8   WHAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF *JIHAD?*

As if in a horror film where some greedy developer, heedless of warnings, breeches ancient burial sites thereby releasing underworld ghosts bent on vengeance, our postmodern polities, hell-bent on the global explosion of new technology, seem to have awakened threatening primordial spirits from the past. But unlike the usually lumbering cinematic ghouls, the real spirits are very clever and move very fast. Religious fundamentalism, nationalism, ethnocentrism, nativism—whatever their differences, a seemingly very old set of foes are back. To this point ethnic nationalism, especially in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, has extracted the most hideous human cost, although the worldwide rise of fundamentalism has not shirked before violence, most famously in its Islamic version. But fundamentalism is an equal-opportunity killer; Hindu extremists have matched their Muslim counterparts in blood, while Sikh, Jewish, and even Buddhist militants have assassinated heads of state (respectively, India's Indira Gandhi, Israel's Rabin, and Sri Lanka's Bandaranaike, the last killed by a monk). The Cold War confrontation of communism versus capitalism has been replaced by the battle Benjamin Barber called Jihad vs. McWorld. In response to the steady international gale of postmodern, capitalist, service-knowledge-and-entertainment-oriented economies, "infotainment telesectors," devoid of communal identity and metanarrative, blowing *Baywatch* and burgers through the Earth's globalized villages, retribalized polities erect primordial walls of identity while their nonstate brothers try to blow up the wind machine (Barber 1995). Certainly liberal modernity has had bigger problems; from 1933 (Hitler's chancellorship) to 1953 (the death of Stalin) it was fighting for its life, and for almost forty more years it lived under a nuclear guillotine. But the widespread collectivist movements in the names of ethnicity and religion raise the possibility that the battle with ideological communism was a momentary aberration in a longer-term struggle between civic-liberal rule and more primordial and transcendental sources of community. Can

the current revivalisms successfully challenge a liberal capitalist modernity that overcame fascism and communism? Are *jihadis* and ethnic cleansers merely the last gasp of a *revanche* or harbingers of an enduring geopolitical split? And what does their current resurgence say about our postmodern version of Western modernity?

As plausible, and inevitable, as our question is, we must be wary of lumping revivalist phenomena together into an undifferentiated wave of anti-Western antimodernism. The revivalists are younger than they look, often modernist youngsters sporting antique fashions. They are part of the modern world's confrontation with its own novel realities. And their ethnic and religious variants are distinct. To be sure, they sometimes fuse; as Mark Juergensmeyer has argued, there is such a thing as "religious nationalism" (Juergensmeyer 1993). Nevertheless, philosophically and politically they pull in different directions. Intellectually, most of the religions in question are intrinsically supranational, transcending all ethnicities and political units (the exceptions being militant Judaism and Hinduism). In political terms there is a continuum of religious-nationalist interweaving. In some conflicts religion is simply a defining characteristic of cultural communities at war over nonreligious issues (Northern Ireland until recently, and Beirut in the 1980s civil war). In others religion is the principled basis for criticism and reform of a state seen as corrupt and immoral (perhaps Turkey in recent years). Sometimes an irreligious state is the enemy, the imagined solution being establishment and protection of a majority religion that still tolerates minority religions (as in Iran—except for its treatment of Baha'is—and the stated goals of the Bharatiya Janata Party in India). For others secular nationalism is the hated doctrine; their goal is to remake their national state along theocentric lines. In the most extreme cases, they seek a religious suprastate (for example, the Islamist thinker Sayyid Qutb). Structurally, it makes sense to regard religious revivalism and nationalism, ethnic or not, as providing a basis of legitimacy, and a source of solidarity, for postcolonial peoples seeking to order their affairs under a centralized government left behind by colonial powers (Geertz 1961). Each is a way to organize power in the transition from local, clan-dominated communities to modern, centralized societies.

Last, we must be wary of narrating revivalist movements as reactionary. As the story goes, the global advance of liberal capitalism and its mostly American mass culture puts people through an introductory course of dislocation, poverty, and culture shock, a misery addressed by advanced

seminars in the *madrassas* (Islamic schools for high-school through college-age students) from which pupils matriculate to al-Qaeda for graduate study. This is indeed partly true. But, as Samuel Huntington and Giles Keppel separately point out, it is the educated, middle-class youth of developing countries, especially students of science and engineering, not the disenfranchised poor, who seem most drawn to religious revival (Huntington 1996; Keppel 1994). As Roxanne Euben has argued, the reactionary theory implies that Western modernization is the only proactive force in the world, as if no other civilization were motivated by internal developments (Euben 1999). Now, all the movements in question are indeed *partially* reactions—as are a number of countermodernizing movements inside Western countries and Japan—but what constitutes the motivation and character of each reaction is a question that can be answered only from *their* side, in terms of their internal dynamics.

Islam and Modernity

The conflict of Islam with the West is not new. The intensity of the current phase has arguably revolved around the issue of Palestine, hence can be dated to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the Suez Crisis of 1956, or the establishment of Israel in 1948. But this phase is part of more than a century of response both to Western imperialism and Western support for corrupt regimes in the Islamic world. It is during this period, since the late nineteenth century, that Islamic revivalism emerged, both in its "modernist" and fundamentalist forms. And of course one could go further back to the Crusades and a millennium of Christian-Islamic competition in the Iberian peninsula, the Balkans, and the holy land. But we ought not be slaves to history; Euro-American countries today enjoy relatively pacific relations with a variety of former colonies and bloody enemies. The current animosity between the West and Islam is not explained by historical interactions alone, but by a present which keeps that past alive. So we must understand the historical impulses internal to Islamic civilization that feed the moment. Certainly there can be no question here of summarizing a family of cultures that cover one-fifth of the Earth's population and have played a pivotal role in world history for fourteen centuries. But we must have some background in that tradition of which Islamic militancy claims to be a revival.

If we were to return to the early caliphate, after the death of Muhammad in 632 C.E. (all dates will be in the Christian calendar), and visit the center of the Abbasid empire at Baghdad at its height, then drop in on Cordoba in the early twelfth century, and finally travel to Ottoman Istanbul in the fifteenth century, it would be hard to escape the conclusion that Islam constitutes one of the three great, still living, largely sovereign old world civilizations over the last millennium, the others being India and China (the Byzantine and West European, however deserving of mention, having been conquered too early or arisen too late to qualify). In learning, trade, law, military prowess, theology, political justice, architecture, and other areas Islam represents a large part of what the human race has accomplished. Islamic civilization absorbed ancient civilizations along a front from Gibraltar to Western China, digesting, altering, and transmitting ancient Greek, Hebrew, Persian, and Hindu traditions to late medieval and modern societies. One can argue that Islam for the most part avoided some of the aspects of Christianity of which contemporary Christians are not so proud. Thus in Islam knowledge and reason have almost never been seen as enemies of religion. Islam did not regard nature or material life or the body as evil or dangerous. While militant Islamists may obsess over sex and fear pollution-by-woman, unlike Christianity traditional Islam counseled restraint, not avoidance; mainstream Islam has no monastic tradition, conceiving the spiritual as fully embodied in familial and social life (the Prophet himself having been both husband and father). Philosophically Islam is what it has always claimed to be: the most purified form of monotheism, with a strict but minimal set of basic beliefs, whose concerns were the individual's submission to God, followed by prayer and moral righteousness, as well as a commitment to charity and social equality. This is not to say that its confessors were always consistent practitioners. They certainly were not, which is to say, they were certainly human.

