

H. S. Harris

General Introduction

On 29 September 1804 (just a month or so after his thirty-fourth birthday) Hegel appealed to Goethe to see to it that he was not passed over when certain other licensed private teachers (*Privatdozenten*) of philosophy at the University of Jena were promoted to the rank of professor. At that time he had been teaching philosophy at Jena for three years and he was the senior *Privatdozent* in the field. Also, since Schelling's departure to Würzburg in the spring of 1803 Hegel had been for more than a year the principal representative at Jena of the kind of natural philosophy that he knew Goethe was anxious to foster. He had some right, therefore, to count on Goethe's support, and he duly received it.¹

In his appeal to Goethe Hegel dismissed his own published work as unworthy of the great man's attention.² But he did think fit to mention to Goethe the manuscript that he was currently working on: "the purpose of a work that I hope to complete this winter for my

1. But the promotion, when it came, still brought him no salary—it took Goethe another year to procure the tiniest pittance for him (a mere one hundred dollars)—so his financial situation, which was already very straitened, soon became critical.

2. His *published* essays, being mainly technical philosophical criticism and polemic, were not likely to interest Goethe much. But he no doubt expressed himself in this way because, ever since the departure of Schelling, he had been expounding his philosophical system in quite a different way. As the reader will soon see for himself, the "purely scientific treatment of philosophy" that Hegel was willing to lay before Goethe as soon as it was ready was just as technical as the *Difference* essay or *Faith and Knowledge* or the essay on *Natural Law*. (And we should remember that we only know definitely which of the major essays in the *Critical Journal* of 1801–3 [*Gesammelte Werke*, Band IV] were Hegel's because he had to submit a curriculum vitae, including a list of publications, before his promotion could be approved.)

lectures—a purely scientific treatment of philosophy—will allow me to lay it before your excellency, if you will kindly permit me to do that.”³

From the evidence of the handwriting we can say with considerable security that the *Logic* and *Metaphysics* here translated formed the first part of this “purely scientific treatment of philosophy.” Some of it was recopied from earlier drafts—for Hegel had been lecturing on logic and metaphysics regularly, and he had been announcing the imminent publication of a textbook ever since his second semester. But the *structure* into which the older material was incorporated was itself new. After two years spent in the elaboration of a four-part system in terms of a number of fundamental dichotomies and antitheses established by Schelling, Hegel began, in October 1803, to articulate his thought in terms of the great triad of logic, nature, and spirit that is familiar to students of the Berlin *Encyclopaedia*. The treatise that he mentions to Goethe was to be articulated in this way. But we can see from the manuscript as we have it that he did not finish it; and from the subsequent lecture announcements and the surviving manuscripts of the system in its next state we can infer that it was precisely a revolution in his concept of logic that caused him to abandon our manuscript about half-way through the *Philosophy of Nature*.⁴

To reconstruct the early evolution of Hegel's conception of philosophical logic is not easy, because the evidence is very fragmentary and inadequate. Any reconstruction must contain much that is hypothetical and some elements that are mere conjecture. But certain basic facts are clear enough to be relatively uncontroversial; and it is important for the reader of this first surviving version of Hegel's logic to be familiar with them because the mature logic (which anglophone readers first met in the pages of Stirling's *Secret of Hegel* in 1865) only began to emerge as a result of the revolution in Hegel's thought that caused him to abandon our manuscript unfinished. What we have here is the final form of his *early* logic. A preliminary account of how the

3. *Briefe von und an Hegel*, ed. Hoffmeister and Flechsig, I, 85.

4. We have not translated the incomplete *Philosophy of Nature*. A short note about it appears at the end of our translation of the *Logic* and *Metaphysics*.

