

## NOTES

BSLD	<i>Baizu shehui lishi diaocha</i>
DSL D	<i>Daizu shehui lishi diaocha</i>
WYHZMZZ	<i>Weishan Yizu Huizu zizhi xian minzu zongjiao zhi</i>
XDSZD	<i>Xishuangbanna Daizu shehui zonghe diaocha</i>
YHSLD	<i>Yunnan Huizu shehui lishi diaocha</i>
YHXD	<i>Yunnan Huizu xiangqing diaocha</i>
YMGS	<i>Yunnan minzu gongzuo sishi nian</i>
YTN	<i>Yunnan tongji nianjian</i>
ZSMJS	<i>Zhongguo shaoshu minzu jiaoyu shi</i>

## INTRODUCTION

Chapter epigraph: Pye, "How China's Nationalism was Shanghaied," 129.

1. National Bureau of Statistics, "2005 nian quanguo 1% renkou chouyang."
2. Townsend, "Chinese Nationalism," 130.
3. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*.
4. Chen, "Healing Sects and Anti-Cult Campaigns."
5. See Gordon White et al., *In Search of Civil Society*; also Wank, "Civil Society." For a critical dissenting view, see Wakeman, "The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate."
6. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 62.
7. Litzinger, *Other Chinas*, 191–92. "Governmentality" is Foucault's term. See Burchell et al., *The Foucault Effect*.

8. Kaup, *Creating the Zhuang*.
9. Gladney, "Representing Nationality"; Schein, *Minority Rules*.
10. Harrell, "Introduction: Civilizing Projects."
11. Litzinger, *Other Chinas*, 187–92.
12. See Notar's discussion in *Displacing Desire*, chapter 4, on how the reconfiguration of the tourist infrastructure in the Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture has been shaped in great part by a fictional and fantastical martial arts movie. "Preposterous" is her assessment.
13. Harrell, "L'état, c'est nous, or We Have Met the Oppressor and He Is Us." Harrell argues the need to "question the assumption that minority cadres are nothing but stooges for the majority" (226), and presents examples of cadres mobilizing state resources in service of local ethnic interests.
14. Pearson, "The Janus Face of Business Associations"; Unger, "Bridges"; Foster, "Associations"; Wank, "Private Business."
15. Gillette, *Between Mecca and Beijing*, 227.
16. Cited in McKhann, "The Naxi and the Nationalities Question," 47.
17. Ibid.
18. On civilized and uncivilized land use, see Sturgeon, *Border Landscapes*, 27–36, 62–63. As Sturgeon points out, the characterization of shifting cultivation as "primitive" has long been challenged.
19. Kaup, *Creating the Zhuang*, 88–89.
20. Diamond, "Defining the Miao," 92–116.
21. Gladney, "Representing Nationality"; McKhann, "The Naxi and the Nationalities Question"; Schein, *Minority Rules*.
22. Blum, *Portraits of "Primitives"*, 50–54. Blum delineates multidimensional categories by which Han classify minorities, such as the "fetishized, ethnic other," the "resistant, disliked ethnic other," "colorful, harmless ethnic others," and the "almost us."
23. Hsieh, "On the Dynamics of Tai/Dai-Lüe Ethnicity."
24. Mackerras, "Aspects of Bai Culture," *Modern China*, 14, no. 1 (1988): 51–84.
25. Fitzgerald, *The Tower of Five Glories*; Hsu, *Under the Ancestor's Shadow*.
26. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*.
27. For a history of state-sanctioned anti-Hui persecution during the nineteenth century, see Atwill, *The Chinese Sultanate*, especially chapters 5 and 6.
28. In 2005, Yunnan's population was estimated at 44.5 million; about 15 million are minority.
29. Giersch, *Asian Borderlands*, 11–12.
30. *Dangdai Zhongguo de Yunnan*, 269.
31. "2006 nian Yunnan nongcun jumin shouru cengzhang sudu mingxian jiada" (Incomes of Yunnan rural residents grow rapidly in 2006), February 12, 2007, <http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20070212/11193333822.shtml> (accessed May 25, 2007).
32. World Bank, *China: Overcoming Rural Poverty*, report prepared by Alan Piazza et al., 38.
33. Some comparative studies include Hansen, *Lessons in Being Chinese*; Blum, *Portraits of "Primitives"*; and Sturgeon, *Border Landscapes*, which compares Chinese Akha

with Akha in neighboring states. Some of Harrell's work on the Yi compares subgroups of the Yi, and examines their relations to each other and to the very idea of the Yi *minzu*.

34. See Blum, *Portraits*, 7–8; Harrell, "L'état, c'est nous," 234–36; and Litzinger, *Other Chinas*, 33–35, 238–42, for discussion of minorities and the Chinese nation.

## 1 CULTURE, THE NATION, AND CHINESE MINORITY IDENTITY

1. Bhabha, *Nation and Narration*, 1.
2. The classic account of identity formation and the crises it entails is found in Erikson, *Young Man Luther*.
3. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
4. Fichte, *Addresses*.
5. Classic examples of this paradigm are Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*; Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*; Inkeles, *Becoming Modern*.
6. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 55.
7. Weber, "On The Nature of Charismatic Authority," 53–54.
8. Hechter, *Containing Nationalism*, 23–24.
9. Duara, *Rescuing History*, 66.
10. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, 14.
11. Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics*, 141.
12. Gergen, *The Saturated Self*.
13. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*; Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*.
14. For American attitudes on multiculturalism, see Citrin et al., "Multiculturalism in American Public Opinion."
15. Rosaldo, "Cultural Citizenship"; Ong, "Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making," 737–51.
16. Taylor, *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"*.
17. Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 83.
18. Taylor, cited in Bhabha, "Culture's In-Between," 57.
19. Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 76.
20. Bhabha, "Culture's In-Between," 57.
21. Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 76.
22. Gupta and Ferguson, "Culture, Power, Place," 1.
23. Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic*.
24. Eagleton, *The Idea of Culture*, 15.
25. For applications of the concept see the essays in Werbner and Modood, eds., *Debating Cultural Hybridity*. For a critique of how hybridity masks power dynamics see Dirlik, "Bringing History Back In."
26. Ortner, "Thick Resistance," 140.
27. Dirks, "Ritual and Resistance."
28. The quote is from Terry Eagleton, *Walter Benjamin: Towards a Revolutionary Criticism* (London: Verso Press, 1981), 48, cited in Dirks, "Ritual and Resistance," 486.
29. Dirks, "Ritual and Resistance," 487–88.

