

CHAPTER 5

Why Speak of “East Asian Confucianisms”?

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PRIOR TO THE TURN of the twenty-first century, very little research had been conducted on “East Asian Confucianisms” in Chinese academia.¹ However, in 2000, a team from National Taiwan University initiated the “Research Project on the Interpretation of Confucian Classics in Early Modern East Asia,” which served as the first stage of research until 2004. This East Asian research project has been developing in stages, and since 2011 it has been conducted as the “Program of East Asian Confucianisms” and was set to continue until 2019. This initiative has ushered into the field a steadily growing number of scholars. Meanwhile, National Taiwan University Press had begun publishing a number of series of books on East Asian Confucianisms and East Asian culture, most notably *Studies in East Asian Confucianisms*, *Research Materials in East Asian Confucianisms*, and *Studies in East Asian Civilizations*. Nearly two hundred books have been published by National Taiwan University Press, and many have been reprinted in simplified-character editions in the People’s Republic of China. Japanese and Korean scholars have also begun to conduct studies on Confucianism from a regional East Asian perspective, and even some mainland Chinese scholars are beginning to write books on East Asian Confucianisms.²

The theoretical foundations and future prospects of this new field of East Asian Confucianisms still await deep and extensive scholarly deliberations. In 2003, the methodological problems that would form the initial dialogue for these deliberations were examined in my article “How Is East Asian Confucianisms Possible [as a Field of Study]?”³ The present essay examines the related question “Why Is East Asian Confucianisms Necessary?” The next section discusses the special features of East Asian Confucianisms, and the subsequent sec-

tion considers the prospects of East Asian Confucianisms as a new field in the present academic world, providing the foundation for a new humanistic spirit for the twenty-first-century age of globalization. The final section concludes the study.

What Is “East Asian Confucianisms?”

The content and special features of “East Asian Confucianisms” can be viewed from a variety of perspectives, the most significant of which are: (1) the interaction between part and whole, and (2) the contrast between form and content.

With regard to the interaction between part and whole, the term “East Asian Confucianisms” is intended to stress that within the rich diversity of the Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese cultures and traditions, and within their differing Confucianisms, lies a common core of shared intellectual and ethical factors. This special feature of East Asian Confucianisms has several dimensions.

First, “East Asian Confucianisms” refers to the impact of Confucian values as manifested in indigenous thought and culture. The diversity of localized formations of Confucian thought and culture across East Asia is not a mere mosaic of these localized manifestations. As a matter of fact, the Confucianisms of the countries of East Asia have influenced one another through exchanges and interactions for centuries. Just as “Christendom,” featuring a plethora of distinctive localized forms, was formed through religious and cultural exchanges and interactions across Western Europe, a similar sort of “Confucianism” took shape across East Asia. The use of the term “Confucianism” underscores the fact that despite the rich variety of localized manifestations of East Asian Confucianisms, there is a distinctive regional wholeness of intellectual and ethical factors that are held in common.

Next, the regional wholeness of East Asian Confucianisms does not exist as an abstraction over and above the concrete exchanges and interactions going on among the Confucian traditions of the East Asian countries. Rather, it exists—while growing and developing—right in the midst of these exchanges and interactions among these diverse East Asian Confucian traditions. The watchword here is “in the midst of.” Again, this wholeness is not to be regarded as something “over and above.”

Furthermore, since East Asian Confucianisms exist in the midst of, and not over and above, the cultural exchanges and interactions among the countries of East Asia, it cannot be regarded as a single, fixed, and unchanging intellectual form that originated and was rigidly defined over 2,600 years ago on the Shandong Peninsula in China. Rather, we must appreciate that it has undergone a continuous and ongoing process of development for over two thousand

years across East Asia. Not only have East Asian Confucianisms progressed over time; they have adapted to suit each different locale they have encountered so that the manifestations of Confucian tradition in each locale seamlessly reflect the special features of that place while still instilling the central core values of Confucianism.