The next phase in the evolution of Hegel's logic itself does not survive in the manuscripts. But we have both lecture announcements *about* the new logic (no longer “*Logic* and *Metaphysics*”) and the new logical structure of the “*real philosophy*” (the *Philosophy of Nature* and *Spirit* of 1805, which does survive) as evidence for the revolution in Hegel's logical theory.

early concept of logic differs from the later one is therefore essential, even though it has to be somewhat schematic, and some rather conjectural statements about its evolution must be asserted dogmatically.⁵

"Logic," in the essays that Hegel thought unworthy of Goethe's notice, is "the extended science of the Idea as such."⁶ "Idealism" is a synonym for logic in this more general sense. The "Idea of reason" in its "extended" form in human experience and in the sciences requires to be collected and organized into systematic coherence. The collecting is a "critical" task, since the elements cannot be organized just as we find them. Thus, "transcendental philosophy" (another synonym for "idealism, or logic") has two great branches: critical theory and speculation.⁷ When Hegel gave courses under the traditional title "Logic and Metaphysics," he used these more specific terms for the two branches of "idealism, or logic," generally. In this narrower usage logic is *critical* idealism, the necessary preamble to speculative metaphysics properly so called. Our manuscript is divided in this way. Logic is distinguished here as a preparatory or introductory study for philosophy proper. The *systematic* exposition of philosophy begins only with "metaphysics." When Hegel himself gave systematic survey courses, he either dispensed with the critical preamble altogether or supplied only a minimal version or substitute for it. So what he called logic in these systematic courses was (at least in the main) metaphysics according to the technical division of the two topics in our present manuscript.⁸

5. The story can be found in full detail in Harris, *Night Thoughts*; see pp. 22–73, 200–206, 226–37, and chap. 8.

6. This definition actually comes from Hegel's draft for the first lecture of his *Introduction to Philosophy* (Oct. 1801). The text will be found in *Gesammelte Werke*, v, 259–65. But see also Harris and Cerf, trans. and eds., *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, pp. 89–117.

7. The identity of philosophy with "idealism, or logic" (and the resultant possibility of its reduction to logic in the narrow, or "critical" sense) is clearly explained in Cerf and Harris, trans. and eds., *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 68. For Hegel's use of "transcendental philosophy" in this sense see especially the announcement of the "System of Speculative Philosophy" for the winter semester of 1803–4 (*Hegel-Studien* 4: 54; *Night Thoughts*, pp. 228–29n).

8. It is clear, for instance, that the lost "Logic" of the "System of Speculative Philosophy" of 1803–4 was in the main a metaphysical theory of "Substance" (see the retrospective summary of the argument at the beginning of the surviving "Philosophy of Spirit," in Harris and Knox, trans. and eds., *System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit*, p. 205. The fragments of the introductory lecture for the "Delineatio" of 1803 (*Gesammelte Werke*, v, 365–69; see Harris, *Night Thoughts*, pp. 200–202) show that critical

Logic—both in the broad, speculative sense and in the narrow, critical sense—was an innovation introduced into the “transcendental idealism” of Schelling’s identity philosophy by Hegel himself. He insisted that the critical approach to the “absolute identity” must be “objective,” in the sense of being neutrally applicable both to thinking subjects and to the objects of thought.⁹ Thus the logic of his first course on logic and metaphysics began with the theory of the “finite categories” taken in this logically neutral or objective sense. This approach was critical, first, in the obvious sense that it was founded upon a critique of the “subjective formalism” of Kant (whose categories are the *forms of subjective manifestation* for a problematic absolute object, the “thing in itself”). But secondly—and much more importantly—Hegel’s logic was critical in its own internal method. It proceeds dialectically, or (to use the language of Plato’s *Republic*) by the “destruction of hypotheses.” In the first phase the categories are brought forth one by one, only to be “nullified” in their relation to the absolute.