30. Duara, *Culture, Power and the State*, 35.
31. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike*.
32. Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation*, cited in Wong, “Two Kinds of Nation,” 119.
33. Wong, “Two Kinds of Nation,” 120.
34. Snow and Benford, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest.”
35. Somers, “Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere,” 587–9.
36. Limits to the concept’s applicability to China are explored in Wong, “Citizenship in Chinese History.”
37. On symbolic practice, participation, and membership in revolutionary France see Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*.
38. Among the most influential of these is Dreyer, *China’s Forty Millions*.
39. Schein, “Gender and Internal Orientalism,” and *Minority Rules*.
40. Gladney, “Representing Nationality.”
41. Harrell, “Introduction,” 49.
42. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, chapter 1. Scott distinguishes between what he calls a “public transcript,” aimed at authorities, and a “hidden transcript,” expressed by marginal actors among others who share their social status. In addition, Scott theorizes the existence of an intermediate realm in which officially sanctioned discourse and behavior is manipulated toward subversive ends.
43. Thornton, “The New Cybersects”; Xu Jian, “Body, Discourse, and the Cultural Politics of Contemporary Chinese *Qigong*”; Chen, “Urban Spaces.”
44. Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics*. This is what Harrell notes in his analysis of Confucian, communist, and market-socialist “civilizing projects”; he argues that contemporary attempts to modernize the economies and societies of minority *minzu* should be seen in terms of this history of paternalistic, chauvinistic improvement of peripheral, barbarian peoples.
45. MacKerras, *China’s Minorities*.
46. Litzinger, *Other Chinas*, 20.
47. Gillette, *Between Mecca and Beijing*. Sidney White discusses the cultural importance of being modern for the Naxi nationality in “State Discourses, Minority Policies.”
48. Chow, “Introduction: On Chineseness,” 6.
49. For an analysis of applications and critiques of Levenson’s culturalism-to-nationalism thesis, see Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism.”
50. Cohen, “Being Chinese,” 88.
51. The term is Hegel’s, who uses it to describe how citizens in civil society are “educated up” to freedom via the state’s penetration of that realm. The term has a distinct moral connotation, and is apropos for the Chinese case, since education in Confucian cultural traditions are what made one a civilized human being. See Herman, “Empire in the Southwest.”
52. This is Townsend’s summary of James Harrison’s thesis, in Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism,” 98.
53. *Ibid.*, 99.

54. Ibid.
55. Leo Ou-fan Lee, “The Cultural Construction of Modernity,” 33.
56. Strand, “A High Place Is No Better,” 126.
57. Duara, *Rescuing History*, 95–110.
58. Ibid., 94.
59. Barmé, “To Screw Foreigners Is Patriotic.”
60. One example is the controversial 1988 television series “He Shang” (The River Dies Young). This series criticized the inhibiting effect of Chinese culture on China’s modernization, and employed the mythology of the Yellow River and other quintessential Chinese symbols as metaphors for the Chinese nation. In defining Chinese nationhood in terms of a mythologized racial lineage, the series reveals the problems of applying the term “Chinese” to non-Han peoples. See “Culture in Debate: The River Dies Young,” in *Beijing Review*, January 23–29, 1989, 20.
61. See Friedman, *National Identity and Democratic Prospects*, especially chapter 10.
62. Ben Xu, “From Modernity to Chineseness”; Wang Hui, “Contemporary Chinese Thought”; Dirlik, “Modernity as History.”
63. Leo Ou-fan Lee, “On the Margins of the Chinese Discourse.”
64. Ibid., 212.
65. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*.
66. Interview with prominent Dai official and member of the former royal family, Jinghong, March 12, 1997; interview with Dai man, Menghan, April 26, 1997.

## 2 THE DAI, BAI, AND HUI IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

1. McKhann, “The Naxi and the Nationalities Question,” 46.
2. Duara, *Rescuing History*, 4–6.
3. Moerman, “Ethnic Identification in a Complex Civilization.”
4. Hsieh, “On the Dynamics of Tai/Dai-Lue Ethnicity,” 303–10.
5. The terms *zhaopianling*, *zhaojingha*, *daimeng*, and *zhaomeng* are pinyin versions of Chinese terms that are themselves transliterations from the Dai. *DSL*D, vol. 2, 35–39; *zhaopianling* is a Chinese transliteration of the Dai term *chao phaendin*. See Hsieh, “On the Dynamics of Tai/Dai-Lue Ethnicity,” 303.
6. *Jinghong shi wenshi ziliao*, 6–11.
7. Herman, “Empire in the Southwest.”
8. *XDSZ*D, vol. 1, 48–61; *DSL*D, vol. 10, 8–13.
9. Moseley, *The Consolidation of the South China Frontier*, 22.
10. McKhann, 41–43.
11. In waging war and revolution, the CCP also demonstrated ideological flexibility in Han areas of central and northeastern China by forging alliances with a variety of local factions and power-brokers. See Chen Yung-fa, *Making Revolution*.
12. Ma Zhuo, *YMGS*, 152.
13. Interview with retired prefecture head Zhao Cunxin, March 19, 1997.
14. Ibid.