As mentioned above, the special feature, the wholeness, of East Asian Confucianisms exists in the midst of and not over and above the cultural and intellectual exchange activities among the respective East Asian countries. Consequently, they must be regarded as a sort of continuously evolving family of intellectual traditions. Although this sort of temporal and continuously evolving family has historical roots in the pre-Qin Confucian school, as soon as the downward and outward flow of Confucianism encountered different cultures and societies of other times and places, distinctive Confucian trademarks of each place were formed and set. We must appreciate that while Zhu Xi learning is very different from the humanist school of Neo-Confucianism, the difference between Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Zhu Xi learning is even greater. Therefore, research in East Asian Confucianisms cannot countenance such theoretical presuppositions as “orthodox versus heterodox” or “center versus periphery.” It absolutely cannot be assumed that Chinese Confucianism is the highest form of Confucianism, which should serve as the vital standard for assessing the correctness of the various manifestations of Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese Confucianisms. Such an assumption would turn Chinese Confucianism into the Procrustean bed of ancient Greek myth—such that the other East Asian Confucian traditions would have to be forcibly stretched or trimmed in order to fit the standards everyone conforms to. On the contrary, we should endeavor to grasp the history of the Confucian traditions of each East Asian country as part of the unfolding of its respective national cultural subjectivity. Simply stated, one must understand that the so-called “single thread” of East Asian Confucianisms exists and develops only as a burgeoning tapestry through the ongoing manifold developments going on in this rich diversity of peoples and cultures in order to grasp its creativity and emotional knowledge.⁴

As to the contrast between form and content, the modes of Confucian intellectual and cultural transmission across East Asia were not at all uniform; they were highly diverse. For example, while the transmitters of Confucian values in China were scholars or scholar-officials, in Tokugawa Japan they were commoner intellectuals, and in Joseon Korea (1392–1910) they were the *yangban* (feudal power holders). The transmitters of Confucian values in these three countries occupied very different positions in society and had highly different relations to political power.⁵ However, despite these differences, commonalities remained among the Confucian traditions of China, Japan, and Korea. To wit, despite the different levels and scopes of Confucian transmitters (the form) in

the politics and societies of these three countries, they all shared the same core Confucian values (the content).

The core Confucian values shared by Confucians in the various East Asian countries include, at the very least, the following two. First, Confucians in all of the East Asian countries firmly believe that the foundation and starting point of Confucianism lay in a self-cultivation process that involves extending sympathy—proceeding along a continuum from self, to family, to society, to state, then on to world. East Asian Confucians all hold, in effect, that the transformation of self is the starting point of transforming the world. Consequently, East Asian Confucian masters all passionately devote themselves to developing deeply profound theories of self-cultivation. Fundamentally, East Asian Confucian philosophies are constituted as practical philosophies of self-cultivation approaches and family ethics. Because the movement in cultivation from the self to family, society, state, and world is not sporadic and ruptured but rather forms a continuum, the practical philosophies of East Asian Confucian traditions all offer responses to the core problem in political philosophy concerning the possibility of getting from individual humane heartedness to general humane governance.

The second core value shared in common by the Confucians of each East Asian country and tradition is Confucius' teaching of *ren* 仁, rendered variously in English as "humanity," "humaneness," "humane heartedness," "benevolence," and "authoritative personhood." The term *ren* appears 105 times in fifty-eight chapters of Confucius' *Analects* (*Lunyu* 論語). Taking *ren* as the core value on which to arrange and construct the empire, the early Confucian masters and students dreamed of realizing a Confucian utopia. Han dynasty Confucians continued along the tracks laid down by the pre-Qin Confucian schools. For example, Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (ca. 179–104 B.C.E.) said, "The *ren* approach lies in loving others, not in just loving oneself."⁶ In the Tang dynasty, Han Yu 韓愈 (768–824) (also known as Han Tuizhi 韓退之) said, "Broad [encompassing] love is called *ren*."⁷ In other words, they explained *ren* directly in terms of love.