Some in the West complain that Islam never had a "Reformation," never replaced its medieval authoritarian tradition (in the Western analogy, Roman Catholicism), with an individualistic, rationalist version (like Protestantism) that promoted tolerance. This argument has little to recommend it. First, the motivating idea is suspect. Remember that the birth of Protestantism led to a century and a half of continuous religious warfare in Europe. Western religious toleration emerged less from the rise of Protestantism than from the *defeat* of its militant form, English Puritanism. So early

Protestantism in itself was not particularly tolerant. Second, far from being "Catholic" we must say that Islam is remarkably reformed. Sunni Islam is a scriptural, scribal, rational religion, devoid of miracles, magic, sacrament, saints, and clergy. Its religious elites are prayer-leading *imams* and Qur'anic scholars, not vehicles of divine grace. It is a religion of the cities, of the educated, however much it historically fed off the purifying simplicity of warlike nomads and the country-dwellers they rule, as Ibn Khaldun argued long ago (Ibn Khaldun 1967). Indeed, Islam's virtual *raison d'être* was the destruction of local polytheism and magic in Arabia, in contrast to Southern Europe and the Americas where Catholicism made continual, if unofficial, hybrids with "pagan" rites. In this sense, regarding mainstream Islam, we might say that Islam was Protestant long before Luther. Turning to the extreme, both Islam and Protestantism have tended periodically to produce evangelical and other "purifying" revivals. In this sense as well, radical Islam has been compared to radical Protestantism; M. J. Gohari refers to the eighteenth-century protofundamentalist sect, the Wahhabis, as "Muslim Calvinists" (Gohari 1999: 40).

A more plausible charge is that the militant Islam evident since the 1970s is caused by a yet unmodernized Islam's confrontation with Western modernity. And as noted, such a reaction is evident almost everywhere to some degree. But the Islamic world is not just *now* confronting modernity. Industrial, political, and cultural modernization have been occurring at many points along the Islamic world since the nineteenth century. Indeed, some Muslim writers have referred to the current revival as *postmodern:* Fazlur Rahman characterizes recent developments as "postmodernist fundamentalism," and Akbar Ahmed sees hope in the "postmodern" condition of the Islamic world (Rahman 1982: 136; Ahmed 1992). Such claims are less intriguing than they sound, hanging as they do on defining modernism as Western imperialism, so that "postmodern" here simply means postcolonial. Nevertheless, the point is that Islam is remarkably modern. As Hodgson puts it, the Islamic project is "one of the most thoroughgoing attempts in history to build a world-wide human community as if from scratch on the basis of an explicitly worked out idea," its early form having borrowed little from either local Arab culture or from Greco-Latin or Persian civilizations (Hodgson 1974, 1:98). In the West, the notion of building a society "as if from scratch" is characteristic of the political revolutions of the eighteenth through twentieth centuries and their "natural rights" and "state

of nature." Just as the modern West rooted republicanism in a "rational" or "natural" theology, Islam sees its final revelation as providing the natural, rational, cosmopolitan, postethnic, and antinationalist religion of all mankind.

Four major roads have been trod by intellectuals in the Islamic world during the past hundred years. It was in the late nineteenth century that Islamic "modernism," the attempt to reconcile Islam with modern Western thought, emerged among intellectuals as a way to revitalize the Islamic world in response to imperialism and perceived decay. Modernism encouraged a tolerant, cosmopolitan approach. Later fundamentalism, hostile not only to the West but to homegrown secular nationalism, insisted on its version of original and literal scriptural meaning, and throughout the twentieth century became increasingly intolerant and violent. Traditionalism is an attempt, in response to modernism and fundamentalism, to reassert the complex Islamic tradition and its scriptural hermeneutics (e.g., Seyyed Hossein Nasr 1987). Last is the nonreligious option of nationalism. Our focus will be fundamentalism, although its relation to modernism and nationalism will be relevant as well

We should remember that "fundamentalism" is an American term that emerged in early twentieth-century Protestantism Evangelism. For Evangelicals the individual's salvation was assured, not by baptism or maturation as part of an established church, but by an adult act of renewal, of being "born again." The label "fundamental*ist*" came to be used for a subset of the Evangelicals opposed to modern "degradations" of Christianity, the term deriving from a series of religious essays edited and published by A. C. Dixon in 1910–15 under the title "The Fundamentals." Fundamentalists accepted the utter "inerrancy" of scripture and a premillennialist eschatology as tests of faith. Inerrancy forced fundamentalist thinkers, like A. A. Hodge and B. B. Warfield, to reject the doctrine of the merely "spiritual" truth of scripture as distinct from "rational" or "empirical" truth (Ammerman 1991). Truth is one, therefore scripture is not only spiritually but also empirically true. Their refusal to compromise with social vicissitudes led them to separate their communities not only from secular America but from the mainstream Protestant churches. However much fundamentalists oppose and threaten those outside the faith, their primary conflict is with the "official," mainstream churches and their traditional compromises with the state.

Westerners must keep in mind that Islamic fundamentalism is not related to mainstream Islam as Christian fundamentalism is to mainstream Chris-

tianity. The analogy fails. First, unlike the Bible the Qur'an is understood to be literally the word of God, dictated by Allah and merely transcribed by the Prophet Muhammad. Even moderate Muslims accept the truth or inerrancy of all statements in the Qur'an. Their meaning is, of course, subject to interpretation, but scriptural hermeneutics in Islam cannot, as in Jewish and Christian exegesis, exploit the alleged imperfections, motivations, and historical contingencies of a human writer. Second, we cannot distinguish militant from mainstream Islam by referring to the former as "political Islam." For mainstream Islam is *already* political. Some use the term "Islamism" for Islamic fundamentalism. This is plausible if "ism" is supposed to indicate a political ideology comparable to nationalism, capitalism, or communism. But then its opposite, Islam without the "ism," is not an *a*political religion divorced from law and social management. "Islamism" is better used for any attempt to base a political program on Islam. The best terms for violent Muslim radicalism are *militant* and *fundamentalist* Islam, the former emphasizing the political radicalism and violence, the latter the uncompromising dogma that shuns traditionalist Islam.

Dār al-Islām and *Dār Al-Harb*

Some Muslims and their supporters have argued that Islam is not an inherently intolerant or expansionist religion, that its track record on women's rights and social justice is far better than most non-Muslims believe, that terrorism is the perversion of Islam by the few. If the jingoist haters of Islam are utterly wrong (and they are), if the paranoids who call the FBI whenever a middle-aged man kneels to pray in a Detroit Walmart are wrong (and they are), so are those who claim there is *nothing* unique to Islam that makes it a likely opponent of liberal modernity. For Islam in principle repudiates the distinction that has been the modern West's most crucial bulwark of tolerance and civility with respect to religion, namely, the distinction between public political authority and "private" religious-cultural life.