15. Zhao Cunxin, quoted in “Zai Cheli xian gongzuo de huiyi” (Remembering work in Cheli County), *Jinghong shi wenshi ziliao*, 125–33.

16. *DSLD*, vol. 2, 20–28.

17. See *DSLD*, vol. 10, 91–102, for a list of *huoxi* obligations by village. Interview with Dai teacher Ganlanba, April 26, 1997.

18. *DSLD*, vol. 2, 26–27.

19. *Ibid.*, 27.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*, 49.

22. Ma Zhuo, *YMGS*, 153.

23. Xishuangbanna underwent five land reforms; however, two of these (the third and fifth) were rehabilitative measures to correct the excesses of previous redistributive campaigns. Interview with Zheng Peng, Jinghong, March 14, 1997.

24. Interview with female Dai villager, Jinghong, April 5, 1997.

25. Interview with former village head, Jingha, April 25, 1997.

26. In Tang and Song accounts of the Nanzhao and Dali kingdoms, for example, the rulers of these states were called the *bai man*; those whom they vanquished were referred to as the *wu man* (*man* connoting savage or barbarian). The *wu man* are considered by some scholars as the forerunners of the minority today known as the Yi. *Baizu jianshi*, 24–31.

27. “Common people” is Mackerras’ translation of the term *minjia*. See Mackerras, “Aspects of Bai Culture,” 51. Fei Xiaotong translates the term as “civilian households,” as cited in Wu, “Chinese Minority Policy,” 2.

28. Hsu, cited in MacKerras, “Aspects,” 53.

29. According to Fitzgerald, “More than half the vocabulary and the grammar” of Bai are “wholly unlike the Chinese language.” Cited in Mackerras, “Aspects,” 53. Mackerras points out that although Fitzgerald saw “the Bai as a people distinct from the Han, he cites numerous examples showing their culture as very similar and subject over the centuries to very great Han influence.”

30. Li Donghong, “Baizu benzhu chongbai,” 82–86. My translation; unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

31. Mackerras (“Aspects,” 54) states, “The Bai people place no emphasis on categorizing religions by name. They are quite happy to accept deities from the local pantheon, or from a Buddhist or Daoist. Shamanistic rites coexist with Buddhist. However, although religious beliefs are vague, their traditional strength is considerable.”

32. Congruence between irrigation networks (or gate societies) and temple hierarchies was a feature of peasant society throughout China. See Duara, *Culture, Power and the State*, 31–32.

33. *BSLD*, vol. 3, 297.

34. The syncretism of the *benzhu* religion has on occasion led to some sticky situations. One village near the town of Xizhou worships Saidianchi, the Bukharan Muslim who served as Yunnan’s first governor during the Yuan. Some years ago the villagers decided that, since Saidianchi was a Muslim, their prayers might be more effective if they went to

the nearby mosque to pray and make offerings. They gathered up the idol, incense, offerings, and other paraphernalia from the *benzhu* temple and walked over to the mosque to continue their activities. This horrified the Hui, since Islam stipulates that there is no god but Allah and forbids the use of incense and graven images. The *benzhu* worshippers were quickly thrown out and fortunately a more serious confrontation was averted. Conversation with two Hui men, Dali, August 27, 1997.

35. Wu, “Chinese Minority Policy,” 2–4.

36. *Ibid.*, 11.

37. *Baizu jianshi*, 99.

38. *Ibid.*, 92.

39. The Yong Chang Xiang firm, established by investors from Xizhou Town and Jiangxi, had branches in Hongkong, Shanghai, Chengdu, Haiphong, and a number of other Chinese cities. Chen Runpu, “Yan Xiecheng,” in *Yunnan laozihao*, 187–205.

40. See Su Songlin, “Dali Baizu shanghao,” in *Yunnan laozihao*, 288–93.

41. Yang Taojun, ed., *Yunnan Huizu shi*, 2; also *Yunnan shengzhi: zongjiao zhi*, 165.

42. One folk account claims that during the Tang dynasty, in 748, a group of sixteen or so itinerant Arabian merchants combined resources to construct Yunnan’s first Muslim prayer hall. By the end of the Tang and beginning of the Song, the Arabic community had grown to roughly forty households, and a proper mosque was constructed. Other accounts, however, indicate that the mosque in question, located in the southern part of Kunming, was built in the mid-thirteenth century after the Yuan conquest. *Yunnan shengzhi: zongjiao zhi*, 165–66; Wang Yunfang, “Kunming diqu qingzhensi,” 97–99.

43. Ma Gongsheng, “Saidianchi Shansiding shiliao sanjian,” in *YHSLD*, vol. 1, 138–40.

44. Ma Zhuo, *YMGS*, 39–41, 86–88.

45. *Yunnan shengzhi: zongjiao zhi*, 66–67.

46. Rossabi, *Kubilai Khan: His Life and Times*, 202–03.

47. Ma Zhuo, *YMGS*, 40.

48. Rossabi, *Kubilai Khan*, 202.

49. Ma Zhuo, *YMGS*, 40; Rossabi, 203.

50. Nasr al-Din was later implicated in an assassination attempt and executed. Rossabi, 203.

51. *Yunnan Huizu shi*, 49–50.

52. *Weishan xianzhi*, 43–44; also *Yunnan shengzhi: zongjiao zhi*, 167.

53. *Yunnan Huizu shi*, 56–57.

54. Mote and Twitchett, eds., *The Cambridge History of China: Volume 7*, 144.

55. Ma Zhuo, *YMGS*, 41–43.

56. *Yunnan Huizu shi*, 74–75.

57. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 72–85.

