

CHAPTER 3

Toward Religious Harmony

A Confucian Contribution

Peter Y. J. WONG

LET ME BEGIN by appropriating John Dewey's distinction regarding three forms of the term "religion":

There is a difference between religion, *a* religion, and the religious; between anything that may be denoted by a noun substantive and the quality of experience that is designated by an adjective.¹

Despite Dewey's dismissal of the use of the singular "religion" in view of the diversity of religions that one encounters, I would like to retain the term, and suggest we use it in the upper case—that is, Religion²—as it involves a sense that goes well beyond the objective sense of the term. On the most obvious level, "Religion" and "a religion" differ according to the perspective one adopts, and according to the presence or absence of allegiance to particular religions. For the committed adherent, the path one follows is always "Religion," while, in contrast, those paths that are significantly different from one's own we may call "religions" (or "a religion"). Religion, in the uppercase, is not to be understood as a reified, absolute entity but as an all-embracing framework that mediates one's access to the world. As such, one's religious sentiment is understood as a feeling that is borne within Religion. A similar parallel can be drawn with regard to language, in that one's access to concepts is always mediated by Language, and there is a qualitative difference between the language that one speaks and those languages of which one speaks.³ There was a time, and it may still

exist in some circles (such as the philosophy of religion in Western analytic philosophy), when one's field of study almost always operated under the auspices of Religion⁴ and was not concerned about the religions, such that other religions and religious traditions were not the proper subject of study.⁵ We note that for at least a millennium in the West, Religion has been identified with Christianity or monotheism.

Yet, is Religion necessarily to be identified with a religion? Could Religion be sufficiently broad such that it supports a variety of religions, include both theistic and non-theistic religions, and accommodate religious experiences that are not based on an affiliation to particular religions? For surely we need Religion to be broad in order that religious sentiments and experiences be shareable across the divide of religions.

For there to be Religion that is accommodating, the common understanding of religions in terms of belief is inadequate. It is no wonder that Dewey sought to do away with religion altogether and emancipate the "religious."⁶ This chapter does not go as far as Dewey, but takes the view that we can't divorce descriptions of Religion and religions from the religious. But we take the lesson from Dewey that key to our understanding of religion is the religious in its adjectival sense, and not belief.

A possible elaboration on the difference between "religions" and "religious" could be found in the writings of Wilfred Cantwell Smith, regarding which he draws a distinction between a public and institutional aspect, one that Smith calls "cumulative traditions" (religions), and a personal but not individualist aspect, called "faith" (religious). As the latter aspect is closely related to the phenomena of religious experiences, he—like Dewey—takes this to be the more primary aspect of religion. It is a point that we will return to later. To anticipate, we will claim that "religion" and "religious" cannot be so neatly separated. And while a proper account of religion needs to include the religious, the reverse is also true.

According to Smith, to the extent that a tradition could be called "religion," a certain degree of self-consciousness is needed. Thus, Smith thinks that many indigenous traditions and practices ought not to be called "religion," precisely because they are not self-reflexive about their own practices as practices, and they have not self-consciously sought to systematize or formalize the religious aspect of their way of life.⁷ For the foregoing reasons, he calls into question the use of reified terms in reference to certain traditions such as "Daoism" or "Confucianism."⁸ Accordingly, we also take Smith to imply that such traditions ought not to be called "religions."

That is not all. Smith goes on to question the very meaningfulness of the term "religion," including "Christianity," "Judaism," and "Islam": although they are reified terms, in reality they do not refer to any identifiable, abstractable

essence.⁹ For Smith, when we take a closer look at “religion,” or for that matter “Christianity,” “Islam,” or “Judaism,” we find only the institutional “cumulative traditions” and personal “faiths.”¹⁰

The question is, should we forgo the use of the term “religion” and instead speak only of “traditions”?