Now, some may object to this sweeping generalization. First, as in all great civilizations, the realities of managing Islamic states and empires generated prudential compromises throughout its history. By no means have predominantly Muslim states conducted themselves consistently as Islamist states. Clearly Muslims living in predominantly non-Muslim countries accept a divorce between religion and ultimate public authority, in practice

and perhaps in belief. Second, Muslim states have often been tolerant of minority religious communities, following Qur'an 2.256: "There shall be no coercion in matters of faith."★ The tradition holds that forced conversion makes no sense, true religion being an internal matter. This is precisely John Locke's argument in his 1689 *Letter Concerning Toleration;* on this issue Islam preceded the godfather of Western liberalism by a thousand years. Third, as the revivalists emphasize, Islam makes no distinction among peoples. *Anyone* who asserts the oneness of God (the *tawhid*), submits to Him, and accepts the prophecy of Muhammed is a Muslim (indeed, as we will see, some Muslim thinkers dispense with the last requirement). Islam is explicit in subordinating questions of group membership and identity to the universal demands of God, hence its opposition to nationalism. As Said Halim Pasha, the Ottoman prime minister, declared: "As there is no English Mathematics, German Astronomy or French chemistry, so there is no Turkish, Arabian, Persian or Indian Islam" (Iqbāl 1998: 259). This extends even to religious differences. The Qur'an upbraids Jews and Christians for their sectarianism: "And they claim: 'None shall ever enter Paradise unless he be a Jew' — or, 'a Christian.' Such are their wishful beliefs! . . . Yea, indeed: everyone who surrenders his whole being unto God, and is a doer of Good withal, shall have his reward with his Sustainer" (Qur'an 2.111–12). Thus, "Say: 'We believe in God . . . and that which has been bestowed upon Abraham and Isma'il and Isaac and Jacob and their descendants, and that which has been vouchsafed to Moses and Jesus. . . . we make no distinction between any of them" (Qur'an 2.136). Last, contrary to common judgment, Islam does not endorse theocracy. Theocracy, government by clerics, is a very rare condition. Even today's Iran is not literally a theocracy, since the clerics do not constitute the administration but a juridical trump to state actions that — in their view — violate Islamic law within an otherwise republican constitution (Juergensmeyer 1993: 176–77). Islam does reject *sectarian* power or any worldly church. Davutoglu argues that this is a direct consequence of Islam's utter separation of the divine from the worldly: only *shari'a* is divine, not governmental authority (Davutoglu 1994). In traditional Islamic states the caliph has, according to the late Malcolm Kerr, "no special religious inspiration or powers of interpretation," his only religious

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★All quotations of the Qur'an are from Muhammad Asad's 1980 translation, *The Message of the "Qur'an."* Note that throughout this chapter transliterated Arabic terms and names now familiar in English (Qur'an, *jihad, Shiite,* Ayatollah Khomeini, Hamas) appear without full diacritical marks.

responsibility being the "protection of the generally recognized tenets of the faith," not their legal administration (Kerr 1966: 150–51). The caliphate's responsibility to protect Islam no more makes it an ecclesiastical office than the responsibility to protect the Church of England so makes the British Crown (Kerr 1966: 27).

Nevertheless, the sticking point remains that Islamic civilization has never undergone a Western-style secularization of political authority or law. From the very beginning, with the Prophet's migration to Medina, Islam has understood itself as a political community *(umma)* of believers, as a space or territory of righteous belief. The early Islamic state saw expansion as its religious duty. As we shall see, even the nineteenth-century modernists who sought reconciliation with modern Western thought rejected secularization. The Christian distinction from Matthew 22:21, give to Caesar's what is Caesar's and to God what is God's, cannot apply to Islam. Islam has never allowed itself to be *privatized,* as did Christianity in the West. Certainly political realities led Islam to evolve compromise measures to live with other states. But the early fervor, to which some revivalists wish to return, aimed to reform the entire world. To this day, in Islam *all* legitimacy is *religious* legitimacy.

Regarding that concept most fearsome to non-Muslims, believers are quick to point out that *jihad* does not primarily refer to warfare. The term means "exertion" or "struggle," in the sense of the believer's struggle to follow the path of God. Classically, there are four kinds of *jihad,* that of the heart, hand, tongue, and sword. *Jihad* means, above all, the moral struggle of righting one's own heart, expressed in works and speech, and only lastly the willingness to risk one's life in combat. In the *hadith* (sayings of the Prophet) Muhammad tells followers returning from battle that they must now turn from the "lesser" to the "greater" *jihad,* from fighting to the struggle against one's base impulses (Johnson 2001: 35). Even in international relations the *jihad* of the sword has been understood by some Muslim writers as statecraft and just governance, not as war against non-Muslims.

Nevertheless, as Khadduri makes clear, the "classical" doctrine in Islamic history dictated a normal state of war with non-Muslim states. As John Kelsay notes, in the history of warfare involving Muslim countries it is *secular* war that is dubious and needful of special justification. The only patently legitimate reason for war is defense of Islamic rule (Kelsay 1993: 48). Islamic fighters accepted as well that to die in battle for Islam guaranteed entrance to Paradise. The Islamic law of international relations "was designed

for temporary purposes, on the assumption that the Islamic state was capable of absorbing the whole of mankind" (Khadduri 2002: 5). The aim was not forced conversion, however. Early Muslims aimed to extend the *dār al-islām,* the territory of peace, justice, and moral order under submission to God. The outer world is the *dār al-hārb,* the territory of "war." *Harbis* live in a Hobbesian state of nature. Extending Islam was thus a war to establish peace. For the polytheists unwilling to abandon their ways, the Qur'an counsels, "Slay those who ascribe divinity to aught beside God wherever you may come upon them" (9.5). *Dhimmis,* Jews and Christians, fellow "People of the Book," were exempt from such treatment as long as they accepted Islamic authority. All communities were "invited" to acknowledge Islamic rule and law by paying tribute *(jizyah),* which would permit their local religious practices, so long as those were not offensive to God (in other words, idolatrous or immoral). This made the gap between defensive and offensive war easy to cross, for the offensive war that followed a refusal to accept Islamic rule could be understood as a willful rejection of God's law, a rejection taken to imply that acts abominable to God would continue in the others' territory. Thus, as Khadduri notes, "the classical doctrine of the jihad made no distinction between defensive and offensive war." Certainly such wars did have to be authorized by the caliph. Hence in Shia Islam since the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam—the absence of an heir upon Hasan al-'Askarī's death in 873 C.E.—there was no recognized leader capable of such authorization, so only defensive, not offensive *jihad,* is accepted.

After the initial period of expansion, the dominant view softened. The Hanafī juristic school held that although the non-Muslim world is a world of unrighteousness and conflict, war against it is justified only if it threatens Islamic territory. Others, like the Shāfi'ī school, maintained the stricter view of *jihad* as the duty of every believer to war on all unbelievers simply because of their unbelief. But subsequently the Shāfi'ī argued for a middling possibility, the *dār al-sulh* or sphere of "peaceful arrangements" or coexistence with non-Muslim states, territories which the Hanafi regarded as simply part of the *dār al-islām* (Khadduri 1966: 12–13). But contracts and treaties were recognized to be temporary, not to exceed ten years. This softening made sense in a Muslim world that was already huge, and for which, as its power declined and it was threatened by fragmentation from within and Christian crusaders and Asian nomads from without, maintenance became a more sensible aim than expansion (in this sense resem-

bling the doctrine of "socialism in one country" that the Soviets were forced to accept after the revolution failed to spread). The great medieval jurist Ibn Taymīya interpreted *jihad* of the sword as a binding duty only in defense, denying that war on unbelievers merely because of their unbelief was legitimate (Khadduri 1966: 59). Thus did the Muslim world accommodate itself to the exigencies of power, forming what we can call traditional Islam.

From Modernism to Fundamentalism

The intellectual roots and historical precedents of today's Islamic revival arguably go far back in time. Said Amir Arjomand suggests that the fundamentalist form of "violent purity" harkens back to the Khārijīs (seceders), who left Ali ibn Abi Talib's camp during the First Civil War (656–61 C.E.) over the issue of succession to the murdered third caliph. The Khārijīs killed Ali in 661, initiating the split between what would become Sunni and Shia Islam. More directly, modern fundamentalism can be traced to two groups, the Wahhabis and the Deoband movement.