From Hegel’s essay *The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy* (1801) we can reliably infer that the finite categories that were here engulfed in the absolute must have included Kant’s first three triads but not the final triad of modality, for in that essay Hegel dismisses the categories of modality as principles of “the non-identity of subject and object.”¹⁰ We can also infer from this passage that these nine categories were not the only ones treated in his first course; and we know that Kant did not treat them in the proper order, “just as they come forth from reason.” But what this proper order was we cannot say. The Logic of 1804 proceeds from the triad of quality to that of quantity and arrives finally at the categories of relation. But Hegel’s insistence in 1801 that “we must always keep before our eyes the archetype that it [understanding] copies” might

logic was replaced (at least in that instance) by a discussion of the cultural “need of philosophy.” In the Berlin *Encyclopaedia*, by contrast, the systematic exposition of the need of philosophy (in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*) was replaced by something more nearly akin to the critical logic of the early Jena years. (This comparison helps us to recognize that the introduction to the *Encyclopaedia* is only a pedagogical expedient.)

9. See *Gesammelte Werke*, v, 271–72, for Hegel’s programmatic outline for this course. The slightly abbreviated quotation by Rosenkranz is translated in Cerf and Harris, *Faith and Knowledge*, pp. 9–10, and the omissions are made good in Harris, *Night Thoughts*, pp. 36–37.

10. *Gesammelte Werke*, iv, 6; Harris and Cerf, *Difference*, p. 80.

be taken to imply that the "dynamic" categories, and particularly the category of "substance and accident" (which is called in the *Difference* essay "the true relation of speculation"),¹¹ came first. Schelling had already inverted the order of the dynamic and the "mathematical" categories (in the deduction offered in the *System of Transcendental Idealism*).¹² It was Fichte who was the first to begin from the categories of quality,¹³ as Hegel does in 1804 (and always thereafter). Hegel was consciously proud of his logic as a novelty in 1801, but it seems altogether probable that he would follow Schelling's lead at that stage. The model offered by Fichte would more naturally have attracted Hegel's serious attention when he adopted the new phenomenological approach (through the concept of "consciousness") in 1803.¹⁴ According to the *Difference* essay, the "negative absolute" in which the finite categories of our intuitive spatio-temporal experience are nullified is the understanding itself. So the second phase of the logic of 1801 was the theory of finite intelligence in its active construction of concepts, judgments, and syllogisms.¹⁵

This construction is engulfed, in its turn, in the "true infinite of reason." What Hegel calls "the speculative theory of the syllogism" leads us in 1801 to a metaphysics that was apparently an exposition of the "Idea of philosophy" combined with a critique of the systematic forms that it has assumed (dogmatic, transcendental, idealistic, realistic, and sceptical) during its history.¹⁶ From the Idea of philosophy

11. *Gesammelte Werke*, iv, 33; Harris and Cerf, *Difference*, p. 166.

12. F. W. J. Schelling, *System des Transcendentalen Idealismus*, in *Sämtliche Werke*, i, iii, 467ff., 505ff.; Heath, trans., pp. 103-12, 134-54.

13. J. G. Fichte, *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (1794), in *Sämtliche Werke*, i, 125ff.; Heath and Lachs, trans., pp. 122ff.

14. The view taken in *Night Thoughts* (pp. 42-43) that the order in 1801 was probably the same as that of 1804 now seems to me less probable because of these antecedent models, to which my attention was drawn by the commentaries of Chiereghin and Moretta in the Italian translation.

15. In *Night Thoughts* (pp. 43-52) I have shown how this part of the program can be interpreted in terms of the reconstruction of Kant that Hegel offers us in *Faith and Knowledge*. But Werner Hartkopf has rightly pointed to the "mechanism of intelligence" in Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism* as a probable model for Hegel's logical theory (*Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in Hegels Jenaer Anfängen*, esp. pp. 254-55).

