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WHAT IS PORK-BARREL POLITICS?

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The Emergence of Pork-Barrel Politics in Parliamentary Myanmar
This chapter is in the book The Emergence of Pork-Barrel Politics in Parliamentary Myanmar
3WHAT IS PORK-BARREL POLITICS?“Pork-barrel” legislation allows a legislative body and its members to appropriate government funds and channel them to geographically defined constituencies, instead of the entirety of the country’s citizenry. The term “pork barrel” developed in the United States after Congress passed in 1824 the Rivers and Harbors Act to fund the expansion of the country’s waterways and ports (Ferejohn 1974). In the 1800s America, salt pork and bacon stored in huge barrels were considered a feast meal for poor families and slave communities. “Delivering pork” or “bringing home the bacon” soon became metaphors for the goods and benefits one could receive “from above”, whether from a plantation owner or a benefactor — a politician for instance.Pork-barrel spending has long epitomized — in a pejorative sense — America’s federal largesse and the distribution of government-funded services or goods to local districts by elected representatives, usually in exchange for political support (Stein and Bickers 1995). Members of Congress have routinely used their influence on Capitol Hill to amend bills or promote new legislation expanding pork-barrel spending in favour of their constituents, often in hope of a re-election (Fenno 1978; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Stein and Bickers 1994). Pork-barrel programmes and other comparable distributive schemes normally involve localized public works and small development projects, such as harbour modernization, the construction of roads and bridges, water sanitation improvement, the renovation of hospitals and schools or the maintenance of a military base. This type of legislation, and the legislative and party politics they have generated wherever adopted, have long been criticized for three pernicious effects.First, there is a widespread assumption that pork-barrelling practices are intimately linked to electoral cycles. Distributing “pork” and channelling government funds to one’s constituents are widely assumed to produce dividends at the ballot box, and representatives who can shrewdly claim credit for the tangible benefits they bring to their local districts can expect to be returned to office in the next electoral round (Cain et al. 1987; Stein and Bickers 1995, p. 118). Pork-barrel programmes do not cost much for either the representative who secures them or the 17-J02046 01 Trends_2017-04.indd 322/5/17 2:05 PM
© 2019 ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute/Singapore

3WHAT IS PORK-BARREL POLITICS?“Pork-barrel” legislation allows a legislative body and its members to appropriate government funds and channel them to geographically defined constituencies, instead of the entirety of the country’s citizenry. The term “pork barrel” developed in the United States after Congress passed in 1824 the Rivers and Harbors Act to fund the expansion of the country’s waterways and ports (Ferejohn 1974). In the 1800s America, salt pork and bacon stored in huge barrels were considered a feast meal for poor families and slave communities. “Delivering pork” or “bringing home the bacon” soon became metaphors for the goods and benefits one could receive “from above”, whether from a plantation owner or a benefactor — a politician for instance.Pork-barrel spending has long epitomized — in a pejorative sense — America’s federal largesse and the distribution of government-funded services or goods to local districts by elected representatives, usually in exchange for political support (Stein and Bickers 1995). Members of Congress have routinely used their influence on Capitol Hill to amend bills or promote new legislation expanding pork-barrel spending in favour of their constituents, often in hope of a re-election (Fenno 1978; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Stein and Bickers 1994). Pork-barrel programmes and other comparable distributive schemes normally involve localized public works and small development projects, such as harbour modernization, the construction of roads and bridges, water sanitation improvement, the renovation of hospitals and schools or the maintenance of a military base. This type of legislation, and the legislative and party politics they have generated wherever adopted, have long been criticized for three pernicious effects.First, there is a widespread assumption that pork-barrelling practices are intimately linked to electoral cycles. Distributing “pork” and channelling government funds to one’s constituents are widely assumed to produce dividends at the ballot box, and representatives who can shrewdly claim credit for the tangible benefits they bring to their local districts can expect to be returned to office in the next electoral round (Cain et al. 1987; Stein and Bickers 1995, p. 118). Pork-barrel programmes do not cost much for either the representative who secures them or the 17-J02046 01 Trends_2017-04.indd 322/5/17 2:05 PM
© 2019 ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute/Singapore

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. FOREWORD V
  3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VII
  4. INTRODUCTION 1
  5. WHAT IS PORK-BARREL POLITICS? 3
  6. INTRODUCING CDFs IN POST-JUNTA MYANMAR 5
  7. THE DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS TO CONSTITUENTS: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SINCE 2014 9
  8. CDFs AND CORRUPTION 12
  9. CDFs AND THE CLIENTELIZATION OF POLITICS 14
  10. CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 18
  11. REFERENCES 20
Readers are also interested in:
https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814786287-004

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. FOREWORD V
  3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VII
  4. INTRODUCTION 1
  5. WHAT IS PORK-BARREL POLITICS? 3
  6. INTRODUCING CDFs IN POST-JUNTA MYANMAR 5
  7. THE DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS TO CONSTITUENTS: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SINCE 2014 9
  8. CDFs AND CORRUPTION 12
  9. CDFs AND THE CLIENTELIZATION OF POLITICS 14
  10. CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 18
  11. REFERENCES 20
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