58. *Yunnan Huizu shi*, 68–73, 91–93; *Yunnan shengzhi: zongjiao zhi*, 201.

59. On the role of economic competition in Han-Hui strife, see Atwill, *The Chinese Sultanate*, especially chapter 5.

60. Ma Weiliang, ed., *Yunnan Huizu lishi yu wenhua*, 26–33.

61. *YHSLD*, vol. 2, 73.

62. Du was a prominent member of the Menghua (Weishan) branch of the *Gelaohui* secret society, called *guanggun* (“glorious scoundrels” or “glorious rods”) by local adherents. *Gelaohui* headquarters in the Hui village of Xiaoweigeng served as a base of operations for the uprising. *Weishan xianzhi*, 900–02.

63. Other rebellions of the period include the Nien in Eastern China (1853–1868), Yakub Beg’s Muslim uprising in Northwest China (1862–1873), a Miao revolt in Guizhou, and a series of interlocking uprisings in Yunnan involving the Yi, Hani, Dai, and other groups. Ma Zhuo, *YMGS*, 57–59.

64. Atwill, *The Chinese Sultanate*, 178–84.

65. *Yunnan Huizu shi*, 309–18.

### 3 DHARMA AND DEVELOPMENT AMONG THE XISHUANGBANNA DAI

1. The amount and event of the donation are recorded on a plaque on the temple grounds. The donation is also noted in 1997 *Xishuangbanna nianjian*, 213.

2. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

3. 2006 *YTN*, 712–13.

4. In the mid-1990s the Jinghong State Farm, the largest rubber-producing farm in the country, invested over one hundred million *yuan* to build the Xishuangbanna Nationalities Song-and-Dance Hotel in a city in Jiangsu Province. 1997 *Xishuangbanna nianjian*, 320.

5. Interview with temple abbot, Ganlanba, April 26, 1997.

6. Xi Yunhua, “Xishuangbanna zhou zongjiao wenhua chanye fazhan: diaoyan baogao” (Research report: The development of religious culture in Xishuangbanna Prefecture), April 22, 2006, <http://www.sdci.sdu.edu.cn/detail.php?id=8469> (accessed Feb. 24, 2006); Mi Yunguang, “Shilun zhengque,” 119–211.

7. Cohen, “A Buddha Kingdom in the Golden Triangle.” See also Davis, *Song and Silence*, 157–59, 172.

8. Mi Yunguang, “Shilun zhengque,” 121.

9. *Ibid.*, 120; See also ZSMJS, 1034, and Hansen, *Lessons*, especially chapter 5.

10. Fewer than half of all primary students who started school in 1970 graduated in 1975. ZSMJS, 1024, 1033.

11. *Ibid.*, 1030.

12. *Ibid.*, 1033.

13. Mi, “Shilun zhengque,” 122–26; ZSMJS, 1031–36.

14. Interview with temple abbot, Damenglong, April 3, 1997.

15. Hansen, *Lessons*, xv. Hansen uses the terms “Tai” and “Sipsong Panna” where I employ “Dai” and “Xishuangbanna.”

16. *Menghai xianzhi*, 720.

17. ZSMJS, 1024–36.

18. In 1983, the land-to-person ratio in Xishuangbanna was 2.4 mu of cultivated land per person, of which 1.84 mu was paddy; in Yunnan as a whole there was 1.49 mu of cultivated land per person, with just 0.57 mu of that being paddy. Tan Leshan, “Xishuangbanna Daizu shehui de bianqian,” 278–81.



19. Ibid., 280.
20. Interview with official from the Minority Work Department, Jinghong, March, 28, 1997.
21. Interview with Zheng Peng, Jinghong, March 10, 1997.
22. In 2005, trade between China and the GMS countries was valued at closed to US \$32 billion. That same year, trade between China and all other ASEAN countries was estimated to be \$130.4 billion. Between Yunnan and the ASEAN countries, the value of trade was \$1.05 billion in 2004, double the amount in 2001. "Six-nation Mekong River basin trade grows tenfold," *Japan Economic Newswire*, July 3, 2005; "China ASEAN trade tops 130 billion US dollars."
23. Baruah, "Taking a New Route to Change in the Mekong Delta," *The Hindu*, November 21, 2005.
24. Ibid.
25. "China-Laos Mekong passenger route to open on June 26," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, June 13, 2001; "\$5.9 Million Invested in Construction of Jinghong-Mekong Port in Yunnan," *Chinese News Digest*, July 15, 2004 (Lexis-Nexis) (accessed February 19, 2006).
26. Zhong Gong Xishuangbanna Zhouwei, *Xishuangbanna wushi nian*, 2.
27. Since the late 1990s TVE earnings have dropped, in great part due to falling prices for natural latex. Earnings plummeted from a 1999 high of 3.5 billion yuan to 1.02 billion in 2001. 2004 *Yunnan jingji nianjian*, 2002 *Yunnan jingji nianjian*, various pages.
28. "Fazhan shitou lianghao, minying qiye dingqi Yunnan xiangjiao chanye banbian tian (With good developmental momentum, civilian-managed firms push forward Yunnan's rubber industry, holding up half the sky)" Dec. 19, 2005, <http://info.chem.hc360.com/HTML/001/020/113391.htm> (accessed February 17, 2006).
29. Interview with Dai villager, Jingha, Xishuangbanna, April 25, 1997.
30. 2006 *YTN*, 754–55; 1999 *YTN*, 437–40, 457–60.
31. 1999 *YTN*, 437–40, 457–60; 2004 *YTN*, 772–79.
32. In 2005, Xishuangbanna had slipped back to tenth of sixteen among prefectures in terms of per capita revenues. 2006 *YTN*, 740–41.
33. Many other scholars note the linkages between commoditized *minzu* culture and the tourist industry. See Harrell, *Ethnic Encounters*, 183–88; Schein, "Internal Orientalism"; Swain, "Commoditizing Ethnicity."
34. See note 13.
35. Ibid.
36. Interview with county bureau chief, March 25, 1997.
37. Ibid.
38. Huang Huikun, "Xishuangbanna Manjinglan lüyou xincun," 53–62.
39. Conversation with Taiwanese tourists, July 15, 2002.
40. Interview with retired prefectural head Zhao Cunxin, March 16, 1997. See also Huang Huikun, *Cong Yueren dao Tairen*, 284–93.
41. "Xishuangbanna Mengle gugong jingqu huifu jianshe xiangmu" (Project to restore the Xishuangbanna Mengle palace), *Zhongguo Minjian Ziben Wang* (China People's Capital Network), February 9, 2007, <http://project.ourzb.com/6641.html> (accessed May 29,