Muhammed Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92) opposed the encroachment of un-Islamic folk practices, like shrines for saints, ultimately aiming to excise all "innovations" allowed by Islamic teachers and jurists, and return to guidance by the Qur'an and the *hadith*. He emphasized the importance of *ijtihad,* independent rational judgment, as a counterweight to established authority. Having converted the head of the ruling Saud clan, his views have remained strong in Saudi Arabia ever since. Similarly, the Deoband movement emerged from central India in the wake of the ill-fated Muslim-led revolt against the British in 1857. Founded by Mohammed Zasim Nanautawi (1833–77) and Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829–1905), it set up madrassas in India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Maulana Abdul Haw, a movement leader, the most prominent at Deoband, formed the hugely popular Haqqania madrassa in Pakistan in 1947. Indefatigable regulators of personal conduct, in the twentieth century alone the Deobandis "issued almost a quarter of a million *fatwa* on the minutiae of every life" (Griffith 2001: 60).

Simultaneous with the founding of the Deobandis, the Islamic revival against imperialism began in earnest with the late nineteenth-century modernists. Most famous among them was Sayyid Jamāl al-Din (1833–97), called

"al-Afghāni." Probably of Iranian origin, and certainly influenced by the Persian intellectual climate—in which, unlike the Sunni countries, Sufism and medieval Arabic *falsafa* (Greek-inspired philosophy) continued to play a role—he was a charismatic, complex figure of intrigue who practiced *taqiyya* or "precautionary dissimulation," sometimes speaking as a Westernizing promoter of science and reason, sometimes as a revivalist of Islam. This ambiguity is particularly evident in the juxtaposition of his famously religious "Refutation of the Materialists" and his secular "Response to Renan" (Keddie 1968). What we can say is that al-Afghāni began the process of making Islam the core idea of a modern political and anti-imperial movement, an alternative to secularism, nationalism, and communism. His most prominent disciple, Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), crafted a more straightforward message in service of the same aim. 'Abduh's *Theology of Unity* is founded on the *tawhīd,* the unity of God, from which he derives a remarkable set of conclusions, most prominently that Islam is utterly compatible with modern science and technology. 'Abduh insists that reason is the heart of Islam. He argued not only that the Qur'an permits minority religious freedom, but that Islam is *never* spread by the sword. Islamic expansion is achieved only by example ('Abduh 1966: 147).

While the modernists have had great intellectual impact, with the exception of their descendent Muhammad Iqbāl, who played an important role in Pakistan, their legacy was politically ineffectual. The twentieth century would see two other movements vying to lead Islamic revival: fundamentalism and nationalism. Nationalism emerged in Egypt after the First World War, led by the Wafd party of Sa'd Zaghloul, which had unsuccessfully sought to overturn British rule. But each time nationalism failed to produce results, progressively more militant forms of Islam asserted themselves. As Giles Keppel points out, re-Islamization proceeded along two tracks, "from below" and "from above." The former refers to local groups that would "honeycomb" civil society, working in hospitals, schools, and various charitable organizations. Perhaps the most prominent was the Jama'at al Tabligh (Society for the Propagation of Islam), founded in India in 1927 by Muhammad Ilyas. Promoting a "scrupulous mimicry" of the Prophet's life in every detail, the Tabligh became a widespread international movement recruiting mostly from pools of disappointed rural immigrants to the cities. In contrast, re-Islamization "from above" refers to intellectual-political movements designed to reform or take over dominant social institutions. These

typically drew from the modernizing, educated sectors of society, especially technocrats and scientists in training. The most famous of these was Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hasan al-Bannā (1906–49) in 1929.

Al-Bannā followed many of modernism's themes. Islam is the source of reason and the pinnacle of civilization, but its recent decadence makes it easy prey for Western colonialism. The way back is through scripture, not the "blind traditionalism" of the *ulama* or community of scholars (al-Bannā 1978: 88). But unlike the modernists al-Bannā starkly defends military *jihad*. It is not merely struggle, but *fighting,* not merely defensive, but *offensive* too. All Muslims must "prepare their equipment" and get ready until the "time is ripe." He writes, "The men of learning . . . agree unanimously that *jihad* is a communal obligation imposed upon the Islamic *umma* in order to broadcast the summons . . . and that it is an individual obligation to repulse the attack of unbelievers upon it" (al-Bannā 1978: 150). The "stigma" of Islam as a militaristic religion is false, he argues, because the aim of *jihad* is the universal peace that will reign when Islam is unchallenged. Those who consider violence the "lesser *jihad*" are defying original Islam. "Some of them try," he continues, "to divert people from the importance of fighting," but "nothing . . . confers on the advocate the supreme martyrdom and the reward of the strivers in *Jihad,* unless he slays or is slain in the way of God" (al-Bannā 1978: 155). Despite this view al-Bannā's political method of choice remained *da'wa,* the calling to social activism, hence his establishment of mosques, schools, hospitals, and sporting clubs. Within the movement his discipline was authoritarian, but aimed at building Islamist community from the ground up.

Two midcentury thinkers then provided the ideological basis for completing the turn of revivalism from modernism to militancy. First was Maulana Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903–79), who in 1941 founded Jamaat-i-Islami, which was to become Pakistan's most prominent fundamentalist group. Like the modernists Mawdudi remained a defender of reason and science. He explicitly criticized those whose opposition to the culture of the West led them to reject scientific or material progress. They are merely "safeguarding the antiques" (Mawdudi 1980: 35). Likewise, he declared that "to cover the books of the writers of the early ages with new coatings of commentaries and footnotes" serves no purpose. Science is common to all mankind, so the Muslim may without heterodoxy learn from Western science. Indeed, Islam is the ultimate source of scientific rationality,

not to mention justice, equality, freedom, and hence true civilization; its current status is due to imperialism from without and decay from within. Unlike all other religions, Islam is nonsectarian and devoid of national or geographical ties; the very meaning of *islām* is simple submission to God. Thus for Mawdudi even those who submitted to God before the revelation to Muhammad were Muslims! Sivan reports the "Maudoodi dictum, often quoted by Arab fundamentalists," that "instead of claiming that Islam is truly reasonable, one should hold that the true reason is Islamic" (Sivan 1985: 67). A follower of the true cosmopolitan religion, the Muslim "does not regard anything in the world as a stranger to himself. He looks upon everything in the universe as belonging to the same Lord Whom he himself belongs to. He is not partisan in his thinking and behaviour. His sympathy, love and service do not remain confined to any particular sphere or group. His vision is enlarged, his intellectual horizon widens" (Mawdudi 1974: 98). Indeed, sounding remarkably like John Stuart Mill, Mawdudi argues that as long as one's interpretation of the Qur'an is not self-serving, disagreement over its meaning "is a stimulus to improvement and the very soul of a healthy society. Differences of this kind are found in every society whose members are endowed with intelligence and reason. Their existence is a sign of life" (Mawdudi 1990: 46).