Smith’s argument with forgoing the use of the term “religion” is not so straightforward. It seems that there is a confusion on Smith’s part over the reality of religion that relies on an essentialistic approach to settle the issue. While religion, and we agree, does not correspond to any isolable entity, this does not mean that religions do not exist. Religions exist as complexes and are dependent upon the contexts of human activity. Currency and economy, for instance, do not fully identify with specific things in the world, yet we normally agree that they exist; that is, they exist within the context of human society, which recognizes, among other things, property and the practices of human commerce, but not in the sense of an entity or that they are metaphysically real.¹¹

A large part of the problem regarding the term “religion” seems to be the objectification of alien others, whose means of showing reverence and piety is not shared by the observer.¹² In the current literature on the study of religions, there is the objection that “religion” is a colonial imposition, used as a means to control colonies.¹³ Thus, perhaps the term “religion” ought to be abandoned or restricted to the Western context. While it is the case that “religion” as a category is modern, originating in the West,¹⁴ and susceptible to becoming an instrument of domination, the alternative of refraining from identifying certain traditions and practices with “religion,” or as “religious,” would also be susceptible to other kinds of discriminations: for example, the perverse view that cultures different from the West do not have practices or traditions worthy of the term “religion.” It seems that the politics of proprietorship of the term “religion” is an issue that we need to be vigilant about, yet seeking to do away with the term “religion” is not necessarily a remedy either.

In view of the various critiques, perhaps our understanding of “religion” could be rehabilitated and modified to accommodate non-theistic sensibilities. We begin with the Chinese case of referring to religions as *zongjiao*, a translation that is borrowed from the Japanese.¹⁵ While the term is intended to be a translation of the Western term “religion,” it nevertheless represents an attempt to express the meaning of “religion” from within the resources available to Sino-Japanese culture. Therefore, the original uses of the term that have been recruited for the translation are not irrelevant details.

The term *zongjiao* 宗教, as a bound compound, made its first appearance in Chinese Buddhist writings and refers to Buddhist teachings in general; that is, the teachings of the Buddha called *jiao*, and those of his followers called *zong*.¹⁶ However, unlike its current usage, which tends to suggest “theistic reli-

gion,” it was still closely associated with the traditional usage of the term *jiao* 教, which is commonly rendered as “teaching.” In addition, Wu Rujun 吳汝鈞 locates the term in other writings of Chinese Buddhism, in which *zong* refers to the schools or sects of Buddhism, and *jiao* to the dissemination of their teachings. Furthermore, Wu also identifies other usages, in which *zong* refers to that which cannot be spoken (*prasiddhi*); and *jiao* as the attempts at communicating the unsayable.¹⁷

Even within the non-Buddhist Chinese world, the use of the term *jiao* seems to overlap with the modern use of *zongjiao*. Reference to the Confucian tradition in conjunction with the term *jiao* occurred as early as the beginning of the Han 漢 dynasty, in Sima Qian’s 司馬遷 epic work on Chinese history, the *Shiji* 史記.¹⁸ Possibly as early as after the end of the Han (the Tang at the latest), Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism were already jointly referred to as the three teachings (*sanjiao* 三教).¹⁹ In this case, the term *sanjiao* implies established traditions and lineages that are authoritative and state-sanctioned; it is also interesting to note that they are ranked in terms of their eminence, which comes close to Smith’s notion of self-conscious organization as a mark of religion.

However, the appellation of *jiao* is not strictly limited to such identifiable schools or movements. The work *Jingjie* 經解, collected in the *Book of Rites* (*Liji* 禮記), when referring to different aspects of Confucian teaching, speaks also of the teaching of the rituals (*Lijiao* 禮教), the teaching of the songs (*Shijiao* 詩教), and the teaching of music (*Yuejiao* 樂教).