2007). Information on door receipts provided in interview with official of the prefectural Minority and Religious Affairs Bureau, February 17, 2008.

42. Su Yunhua, “Nanchuan Fojiao Wenhuyuan’ potu donggong” (Groundbreaking and construction begin on the “Theravada Buddhism Culture Center”), May 11, 2005, *Xishuangbanna Daily*, <http://www.xsbn.gov.cn/govinfo/bnnews/200505/510.html> (accessed January 15, 2006).

43. McCarthy, “Gods of Wealth,” 28–29.

44. Dean, “Ritual and Space,” 172–75.

45. Lang, Chan, and Ragvald, “Folk Temples and the Chinese Religious Economy.”

46. Tsai, “Cadres, Temple and Lineage Institutions, and Governance”; Ashiwa and Wank, “Politics of a Reviving Buddhist Temple.”

47. Schein, “Internal Orientalism.”

48. Lefferts, “Time out of Time in Time.”

49. Duara, *Rescuing History*, 95–110, 160–68.

50. Interviews with Dai pop music group founders, Jinghong, April 7, 1997; interview with Dai literacy promoter, Jinghong, July 18, 2002.

51. Interview with pop music producer, Jinghong, April 7, 1997.

52. Davis, *Song and Silence*, 72.

53. Interview, music producer, Jinghong, April 7, 1997.

54. “2007 Foguang Zhi Jia gongzuo jihua” (2007 Foguang Zhi Jia work plan), *China Sangha Metta*, April 4, 2007, [http://www.chinasanghametta.org/article/news\\_view.asp?newsid=573](http://www.chinasanghametta.org/article/news_view.asp?newsid=573) (accessed May 15, 2007).

55. On the socio-cultural and gendered dimensions of AIDS in Yunnan, especially Xishuangbanna, see Hyde, *Eating Spring Rice*. See also Hyde, “Selling Sex and Side-stepping the State.”

56. Another organization involved in AIDS prevention and education is the Jinghong Women and Children’s Psychological and Legal Counseling Service Center. The center was established in 1997 by activists in the Xishuangbanna Judicial Department and the Women’s Federation, with assistance from Save the Children, UK. Though the center advocates in a variety of issue areas, HIV/AIDS prevention and awareness are a major component of its work. In 2006 the center won a US \$250,000 Peace and Social Justice Grant from the Ford Foundation. “Law and Rights Project Digest,” *China Development Brief*, January 1, 2002 <http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/170> (accessed February 12, 2007).

57. “Monks teach, practice tolerance for HIV-AIDS victims,” *People’s Daily Online*, October 26, 2005, [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200510/26/eng20051026\\_216985.html](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200510/26/eng20051026_216985.html) (accessed January 10, 2006); “Rang renmen yuanli aisibing de qinrao” (Helping people escape the AIDS invasion), *Legal Daily Online*, November 20, 2000, [http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2000-11/30/content\\_9424.htm](http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2000-11/30/content_9424.htm) (accessed January 10, 2006).

58. “Xishuangbanna senglü jiji canyu aisibing xuanchuan fangzhi gongzuo (Xishuangbanna monks participate enthusiastically in AIDS prevention education work),” *China Buddhist Information Net*, September 5, 2005, [http://news.fjnet.com/jjdt/jjdtmr/t20050811\\_12727.htm](http://news.fjnet.com/jjdt/jjdtmr/t20050811_12727.htm) (accessed January 10, 2006).

59. China Sangha Metta, “2007 Foguang Zhi Jia gongzuo jihua.”

60. Chih-yu Shih, “Ethnic Economy of Citizenship,” 237.

#### 4 THE BAI AND THE TRADITION OF MODERNITY

1. 2006 YTN, 700.

2. Ibid., 712–13.

3. In Midu, less than one-half of one percent of the population is Bai. Ibid., 713.

4. 1996 YTN, 637–38.

5. Fitzgerald, *The Tower of Five Glories*; Hsu, *Under the Ancestors' Shadow*.

6. Dali is the name of a prefecture (Dali *zhou*), a county-level municipality (Dali *shi*), and an old walled city, Dali Old Town (Dali *gucheng*). Dali *shi* is comprised of Dali Old Town, the small city of Xiaguan, and ten rural townships. Dali prefecture is comprised of Dali *shi* and eleven rural counties.

7. 1998 Dali *zhou nianjian*, 249; 1999 Dali *zhou nianjian*, 163. In 2002, municipal revenues from tourism amounted to ¥18.8 billion. 2003 Dali *zhou nianjian*, 304.

8. In 2005 Dali *shi* ranked ninth among Yunnan's 131 counties and county-level municipalities in terms of per capita GDP. 2006 YTN, 687–88. Per capita GDP in China in 2005 was ¥14,040.

9. Ibid., 685–66.

10. 2003 YTN, 731.

11. 1998 Dali *zhou nianjian*, 170.