In the Northern Song, Zhang Zi 張載 (1020–1077) composed the *Western Inscription* (*Ximing* 西銘),⁸ which implicitly presents *ren* at a lofty, cosmic level. Next, the Southern Song Neo-Confucian synthesizer Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) (also known as Huian 晦庵) composed the masterpiece, *Treatise on Humanity* (*Renshuo* 仁說), which gives *ren* a metaphysical foundation as well as a cosmological function, thereby enhancing *ren*'s cosmic loftiness in the subsequent tradition. After Zhu Xi's new account of *ren* was transmitted north-east to Japan, it stirred up a hornet's nest of discussions and disputes among Zhu Xi's supporters and critics there, with his critics in the majority, as metaphysics did not sit well with the pragmatically minded Japanese. Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋 (1627–1705),⁹ Ōta Kinjo 大田錦城 (1765–1825),¹⁰ Toshima Hōshū 豐島豐洲

(1737–1814),¹¹ and Asami Keisai 淺見綱齋 (1652–1711)¹² all wrote original essays of their own on the meaning and significance of *ren* and the cultivation of *ren*. It was not only the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians who paid special attention to *ren* as a core value of Confucianism; Joseon Korean lords and ministers always discussed problems related to humane governance (*renzheng* 仁政). As Yang Rubin (1956–) points out, “The development of the concept of *ren* in East Asia is just like the unfolding grand epic of a heroic righteous war.”¹³ The East Asian Confucians were all bards of this grand heroic historical epic.

In general, from the seventeenth century, Confucians all over East Asia shared the core Confucian values. We could say that the East Asian Confucian community had quietly taken shape by the seventeenth century. Examples of this sort of common Confucian consciousness appeared in every East Asian country. It was manifested in Edo Japan in 1600 when Fujiwara Seika 藤原惺窩 (1561–1619), an early follower of Zhu Xi, called on Tokugawa Ieyasu 德川家康 (1543–1616), who ruled as Shōgun from 1603 to 1605. It was also manifested in the seventeenth century when another Korean follower of Zhu Xi, Yi Hwang 李滉 (1502–1571) (also known as Toegye 退溪) compiled *Zhu Xi's Essential Writings* (朱子書節要) for the edification of his students. It became even more apparent in nineteenth-century Japan during the popular general education explosion in society when many scholars enthusiastically began to offer public lectures on the *Analects* of Confucius.

Why Is “East Asian Confucianisms” Necessary?

We are now in a position to consider the fundamental question, “Why is ‘East Asian Confucianisms’ necessary?” This question can be approached from two angles.

First, we can view the rise of the field of East Asian Confucianisms on the new stage of scholarship in the twenty-first century as a reaction to the form of Confucian studies conducted in the Chinese-language academia of the twentieth century. For example, twentieth-century Chinese New Confucian philosophers tended to view Confucianism narrowly as a segment of their national and ethnic identity, especially as bound up with the vast and far-reaching historical traumas and transformations of the early twentieth century. With regard to methodology, they tended to be highly critical of programmatic May Fourth scientism and narrow-minded Qing dynasty empirical studies. Culturally, they staunchly supported cultural ethnocentrism and turned Confucian studies into a sort of mission to renew and recharge the national spirit. In a word, twentieth-century Chinese New Confucians took the promotion of a Chinese cultural renaissance as their existential responsibility.