At the same time, Mawdudi makes Islam a totalistic, universally valid, and utopian way of life. Islam is a complete system; the task of the Muslim is "to try to make the whole of Islam supreme over the whole of life" (Marty and Appleby 1995, 1:487). While he continues the older tradition of understanding *jihad* as primarily defensive, he promotes it to the status of the Five Pillars: "*Jihad* is as much a primary duty of the Muslims as are prayer and fasting" (Mawdudi 1974: 141). Every Muslim is obligated to engage in violent struggle against "those who perpetrate oppression as enemies of Islam." As Mawdudi repeats again and again, the *tawhīd* implies that no person should bow to anyone but God. Sovereignty belongs to God alone. Recognition of that fact, and the rejection of any other authority, guarantees human equality and freedom. Clan elders, tribal leaders, nationalist presidents, priests, popes—all are usurpers of God's authority and violators of human justice. The "root of all evil" is "acceptance of supremacy and overlordship other then [sic] that of Allah" (Mawdudi 1980: 93). Geopolitically, communism is evil, liberal capitalism is cruel and licentious, nationalism is contrary to God's will. The communist and Western powers threaten to blow up the world. Only Islam can save it. Likewise the eco-

nomic problems of humanity can only be solved by "Islamic economics."
The rejection of usury and conspicuous accumulation of wealth, along
with the *zakat* or obligatory donation to the poor, will produce collective
prosperity without the evils of Western inequality or communist oppres-
sion. Echoing the utopianism of Marx, the morally ideal society will simul-
taneously achieve the highest prosperity, the greatest quantity of leisure,
and complete economic justice and equality. Under Islam,

> every branch of economic activity will expand and flourish. Islam
> roots out all these evils through the institution of *Zakat* and the
> agency of the public exchequer is always available to you as a
> helper. You need not take thought for the morrow. Whenever you
> are in need you can go to the public exchequer and obtain your
> rightful due. There is no necessity of keeping deposits in banks
> and of having insurance policies. You can leave this world without
> any anxiety for the future of your children, the exchequer of the
> community will be responsible for them afterwards. (Mawdudi
> 1992: 40)

The ideal world will result. Thus, "The objective of Islamic Jihad is to put
an end to the dominance of the un-Islamic systems of government and
replace them with Islamic rule. Islam intends to bring about this revolu-
tion not in one country or in a few countries but in the entire world"
(Mawdudi 1980: 142).

   While Muslim fundamentalist groups multiplied in Arab countries dur-
ing midcentury, they were briefly outshone by secular nationalism, which
reached its high point in the 1950s and 1960s during the reign of Egyptian
president Gamal Abdel Nasser. Following the Nasserite model, fundamen-
talism was commonly suppressed in the Islamic world by newly postcolo-
nial states. Thus the jails became the new *madrassas* for a growing extrem-
ism. The fundamentalism of the 1970s was then an explicit reaction against
the perceived corruption, and the very real repression, of Nasser's regime.
But the humiliation of Arab governments by Israel in the 1967 Six Day
War, and their less devastating defeat in 1973, tarred nationalism beyond
redemption. Then came OPEC and the rise in oil prices which flooded
the oil-rich states with cash, in particular, Saudi Arabia, the home both of
Islam's most sacred sites and Wahhabism.

   One of those imprisoned Egyptian Islamists, Sayyid Qutb, laid the intel-
lectual foundations for the most militant form of fundamentalism. Arrested

three years after a personal conversion that led him to join the Muslim Brotherhood, he sat in prison for a decade, was released in 1964, then arrested again and hanged in 1966. Qutb followed much of Mawdudi's line. Islam is the natural human religion, recognizing no differences of ritual, ethnicity, race, or tribe. All people who have faithfully submitted to God are Muslims. Islam can absorb modern science, since "the experimental method" was invented by Islam and copied by the West (Qutb 1990: 94). Civilized society is one in which the laws of God are the law of the land, hence Allah alone is sovereign, human authorities being mere "viceregents." The only truly human community is a "community of belief." In an almost Rousseauian turn, human governance is slavery of one man to another, but in submitting to God one submits to no man, hence remains free.

Chastened by his prison experience, Qutb took the radical step of explicitly branding all existing Islamic societies as part of *jahiliyya*. Literally unbelief or ignorance, the term originally referred to those unaware of the Prophet's message, who lived before Islam or outside its spread, thus carrying as well the sense of "barbarism." Qutb regarded contemporary *jahiliyya* as "rebellion" against God, insisting that Muslims must identify, judge, and overcome unbelievers. *Jahiliyya* is for Qutb the entire world; current Islamic states are no better than Western ones. Only the Qur'an and the *hadith* are legitimate sources of social and political guidance; traditional jurists, priests, and men of theory are not to be trusted. But Qutb approved of *ijtihad,* thinking for oneself, since he believed it discredited traditional Islamic authorities and supported militancy. His attention turned from the community-building of al-Bannā to revolution; society must be remade now by direct attack on the state. This was an implicit critique of the Muslim Brotherhood; as the Sudanese Islamist Hassan al-Turabi later put it, "Look at the Brotherhood; they don't change society at all, they never detribalize society, they promote a traditional, sectarian Islam against a progressive Islam" (Shadid 2001: 62). Giles Keppel remarks, "Qutb's wish to break with the world was very singular. It was contrary to the position adopted by... even most of the Muslim Brothers—during the 1960s. They held that there could be no breaking with a society which was, however imperfectly, Islamic. . . . Qutb, on the other hand, thought that Nasser's 'barbarism' had reached a point of no return" (Keppel 1994: 20).

When Nasser's successor Anwar Sadat lifted the ban on fundamentalism, the children of Qutb emerged from jail with radicalized views. Some called

for an internal withdrawal of believers into separatist Islamic communities, given the utter unacceptability of existing majority-Muslim societies. But Muhammed 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, a member of the militant group al-Jihād, rejected that approach. Like Qutb he insisted that "the Rulers of this age . . . were raised at the tables of imperialism, be it Crusaderism, or Communism, or Zionism. They carry nothing from Islam but their names" (Jansen 1986: 169). Faraj took the logically final step toward holy war in his *Al-Farīdah al-Ghā'ibah* (The Neglected Duty). For centuries corrupt rulers and traditional scholars have purposely suppressed the Islamic duty of offensive *jihad* espoused by the Prophet and the early caliphate: "Neglecting jihad is the cause of the lowness, humiliation, division and fragmentation in which Muslims live today" (Jansen 1986: 205). True Islam is a violent transformation of the real by the ideal, the takeover of all Islamic states by force of arms, an Islam "spread by the sword" (Jansen 1986: 193). Faraj makes *jihad* the essence of Islamic commitment. This militancy achieved its greatest success when on October 6, 1981, one of Faraj's associates assassinated President Sadat, stating afterward, "I have killed Pharaoh."

Islamic militancy thus reached the historical plateau from which September 11, 2001, can be understood. But in the almost exactly twenty years that intervened, we must also recognize the unique role of Afghanistan. After the Soviet invasion of 1979 the Afghan war became, as Anthony Shadid insightfully puts it, the Spanish Civil War for Islamists, generating an "Islamic International" of mostly Arab fighters available to travel to virtually any Islamic conflict (Shadid 2001: 79ff.). These itinerant warriors have been, however, largely devoid of a detailed ideology or political program, their purely military, pan-Islamic militancy largely unconnected to the regional and local Islamist movements they join. As Olivier Roy described the new breed of Islamic terrorists, referring to the man who would later mastermind the September 11 attacks,

> Their distinctive feature is their internationalism and lack of territorial base. . . . They are thus disconnected not only from existing states . . . but also from the large Islamist movements, which have disowned their offspring. [Those] movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the FIS [Algeria], Refah in Turkey and Hamas in Palestine, place their struggles in a national framework and claim full recognition as protagonists in the political process. This approach,

which is shared by Iran, might appropriately be described as Islamic nationalism. It is a far cry from the imaginary *umma* which Bin Ladin and his associates invoke . . . without a genuine political project. (Roy 1998: 8)

According to Shadid even Hassan al-Turabi regarded bin Laden as "nothing but a foot soldier," a heroic *mujahīd* but without a political program.