12. Ibid., 166–67.

13. As Notar shows, “Five Golden Flowers” continues to shape popular perceptions of the Bai throughout China, thereby influencing tourism (especially domestic tourism) within Dali prefecture. In so far as sightseeing itineraries and other activities are organized around sites and representations from the movie, much Chinese tourism in Dali, she argues, is aimed at “avoiding authenticity” rather than experiencing it. See *Displacing Desire*, chapter 3, especially 60–61.

14. 1999 Dali *zhou nianjian*, 271.

15. Ibid.

16. Dali *shizhi*, 351–52.

17. 1998 Dali *zhou nianjian*, 251–53.

18. See Kraus, *Pianos and Politics*.

19. On the evolution of “Foreigner Street” in light of increasing domestic Chinese tourism, see Notar, *Displacing Desire*, 37–46.

20. Interview with orchestra members, Dali, July 15, 1997.

21. Dong Mianhan, “Baizu yinyue dui Zhongguo gudai,” 81–83.

22. Ibid. Dong argues that certain instruments and pieces of music that had been included in the tributary gift became some of the most frequently played.

23. Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, 47.

24. Ibid., 46–47.

25. Bhabha, *Nation and Narration*, 1.

26. Wu Guodong, *Baizu yinyue zhi*, 69.
27. *Ibid.*, 24.
28. *Ibid.*, 579–89.
29. By 1956 the number of primary school students in Xishuangbanna had ballooned to over 10,041. Xie Jingqiu, *Yunnan jingnei de shaoshu minzu*, 193.
30. 2003 YTN, 676.
31. 1996 *Zhongguo jiaoyu nianjian*, 137.
32. 1999 *Dali zhou nianjian*, 221–24.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*, 159.
35. Zhang Wenbo, “Jianchuan Xizhong,” 35.
36. Total TVE revenue in Jianchuan in 1998 amounted to 5.7 percent of the revenue of Dali prefecture as a whole. Jianchuan firms earned an average of 15,460 yuan, compared to 41,414 per firm in Dali. 1999 *Dali zhou nianjian*, 137.
37. Zhang Wenbo, “Bai Han shuangyu jiaoxue yanjiu,” 240–41; Yang Mei, “Analysis of the Bai Nationality Bai-Han bilingual education sixteen-point experimental program” *China Education and Research Network*, December 12, 2001, <http://www.edu.cn/20011205/3012879.shtml> (accessed September 8, 2005).
38. Mackerras, *China's Minority Cultures*, 134–35.
39. *Ibid.*, 142.
40. *Ibid.*, 135.
41. 1996 *Zhongguo jiaoyu nianjian*, 260–61.
42. Interview with retired Xizhong village official, August 5, 1997.
43. Interviews with Bai villagers and official from the Eryuan County Education Department, Eryuan, August 6, 1997.
44. Interview with Bai retired educator, Jianchuan, Yunnan, August 5, 1997.
45. Zhang Wenbo, “Jianchuan Xizhong,” 34.
46. *Ibid.*
47. Dong Jianzhong, “Renzen zongjie Baizu de lishi,” 160–61.
48. Interview with Bai educator, Jianchuan, Yunnan, August 5, 1997.
49. Interview with Zhang Wenbo, Jianchuan, August 4, 2002.
50. 1999 *Dali zhou nianjian*, 213.
51. Interview with Zhang Wenbo, August 11, 2007, Jianchuan. Zhang himself is in his late 80s.
52. Interview with Zhang, August 4, 2002.

## 5 AUTHENTICITY, IDENTITY, AND TRADITION AMONG THE HUI

1. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 1997.
2. Kevin O'Brien uses the term “rightful resistance” to describe grassroots actions against official policies that participants defend in terms of legal guarantees or theoretical principle. Such resistance may include vandalism and sabotage, behaviors considered criminal by the state, but which perpetrators see as morally appropriate. O'Brien, “Rightful Resistance,” 31–55.

3. In 2005, the Hui population in Yunnan was estimated at 689,928. 2006 YTN, 700–05.

4. 2003 YTN; 1997 *Zhaotong nianjian*, 277, 283; 1999 *Weishan nianjian*, 81.

5. This stereotype can sometimes work to their advantage. Maris Gillette argues that because of this alleged propensity Hui have received “official support and encouragement to take advantage of the state’s economic reforms.” Gillette, *Between Mecca and Beijing*, 45.

6. In 2005, the per capita net rural income in the Hui town of Nagu in Tonghai was ¥6,447 (roughly \$806). In Ludian it was ¥1,286 (\$161). 2006 YTN, 754–55.

7. The translation is from Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 55.

8. On the diversity of teachings in China, see Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, appendix A, 385–92; see also “Yisilanjiao xinyang (The Islamic faith),” *Cultural Yunnan*, July 25, 2005, <http://www.wenhuiyunnan.com/2005-07/07251057401.htm> (accessed May 22, 2007).

9. In 2005, the per capita rural income in Weishan was ¥1,538, three-quarters the rural income for Yunnan as a whole, and less than half the national average of ¥3,255. 2006 YTN, 754–55.

10. In 2005, the county population was 309,600; 21,774 of those were Hui. 2006 YTN, 712–13.

11. For a comprehensive account of the Panthay Rebellion, see Atwill, *The Chinese Sultanate*.

12. Du was a member of the Hong Bang (the Red Gang), a local offshoot of the Gelao-hui secret society. His position in the Hong Bang was that of “Fifth Brother” (*wuge*), a kind of public relations officer or emissary to the outside world. *Weishan xianzhi*, 900–901. Casualty figures are hard to come by, though census data before and long after the rebellion give some idea of the devastation. Five years before the rebellion in 1851 the Muslim population of Weishan was approximately 50,000. In 1923, more than fifty years after the rebellion, a census conducted by the Nationalist government put the Muslim population of Weishan at around 6,000. WYHZMZZ, 3; Gao Fayuan, ed., *YHXd*, 183.