In common Chinese usage, *jiao* 教 literally means “to teach.” According to the *Analects*, Confucius is said to have taught four things: culture, conduct, doing one’s utmost, and making good on one’s words.²⁰ From this, we see that what is implied is not only the idea of the straightforward imparting of knowledge (*jiaoshou* 教授), but also transformative teaching (*jiaohua* 教化). For example, the *Jingjie* refers to the transformative influence of the rites as *jiaohua*:

The transformative teaching of *li* (禮之教化) is subtle. Its curbing of bad actions takes place before the event. And it is capable of influencing people to become good and stay away from wrongdoing without their being aware of it.²¹

Jiao also connotes *jiaoyu* 教育, usually translated as “education.” However, the term can also be translated as “teaching and nurturing.”²² Thus, education is concerned not only with the transmission of knowledge but also the formation of the person in all aspects—social, cultural, and interpersonal. Finally, as indicated by its radical, *pu* 攴, *jiao* is also authoritative in connotation; therefore, it is associated with various terms that mean both teaching and actions typi-

cally associated with authoritative conduct: to give guidance (*jiaodao* 教導), to admonish (*jiaohui* 教誨), and to instruct or to reprimand (*jiaoxun* 教訓), all of which are reflected in the teaching activities of Confucius.

The foregoing considerations suggest that there may be resources within the Chinese tradition for coming to a different understanding of religion. Cai Renhou 蔡仁厚, in his work on the Mohist School (墨家), initially takes his understanding of religion from a Western theistic perspective. In this work, he sought to assess the Mohist sense of religiousness in theistic terms centered on the Mohist understanding of the heavens (or perhaps “Heaven”) (*tian* 天), demon (*gui* 鬼), and divine (*shen* 神). He concluded that while there is an understanding of a transcendent and benevolent deity that is associated with the Mohist view of *tian*, the Mohist School ought not to be viewed as a religion because it lacks a certain sensibility that problematizes existence (as is found in notions such as sin or suffering in other traditions), nor is there a view about the helplessness of the human condition, nor a sense of the mystical—characteristics he takes to be essential marks of a religion.²³ By the same yardstick, we may conclude that Confucianism—because of a much vaguer sense of *tian*—is even farther away from a theistic construal of religion.

Interestingly, Cai Renhou apparently changed his mind regarding the notion of religiousness that is operative in Chinese traditions. In remarks later appended to his discussions just mentioned, rather than a religiousness characterized as a belief in a deity, he offers an alternative understanding of religion based on functional terms, as follows:

A religion (*zongjiao* 宗教) must be the inspirational source of cultural life and creativity. First, it must lay down for the people “a path for their daily living,” and second, it must open up “a way for their spiritual life.” . . . People of today take any talk about the Confucian Religion (*Rujiao* 儒教) to be a taboo subject.²⁴ This is because of the current fashion that unconsciously adopts Western religion as the standard. They do not understand the East, especially the significance of the term “*jiao*” (教) for the Chinese. I wonder how many people in this age have considered that the Chinese cultural system also constitutes another standard.²⁵

In the alternative that Cai Renhou adumbrates—in contrast to the efforts of Kang Youwei and others—he avoids the theistic construal of religion. The suggestion seems to be that rather than being dictated by a theistic understanding of religiousness, which tends to distort our understanding of the meaning of the term *jiao* in Confucian teaching, we should seek to re-describe it from the Chinese perspective.

In view of the foregoing considerations, “religion,” when construed broadly

in terms of *jiao*, can be thought of as an authoritative way (*dao* 道) that imparts wisdom, facilitates transformation, and nurtures the formation of the total person. This is in good agreement with the *Zhongyong*, which states, “Practicing the way is called *jiao*” (修道之謂教). And we can add to this Cai Renhou’s notion of the way as one that provides meaning for daily living and guidance for the spiritual life.

Yet, such characterizations of a religion will always remain unsatisfactory to those who hold allegiance to specific traditions, for whom an almost unbridgeable gap exists between the objective “a religion,” even when construed as *jiao*, and the all-involving “Religion.” And the difference between the two may be located in the term “religious.” J. L. Schellenberg, drawing upon Smith, speaks of the latter term as the personal aspect of religion that includes religiousness, piety, and spirituality.²⁶ One thinks of Religion as providing the space within which one makes sense of the world. For example, my colleague Patrick Hutchings writes, “Why should I be, and why should I be in such a world? My adherence to the Christian faith suggests an answer.... Why should you be in the world? If it was good enough for the Son of God, then it’s good enough for the likes of you.”²⁷ In such responses, one can’t help but be personal, and the language of one’s religion features ineluctably in the articulation of one’s religious sentiments.