16. Hegel's first course broke up early and he retired to his study to write a textbook before he attempted to teach the subject again. So it is quite possible that the first project for metaphysics never existed in written-out form at all. We know that the first textbook draft contained a *systema reflexionis* (logic) and a *systema rationis* (metaphysics); but how these two systems were related either to one another or to the earlier and

Hegel's version of the identity system moved to "real philosophy," or the theory of "the universe." This differed from the "philosophy of nature," which succeeds metaphysics in our manuscript, because it embraced the whole of finite reality. The philosophy of finite spirit was itself one of the two parallel aspects of the "absolute identity." It was also *higher* than the theory of physical nature because it dealt with the practical *reconstruction* of identity as the intuition of *ethical* nature. But it was itself *part* of nature as a whole; so the relation of spirit and nature was more positive and direct than that which exists in the tripartite system to which our Logic and Metaphysics belongs. In the earlier system it is only the theory of absolute (or free) spirit that stands apart as the "resumption into unity" of the whole extension of "idealism, or logic."¹⁷

We do not know how the *systema reflexionis et rationis* of 1802 was organized. It seems possible (for example) that the cyclic parallel treatment of Cartesian, Spinozist, and Leibnizian themes that is to be found both in the Logic and in the Metaphysics of 1804 had its origin here. For this cyclic parallel can be viewed as a reflection of the historical treatment of metaphysics projected in 1801. But this is mere speculation (and unless more of the manuscripts are found, it can never be any more than that). What we know for certain is that as soon as Schelling left Jena (so that Hegel was obligated to lecture on the identity philosophy as a whole), the Kantian conception of a moral *opposition* between nature and spirit began to take on greater significance in Hegel's mind. At the same time the theme of *consciousness* as the discursive medium of experience became the focal topic of his philosophical system. In the pure abstraction of logic this theme appears as the concept of "cognition." The task of logic generally is to

later versions of Logic and Metaphysics is not certain. (Parts of this first textbook may survive in our text, and even the basic pattern of our text may go back to 1802. But Hegel continued to employ the critical-historical approach to metaphysics too. So there is no solid ground even for conjectures here.)

17. This emphasis on the contrast between the finite world (nature, and finite spirit, subjective and objective) and the infinite (transcendental philosophy and absolute spirit) is maintained in the system of 1805, but is there successfully conciliated with the triadic structure of 1803-4. The conciliation thus achieved remains valid in Hegel's maturity; and for that reason the *Phenomenology*—as the final instrument of this conciliation—remains essential to the encyclopaedic synthesis. (It supplies the mature form of the critical survey of the Idea in its "extension"; this is what is "resumed" in the mature theory of absolute spirit.)

construct the concept of "absolute cognition": "The Idea of cognition is the first Idea of metaphysics."¹⁸

The fragments dealing with Hegel's logic and metaphysics in this first year after Schelling's departure are rather exiguous. We have a draft for two "notes" that were probably part of the continually evolving textbook, and the summary outline for a discussion of metaphysics that would have occupied several lectures. The two notes are also concerned with the foundation stone of metaphysics; the remarkable thing about this stage in Hegel's logical reflections is that the starting-point of metaphysics is taken to be a unitary principle. Instead of beginning (as our *Metaphysics* does, in 1804) with a "system of principles," the *Metaphysics* of 1803 apparently began with a "fundamental proposition." We do not know for certain what this basic thesis about philosophical cognition was; but the most plausible inference from the evidence that we have suggests that it was a formulation of the "principle of ground."¹⁹ In any case this proposition with which metaphysics began was also the terminus of philosophical speculation. Thus, the ideal of philosophy as a self-grounding circle was perfectly realized.

The ideal of this perfect circularity, however, creates a problem. For it is now hard to see how the initial approach to this closed circle of speculative knowledge can be a *logical* one. The comprehension of one's time and of its "need of philosophy" seems now to be the only natural path to the discovery of this absolute beginning (and end) of metaphysics.

This is the solution that Hegel eventually adopted in the "system of science," which combined the "science of the experience of consciousness" with the "science of logic." But before he could be satisfied with that solution, he had to find a way of resolving all of the *logical* content of his critical logic into the unitary science of speculative logic (which is this circular metaphysics under its *general* name). In 1804 the *Metaphysics* begins with a system of principles and proceeds to

18. *Gesammelte Werke*, vii, 341. This sketch for lecturing on or writing up the topic of metaphysics cannot be dated at all precisely because of its brevity. But it must be later than April 1803, and it does not fit into the plan for *our* manuscript, which was certainly clear in Hegel's mind before September 1804. (Someone, however, did insert it into our manuscript at a more or less appropriate point.)

