Contents

Acknowledgments xiii

Introduction 3

THE BASIC TEMPORAL AND SEMANTIC STRUCTURE OF SENTENCES 11

1.1 Temporal and Semantic Structure 12

1.1.1 Temporal Structure 12

1.1.2 Reichenbach's 1947 Formalism 16

1.1.3 The 1947 Topology Supplemented 20

1.1.4 The Natures of Speakers, Tokens, "Perceiver-Describers," Companions, and Situations 22

1.1.5 Persons, Competence, Groups, and Locations 28

1.2 Applying the Theory 36

1.2.1 Adverbials and Simple Sentences 36

1.2.2 The Future Tense 39

1.2.3 The Anterior and Posterior 46

1.3 Tense Is Not an SE Relationship 48

1.3.1 Tense Logic and the SE Relationship 48

1.3.2 SE Relationships and the Consequences of Tenses 54

2 COMPLEX SITUATIONS 61

2.1 Propositional Attitudes 62

2.1.1 The Structure in Detail 65

2.1.2 An Epistemic Matter: Responsibility and Tense 68

2.2 Modals, Epistemic and Root 76

2.2.1 Root Modals 77

2.2.2 Epistemic Modals 80

2.3 'When' 87

2.3.1 Conditioned Root Modals 96

2.4 Iterative States: Habituals, Nomics, and Generalizations 99

2.4.1 The Structure 101

2.4.2 The Nomic Difference 105

2.5 Conditionals and Arguments 113

2.5.1 The Structure of the Standard Conditional 115

2.5.2 The Subjunctive and Counterfactual Conditionals 122

2.5.3 Arguments, Conditioned Root-Modal Iteratives, and the Storytelling "We" 129

2.5.4 Conditionals, (A)s, Truth, and Scepticism 137

3 MEANING, MEANINGFULNESS, AND REFERENCE 145

3.1 Meaning and Meaningfulness 146

3.2 Truth Conditions and Meaning 148

3.3 Meaning as Referring 157

3.3.1 Indexicality 158

3.3.2 Exemplificational Reference to t, i_S, and p; Ties 161

3.3.3 On Referring: Picturing Situations 164

3.3.4 On Chomsky's Contribution 169

3.3.5 Just Slightly More Than Syntax and Lexicon; Public Meanings 172

3.3.6 Means-Sentences 176

3.3.7 Meaning, Publicity, and Scepticism 177

3.4 Semantics and World: Double Constructivism 178

4 REFERENCE 182

4.1 The Standard View of Reference 183

4.2 Picture Reference 183

4.2.1 Recognizing and Classifying 184

4.2.2 Synonymy and Analyticity 187

4.2.3 Meaning Change 191

4.2.4 Proper Names 194

4.2.5 Complex Pictures 197

4.3 Identifying Reference 201

4.3.1 Other Views: Preliminary Remarks 202

4.3.2 Salience for ψ 205

4.3.3 Reidentification 211

4.3.4 Identifying Reference and the Autonomy of Contents 215

4.4 Demonstrative Reference 220

5 EXISTENCE AND TENSE 222

5.1 Existence: An Overview 222

5.1.1 Existence and Meaningfulness 224

5.1.2 Towards a Criterion of Existence 224

5.1.3 The Platonic Gambit 228

5.1.4 Existence Sentences 230

5.2 Mathematical Sentences, the Existence of Numbers, and Mathematical Truth 232

6 SITUATIONS AND ASPECTS 244

6.1 Situations 245

6.1.1 Movements 248

6.1.2 Processes (Including Activities) 250

6.1.3 Changes 252

6.1.4 States 255

6.2 Imperfectives and Perfectives of Situations with Bounds 256

6.3 Imperfectives and Perfectives of Situations without Bounds 260

6.3.1 Simple States 261

6.3.2 Scheduling States 268

6.3.3 Iterative States 271

6.3.4 Propositional Attitude States (and Processes) 271

6.4 Discourse Effects of the Perfective and Imperfective of Situations with Bounds 276

6.5 REs (Contents) and Perfectives and Imperfectives 279

7 MEANING, MEANINGFULNESS, AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 283

7.1 Content Competence: Picture-Referential and Attention Groups 283

7.1.1 The Limits of Meaning: How Many Propositions Are There? 284

7.2 The Evidence and Storytelling Groups 291

7.2.1 Forces 292

7.2.2 Truth: Time, Tense, and Storytelling 297

7.2.3 *A* Theory of Force? 316

7.3 Constructivism 319

7.4 Worldmaking Reconceived: Projective Illusions 323

Notes 325

Bibliography 361

Index 371