The foregoing involves the aspect that Smith calls “faith.” While Smith clearly takes the holding of specific beliefs to be an aspect of faith, he also has a broader understanding of it that includes art and music. Despite Smith’s broader interpretation, he still describes the religious in terms of transcendence.²⁸ Smith’s understanding of transcendence as that which is greater than oneself²⁹ draws inspiration from the theistic religions. And as such, Smith’s description of “faith” tends to exclude non-theistic traditions, such as the majority of Buddhist and Confucian teachings.³⁰ While the failure is partly due to the limitation of Smith’s conception of faith, one understands that he could not remain silent—he needed to say something about what it means to be religious. The question is how do we find a way of discussing the religious aspect of experience without falling into sectarian particularity? Or, rather, how do we come to some agreement about the religious aspect of experience despite our diverging articulations of such? I would suggest that even “secular” people cannot escape this difficulty, as they would still need to resort to some kind of particular articulation in order to differentiate the religious experience from that of the superficial sort. It would seem that a functional description of religion might be more promising. And Confucianism in the Chinese world can offer an example for our consideration.

Rather than a notion of “religious” that is understood with reference to a transcendent deity, the *Zhongyong* speaks of the possibility of achieving sublime

action for the person who walks the path according to Confucian teaching. In the *Zhongyong*, *jiao* is also described as the process of leading a person from “understanding” or “clarity” (*ming* 明) to “authenticity,” “integrity,” or “wholehearted engagement” (*cheng* 誠).³¹ Ultimately, the culmination of such a process allows the person who is fully human to participate in, and realize the transformative and nurturing work of, the heavens and the earth (the paired imageries that evoke the natural world) expressed in the following manner:

Only those who are wholeheartedly engaged (*cheng* 誠) to the utmost . . . can participate in the transforming and nurturing action of heaven (*tian* 天) and earth. . . . [Only then] can they form a triad together with heaven and earth.³²

Here we see the breadth and depth of *jiao* expressed in Confucian terms; it begins with teachings that invite practice, promote understanding (*ming*), sincerity of purpose (*cheng*), luminosity (*ming*) in conduct,³³ and authentic engagement. Moreover, the teachings facilitate creative realizations that shape entire communities and beyond. To be, and become, fully human in the Confucian tradition is then a religious project, one that begins within the simple and ordinary circumstances of inherited traits and familial relationships, gradually expanding and developing such connections and circumstances to the point of becoming influential, and eventually arriving at the tremendous deeds of transforming and enhancing one’s world, to match—and to collaborate—with the works of the natural world.³⁴ The vision is to realize a humanized world that improves upon the natural world in a way that facilitates the growth and transformation of everything within it.³⁵

Thus, from the perspective of the Confucian tradition, to think of *jiao* simply in terms of the modern usage of teaching, as the imparting of knowledge, would be reductionistic. At the same time, we note how the discussion has proceeded seamlessly from the understanding that “cultivating the way is called *jiao*” to “leading one from clarity to wholehearted engagement is called *jiao*.” Regarding the term *jiao*, the former phrase corresponds to the aspect of “religion” in Smith, and the latter to that of “religious” in Dewey. We might say that for the *Zhongyong*’s understanding of *jiao*, the “religious” and “religion” are intimately bound together.

Even Smith’s articulation of the public aspect of religion as “cumulative traditions” necessarily involves saying what these traditions are cumulative of—namely experiences having to do with transcendence. It would seem that attempts to strictly separate the religious from religion might be difficult if not impossible. Similarly, when Dewey attempts to emancipate religious experiences while at the same time he eschews religions, he wishes to retain the possi-

bility that religious experience be understood as one that brings about a “better, deeper enduring adjustment in life.”³⁶ Yet, how would one recognize experience to be religious without further elaboration as to what counts as better and deeper?