We will turn to an overall evaluation of Islamic fundamentalism presently. First, let us draw some tentative conclusions from our brief survey.

Islamic fundamentalism is not, or not primarily, antimodernist, primitive, primordial, or irrational. We may say that fundamentalism is antimodernist, if we understand "modernism" in the Western sense as the attempt of mainstream denominations to relax standards and to interpret scripture more loosely and metaphorically in order to make religion workable in the modern world. In the Islamic world that relaxed interpretive style is characteristic of *traditionalism* (although the modernism of Afghani and 'Abduh produced its own version). The crucial point is that from the first emergence of fundamentalism by name in Protestant America, to its Islamist version, fundamentalists have been highly rationalist, concerned to apply a careful, if stilted, analysis of scripture as consistently as possible across all social areas of life, refusing to accept *ad hoc* pragmatic trade-offs that cannot be justified on scriptural grounds. Neither is it right to say that fundamentalists are "traditionalists." While they regard themselves as returning to original teachings, they reject all more recent traditions of interpretation, the accumulated practices of the era intervening between the time of revelation and the present. Their opposition to the elite authorities of the mainstream makes them, in their eyes, *anti-authoritarian,* alone training a harsh, critical light on mainstream scriptural hermeneutics. Fundamentalism is not what sociologist Edward Shils called "primordial," even if it trades on primordial feelings. It is not determined by history, it is not ethnic or nationalist. Fundamentalists of all kinds worship The Book, not ancestors. Most important, as we shall see, the fundamentalisms that we are familiar with are almost by definition political. They accept the modern *politicization of culture.* As Geertz argued regarding the ethnic nationalism of the postcolonial states that emerged after World War II, fundamentalism is motivated by the presence of a modern, centralized state, a "valuable new prize over which to fight and a frightening new force with which to contend"

(Geertz 1961: 22). Like nationalists, fundamentalists want to capture the state and its mass culture, not dismantle them.

Here the relationship between the fundamentalist and modernist wings of the Islamic revival is instructive. While the modernists are often considered synthesizers who sought to bridge Western and Islamic thought, hence a pole away from the militants, this is a bit misleading. Mawdudi is no less ardent in his defense of science and reason than is 'Abduh. The modernists were not suggesting a secular, non-Islamic society (although al-Afghani suggested almost everything at one time or another), and they specifically rejected the Western division of religion and politics. It was not for nothing that 'Abduh's followers called themselves Salafiyyah, devotees of the *salaf* or "pious ancestors." Certainly the fundamentalists invoke a militant understanding of *jihad,* justifying a violence that the modernists rejected. But the key difference, I think, hence the *sine qua non* of fundamentalism, goes beyond this specific doctrine. What makes militant Islam militant is not merely the doctrine of *jihad,* nor heightened intolerance, nor violence, nor traditionalism, nor fear of modernity, nor an angry response to imperialism. Its novelty is more profound than that.

Anticulture, Taliban-style

Taliban means student, and was used in southern Afghanistan in the late twentieth century to refer to religious students at a *madrassa* who, after several years of instruction, could be qualified as village *mullah* or scriptural authority. During the war against the Soviet occupation Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi's Islamist group, Harakat-I Inquilab-I Islami, drew many of its soldiers from such *taliban*. In 1994 two teenage girls near the Khandahari village of Sang Hesar were kidnapped and raped by a group of *mujahedin*. Mohammad Omar, who had been a Harakat commander but retired to study in the *madrassa,* recruited thirty students and rescued the girls. As Omar later said, "We were fighting against Muslims who had gone wrong" (Griffin 2001: 35). This was the beginning of the transformation of *taliban,* students, into *the* Taliban, revolutionary party. By late in the year Omar had fifteen hundred men.

Upon taking power the Taliban had the reputation of restraint and decency, refusing the temptations of theft and rape. This reputation was not

long in losing its luster. The Taliban's religious orientation is a Deobandi radicalization of the Wahhabi line. M. J. Gohari reports that on a trip to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s he had seen what he assumed were Saudi guards preventing some elderly Iranians from kissing the Prophet's tomb, a folk-polytheist departure from *tawhīd*. He was surprised by the guards' vehemence in making an issue of this minor sign of fealty, but was more surprised to discover that they were not Saudis but Afghans. One said he was delighted to be studying "true Islam," which must have meant Wahhabism. It is this perspective that the Taliban, after ten years of brutal warfare, were now able to impose on a diverse but largely Persianate Afghanistan. Once in power they "made it clear they proposed to rewrite Afghan history" (Sinha 1997: 45). Their ideological radicalism, reminiscent of the style if not the genocidal results of the Khmer Rouge, is by now well known: virtually no music, no nonreligious books or bookstores, no visual representation, no uncontrolled television or radio, and of course no non-Islamic statuary, as seen in their gratuitous destruction of the giant Buddhas of Bamiyan, an ancient religious site posing no threat to the dominance of Islam in the region. The restriction of women reached a crescendo, barring their public education as well as travel in public alone, even though covered from toe to scalp. Sex was clearly a special concern. But Taliban doctrine evidently still permitted some forms of humor: regarding adultery, Mullah Moham-mad Hassan of Khandahar quipped, "We have a dilemma on this. One group of scholars believes you should take these people to the highest building in the city and hurl them to their deaths. [The other] recommends you dig a pit near a wall somewhere, put these people in it, then topple the wall so that they are buried alive" (Griffin 2001: 61).

We may note two brief portraits by John Sifton, a humanitarian aid worker in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan during 2000–2001. In Jozjan province, at a Soviet-era hotel used by the Taliban to house foreigners, he came across a landscape painting that included several animals. The heads of the animals had been carefully cut out by Taliban police. "This left a decapitated deer standing by a pond and a headless beaver sitting on a tree stump. . . . A terrible painting . . . done entirely with two shades of green and one shade of brown and then vandalized by the Taliban police trying to ensure its innocence before God without destroying it altogether. In its own way, I thought, it is a post-postmodern masterpiece." Later, in summing up his experience, he writes, "We are off the grid. . . . There are no

telephones outside the cities. There is no television reception. We have no access to 'entertainment.' There are no theaters, films, galleries or circuses. The Taliban has even banned music. . . . Sometimes it feels as if we have been brought back not just to a time before modern entertainment but to a time before art . . . a time without images and ideas and representations, only actual events" (Sifton 2001). Here the Taliban form the best, if most extreme, example of a virtually *anticultural* religious practice. Most of Afghan culture was literally eliminated or suppressed—artifacts, music, narratives, styles of dress. It is not that they eliminated decadent Western culture or secular Afghan culture. They eliminated culture *per se.* This may seem an odd formulation, since religion is itself a part of culture. But we already know that one part of culture—for example, political ideology—can tyrannize the rest. So can Church, Temple, or Mosque. In the Taliban and the post-Qutb forms of Islamic militancy generally, we see the complete condemnation of existing society, the requirement for a wholesale reconstruction of culture in strict accordance with a single dogma by a revolutionary vanguard who alone can tell its literal meaning. The enemy here is historical culture itself.