In the twentieth century, through a series of important writings, the New

Confucians extended traditional Confucianism's spiritual resources as their *raison d'être*. Under the adverse conditions of twentieth-century China, these devoted scholars carried on with their studies and reflections, and made truly great contributions to Confucian culture and scholarship. However, since they accepted the limitations of a rigid national ethnocentrism, twentieth-century Chinese Confucian writings today come across largely as part of a national ethnic discourse. In fact, Japanese Confucian studies were also deeply imbued with cultural nationalism; as Yoshikawa Kōjirō 吉川幸次郎 (1904–1980) pointed out, the fundamental mission of Tokugawa era (1603–1868) Japanese Confucian scholarship was to “Japanize” Chinese Confucianism. Well into the twentieth century this scholarship was highly charged with nationalism.¹⁴ During the 1930s, the early stage of World War II, Japanese scholars even reinterpreted the first chapter of Confucius' *Analects* on “learning and practicing what one has learned” in terms of the Japanese emperor's imperial edict directing education.¹⁵

Against this twentieth-century background, an important function of the new field of East Asian Confucianisms is that it involves actively purging Confucian studies of the limitations—and prejudices—of ethnocentrism to ensure that Confucian studies will never again be confined within state-centrism. This results in freeing Confucianism to be more broadly conceived and extending its spiritual mission to new heights in the twenty-first-century age of globalization. As the *Doctrine of the Mean*, chapter 28, anticipates:

致廣大而盡精微，極高明而道中庸。

[The superior man is] penetrating the furthest reaches while exhausting the most subtle essentials; attaining utmost loftiness and perspicacity while practicing the utmost propriety.

Freed of the twentieth-century nationalism and ethnocentrism that has characterized each East Asian country, scholars who actively pursue studies on East Asian Confucianisms will be able to debunk the limiting binaries of “center and periphery” and “orthodoxy and heterodoxy.” Moreover, they will be freed from examining classical texts solely in the light of the history of their single country. Furthermore, scholars in East Asian Confucian studies will be able to undertake open-minded analyses of the interactions and fusions of Confucianism, and the societal and cultural traditions of each host country and locale around East Asia. Indeed, the developmental vantage of Confucianism in each East Asian country could be said to be a seamless reflection of the developmental process of cultural subjectivity in each of these countries.

Second, the necessity of advocating “East Asian Confucianisms” as a distinct field is a proactive intellectual response to the predilection of those

twentieth-century East Asian academicians who have interpreted the East according to the West. In this sense, East Asian Confucianisms manifests the vital mission to revisit the Confucian core values as the mainstream of East Asian cultures that might be expanded to provide the foundation of a new Humanism for the age of globalization.

On the heels of the development of globalization and the rise of Asia, intellectuals worldwide are more and more starting to feel that the Humanism that arose out of the Enlightenment of eighteenth-century Europe is too strongly colored by special European sources and characteristics, which make it ill equipped to respond to the needs of the multifaceted demands of the twenty-first-century age of globalization. Therefore, it is necessary to undertake reviews, as well as to research and develop the alternative "other" humanistic resources contained in the treasures of non-European cultural traditions.¹⁶ In the process of establishing a new Humanism in this age of inter-civilizational dialogue, the reinterpretation of the lost treasures of East Asian Confucian culture would indeed be a most worthwhile academic mission to undertake.

Can Confucianism Transcend the East Asian Sphere?

"East Asian Confucianisms" is constructed from the terms "East Asia" and "Confucianisms." However, once these terms have been combined to form "East Asian Confucianisms," two considerations immediately arise. First, during the twentieth century, the people of East Asia, including the Japanese, wrote East Asian history with their own blood, sweat, and tears. The expression "East Asia" in the term "East Asian Confucianisms" genuinely carries too many sad and horrific twentieth-century memories of imperialism. For example, the memory of imperial Japan's announcement of its ambition to establish a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in 1933,¹⁷ now understood as Japan's pretext for invading East Asia, causes deep, gut-wrenching pain to the peoples of East Asia, particularly in China and Korea. Consequently, down to the present, the term "East Asia" is heavily burdened with historical baggage.¹⁸ With the rise of China at the beginning of the twenty-first century, memories of the historical Chinese empire have begun to engage the attention of the academic world.¹⁹ It is a historical fact that "East Asian Confucianisms" arose on the Shandong Peninsula some 2,500 years ago, and some scholars suspect that if China develops into a superpower in the twenty-first century then the advocacy of the values of "East Asian Confucianisms" in China would simply lead to an atavistic revival of "national" Chinese learning and culture in the twenty-first century. For this reason, the term "East Asia" that appears in the expression "East Asian Confucianisms" should be understood as a methodology rather than as a reality, in order to avoid its being subverted into an illicit new-imperialist discourse.²⁰

Second, since the term “East Asian Confucianisms” presents Confucianisms on the platform of East Asia, we might wonder whether and how Confucianism could transcend this platform of East Asia and become a source of universal values for the age of globalization.