For similar reasons, it is problematic with societies that seek to maintain religious harmony by attempting to apply to religions a secular framework—its sheer neutrality leaves out an account of the religious dimension of the traditions it seeks to accommodate, which therefore diminishes those very traditions and renders them impotent and irrelevant. It is not surprising that religions tend to resist such attempts; even a non-theistic tradition such as Confucianism, which seems to be closest to a secular perspective, requires that “religion,” understood as *jiao*, be expressive of particular values.

It seems that attempts at reconciling religions in terms of beliefs are doomed to failure because of competing and mutually exclusive claims that are irreconcilable. Moreover, as discussed, mere description of “belief” is insufficient to reveal the religious character of Religion. We suggest that a functional approach offers the best chance of success.

When Religion is understood in functional terms, then the borders between religions can become more permeable. The Chinese notion that “the three *jiao* are continuous” (*sanjiao heyi* 三教合一) realizes the possibility of moving from one tradition to another without insurmountable differences and barriers.³⁷ It allows one to find new ways of being religious when circumstances change. (Does this understanding require the confessional religions to alter their claim of exclusiveness? One supposes it must.) When our understanding of Religion expands beyond identification with a particular religion, then we can begin to explore the kind of religiousness of the ordinary that Dewey so desired. Perhaps what we are looking for is the development of a religious culture that is accommodating enough to include most religions, which are themselves in turn open enough. The Chinese experience shows that such a change can be done without damaging the integrity of the respective traditions, and it need not lead to confusion or chaos.

Notes

1. John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 3.
2. At the same time, a more vague and undifferentiated sense of “religion” in the lower case is also used in this chapter.
3. My thanks to Arindam Chakrabarti for suggesting this point in his comments on this chapter.
4. For example, the problem of evil is always a present concern.
5. This is mainly because “religions” do not motivate philosophical problems.

6. For Dewey, being religious is a quality that can be found in the most ordinary of experiences and does not require any explicit connection with religion: “I am not proposing a religion, but rather the emancipation of elements and outlooks that may be called religious” (Dewey, *A Common Faith*, p. 15). “Any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal end against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of conviction of its general and enduring value is religious in quality. Many a person, inquirer, artist, philanthropist, citizen, men and women in the humblest walks of life, have achieved, without presumption and without display, such unification of themselves and of their relations to the conditions of existence” (ibid., p. 27).

7. See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, chapter 3, “Other Cultures: The Religions,” in *The Meaning and End of Religion* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991 [1962]), pp. 51–79.

8. See ibid., pp. 62ff.

9. Islam is treated as a special case by Smith, as the religion is self-consciously named “Islam” and shares a similar understanding of religion with the West.

10. Smith speaks of the Abrahamic traditions as more predisposed to reification because of the way they saw themselves as a system or a formalized way of life, and because of the ideal that there be a unique and singular articulation. But, ultimately, he concludes later in his book that “the concept of a religion is recent, Western-and-Islamic, and unstable” (ibid., p. 120).

11. See J. L. Schellenberg, *Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005), and Kevin Schilbrack, *Philosophy and the Study of Religions: A Manifesto* (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), as projects aiming at rehabilitating “religion” as a viable category.

12. Furthermore, such acts of objectification tend to provoke yet more objectified points of view. Smith says, “A dialectic ensues. . . . If one’s own ‘religion’ is attacked, by unbelievers who necessarily conceptualize it schematically, or all religion is, by the indifferent, one tends to leap to the defence of what is attacked, so that presently participants of a faith—especially those most involved in argument—are using the term in the same externalist and theoretical sense as are their opponents” (Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion*, p. 43).

13. See Schilbrack, *Philosophy and the Study of Religions*, pp. 86–89.

14. Smith gives an account of how the notion of “religion(s)” came about through abstraction and objectification in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe (Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion*, p. 43).