19. See the "Zwei Anmerkungen" in *Gesammelte Werke*, vii, 343-47; the discussion in *Night Thoughts*, 226-37, depends heavily on the interpretation proposed by J. H. Trede (*Hegel-Studien* 7: 160-65).

deal with the Kantian "Ideas of reason" (which are the topic of the Metaphysics outline of 1803-4). But at the climax of the very first phase of the Logic we are already faced with the true infinite. Admittedly, the true infinite is introduced at this point only by anticipation: in the Logic it actually functions only negatively. Thus the essentially critical (or dialectical)²⁰ character of logic in the narrow sense is preserved. But the very fact that the true infinite can legitimately be introduced so early in the discussion shows how easy the move to a *completely speculative* conception of logic and metaphysics has now become.

In order that this speculative conversion may occur, critical logic must lose its *externally* reflective character, that is, its dependence upon the *contingent* consciousness of a particular thinker. Even as the logic of understanding (which is what we find in the first phase of the present manuscript), logic must be the work of *absolute* reflection. This implies that the problem of how the historically contingent consciousness of the rational animal is to overcome its contingency and arrive at the absolute standpoint of "pure thought" must be consigned to a different science. The "need of philosophy" and the evolution of consciousness to the point where this need is *absolutely* comprehended—that is, the point where it is comprehended as the self-sufficient goal of rational cognition, or as the very *concept* of cognition—must become the object of quite a different logical science, the science of *time*, and of our "experience of consciousness" in time.

The logic of our manuscript is ready for this conversion. Since we know that Hegel had already experimented with a *historical* approach to his "system," it is no surprise to learn that in the semester following his promotion Hegel announced a course on his system as a whole but actually gave one on "Logic."²¹ And we find also among our manuscript remains, at the very moment of this change, the earliest scraps that are demonstrably connected with the project of the *Phenomenology*.²²

20. In all his Jena writings, but especially in this manuscript, Hegel uses the noun and adjective "dialectic," "dialectical," to refer to an essentially negative, destructive process, phase, or method. The process is *progressive* because the overthrow of each thought-hypothesis (or the breakdown of a real institution) indicates or leads us to its replacement).

21. The announcement for summer 1805 is in *Hegel-Studien* 4: 54. We know about the actual course because we have the list of the students who enrolled in it (*ibid.*, 62).

22. Rosenkranz, in *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben*, p. 202, considered that

It is likely that the course on logic in summer 1805 dealt with phenomenology and speculative logic together. We know that once the manuscript of the *Phenomenology* existed, Hegel used it in his course on "Speculative Philosophy or Logic" (summer 1806, the last course that he actually gave at Jena); and he even included the topic "Phenomenology of Spirit" separately in the announcement for winter 1806–7 (when he actually gave no classes because the military and political crisis coincided with, and contributed to, his own personal crisis, and forced him to abandon his first academic career). In the summer course of 1806 the speculative logic was dealt with only briefly at the end of a much fuller treatment of (at least some parts of) the *Phenomenology*.²³

Possibly Hegel's new speculative logic was still only a skeleton when he left Jena. For his most urgent task was to work out the application of the new *logical* method to his "real philosophy." He lectured on this steadily in 1805 and 1806, and the manuscript—which has come down to us—shows that the whole system was reorganized in accordance with the fully developed pattern of what is called in the work of Hegel's maturity "subjective logic." Every stage—from the basic theory of space and time onwards—is conceived as an evolution from "concept" through "judgment" to "syllogism."