The two above-mentioned considerations touch upon two problems that warrant deeper discussion: (1) the problem of the conflict between political and cultural identity faced by Confucians in all of the East Asian countries, and (2) the problem of how the cultural subjectivity of Confucians in each East Asian country can manifest itself in shared universal values.

The core of the first problem lies in whether Confucian studies can transcend the confines of the state. The answer to this question is twofold. Viewed from the perspective of political identity, since the seventeenth century, after the rise of a regional East Asian national identity, Confucian scholars have found it extremely difficult to escape from the nationalistic platform of their respective countries. During the seventeenth century, from the time when Yamazaki Ansai 山崎闇齋 (1618–1682) posed the hypothetical question to his students, “What if Confucius and Mencius were to lead a mounted army of several ten thousands to attack our realm,”²¹ until the Tokugawa Confucian scholars Yamaga Sokō 山鹿素行 (1622–1685), Asami Keisai 淺見綱齋 (1652–1711), Kōtsuki Sen’an 上月專庵 (1704–1752), Sakuma Taika 佐久間太華 (d. 1783), and Sarō Issai 佐藤一齋 (1772–1859) reinterpreted *Zhongguo* 中國 as a political term,²² they all manifested a national political identity, and it would have been difficult for them to transcend it. However, from the perspective of cultural identity, Confucians in each of the East Asian countries also shared the Confucian core values of *ren* and self-cultivation. Hence, these Confucian common core values ultimately transcended national boundaries and can be regarded as values that might be shared by all of humankind.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we may argue that, at root, Confucianism is a unique theory of self-cultivation, and it is also a collection of values of cultural identity. In this sense, Confucianism certainly could transcend the nationalistic confines of each country in East Asia. As these countries enter the twenty-first century, memories of past wars and other horrors are gradually fading away. However, both postwar economic competition and recent struggles in the East China Sea and the South China Sea are driving the continuing ethnocentrism of the East Asian people, and war clouds are beginning to form overhead. In light of this situation, the widespread adoption of the cultural identity of East Asian Confucianisms should be regarded as a matter of paramount importance.

Again, many of the doubts concerning the term “East Asia” in the expression “East Asian Confucianisms” arise because of the historical burden carried by imperial Japan from the 1930s and 1940s. Facing this problem, we are in complete agreement with the opinion of Wu Zhen 吳震, who said,

The “East Asia discourse” of imperial Japan is a relic of history. It is a matter that Japanese scholars in particular are responsible to investigate. Likewise, however, it is not suitable for Chinese scholars to treat East Asian Confucian studies as a linear or monolithic body of discourse. At the same time, it must be admitted that the Japanese scholars’ troubled consciousness regarding that era and [the need to develop a] critical consciousness certainly merits our close attention. Their critical suggestions regarding the problem of the term “East Asia” certainly should inspire our deep reflection.²³

Finally, the question remains: Can Confucianism shed its regional “East Asian” platform to provide truly universal values to be accepted by humanity around the world in this age of globalization? I consider the answer to this question to be in the affirmative.

The “universal values” of today, such as democracy, freedom, liberty, and human rights, all arose during the past 250 years in Europe and North America. Ironically, the Western powers were controlling and ruthlessly exploiting colonies in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere at the very time that they were developing and promulgating such “universal” values. The Confucian traditions that arose and developed over time in East Asia, with their loftiness, breadth, and depth, naturally can be reinterpreted through “interpretive, bridging, and normative”²⁴ approaches and will certainly emerge as the source of truly universal values for the twenty-first-century age of globalization, most notably their shared core values of *ren*, self-cultivation, and the kingly way (*wangdao* 王道). In the civilizational dialogue of the new age, these values can offer new inspiration and new meaning.