15. See Anna Sun, *Confucianism as a World Religion: Contested Histories and Contemporary Realities* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 23ff.

16. 「佛教以佛所說為教，佛弟子所說為宗，宗為教的分派，合稱宗教，指佛教的教理。《景德傳燈錄》十三〈圭峰宗密禪師答史山人十問〉之九：『（佛）滅度後，委付迦葉，展轉相承一人者，此亦蓋論當代為宗教主，如土無二王，非得度者唯爾數也。』」《辭源·宗教》. Anna Sun records a slightly different account by citing T. H. Barrett and Francesca Tarocco, who “suggest that the two words, *zong* and *jiao*, have in fact ‘been brought together in the sixth century by one or two scholar-monks who differentiated strand[s] in Buddhist thought as different ‘principle-teachings’ ” (T. H. Barrett and Francesca Tarocco, “Terminology and Religious Identity: Buddhism and the Genealogy of the Term *Zongjiao*,” in *Dynamics in the History of Religions between Asia and Europe*:

Encounters, Notions, and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Vokharde Krech and Marion Steineke [Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012], p. 311, cited in Sun, *Confucianism as a World Religion*, p. 23). It is also interesting to note the source that Barrett and Tarocco themselves draw from: the writings of Fazang 法藏: *Huayan yicheng jiao yi fen qi zhang* 華嚴一乘教義分齊章, 1, 480c–481b, Taishō, vol. 45, no. 1866. Perhaps there is a sense of understanding *zong* 宗 as “sect,” in which *zongjiao* means the teachings of the sects. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the work also distinguishes different classifications of teachings (*jiao*) in Buddhism.

17. Wu Rujun 吳汝鈞, *Fojiao sixiang da cidian*, “*Zongjiao*” 佛教思想大辭典、「宗教」(Dictionary of Buddhist thought, “religion”) (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan 臺灣商務印書館 [Taiwan Commercial Press], 1992), pp. 284, 285. It is interesting to note that the Venerable Jing Kong 淨空, a contemporary Chinese monk, recently provided a creative interpretation of the term *zongjiao* in which he suggests that *zong* refers to that which is dominant, important, and respectable, and *jiao* to education, teaching, and transformation (「宗教」這一名詞，其在中文的釋義為：「宗」具有：主要的、重要的、尊崇的；三種意義；「教」具有：教育、教學、教化三重含義). And thus, the work of Buddhist interpretation of the term continues. See http://www.amtb.org.tw/jkfs/jkfs.asp?web_choice=7&web_amtb_index=31; accessed 23/9/14.

18. See *Shiji*, “*Zhujiachuan*” 史記、朱家傳：「魯人皆以儒教、而朱家用俠聞。」. Here, the term *jiao* is used as a verb.

19. 北史、卷十周本紀下 *Bei shi*, “*Juan shi zhou benji xia*”: 「十二月癸巳、集群臣及沙門道士等、帝[高祖武皇帝]升高座、辨釋三教先後、以儒教為先、道教為次、佛教為後。」.

20. *Analects* 7.25.

21. 禮記、經解 *Liji*, “*Jingjie*”: 「故禮之教化也微，其止邪也於未形，使人日徙善遠罪而不自知也。」. Here we have a recurring theme in Confucian and Daoist philosophy: the valuing of subtlety. It venerates that which is effective but the influence of which is undetectable, i.e., *shen* 神. If the term is to be construed as divine, then the tendency is to be functional in its approach: anyone who is able similarly to exert undetectable influences of consequence, they, too, are considered *shen*.

22. See *Mencius* 7A20: “The noble person has three delights...to have the talents of the world and nurture them is the third delight” (君子有三樂...得天下英才而教育之，三樂也).