This whole task of reorganizing the "real philosophy" was achieved after the abandonment of our manuscript (in which the philosophy of nature is organized in quite a different way). But K. W. G. Kastner (who attended the class for which our manuscript was written, before passing on to Heidelberg as professor of chemistry the next year) wrote to Schelling in March 1806 that "according to the Jena lecture-list Hegel's system is appearing at Easter, and as I have heard tell it is in four volumes at one time."²⁴ Kastner misunderstood the lecture-list (which announced only the "System of Science," meaning phen-

Hegel conceived this project as early as 1804. But the rightful assignment of our present manuscript to that period makes his hypothesis rather implausible. The earliest fragment that can plausibly be interpreted as part of such a project is a sketch dealing with the clash of divine and human law (*Gesammelte Werke*, ix, 437). This was written on the back of one of the drafts for Hegel's letter to Voss (May 1805).

23. The course announcements are in *Hegel-Studien* 4: 54–55; for the content of the 1806 course on "Logic and Metaphysics or Speculative Philosophy" we have the testimony of Gabler, who took it (*ibid.*, 71).

24. G. Nicolin, ed., *Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen*, report 43.

omenology and logic together). But either Hegel himself or someone close to him had obviously said or written that the system would be in four parts and that it would appear soon. Had it not been for the battle of Jena (and the imminent arrival of an illegitimate child), Kastner's forecast might have been fulfilled within a year or two. In actual fact it took Hegel ten more years to complete the *Logic*, and he never did produce the "real philosophy" in a proper book form at all.

From this bird's-eye view of the evolution of Hegel's logic we can see that there is indeed, as J. Heinrichs suspected, a close relation between the *Logic* of 1804 and the program of the *Phenomenology*.²⁵ But the relation is both closer and more distant than he believed. The whole system that the *Logic* of 1804 is designed to introduce was conceived and structured phenomenologically (that is, as a logical evolution of consciousness). It is therefore right to look for the principle of consciousness in the Jena *Logic* from the very beginning. "Consciousness," or the subject-object opposition, appears there as the principle of "reflection"; and in the brief analyses of each stage of the argument that are offered here as aids to the user of this translation, I have tried to show how the dialectic of subject and object in consciousness can provide a key to difficult transitions.²⁶

But Heinrichs' claim that the pattern of the *Logic* and *Metaphysics* of 1804 can be directly mapped on to the *Phenomenology* of 1807 is highly dubious, since the *Phenomenology* of 1807, although itself an introduction and first part to the system of philosophy, repeats the whole system of 1803–5 (not just that introduction and first part that the *Logic* and *Metaphysics* was to be). A mapping of this kind may still be possible, because of the internal mirroring that can be observed in properly selected "wholes" within Hegel's system. The *Logic* and *Metaphysics* is one such whole, and it does share with the *Phenomenology* the peculiarity of being both an introduction and a first part. But the problem of the relationship between them must be ap-

25. *Die Logik der "Phänomenologie des Geistes."*

26. This is a novelty in the analyses offered here as compared with the more detailed examination of the argument in *Night Thoughts*, chap. 8. I was well aware of the phenomenological character of the system when I wrote that chapter, but I was more struck then by the continuity of the 1804 *Logic* with the logic program of 1801—which requires that the initial evolution of the categories should be objective or neutral. I think now that *both* emphases are present. But the reader must decide for himself which of them is predominant, or how they are equilibrated.

proached cautiously; and the very different structure and goals of the systems that they introduce must be kept firmly in mind.²⁷ With that preliminary caveat the reader can be left to study the texts for himself. Certainly the close affinity between this text and the great book that emerged only two years later is one of the most compelling reasons why we should study it with passionate care and attention.

27. This is difficult because very little of Hegel's discussion of the *goal* of the system in 1803–5 survives. But it seems clear that a *complete system* whose discursive principle is phenomenological aims at *scientia intuitiva*, or “absolute intuition.” The goal of a *systematic phenomenological introduction*, on the other hand, is the system itself as *discursive science* (or cognition).