This essay has explored several problems regarding East Asian Confucianisms as a new field of study. The second section explored how the Confucian traditions that arose in various East Asian countries—China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam—shared a common thread, or tapestry, of core values in the midst of the exchanges and interactions among Confucian scholars in these different countries, but certainly not as a definite and fixed consciousness over and above each country’s Confucianism. For this reason, as an ideology East Asian Confucianisms has advanced and diversified in accordance with the times, and has constantly adapted to suit local intellectual traditions and trends. Although the Confucians of each country in East Asia definitely hold different specific values and have widely differing attitudes and practices, they continue to share several fundamental core values, such as *ren* and self-cultivation.

In the third section above it was pointed out that the field of East Asian Confucianisms provides a relatively broad intellectual prospect. It involves the

commitment to shed the confines of the narrow nationalistic ethnocentrism advocated in the twentieth century by each of the East Asian countries, and moreover to adopt its broad purview to observe the development process of cultural subjectivity in each East Asian country and locale. The very idea of a field of East Asian Confucianisms should stir scholars to rectify the “reflexive Orientalism” of twentieth-century scholars in each East Asian country and anticipate that scholars in the twenty-first century will reexamine this East Asian cultural mainstream and its core values.

The political identity of Confucians in each East Asian country should completely remove the limitations of their nationalistic ethnocentrism, and cause each to bear in mind that the Confucian world of thought is an even more fundamental cultural homeland. In the twenty-first-century age of globalization, the field of East Asian Confucianisms and its common core values, which originated and developed in East Asia, hold tremendous potential for offering a platform on which to host cross-civilizational dialogue in the new century.

Notes

1. Yu Ying-shih 余英時, “Dai Zhen yu Itō Jinsai” 戴震與伊藤仁齋 (Dai Zhen and Itō Jinsai), *Shi huo yuekan* 食貨月刊 (Shi huo monthly) 4, no. 9 (December 1974): 369–376; Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑, “Dongya jinshi ruxue sichao de xindondxiang—Dai Dongyuan, Itō Jinsai, yu Ding Chashan dui Mengxue de jieshi” 東亞近世儒學思潮的新動向—戴東原、伊藤仁齋與丁茶山對孟學的解釋 (The new tide of modern East Asian Confucianisms: Dai Zhen, Itō Jinsai, and Ding Chasan on the interpretation of Mengzi), *Han'guk hakbo* 韓國學報 (Korea journal) 1 (April 1981), later collected in Huang Chun-chieh, *Ruxue chuantong yu wenhua chuangxin* 儒學傳統與文化創新 (Confucianism and cultural creativity) (Taipei: Dongda Press, 1983), pp. 77–108. This article has also appeared in Korean; see Chung Inchai 鄭仁在, trans., “Dong-a geunse Yuhak sajo ui sin donghyang—Dae Dongwon, Itō Jinsai, wa Dasan ui Maenghak e deahan haeseok” 東亞近世儒學思潮의 신동향—戴東原 伊藤仁齋와 다산의 孟學에 대한 해석, *Dasan hakbo* 茶山學報 (Seoul: Dasanhak Yeon'guwon), no. 6 (1984).

2. Cf. Chen Lai 陳來, *Dongya ruxue jiulun* 東亞儒學九論 (East Asian Confucianism: Nine essays) (Taipei: Sanlian Press, 2008); Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇, ed., *Dongya ruxue lunji* 東亞儒學論集 (East Asian Confucianisms: Collected essays) (Changsha: Yuelu Publishing House, 2011).

3. Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑, “Dongya ruxue ruhe keneng?” 東亞儒學如何可能? (How is East Asian Confucianisms possible [as a field of study]?), *Qinghua xuebao* 清華學報 (Tsing Hua journal) 33, no. 2 (December 2003): 55–68, reprinted in Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑, ed., *Dongya ruxue: Jingdian yu quanshi de bianzheng* 東亞儒學：經典與詮釋的辯證 (East Asian Confucianisms: Dialectics of classics and interpretations) (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2007), pp. 29–56.

4. I agree with Kan Huai-chen's account of this. See Kan Huai-chen 甘懷真, “Cong

ruxue zai Dongya dao Dongya ruxue: Dongya ruxue yanjiujihua de xingsi” 從儒學在東亞到東亞儒學：東亞儒學研究計劃的省思 (From Confucianism in East Asia to East Asian Confucianism: Reflections on the research project on East Asian Confucianisms), *Dongya guannian shi jikan* 東亞觀念史集刊 (Journal of the history of ideas of East Asia) 1 (December 2011): 381–400, esp. p. 393.

5. Hiroshi Watanabe, “Jusha, Literati and Yangban: Confucians in Japan, China and Korea,” in *Japanese Civilization in the Modern World V: Culturedness*, ed. Tadao Umesao, Catherine C. Lewis, and Yasuyuki Kurita, *Senri Ethnological Studies* 28 (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1990), pp. 13–30.

6. Su Yu 蘇輿, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng* 春秋繁露義證 (Corroborated meaning of the *Chunqiu fanlu*), ed. Zhong Zhe 鐘哲 (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1996), “Ren, Yi, Fa 仁義法 no. 29,” p. 50.

7. Han Yu 韓愈, “Yuan dao” 原道 (Inquiry into the Way). See Dong Dide 童第德, *Hanji jiaquan* 韓集校註 (Han Yu’s collected writings with annotations) (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1986), vol. 1, chap. 11, p. 400.

8. Zhang Zai 張載, *Ximing* 西銘 (Western inscription), included in Okata Takehiro 岡田武彥, ed., *Zhouzhang quanshu* 周張全書 (Collected writings of Zhou [Dunyi] and Zhang [Zai]), *Heke yingyin jinshi Hanji congkan* 和刻影印近世漢籍叢刊 (Modern Chinese photo-engraved series), vol. 1 (Taipei: Kuangwen Book Company; Kyoto: Chubun Shuppansha, 1972), pp. 261–274.

9. Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋, “Jinsetsu” 仁說 (Treatise on humanity), in *Kogaku sensei shibunshū* 古學先生詩文集 (Collected literary works of ancient masters), in Kinsei Juka bunshū shūsei 近世儒家文集集成 (Harvest of early modern Confucian literature) series, book 1 (Tokyo: Perikansha, 1985), vol. 3, pp. 60–61.

10. Ōta Kinjo 大田錦城, “Shushi jinsetsu” 洙泗仁說, in *Nihon rinri iben* 日本倫理彙編 (Collected books on Japanese ethics) (Tokyo: Ikuseikai, 1901), vol. 9, 折衷學派の部, pp. 456–472.

11. Toshima Hōshū 豐島豐洲, “Jinsetsu” 仁說, *Nihon Jurin sōsho* 日本儒林叢書 (Japanese Confucianism book series) (Tokyo: Ho Shuppan, 1978), book 6, pp. 5–6.

12. Asami Keisai 淺見綱齋, “Kijinsetsu” 記仁說, *Keisai Sensei bunshū* 綱齋先生文集 (Literary anthology of Mr. Keisai), *Kinsei Juka bunshū shūsei* 近世儒家文集集成 (Anthology of early modern Confucian literature), book 2 (Tokyo: Perikansha, 1987), vol. 6, pp. 124–125.

