Confucian philosophy.

Notes

1. Yun Ch'i-ho 尹致昊, *Yun Ch'i-bo ilgi* 尹致昊日記 (Diary of Yun Ch'i-ho) (Seoul: Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, 1973), December 12, 1893; my emphasis.

2. Starting his career as a journalist in Japan, from 1903 Takahashi Tōru took up residence in Korea as teacher and colonial bureaucrat. From 1926 he was a professor of Korean language, culture, and thought at Keijo (Seoul) Imperial University. After World War II, he was one of the founders of Chōsen Gakkai 朝鮮学会 (Association for Korean Studies). He left behind extensive writings on Korean Confucianism, Buddhism, culture, and language, which had a profound impact on the next generation of Japanese, Korean, and American scholars of Korean Studies, including Edward Wagner.

3. Inoue Tetsujirō was one of the major scholars to view the Wang Yangming School as having contributed significantly to the activists of the Meiji Restoration, delineating the genealogy from Nakae Tōju to Katsu Kaishū, as he argued in his book, *Nihon Yōmeigakuha no tetsugaku* 日本陽明學派之哲學 (Philosophy of the Japanese Wang Yangming School), published in 1900. Yet many scholars today have found the notion of the Wang Yangming School as being behind the spirit of the Meiji Restoration to be incongruent with the historical facts and a deliberate creation of Inoue's. For example, Ogyū Shigehiro has argued that there were two conflicting ways of interpreting the sovereignty of the people in the nineteenth century: by commoners (*heimin* 平民) or by all the people of the nation (*kokumin* 國民). The Wang Yangming Learning discussed above that was transformed by modern ideas into *Yōmeigaku* should be distinguished from the *Yōmeigaku* that existed prior to the Meiji Restoration: "The idea that Wang Yangming Learning contributed to the Meiji Restoration was a thesis created by modern nationalists through the projection of their own ideas onto history" (see Ogyū Shigehiro 荻生茂博, *Kindai, Ajia, Yōmeigaku* 近代・アジア・陽明学 [Modernity, Asia, and Yangming Learning] [Tokyo: Perikansha, 2008]). For a partial English translation of this book, see Ogyū Shigehiro, "The Construction of 'Modern Yōmeigaku' in Meiji Japan and its Impact in China," trans. with intro. by Barry D. Steben, *East Asian History* 20 (December 2000): 83–120.

4. Chōng In-bo 鄭寅普, *Tamwŏn Chōng In-bo chŏnjip* 蔭園鄭寅普全集 (Collected works of Chōng In-bo), vol. 2 (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1983), p. 114.

5. Takahashi Tōru 高橋徹, *Chōsen Jugaku taikan* 朝鮮儒學大觀 (General survey of Korean Confucianism), in *Takahashi Tōru Chōsen Jugaku ronshū* 高橋徹朝鮮儒學論集 (Collected articles of Takahashi Tōru on Confucianism in Korea), ed. Kawahara Hideki 川原秀城 and Kim Kwang-nae 金光來 (Tokyo: Chisen Shokan, 2011 [1927]), p. 31.

6. Abe Yoshio 阿部吉雄, *Ri Taikei* 李退溪 (Yi T'ŏegye) (Tokyo: Bunkyo Shoin, 1944), pp. 7–8.

7. Haruyama Akiyo 春山明世 [Yi Myŏngse], "Tōa Kyōeiken to Jukyō no yakuwari" 東亞共榮圏と儒教の役割 (The [Greater] East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the role of Confucianism), *Judō* 儒道 (Confucian way) 1 (1942): 1, 38.

8. Imperial Ordinance No. 3 of 1886, Article 1 in the Decree of the Imperial University, Nakano Bunko, [http://www.geocities.jp/nakanolib/rei/rm19-3.htm#帝国大学令\(明治19年勅令第3号\)](http://www.geocities.jp/nakanolib/rei/rm19-3.htm#帝国大学令(明治19年勅令第3号)).

9. Ilya Prigogine in collaboration with Isabelle Stengers, *The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature* (New York: Free Press, 1997).

10. In addition to reluctant service to the central government, for many years T'oegye also actively served local bureaucrats in Tannyang and P'unggi in promoting private local Confucian academies and community compacts. Regarding his hostile comments on Wang Anshi, see *T'oegye chip* (Collected works of T'oegye), book 4, "Petition to the King No. 2" (Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Ch'ujinhoe, 1988).

11. *T'oegye chip*, Book 7, "Lectures on the top line of the hexagram Qian" (Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Ch'ujinhoe, 1988).

12. John Dewey, "On Philosophical Synthesis," *Philosophy East and West* 1, no. 1 (1951): 3.

13. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *The Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China* (Chicago: Open Court, 1999).