23. This is required in order to motivate soteriology. Perhaps this aspect is absent in Chinese religiosity.

24. This is probably in reference to the movement in modern China to transform Confucianism into a modern religion, after the fashion of Christianity, that was led by personages such as Kang Youwei 康有為; that and other similar attempts ultimately failed with the fall of the first Republic. The names proposed by those movements for the Confucian religion were Rujiao 儒教, Kongjiao 孔教, and Kongjiaohui 孔教會. See Sun, *Confucianism as a World Religion*, pp. 42ff. Moreover, the question of whether Confucianism is a religion continues to be a controversial subject in contemporary China; see Anna Sun, “The Confucianism as a Religion Controversy in Contemporary China,” in Sun, *Confucianism as a World Religion*, pp. 77–93.

25. 「凡宗教，必須是文化生活與文化創造之靈感的泉源。第一、它須為生民

安排『日常生活之軌道』，第二、它須開出『精神生活之途徑』。時下人忌諱說儒教，那是由於時風之動染，不自覺以『西方宗教』為標準，所以不了解東方、特別是中國自己的『教』義。試問當今之世，有幾個人曾經想到，中國自己的文化系統，亦同樣是一個標準？」(Cai Renhou 蔡仁厚, *Mojia zhixue* 墨家哲學, 3rd ed. [Taipei: Dongda Tushu Gongsi 東大圖書公司, 1993; 1st ed. 1978], p. 97).

26. Schellenberg, *Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion*, p. 6.

27. Patrick Hutchings, "Religious Belief" (forthcoming).

28. "We speak of the life of religious man seeming to be somehow in two worlds, the mundane realm of limiting and observable and changing actuality and a realm transcending this. What is the nature of that transcendent sphere and what is the nature of its relation to this mundane one are questions on which, to put it mildly, there is no general agreement" (Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion*, p. 154).

29. "[M]en's involvement with them is an involvement through them with something greater than they"—i.e., in "words, both prose and poetry; in patterns of deeds, both ritual and morality; in art, in institutions, in law, in community, in character" (Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion*, p. 171).

30. Roger Ames argues for a sense of religiousness in Confucianism that is not to do with something that is beyond (that transcends) the human. Rather, it is a "human-centered religiousness." (See Roger T. Ames, "Confucian Human-Centered Religiousness," in Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary* [Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, and Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011], pp. 211–255.) According to Ames, "for the Confucian, it is the creative possibility within the inspired human life to enchant the cosmos that is the more important meaning of 'religiousness.' This enchantment in the 'thoughtful' feelings of family and friends emerges in their mutual and reciprocated sensitivity and awareness" (ibid., p. 239).

31. *Zhongyong*, chapter 21: 「自明誠謂之教」. The meaning of *cheng* 誠 is complex and too broadly construed to be encapsulated in a single translation; the possible meanings of the term range from being sincere to being wholehearted in one's commitment, and from being candid to being unimpeded. Furthermore, there is also the recent thought-provoking and novel interpretation of *cheng* as "creativity"; see Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall, *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001).

32. *Zhongyong*, chapter 22: 「唯天下至誠...可以贊天地之化育...可以與天地參矣」.

33. "The way of the great learning consists in clarifying the luminous excellences..." 「大學之道，在明明德...」 (*Daxue* 大學).

34. This sense of progressing from the incipient to the profound is found in the *Zhongyong*, and is articulated even more explicitly in the *Daxue*.

35. Roger Ames puts it this way: "I will argue that Confucian religiousness is precisely this sense of co-creativity of self and world, and in fact that such co-creativity is the only kind of real creativity. Indeed, in this Confucian cosmology, nothing happens by itself... I will invoke the Confucian notion of the "three capacities" (*sancai* 三才) and the claim that human creativity is an ingredient integral and necessary to further inspire the heavens and the earth in the evolving process of generating cosmic spirituality" (Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics*, p. 241).

36. See Dewey, *A Common Faith*, p. 14.

37. Contrast this with a solution on the level of “religions”—e.g., those popular religious movements that tend to be full-on syncretic, what Anna Sun calls “redemptive societies”; they seek to amalgamate the different religions and maintain the theistic model: Yiguandao 一貫道 (and, not mentioned in Sun’s book, the Vietnamese Cao Đài). See Sun, *Confucianism as a World Religion*, p. 43.