As this implies, and as Roxanne Euben notes of Islamic fundamentalism in general, the Taliban exhibited a Marxist-Leninist analogy (Euben 1999). For the militants the crumbling of extant world systems—capitalism, communism, nationalism—is inevitable. The ideal social order is possible, if the right ideology is accepted, and all can accept it, because it is the final fulfillment of human civilization, transcending any of the older human divisions of nation, caste, or class. Once accomplished, all of life, economic, social, political, intellectual, and cultural, will be different. Only truly Islamic rule, either by making all humanity Muslims or forcing other monotheists to accept Muslim authority, will allow humanity to be truly human. And the key to this transformation is held by an educated elite who understand the inner truths. Mawdudi even called for a "permanent *jihad,*" echoing Trotsky's notion of permanent revolution. But not only is leftist utopianism thereby invoked. The Taliban scoured the semiotic landscape of all other religious and cultural inheritances, an obsession not unlike the Nazi determination to root out that last shopkeeper hiding in an attic, to render the homeland *judenrein.* Of course Islamic fundamentalism has a very long way to go to complete that analogy. In terms of totalitarian slaughter the West remains unchallenged, its ideological children, fascist-nationalism and

Russian communism, being hard to beat (even if Chinese and Cambodian communists made a strong showing). Militant Islam will undoubtedly never catch up. But it will not be for lack of the right spirit.

How Many Modernities?

What marks the special nature of Islamic fundamentalism, as other commentators have noted, is its *modernism*. It entails a closeted form of the Western modernism that it so publicly claims to oppose. If Islam was always political in the sense that it sought to establish a righteous monotheistic community, for Islamists the *whole* point and method of Islam becomes political. Personal confession and virtue matter less than the inauguration of a new order. As Arjomand points out,

> The Principle of Qutb's neo-Kharijite sectarianism is this: the profession of faith according to the canonical formula and the belief in the Five Pillars are not the defining mark of a Muslim believer. The believer must in addition reject all man-made laws and governments, which are the foundations of the new paganism. The true believers, the elect, must organize themselves into vanguard groups apart from the new society of ignorance and repeat the original pattern of the establishment of Islam through withdrawal/migration, jihad, and conquest of power. (Marty and Appleby 1995, 5:184)

As Olivier Roy explains of twentieth-century Islamists, "Far from having emerged from the clergy or traditional circles, they are to be found within the modern institutions of society (colleges, faculties of science, and in general in the urban environment)" (Roy 1986: 6). Islamist leaders discovered themselves as modern people in barely modernized societies suffering from economic underdevelopment, geopolitical inferiority, and political infantilization under autocratic leaders. Exposed to the West, often educated in it, they sought the source of their home society's inadequacy with Western tools. Knowing the modern West better than their own religious tradition, Hamid Dabashi argues, "They recognize a heightened state of ideological self-awareness on the part of 'the West' that they identify as the

source and cause of its achievements." They bend Islam to fill the role of an ideological alternative to secularism, capitalism, nationalism, and communism, "to create from Islam a political model capable of competing with the great ideologies of the Western world" (Roy 1986: 6). Repulsed by "backward and superstitious" Islam, the traditional Islam of their birth communities, the militant seeks "'the True Islam,' which he imagines as socially active and politically progressive," that is, as fulfilling the function of ideology in the postreligious West (Dabashi 1993: 326–27). The acceptance of the modern state left behind by retreating Western imperialists as the ultimate prize, the free decision to break with given social norms to join an elite vanguard, the rationalist planning that hopes, through novel methods and technologies, to win the prize, and the utopian reconstruction according to intellectual principles it hopes to carry out—these are the fruit of modern secularism, not the religious tradition.

In this, militant Islam is neither orthodox nor traditional. Its heterodoxy lies not only in the use of violence by terrorists, which when it kills women and children, violates the *hadith*. The ideologically hidden violation of tradition is deeper and more essential. For society can only be remade by militants if they organize as a modern, Western-style political party and seize control of a modern, Western-style, centralized state: "Instead of wishing, like the *'ulama,* to manage civil society, their ambition is to reconstruct society, starting with the state" (Roy 1986: 6). In doing so they must eliminate the power of traditional Islamic authorities. As Ann Mayer explains, "Islamic law was applied for over a millennium without there having been recourse to legislative measures by governments to bring it into force," rather merely by local juristic interpretation and application (Mayer 1990: 182). To be legislated, Islamic law had to be, for the first time, codified. The Ayatollah Khomeini himself ordered in 1988 that the Iranian government be free to "prevent any matter, be it spiritual or material, that poses a threat to its interests," hence that "for Islam, the requirements of government supersede every tenet, including even those of prayer, fasting and pilgrimage to Mecca"! (Pipes 2002: 82). Last and most blatant, the very idea of constructing a worldly utopia, as called for by Mawdudi and Qutb, is heterodox, for like Christianity, Islam posits paradise in the next world, not this one.

The militants' merger of government and legal administration is reminiscent of that nadir of modern Western legal practice, totalitarianism. And

this is precisely the conclusion of S. N. Eisenstadt: militant Islam is the religious version of twentieth-century totalitarianism, thus a kind of *religious Jacobinism* (Eisenstadt 1999). The Jacobins, utopian radicals of the French Revolution, were certainly not antimodernist, nor premodern. Their movement was a *kind of* modernism, a perennial option within modernity, a collectivist, rationalist, utopian reorganization of society by a centralized state claiming to represent a democratic egalitarian social order, in which civil society, individualism, and pluralism are repressed. Such reorganization was attempted in the past century by a mythic-primordialist nationalism in Italy, Germany, and Japan, and by a mythic-progressive communism in Russia, China, and elsewhere. The Islamic militants have devised their own version.

How then can we understand the differences between contemporary Islamic civilization, with its revivalism, and Western modernity? First, the Islamic world never nationalized in any thorough way. In the West nationalism provided the supralocal, culturally unified context for modernization, breaking traditional hierarchy, localism, and clan politics. But in the Islamic world, while nationalism has been the slogan for various secular anti-imperialists, most famously Nasser, it never remade social loyalty among the masses. With rare exceptions, in terms of political identification, Islamic peoples have gone from local, tribal, ethnic identity directly to pan-Islamic identity with little in between. In the Islamic world it is religion, not nation, that has provided the modernist trump to community and locale. Second, this suggests that majority Islamic societies find themselves to be based in Islam in a way that Western societies are not based in Christianity. The relation of Western civilization to Christianity now appears to have been more mediated, enabling the West to *culturalize* Christianity, to sublimate its otherworldly, doctrinal, and liturgical aims into cultural ideas. In contrast, a call to Islam in Islamic societies is a call to identity and ideality, to the true self and the righteous social order. However much they may reject the intolerance and violence tied to it, even mainstream Muslims seem ill at ease with the prospect of rejecting such revivalism. Third, in the West–Islam conflict we may witness the unique historical confrontation of the two most aggressive forms of moral universalism the world has yet seen. Islam's belief in its own natural, rational, universal, transethnic validity, coupled with its expansionist past, mirrors the modern West's secular universalism, embodied in imperialism and its current geopolitical primacy. No other civilization of the past two millennia has coupled its belief that it repre-

sented the best of humanity—a common enough view—with the claim that all others *can and ought* accept its uniquely culture-transcending ways.★

Fourth and most basically, Islam and even Islamism are not less rational than Western modernism or postmodernism, they are *more* rational. Islam's refusal to draw a hard line between religion and political authority is more, not less, intellectually and normatively consistent than the Western duality. If the ultimate truth is what is given by religion in the form of discursively available norms that citizens endorse, why should the *polis* operate on any other basis? The modern West's largely instrumentalist rationality cannot answer that question. It refuses to rationalize all the way down, to make all contexts of life consistent. Ernest Gellner's unappealing term for the necessary mental substructure of modern Western civil society is *hypocritization.* That society does not require that we be agnostics or atheists, as the Marxist version of modern secularism did. Liberal secularism allows, even encourages, people to have religious worldviews, but requires that they abandon them at key points in public life with only a pragmatic explanation of why that should be (namely, to avoid social conflict). Strikingly, in her unique definition of liberalism, *Ordinary Vices,* the late political theorist Judith Sklar makes Gellner's point: in order to restrict power and respect rights—hence to make *cruelty* the worst vice—liberalism had to invoke a rigid private-public distinction that in effect permitted and even encouraged *hypocrisy.* Liberal toleration is not that of a philosophical system that justifies toleration as one of its theorems; it is the toleration of one who is willing to doff his or her philosophical system because of contextual judgments, later to don it again. What I have called the differentiation of spheres and modes of judgment, and the powerful advantages it gives us, are more dear than the attempt at a synthetic, integrative metanarrative.