13. Yang Rubin 楊儒賓, “Ren yu Lunyu de Dongya shijie” 仁與論語的東亞世界 (*Ren* and the East Asian world of the *Analects*), *Taiwan Dongya wenming yanjiu xuekan* 臺灣東亞文明研究學刊 (Taiwan journal of East Asian studies) 5, no. 1 (July 2008): 253–256, esp. p. 255.

14. Yoshikawa Kōjirō 吉川幸次郎, *Wode liuxueji* 我的留學記 (My journey of studying abroad), trans. Qian Wanyue 錢婉約 (Beijing: Guangming Daily Press, 1999), p. 4.

15. Itō Tarō 伊藤太郎, *Nihon tamashi ni yoru Rongo kaishaku gakuji daiichi* 日本魂による論語解釋學而第一 (Interpretation of the first volume of the *Analects* based on the Japanese soul) (Tsu City: Rongo Kenkyūkai, 1935), table on pp. 34–35.

16. Since 2009, Jörn Rüsen has co-edited with others the series *Der Mensch im Netz der Kulturen—Humanismus in der Epoche der Globalisierung* = Being Human: Caught in

the Web of Cultures—Humanism in the Age of Globalization (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2009–). Since 2012, he has started editing with others another series, *Reflections on[/in] Humanity* (Göttingen and Taipei: V & R Unipress and National Taiwan University Press, 2012–).

17. *Daitōa kyōdō sengen* 大東亞共同宣言 (Greater East Asia joint declaration) (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 1946).

18. Ironically, the Japanese imagined themselves as “Other” than East Asia due to their island status and their affinities with Europe. (If this seems odd, the United Kingdom often likes to imagine itself as unique and different from Western Europe.)

19. Charles Horner, *Rising China and Its Postmodern Fate: Memories of Empire in a New Global Context* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009).

20. Koyasu Nobukuni 子安宣邦, *Dongya ruxue: Pipan yu fangfa* 東亞儒學：批判與方法 (East Asian Confucianism: Critique and method), trans. Chen Wei-fen 陳瑋芬 (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2003), pp. 17–18. Wu Zhen 吳震 pointed out, “The Japanese used the expression ‘East Asia’ to oppose the realization and unification of East Asia. They in effect treated ‘East Asia’ as their ‘Other’ and ‘Methodologized’ it according to their plans.” This is a shrewd and penetrating insight. See Wu Zhen 吳震, “Shishuo ‘Dongya ruxue’ heyibiyao” 試說 “東亞儒學” 何以必要 (The necessity of East Asian Confucianisms), *Taiwan Dongya wenming yanjiu xuekan* 臺灣東亞文明研究學刊 (Taiwan journal of East Asian studies) 8, no. 1 (June 2011): 301–320, esp. p. 306.

21. Hara Nensai 原念齋, *Sentetsu sōdan* 先哲叢談 (Collected anecdotes of former philosophers), vol. 3 (Edo: Keigendo 慶元堂, Yomando 擁萬堂, 1816), pp. 4–5.

22. See Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑, *Dongya wenhua jiaoliu zhong de rujia jingdian yu linian: Hudong, zhuanhua yu ronghe* 東亞文化交流中的儒家經典與理念：互動、轉化與融合 (The Confucian classics and concepts of cultural exchange in East Asia: Interactive, transformation, integration) (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2012), chap. 4, pp. 85–98.

23. Wu Zhen 吳震, “Guanyu ‘Dongya ruxue’ de ruogan wenti” 關於 “東亞儒學” 的若干問題 (Questions concerning “East Asian Confucianisms”), *Rujia wenhua yanjiu* 儒家文化研究 (Studies in Confucian culture), vol. 6, *Zhongguo zhexue yu haiwai zhexue yanjiu zhuanhao* 中國哲學與海外哲學研究專號 (Special issue on Research in Chinese philosophy and overseas philosophy) (Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2013), p. 442.

24. Robert Neville has said that contemporary Western scholars who investigate Chinese philosophy and Confucianism proceed by “interpretive, bridging, and normative” paths. See Robert Cummings Neville, *Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), pp. 43ff.