13. Ma Chaoxiong, *Weishan Huizu jianshi*, 68–75; also *YHXd*, 183.

14. *YHXd*, 164–65; also *YHSLD*, vol. 1, 22–23.

15. *Weishan xianzhi*, 158.

16. *Ibid*; also *YHXd*, 165.

17. The population of the county, which grew at an annual rate of 2 to 3 percent from 1950 through 1957, fell 8.8 percent between 1958 and 1961. *Weishan xianzhi*, 611–12.

18. *Weishan xianzhi*, 689–90.

19. *YHXd*, 183–84.

20. *Weishan xianzhi*, 615–19.

21. *YHXd*, 174.

22. *Yunnan Huizu shi*, 317; *Yunnan shengzhi: zongjiao zhi*, 208.

23. The personal experiences of the elite may have something to do with this; members of the upper strata were often singled out for struggle and persecution by Red Guards comprised of sent-down youth, students, etc., who were in fact predominantly Han from other parts of Yunnan and China.

24. Interview with Hui official from the Islamic Association, Dali, August 22, 1997.

25. Interview with sociologist from Mengzi, near Shadian, Kunming, May 17, 1997.

26. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 137–40.
27. Provincial and local governments rebuilt Shadian and turned it into a showcase of *minzu* unity and economic reform. The government established factories to make roof tiles, shoes, electrical appliances, textiles, and other manufactured goods. In 1994, the average income in Shadian was just under ¥1,400, compared to ¥803 for the province. Shadian District Party Committee and Government, eds., *Shadian de zuotian, jintian*, 45–56.
28. *Weishan xianzhi*, 621; *YHSD*, 165–66.
29. 1998 *Dali zhou nianjian*, 170.
30. 1999 *Dali zhou nianjian*, 304–05.
31. *YHSD*, 142, 166.
32. “Yunnan Weishan Yongjian diqu zhaidiao ‘dupin zhongmiequ’ maozi” (Yongjian district in Weishan, Yunnan takes off its “drug destruction area” cap), *Yunnan Daily*, October 27, 2004; “Zhongguo gong’an jiguan gongbu jinqu pohuo dupin da’an qingkuang” (China public security agencies report on recent major drug arrests), <http://www.cnr.cn/home/column/zgjd/jdxid/200506100310.html> (accessed June 15, 2005).
33. *WYHZMZZ*, 328.
34. *YHSD*, 184.
35. On Islamic factions and mosque architecture, see Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 55–56.
36. Hu Xuefeng, “Jianlun qingzhensi,” 47–49.
37. Hui women in Weishan pray in the home (or in school buildings if they are students), not in the mosque. A prayer mat is unrolled and placed so that one will be facing west, toward Mecca.
38. On Du’s posthumous decapitation, see Atwill, *The Chinese Sultanate*, 181–83.
39. *WYHZMZZ*, 325; also *Weishan xianzhi*, 162. This day of remembrance resembles collective Hui rituals in Northwest China that commemorate the victims of other nineteenth century massacres and failed rebellions. Gillette describes one such commemorative feast day in the Hui quarter of Xi’an, in *Between Mecca and Beijing*, 160.
40. Personal observation; also *WYHZMZZ*; 143, *Shadian*, 95.
41. Speech by a representative of the Dali Islamic Association at the graduation ceremony of the Dali Muslim Culture College, Wuliqiao Village, Dali, 1997.
42. Interview with *ahong*, Menghai County, July 21, 2002.
43. On the name change, see Hillman, “Paradise under Construction.”
44. Ma Weiliang, *Yunnan Huizu lishi yu wenhua*, 133–51. See also Ma Weiliang and Wang Yunfang, “Diqing Zangzu zizhizhou Huizu diaocha,” in *YHSLD*, vol. 3, 43–50.
45. Nu Lunding, “Mingji lishi; zhongshi jiaoyu,” 49–50.
46. *Ibid.*, 49.
47. *WYHZMZZ*, 328–29.
48. *YHSLD*, vol. 3, 120–24.
49. *ZSMJS*, 105.
50. *Ibid.*
51. In some Hui communities with the worst enrollment rates, rural incomes far outpace those in Hui areas with better records. In the two largely Hui townships of Shouwang and Taoyuan in Zhaotong District, primary school enrollment rates in 1990 were 58 per-

cent and 76 percent, respectively, compared to 82 and 84 percent in the counties in which these towns are situated. Yet per capita net rural incomes in Shouwang typically exceed those in Taoyuan several times over, and exceed those in more Han parts of Zhaotong. I do not have figures for 1990, but in 1995 the per capita net income in Shouwang was nearly four times greater than that in Taoyuan (¥1,703 compared to ¥446). The 1995 per capita net rural income in Yunnan was ¥1,011. *YHxD*, 221, 247; *1996 Zhaotong nianjian*, 212, 220; 2000 *YTN*, 497.