Islamic consistency need not, however, be incompatible with other features of liberal republican politics. Democracy is not difficult to imagine in Islam. It exists in fact in today's Turkey, more or less in Pakistan, and in another sense in Iran. Muhammad Khalaf-Allah in fact argues that Islam *requires* democracy (Kurzman 1998). Here one can invoke the concept of *shura,* or consultation; the Muslim community is described as one "whose rule [in all matters of common concern] is consultation among themselves" (Qur'an 42:38). Further, as noted, Islamic rule does have a tradition of tol-

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★As was suggested to me by Mark Ryan.

eration of minority religious communities. Michael Walzer has shown that the American style of largely culturally neutral government permitting maximum individual liberty is only one "regime of toleration" among several (Walzer 1997). In particular, the "millet" system, most recently embodied in the Ottoman Empire, traditionally allowed local religious or national autonomy under an imperial government. Davutoglu argues that the millet system is characteristically Islamic (Davutoglu 1994). The bigger problem is domestic liberalism, the restriction of governmental and majoritarian power to respect individual liberties. Nevertheless, even here a number of Islamic writers have argued for a "liberal Islam" that employs Islamic sources to justify toleration. As Kurzman recounts, this has come in three distinct but overlapping forms: the argument that the Qur'an and *shari'a* themselves demand toleration of other groups, most famously proposed by Ali Bulaç; the claim of 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq and Muhammad Sa'id al-'Ashmawi that the *shari'a* is a religious code not meant to be codified into a positive legal system; and a hermeneutic toleration of varieties of interpretation of Islam based in the notion of *ijtihad,* that believers are to use their own reasoning to understand the word of God, as suggested by Muhammad Asad, Yusef al-Qaradawi, and Mohammed Arkoun (Kurzman 1998). Whatever option is exercised, we must imagine that the continued modernization of majority Islamic societies will presumably bar any return to a "customary" Islamic world informally tolerant of local deviations. For that is just what modernization cannot abide. If toleration is to be reliably practiced in Islamic countries, it must become an explicit policy. Nor can we imagine a literal return to the millet system of the Ottomans. Absent a sheer resort to empire, we are not going to see every land from Algiers to Jakarta ruled by a single sovereign entity. But multiple Islamist sovereignties embodying a variety of traditionalist, capacious interpretations of the *shari'a* might well be plausible.

In all this we must be careful not to impose our black-and-white Western, and especially American, choice between a putatively modern "wall" of separation of church and state and a "theocratic" merger. For we must acknowledge that there are many ways of *managing the relation of the sacred and the profane.* One mode is secularization *simpliciter,* a sheer demise of religious fervor, commitment, and institutional significance. Another is the segregation of religious feeling to nonpublic, nonpolitical life, except in its vaguest, most ecumenical form. A third would be the presence or evolution of a form of religion that can endorse, or even redirect spiritual enthu-

siasm into, modernity. A fourth, resembling but distinct from the second and third, is the presence or evolution of a religious tradition valid across all spheres of life but for which modern activities are either spiritually irrelevant or, what amounts to the same thing, pose no special problem of religious vetting.

Arguably the level of religious intensity, focused on properly religious aims and objects, was indeed lessened in the West by modernity. But the remarkable fact about the West is the unique combination of the second and third strategies. While the West achieved a privatization of religion, at the same time, as Weber argued, it evolved a form of Christianity that endorsed and even fueled key parts of the modernist project, namely, Protestantism. Its radical, militant form (Puritanism), after its political defeat, helped to inspire a modern economy, especially the—in Weber's term—"this-worldly asceticism" of profit accumulation, while its private-public distinction made possible modern liberal democratic politics. The fourth strategy seems to have been the case in East Asia, both in Japan and in the Confucian societies of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea, allowing them to evolve a more communitarian but still pragmatic capitalism in league with gradually increasing democratization, without any showdown with religious tradition at all. In the case of Islamic societies it would also seem the fourth is the most promising, perhaps helped by a dollop of the third, that is, some combination of a scientific-economic-bureaucratic modernization that has no anti-Islamic implications, with a yet-to-evolve strain of Islamic interpretation that finds scriptural justification for endorsing constitutional democratic politics. At any rate, the achievement of political stability and tolerant democracy in the Islamic world will likely hang on the internal development of moderate Islamism, that is, a revivalist Islam which accepts the non-neutrality of government toward Islam (versus the Western model), but nevertheless finds within itself the resources for tolerating minority communities, allowing a scope for individual intellectual and political expression (if still lesser than the Western model), and which generates loyalty to, and legitimacy of, normalized, legalistic states, without either secular nationalism or autocrats whose pretense of Islamism serves only to bolster their power by deflecting criticism.

In conclusion, while some think liberalization and democratization would eventually lead Islamic societies to a more Western-looking modernization path, just as some—perhaps the same "some"—assume that China's attempt to modernize economically but not politically must fail, leading, again, to a

more Westerly route, most of the evidence points in the opposite direction. More Islamic democracy probably means more Islamism. And there is little reason to believe this is merely a short-term phenomenon. It may well be that today's Islamic revivalism represents yet another form of modernism, one that largely abandons the Western liberal independence of state from religion. It may be that a sizable chunk of the great swath of humanity living from Morocco to Indonesia may modernize *not* through secularizing or developing a strong public/private distinction or abandoning official meta-narratives, but by being economically and technologically sophisticated Wahhabis. In twenty years the present spate of militant Islamic violence might end if tolerable solutions are reached in Kashmir and the West Bank, with stable moderate Islamist regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq (as well as Turkey), allowing the U.S. military presence on Arab land and Afghanistan to be reduced to a minimum. Many ifs to be sure, but a viable status quo that isolates the militants is not inconceivable. My point is that even such a pacific future would not mean Islamic imitation of the West, or the discontinuation of its own inner struggles with modernity, or a future devoid of ever more clashes around the borders of modernization. What we see in the Islamic world, not the terrorism of the extremists but widespread official and public endorsement of Islam with a strong pan-Islamic identification, *may well be what a modernized Islamic civilization looks like.* Pan-Islamic revival may be a late analogue of Western nationalism, the centralization and politicization of high culture as the idiom of social life. But unlike earlier Western nationalism, the high culture in question is far more cosmopolitan and may be capable of long-term economic, technological, and even democratic progress. If so, we may have to admit a new, if not long-term then at least middling-term option for modernization, just as scholars have recognized a non-individualistic, more communitarian or corporate modernization in the vibrant East Asian economies. If we in the West, familiar with our own individualist, capitalist, agonistic or *competitive* modernity, have watched the failure of *communist* modernity, and recognized the apparent success of *communitarian* modernity, we may now have to admit as well the viability of a *congregational* modernity.