

Acknowledgments

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But in what is most its own phenomenology is not a school. It is the possibility of thinking, at times changing and only thus persisting, of corresponding to the claim of what is to be thought. If phenomenology is thus experienced and retained, it can disappear as a designation in favor of the matter of thinking whose manifestness remains a mystery.

Martin Heidegger
 “My Way to Phenomenology” (82)

To the question, What is to be done? when raised together with the question, What is being? a radical phenomenologist can only respond: dislodge all vestiges of a teleocratic economy from their hideouts—in common sense as much as in ideology—and thereby liberate things from the “ordinary concept” which “captures” them under ultimate representations.

The entry into the event [of Appropriation] is the homecoming from metaphysical errancy, which, for us, children of technology, remains thinkable and doable only as the struggle against the injustice, the hubris, of enforced residence under principal surveillance—whatever form it may take. Such removal would be the politics of “mortals” instead of “rational animals.” It carries out the answer to the question, What is to be done at the end of metaphysics?

Reiner Schürmann
Heidegger on Being and Acting (280–81)