52. Interview with retired principal of the Dali Muslim Culture College, August 2002.
53. Gui Limei, “Cong duo xueke jiaodu,” 167.
54. Kong Lingwen, “Huizu minjian jiaoyu de zouxiang,” 242.
55. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 72–85.
56. Kong Lingwen, “Huizu minjian jiaoyu de zouxiang,” 243.
57. Ma Bin, “Guanyu Xi’an huifang jiaoyu,” 202.
58. Ma Zaixian, “Emphasize Han Language Education,” Web site of the Najiaying Mosque, Feb. 28, 2004, <http://www.njy.cn/> (accessed July 16, 2005).
59. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 205.
60. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 55–56. On Wahhabism and modernization in China see also Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 204–11, and Gillette, *Between Mecca and Beijing*, 76–79.
61. *Shadian*, 91–92.
62. Israeli and Gardner-Rush, “Sectarian Islam and Sino-Muslim Identity,” 452–57.
63. Interview with young woman studying to become an *ahong*, Weishan, Yunnan, July 21, 1997.
64. Zhang Yongqing et al., eds., “Yisilanjiao kending jingying shangye,” 387.
65. Zhang Yongqing, Ma Ping, and Liu Tianming, *Yisilan yu jingji*, 387.
66. The full quote from this section is as follows: “The condition of man is such that no individual can acquire, by him- or herself, all that he needs or wants; human beings must rely on each other—mutual reliance. The exchange of commodities in markets—trade, buying, and selling—helps satisfy the needs of people. Because of this, for Islam, trade, commerce, and the expansion of markets is a noble enterprise.” *Ibid.*, 23–24.
67. “Islam and Science,” <http://www.kyaz.com/English/IslamAndScience.html> (accessed August 25, 2006).
68. Interview with retired science teacher, August 15, 1997. As the teacher explained, “I use science to make them see and understand the scientific rationality of the Koran.”
69. Karen Armstrong, author of *The Battle for God*, on National Public Radio, “Fresh Air,” March 29, 2000.
70. Ravetz, “Prospects for an Islamic Science.”
71. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 208–11.
72. Xinjiang Television report of May 14, 1996, as quoted in “Religious Repression in China,” Amnesty International Report ASA 17/69/96, July 1, 1996, 17.
73. *Xinjiang Daily*, May 22, 1996, reported in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, June 8, 1996.
74. *Xinjiang Television*, June 7, 1996, reported in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, June 3 and 11, 1996.

75. Interview with Hui students and religious studies teacher, Dali Prefecture, August 14, 1997.

76. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 312.

77. As Fredrik Barth has argued, the boundaries between groups, rather than any ethnic traits or content, are often the focus of efforts to promote and maintain group identity. Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, 14–15.

78. Conversation with religious studies teacher in Dali, August 10, 1997.

79. Interview with vice-principal of an Islamic school, Dali, August 15, 1997.

80. Similarly, people in Taiwan would often tell me that my hair was golden (*jinhuangse*) and that I was tall (*gao*). For the record I am five-foot-three and my hair is auburn. I am indebted to Sara Davis, who had the same experience in Xishuangbanna, for the English transliteration of the Dai term. See Davis, *Song and Silence*, 2.

81. Interview with Hui restaurateur, Kunming, November 28, 1996.

82. Interview with Han businessman, Kunming, May 11, 1997.

## 6 CONCLUSION

1. Mackerras, *China's Minority Cultures*, 134–35.

2. Notar, *Displacing Desire*, chapter three; Blum, *Portraits*, chapter four; Davis, *Song and Silence*.

3. Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, 46.

4. Gillette, *Between Mecca and Beijing*, 235–36.

5. See the discussion of Deutsch, Gellner, Hechter, Baumann, etc., in chapter one.

6. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 44.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Connor, “Nation-building or Nation-destroying?” Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 45–46, 199–205; Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*; and many others.

9. See the discussion in chapter one of Gupta and Ferguson, 1998; Ortner, 1999; Dirks, 1994; and Duara, 1988.

10. This type of discourse is often used in discussions about the United States. On the immigrant, mainly Latino threat to American culture and civilization, see Pat Buchanan, *The Death of the West*, and Samuel Huntington, *Who Are We?*

11. Sheila Tefft, “Ethnicity Stirs in a China set on Wealth,” *Christian Science Monitor*, June 27, 1995.

12. O'Brien and Li, “Suing the Local State,” 92–94. See also O'Brien and Li, *Rightful Resistance in Rural China*, and the collection of essays in Diamant, Lubman, and O'Brien, eds., *Engaging the Law*.

13. Woo, “Law and the Gendered Citizen,” 322.

14. Chan Siu-sin, “Civil groups given state funding for relief operations; move signals government shift to outsourcing, say NGOs,” *South China Morning Post*, March 20, 2006 (Lexis-Nexis, accessed January 15, 2007).

15. Zhang Liwei, “Fangtan: Zhongguo tese gongmin shehui de xingqi” (Discussion: The Rise of civil society with Chinese characteristics), 21 *shiji jingji baodao* (Twenty-first cen-



tury economic report), December 5, 2005, <http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/sjjj/chanjing/200512050748.asp> (accessed August 8, 2006).

16. Tsai, “Cadres, Temple and Lineage Institutions”; Zhang and Baum, “Report from the field”; Saich, “Negotiating the State”; Thurston, “China’s New NGOs.”

17. Woo, “Law and the Gendered Citizen,” 324–28.

18. Tsai, “Cadres, Temple and Lineage Institutions.” See also Weller, *Alternate Civilities*.

19. See the roundtable presentations from “Proceedings of Building a ‘Harmonious Society’ in China: Non-governmental and Faith-based Organizations as Agents of Social Change and Stability,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, in cooperation with the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. Washington D.C., September 26, 2005, [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/050926\\_agenda.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/050926_agenda.pdf) (accessed September 3, 2007).

20. Shue, “State Power and the Philanthropic Impulse.”

21. Thornton, “The New Cybersects”; Perry, “Challenging the Mandate of Heaven.”

22. Mayfair Yang, “Putting Global Capitalism in its Place.”

23. Madsen, “Religious Organizations and Local Self Rule.”

24. Atwill, *The Chinese Sultanate*.

25. Interview with Hui scholar, Kunming, January 25, 1997.

26. Chan Siu-sin, “Buddhism held up as healer of social divisions; teachings are close to Chinese outlook, says religious official,” *South China Morning Post*, April 11, 2006 (Lexis-Nexis, accessed February 22, 2007).

27. Duara, *Rescuing History*, 10.

